The Italians in the Second Punic War: Local Conditions and the Failure of the Hannibalic Strategy in Italy

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The Italians in the Second Punic War: Local Conditions and the Failure of the Hannibalic Strategy in Italy THE ITALIANS IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: LOCAL CONDITIONS AND THE FAILURE OF THE HANNIBALIC STRATEGY IN ITALY DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Michael P. Fronda, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2003 Dissertation Committee: Approved By Dr. Nathan Rosenstein, Adviser Dr. Timothy Gregory ____________________________ Adviser Dr. Barry Strauss Department of History ABSTRACT Rome’s victory in the Second Punic War paved the way for its conquest of the Mediterranean. Yet that victory is bound up with Hannibal's failure in Italy, even though he brought Rome to its knees in the early stages of the war. Previous explanations for the failure of Hannibal's strategy have tended to stress either the hopelessness of this strategy, because of the loyalty of Rome's Italian allies and their willingness to be integrated into the Roman system, or the success of Rome's counter-strategy of attrition, aimed at limiting allied revolts while wearing down Hannibal's forces. Previous scholarship, however, neglects an important dimension of the question of the failure of Hannibal’s strategy; that is, Hannibal’s failure as a diplomat to win over large numbers of Rome’s Italian allies and thus overcome Rome’s long-term strategic advantages. This dissertation looks at the Second Punic War from the perspective of the Italian states in order to explain why Hannibal did not gain more Italian allies. The dissertation is divided into four regional case studies and brings to bear literary, archaeological, numismatic, epigraphic, and topographic evidence. Thus, local political, diplomatic, and economic conditions that shaped the decision faced by Rome’s Italian allies to revolt or to remain loyal to Rome are brought into focus. Aristocrats in various Italian states were motivated more by local and immediate impulses rather than by an ideological attachment to Hannibal or Rome. Therefore, Hannibal was forced to practice ad hoc ii diplomacy – at times threatening Italian cities, at times promising freedom, territory, or power – to gain allies. In particular, when Hannibal won over a number of powerful Italian cities, such as Capua or Arpi, he did so in part by promising to extend those cities’ local hegemonic interests. However, this tended to drive cities that were traditional rivals to his new allies more firmly into the Roman camp. In effect, Hannibal’s success in winning over some cities in a given region actually precluded his chances to win over other cities in the same region. Overall, therefore, local conditions contributed greatly to Hannibal’s strategic failure in Italy. iii Dedicated to J.B. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the members of my committee, Tim Gregory and Barry Strauss, for their input, corrections, and advice, and especially my adviser Nate Rosenstein, without whom this project would have remained a fuzzy seminar paper. I also want to extend a special thank you to Jack Balcer for his support and guidance. I am grateful to my good friends and colleagues Bill Caraher and Jack Wells, as well as David Pettigrew and Dan Sarefield, for both their criticism and camaraderie. I am indebted to Garrett Jacobsen for knowing and listening. Finally, I must acknowledge Jennifer Brecht, for her love, support, and above all patience; without her there is no reason. v VITA December 16, 1970 Born, Binghamton, NY 1994 B.A. History, Cornell University B.A. Classics, Cornell University 1997 M.A. History, The Ohio State University 1994-1999 Graduate Teaching Associate The Ohio State University 1999-present Instructor, Denison University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History (Ancient) Minor Fields: History (Early Medieval) Classics (Latin Literature) vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ ii DEDICATION....................................................................................................................iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v VITA...................................................................................................................................vi LIST OF TABLES..............................................................................................................ix LIST OF MAPS ...................................................................................................................x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................xi INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 The Problem.....................................................................................................................1 Historiography .................................................................................................................2 Subject of the Present Work...........................................................................................18 Organization of the Present Work..................................................................................21 CHAPTER 1 ......................................................................................................................25 1.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................25 1.2 Hannibal’s success and the revolt of Capua (216-215 BC) .....................................31 1.3 The Revolt of Capua’s Allies (216-215 BC) ...........................................................65 1.4 Hannibal’s Limited Success: the failure to win more allies (216-214 BC) .............73 1.5 Longterm Failure of Hannibal’s Strategy in Campania (215-211 BC)..................101 CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................................117 2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................117 2.2 The Revolt of Arpi (216 BC).................................................................................124 2.3 The revolt of the smaller Apulian cities (216 BC).................................................158 2.4 Hannibal’s failure to elicit further rebellions.........................................................167 2.5 Long-term failure of the Hannibalic strategy in Apulia.........................................183 CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................................................................196 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................196 3.2 Hannibalic Success among the Bruttii (216-215 BC)............................................200 3.3 The revolt of Locri and its subordinate allies (215 BC) ........................................205 3.4 The revolt of Croton (215/214 BC)........................................................................224 3.5 Hannibal’s limited success: the failure to win over Rhegium (215 BC) ...............234 3.6 The longterm failure of Hannibal in western Magna Graecia and Bruttium .........245 CHAPTER 4 ....................................................................................................................253 4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................253 4.2 The failure to elicit Tarentum’s revolt (216-213 BC)............................................256 4.3 The Revolt of Tarentum (213/212 BC)..................................................................292 vii 4.4 The Aftermath of the Tarentine Revolt..................................................................301 4.4.1 Metapontum and Heraclea ..............................................................................301 4.4.2 The revolt of Thurii and the limits of local rivalry .........................................305 4.4.3 The revolt of the Lucanians ............................................................................315 4.5 The Roman Re-conquest of eastern Magna Graecia (212-207BC) .......................317 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................332 APPENDIX A..................................................................................................................391 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................408 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Capuan League alliance patterns, 4th-3rd centuries BC.........................................72 Table 2: Campanian alliance patterns, 4th-3rd centuries BC ...............................................92 Table 3: Arpi and its allies, 4th-3rd centuries BC............................................................162 Table 4: Apulian Alliance Patterns, 4th-3rd centuries BC...............................................174 Table 5: Chronology of 215 BC.......................................................................................209 Table 6: Chronology of 217 BC.......................................................................................400 ix LIST OF MAPS Map 1: Campania: Topography and cities.......................................................................379
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