HISTORYHISTORY — ROME The Imperial Republic

Once a republic reluctant to fight wars except in selfdefense, Rome became an imperial colossus capable of annihilating an entire nation out of sheer spite.

by Steve Bonta Romans, who had deployed extra infantry Rome by brute experience that imperial in the center of the formation in hopes of expansion has a high price. This is the third installment in a series of breaking through the Carthaginian lines, Rome had never been a peaceful state. articles on the rise and fall of the Roman found themselves outflanked by elite In the early centuries of the republic, how- Republic. North African cavalry units. Hannibal’s ever, many of Rome’s conflicts were pro- cavalry overwhelmed the Roman cavalry voked by jealous neighbors like the Vols- n all of human history, there have been on both flanks and then swept behind the cians and the Aequans. The early Italian few spectacles to rival the great battles Roman forces to attack from the rear. In peninsula was a tough neighborhood, with I of the ancient world, with their pag- short order, the Romans were completely rival Etruscan and Latin states, including eantry, color — and awful carnage. And hemmed in by the Carthaginians. Han- Rome, jostling for control, and the Gauls, few battles of that age could match the nibal’s numerically inferior forces then who occupied parts of northern Italy, fre- drama that unfolded under the hot Ital- slaughtered the Romans on the field al- quently making incursions southward. ian sun one August morning in 216 B.C. most to a man. Enclaves of southern Italy, called Magna near Cannae during the Second Punic War. When the choking dust of battle subsid- Graeca, or “Greater Greece,” were Greek. On that fateful day, two of the mightiest ed, more than 70,000 Romans lay dead on Though conflict was frequent among all armies ever assembled faced each other for the fields of Cannae, including one con- of these jostling ethnic groups, many of what was to be a cataclysmic showdown. sul and at least two former consuls, not to Rome’s early campaigns against her pen- On one side was arrayed almost the entire mention most of the rest of Rome’s land insular neighbors were defensive, not ex- military force of Rome: eight full legions, forces. Ten thousand more, who had been pansionist. amounting to more than 80,000 men. On left to guard the Roman camp, were taken It was Rome’s dispute with the Greek the other were the forces of Carthage, led prisoner by the victorious Carthaginians, city of Tarentum in southern Italy that by the matchless Hannibal, the greatest foe who themselves had lost only 6,000 men. gave Rome her first taste of conflict with Rome had ever faced. Only 3,000 Romans escaped Cannae alive. an overseas power. The Tarentines request- With dazzling speed, Hannibal had led By all appearances, Rome was doomed. ed the aid of Pyrrhus, who sailed with his his vast army out of Spain, across southern The brilliant and apparently invincible forces across the Adriatic and defeated the Gaul, and over the Alps into Italy before Carthaginian general had virtually wiped Romans in two costly battles, Heraclea Rome even realized he had left the Ibe- out Rome’s military forces in a single and Asculum. In a later campaign, Rome rian peninsula. Hannibal’s army quickly stroke, and the road to Rome itself now finally defeated Pyrrhus at the Battle of inflicted two crushing defeats on Roman lay undefended. Beneventum, but was content to expel him forces, at Trebia and Lake Trasimene. For How could such a tragedy come to from Italy, rather than to seek reprisals on a time, the Romans adopted a policy of pass? In the fairly recent past, Rome had Greek territory. containment, avoiding direct battle with successfully fended off the challenge of Hannibal while harassing his forces and another military genius, Pyrrhus, the king A Fateful Choice attacking his supply lines. But Rome soon of Epirus, a kingdom in southwest Greece. The situation was far different a decade or tired of permitting Hannibal to ravage Rome’s leader at Cannae, Lucius Aemilius so later in 264 B.C., when Rome decided Italy uncontested, and resolved to risk all Paulus, had earned distinction in successful to intervene militarily in a conflict on the in a single battle. Hannibal’s forces, espe- campaigns in Illyricum (in the approximate island of Sicily. The powerful Greek city cially his celebrated elephants, had been area of modern Albania). In the First Punic of Syracuse had besieged the city of Mes- depleted by the arduous trek over the Alps War, the Romans had soundly beaten the sina, which was occupied by an unsavory and the subsequent campaigning. But they Carthaginians, leaving Rome in possession band of Italian mercenaries called the were still formidable: around 50,000 men, of the island of Sicily and with significant Mamertines. The Mamertines frequently including expert cavalrymen from Numid- alliances and interests elsewhere. plundered surrounding territories, as ban- ia in North Africa and slingers from the Now an upstart general with an uncon- dits are wont to do, until Syracuse grew Balearic Islands. ventional, multinational force had invaded weary of their depredations. The Mam- Amidst the din of trumpets and of bat- the Roman heartland and had struck a blow ertines, in turn, called upon both Rome tle cries, the two massive forces charged from which no reasonable observer could and Carthage for help. Initially only Car- across the plain, the respective infantries expect Rome to recover. Hannibal Barca thage jumped into the fray, but then Rome flanked on either side by crack cavalry was tutoring Rome in the costs of empire. — against her better judgment, and rat io- units. As the lines crashed together, the His massive invasion force was showing nalizing that she needed to act as a coun-

