'Stretching' Marxism in the Postcolonial World
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Rethinking U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt
Rethinking U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt Amy Hawthorne OCTOBER 2016 RETHINKING U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO EGYPT Amy Hawthorne OCTOBER 2016 © 2016 Project on Middle East Democracy. All rights reserved. The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, Washington, D.C. based 501(c)(3) organization. The views represented here do not necessarily reflect the views of POMED, its staff, or its Board members. Limited print copies are also available. Project on Middle East Democracy 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Suite 617 Washington DC 20036 www.pomed.org CONTENTS I. Introduction. 2 II. Background . .4 III. The Bilateral Economic Aid Program: Understanding the Basics. 16 IV. Why Has U.S. Economic Aid Not Had A Greater Positive Impact? . 18 V. The Way Forward . 29 VI. Conclusion . 34 PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY 1 RETHINKING U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO EGYPT I. INTRODUCTION Among the many challenges facing the next U.S. administration in the Middle East will be to forge an effective approach toward Egypt. The years following the 2011 popular uprising that overthrew longtime U.S. ally President Hosni Mubarak have witnessed significant friction with Egypt over issues ranging from democracy and human rights, to how each country defines terrorism (Egypt’s definition encompasses peaceful political activity as well as violent actions), to post-Qaddafi Libya, widening a rift between the two countries that began at least a decade ago. Unless the policies of the current Egyptian government shift, the United States can only seek to manage, not repair, this rift. The next U.S. -
Rethinking Islamist Politics February 11, 2014 Contents
POMEPS STUDIES 6 islam in a changing middle east Rethinking Islamist Politics February 11, 2014 Contents The Debacle of Orthodox Islamism . 7 Khalil al-Anani, Middle East Institute Understanding the Ideological Drivers Pushing Youth Toward Violence in Post-Coup Egypt . 9 Mokhtar Awad, Center for American Progress Why do Islamists Provide Social Services? . 13 Steven Brooke, University of Texas at Austin Rethinking Post-Islamism and the Study of Changes in Islamist Ideology . 16 By Michaelle Browers, Wake Forest University The Brotherhood Withdraws Into Itself . 19 Nathan J. Brown, George Washington University Were the Islamists Wrong-Footed by the Arab Spring? . 24 François Burgat, CNRS, Institut de recherches et d’études sur le monde arabe et musulman (translated by Patrick Hutchinson) Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring . 28 Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) The Islamist Appeal to Quranic Authority . 31 Bruce B. Lawrence, Duke University Is the Post-Islamism Thesis Still Valid? . 33 Peter Mandaville, George Mason University Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong? . 37 Marc Lynch, George Washington University Rethinking Political Islam? Think Again . 40 Tarek Masoud, Harvard University Islamist Movements and the Political After the Arab Uprisings . 44 Roel Meijer, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and Ghent University, Belgium Beyond Islamist Groups . 47 Jillian Schwedler, Hunter College, City University of New York The Shifting Legitimization of Democracy and Elections: . 50 Joas Wagemakers, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands Rethinking Islamist Politics . 52 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Emory University Progressive Problemshift or Paradigmatic Degeneration? . 56 Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Hobart and William Smith Colleges Online Article Index Please see http://pomeps.org/2014/01/rethinking-islamist-politics-conference/ for online versions of all of the articles in this briefing . -
Fault Lines: Sinai Peninsula 20 OCT 2017 the Sinai Peninsula Is a Complicated Operational Environment (OE)
Fault Lines: Sinai Peninsula 20 OCT 2017 The Sinai Peninsula is a complicated operational environment (OE). At present, there are a number of interconnected conditions creating instability and fostering a favorable environment for the growth of Islamic extremist groups. Egypt is battling this situation with large-scale security operations, yet militant activity is not diminishing. The Egyptian government, in coordination with the Israeli government, is placing renewed interest on countering insurgent actors in the region and establishing a lasting security. Despite its best effort, Egypt has been largely unsuccessful. A variety of factors have contributed to the continued rise of the insurgents. We submit there are four key fault lines contributing to instability. These fault lines are neither mutually exclusive nor are they isolated to the Sinai. In fact, they are inexorably intertwined, in ways between Egypt, Israel, and the Sinai Peninsula. Issues related to faults create stability complications, legitimacy concerns, and disidentification problems that can be easily exploited by interested actors. It is essential to understand the conditions creating the faults, the escalation that results from them operating at the same time, and the potential effects for continued insecurity and ultimately instability in the region. FAULT LINES Egypt-Israel Relations - Enduring geopolitical tension between Egypt and Israel, and complex coordination needs between are “exploitable dissimilar and traditionally untrusting cultures, has potential for explosive effects on regional stability. sources of Political Instability - Continued political instability, generated from leadership turmoil, mounting security concerns, and insufficient efforts for economic development may lead to an exponentially dire security situation and direct and violent instability in the challenges to the government. -
