DOCSLIB.ORG

The Imperial Republic

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Imperial Republic HISTORYHISTORY — ROME The Imperial Republic Once a republic reluctant to fight wars except in selfdefense, Rome became an imperial colossus capable of annihilating an entire nation out of sheer spite. by Steve Bonta Romans, who had deployed extra infantry Rome by brute experience that imperial in the center of the formation in hopes of expansion has a high price. This is the third installment in a series of breaking through the Carthaginian lines, Rome had never been a peaceful state. articles on the rise and fall of the Roman found themselves outflanked by elite In the early centuries of the republic, how- Republic. North African cavalry units. Hannibal’s ever, many of Rome’s conflicts were pro- cavalry overwhelmed the Roman cavalry voked by jealous neighbors like the Vols- n all of human history, there have been on both flanks and then swept behind the cians and the Aequans. The early Italian few spectacles to rival the great battles Roman forces to attack from the rear. In peninsula was a tough neighborhood, with I of the ancient world, with their pag- short order, the Romans were completely rival Etruscan and Latin states, including eantry, color — and awful carnage. And hemmed in by the Carthaginians. Han- Rome, jostling for control, and the Gauls, few battles of that age could match the nibal’s numerically inferior forces then who occupied parts of northern Italy, fre- drama that unfolded under the hot Ital- slaughtered the Romans on the field al- quently making incursions southward. ian sun one August morning in 216 B.C. most to a man. Enclaves of southern Italy, called Magna near Cannae during the Second Punic War. When the choking dust of battle subsid- Graeca, or “Greater Greece,” were Greek. On that fateful day, two of the mightiest ed, more than 70,000 Romans lay dead on Though conflict was frequent among all armies ever assembled faced each other for the fields of Cannae, including one con- of these jostling ethnic groups, many of what was to be a cataclysmic showdown. sul and at least two former consuls, not to Rome’s early campaigns against her pen- On one side was arrayed almost the entire mention most of the rest of Rome’s land insular neighbors were defensive, not ex- military force of Rome: eight full legions, forces. Ten thousand more, who had been pansionist. amounting to more than 80,000 men. On left to guard the Roman camp, were taken It was Rome’s dispute with the Greek the other were the forces of Carthage, led prisoner by the victorious Carthaginians, city of Tarentum in southern Italy that by the matchless Hannibal, the greatest foe who themselves had lost only 6,000 men. gave Rome her first taste of conflict with Rome had ever faced. Only 3,000 Romans escaped Cannae alive. an overseas power. The Tarentines request- With dazzling speed, Hannibal had led By all appearances, Rome was doomed. ed the aid of Pyrrhus, who sailed with his his vast army out of Spain, across southern The brilliant and apparently invincible forces across the Adriatic and defeated the Gaul, and over the Alps into Italy before Carthaginian general had virtually wiped Romans in two costly battles, Heraclea Rome even realized he had left the Ibe- out Rome’s military forces in a single and Asculum. In a later campaign, Rome rian peninsula. Hannibal’s army quickly stroke, and the road to Rome itself now finally defeated Pyrrhus at the Battle of inflicted two crushing defeats on Roman lay undefended. Beneventum, but was content to expel him forces, at Trebia and Lake Trasimene. For How could such a tragedy come to from Italy, rather than to seek reprisals on a time, the Romans adopted a policy of pass? In the fairly recent past, Rome had Greek territory. containment, avoiding direct battle with successfully fended off the challenge of Hannibal while harassing his forces and another military genius, Pyrrhus, the king A Fateful Choice attacking his supply lines. But Rome soon of Epirus, a kingdom in southwest Greece. The situation was far different a decade or tired of permitting Hannibal to ravage Rome’s leader at Cannae, Lucius Aemilius so later in 264 B.C., when Rome decided Italy uncontested, and resolved to risk all Paulus, had earned distinction in successful to intervene militarily in a conflict on the in a single battle. Hannibal’s forces, espe- campaigns in Illyricum (in the approximate island of Sicily. The powerful Greek city cially his celebrated elephants, had been area of modern Albania). In the First Punic of Syracuse had besieged the city of Mes- depleted by the arduous trek over the Alps War, the Romans had soundly beaten the sina, which was occupied by an unsavory and the subsequent campaigning. But they Carthaginians, leaving Rome in possession band of Italian mercenaries called the were still formidable: around 50,000 men, of the island of Sicily and with significant Mamertines. The Mamertines frequently including expert cavalrymen from Numid- alliances and interests elsewhere. plundered surrounding territories, as ban- ia in North Africa and slingers from the Now an upstart general with an uncon- dits are wont to do, until Syracuse grew Balearic Islands. ventional, multinational force had invaded weary of their depredations. The Mam- Amidst the din of trumpets and of bat- the Roman heartland and had struck a blow ertines, in turn, called upon both Rome tle cries, the two massive forces charged from which no reasonable observer could and Carthage for help. Initially only Car- across the plain, the respective