What Were the Key Factors That Allowed Hannibal His Run Of
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NEGOTIATIONS at ROME Hannibal, One of History's Great Failures, Had Been Driven from Italy, Defeated in Mrica, and His Flight Fr
CHAPTER SIX NEGOTIATIONS AT ROME Hannibal, one of history's great failures, had been driven from Italy, defeated in Mrica, and his flight from his home city in 195 marked him also as a failed politician in Carthage after the peace. He had arrived in the city from Italy as a stranger, and his assumption of authority had not been a wholly popular move with those who believed such a position should be their own. There had always been a faction in the city which had been anti-Barkid, and which had thus at various times been anti-imperialist, anti-war, or pro-Roman. By 195, Hannibal had made himself sufficiently disliked to fear for his life, and he fled Mrica in a prepared ship, as he had fled Italy. 1 For a man such as Hannibal there was now only one place to go. The whole of the western Mediterranean, all of Greece, and Egypt were subject to, or friendly towards, Rome, and so were closed to him. Only the Seleukid empire could provide him with a refuge, and this was all the more suitable since Carthage's home city was Tyre, one of Antiochos III's recent conquests. He was the most famous Phoenician of his time; Tyre was a natural refuge for him, where he would be welcomed. Extradition thence, no matter what Antiochos' power or Rome's insistence, would be effectively impossible. It is important to note that Hannibal was not harried out of Carthage by Rome: he fled the city because he was in danger from his fellow-citizens. -
Symbolic Victory Signaling Strength Through Battlefield Choice (Paper in Progress)
Symbolic Victory Signaling Strength through Battlefield Choice (Paper in Progress) Richard Jordan August 7, 2014 Abstract Strong states can fight riskier battles in order to signal their strength and con- clude wars. I open with the broad question, why do some battles end wars, while others do not? I argue that Clausewitz' conception of decisive victory does not describe the majority of war-deciding engagements. The larger literature on bar- gaining and war proves equally unhelpful: while it predicts war termination should correlate with its duration (since fighting causes beliefs to converge), empirical tests have failed to corroborate this hypothesis. Focusing on the game theoretic litera- ture, I suggest this failing results from the assumption that generals cannot choose their battlefields. I argue that where and how a general fights conveys information: stronger states can (and will) fight on more difficult ground and for more difficult objectives than weak states. This decision conveys information to an enemy; this additional information increases our ability to predict war termination. In short, strategic risk is a costly signal in war. After developing this logic informally, I develop it further in a formal, game theoretic model of symbolic victory. Finally, I briefly illustrate the model with cases from the Second World War and the Second Punic War. 1 In 1800 Daniel Steibelt, a pianist of some renown, challenged the young Ludwig van Beethoven to an improvisational duel. Confident in his abilities, Steibelt played a quintet of his own composition and then|in an unmistakable insult|improvised on one of Beethoven's own themes. Furious, Beethoven strode to the piano, on his way snatching the cello part of Steibelt's quintet. -
75 AD FABIUS 270-203 BC Plutarch Translated
75 AD FABIUS 270-203 B.C. Plutarch translated by John Dryden Plutarch (46-120) - Greek biographer, historian, and philosopher, sometimes known as the encyclopaedist of antiquity. He is most renowned for his series of character studies, arranged mostly in pairs, known as “Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans” or “Parallel Lives.” Fabius (75 AD) - A study of the life of Fabius, a Roman consul. FABIUS HAVING related the memorable actions of Pericles, our history now proceeds to the life of Fabius. A son of Hercules and a nymph, of some woman of that country, who brought him forth on the banks of Tiber, was, it is said, the first Fabius, the founder of the numerous and distinguished family of the name. Others will have it that they were first called Fodii, because the first of the race delighted in digging pitfalls for wild beasts, fodere being still the Latin for to dig, and fossa for a ditch, and that in process of time, by the change of the two letters, they grew to be called Fabii. But be these things true or false, certain it is that this family for a long time yielded a great number of eminent persons. Our Fabius, who was fourth in descent from that Fabius Rullus who first brought the honourable surname of Maximus into his family, was also, by way of personal nickname, called Verrucosus, from a wart on his upper lip; and in his childhood they in like manner named him Ovicula, or The Lamb, on account of his extreme mildness of temper. -
The Herodotos Project (OSU-Ugent): Studies in Ancient Ethnography