Republican Egypt Interpreted: Revolution and Beyond
14 Republican Egypt interpreted: revolution and beyond ALAIN ROUSSILLON Egypt is one of a restricted group of developing countries whose politics have assumed a special significance as test cases of opposing models of development. Egypt shares with India, China, Algeria, Yugoslavia and Cuba the analytical interest of partisan and aca- demic observers for the light its experience may shed upon the competing theories of development and for the possibility that its history may reveal a unique and unanticipated model Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm, p.. i. Introduction Towards the end of the 1970s, as the opening up (infitah) toward the west and the liberalization of the economy were sharply criticized as "betrayal" of the 1952 revolution's goals, as return of the exploitative bourgeoisie, and as abandonment of the Palestinian cause, certain observers, Egyptian and foreign, began to lay out a new "model" for the reading of contemporary Egyptian history. This model attempted to view Egypt's various "experi- ments," before and after the revolution, from a common perspective; it also made it possible to explain the "cycles" through which Egypt has ultimately failed to "modernize" and regain the place among nations that its millenia of history allows it to demand. Muhammad 'Ali and Nasir, breaking with a past of national humiliation, both incarnated Egypt's "will to power" by basing restoration of its regional and international role on a state economy heavily reliant on industry and the construction of a national armed force: the failure of both projects was brought about by conjunction of the "perverse" consequences of their own options and methods, and by the hostility from coalitions of external interests, alarmed by the regional role to which Egypt aspired. -
FACTS and FIGURES 2018 Geography Surface (In Sqkm) 1,001,450 O.W
EGYPT FACTS AND FIGURES 2018 Geography Surface (in sqkm) 1,001,450 o.w. Land area 995,450 o.w. Water area 6,000 Land boundaries' length (in km) 2,665 Coastline length (in km) 2,450 Maximum altitude: Mount Catherine (in m) 2,629 Demography Population (in millions) 97.0 Population annual growth rate (2008-2018) 2.6% Population under 15 years (% of total population) 34% Population density (per sqkm) 97 Urban population (% of total population) 43% Unemployment rate 10.9% Life expectancy at birth 72 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 19 Human Development Index (UNDP) 0.696 Education Adult literacy rate Male 77% Female 66% Number of students in pre-university education (000s) 22,453 Number of schools 55,214 Number of teachers 1,026,727 Health Number of nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people) 1.4 Number of physicians (per 1,000 people) 0.8 Health expenditures/GDP 4.6% Technology Diffusion Number of telephone mainlines (per 100 people) 6.8 Number of cellular subscribers (per 100 people) 105.5 Number of internet users (per 100 people) 45.0 Number of broadband subscribers (per 100 people) 5.4 Infrastructure (in Km) Roadway length (paved) 48,000 Railway length 5,085 Ports and terminals Ayn Sukhnah, Alexandria, Damietta, El Dekheila, Sidi Kurayr, Suez General Currency Egyptian Pound Official language Arabic Fiscal year July 1 - June 30 Number of governorates 26 Fiscal Year 2016 2017 2018 Macroeconomic Indicators GDP (US$ billion) 329.2 257.3 244.4 o.w. Agriculture, irrigation & fishing 11.9% 11.7% 11.5% o.w. -
CHP2.Pdf.Pdf (69.15Kb)
Chapter Two The Etatist system in Egypt, 1952-1991 Introduction To understand the historical development of the economic and political transformations caused by Egypt’s structural adjustment program at the beginning of the 1990s, it is necessary to analyze the development of the Egyptian economy from the 1950s to today. Hansen (1991: 10) divides Egypt’s economic and political transformations in the twentieth century into five periods. The first period, from 1929 to 1955, was characterized by a dependence upon private enterprise and free trade. This yielded a moderate-sized public sector. At this time, Egypt’s development strategy depended upon agricultural exports, which it supported through public investment. In terms of industry, Egypt primarily focused upon import substitution, which supported Egypt’s industry through tariffs and other trade restrictions. The second period, from 1955 to 1960, which was a period of transition, witnessed no essential changes. However, the third period, from 1960 to 1965, witnessed the rise of etatism, a peacetime economy, an increased public sector, and Egypt’s first five-year plan. Like the first period, Egypt’s economy still depended upon agriculture, export promotion and import substitution. In industry, however, import substitution began to be supplanted by a growing military-production agenda. The fourth period, from 1965 to 1973, merged etatism with a wartime economy, an enlarged public sector, and military-based economic growth. Finally, the fifth period, 17 from 1973 to1991 continued Egypt’s involvement with etatism and a large public sector, but moved back to a peacetime economy, and witnessed the development of the infitah, or partial economic liberalization. -
