What were the key factors that allowed Hannibal his run of military success that began at the Trebia and ended at the massacre at Cannae and why didn't he move forward from this success by marching on Rome?

By Ben Sharpley

Candidate Number: 8588

Institution Code: 58625

By Ben Sharpley TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... 2

Introduction ...... 2

Literature Review ...... 5

Discussion ...... 12

Hannibal’s Character ...... 12

Army Composition ...... 15

Hannibal’s Strategy ...... 19

Failures of the Romans ...... 23

The Role of Propaganda ...... 25

Why Hannibal didn’t march on Rome ...... 26

Conclusion ...... 29

Further Research ...... 31

Evaluation ...... 32

Bibliography ...... 35

1 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley ABSTRACT

This research project aims to establish the amount of credit that Hannibal should be given as a general and to what extent other factors like his Roman opposition were important. It will also strive to differentiate between the individual factors that made Hannibal an effective leader rather than just assess his importance in general. Information on the subject has come from books provided by the King Edward VI’s School library and Classics department. The Amazon online store was also used to source some of the literature and the project used the website JSTOR extensively, as well as History Today occasionally in order to access academic journals and other materials.

The project concludes that Hannibal should be praised greatly for his achievements although he did have the huge advantage of not having to worry about politics, which hindered the Roman War effort greatly. Nonetheless his creativity and ability to manipulate the battlefield are impossible to ignore as the key reasons for his success. The project explores other factors away from the battlefield, such as propaganda, however, it is clear that Hannibal’s success during the given period came almost entirely from the battlefield and thus they weren’t as crucial in explaining his triumph.

INTRODUCTION

Hannibal Barca is renowned in History as one of the greatest military generals to ever have lived, a reputation he shares with the likes of Alexander the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. Biographical details around Hannibal are hard to come by due to the events of 146BC which signified the end of the Third Punic War, when the city of Carthage was sacked and burned. Thus any historical evidence of Hannibal’s life that might have been kept there was lost. From the information that we do have we know that Hannibal grew up a soldier. From an early age he partook in his father’s, Hamilcar Barca’s, campaigns in Iberia. It is said that he

2 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley inherited, from his father, a hatred of Rome which is what spurred him on to reignite a war with the Romans.

The City of Carthage was founded as a city state of the Phoenician state of Tyre. It gained its independence around 650BC and began to build an empire that encompassed a lot of Spain, Sardinia, the North coast of Africa and Sicily. This was where they came into contact with the Greeks causing a prolonged period of friction which saw Carthage partake in the three Sicilian Wars and the Pyrrhic Wars. Neither civilisation was able to take complete control of the island before the Romans arrived at the scene. At this point the Carthaginians had developed a sizeable naval trade network and their Navy completely dominated the Western Mediterranean.

This all changed with the First Punic War. The emerging Roman republic was growing in power and had control over the whole of the Italian Peninsula. Carthage had taken control of Messana which gave them a lot more influence in Sicily and hence the move was disliked in Rome, who decided to engage the Carthaginians over the issue and so began the First Punic War, in which Hamilcar Barca had fought and lost to the Romans. Thus they were forced to evacuate Sicily and they lost their naval supremacy in the area.

In the intervening period, which Hannibal grew up in, Hamilcar fought in the Mercenary war which, although eventually won by Carthage was a bloody affair. Polybius had labelled it the “Truceless War” although it did increase the renown of the Barcid family in the Government. He also spent considerable time campaigning in Iberia and built up the Carthaginian influence there considerably.

When he died, there was an intervening period before Hannibal took control in which Hasdrubal, Hamilcar’s son in law was in control in Iberia. During this period the Ebro treaty was signed which was important in the start of the Second Punic War. Signed by Rome and Carthage it decreed that Carthage had free reign over the Spanish Peninsula south of the River Ebro. Therefore when Hannibal laid siege to the city of Saguntum, an ally of Rome situated south of the Ebro it posed an interesting question over whether he was in the wrong for doing so and thus whether the Roman senate should declare war. It is in fact a

3 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley meaningless question because Hannibal wasn’t simply probing the Romans, seeing how far they might stretch, Hannibal was on a war path and Saguntum was the first stop. The city held out for 8 months but didn’t receive any military support from Rome and so eventually gave in. When the inhabitants refused to leave the city the adult population was put to the sword. With this the Second Punic War began and Hannibal began preparing for the long march to Northern Italy in which he would have to traverse the Pyrenees, Alps and the Rhone river whilst constantly in hostile Gallic territory.

This route was forced upon him by the naval inferiority of Carthage which ruled out any sea route. This was partly just a hangover from the First Punic War but also due to the Barcid family’s neglect of the problem. Both Hamilcar and his son were renowned as great military generals on land but couldn’t replicate this on the waves.

Although Hannibal was able to cross the Pyrenees more or less without issue, he suffered considerable losses owing to clashes with the local tribes. For this reason he had to leave a sizeable force in the area to quell those peoples and to protect from a Roman counter- offensive. At the Rhone Hannibal showed his military expertise when faced with a hostile army waiting on the opposite bank by sending his nephew Hanno with a large force of cavalry to cross up river. Hannibal then began the crossing as Hanno fell on the opposing army who were taken completely by surprise and fled almost immediately. Perhaps his greatest feat though was the crossing of the Alps. The crossing took place as late as October so the army faced harsh weather conditions while they constantly had to deal with mountain tribesman who regularly harassed the army, trying to take their supplies. Nevertheless Hannibal made it through, not without suffering heavy losses to his army however, which was seriously depleted, although the majority of the elephants had survived which was a huge achievement.

The Carthaginian army descended into the Po valley where it recuperated. To gain the important support of the Gallic tribes in the area, Hannibal solved a local dispute by sieging and destroying the main settlement of the Taurini which acted as an example to the other Gauls. Soon after he won his first victory over the Romans in a small but decisive victory

4 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley against Publius Cornelius Scipio, one of the consuls of that year. Later that year was the first major engagement at the River Trebia where Hannibal’s run of great victories began.

What Hannibal achieved in the following 2 years was astonishing. He obliterated three Roman armies, killing or capturing around 100,000 men in the process. The majority of the credit for this success should be given to Hannibal who far surpassed any of his Roman counterparts. He was able to galvanise his hugely diverse army and use that diversity to his advantage, using every type of soldier in the most useful way they could be used. The best example of this was the Numidian cavalry who played a key role in goading the enemy into battle when Hannibal wished and also in general reconnaissance which was a simple but imperative factor in the early success of the campaign, a lesson Flaminius learned at the cost of his life at Lake Trasimene. By using the terrain he gave himself an immediate advantage over the seemingly narrow-minded Romans and this added to the array of inventive techniques he employed to surround the enemy army, a rare sight on the ancient battlefield due to the rigidness and lack of manoeuvrability of infantry formations. The limitations of the Romans must also be taken into account though, both on the battlefield and in the Senate. Hannibal was one man commanding one army. The Romans on the other hand were susceptible to the whims of politics and faction fighting while their system of Government didn’t permit one general to gain any proper experience or form any serious connection to his army which only a prolonged period in the field can provide. Thus in explaining Hannibal’s success we must look at a wealth of factors to provide a complete picture.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of ancient history gives rise to large historiographical problems, often due to the lack of sources and then the nature of the sources. This is obviously due to the fact that everything occurred much longer ago and thus sources, especially those in the form of literature and Government records, are few and far between. Owing to this fact the nature of historical writing is at times very different to its more modern counterpart. When assessing sources which are particularly contradictory (Something that occurs regularly with

5 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley our beloved Livy and Polybius) logical inferences based on previous knowledge of how logistics and battles played out normally, for instance, in the context of the ancient world, come to the fore instead of hard evidence which is often scarce1. This is something many of the writers studied for this piece of research spend a lot of their time doing.

