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Reactionary Nationalism and Democratic Development in Myanmar and Japan Apichai W

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Reactionary Nationalism and Democratic Development in Myanmar and Japan Apichai W Policy Forum Reactionary Nationalism and Democratic Development in Myanmar and Japan Apichai W. Shipper1* Nationalism has reemerged as a major issue in Asia, where thousands of ethnic groups live inside national boundaries artificially constructed by Western colonizers. While other Asian societies are witnessing various forms of nationalism, Myanmar and Japan are experiencing reactionary nationalism, which is making negative headlines around the world. I define “reactionary nationalism” as a demonstration of love for the nation among a group of ordinary people in reaction to a perceived, falsely constructed, or real threat to its national security or existence from an ethnic minority or foreigner group. It arises from a dissatisfaction with modernization that is accompanied by increasing economic and social inequality. Reactionary nationalists seek to punish specific ethnic minorities or foreigner groups that act in ways perceived as destroying their collective political community or as undermining their common identity or national unity. They view the targeted ethnic group with prejudice for receiving special privileges or assistance from the government or the international aid community. While demonstrating their love for the country, they often incite hatred against a particular minority or foreigner group. Reactionary nationalists in both the heterogeneous society of Myanmar and the homogeneous society of Japan have formed hate groups comprised of Buddhist nationalists and internet ultra-rightists (netto uyoku), respectively. I argue that these particular nationalist groups hinder democratic development in their countries, because democracies require respect for individual political rights and for differences in culture (beliefs and identities) between individuals and groups. Reactionary nationalist groups espouse undemocratic ideals and ethnic violence against minority groups. Specifically, the growth of such groups and accompanying violence impede democratic transition in Myanmar and democratic deepening in Japan, while potentially putting these societies on a dangerous path toward democratic retrenchment – or even greater state control and intolerance. 1 *Apichai W. Shipper is an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Asian Studies Program at Georgetown University and the Asia Regional Chair at the Foreign Service Institute of the US Department of State. Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government. [28] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs Shipper | Reactionary Nationalism and Democratic Development in Myanmar and Japan This article is part of a larger project in which I have identified six categories of nation- alism in Asia: revisionist nationalism, official nationalism, mono-cultural nationalism, reactionary nationalism, diasporic/long-distance nationalism, and ethnic nationalism. One or more of these categories of nationalism can be found in Japan, Korea, the People’s Republic of China, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines. Reactionary nationalism also exists in Cambo- dia, particularly against ethnic Vietnamese. My research on reactionary nationalists in Cambodia remains at an early stage soI have not included the Cambodia case here. Myanmar Myanmar is mostly a Buddhist country. According to the 2014 national census, 87.9 percent of the population considered themselves Buddhists, 6.2 percent Christians, 4.3 percent Muslims, and 1.6 percent others.2 Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar became visible after the political transition in 2011. The 969 movement and the Ma Ba Tha (Asso- ciation for the Protection of Race and Religion) exemplified two successive reactionary movements against the perceived threat of Islam spreading into Southeast Asia, with only Myanmar standing between 160 million Muslims in Bangladesh and 250 million Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia. They noted that Buddhism was once predominant in these neighboring countries before being overtaken by Islam in the thirteenth century. Based on the current regional dynamics, Buddhist nationalists have increasingly referred to Myanmar’s borders with Bangladesh as “the western gate” (anauk-taga).3 They are gripped by existential angst, including demographic, economic, and cultural anxieties. They claim that Muslims “are hoarding capital, using their wealth to woo and marry Buddhist women, then forcing their wives and children to convert to Islam through physical or economic pressure.”4 Meanwhile, political elites, who are mostly Buddhists, focus their attention on accumulating personal wealth and power through