34 THE NEW AMERICAN • NOEMBER 1, 2004 terpoise against Carthage’s occupation of solve and the military genius to do Messina — jumped in as well. For the first so. After leading his army across The First Punic War exhausted both time ever, Rome sent a large expedition- the Alps into Italy, he won three ary force overseas, and soon found herself monumental victories against Rome and Carthage for a generation, directly confronting the Carthaginians for the Romans culminating in the but it had kindled in Rome a fatal yen control of Messina and the rest of Sicily. debacle at Cannae, victories that Thus began the first of the three Punic laid the Eternal City itself bare for for conquest. No longer content to Wars between Rome and Carthage. conquest. mind her own affairs in Italy, Rome The First Punic War, one of the costliest Fortunately for Rome, in one of in recorded history up to that time, lasted history’s more enduring myster- began to see herself as the mistress for 23 years. Because it was primarily a ies, Hannibal chose not to follow of the Mediterranean. naval conflict, the Carthaginians, with his crushing victory at Cannae their vast navy and experience with sea warfare, enjoyed a heavy ad- vantage. Nevertheless, the Romans soon built a navy of their own, de- signing their craft after captured Carthaginian vessels, and before long, the tide of the war began to change. Rome enjoyed a substantial constitutional advantage over Car- thage, because the old, oligarchic Carthaginian state could not match the vitality of Rome’s compara- tively open society and competitive marketplace. Rome failed in her at- tempt to conquer Carthage by land, but ultimately won the war at sea, forcing Carthage’s army stranded on Sicily to surrender. The First Punic War exhausted both Rome and Carthage for a gen- eration, but it had kindled in Rome a fatal yen for conquest. No longer content to mind her own affairs in Italy, Rome began to see herself as the mistress of the Mediterra- nean. Besides governing her new Sicilian territory, Rome sought to dictate terms to Carthage at the far western end of the Mediterranean, in Iberia. There, Rome ordered the Carthaginians to keep their forces south of the Ebro River. When the impetuous young Carthaginian general Hannibal flouted Rome’s dictate in 218 B.C., Rome declared war against Carthage for a second time. The Second Punic War was shorter than the first, but its 16 years exacted a far heavier toll on both sides than the first. Hannibal, according to Roman accounts, had Hannibal Crossing the Alps: In one of the most brilliant and unconventional maneuvers in military sworn an oath to fight Rome all his history, the Carthaginian leader Hannibal led his forces, complete with war elephants, across the Alps life and, unlike many of Carthage’s into Italy. Thousands of his men and nearly all of the elephants were lost in transit, but Hannibal still won dissolute nobility, possessed the re- many victories over Rome in the Italian heartland.