The historiography around the Punic Wars is a very pertinent example of a period where historians face considerable challenges due to the surviving sources. Never more has the saying “History is written by the winners” been more relevant. The city of Carthage was of course burned to the ground at the ending of the Third Punic war and thus any records of Carthaginian culture and sources on this subject were lost. Nearly all the information that we have today comes from two sources; Titus Livy and Polybius1. It is from these two works and of course those logical inferences, that historians today must ascertain what went on during Hannibal’s campaigns and much of Carthaginian history in general. This is not to say that there weren’t others, Richard Miles mentions two other sources in Sosylus and Silenus who followed Hannibal and wrote about his campaigns2. Sadly their writings did not survive to the modern day which is a shame especially since Silenus’ work was regarded highly by the likes of Polybius and Cicero as well.

Livy’s The War with Hannibal was the source chosen to be closely examined in this piece of research while Polybius will be used as a point of comparison1. Livy’s work is undoubtedly of great literary value and he was a talented writer but his historical methodology was certainly very questionable. Very little is known about his personal life which was almost completely devoted to writing a history of Rome.3 It is clear from the outset that Livy has a style of writing that is his own; extended speeches given by generals before battle or in the Roman or Carthaginian Senate are seen regularly, something not frequently used by modern historians. He aimed to write a book on history that was enjoyable to read for those reading it and because of this his artistic license is very obvious at times and so the many anecdotes

1Livy, Titus, The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from its Foundation, Books 21-30, Aubrey De Selincourt, Penguin UK, 1972 Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Ian Scott Kilvert, Penguin UK, 2003 2Miles, Richard, Carthage Must Be Destroyed The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilisation, Penguin UK, 2011 3 http://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/histroians-ancient-biographies/livy

6 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley and little stories that are seen should not be taken at face value most of the time and are simply narrative devices to satisfy the reader. Apart from anything he was writing almost 200 years after the campaigns, which leaves him without access to any eye witness sources which is the only way he could realistically bring in anecdotal information about battles and key events. This piece of research has a military focus and for that purpose Livy does not provide a wealth of good evidence. This is for two reasons; firstly his background. Livy had no experience in the military which was unusual for a roman man of his time but this was the case and thus he wasn’t able to fill in the informational gaps left by his sources with regards to battles using his own knowledge. Something Polybius would have been able to do. Secondly he simply doesn’t focus on the military aspect that much. There is little mention of soldier formations for example and his descriptions of the engagements are often brief and even then focus more on creating a literary spectacle rather than detailing specific events. For instance his description of the ambush at Lake Trasimene is a glorious extract but for that reason it makes one somewhat question the accuracy of his supposedly historical writings. Furthermore as a Roman, it must be noted that he follows a trend of Roman writers that are keen that they occupy the moral high ground, as Richard A Gabriel points out4. They saw themselves as superior to others by exaggerating the unfavourable characteristics and actions of opponents and Livy’s interpretation of events, often putting a negative tint on the actions of Hannibal and his character, is a fine example of this effect in Roman literature. In nearly all instances his actions can be militarily justified. The best example of this being in how Livy makes much out of how Hannibal ravages the Italian countryside during his campaigns but the reality of the situation was that he simply needed to feed what was a very large army without supplies from home. Livy mustn’t be discarded, however. If used carefully and with constant scrutiny a lot of useful information can be taken from his work.

The only other to write extensively on Hannibal was Polybius in his Histories1. Although another Roman, Polybius showed a keen need for impartiality in his writing which leads us to believe he may be more reliable than Livy on many accounts. He also had various

4 Gabriel, Richard A, Hannibal: A Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy, Potomac Books, Inc, USA, 2011

7 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley circumstantial advantages including time and background5. He was writing much closer to the time than Livy so would have had a larger number of sources to work from including possibly eye-witness accounts or at least second hand accounts. He also possessed experience as a cavalry officer from his youth so can be considered more reliable in his military assertions than Livy. If we were looking to criticise Polybius however we could look to how he wrote under the patronage of Amelius Paulus, a direct relative of Lucius Aemilius Paulus who fought and died at the Battle of Cannae. It is likely Polybius could have endeavoured to paint him in an favourable light although this only makes up a small chapter of events. On the positive side it is likely that this connection with Paulus, who occupied a position high up in Roman Government, would have given him useful insight into the politics of the Roman State which is certainly reflected in his works6. It is worth noting though that what you gain in historical methodology you lose in literary style even if from a research point of view this can’t be much of a criticism.

With regards to modern times there is a wealth of writing on the subject of Hannibal and the Punic Wars. H.H Scullard’s A History of the Roman World: 753-146 BC gives a good textbook like overview of the period of Roman and Carthaginian conflict providing valuable context to the reader7. This book however covers a much larger time period than just the Punic Wars and so for a more detailed overview of the period The Punic Wars by Brian Caven8 is a useful book. It provides a detailed account of events although doesn’t focus heavily on the military aspect of Hannibal’s campaign due to its overview format making it of still limited use to this piece of research. The reader is introduced to historical interpretations in this book however as Caven at least begins to engage with questions like why Hannibal didn’t attack Rome and how the War was lost overall. For this question he asserts that Carthage’s mercantile nature meant they focused on protecting their assets in Spain rather than prioritising Hannibal’s campaign9.

5 http://www.ancient.eu/Polybius/

6 www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195389661/obo-9780195389661-0047.xml 7Scullard H.H, A History of the Roman World: 753-146 BC, University Paperbacks, Routledge, 1990 8 Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Book Club associates by arrangement with Weidenfield and Nicolson, UK, 1980 9 Boren, Henry C. “The Historian.” The Historian, vol. 44, no. 2, 1982,pp. 247-248. www.jstor.org/stable/24446146

8 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley

The military factor is of course the most important with regards to how Hannibal succeeded but despite it being a military campaign, many of the works on the subject don't focus in on how the battles were actually fought. For Livy the battles were components of a wider story in which the characters were more important1. More general histories like Caven's for instance, give brief overviews and statistics of numbers on each side and the mortality rates8. To gain an understanding of the battlefields of the war specific military historic works are needed. This literature delves into the mind of Hannibal when planning battle like Tony Bath does in Hannibal's Campaigns in which Hannibal's thought process before the ambush at Trasimene is analysed10. Similarly Gabriel lays out the general criteria and tactics that would have occupied his mind before all the key battles5. With regards to actual mechanics of the battles this, more specific literature, provides a much fuller account. They detail clearly the manoeuvres of the troops and mainly how Hannibal was able to encircle the enemy, although Philip Sabin's article; The Mechanics of Battle in the Second Punic War is key to understanding the historical context of Hannibal's tactics since his strategy of encirclement was far from common on the ancient battlefield and neither was the symmetrical way he formed up his troops at the beginning of battle11. Of course, no book is perfect and each has its own flaws and merits. Both look into the different soldiers used by the armies of the day. Something that is especially important in understanding Hannibal's efforts since his army was such a jumbled mix of soldiers. With regards to the Romans it goes a long way to explaining their inflexibility on the battlefield. Bath excels in this area, especially focusing on the weapons, which gives a richer image of how the men would have fought. However, the most useful information on individual troops comes from Gabriel when he explains the effectiveness of Hannibal's cavalry arm and in particular the 'Intimidating Intimacy' with which they fought4.

No literature on Hannibal would ever fail to mention elephants and assess their use. Recent

10Bath, Tony Hannibal’s Campaigns, Patrick Stephens Limited, UK, 1981

11 Sabin, Philip,”THE MECHANICS OF BATTLE IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, no. 67, 1996, pp. 59-79. www.jstor.org/stable/43767903

9 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley interpretations are in agreement that the elephants in Hannibal's army were smaller than those in Asia and were generally unreliable on the battlefield. Their main use for the commander was to impress and scare the Gauls and Northern Italians who would never have seen one, rather than as weapons in battle. We know Hannibal was able to call back his elephants and place them at the side of the army at the Trebia which provides strong evidence for the large amount of control he had over his troops on the battlefield since this was a huge challenge for many commanders and something even he was unable to do at Zama leading to them inflicting more damage on his own army than Scipio’s12.