Faculty of Literature and Philosophy Julie Boeten The Herodotos Project (OSU-UGent): Studies in Ancient Ethnography Barbarians in Strabo’s ‘Geography’ (Abii-Ionians) With a case-study: the Cappadocians Master thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Linguistics and Literature, Greek and Latin. 2015 Promotor: Prof. Dr. Mark Janse UGent Department of Greek Linguistics Co-Promotores: Prof. Brian Joseph Ohio State University Dr. Christopher Brown Ohio State University ACKNOWLEDGMENT In this acknowledgment I would like to thank everybody who has in some way been a part of this master thesis. First and foremost I want to thank my promotor Prof. Janse for giving me the opportunity to write my thesis in the context of the Herodotos Project, and for giving me suggestions and answering my questions. I am also grateful to Prof. Joseph and Dr. Brown, who have given Anke and me the chance to be a part of the Herodotos Project and who have consented into being our co- promotores. On a whole other level I wish to express my thanks to my parents, without whom I would not have been able to study at all. They have also supported me throughout the writing process and have read parts of the draft. Finally, I would also like to thank Kenneth, for being there for me and for correcting some passages of the thesis. Julie Boeten NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING Deze scriptie is geschreven in het kader van het Herodotos Project, een onderneming van de Ohio State University in samenwerking met UGent. De doelstelling van het project is het aanleggen van een databank met alle volkeren die gekend waren in de oudheid. -
Enrichment: Hannibal
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC SECTION 4 Name ________________________________________________ Class ________________________ Date ______________ Enrichment: Hannibal Directions Read the selection below. Answer the questions that follow and complete the activity. Carthaginian general Hannibal is considered one of history’s greatest military leaders. His military judgment can perhaps be traced to his earliest days. The son of a general, nine-year-old Hannibal went with his father to war in Spain. His father taught him about the military and also taught him to hate Rome, which had earlier defeated Carthage in war. Over the next 15 years Hannibal also learned how to fight. When he became general in Spain in 221 B.C., he was an experienced military leader. After crossing the Alps with his war elephants in 218 B.C., Hannibal used clever tactics to outsmart the Romans. In three great battles he defeated one Roman army after another. The last of these was the Battle of Cannae, in 216. There, he cornered the Roman army. Carthaginian armies lost just 6,000 to 7,000 men and killed more than 50,000 Roman soldiers. After Cannae, success shifted to the Romans, in part because they beat Hannibal at his own tactical game. For example, they learned to fight Hannibal’s war elephants. Rather than flee in panic when the Carthaginian elephants charged, the Roman maniples stood aside and let the elephants pass. The Romans used the advantage they had of fighting in their own territory to wear down Hannibal. Instead of starting battles, the Romans delayed while the Carthaginians ran out of supplies. -
A Glimpse Into the Roman Finances of the Second Punic War Through
Letter Geochemical Perspectives Letters the history of the western world. Carthage was a colony founded next to modern Tunis in the 8th century BC by Phoenician merchants. During the 3rd century BC its empire expanded westward into southern Spain and Sardinia, two major silver producers of the West Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Rome’s grip had tight- © 2016 European Association of Geochemistry ened over the central and southern Italian peninsula. The Punic Wars marked the beginning of Rome’s imperial expansion and ended the time of Carthage. A glimpse into the Roman finances The First Punic War (264 BC–241 BC), conducted by a network of alliances in Sicily, ended up with Rome prevailing over Carthage. A consequence of this of the Second Punic War conflict was the Mercenary War (240 BC–237 BC) between Carthage and its through silver isotopes unpaid mercenaries, which Rome helped to quell, again at great cost to Carthage. Hostilities between the two cities resumed in 219 BC when Hannibal seized the F. Albarède1,2*, J. Blichert-Toft1,2, M. Rivoal1, P. Telouk1 Spanish city of Saguntum, a Roman ally. At the outbreak of the Second Punic War, Hannibal crossed the Alps into the Po plain and inflicted devastating mili- tary defeats on the Roman legions in a quick sequence of major battles, the Trebia (December 218 BC), Lake Trasimene (June 217 BC), and Cannae (August 216 BC). As a measure of the extent of the disaster, it was claimed that more than 100,000 Abstract doi: 10.7185/geochemlet.1613 Roman soldiers and Italian allies lost their lives in these three battles, including The defeat of Hannibal’s armies at the culmination of the Second Punic War (218 BC–201 three consuls. -
2007 Conference Papers