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ing tactics kept Hannibal at war to Carthage itself. Only such a bold Rome was soon to learn an awful lesson: bay where direct confronta- move, he argued, would induce Hannibal, tion could not, and Marcus who was still making trouble in Italy, to Imperial republics are inherently unstable. Claudius Marcellus, whose vacate the Roman heartland and return to They must either abandon their designs of forces took Syracuse. But defend his own borders. Rome’s champion, and the Many senators, led by the now-vener- conquest abroad, or modify their domestic central figure of the age, was able Fabius Maximus, opposed Scipio’s policies to better conform to a program of Publius Cornelius Scipio, af- plan. Besides the additional cost in men terwards named Africanus. and materiel, the pitfalls of further over- imperial administration — and renounce seas expansion troubled their republican liberty into the bargain. Scipio’s Defiance instincts. Scipio, however, made it very Several of Scipio’s rela- clear that he would ignore Senate au- tives had died in war against thority and appeal directly to the people, with an immediate assault on the Roman Carthage, and Scipio himself was one if need be, to secure approval for the capital, but instead resumed his campaign- of the few to escape the carnage at Can- invasion. ing in Italy, seeking allies among the fickle nae. Young Scipio had, therefore, a very In an epic Senate debate recorded by Roman tributary cities. Some, like Taren- keen appreciation of the potency of the Livy, Fabius reproved his younger col- tum and Syracuse, declared themselves Carthaginian military. He volunteered to league for being more interested in per- for Hannibal and later incurred the wrath lead Roman forces in Iberia and, despite sonal glory than in wise policy. Hannibal, of Rome. Syracuse, defended by the in- his youth, his demeanor so impressed the Fabius pointed out, was still in Italy; did it genious war machines designed by Archi- Senate that he was given the command. not make better sense to undertake the less medes, fell to the Romans after a two-year Scipio was as good as his word, and after glamorous task of defending the Italian siege. Tarentum became a focal point of his forces had defeated the Carthaginians homeland than to seek glory and conquest the war in Italy, with control over the city in Spain, he was hailed as a hero. overseas? “Although you naturally prize changing hands several times between Yet Scipio, for all his brilliance as a lead- more highly the renown which you have Rome and Carthage. er, orator, and military strategist, was also acquired than that which you hope for,” he The Second Punic War produced its a man of boundless personal ambition. He told young Scipio, “yet surely you would share of Roman leaders — among them wanted to achieve greater glory by leading not boast more of having freed Spain from Fabius Maximus, whose careful delay- Roman forces into Africa and taking the war than of having freed Italy.... Why then

167 B.C. 264 B.C. 218 B.C. 202 B.C. Final Triumph Outbreak Outbreak End of Rome over 146 B.C. of First of Second of Second Macedonian Destruction Punic War Punic War Punic War Greeks of Carthage 509 B.C. Founding of the Republic

THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC

753 B.C. Founding of Rome 280 B.C. 241 B.C. 216 B.C. 186 B.C. 149 B.C. Pyrrhus End Battle of Suppression Outbreak invades Italy of First Cannae of the of Third Punic War Bacchic Cult Punic War

36 THE NEW AMERICAN • NOEMBER 1, 2004 do you not apply yourself to this, and carry to the people.” Leaving no doubt of his in- a tributary nation. Hannibal himself, wily the war in a straightforward manner to the tentions, Scipio responded boldly that “he as ever, managed to elude capture and flee place where Hannibal is...? Let there be would act as he thought for the interest of to Syria, where he took refuge with King peace in Italy before war in Africa; and let the state,” in Livy’s words. Antiochus and played a significant role in us be free from fear ourselves before we Scipio’s defiance was the first time in stirring up that potentate to make war with bring it upon others.” Concluding his ad- the history of the republic — though not, Rome. dress, Fabius added witheringly, “Publius unhappily, the last — when a charismatic, Scipio was elected consul for the service successful military leader placed his own War Without End of the state and of us, and not to forward judgment above the laws of Rome and the The third century B.C. closed with Rome his own individual interest; and the armies counsels of the Senate. The Senate, fear- in control of all of the former dominions were enlisted for the protection of the ing a confrontation, eventually authorized of Carthage save a few portions of North city and of Italy, and not for the consuls, Scipio to cross into Africa, giving the Africa and the city itself. Having secured like kings, to carry into whatever part of color of legality to the young general’s the western Mediterranean as Roman do- the world they please from motives of challenge. But his impudence set another minions, Rome now turned her attentions vanity.” gloomy precedent, one that Rome would to the east, where the Greek city-states In reply, Scipio reminded the senators bitterly regret in generations to come were in turmoil, threatened both by a re- that he had lost his father and uncle to — when military leaders less principled surgent Sparta under the despot Nabis and Carthaginian arms, and admitted that he than Scipio would not scruple to trample by ambitious Macedonian rulers seeking did indeed seek greater glory — an instinct underfoot the will of the Senate and the to establish hegemony over the Hellenic that he considered natural and noble. The people alike. world. Now acclimated to her role as Med- Senate, having already been informed Scipio successfully invaded Carthagin- iterranean policeman, Rome sent troops of Scipio’s intent to bypass their author- ian territories in North Africa and won a to Greece to quell the ambitions of Nabis, ity, was unimpressed. Quintus Fulvius, resounding victory at Zama over Hanni- justifying every step of the expedition as a a former consul, bluntly asked Scipio to bal’s hastily recalled forces, ending the mission to liberate the Greeks. declare openly to the Senate whether “he Second Punic War. The city of Carthage After defeating Nabis and his Mace- submitted to the fathers to decide respect- itself was left intact, but the terms of the donian allies, the Roman general Titus ing the provinces, and whether he intended Roman victory denied the Carthaginians Quinctius made a dramatic announcement to abide by their determination, or to put it all but a token military and reduced her to at Corinth to the effect that Rome, having

