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Rome Falls for Another Carthaginian Ambush

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Rome Falls for Another Carthaginian Ambush By David Davies THEME ROME FALLS FOR ANOTHER CARTHAGINIAN AMBUSH FOOL ME THREE TIMES! The saying goes “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.” But what about three times? After the battles of the Trebia (218 BC) and Lake Trasimene (217 BC), the Roman military had time and again walked into am- bushes set up by Hannibal, and had paid the price dearly. Trebia had cost at least half of the Roman forces involved and Trasimene was a near-total victory. s a response to the Carthaginian threat, The Romans intensified their attacks on the foraging Rome appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus parties. As his aggressive tactics seemed to be paying Verrucosus as dictator for one year. In his o, Minucius decided to risk storming the newly built adopted strategy (called the ‘Fabian strat- fort with the all the forces he had available. egy’), the Roman army would shadow the Aenemy and harass them, cutting off supply lines, and Hannibal found himself with only a fraction of his win by a war of attrition. Rome would only engage forces (some out foraging and some in Geronium) and the Carthaginians when the terms were favourable. facing the Roman army. Some historians say he sallied forth to meet the attackers, but Polybius states he de- At Ager Falernus, Fabius successfully surrounded Han- fended the fort (the most likely option). nibal’s army and fortified all the passes and bridges out of the area. Cut o from their supply lines, it would only Despite the Roman losses (approximately 5000 dead to be a matter of time before the Carthaginians’ provisions 6000 enemies), Minucius’ attack was seen as a great vic- would run out and they would starve. However, Fabius tory. Hannibal abandoned the fort and retreated to Gero- hadn’t allowed for the ingenuity of the Carthaginian nium. The Senate of Rome elevated Minucius to the equal general. Hannibal attacked one of the outposts guarding rank of dictator (much to Fabius’ probable annoyance). a pass at night, using stampeding oxen with firebrands lashed to their tails. These, supported by the Carthagin- Fabius oered Minucius a choice: either control the ian infantry, broke the Roman guards and took the pass. army on alternate days (as was the Roman custom) or Fearing further ambushes at night, Fabius waited until take control of half the Roman army. Minucius chose dawn before following after the Carthaginians. the latter and camped his half of the army separately from Fabius, closer to Geronium. Watching these devel- Fabius’ strategy, however, became unpopular in Rome, opments closely and learning from prisoners of the rift and he was recalled to defend his actions, leaving his sec- in the Roman command structure and of Minucius’ am- ond-in-command Marcus Minucius Rufus in command. bition, Hannibal saw an opportunity. If he could trick Meanwhile, Hannibal had taken the city of Geronium, Minucius into attacking, he could surround his army intending to spend the winter there. Disobeying orders, and defeat it. But it would take skill to entice the Ro- Minucius moved his camp closer to the city and sought to man general into attacking… actively engage the enemy. When some of the Carthagin- ians left the city to forage, he saw an opportunity to harass THE BATTLE OF GERONIUM and harry them. At this point Hannibal’s greatest asset, his Initially, the Carthaginians had been facing a Roman numerically superior cavalry, were being rested and thus force that outnumbered them. With the rift in the Ro- they were mostly absent from the coming battles. man camp, the force facing them had been halved. THE FIRST SKIRMISHES Hannibal’s plan was simple: lure the Romans into a skir- Initially, Hannibal built a camp overlooking the Roman mish battle and then slowly increase the forces involved, position, guarded by 2000 Numidian spearmen, but this forcing the Romans to commit even more forces and was stormed by the Romans. A second Carthaginian eventually the Legions to try and win the fight. When camp was built outside the town to defend and support the legions were in the heat of battle, Hannibal would the foraging eort, giving safe refuge from Roman attack. unleash his hidden flanking force and surround them. 1 WARGAMES, SOLDIERS & STRATEGY 91 online_article.indd 1 28/06/2017 15:14 The Roman vanguard advances towards the enemy. The game • Three units of Numidian spearmen (shield) This is a standard pitched battle scenario with the fol- • Four units of allied Gallic and Italian infantry (shield) lowing exceptions: Start by placing only the skirmishing • Three units of concealed light infantry (the hid- forces on the board, some 12” apart. This represents the den flanking force) initial skirmish. The Romans have the first turn as the at- • One unit of concealed light cavalry (the hidden tackers. From turn 2 onwards, either side can commit flanking force) their cavalry, arriving from their respective board edge. Once the cavalry are engaged in combat, in the follow- HISTORICAL CONCLUSION ing turn, line infantry reinforcements can be brought on As predicted, the skirmishers clashed, but as they (again from the board edge). In any turn after the Roman risked being overwhelmed, Minucius committed his line infantry have been committed, the Carthaginians can cavalry. When that too was in danger of being over- call in their flank attack forces from one or either flanks. whelmed, he pushed his legions forward, unaware of the trap that was about to be sprung upon him. The Roman general can call upon Fabius’ forces at any When Minucius’ legions were in danger of being time after the flank attack is launched; they will arrive overwhelmed, he called for the help of Fabius. See- in the next one to two turns. However, then Minucius ing Fabius’ troops arrive, Hannibal is alleged to have will have lost face, and at best the game will be a exclaimed, “That cloud on the mountains has broken draw. The following forces are a suggestion of the size in storm at last!” The Carthaginians wisely retreated of forces for a standard game; feel free to adjust them from the combined armies. to fit the size of your armies. Yet again, Hannibal had outwitted the Romans and Mi- Suggested forces – Roman nucius had only been saved from disaster by the timely • General Minucius (Standard quality) intervention of Fabius. The more sceptical amongst you • Three units of velites (shield) might think that Fabius foresaw the trap and moved his • Two units of Roman cavalry forces closer so he could rescue Minucius at just the • Three units of principes (armour and shield) right time to take the credit… • Six units of hastati (shield) • Three units of triarii (armour and shield) THE AFTERMATH The Roman commander has the option of calling in After the battle, Minucius declared Fabius his ‘father’, more forces by asking Fabius for help, but that will eectively swearing loyalty to him and giving up his mean that the Roman general can at best claim a draw dictatorship title. Both the Romans and Carthaginians (as Fabius will take all the credit for any victory). Fabius' settled down in winter quarters. When Fabius’ term as force should be the same size as the one shown above. dictator expired, it was not renewed by the Senate, and the ever-impatient Roman people wanted Hannibal Suggested forces – Carthaginian dealt with. Thus Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Ae- • General Hannibal Barca (Exceptional General) milius Paullus were elected consuls for the year, and • Three units of skirmishers then marched to meet Hannibal’s army and their fate • Three units of allied cavalry (Carthaginian and allies) at Cannae in 216 BC, which was to prove Hannibal’s • Three units of Carthaginian veteran spearmen (ar- greatest victory. Fool me four times? WS&S mour and shield) WARGAMES, SOLDIERS & STRATEGY 91 2 online_article.indd 2 28/06/2017 15:14.
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