Volume19 Journalof the NumismaticAs soc ratron of Austraha 2007Conference Papers Coinage of the Libyan Revolt, 241–238 BC Stephen P Mulligan Historical background Mediterranean with control over Sardinia, The Libyan Revolt was a conflict western Sicily and the North African between Carthage and her former coast12. Carthage had her own military and mercenary army that lasted from 241 political classes such as the famous Barcid to 238 BC1-7. It is also known as the family (e.g. Hamilcar Barca and his son ‘Mercenary War’ or the ‘Truceless War’, Hannibal)13–14. The continuous use of the the latter reflecting the barbarity on both horse as an image on her coinage suggests a sides1,7. It occurred immediately after the strong equestrian and cavalry tradition prolonged First Punic-Roman War that within Punic society15–20. However, probably spanned 23 years from 264 to 241 BC, and due to her limited population and for simple that had taken place on land and sea commercial reasons, during much of her 8-11 around Sicily . history Carthage appears to have relied There are two sources of evidence for heavily on mercenary armies when the need the Libyan Revolt; the historical account arose21–22. This was particularly in the era in of Polybius1 and the numismatic evidence which she produced coinage, and there is an of the coins that were issued by the rebels. obvious link, because the most convenient Coins have a special symbolism in this method of payment for a mercenary army war, which began as a financial dispute was coinage. The mercenaries were drawn between a city of merchants, her from around the Carthaginian home- mercenary army and the heavily taxed land populated by native Libyans, who populace. -
The Crucial Development of Heavy Cavalry Under Herakleios and His Usage of Steppe Nomad Tactics Mark-Anthony Karantabias
The Crucial Development of Heavy Cavalry under Herakleios and His Usage of Steppe Nomad Tactics Mark-Anthony Karantabias The last war between the Eastern Romans and the Sassanids was likely the most important of Late Antiquity, exhausting both sides economically and militarily, decimating the population, and lay- ing waste the land. In Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium, Walter Kaegi, concludes that the Romaioi1 under Herakleios (575-641) defeated the Sassanian forces with techniques from the section “Dealing with the Persians”2 in the Strategikon, a hand book for field commanders authored by the emperor Maurice (reigned 582-602). Although no direct challenge has been made to this claim, Trombley and Greatrex,3 while inclided to agree with Kaegi’s main thesis, find fault in Kaegi’s interpretation of the source material. The development of the katafraktos stands out as a determining factor in the course of the battles during Herakleios’ colossal counter-attack. Its reforms led to its superiority over its Persian counterpart, the clibonarios. Adoptions of steppe nomad equipment crystallized the Romaioi unit. Stratos4 and Bivar5 make this point, but do not expand their argument in order to explain the victory of the emperor over the Sassanian Empire. The turning point in its improvement seems to have taken 1 The Eastern Romans called themselves by this name. It is the Hellenized version of Romans, the Byzantine label attributed to the surviving East Roman Empire is artificial and is a creation of modern historians. Thus, it is more appropriate to label them by the original version or the Anglicized version of it. -
Historical Background
Historical background Carthage and Rome were both emerging superpowers of the Mediterranean. Rome built its power upon the infantry and conscription system. No matter how many defeats the Romans suffered, they were always able to overcome the enemy by recruiting new troops. Carthage’s wealth came from trade and the strength of its navy. Both superpowers had been allies fighting against their common enemy - the mighty Pyrrhus, King of Epir. But it took them only 12 years to be turned into enemies. The casus belli was the Carthaginian attempt to gain control over Sicily. Rome considered this a major threat towards its control over the entire Italian peninsula. he First Punic War lasted 23 years. In 264 BC, the Romans laid laid siege to Saguntum, the Romans objected, making it another ca- T siege to Syracuse and forced this small kingdom to break its al- sus belli. In 218 BC Hannibal raised an army and crossed the Alps, liance with Carthage and become yet another ally of Rome. The Car- defeating Publius Scipio at the Ticinus River. Right after, Hannibal thaginians thought that they could overcome the Romans just as they invaded Italy, achieving his most significant victory in the Battle of did Pyrrhus – by fortifying important cities and keeping their naval Cannae in 216 BC annihilating entire Roman army in the process. superiority. Rome had no navy, thus it was supposed to lose the war in However, Hannibal refrained from besieging the Rome itself and in- the long term anyway. stead decided to cut off the Romans from their allies, who – just as However, in 262 BC the Romans successfully besieged the fortress Capua and Tarentum – begun to switch sides. -
Command & Colors: Ancients SCENARIOS