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greater administrative challenges ond Punic War, the Carthaginians, who The Roman Republic would not outlive to the Roman state. The republic, were first and foremost a commercial, not after all, was designed to govern a military, republic, rebounded economi- fallen Carthage by many generations. Romans within a single cohesive cally. Seemingly content to prosper com- Rome, having sown the wind abroad, territory; her constitution was not mercially under the Roman military yoke, well adapted to the suppression of the Carthaginians strove to keep the oner- before many years would reap the multinational imperial subjects. ous obligations of their treaty with Rome. whirlwind at home. Unfortunately for them, the Roman lust Social Decay for vengeance had not yet been satisfied. At home, too, the character of A large number of Roman politicians restored to the Greeks the freedom that Roman society was beginning to change. viewed the resurgence of Carthage as an was their birthright, would now withdraw The Romans began to develop a taste for unacceptable challenge and agitated for all her forces to Italy. The rumor-mon- luxury and contempt for the austere vir- a resumption of hostilities. Their mouth- gers were wrong, he claimed, who “had tues of earlier times. In 186 B.C., Rome piece was the senator Cato the Elder, spread the calumny that the cause of lib- was shocked by an unprecedented calam- whose condemnation of Carthage was so erty had been wrongly entrusted to the ity that signalized the moral dry rot con- intense that he ended every speech with Roman people, and that the Greeks had suming Roman society. The crisis began, the famous phrase “Carthago delenda est” merely exchanged Macedonian masters according to Livy, with the arrival in Italy (“Carthage must be destroyed”). Rome for Roman lords.” He laid down strong of a mysterious Greek who claimed to be would not rest until she found a pretext recommendations for how the Greeks an initiate of a secret cult dedicated to for eliminating Carthage. Massinissa, the should conduct their affairs in the future, Bacchus, the god of wine and transgres- Numidian king, finally gave her one. and enjoined them to “guard and preserve sive behavior. The Numidians, a rival African power, [their liberty] by their own watchfulness, The cult, with its secret nighttime or- had long been at odds with the Carthagin- so that the Roman people might be as- gies, human sacrifices and other abomi- ians, their former allies. When Massinissa sured that liberty had been given to men nable practices, spread rapidly among the began taking advantage of Carthaginian who deserved it, and that their boon had Romans. The adherents of Bacchus aimed military weakness and attacked Carthagin- been well-bestowed.” According to Livy, not merely to corrupt Roman morals, but ian towns (with the support of Rome), the the source of this account, “the delegates also to undermine the Roman government, Carthaginians, unable to rely on protection listened to these words as if to a father’s according to the consul Spurius Postumius, from Rome, raised their own military and voice, and tears of joy trickled from every who first exposed the conspiracy before the defended themselves. eye.” The servile Greeks watched with en- Roman Senate. “Never,” exclaimed Postu- This was all the pretext that Rome need- thusiasm as, in 194 B.C., the Romans, as mius, “has there been so much wickedness ed. Frothing senators, led by Cato, pointed good as their word, evacuated their forces in this commonwealth, never wickedness to the developing new Carthaginian armed from Greek territory. affecting so many people, nor manifesting forces as an intolerable threat to Rome. Unfortunately for Greece, the Romans’ itself in so many ways....And they have not The Carthaginians were put on notice that ardor for Greek independence was short- yet put into practice all the crimes towards they could expect a Roman invasion and lived. Within a few years, Antiochus of which they have conspired. Their impious utter desolation unless they submitted to Syria, egged on by the vindictive Han- conspiracy still confines itself to private Roman terms. The supine Carthaginians nibal, declared war on Rome and sought outrages, because it has not yet strength sent envoys to Rome to plead their case, allies among the Greeks. In the complex enough to overthrow the state. But the evil but found themselves confronted by a wars that followed, the Roman military re- grows with every passing day.... It aims at hostile united front of Roman leadership turned to Greece to fight Antiochus and his the supreme power in the state.” already resolved upon war. With perfidy Greek allies, and then became embroiled In response to Postumius’ warnings, the more reminiscent of the smirking despots in several decades of war in the eastern Bacchic cult was broken up, its shrines Rome had overthrown in nobler times, the Mediterranean, primarily against the kings destroyed, and many of its adherents im- Roman senators, holding out false prom- of Macedonia, that left Rome in permanent prisoned or executed. For the time being, ises of peace, deliberately misled the Car- control of Greece by about 167 B.C. the fabric of Roman society was kept from thaginians into surrendering hostages and During the first half of the second cen- unraveling; but as the very potency of the armaments to Rome. tury B.C., Rome was not only conquer- Bacchic cult showed, it was starting to fray Even after a huge Roman expeditionary ing the eastern Mediterranean, but was around the edges. force had crossed into Africa, Carthage also constantly at war in Iberia and in was still suing for peace. But it was not to North Africa. While preserving the politi- Carthage’s Last Stand be. The Romans finally showed their hand cal forms of the old republic, Rome was With the Roman conquest of the Mediter- by deliberately demanding what even the transforming into an empire in substance. ranean all but assured by the middle of the terrified Carthaginians could not accept: Her vast new dominions, with their unruly second century B.C., only one lingering evacuating their city and moving inland, citizenries, alien cultures, and harsh, far- challenge lay yet unresolved — Carthage. where they would be resettled. Rome flung geography, would pose greater and After Carthage’s total defeat in the Sec- would demolish the city itself, to ensure

