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Durham E-Theses Destructive realism: Metaphysics as the foundation of natural science Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick How to cite: Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick (2004) Destructive realism: Metaphysics as the foundation of natural science, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2824/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk DESTRUCTIVE REALISM: METAPHYSICS AS THE FOUNDATION OF NATURAL SCIENCE DARRELL PATRICK ROWBOTTOM THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PHD IN PHILOSOPHY, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 2004 ABSTRACT This thesis has two philosophical positions as its targets. The first is 'scientific realism' of the form defended by Boyd, (the early) Putnam, and most recently Psillos. The second is empiricism in the vein of Mill, Mach, Ayer, Carnap, and Van Fraassen. My objections to both have a rather Popperian flavour. For I argue that 'confirmation' is a misnomer, that so-called 'ampliative inferences' are heuristics at best, and that naturalism and subjectivism are regressive doctrines. At the heart of genuine realism, I argue, is a stance on the issues of perception and conception. In particular, I hold that to be a realist is to reject the notion that there are representations which have some sort of epistemic priority. And along related lines, I maintain that the closely aligned doctrine of physicalism cannot simply be presupposed. What this amounts to is that the search for some sort of 'solid foundation' for 'knowledge' is a futile enterprise. Such a foundation would be unimportant, even if there were to be one, and we ought to be free to critically examine any claim we like. So rather than sapere aude, I would have 'dare to err', and place an intersubjective emphasis on inquiry. And this goes for metaphysics, logic, and mathematics, as well as for natural science. Yet I also advocate the view that we ought to be optimistic about our ability to find the truth, ceteris paribus. And to this end, I argue that we should accept that our faculty of conception is sufficient to allow us to connect with the possibilities of being, whereas our faculty of sense is sufficient to allow us to connect with that which is actual; this, given considerable critical struggle on our parts, both individually and collectively. I urge that it is methodologically advisable to behave as if this is so, if we are not to achieve only the self-paralysis of the Pyrrhonist. In a nutshell, destructive realism says that natural science progresses by ruling out possibilities, in particular by ruling out possible worlds as candidates for the actual world, but that this is a two-stage process, involving both an a priori (metaphysical) and an a posteriori (observational) component. The aim of natural science is to eliminate false theories. Its aspiration is truth. We are all metaphysicians; and science derives historically from metaphysics. POPPER [W]hen the love of ideas and fancies becomes a substitute for the love of living people, the lover, the committed man, often subordinates the requirements of human beings to the claims of his idea - the "demand of the object". Thus, that most inhuman of transformations occurs: human beings become objects, to be bent, broken, molded, even "educated," for the love of an idea. BARTLEY PROLOGUE Ostensibly, this is a thesis about the epistemic status of natural science, and the judgement to be offered is based upon a particular understanding of its necessary, as opposed to contingent, features. I tackle 'scientific realism', 'constructive empiricism', and other trendy positions, in order to dismantle some of the prevalent contemporary perspectives, and then attempt to put something in their place. Curiously, however, the replacement is almost trite in its simplicity, in so far as I arrive primarily at the suggestion that a Socratic approach to inquiry is best. Indeed, it is actually saying anything more than this - trying to formulate all-embracing epistemic principles, general methods, and the like - that I argue against. As such I might come across as a 'spoiler', in the vein of Feyerabend, but I take this sort of spoiling activity to show exactly what I am arguing for. In other words, I take the means by which I conduct my investigation to be entirely consistent with my final conclusion, and while neither might be to the reader's taste, to do things differently would be dishonest. After all, this is an inquiry into inquiry. So I ask the reader not to expect a sequentially constructed position, where each single section is slotted neatly into its preordained place in a preconceived jigsaw puzzle. I am not interested in puzzles in the Kuhnian sense, but rather problems, and hence present a smorgasbord of dialectical discussions on issues which are generally taken to be important in what has unfortunately become known as 'philosophy of science'. If there is mystery, or if I do not understand something, I say so. Further, I mean it: I should not like the reader to take such declarations as substitutes for argument, but rather as frank admissions that I, and we, have limits. I will confess to suspicions that many of the positions I argue against are contrivances designed to preserve dogmas, precisely because of their dismissal (or avoidance) of deep mysteries, but do not make it my business to throw around such accusations. The reader can judge for herself. One would be unwise to think that the core issue is unimportant; an abstract matter only worthy of consideration by a 'philosopher's philosopher'. Given the high level of trust placed in even the most radical claims of natural scientists in the West', most pertinently within its schools, courts, and governments, such investigations become vital.^ The faith in the authority of the natural scientist, or at least natural science, which seems to be burgeoning - and which is, alarmingly, oft accompanied by a considerable lack of detailed knowledge, even on trivial matters such as whether astronomers think that the Sun revolves around the Earth, or vice versa - may have disastrous consequences.^ And when one finds philosophers making claims such as 'In science (and only in science) can we say that we have made genuine progress: that ' In recent interviews performed for a report to the British government, OST & Wellcome Trust [2000], it was found that only 21 percent of the public sample agreed with the statement: 'The achievements of science are overrated'. ^ The McLean vs. Arkansas case is an excellent illustration. See Ruse [1982a], Laudan [1982], and Ruse [1982b]. ^ Evidence of public misunderstanding of science is considerable. See, for example, National Science Foundation [2002]. 55% of respondents thought it was true that "Lasers work by focusing sound waves", which seems to suggest they didn't even realise that 'LASER' is an acronym. More worryingly, 35% of respondents thought it was true that 'radioactive milk [can] be made safe by boiling it', and 49% that antibiotics can kill viruses. we know more than we did before.' , one wonders if it is seriously being suggested that we should disregard the work of those such as Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Archimedes, and Apollonius of Perga. Can it really be right that they were discussing mere trivialities, with which we can readily dispense, since we are blessed to find ourselves in a 'special period' where the truth is almost manifest? That philosophy is dead, or lives on only in so far as it is fed by the scraps that natural science throws it? One might be forgiven for missing the subtext to my discussions, which is humanistic (yet not anti-religious), and ethical. But to attempt to spell this out in a sentence or two would be a mistake; perhaps Wittgenstein was right that some things can only be shown, and I have a particular mode of engagement - one that I strive for - in mind. With this said, let us begin. Popper [1970], p.57. As I shall argue later, though, this statement is out of character, given Popper's radically anti-authoritarian perspective. CONTENTS Prologue 4 I. REALISM ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE: DISPELLING THE MYTHS Introduction 10 1. Scientific Realism Apricated 11 2. Scientific Realism Dessicated 14 2.1 The Insufficiency of the Metaphysical Thesis 15 ST&AT\=MT&MR 17 MT&ST&AT&ET \^MR 19 2.2 Against Justificationism and Induction: Quid Juris 22 (AT |=~ET) From Knowledge as 'Justified True Belief to Fallibilism 23 From Fallibilism to the Rejection of Justificationism 28 'Probably' Useless - The Problem with Probabilistic Accounts of Justification 30 Classical 32 Logical 34 Subjective 43 The Banality of Bayesianism 48 2.3 Against Induction: Quid Facti 57 Elucidation of the Position under Attack 59 The Significance of Repetition in Learning 62 Summary 66 2.4 Anti-Inductivism Settled: A Modest Proposal 67 2.5 Against Naturalism 70 II. ON METAPHYSICS, REALISM, AND INQUIRY: PREPARING THE GROUND Introduction 78 1. The Rise of Aristotelian Thought 81 1.1 The Dominance of Aristotelian Thought 85 1.2 Two Historical Theses 89 On Greek Science 90 On Methodology: Zabarella vs.