For a while the dominant theory as to why Hannibal didn’t attack Rome after Cannae was a lack of siege equipment. This view has long been disproven however, on the grounds that the Carthaginians were adept at making siege equipment on site so wouldn’t have needed to have any with them to begin a siege of Rome. In more recent times historians have discovered a wealth of reasons for his decision including logistical problems of traveling with an army heavily laden with prisoners form Cannae and the vulnerable position a siege would have put Hannibal’s army in. These are the predominant reasons Tony Bath gives which show that, despite his background as a war gamer not a historian, he deals effectively with the historiographical problems and questions presented by the period like the question of why Hannibal didn’t attack Rome and the use of Livy as a source13. All historians writing on the subject must provide effective and critical analysis of Livy due to his historiographic flaws. Bath does this very well and so is an extremely useful work as his attention to detail with regards the individual soldiers and how they fought (something one would expect from a War gamer) which he then combines with perceptive analysis of the non-military elements of the campaign. Gabriel on the other hand has a background of huge renown as a military historian and professor, having written extensively on war in ancient and modern times14. It is clear that he has a strong grasp on the mechanics of ancient warfare but it is important to note his deep understanding of the period. This shines through when he assesses why Hannibal didn’t attack Rome, asserting that Hannibal’s Hellenistic view of war played a large

12 Charles, Michael B., and Peter Rhodan. ’Magister Elephantorvm’: A Reappraisal of Hannibal’s Use of Elephants. The Classical World, 100(4), no. 4, 2007, pp. 363-389. www.jstor.org/stable/25434049. 13 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tony_Bath 14 http://us.macmillan.com/author/richardagabriel

10 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley role in this decision. By this he means that Hannibal thought that if he could keep beating the Romans in the field they would be forced to come to the negotiating table with him where he could regain Carthaginian control of the Mediterranean.

All these previous four sources are heavily geared towards the military aspect and so it would be easy for someone reading on this subject to miss a key element of the campaign. That key element is propaganda, or at least its equivalent in the ancient world. Richard Miles is the author who brought attention to propaganda in his book Carthage Must be Destroyed The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilisation3. The book is a large text which covers the whole of the Carthaginian civilisation from its beginnings to the city’s destruction at the end of the Third Punic War. For this reason Miles doesn’t give such a detailed account of Hannibal’s campaigns in the military sense. Miles comes from a completely different angle informing us of how Hannibal and his writing companions who were mentioned earlier (Sosylus and Silenus) tried to create a link between himself and Herakles who had undergone a similar journey. This creates an interesting dynamic with the Roman civilisation since they felt they had a strong affiliation with the character of Herakles as well. Thus a type of mythological propaganda war was present between Hannibal and the Romans during his time in Italy. The success of which would have played a big role in the loyalties of the Italian confederate states and how much support Hannibal gained.

With there only being two major contemporary writers whose works have survived to this day, modern historians face a difficult task in extracting facts and deciphering what may be biased or simply inaccurate due to a lack of primary sources possessed by either Livy or Polybius. Therefore the key in understanding Hannibal’s character, his army and his enemy comes from in depth knowledge of the ancient world as a whole and also logical inferences that can be made since often finding the answer comes from taking a closer look at the geography or logistics of the situation which will regularly rule out many interpretations from our contemporary authors.

Understanding Hannibal’s success as a military commander is important on the basis that military tactics change surprisingly little as time moves on which is why people like Napoleon Bonaparte have paid attention to him. It also provides a view into the two

11 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley civilisations of Carthage and Rome, because in the ancient world warfare was a much greater part of people’s lives, it therefore gives a brilliant insight into the civilisations of the time. This is important for Carthage since relatively little is known of them in comparison to the Romans and Greeks because their civilisation didn’t survive as long and of course due to the destruction of Carthage itself. As for the Romans, it is easy to forget, due to the size and success that the Empire achieved later on, just how close they came to destruction during the Second Punic War, and that is essentially what this piece of research is assessing. It could be argued that it didn’t affect the outcome so this type of research is useless but by realising how close Hannibal came to destroying Rome we raise the question over what would have happened if he had succeeded and the Roman Empire hadn’t survived. This is, of course an impossible question to answer definitively but we can be sure that European history would have been changed immeasurably.

DISCUSSION

Hannibal’s Character

We know relatively little of Hannibal’s life before the Second Punic War compared with most other historical figures due to the lack of surviving sources on the subject, therefore most of what we know comes from a judgement of his behaviour during the War. That said we do know he had a military upbringing, campaigning with his father Hamilcar in Iberia throughout his childhood. Therefore he spent little time in Carthage itself which offers a likely explanation for the dis-connect between Carthage and Hannibal during his time in Italy which is given as a major cause of his ultimate failure.

With regards to his character Livy is extremely complimentary saying, “Power to command and readiness to obey are rare associates; but in Hannibal they were perfectly united and this union made him as much valued by his commanders as by his men”15. In this way Livy lauds his strengths as a general, with special mentions going to his work ethic and the

15Livy, Titus, The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from its Foundation, Books 21-30, Aubrey De Selincourt, Penguin UK, 1972 Pg. 26

12 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley connection he had with other soldiers despite his higher rank. As always Livy’s words should be taken with a pinch of salt, this certainly doesn’t come from first-hand experience and the more able Hannibal is portrayed as, the greater the Roman achievement of defeating him. Although it is unlikely Livy wrote with this in mind it is important to grasp that most Romans, Livy certainly included, saw their own people as being morally superior.

He doesn’t end there, however, and goes on to speak of Hannibal’s “inhuman cruelty”16 and his “total disregard of truth, honour and religion”17. Harsh accusations which are mainly based on his treatment of Italians during his campaign. For example, upon crossing the Apennines and descending into Etruria Hannibal received little support from the Etruscans so, in an attempt to goad Flaminius into a fight he raided and burned as he moved through the area taking supplies from the populace. This viewpoint has been heavily criticised by modern historians. Firstly due to the fact that incidents like this made sound military sense from Hannibal’s perspective because it allowed him to get under the skin of Roman generals, in this case Flaminius. This does not take away from the cruelty however so historians point to the simple logistical problem of maintaining an army in enemy territory as justification. Hannibal had to feed a huge army and in doing so was forced to take supplies from the locals. Arguably this doesn’t excuse any acts of brutality but when put in the context of War it certainly isn’t anything out of the ordinary. The second way in which historians criticise Livy is with regards to the lack of comparison to Roman cruelty of which there was much. When they retook Capua the Romans butchered the aristocracy, enslaved the citizenry and plundered the city. Furthermore, throughout the War Hannibal showed great respect for fallen Roman Generals in terms of their burials which can be compared to Nero, who after the Battle of Metaurus River sent Hasdrubal’s head all the way to Italy to be shown to Hannibal18.

Therefore it is extremely easy to criticise Livy’s interpretation of Hannibal’s character although it is equally important not to portray the situation as too rosy either. There is a slight tendency in current literature on the subject, presumably because it is easy to become

16 Ibid pg 17 Ibid pg 18Gabriel, Richard A, Hannibal: A Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy, Potomac Books, Inc, USA, 2011

13 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley enamoured by Hannibal due to his prowess as a general, to portray him as a just and righteous commander. Obviously this wasn’t the case because ancient War brings out the worst in most people and few emerge from it untouched by wrongdoing so we have no reason to say Hannibal was morally superior to others at the time, but the point is he was no worse than his counterparts.

