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Operation Battleaxe Axis Forces June 15, 1941 Sollum-Halfaya Pass Gruppe

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Operation Battleaxe Axis Forces June 15, 1941 Sollum-Halfaya Pass Gruppe Operation Battleaxe Axis Forces June 15, 1941 Sollum-Halfaya Pass Gruppe Stuetzpunkt (strongpoint) Halfaya I/104th Infantry Battalion (-) x 6 x 2 x 1 x 1 x 1 x 2 x 1 x 6 I/33rd I/2nd Flak Italian Regiment Artillery (-) Regiment x 2 x 2 x 1 x 1 (-) x 1 x 1 II/62nd Most of these forces were on Italian the high ground with the low Infantry ground very thinly defended Regiment but heavily mined. (-) x 3 x 1 x 1 x 1 x 2 Stuetzpunkt Qalala German Italian Italian Italian This strongpoint was located on the high ground about 3 miles east of Halfaya Pass and consisted of the German 6th Oasis Company plus some Italian artillery and a x 3 x 1 x 1 x 1 little bit of Italian infantry. Stuetzpunkt Capuzzo I/61st The Italians once again Italian defended Fort Capuzzo Infantry with a reinforced infantry Regiment company. (-) x 3 x 1 x 1 x 2 Stuetzpunkt Musaid II/62nd This strongpoint was halfway Italian between Fort Capuzzo and Infantry Sollum and was defended by Regiment a reinforced infantry com- (-) x 3 x 1 x 1 x 3 pany. By Greg Moore gregpanzerblitz.com July, 2009 Stuetzpunkt Ober Sollum II/62nd Strongpoint Upper Sollum Italian was defended by another Infantry reinforced Italian Infantry Regiment company. (-) x 3 x 1 x 1 x 2 Stuetzpunkt 206 15th Motorcycle Battalion (1 reinforced company) x 3 x 1 x 1 x 1 x 3 I/33rd This strongpoint was Artillery located about 5 miles Regiment south of Fort Capuzzo. (-) x 1 x 1 Stuetzpunkt 208 4/15th I/33rd Motorcycle Flak Battalion Regiment (-) x 2 x 1 x 1 x 1 x 1 This strongpoint was located about 5 From 33rd miles west of Fort Capuzzo and was Anti-Tank manned by German forces. Battalion x 1 x 1 Mobile Infantry Reserve 15th Motorcycle Battalion This mobile reserve force (-) was stationed somewhere x 6 x 1 x 1 x 1 x 1 x 10 behind the front ready to be deployed as needed. I/33rd I/33rd Artillery Flak Regiment Regiment (-) (-) x 1 x 1 x 1 x 1 The Panzer battalions were again held in reserve behind the front, ready to launch a counterstrike at any breakthroughs. Panzer Striking Force I Panzer 8th Battalion Panzer x 2 x 1 x 2 x 2 Regiment (from15th This group was held in Panzer II reserve north of Fort Division) Panzer Capuzzo. After the Battalion fort fell, it was ordered to retake the fort x 4 x 1 x 4 x 2 against dug-in Matil- das and 25 pdr guns. The attack was de- feated with many tank I/104th 33rd losses. Infantry Anti-tank Battalion Battalion (1 co.) (1 co.) x 3 x 6 x 1 x 2 x 3 I/33rd Flak Regiment (-) x 2 x 2 x 1 x 1 Panzer Regiment 5 (from 5th Light Division) I/5th When Operation Bat- Panzer tleaxe began, this regi- Battalion ment was back by To- bruk keeping an eye x 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 on things there. It was rushed to the front and helped defeat the Al- II/5th lied attack. Panzer Regiment x 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 .
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