Chapter Eleven the SUPPRESSION of the Muslim Brotherhood Had
Chapter Eleven THE SUPPRESSION of the Muslim Brotherhood had freed Egypt from terrorism, but had not removed the causes of social unrest. Return to normal life brought conditions in which reform might have at least delayed, if not prevented, the fall of the old regime. But this last chance was thrown away. 'The year 1949 was a year of depression and weari- ness, in which the only signs of life were the secret activities. Egypt was at a Low ebb, but destiny was knocking at the door. Farouk was in a difficult situation, for he realized that he could not continue to rule without the support of a popular party. In spite of his strong dislike of Nahas Pasha, and the certainty that an election would mean a crushing majority for the Wafd, Farouk resolved to go to the country. In July, Hussein Sirry succeeded Abdul Hadi, and formed a coalition government with the Wafd, www.anwarsadat.orgto prepare for the general election. The government was unable to reach agreement about the division of the country into electoral districts, and in December Sirry was forced to resign in order to form a neutral cabinet composed of independents. It was a sign of the times that the Wafd election campaign stressed the social question, promising economic reforms, a reduction in the cost of living, a curtailment of state expenditure and waste, and other promises which were never kept. The election took place in January, 1955, and more than two-thirds of the seats went to the Wafd. Nahas Pasha formed a cabinet composed entirely of Wafdists, and the classic duel between the King and the Wafd began again. -
A Egypt-HIMS Volume I
Arab Republic of Egypt Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics Egypt-HIMS Egypt Household International Migration Survey 2013 Volume I Determinants and Consequences of International Migration Arab Republic of Egypt Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics Egypt-HIMS Egypt Household International Migration Survey 2013 Volume I Determinants and Consequences of International Migration Edited by Samir Farid Amal Nour El-Deen Rawia El-Batrawy This report summarizes the main findings of the 2013 Egypt Household International Migration Survey (Egypt-HIMS) carried out by the Central Agency of Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) as part of the Mediterranean Household International Migration Survey (MED-HIMS). An earlier version of this report was published in 2015. The present report includes five of the six chapters previously published in 2015 (Chapters 1 to 4 and 6), in addition to six new chapters. Additional information about the Egypt-HIMS may be obtained from CAPMAS, Salah Salem Road, Cairo 11221, Egypt; Telephone: +202-2402-3031; E-mail: [email protected]. Additional information about the MED-HIMS Programme is available at the Eurostat Website. Suggested citation: Farid, S., Nour El-Deen, A., & El-Batrawy, R., eds. (2016). Egypt Household International Migration Survey 2013: Volume I: Determinants and Consequences of International Migration. Cairo, Egypt: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. FOREWORD This report presents the main findings from the 2013 Egypt Household International Migration Survey (Egypt-HIMS) which was conducted by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt. The survey was carried out as part of the ‘Mediterranean Household International Migration Survey’ Programme (MED-HIMS), which is a joint initiative of the European Commission / Eurostat, ILO, IOM, LAS, UNFPA, UNHCR, and the World Bank, in collaboration with the National Statistical Offices of the Arab Countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region. -
1 Please Note Author Is the Copyright Holder Paper Is Not to Be
Please note Author is the copyright holder Paper is not to be quoted without express permission of the author Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of Islamist Social Movements in Egypt and Turkey Joel Beinin Department of History Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-2024 [email protected] prepared for the conference on French and US Approaches to Understanding Islam France-Stanford Center for Interdisciplinary Studies September 12-14, 2004 © Joel Beinin 1 I. Introduction: Statement of the Argument Since September 11, 2001 much ink has been spilled analyzing “Islamic fundamentalism” or ostensibly more authoritatively, but not necessarily more precisely, “Wahhabism” and their threat to US national security and Western civilization. The armed radicals of al-Qa`ida and similar groups, while they have received the lion’s share of public attention, are only one relatively small component of a broad movement of Islamic activism that has emerged since the mid-1970s. “Islamists” or “Islamic activists” or proponents of “political Islam” – I use these terms interchangeably – are Muslims who do not necessarily accept received understandings of the Islamic tradition as the ultimate determinants of contemporary Muslim identity and practice. Rather, they self-consciously seek to refashion that tradition in response to the challenges – however defined – faced by their community and to mobilize Muslim sentiment and identity in support of their vision of a proper Islamic society.1 Even if that vision is presented as a return to an ideal past, it addresses modern political, economic, and cultural problems. The term “fundamentalism” is inadequate to describe this phenomenon because it suggests a Protestant literalist reading of the Bible which has no analog in Islam and because it implies a backward-looking rather than a modern social movement. -