Livy makes a stab at Hannibal’s lack of religion in the quote used above which only adds evidence to Livy’s failings since this accusation is wholly untrue. Before setting off on his campaign Hannibal made a 700 mile journey from New Carthage to Gades in order to worship the Carthaginian God Melqart which certainly proves he was as committed as anyone at the time.19 There certainly wasn’t a high level of religious tolerance between cultures at this time and thus we can presume it was an off the cuff comment justified because the Carthaginians had a completely different religion to the Romans. Meaning it wasn’t in any way a true reflection of his character.

With Hannibal’s character having been assessed it must now be gauged as a factor for his success. It is clearly a very important factor in that his intimacy with his army and the respect they had for him because of his character were key during the campaign. This is shown clearly in the army’s crossing of the Arno Marshes which was intensely hard. They didn’t walk on dry land for almost a week and many died on the way but despite the hardship the army stayed together and functioning when they came out the other side. It can be argued that this was because Hannibal favoured his non-gallic troops by placing the food train with the Spanish and African infantry or the Cavalry. This meant many more Gauls died than any others but from Hannibal’s point of view this made sense.20 His African and Spanish troops were the backbone of his army whereas the Gauls were expendable therefore it made sense for them to lose out. Thus although morale took a hit Hannibal was able to limit this mainly to the non-crucial part of the army. His intimacy with his army is shown by his placement of himself in the middle of the infantry line at Cannae. This was the area most crucial to the fight but not where a general would usually place himself due to the

19Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Book Club Associates by arrangement with Weidenfield and Nicolson, UK, 1980, pg 86 20 Bath, Tony Hannibal’s Campaigns, Patrick Stephens Limited, UK, 1981

14 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley danger he would face. However Hannibal knew the morale benefit of him being there would be key.

More important still than his own character was his ability to read the character of others which gave him a deeper understanding of the situation meaning he could adapt to each. This was something most of the Roman generals did not possess. The key to understanding any situation at the time was reconnaissance which will be discussed later but was something Hannibal excelled in. The point however was that he understood the situation and more importantly the Generals facing him. The finest example of this is at the Trebia where Hannibal, through reconnaissance, knew about the differing views of the generals; Sempronius and Scipio. Thus he was able to goad Sempronius into a fight that Scipio didn’t want, creating a disconnect between the two men, giving Hannibal the strategic advantage.

It is clear that Hannibal’s character is key to explaining his success during the period from the Trebia to Cannae as it meant he received a lot of respect from his army and was therefore able to hold together what was a very ethnically diverse group of men despite the hardship they faced. Moreover his ability to read the character of others gave him an advantage over his Roman counterparts, who he was able to manipulate before and during battle.

Army Composition

Hannibal’s army was very different to that of the Romans and he was able to use it exceedingly well during the entire campaign but especially at the Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae. The Carthaginians had a long tradition of using large numbers of mercenary troops in their armies21. This means they paid men to fight for them rather than citizens that were conscripted to serve military service for instance. This brought both advantages and disadvantages. Mercenaries fought for a living so were usually well trained and equipped because it was in their interest to be but conversely they were usually fickle and very concerned with money thus lacking in any great respect for those that they served. The

21 Bath, Tony Hannibal’s Campaigns, Patrick Stephens Limited, UK, 1981

15 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley

Carthaginians were fully aware of this fact after the Mercenary War of 240 BC where those who had served Carthage in the First Punic War rose up against them due to problems over pay22.

Due to the focus on mercenaries, the army Hannibal took to Italy comprised of many different types of men. Men from Africa and Spain made up the heavy and most important infantry divisions which Hannibal came to rely on greatly. There were also light infantry usually equipped with javelins from these nations, although a great deal of the infantry used were Gauls from the Po valley which Hannibal acquired after crossing the Alps. These men, who were seen as expendable compared to those that he had brought with him, were generally used to take the brunt of the Roman infantry attack and therefore they consistently suffered the greatest losses of any group23.

Hannibal’s army was unique, however, due to emphasis on the cavalry arm. In this area he constantly had superiority over the Romans for a number of reasons. The first being that he simply brought much larger numbers to the field than the Romans, who relied heavily on their superior infantry. Second, was the way in which the Carthaginian cavalry fought. Gabriel coined the term ‘Intimidating Intimacy’ which alludes to their devastating charge as they were armed with long lances but then when in combat they also had short swords which they used effectively to cut down infantry in hand to hand combat.16 Due also to their superior training the Carthaginians were far more effective than their Roman counterparts, who often dismounted in hand to hand combat rather than fight on their horse. This idea was not new in the ancient world, however, so Hannibal can’t be given too much credit himself. The new style of cavalry combat had been created by Alexander the Great who was the first to train his cavalry in this manner so that they became the deciding factor in battle.24 The last cavalry advantage was the Numidian cavalry that Hannibal hired from the neighbouring African nations to Carthage. These were light cavalry equipped with javelins and only a knife for hand to hand combat while they rode bareback. Compared with the

22 http://www.soldiers-of-misfortune.com/history/truceless-war.htm 23 Bath, Tony Hannibal’s Campaigns, Patrick Stephens Limited, UK, 1981 24 Basler, Matthew R. “The Historian.” The Historian, vol. 70, no. 3, 2008, pp. 599–600. www.jstor.org/stable/24454645. A review of Warhorse: Cavalry in Ancient Warfare by Philip Sidnell

16 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley

Romans they were also very effective, rarely ever coming into contact with opposition forces, they preferred to wheel around and attack with their javelins thus suffering few losses. Their main significance came in reconnaissance however, not on the battlefield. Their mobility meant they could cover large distances and so survey a wealth of terrain around the army meaning Hannibal always had a good idea of the land around him in a way the Romans didn’t, despite the conflict taking place in Italy.

Finally, one cannot talk about Hannibal and his army without his elephants. They are the source of great speculation by modern historians. It was presumed that they were used in the same way as their Asian counterparts, meaning they were mounted by turrets housing archers. More recently, however, research has shown that the beasts used by Carthage were different. It was a breed that is extinct now but used to populate northern Africa. They were, importantly, smaller than both their Asian and modern African counterparts therefore making it unlikely that they could have carried a turret. As further evidence there is no mention of turrets being used in contemporary literature.25 Thus we can presume that they would have been used as shock troops, aiming to cause as much damage and frighten the enemy as much as possible with their charge. Once in battle they were of little use since they were so hard to control. In terms of Hannibal’s campaign elephants didn’t play a vital role. They only appeared in battle at the Trebia where they were of measured use. Notably, Hannibal was able to call them back behind his own lines during the battle which shows two things. Firstly, needing to bring them back shows their limited use in prolonged conflict and secondly it showed the level of control Hannibal had over the battlefield because of the difficulty involved in controlling the animals with a battle raging around them. They shouldn’t be dismissed as useless for the whole campaign however. It is likely that they played a role in securing Gallic allies because of how amazed and scared men who had never seen them before would have been. Obviously this is hard to gauge in a definitive way but we can be sure they played a role in this regard.

25 Charles, Michael B. “AFRICAN FOREST ELEPHANTS AND TURRETS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD.” Phoenix, vol. 62, no. 3/4, 2008, pp. 338–362. www.jstor.org/stable/25651736.

17 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley

Each battle comprised of two armies however and so an overview of the Romans is necessary for an in depth understanding. The Roman army differed hugely to that of the Carthaginian due to the focus on infantry over cavalry, but also its homogeneity. The infantry comprised of three main parts.26 At the front were the Hastati, then the Princeps, then the Triarii at the back. There were minor differences between them but for the most part all three types had very similar equipment. The distinguishing factor between them was their level of experience, the Hastati being the new recruits and the Triarii being the seasoned campaigners. In head on fights they were very well trained and fought effectively as a large body of men, however their homogeneity led to a lack of manoeuvrability and creative strategising. Once the battle began the infantry block would only really be able to move forward and backwards which made them especially vulnerable to Hannibal’s encircling movements.

