―Basically a True Story:‖ the Beginning Or the End, Fat Man and Little Boy, and American Remembrance of the Atomic Bomb

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―Basically a True Story:‖ The Beginning or the End, Fat Man and Little Boy, and American Remembrance of the Atomic Bomb

By Theresa Lynn Verstreater

B.A. in History, December 2008, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of the George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

January 31, 2015

Thesis directed by

Charles Thomas Long Assistant Professor of History

Abstract of Thesis

―Basically a True Story:‖ The Beginning or the End, Fat Man and Little Boy, and American Remembrance of the Atomic Bomb

The impact of film as a vehicle for dissolution of information should not be discounted because it allows the viewer to experience the story alongside the characters and makes historical moments more relatable when presented through the modern medium. This, however, can be a double-edged sword as it relates to the creation of collective memory. This thesis examines two films from different eras of the post-atomic world, The Beginning or the End (1947) and Fat Man and Little Boy (1989), to discover their strengths and weaknesses both cinematically and as historical films. Studied in this way, the films reveal a leniency toward what professional historians might consider to be historical ―truth‖ while emphasizing moral ambiguity about the bomb and the complex relationships among the men and women responsible for its creation. While neither film boasts outstanding filmmaking, each attempts to educate the viewer while maintaining entertainment value through romantic subplots and impressive special effects. The mainstream relatability of both films makes them useful points from which to launch discussions about the subject matter and the way Hollywood has chosen to remember it.

Table of Contents

Abstract of Thesis…………………………………………………………………………ii

List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….iv

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..1

Chapter 1 – The Beginning or the End………………………………….………………..6

Chapter 2 – Fat Man and Little Boy…………………………………...……………….. 24

Chapter 3 – Reflecting and Creating Remembrance……………………………………..40

Conclusion – So What?.……….……………………...……………………………….…55

iii

List of Figures

Figure 1. Drawing of the Chicago pile…………………………………………………….8

Figure 2. The Chicago pile in The Beginning or the End…………………………..……..9

INTRODUCTION

When I was a young teen, I saw a movie about the American Revolution called

The Patriot. There were only two reasons I went to see this movie: first, because my dad raised me to love history in all its forms, and second, because like most girls my age, I was mad for the supporting star, Heath Ledger. The film told the story of a South

Carolina farmer who owned no slaves and wanted no part of independence but who was drawn into the conflict to protect his family. Mel Gibson played Benjamin Martin, the family patriarch and an amalgam for several real revolutionaries.

While the story was based on actual battles and some real historical figures, the central plot regarding the Martin family was fiction invented to represent the experience of reluctant Southern rebels during the American Revolution. The film has been criticized for its omission of race as a major issue during the war and its altruistic portrayal of

Southern farmers. While the film may not detail all the issues of the American

Revolution, it inspired at least one young viewer to seek out her own facts about the people Mel Gibson and Heath Ledger represented and to learn a thing or two about the

Revolution in the southern states.

While I didn‘t learn all I needed to know about the Revolution in the South from

The Patriot, I did learn that history most interested me when it was relatable; Heath

Ledger was someone I could relate to, or at least focus on long enough to get the film‘s message. I have always been a lover of film, and never am I more captivated by history than when it is presented in Technicolor on a giant screen as a well-written and well- acted story.

The impact of film as a vehicle for dissolution of information should not be discounted because it allows the viewer to experience the story alongside the characters and makes historical moments more relatable when presented through the modern medium. This, however, can be a double-edged sword as it relates to the creation of collective memory. When seeing a horror film or a ridiculous comedy where characters make stupid decisions and seemingly impossible things happen, it is easy to remind ourselves that ―it‘s only a movie.‖ But when we‘ve been lulled into familiarity by historical figures or events we know were real, it can be more difficult to remember that we may be seeing more than ―just the facts.‖ Collective memory implies that different demographics might remember a single event in dramatically different ways depending on how people within each demographic experienced it and passed down their own memories, and how the group has reacted to and adapted conflicting narratives about the same event. For example, the American Civil War might also be referred to as The War

Between the States or the War of Northern Aggression, depending on where one hails from and how one‘s family or societal demographic has chosen to remember the war‘s events and causes. Each group‘s remembrance of the event is no less true to those within

the demographic, but it will likely differ from the remembrance of another group depending on which facts are considered most relevant to the group‘s own narrative.