infantries expect Rome to recover. Hannibal Barca thage jumped into the fray, but then Rome flanked on either side by crack cavalry was tutoring Rome in the costs of empire. — against her better judgment, and rat io- units. As the lines crashed together, the His massive invasion force was showing nalizing that she needed to act as a coun- 34 THE NEW AMERICAN • NOEMBER 1, 2004 terpoise against Carthage’s occupation of solve and the military genius to do Messina — jumped in as well. For the first so. After leading his army across The First Punic War exhausted both time ever, Rome sent a large expedition- the Alps into Italy, he won three ary force overseas, and soon found herself monumental victories against Rome and Carthage for a generation, directly confronting the Carthaginians for the Romans culminating in the but it had kindled in Rome a fatal yen control of Messina and the rest of Sicily. debacle at Cannae, victories that Thus began the first of the three Punic laid the Eternal City itself bare for for conquest. No longer content to Wars between Rome and Carthage. conquest. mind her own affairs in Italy, Rome The First Punic War, one of the costliest Fortunately for Rome, in one of in recorded history up to that time, lasted history’s more enduring myster- began to see herself as the mistress for 23 years. Because it was primarily a ies, Hannibal chose not to follow of the Mediterranean. naval conflict, the Carthaginians, with his crushing victory at Cannae their vast navy and experience with sea warfare, enjoyed a heavy ad- vantage. Nevertheless, the Romans soon built a navy of their own, de- signing their craft after captured Carthaginian vessels, and before long, the tide of the war began to change. Rome enjoyed a substantial constitutional advantage over Car- thage, because the old, oligarchic Carthaginian state could not match the vitality of Rome’s compara- tively open society and competitive marketplace. Rome failed in her at- tempt to conquer Carthage by land, but ultimately won the war at sea, forcing Carthage’s army stranded on Sicily to surrender. The First Punic War exhausted both Rome and Carthage for a gen- eration, but it had kindled in Rome a fatal yen for conquest. No longer content to mind her own affairs in Italy, Rome began to see herself as the mistress of the Mediterra- nean. Besides governing her new Sicilian territory, Rome sought to dictate terms to Carthage at the far western end of the Mediterranean, in Iberia. There, Rome ordered the Carthaginians to keep their forces south of the Ebro River. When the impetuous young Carthaginian general Hannibal flouted Rome’s dictate in 218 B.C., Rome declared war against Carthage for a second time. The Second Punic War was shorter than the first, but its 16 years exacted a far heavier toll on both sides than the first. Hannibal, according to Roman accounts, had Hannibal Crossing the Alps: In one of the most brilliant and unconventional maneuvers in military sworn an oath to fight Rome all his history, the Carthaginian leader Hannibal led his forces, complete with war elephants, across the Alps life and, unlike many of Carthage’s into Italy. Thousands of his men and nearly all of the elephants were lost in transit, but Hannibal still won dissolute nobility, possessed the re- many victories over Rome in the Italian heartland. THE NEW AMERICAN • NOEMBER 1, 2004 35 HISTORYHISTORY — ROME ing tactics kept Hannibal at war to Carthage itself. Only such a bold Rome was soon to learn an awful lesson: bay where direct confronta- move, he argued, would induce Hannibal, tion could not, and Marcus who was still making trouble in Italy, to Imperial republics are inherently unstable. Claudius Marcellus, whose vacate the Roman heartland and return to They must either abandon their designs of forces took Syracuse. But defend his own borders. Rome’s champion, and the Many senators, led by the now-vener- conquest abroad, or modify their domestic central figure of the age, was able Fabius Maximus, opposed Scipio’s policies to better conform to a program of Publius Cornelius Scipio, af- plan.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Calendar of Roman Events
    Introduction Steve Worboys and I began this calendar in 1980 or 1981 when we discovered that the exact dates of many events survive from Roman antiquity, the most famous being the ides of March murder of Caesar. Flipping through a few books on Roman history revealed a handful of dates, and we believed that to fill every day of the year would certainly be impossible. From 1981 until 1989 I kept the calendar, adding dates as I ran across them. In 1989 I typed the list into the computer and we began again to plunder books and journals for dates, this time recording sources. Since then I have worked and reworked the Calendar, revising old entries and adding many, many more. The Roman Calendar The calendar was reformed twice, once by Caesar in 46 BC and later by Augustus in 8 BC. Each of these reforms is described in A. K. Michels’ book The Calendar of the Roman Republic. In an ordinary pre-Julian year, the number of days in each month was as follows: 29 January 31 May 29 September 28 February 29 June 31 October 31 March 31 Quintilis (July) 29 November 29 April 29 Sextilis (August) 29 December. The Romans did not number the days of the months consecutively. They reckoned backwards from three fixed points: The kalends, the nones, and the ides. The kalends is the first day of the month. For months with 31 days the nones fall on the 7th and the ides the 15th. For other months the nones fall on the 5th and the ides on the 13th.