The cavalry were brought mainly from the noble classes and thus weren’t trained in the same vigorous manner as the Carthaginians. They also possessed much smaller numbers showing how the Romans, at least at that time, simply didn’t know how to effectively use them in battle. This infantry-focused philosophy is also shown by how their allies provided three times as many cavalry compared to how they only had to provide the same number of infantry as Rome itself provided for each Legion.

It would be easy to say that there was a large disparity between the two armies which gave the Carthaginian general, whoever that might have been, a clear advantage. However the dominance of the Roman infantry shouldn’t be underestimated as the breakthrough at the Trebia showed. Hannibal did have superior cavalry but a skilled general was required to put them to use as is shown by the lack of success from other Carthaginian generals in Spain and Sicily during the War. Therefore the army compositions did play a key role in Hannibal’s success during the campaign but only because of Hannibal himself, who was able to make use of what he had. Carthaginian superiority should not be presumed because of Hannibal’s success as personal accomplishments were far more influential.

26 Bath, Tony Hannibal’s Campaigns, Patrick Stephens Limited, UK, 1981

18 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley Hannibal’s Strategy

As has been shown Hannibal certainly didn’t face the Romans in a decidedly advantageous position before any of the three key battles. Despite various disparities between them, the Romans and Carthaginians both had strengths and weaknesses. In terms of numbers they were usually similar although at Cannae the Romans far outnumbered their opponents. We know, however, that luck, although prevalent at times, only goes a small way to Hannibal’s victory and thus his strategy must have been key.

Studying Hannibal’s strategy is easy because there are so many recurring themes that run through the three major battles. Gabriel wrote about four main rules that would have occupied Hannibal’s thinking before a battle.27 The first is how he could maximise shock, usually using a cavalry or elephant charge. The shock factor also increased dramatically if this was aimed at the flank or rear of the infantry or even better if it came from a well- executed ambush. Secondly, he would do his best to make sure the other army was forced to face an obstacle just before or during the fight to lessen their fighting ability by draining their energy. Thirdly, he would always try and tempt the opposing army to fight uphill and, finally, he would never fight unless the circumstances were favourable, usually because he had engineered them.

The Trebia is a fine example of Hannibal using his strategies to good effect. It can be compared to Cannae in many ways because during the battle similar tactics were used, however the outcome of the first battle was much more set in stone due to Hannibal’s impeccable preparation which meant the odds were hugely in his favour. With spies and reconnaissance he understood the divisions between the two consuls and so he knew he could goad the over-confident Sempronius into a fight that Scipio didn’t want. He was able to execute this because of the Numidian cavalry who were able to feign an attack on the Roman camp causing Sempronius to mobilise against Hannibal despite there being little real threat. Furthermore Hannibal, having surveyed the terrain, stationed an ambush party under Mago showing his keen eye for using the land to his advantage; something he did well

27 Gabriel, Richard A, Hannibal: A Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy, Potomac Books, Inc, USA, 2011

19 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley in all three battles, although especially at the Trebia and Trasimene. Early in the morning, without breakfast, Sempronius led his army out and across the Trebia, a large obstacle in itself but freezing cold at this time of year. Therefore, when they finally came to face the Carthaginians who were well fed and prepared, the Roman army were tired, cold and hungry. The Romans aimed to overwhelm the Carthaginian infantry and so placed their stronger men in the middle of the line so they could punch through. Unfortunately this only aided Hannibal’s encirclement tactics as the weaker troops at the edges were overwhelmed by the elephants and Hannibal’s superior infantry. Meanwhile, the Gaul’s, placed in the middle were taking the majority of Carthaginian losses. The cavalry fight predictably went the way of the Carthaginians so they were able to fall on the rear of the Roman infantry and then Mago sprung his trap, finishing the battle. Despite their losses many Romans in the middle of the battle did break through the line but instead of using this to their advantage they carried on moving in the same direction until they reached the nearby town. This shows two things; firstly, the potency of the Roman infantry in a normal front on battle scenario but also the lack of leadership other than that of the main general. There clearly wasn’t anyone who was able to take control and capitalise on their victory. Thus Hannibal’s brilliant planning and cavalry victory won him the Battle of the Trebia.

The Battle of Lake Trasimene is the odd one out of the three because it was a large ambush rather than a pitched battle. Due to being an ambush Hannibal’s planning was once again the most important factor rather than anything that happened during the battle. Once again he read his opponent, Flaminius, exceptionally well. By raiding Etruria and then moving to a more southern position he forced Flaminius to act impulsively. This was partly due to anger but also the fact that Hannibal was between him and Rome so he chased him south. His impulsiveness meant no reconnaissance occurred on the Roman part so he had no way of knowing Hannibal had stopped ahead of him. This was all engineered by Hannibal. Like with Mago’s trap he once again made use of the terrain. Livy downplays this ability of spotting ambush locations by making it sound obvious; “deliberately designed, it would seem, for its sinister purpose”.28 This may have been the case but a good eye was still needed to make

28 Livy, Titus, The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from its Foundation, Books 21-30, Aubrey De Selincourt, Penguin UK, 1972 Pg. 26

20 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley use of such a place, something that Hannibal is able to do consistently. Also the fact that a lot of emphasis in modern writing shows that the morning mist was very important in concealing the Carthaginian army means that the spot chosen by Hannibal wasn’t actually perfect in that it wouldn’t have worked without the mist. Thus we see Hannibal as a gambler, planning as much as he can but also making calculated bets which in this case paid off. Therefore the Romans marched along the road that was sandwiched between the Lake to their right and the hills to their left and when the call was given the whole Carthaginian army descended from the hill onto the Romans who were still in marching formation. The stronger African and Spanish infantry were stationed at the front to prevent Romans breaking away there while the cavalry took the rear blocking off any paths to flee. Hannibal’s role was minimal during the battle as there was no need for any manoeuvring of troops but immediately after the battle he once again showed his worth as his general. He knew that Flaminius had planned to trap him by leading him straight into Servilius, the other consul and his army who were travelling along the same road towards Hannibal. And so he quickly endeavoured to work out the whereabouts of Servilius using his cavalry to reconnoitre. They came across an advance guard mainly made up of cavalry and so they engaged them, winning another comprehensive victory. This meant he would not be threatened by a whole new consular army before he had time to regroup his own army. This episode showed Hannibal’s opportunistic nature and how he was clearly in control of the situation both before and after the battle. He definitely didn’t indulge in his victory until he had full control of the aftermath.

The Battle of Cannae is the best known of the three and this is because of the numbers involved. It is thought that the Roman army comprised of up to 80,000 men, the biggest it had ever fielded, while Hannibal’s was only 50,000 (although he still had around 4,000 more cavalry).29 The casualty figure is even more impressive however. Over 50,000 Romans were killed and the Carthaginians captured 20,000 as prisoners leaving around 10,000 that escaped to the nearby town of Canusium.

29 Gabriel, Richard A, Hannibal: A Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy, Potomac Books, Inc, USA, 2011

21 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley

Unlike the other two battles, Hannibal was cleverly denied the liberty of choosing the site of battle at Cannae. When the two armies were facing each other on one side of the River Aufidus Terentius Varro, one of the Consuls in command of the army, decided to move to the other side to meet Hannibal because that would deprive him of the open ground that would give Hannibal’s cavalry the advantage. On the other side of the river was enough space for the armies to line up but then the terrain became hilly, making a flanking manoeuvre harder. Hannibal was able to cleverly adapt his tactics, however. The Romans lined up their cavalry equally dispersed on either flank. Hannibal on the other hand took a more complicated approach. He put the majority of his cavalry, which were heavy cavalry, on the side closest to the river and only his Numidian cavalry, who were hugely outnumbered, on the other side with a bit more space for manoeuvring. When the battle began the heavy cavalry by the river enacted a head on charge and easily overpowered their Roman opponents, causing many of them to flee. They were then able to swing around behind the Roman army to the other flank. On this side the Numidian’s had harassed but not directly engaged the Romans using their exceptional mobility to their advantage. The heavy cavalry then engaged the Romans who had faced the Numidian’s and they were defeated as well allowing all the Carthaginian cavalry to double back and attack the rear of the Roman infantry.