The primary discourse among historians of history and film centers on whether or not history as entertainment is truly historical and if it is beneficial or detrimental to viewers. The most commonly asked question in such discourse is, does it matter if historical films take liberties with historical fact for the sake of cohesive storytelling and entertainment? Whether historians like it or not, historical films are more successful than professional written history at inspiring the general public to study history. In his essay,

―In Defense of the Filmmakers,‖ historian Robert Brent Toplin discussed the popular impact of the wildly successful 1998 World War II film Saving Private Ryan:

Visitors [to Normandy] wanted to see locations depicted in the popular film that starred Tom Hanks. The movie also boosted sales of books about D-Day and its aftermath written by Stephen Ambrose, the popular historian who had served as an adviser to Spielberg‘s movie project…In fact, Saving Private Ryan helped spike a general return of book readers and moviegoers to themes related to the Second World War.1

Toplin posits that moviegoers so easily remember history they see on film because the images create an emotional memory of previously learned history. On film, viewers get to see human characters experiencing history and bringing it off the page.

Toplin recognizes that while historical films help to flesh out history and make it relatable, the historical genre has its flaws. He lays out five major issues present in most historical films: they usually feature ―great men‖ storylines, they focus on events rather

1 Robert Brent Toplin, ―In Defense of the Filmmakers,‖ in Lights, Camera, History: Portraying the Past in Film, ed. Ricard Francaviglia and Jerry Rodnitzky (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 116. 3

than ideas, their history is not comprehensive, they tell one-sided stories, and they focus

―disproportionately‖ on war.2 While all of these are valid arguments against historical film, they are circumstantial to limits of the medium. For the sake of time, several figures are condensed into a single character, as with Mel Gibson‘s character in The Patriot.

Hollywood is incapable of explaining comprehensive historical arguments in a single film or even in a series, and it cannot back the arguments on screen with historiography as a historian can in a book. A film may take creative license with facts in order to maintain the overall message. The central question is: do these creative liberties invalidate the history or the film itself? Very simply, the answer is no.

This thesis will examine two films about the creation of the atomic bomb, The

Beginning or the End and Fat Man and Little Boy.3 Each film tells the story of the creation of the bomb from the perspective of the Manhattan Project‘s military leader,

Gen. Leslie Groves, and its scientific leader, J. Robert Oppenheimer, in addition to some smaller characters created for dramatic and narrative effect. Produced in 1947, The

Beginning or the End was the first film about the atomic bomb and was released barely eighteen months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed. Released in 1989, after the

Red Scare, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Reagan era, Fat Man and Little Boy is a similar story which starred famous anti-armament liberal Paul Newman as a brash and driven General Groves in the race to beat first Germany then Japan to the ultimate military weapon. The production style and tone of each film are representative of the times in which they were produced, and comparing two such similar films released more

2 Toplin, ―Filmmakers,‖ 122-126. 3 In Atomic Bomb Cinema, Jerome Shapiro claimed the latter was a remake of the former, although I have found no further evidence to prove this. It could be easy to assume this, however, because the two films share a very similar storyline and cast of characters. 4

than four decades apart presents a useful model for examining the evolution of American collective memory about the atomic bomb throughout the twentieth century. Studying them side by side reveals how little historical accuracy matters to the meaning of a film that has clearly taken a side in a historical debate.

1. THE BEGINNING OR THE END4

In October 1945, only four months after the atomic bombs Little Boy and Fat

Man had decimated the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an atomic scientist named

Edward Tompkins wrote a letter to a former student, Hollywood star Donna Reed.

Apparently trying to impress the young starlet, Tompkins wrote that he had been absent from correspondence due to his involvement in the development of the atomic bomb, first with Enrico Fermi at the University of Chicago and later at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He was writing with a brilliant idea for a film about the development of the atomic bomb and the life of a scientist at Oak Ridge.5

Ultimately, that film would become Metro Goldwyn Mayer‘s The Beginning or the End, a dramatization of the research, development and use of the first atomic bomb.

While the film sometimes wanders off course due to its mashup of documentary and dramatic styles, its visual effects were remarkable for the time and the screenplay makes

4 This film is not available in any modern medium but is shown periodically on Turner Classic Movies. I was able to locate a video of the film recorded from a TCM broadcast through a colleague. 5 Michael J. Yavenditti, ―Atomic Scientists and Hollywood: The Beginning or the End?,” Film and History 8 (1978): 77. 6

a valiant effort to explore different opinions on the bomb before settling on its moral position.

The opening scene is shot like a newsreel, showing a time capsule ―containing the symbols and products of the first humans in history to harness and use atomic energy,‖ including a print of the movie the viewer is about to see, being sealed until the twenty- fifth century. In the opening credits, the viewer is told, ―This is basically a true story.

However, for dramatic license and security purposes, some rearrangement of chronology and fictionization was necessary‖ and that William A. Considine of the Manhattan

Project served as a technical advisor.

Hume Cronyn as J. Robert Oppenheimer plays directly to the camera and address the twenty-fifth century audience to explain the world in his time. The scene makes sense only because it follows the newsreel, but it plays oddly, especially since it‘s unclear exactly when Oppenheimer is speaking from and he seems more like a nameless narrator than the lead scientist on the project. The film then cuts to a young scientist named Matt

Cochran, played by Tom Drake, working in a Chicago lab with his mentor, Enrico Fermi.