their official connections, while ignoring the plight of ordinary people.5 In this sense, Buddhist nationalists oppose both Muslim ethnic minorities and (Buddhist) political elites. The name of the 969 movement itself signified a reaction against a folk Islam repre- sentation of the Basmala’s numerology of “786” in the religious phrase “In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful” (bi-smi llāhi r-rahmāni r-rahīm). Muslims in Myanmar and many parts of South Asia had long used “786” on the storefronts to identify halal restaurants and Muslim-owned shops.6 For Buddhist nationalists, 2 Central Intelligence Agency, “Burma – The World Factbook,” Internet, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html, Accessed April 5, 2020. With a mass exodus of Muslims from the Rakhine state in recent years, the Muslim population in Myanmar has declined to about 3 percent. 3 Thant Myint-U, The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century (New York: Norton, 2020), 208. 4 International Crisis Group, “Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar,” (Yangon/Brussels: Crisis Group Asia Report No. 290, September 5, 2017), 7. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/pd- fid/59ae8e1f4.pdf). 5 Thant Myint-U, The Hidden History of Burma, 208. 6 International Crisis Group, “Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar,” 10. Volume 6 | 2020 [29] Policy Forum “969” stood for a specific number of characteristics of Buddhism’s three jewels: nine characteristics of the Buddha, six characteristics of the Dharma (the teachings of the Buddha), and nine characteristics of the Sangha (the monastic community). The 969 movement, which started in Mawlamyine (formerly Moulmein) in the Mon state under the leadership of prominent monks such as Ashin Wirathu and Ashin Wimala, espoused bigoted, extremist rhetoric. Members of the movement made unsubstantiated claims of “a Muslim plot to take over the country and of schemes to have Muslims marry and convert Buddhist women.”7 Certain individuals even devised a conspiracy theory that 7+8+6 adds up to twenty-one, signifying that the twenty-first century would be under the control of Muslims. The alleged rape and brutal murder of a Buddhist woman, Thida Htwe, by three Muslim youths in the Rakhine (formerly Arakan) state on May 28, 2012, brought unsavory media attention to Rakhine, as Buddhist Rakhines and Rohingya Muslims attacked each other’s communities. Starting in June 2012, a wave of anti-Muslim violence swept across the country. In late 2013, the Sangha Council, a government-appointed body of monks that oversees and regulates the Buddhist clergy, officially banned the 969 movement for its un-Bud- dhist nature. The loosely organized movement then evolved into a more formal structure of the Ma Ba Tha, based in the old capital of Mandalay. Under the Ma Ba Tha structure, laypeople, especially women, played important roles in extending awareness of nation- alist ideology. Believing that recent conflicts were rooted in tensions originating from the taking of young Burmese women as second wives by older Muslim men, Buddhist women led a rally for the adoption of four new race and religious laws in 2015.8 These laws: 1) prohibited polygamy practices or marital infidelity; 2) ensured that religious conversion of women into Islam is done voluntarily (or needed parental consent if under age twenty) with basic knowledge of Islamic family laws; 3) required an interfaith couple to submit a marriage application to the township registrar for public display for four- teen days; and 4) limited Muslim couples to two children in geographic regions where population rates were considerably high (i.e. Rohingya areas of the Rakhine state). In effect, the laws targeted Muslims, especially the darker-skin Rohingya. In October 2016, the militant group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked Border Guard Police bases in northern Rakhine state. This event revitalized Buddhist nationalists and brought the perceived threat of violent Islam to the forefront of the national consciousness. Thereafter, anti-Muslim sentiment spiked. In August 2017, ARSA again attacked police posts and attempted to raid an army base. The Tatmadaw (military) responded violently against ARSA and ruthlessly against the Rohingyas. As the plight and persecution of the Rohingyas captured the world’s attention, their Buddhist and non-Rohingya Muslim neighbors did nothing to help or protect them. This may have to do with the preferential treatment many Rohingyas received from inter- national media and aid organizations. Although the Rakhine state is one of the poorest regions in Myanmar, populated by Buddhists, Rohingyas, and non-Rohingya Muslims, humanitarian assistance from international aid organizations, by definition, went mostly 7 International Crisis Group, 10. 8 Thant
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