Although the cavalry could be seen as the deciding arm, the infantry battle was key in Hannibal’s strategy. He had to find a way to overcome the huge difference in numbers and essentially delay any Roman victory so his cavalry could rescue the situation. He went about doing this by setting up his infantry line in a convex shape facing the Romans, with the Gaul’s in the middle and his heavier African and Spanish infantry on the flanks. When the clash occurred the Gaul’s in the middle were ordered to slowly give ground until eventually the shape had been reversed and the Romans occupied the ground in the middle of a concave Carthaginian infantry line. The Roman tactics, like at the Trebia, played into Hannibal’s hands. The Roman infantry, although numerous, was made up mainly of raw recruits due to the desperation with which the army had been raised and so the commanders, Paulus and Varro thought it a good idea to form them into a thinner but much deeper block formation. The thinking behind it was that the less experienced were less likely

22 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley to lose morale and flee if they were part of a large block rather than spread out more thinly in a line. This would make it easier for the heavier Carthaginian cavalry to outmanoeuvre their flanks and begin the encirclement.

The battle plan was executed perfectly. There is no doubt that Hannibal’s strategy won him the Battle of Cannae but the most important thing to note is how he was able to adapt. For the other two good preparation meant the battle was more or less over before it had begun due to how he was able to engineer the circumstances of the battle. This was impossible for Cannae but still, he was able to adapt. Hannibal’s strength of character must also be applauded, however, as despite the flawless plan, it was far from certain that the middle of the infantry line would hold. This is why he placed himself there during the battle to strengthen morale, another insight into his wisdom as a general and the understanding that he shared with his men.

It would be wrong to say the three major battles were the only indicators of Hannibal’s success during the beginning of his campaign although they certainly were the major ones. Therefore his strategy, which played the vital role in allowing him to win those battles, was at the heart of his overall success.

Failures of the Romans

The most important point to investigate when assessing Hannibal’s success is the extent to which he was responsible and the extent to which other factors contributed. With regards to Roman failures, on occasions the lines are certainly blurred. Varro’s decision at Cannae to shorten the infantry line meant it was easier for Hannibal to perform the encirclement suggesting it was a failure on Varro’s part. However, it could just as easily be argued that it wasn’t and it simply turned into one due to Hannibal’s effective strategising. There are, however, many incidents and general facets that limited the Romans’ ability during the beginning of the Second Punic War.

The Roman army functioned because all the soldiers were trained in the same way, even the allied soldiers who bolstered their ranks. This gave generals solidarity but also burdened

23 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley them with rigidity in their tactics. Often they were unable to move men around the battlefield once the fight had begun. Their potency shouldn’t be underestimated, however, and man to man they were far superior at least to their Gallic counterparts if not Hannibal’s heavier infantry from Spain and Africa. This is shown by the breakthrough at the Trebia in the middle of the confrontation. They were of course let down by their cavalry capabilities, an area of battle which they had neglected, since they had previously been able to rely on their superior infantry. Thus when it came to the fore in the Second Punic War they were underprepared to deal with it.

Hannibal was acting with the support of Carthage but due to him being cut off from his homeland he received no orders from them. He acted alone, with the same army throughout and so wasn’t subject to the whims of politics. The same cannot be said for the Romans. They feared praetorianism above all else which led to the consular form of Government, in which each year two consuls would be elected to rule. They then alternated power during the year. This created major problems during times of war, however. Both Consuls took control of a consular army but only for the year that they had power, then the next Consuls would take over. This meant no general could get to know his army in any serious way like Hannibal could because they never spent more than a year with them. It also meant they had very little military experience by comparison. It would be wrong to say they had none, however, because to get to the position of consul by rising up through the ranks, military service was compulsory at points. Therefore they had a little prior experience but really their job was predominantly gubernatorial. Furthermore on occasions when the two consular armies came together the Consuls would switch command of the army daily. When the two leaders differed in opinions on any matter this created big problems as no continuous policy could be followed. Hannibal was able to take advantage of this at Cannae. Paulus was erring on the side of caution whereas Varro wanted a confrontation so Hannibal simply waited until a day when Varro was in command and provoked him to fight.

In times of emergency the Roman Senate was able to elect a dictator for a set amount of time. This occurred after the loss at Lake Trasimene with Fabius Maximus being elected Dictator. Even then, though, Fabius was subject to the problems of politics and factional

24 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley fighting. This is best shown by the Falernian planes incident. Up until that point Fabius, despite the complaints of those in Rome, had been effectively wearing Hannibal down using a strategy of attrition and denying him a pitched battle. Eventually he managed to trap Hannibal on the Falernian planes with nowhere to spend the winter. Hannibal, however, was able to trick the 4000 infantry that had been given the task of keeping watch over the Carthaginian army by sending oxen up a hill at night with lights. The Romans rushed over thinking they were trying to escape the planes, which allowed Hannibal and his actual army through the passage they had been guarding. Fabius was then called back to Rome and his ultimate command taken away so that he now shared control with his previous Master of Horse, Minucius. Had Fabius been able to continue his strategy without interruption it is likely Cannae would never have happened and the Romans would have won the war a great deal quicker.

Thus it is clear that Roman limitations both on the battlefield and in Rome were a large factor in explaining Hannibal’s success in the period between the Battle of the Trebia and Cannae.

The Role of Propaganda

It is incredibly hard to gauge the effect of propaganda because understanding what motivated the average Roman or Carthaginian soldier is nigh impossible due to the lack of historical sources. However, there are historical pointers which help us understand its effect.

Hannibal’s main ploy was to associate himself with the great mythological figure Herakles, therefore justifying his invasion.30 He did this by comparing his trip through the Alps to that of Herakles who then fought and defeated the tyrannical rulers of Italy, freeing its people. Hannibal hoped to use this to persuade the Italian peoples under Roman rule that they were in the same position and he was the one who could free them. This seems to have had little effect on the people of Etruria in 217 BC suggesting a lot of Roman allies were happy to pay

30Miles, Richard, Carthage Must Be Destroyed The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilisation, Penguin UK, 2011

25 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley lip-service to Hannibal but never to actually abandon Rome, although there were some in the south like the city of Capua.

It is likely, however, that a connection with the divine helped Hannibal overcome the culture clashes within his own army. It is clear his character in general played a key role in this but a connection with Heracles would have bound the different types of soldiers, who came from Spain, Africa and Northern Italy, together, allowing Hannibal to harness their individuality and differences to his advantage on the battlefield.

With regards to the Romans, its effect comes through clearest in the behaviour of the generals. The best example is that of Minucius who dedicated an altar to Herakles when he gained equal control of the Roman army with Fabius after the disaster of the Falernian Planes. This shows the connection with Herakles wasn’t trivial but a powerful political tool since it wasn’t just Hannibal and Minucius who strove to be associated with him. Fabius also claimed an affinity with the figure, showing how Minucius’ act was aimed at both Hannibal and Fabius as a political tool to garner support. Thus it is clear claiming an association with Herakles was a common ploy at the time.