    [Show full text]
  • PHILOPOEMEN IMMODICUS and SUPERBUS and SPARTA the Decision Taken by the Achaean League in the Autumn of 192 B.G at Aegium To
    PHILOPOEMEN IMMODICUS AND SUPERBUS AND SPARTA The decision taken by the Achaean League in the autumn of 192 B.G at Aegium to wage war against the Aetolians and their allies was crucial to the Greeks and their future. Greece proper had been divided for generations among several political bodies — and, in fact, had never been united into one state. Yet all those known as Έλληνες felt the natural human desire to avoid the unnecessary violence, bloodshed, and self-destruction engendered by ceaseless competition for preeminence and hegemomy in the domestic arena. The so-called “Tragic Historians” adopted these emotions as the leitmotif of their principal efforts to delineate the deeds and omissions of the Greek leadership and populace.1 Rome’s powerful political-strategical penetration east of the Adriatic sea, into Mainland Greece, particularly during the later decades of the third century B.C, undermined the precarious balance of internal Greek politics. The embarrassment which had seized most of Greece is easily understandable. Yet the Achaeans at Aegium do not appear to have been inspired by the memory of their ancestors’ resistance to the Persians. The Achaean leaders, Philopoemen not excluded, rejected Aetolian pleas for help or, at least, non-intervention in the struggle that they had started in the name of Έλληνες for the whole of Greece. Somewhat surprisingly, the Achaean leaders hastened to declare war on the Aetolians, anticipating even the Roman crossing to Greece2. These are the bare facts available to us (Livy 35.50.2-6). However, the conventional interpretation of these occurrences derived from Polybius 3 tends to be pathetic more than historical, and consti­ tute an embellished portrait of Achaean policy and politicians of those days rather than an honest guide to the political realities of the Έλληνες and Greece proper.
    [Show full text]
  • War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History
    War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History edited by Philip de Souza and John France CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521817035 © Cambridge University Press 2008 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2008 ISBN-13 978-0-511-38080-8 eBook (Adobe Reader) ISBN-13 978-0-521-81703-5 hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Contents List of contributors page vii Acknowledgements ix Note on abbreviations xi 1 Introduction Philip de Souza and John France 1 2 Making and breaking treaties in the Greek world P. J. Rhodes 6 3 War, peace and diplomacy in Graeco-Persian relations from the sixth to the fourth century BC Eduard Rung 28 4 Treaties, allies and the Roman conquest of Italy J. W. Rich 51 5 Parta victoriis pax: Roman emperors as peacemakers Philip de Souza 76 6 Treaty-making in Late Antiquity A. D.