Curriculum Vitae Prof. Dr. Abdel Aziz Salah Salem
Curriculum Vitae Prof. Dr. Abdel Aziz Salah Salem Professor of Archaeology, Faculty of Archaeology, Cairo University Nationality: Egyptian Date & Place of Birth: 23 rd April 1966, Egypt. Marital status: Married with three Children Present Job: Professor of Archaeology and Islamic Arts, Faculty of Archaeology, Cairo University. Previous Job: Archaeology Expert, at The Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural, Organization ( ISESCO ) – Morocco. ( from: 10/11/2002 to 30/06/2015 ) Phone: 002 02 35675602 Mobile: 00201001159088 Fax: 0020235728108 E-mail : [email protected] Address: Faculty of Archaeology - Cairo University - Giza - Egypt – P.c.12613 1 ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS 18/11/1997 Ph.D., from The Dept., of Islamic Archaeology, Faculty of Archaeology, Cairo University, with the grade: Frist Grade honour, the subject: The Ayyubid Metal in Egypt and Syria, Archaeological and Artestical, (Joint supervision with Sorbonne University, Paris 4, France). 26/4/1993 Master Degree from The Dept., of Islamic Archaeology, Faculty of Archaeology, Cairo University, with the grade: Excellent, the subject: the Sports and their Tools in Islamic Under light of Islamic and Coptic Groups in Cairo, Archaeological and Artestical Bachelor of Archaeology, Islamic Dept., Faculty of Archaeology, May, 1988 Cairo University. With the mention: Very good with Honour. FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY From 25 / 2/ 2014: Professor of Archaeology, Faculty of Archaeology, Cairo University 2002 – 2015 Archaeology Expert, at The Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ( ISESCO ) Morocco, From: 1O /11/ 2002- 30 /06 /2015 2 1999 – 2002 Supervisor of Division for Islamic Heritage, Cultural and Natural Heritage Documentation Center, Egypt, ( CULTNAT ) 1989 – 1999 Lecturer, Faculty of Archaeology. Cairo University, Egypt 1993 – 1997 Assistant Lecturer, Faculty of Archaeology. -
Fo#371/102701
'J AH. SAVING TELEGRAM. ADVANCE COPY En Glair. By Confidential Bag, FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE. Mr. R.M.A. Hankey. No.190 Saving.' INDEXED 17.8.53. REPEATED Saving to:- Addis Ahata No. 21(S Alexandria . No. 21 rt Amman No. 38 s Athens No. 18 o Bagdad No. 44 ("•J Beirut No. 86 C! o Benghazi No. 46 AUQ Fayid No. 340 CJ Damascus No. 44 ^5 Jed da No. 47 o Jerusalem No. 25 Q Karachi No. 20 o' Khartoum No. 56 o Port Said No. 25 s Suez No. 20 s Tel Aviv No. 26 s Tripoli No. 36 s B.M.E.O. Beirut U/N s CONFIDENTIAL. Political Summary for the period 29th July - llth August, 1953. ADDRESSED to Foreign Office telegram No. 190 Saving of 17/8 REPEATED for information Saving to Addis Ah aha, Alexandria, ^mman, Athens, Bagdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Fayid, Damascus, Jed da, Jerusalem, Karachi, Khartoum, Port Said, Suez, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and B.M.E.O. Beirut. My telegram No. 182 Saving. GENERAL. Contacts "between the British and Egyptian Delegations for a new Canal Zone agreement have led to informal discussions covering most of the field. 2. A new series of shooting incidents and vehicle thefts in the Canal Zone followed on visits "by members of the C.R.C. to Ismailia and Pojrt Said, "but the situation has eased as the result of vigorous representations to the Egyptian Delegation in Cairo. 3* We have also had to make representations ahout Egyptian propaganda and interference in the Sudan. Major Salah Salem has again visitod Khartoum. -
Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 1 Ryan, C. R. (2001). POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN EGYPT. Journal of Third World Studies, 18(2), 25-46. Published by the Association of Third World Studies. (ISSN: 8755-3449) Version of record available from: http://gsw.edu/~atws/volumes/vol18.htm Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt by Curtis R. Ryan ABSTRACT The article explores the durability of Egypt's republican executive leadership and examines the strategies of survival employed by the three presidential regimes of the country from 1954 to 2000. The presidential regimes of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser, Anwar al- Sadat and Husni Mubarak were compared. Strategic patterns of each president were identified under the concepts of containment, repression and external diversion. The article further shed light on the strategies of political survival which are common in other developing countries. It gave a view on the effect of these survival strategies on plans for change and development. ARTICLE Given the chronic instability that characterizes much of the Middle East and the "Third World", it is puzzling that Egypt has seen few changes of government since the 1952 overthrow of the monarchy of King Farouk. Egypt has maintained and developed essentially the same state structure since 1952, with only two changes of chief executive- and these transfers of power came about not as a result of a coup or revolution, but only upon the death of the incumbent president.1