38 THE NEW AMERICAN • NOEMBER 1, 2004 that it could never be a threat again. was soon to learn an awful lesson: Im- sume Carthage, reportedly likened the In dismay, the Carthaginians resolved perial republics are inherently unstable. scene to the destruction of Troy and won- to fight their implacable enemy. The They must either abandon their designs dered aloud whether a similar fate would merciless Roman forces laid siege to of conquest and domination abroad, or befall Rome. As events turned out, the the great city of Carthage, wonder of the modify their domestic policies to better Roman Republic would not outlive fallen Mediterranean for an entire age. The Car- conform to a program of imperial admin- Carthage by many generations. Rome, thaginians proved astonishingly resilient istration — and renounce liberty into the having sown the wind abroad, befor e in their final struggle. Though they had bargain. many years would reap the whirlwind at been beguiled by Rome into destroying Scipio, as he watched the flames con- home. ■ their navy and giving up their weapons, they managed to construct new ships and weapons using resources within the walls of their own city. The entire city worked night and day manufacturing weapons out of any available objects. All metal was melted down to be converted into spear and arrow tips and swords. Even women’s hair was cut off and braided into cords for catapults. The desperate Carthaginians enjoyed several military successes against Rome, but they could not break the siege. Fi- nally, after two years of stalemate, Rome appointed Scipio Aemilianus, the adoptive grandson of Africanus, as the leader of the forces besieging Carthage. Under Scipio’s energetic generalship, the war was soon resolved. As the Carthaginian defenses collapsed, 50,000 of her citizens surrendered to the Romans under a promise of leniency. Their lives were spared, but they were eventually sold into slavery. The remain- ing inhabitants of the city, numbering as many as 650,000, were less fortunate. The Romans systematically slaughtered all the Carthaginians, including women and children, an event that may have been the worst butchery of civilians before the 20th century. It is said that Scipio Aemilianus shed tears of regret as he witnessed the de- struction of Carthage, but that did not stop him from allowing his men to massacre the inhabitants. He then razed the entire city to the ground in a final act of fanati- cal vindictiveness that even the barbarians who sacked Rome in later centuries never equaled. Such was the moral decline of Rome, from a republic reluctant to fight wars ex- cept in self-defense to a belligerent, self- absorbed colossus capable of annihilat- ing an entire nation out of sheer spite. For Rome had become an imperial republic; her chief concern now was not securing Death of a republic, rise of an empire: It could be argued that two republics died in spring the liberty of her own citizens, but the of 146 B.C., when Roman forces, resolved on a program of imperial conquest, stormed and domination of foreign powers. But Rome destroyed Carthage, a centuries-old citadel of Mediterranean trade and culture.

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