    [Show full text]
  • Roman Policies Towards Antiochus III and the Greeks from Winter 197/196 B.C
    Roman Policies towards Antiochus III and the Greeks from Winter 197/196 B.C. to Autumn 196 B.C. [Roms Politik gegenüber Antiochos III. und den Griechen zwischen Winter 197/196 a.c. und Herbst 196 a.c.] Eike Hellmut Deutschmann (Universität Hamburg) eike.hellmut.deutschmann@uni-hamburg.de Abstract Zusammenfassung In the Second Macedonian War (200-196 B.C.), the Die res publica verminderte im Zweiten res publica reduced the strength of the enemy King Makedonischen Krieg (200-196 a.c.) die Macht des Philip V apparently to establish a new political gegnerischen Königs Philipp V - anscheinend um order in Southern Balkans: Assumedly a pro- eine neue politische Ordnung im südlichen Roman balance of forces should prevail there, Balkanraum zu etablieren: Vermutlich sollte dort untainted by influence of another major power. A ein romfreundliches Kräftegleichgewicht particular senatorial policy towards the Greeks vorherrschen, auf das keine andere Großmacht probably did not exist before the fighting in Hellas Einfluß hat. Eine speziell an die Griechen gerichtete came to an end in summer 197 B.C. In the same Politik seitens des römischen Senats gab es year, the Seleucid king Antiochus III brought large wahrscheinlich nicht vor Ende der parts of the west coast of Asia Minor under control Kampfhandlungen in Hellas im Sommer 197 a.c. In and set about crossing the Hellespont. Rome dem Jahr erweiterte der seleukidische König subsequently stylized itself as the guardian of Antiochos III. seinen Einflussbereich auf große Teile freedom for the Greeks living in Hellas and Asia der kleinasiatischen Westküste und schickte sich Minor. The statesmen of the res publica could have an, den Hellespont zu überqueren.
    [Show full text]
  • Download PDF Datastream
    A Dividing Sea The Adriatic World from the Fourth to the First Centuries BC By Keith Robert Fairbank, Jr. B.A. Brigham Young University, 2010 M.A. Brigham Young University, 2012 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Program in Ancient History at Brown University PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND MAY 2018 © Copyright 2018 by Keith R. Fairbank, Jr. This dissertation by Keith R. Fairbank, Jr. is accepted in its present form by the Program in Ancient History as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date _______________ ____________________________________ Graham Oliver, Advisor Recommended to the Graduate Council Date _______________ ____________________________________ Peter van Dommelen, Reader Date _______________ ____________________________________ Lisa Mignone, Reader Approved by the Graduate Council Date _______________ ____________________________________ Andrew G. Campbell, Dean of the Graduate School iii CURRICULUM VITAE Keith Robert Fairbank, Jr. hails from the great states of New York and Montana. He grew up feeding cattle under the Big Sky, serving as senior class president and continuing on to Brigham Young University in Utah for his BA in Humanities and Classics (2010). Keith worked as a volunteer missionary for two years in Brazil, where he learned Portuguese (2004–2006). Keith furthered his education at Brigham Young University, earning an MA in Classics (2012). While there he developed a curriculum for accelerated first year Latin focused on competency- based learning. He matriculated at Brown University in fall 2012 in the Program in Ancient History. While at Brown, Keith published an appendix in The Landmark Caesar. He also co- directed a Mellon Graduate Student Workshop on colonial entanglements.
    [Show full text]
  • Interventions by the Roman Republic in Illyria 230 – 167 BC
    Interventions by the Roman Republic in Illyria 230 – 167 BC Submitted by Jack James Willoughby, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classics, September 2018. This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. (Signature) ……………………………………………………………………………… Page 1 of 181 Abstract This thesis aims to determine how and why Rome undertook a series of interventions in Illyria during the period of 230 – 167 BC. The thesis is based on a detailed examination and consideration of the ancient written sources and the subsequent historiography on the subject. The Roman interventions in Illyria during this period have traditionally been treated as a component of wider studies of Roman expansion, although Rome’s involvement in Illyria has recently been examined by Dzino in his 2010 work Illyricum in Roman Politics 229BC-AD68. This work examined the development and integration of Illyricum in Roman political discourse, in which the Roman interventions were a smaller component in the broader study. A study of the Roman interventions in Illyria during the period of 230 – 167 BC has never previously been treated on this scale, nor effectively with a synthesis of the various approaches and pieces of evidence that are now available.