Propaganda, in its ancient form, wouldn’t have been as widespread as what we think of as modern day propaganda and although it clearly didn’t play the pivotal role in Hannibal’s success, it’s effect shouldn’t be underestimated as what we see today as myth was very real in the eyes of contemporaries. Livy shows this by devoting a great deal of time to descriptions of omens and the words of oracles which suggests this type of propaganda would have had a profound effect on those exposed to it because to them it was very real.31

Why Hannibal didn’t march on Rome

This question is usually asked with regards to the immediate period after the Battle of Cannae but in actual fact the best opportunity was after the Battle of Lake Trasimene and

31 Livy, Titus, The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from its Foundation, Books 21-30, Aubrey De Selincourt, Penguin UK, 1972 Pg. 26

26 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley there is evidence to suggest that this may have been the plan of Hannibal all along.32 The evidence for this is that there was a Carthaginian fleet near Rome after the battle, suggesting a coordinated naval blockade. The army was only 80 miles away from the capital, a lot less than the 250 after Cannae, while the army was in good shape, numbering 50,000 to 55,000. The Rome garrison consisted of two legions, mustered to protect Rome but they were both only at half strength as they hadn’t received the allied troops that would normally fight with them. Furthermore there was only one other Roman legion in Italy at the time, all the way in the south at Tarentum, meaning Hannibal would be able to impose a relatively long siege without facing much of an external threat. Therefore the question as to why Hannibal didn’t attack Rome after Lake Trasimene is actually a more pressing one than why he didn’t after Cannae.

Perhaps the reason for this being such a big issue when talking about the Second Punic War is what Maharbal, Hannibal’s cavalry commander, said after the battle. He urged his leader to march on Rome and then when Hannibal decided that they would stay and recover he famously said “No man has been blessed with all God’s gifts. You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory.”33 Upon examination it becomes fairly clear as to why Hannibal didn’t follow Maharbal’s advice.

The reason given originally by historians was that Hannibal didn’t have siege equipment with him and therefore wouldn’t have been able to storm the city. This is true, he didn’t, however the Carthaginians were adept at building such equipment on site and there was plenty of resources around Rome which would have allowed this. Therefore this isn’t a good enough reason. The first real reason is simply logistics. The army was 250 miles away and thus wouldn’t have the element of surprise, besides they were heavily burdened by prisoners meaning marching straight away wasn’t a viable option.

The second reason is the position a siege would have put Hannibal in. The main reason he was able to win the three previous battles was his immaculate preparation before battle. In

32 Gabriel, Richard A, Hannibal: A Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy, Potomac Books, Inc, USA, 2011 33 LAZENBY, JOHN. “WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT?” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, no. 67, 1996, pp. 39–48. www.jstor.org/stable/43767901.

27 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley a siege, he would lose this control. He wouldn’t be able to choose the time of battle, for instance and could have been caught in the middle of a relief army and the garrison. It is also unlikely that he would have gained any support or persuaded any confederate states to join him as the closer he got to Rome the longer the time that they had been under Roman rule and thus the lower the chance of their defection34. The garrison had changed little since after the battle of Trasimene and still consisted of two half-complete legions. The problem was that there were now two legions placed in both Gaul and Sardinia, meaning an attack from a relief army was likely to come relatively quickly.

The third reason, which may also go a long way to explaining why Hannibal didn’t attack after Lake Trasimene as well, is his Hellenistic view to war. This means that he thought if he won enough battles against the Romans they would be forced to come to the negotiating table and accept favourable terms that he put forward. This was a fatal misjudgement on his part as it was the Romans’ stubbornness and refusal to come to the negotiating table that eventually allowed them to grind Hannibal and Carthage down. Hannibal also misjudged the loyalty of Rome’s allies which is another reason that explains why he lost in the long run but also explains why he didn’t attack Rome. He believed he could win over enough confederate states to seriously weaken Rome’s authority and thus Carthage would dominate them.

Logistically and militarily speaking it was a risky plan for Hannibal to march on Rome but he consistently showed he was willing to gamble and take chances in this regard. Although difficult, it was the best option for Hannibal since taking Rome was the only real way he could win the war. Therefore the best explanation for him not deciding to march on Rome is his inability to see this fact and simply his long term plan for how he would win the war.

34 LAZENBY, JOHN. “WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT?” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, no. 67, 1996, pp. 39–48. www.jstor.org/stable/43767901.

28 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley CONCLUSION

The over-arching question when assessing the key factors is whether Hannibal himself is responsible for his own success. There is obviously no doubt he was extremely talented but as has been explained there were other factors, namely failure on the part of the Romans. But there is also the argument that his army was superior to that of the Romans and thus he was always going to win the key battles. Perhaps there is some validity in this. Hannibal’s infantry was largely made up of mercenaries, career soldiers, as opposed to the Roman army which consisted almost entirely of citizens. He also possessed a much stronger Cavalry arm, both in terms of damage it could deal in battle but also in simple numbers. Even at Cannae where the Romans numbered 80,000 they didn’t equal the Carthaginian cavalry. This argument doesn’t hold up, however. Many of Hannibal’s men were mercenaries but in the three battles the Romans generally clashed with the Gallic troops because Hannibal couldn’t risk his experienced African and Spanish soldiers. This was because he simply didn’t have the numbers for them to be continually in the middle of the fight if he wanted any for the rest of the campaign. At the Trebia a large block of Roman infantry broke through the middle of the Carthaginian line despite being encircled, showing their potency. It is therefore, not accurate to assume Hannibal had an easy time of it with regards the infantry side of battle, as the evidence suggests the Roman infantry was more effective than its Carthaginian counterpart and often more numerous as well.

This leads us to the conclusion that the Cavalry fight is where the battles were won and lost. There is no doubt in the truth of this statement but what was the role played by Hannibal himself in those victories? As Gabriel points out the Carthaginian cavalry fought with an ‘intimidating intimacy’ that the Romans did not possess.35This potentially shows that there was little Hannibal needed to do to win the battles in this area, however, the reality was that winning the cavalry fight had to then translate to winning the overall battle. For this to happen, extensive planning was needed so that once they had beaten off the enemy cavalry, they knew exactly where to strike next for maximum effect. Thus Hannibal’s role of

35 Gabriel, Richard A, Hannibal: A Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy, Potomac Books, Inc, USA, 2011

29 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley effective planning and comprehensive reconnaissance was key, implying he was the major factor in his own success.

There is no reason to doubt Hannibal’s strategic brilliance but he is in fact responsible for more than that. His characteristics as a general gelled the army together, a factor that should not be understated since the army was made up of so many different ethnic and cultural components. They needed something that bound them and Hannibal, as their general, provided this. His propaganda campaign may have helped to do this although in comparison to military elements, propaganda doesn’t hold much importance as a factor. It is unlikely it would have been able to reach people in the same way as the propaganda we see in modern times. Furthermore his ability to read his opposition and then manipulate them gave him more of a strategic advantage to work with, epitomised by Lake Trasimene where his ability to read Flaminius’ character and his planning turned a potentially difficult battle into a slaughter. This provides further evidence that Hannibal himself is the major factor.

Roman failure is, of course, the most prevalent factor that affected Hannibal’s success other than Hannibal himself. This occurred on the battlefield where Roman generals were consistently outmanoeuvred owing in part to the Roman army composition but also their own lack of creativity, suggestive of insufficient or inadequate training, at least to face a general such as Hannibal. The major limitation of the Roman military system was the political element, however, which limited any general’s ability to form a meaningful relationship with their army and to gain military experience by spending a prolonged period in the field campaigning because the consular system meant leaders only had a year in power and even then it was split. Thus, due to being limited by faction and politics, Roman limitations contributed, to a certain extent, to Hannibal’s success.

In conclusion the key factor in explaining Hannibal’s success during this period is Hannibal himself. The reason for the period being considered a success is due to the battles and thus, Hannibal’s strategy is crucial, while his character and ability to read the character of his enemy were similarly important. There is no doubt, however, that Roman failures both on the battlefield and off it augmented his ability as a general. But these should not be

30 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley overstated and to a large extent it was Hannibal’s ability to take advantage of these failings that served him so well, thus he should take the majority of the credit for Carthaginian success in the Second Punic War in the period that began with the Trebia and ended at Cannae.