Command & Colors: Ancients 1 Command & Colors: Ancients SCENARIOS THE BATTLE OF AKRAGAS – 406 BC 2nd BATTLE OF BENEVENTUM - 214 BC crimissos river – 341 BC CASTULO – 211 BC bagradas – 253 BC BAECULA – 208 BC TICINUS river – 218 BC METAURUS - 207 BC Trebbia – 218 BC ILIPA – 206 BC LAKE TRASIMENUS – 217 BC Great plains – 203 BC CANNAE – 216 BC DERTOSA – 215 BC ZAMA – 202 BC Game Design by Richard Borg GMT Games, LLC P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308 • www.GMTGames.com © 2006 GMT Games, LLC 2 Command & Colors: Ancients THE BATTLE OF AKRAGAS – 406 BC CARTHAGINIAN Mago Himilco MA HM A AA LC CH LB L CH LB LB L LC A H H H H A A MC Daphnaeus Dionysius SYRACUSAN Historical Background War Council It is a time of violent competition between the Syracusan Ty- Carthagian Army rants (military dictators) and Carthage for control of Sicily. The • Leader: Himilco Carthaginians under Himilco have besieged Akragas, a city al- • 5 Command Cards lied with Syracuse, prompting Daphnaeus and his army to march to its aid. The Carthaginians split their army into an observation Syracusan Army force in front of Akragas, and a blocking force sent to oppose • Use Roman blocks Daphnaeus. The Carthaginian army was almost totally merce- • Leader: Daphnaeus nary, while Daphnaeus’s contained veteran heavy infantry that • 6 Command Cards proved invincible when committed to the battle. The survivor’s • Move First of Himilco’s badly beaten army fled to the coastal fort shelter- Victory ing Mago’s observation force. There was no pursuit and no fur- 5 Banners ther battle. -
Polybius and His World. Essays in Melllory of F. W. Walbank
Polybius and his world. Essays in melllory of F. W. Walbank EDITED BY BRUCE GIBSON AND THOMAS HARRISON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS ~ments Contents Isly by the British Academy as well Abbreviations LX Id Egyptology of the University of List of Illustrations xi all aspects of the conference with Notes on Contributors xii lary O'Shea and her colleagues at Welcome to the Liverpool Conference: Frank Walbank xvi ~ assistance, and to the anonymous previously published in J. Pastor, 1. Introduction: F. W. Walbank, Polybius, and the Decline of Greece phus: Interpretation and History, Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison of ludaism, 146 (Leiden, 2011), 2. 'A piece of work which would occupy some years .. .' Oxford ission of Brill. Finally, we should University Press Archive Files 814152, 814173, 814011 37 rt and advice of Dorothy Thomp lohn Henderson ,ank. 3. Polybius, Phylarchus, and 'Tragic History': A Reconsideration 73 B. J. G lohn Marincola T.H. 4. Polybius, Aratus, and the History of the 140 th Olympiad 91 Andrew Meadows 5. Some Misunderstandings of Polybius in Livy 117 lohn Briscoe 6. Polybius' Roman prokataskeue 125 Hans Beck 7. Historiographie Patterns and Historical Obstacles in Polybius' Histories: Marcellus, Flaminius, and the Mamertine Crisis 143 Craige Champion 8. Polybius and Xenophon: The Mercenary War 159 Bruce Gibson 9. Youthfulness in Polybius: The Case of Philip V of Macedon 181 Brian McGing 10. Frank Walbank's Philippos Tragoidoumenos: Polybius' Account of Philip's Last Years 201 Boris Dreyer 11. Polybius in Context: The Political Dimension of the Histories 213 101m Thornton 12. How to Rule the World: Polybius Book 6 Reconsidered 231 Andrew Erskine viii Contents 13. -
Warfare in the Sicilian Historiographical Tradition ∗
Histos Supplement ( ) – WARFARE IN THE SICILIAN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRADITION ∗ Frances Pownall raditionally, in both antiquity and modern scholarship, the historiography of ancient Sicily has been considered apart from that of the Greek mainland, 1 and where any direct influence has been T 2 recognised, it has generally been only from east to west. The almost complete loss of Sicilian historical texts prior to Diodorus Siculus (whose narrative is heavily influenced by his contemporary context in Augustan Rome) further complicates the situation. 3 Nevertheless, the complex and tumultuous history of Sicily provides a critical object lesson in the process through which the narrative of warfare became polarised in the histo- riographical tradition. 4 As dynastic autocrats branded their territorial expansion as a defence against external enemies, upon their expulsion these same campaigns were rebranded as imperialistic and tyrannical by their successors as a means of legitimising the transfer of power. A parallel polarity can be seen in the Sicilian historiographic tradition’s fraught dialogue with the mainland historiographic tradition on the construction of Greek identity ∗ I would like to thank the co-editors for their kind invitation to contribute to this volume. All translations are my own. 1 The extant ‘fragments’ (or, more properly, citations of lost works by later writers) from the historiographic tradition of ancient Sicily can be found in Jacoby, FGrHist , nos. @@A‒; translations and commentaries can now be found in Brill’s New Jacoby , and I shall henceforth cite them under their BNJ reference. 2 E.g., the Sicilian historian Philistus’ alleged ‘plagiarism’ from Thucydides: BNJ @@ T A and F @ .