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography
    Bibliography A. Aaboe, Episodes from the Early History of Mathematics (Random House, New York, 1964) A.D. Aczel, Fermat’s Last Theorem: Unlocking the Secret of an Ancient Mathematical Problem (Four Walls Eight Windows, New York, 1996) D. Adamson, Blaise Pascal: Mathematician, Physicist, and Thinker About God (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995) R.P. Agarwal, H. Agarwal, S.K. Sen, Birth, Growth and Computation of Pi to ten trillion digits. Adv. Differ. Equat. 2013, 100 (2013) A.A. Al-Daffa’, The Muslim Contribution to Mathematics (Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1977) A.A. Al-Daffa’, J.J. Stroyls, Studies in the Exact Sciences in Medieval Islam (Wiley, New York, 1984) E.J. Aiton, Leibniz: A Biography (A. Hilger, Bristol, Boston, 1984) R.E. Allen, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle (The Free Press, New York, 1966) G.J. Allman, Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid (Arno Press, New York, 1976) E.N. da C. Andrade, Sir Issac Newton, His Life and Work (Doubleday & Co., New York, 1954) W.S. Anglin, Mathematics: A Concise History and Philosophy (Springer, New York, 1994) W.S. Anglin, The Queen of Mathematics (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995) H.D. Anthony, Sir Isaac Newton (Abelard-Schuman, New York, 1960) H.G. Apostle, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952) R.C. Archibald, Outline of the history of mathematics.Am. Math. Monthly 56 (1949) B. Artmann, Euclid: The Creation of Mathematics (Springer, New York, 1999) C.N. Srinivasa Ayyangar, The History of Ancient Indian Mathematics (World Press Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1967) A.K. Bag, Mathematics in Ancient and Medieval India (Chaukhambha Orientalia, Varanasi, 1979) W.W.R.
    [Show full text]
  • On Ancient Greece
    ANCIENT I ' . A Historical Overview of Greece Greece is located on a peninsula jutting out into the Mediterranean Sea. The Aegean Sea is to the east and the Ionian Sea is to the west. A thin strip of land connects Greece's northern mainland to the Peloponnesus, which is another name for southern Greece. Here the climate and land are poor for farming, but this location is perfect for seafaring-the Greeks have al­ ways been excellent fishermen and sailors. Around 2000 B.C., a tribe called Mycenaeans settled in the Peloponnesus. In 1194 B.C., they attacked the city of Troy on the eastern coast of the Aegean Sea. This began the Trojan War. A blind poet named Homer re- ...______________ .. corded the deeds of the heroes of the Trojan War in the llliad. Homer's other famous epic poem, the Odyssey, told the adventures of a Trojan War hero as he traveled home to Greece after the war. Ancient Greeks believed many gods and goddesses controlled the world and lived in the sky on Mt. Olympus. The mountains and valleys on the mainland of Greece isolated people from each other and caused them to form their own city-states. Everyone thought that their city-state was the best. The Greeks' pride in their own city-state kept them from uniting into a strong country. II. T.S. Denison & Co., Inc. 5 Ancient Civilizatwns-{;reece One of these important city-states was Athens. The people of Athens were divided into three social classes: the upper class, free male land­ holding citizens born in Athens; the middle class, foreign-born merchants; and the lower class, which were slaves.
    [Show full text]
  • 14Th International Conference on the History of Science in East Asia (Paris, 6-10 July 2015): Book of Abstracts Catherine Jami, Christopher Cullen, Sica Acapo
    14th International Conference on the History of Science in East Asia (Paris, 6-10 July 2015): Book of Abstracts Catherine Jami, Christopher Cullen, Sica Acapo To cite this version: Catherine Jami, Christopher Cullen, Sica Acapo. 14th International Conference on the History of Science in East Asia (Paris, 6-10 July 2015): Book of Abstracts. 2015, pp.2015-07. halshs-01220174 HAL Id: halshs-01220174 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01220174 Submitted on 25 Oct 2015 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. SOURCES, LOCALITY AND GLOBAL HISTORY: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND MEDICINE IN EAST ASIA BOOK OF ABSTRACTS 6-10 July 2015 EHESS, Paris 14TH ICHSEA PARTNERS & SPONSORS INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF EAST ASIAN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND MEDECINE GDR 3398 « Histoire des mathématiques » 14TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IN EAST ASIA SOURCES, LOCALITY AND GLOBAL HISTORY: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND MEDICINE IN EAST ASIA BOOK OF ABSTRACTS Designed by Sica Acapo Edited by Catherine Jami & Christopher Cullen 6-10 July
    [Show full text]
  • The Diplomacy of Intervention in the Middle Republic: the Roman Decision of 201/200 B.C.1