Further Research

This piece of research ended up being refined dramatically in its scope, only covering a period of a few years. This allowed me to focus on the military element because the three key battles all occurred in that period but it meant I didn’t have the opportunity to look at the wider picture such as the whole of the Second Punic War and the Punic Wars in general. If I had the opportunity to conduct further research I would look at the years after Cannae in more depth and in particular why Hannibal eventually lost the War. This would include the Battle of Zama and thus some similar military material to that which I have already studied. From what I have read, from a historical perspective the battle offers an insight into the battles I have already studied because it was in many ways the diametric opposite. For example the Romans had the Cavalry advantage for various reasons and so many of the reasons for Scipio’s victory were the same as those that I have cited as reasons for Hannibal’s success. I think that a comparison of Cannae with the Battle of Zama would be a very interesting topic of research.

In a wider, non-military sense, I would like to spend time researching the ideological differences between Hannibal and the Carthaginians with the Romans. This was clearly one of the reasons he did not attack Rome after the Battle of Cannae but, as a theme, it is seen throughout Hannibal’s campaign. Furthermore I would enjoy spending time looking elsewhere from Hannibal, especially at the attitudes of the Carthaginian senate and how this affected the conflict around the rest of the Mediterranean in Sardinia and Spain for instance. In addition, while the processes and politics of Roman Government is something that constantly cropped up when reading Livy and other books such as Brian Caven’s that

31 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley weren’t completely focused on the military element.3637 This was something that clearly had a big impact on the period I researched but I was unable to research in depth and so I would love to go back to it at some point.

The final area which I would be inclined to research in the future is Scipio Africanus himself, as the general who was able to beat Hannibal. I would look at his rise as a commander in Spain during the War and what he did which changed Roman strategy so drastically resulting in their victory at Zama.

EVALUATION

The main problem I encountered with this project was to do with the historiographical element. This is often the case in Ancient History as source material tends to be scarce and is often written or created with an agenda. This is very much true with Livy who wrote from the biased position of a Roman glorifying previous Roman success.38 Thus his work is littered with biases and inaccuracies which I had to be extremely conscious of when reading his work and very cautious when using evidence from his works. I had a slightly different problem with the modern literature, however. The majority of work that I had access to was in the form of survey studies which allows little discussion or disagreement between Historians. I was unable to find any serious monographs that set forward a clear line debate as my access to sources were fairly limited. If I had more time I may have been able to access more university libraries for example, in which I would be more likely to find the sort of argumentative works that I was unable to with the time allocated. Thus there are few thematic disagreements that I was able to talk about in the Literature Review. The disagreements that do exist tend to be over logistical details such as where Hannibal

36 Livy, Titus, The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from its Foundation, Books 21-30, Aubrey De Selincourt, Penguin UK, 1972 37 Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Book Club associates by arrangement with Weidenfield and Nicolson, UK, 1980 38 Livy, Titus, The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from its Foundation, Books 21-30, Aubrey De Selincourt, Penguin UK, 1972

32 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley crossed the Alps or how many men died at a certain battle, things which aren’t relevant to my research question.

Furthermore, in terms of content, my project was very limited by the lack of emphasis on non-military factors. The main area which should have been researched in more depth was Roman Politics. To a certain extent I understood at the beginning that it would play a role and so I did endeavour to learn the basic structures and systems of the Republic at the time, however, on reflection, it may have played a bigger role than I first thought. This is because there was a great deal of information on it in the literature that wasn’t military specific in its scope. Naturally, Livy wrote a great deal about events in Rome because he was writing from the Roman point of view, but in modern literature there was often a focus on Rome. For example, The Punic Wars, which I read as an overview for the period but I then focused more on the military aspects as my research continued, ignoring to a large extent, some of the themes brought up in the book such as Roman Politics.39 The result of this is that I was unable to fully develop my arguments in the Failures of the Romans section of my discussion. If I were to do the project again this is certainly an area I would devote more time too.

There were other, non-military factors, which perhaps should have been brought in to broaden the scope of the project, such as economic or religious elements. One of these factors, which I did address was propaganda although as it turned out this section was constrained, for a number of reasons. The first was simply that I only established it as a factor late on. Carthage Must be Destroyed was the only place which I found any mention of it and this happened to be the last book I read before beginning to put it all together.40 Having written my literature review I quickly realised this was an area in which further research was necessary to supplement my discussion but sadly this was not forthcoming. I was unable to find any useful material on websites such as JSTOR and History Today so I ended up writing the section almost entirely based on one source meaning it was impossible to accurately assess the influence it had on the period. I came to the conclusion that, since it was rarely mentioned, it was unlikely to have had a considerable effect although this is

39 Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Book Club associates by arrangement with Weidenfield and Nicolson, UK, 1980 40 Miles, Richard, Carthage Must Be Destroyed The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilisation, Penguin UK, 2011

33 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley clearly an unsatisfactory and speculative conclusion. If I were to repeat the research project I would discard Propaganda as a major factor and explore others, such as religious influences. Propaganda is connected to religion, especially in the ancient world, thus I would have been able to use the research I had already done, but it would have allowed a much wider subject for me to research. Its effect on the War would have been more obvious as religion was so important to both the Carthaginian and Roman civilisations and would have played a role in the motivation of the soldiers.

In terms of the method, there are a few things I would certainly have done differently were I to do the project a second time. Firstly I would have read and researched more of Polybius so I had a good grasp of both his, and Livy’s work. Because I focused on Livy I was unable to critique modern interpretations on the subject with the same vigour that I would have been able to if I had read both the main two sources in depth.

Secondly, in regards to my timescales, I would have thought more about exactly how long an objective would take. I found that research and planning took longer than expected generally, whereas the actual writing didn’t require the same time commitment. Therefore if I were to do the project again I would allow more time for research, which would benefit the project for obvious reasons, without worrying that I would run out of time later on when writing it out.

Another problem that I encountered was that I had no experience of writing a Literature Review. To overcome this I decided to examine some past dissertations from previous pupils. I looked at three in total and found one especially helpful because the student had actually included a lot of unnecessary content which shouldn’t have been in that section. The marker obviously picked up on this and from reading those comments I gained a much better idea of exactly what needed to go into the Review.

34 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books T. Livy, The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from its Foundation, Books 21-30, Aubrey De Selincourt, Penguin UK, 1972

Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Ian Scott Kilvert, Penguin UK, 2003

R. Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilisation, Penguin UK, 2011

R. A. Gabriel, Hannibal: A Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy, Potomac Books, Inc, USA, 2011

H.H. Scullard, A History of the Roman World: 753-146 BC, university paperbacks, Routledge, 1990

B. Caven, The Punic Wars, Book Club associates by arrangement with Weidenfield and Nicolson, UK, 1980

T. Bath, Hannibal’s Campaigns, Patrick Stephens Limited, UK, 1981

Articles H.C. Boren. “The Historian.” The Historian, vol. 44, no. 2, 1982,pp. 247-248. www.jstor.org/stable/24446146

P. Sabin,”THE MECHANICS OF BATTLE IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, no. 67, 1996, pp. 59-79. www.jstor.org/stable/43767903

M. B. Charles, and P. Rhodan.”’Magister Elephantorvm’: A Reappraisal of Hannibal’s Use of Elephants. The Classical World, 100(4), no. 4, 2007, pp. 363-389. www.jstor.org/stable/25434049.

M.R Basler. “The Historian.” The Historian, vol. 70, no. 3, 2008, pp. 599–600. www.jstor.org/stable/24454645. A review of Warhorse: Cavalry in Ancient Warfare by Philip Sidnell

M.B Charles. “AFRICAN FOREST ELEPHANTS AND TURRETS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD.” Phoenix, vol. 62, no. 3/4, 2008, pp. 338–362. www.jstor.org/stable/25651736

Websites http://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/histroians-ancient-biographies/livy

35 | P a g e

By Ben Sharpley

http://www.ancient.eu/Polybius/ www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195389661/obo-9780195389661-0047.xml https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tony_Bath http://us.macmillan.com/author/richardagabriel http://www.soldiers-of-misfortune.com/history/truceless-war.htm

.

36 | P a g e