    THE DIPLOMACY OF INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE REPUBLIC: THE ROMAN DECISION OF 201/200 B.C.1 Resumen: El artículo argumenta que la histórica decisión mundial de intervenir en la cri- sis geopolítica que estaba convulsionando Grecia en el invierno del 201/200 a.C. tuvo varios elementos determinantes, sobre los que destacó una cultura greco-romana que, en general, observaba la intervención del más fuerte a favor del «injustamente tratado» como una buena acción, como un signo no tanto de poder como de virtud. Palabras clave: diplomacia antigua, intervención interestatal en la Antigüedad, expansión imperial romana. Abstract: The paper argues that the world-historical Roman decision to intervene in the geopolitical crisis that was convulsing the Greek East in winter 201/200 B.C. had many determinants, but one overlooked determinant was a Greco-Roman culture that in general looked upon intervention by the strong upon behalf of the “unjustly treated” as a good thing, as a sign not merely of power but actually of virtue. Key words: ancient diplomacy, ancient interstate interventions, Roman imperial, expansion. Introduction Envoys from four Greek states —Egypt, Rhodes, Athens and Pergamum— arrived in Rome in autumn 201, pleading for Roman intervention against Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus III of Syria. They warned of severe consequences should the power of the two kings be allowed to expand unimpeded. The sudden expansion of the kings’ power was ultimately caused by the weakening and then increasing collapse of Ptolemaic Egypt, which since ca. 280 had formed one of the three pillars of the state-system in the Greek Mediterranean.
    [Show full text]
  • The Italians in the Second Punic War: Local Conditions and the Failure of the Hannibalic Strategy in Italy
    THE ITALIANS IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: LOCAL CONDITIONS AND THE FAILURE OF THE HANNIBALIC STRATEGY IN ITALY DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Michael P. Fronda, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2003 Dissertation Committee: Approved By Dr. Nathan Rosenstein, Adviser Dr. Timothy Gregory ____________________________ Adviser Dr. Barry Strauss Department of History ABSTRACT Rome’s victory in the Second Punic War paved the way for its conquest of the Mediterranean. Yet that victory is bound up with Hannibal's failure in Italy, even though he brought Rome to its knees in the early stages of the war. Previous explanations for the failure of Hannibal's strategy have tended to stress either the hopelessness of this strategy, because of the loyalty of Rome's Italian allies and their willingness to be integrated into the Roman system, or the success of Rome's counter-strategy of attrition, aimed at limiting allied revolts while wearing down Hannibal's forces. Previous scholarship, however, neglects an important dimension of the question of the failure of Hannibal’s strategy; that is, Hannibal’s failure as a diplomat to win over large numbers of Rome’s Italian allies and thus overcome Rome’s long-term strategic advantages. This dissertation looks at the Second Punic War from the perspective of the Italian states in order to explain why Hannibal did not gain more Italian allies. The dissertation is divided into four regional case studies and brings to bear literary, archaeological, numismatic, epigraphic, and topographic evidence.
    [Show full text]
  • Neptune's Altars: the Treaties Between Rome and Carthaga (509-226 B.C.) Author(S): John Serrati Source: the Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol
    Neptune's Altars: The Treaties between Rome and Carthaga (509-226 B.C.) Author(s): John Serrati Source: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 56, No. 1 (May, 2006), pp. 113-134 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4493392 Accessed: 05-07-2019 17:47 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Cambridge University Press, The Classical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Classical Quarterly This content downloaded from 128.32.10.230 on Fri, 05 Jul 2019 17:47:01 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Classical Quarterly 56.1 113-134 (2006) Printed in Great Britain 113 doi: 10.1017/S0009838806000103 NEPTUNE'S ALTARS: THE TREATIES BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE (509-226 B.C.)1 In Book 3.22-7, Polybius surveys the diplomatic history of the relations between Rome and Carthage; here he outlines six treaties, five authentic and one false, which are relevant to his narrative concerning the Punic capture of Saguntum and the outbreak of the Second Punic War. As four of these six pacts come before 264 and the outbreak of the First Punic War, any analysis of Roman imperialism in Sicily during the mid-Republic would be incomplete without taking them into account.
    [Show full text]