Discussing the possibility of an atomic bomb, Matt argues that science is to ―help humanity, not destroy it.‖ Fermi, though, explains his previous refusal to conduct atomic research in Italy under Mussolini but insists he now considers it essential to beat Hitler to the bomb, and he asks his young colleague, ―Which end of the bomb do you want to be on?‖

As the two are working together attempting to split atoms, fiddling with blinking lights on a small machine resembling a ham radio, a successful test sends them running to

Albert Einstein whom they both apparently know well enough to drop in on. Matt is a

newlywed and must skip his honeymoon to visit with Einstein, but it pays off when

Einstein agrees almost instantly to write to President Roosevelt on Fermi‘s behalf to encourage support for the bomb. A transition scene shot like a newsreel shows various scientists at universities around the country studying atomic energy, flashing next to images of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The choppy transition attempts to justify to the audience the necessity of the bomb as retaliation for the Japanese bombing of Pearl

Harbor. The next scene cuts to Dr. Vannebar Bush, science advisor to the president, warning FDR that the Manhattan Project will cost between one and two billion dollars.

Wondering how to get Congress to approve the spending, FDR asks, ―Will it be just another bomb, or a decisive weapon?‖ At his secretary‘s insistence that Hitler would use an atomic bomb if he had one, FDR phones Winston Churchill who orders his scientists to the United States to collaborate on the project.

A drawing of Chicago Pile-1 under the original Stagg Field at the University of Chicago. Photo courtesy of the Argonne National Laboratory.

At the University of Chicago, Matt shows young Col. Jeff Dixon, the Army‘s observer, around the lab where Fermi‘s team is conducting uranium experiments. Matt escorts Dixon over to a blackboard where he begins to draw and explain how neutrons are applied to uranium to make plutonium, much like a professor in a midcentury instructional video might do. While the scene is clearly written as an educational moment for a post-Hiroshima American audience, the viewer is left wondering how long it will be before Matt speaks directly to camera to deliver an earnest message about atomic energy.

As the enter the lab, Matt laments that it took war for the team to move this far forward on atomic research and claims most scientists don‘t really want to make a bomb. Dixon happily pats him on the shoulder, insisting, ―Just get us that bomb, and get it before Hitler or the Japs.‖ When Matt wonders if they should, Dixon advises him to get the bomb first and do his wondering later.

The Chicago Pile in The Beginning or the End. Copyright MGM, 1947.

The two men enter the room full of scientists where Matt explains the pile to

Dixon. The team begins the test by slowly firing neutrons into the pile of alternating bricks of graphite and pure uranium to create plutonium. After the test produces a stable reaction, Fermi leads the team in a toast, asking, ―God, give us time.‖ Matt, however, seems genuinely disappointed that the test was successful, replying, ―And God forgive us.‖ Immediately after the toast, some scientists resign now that they consider it to be a munitions project.

As Matt leaves the lab, he is flagged at the gate for possible radiation and is sent back to the lab for testing. The audience sees in the lab that the doctors are already aware of the possibility and effects of radiation poisoning and are using rabbits to monitor alpha-radiation. A Radium capsule is found in Matt‘s pocket, it‘s deemed a false alarm, and he is free to go. While this scene is lacking drama, it does seem to be a moment of foreshadowing for young Matt. He goes to meet his wife and openly worries about the consequences of the project he‘s a part of but refuses to share any details about his fears.

His wife, Anne, insists, ―If we can‘t talk about [the problems], let‘s forget them. There are nicer things for the few moments we have.‖ This less-than-subtle reference to the brevity of life seems to be another foreboding moment for our leading man.

At long last, General Leslie Groves makes his first appearance. He‘s assigned to run the new project, warned he probably won‘t enjoy it, and unsurprisingly he seems disappointed, especially upon learning he‘ll have to meet with a young colonel named

Dixon for the briefing. Groves holds a meeting to bring together representatives from collaborative countries, scientists and military personnel assigned to the project, and leaders from major corporations who will co-fund the project. This expository scene

filled with name-dropping and ad placement for companies like General Electric and

Dupont also serves to name the project, Manhattan District, and to explain in short the smaller, compartmentalized projects that would make up the whole. Site W in

Washington near Grand Coulee Dam would house the plutonium plant, Site X in

Tennessee would be home to two uranium plants and a plutonium pilot plant, and Site Y would be an undisclosed testing location. After hearing the plan, the industrialists insist that they must rise to this challenge to create something new as they say American industry has always done. In an unconvincing act of selflessness, they also insist that the patents be assigned to the American people and they themselves be paid only one dollar.

The screenplay emphasizes the number of jobs created for those who built the sites and how important secrecy was to the security of the project, insisting that the scientists kept silent about what they knew because they understood the security ramifications. In the next scene, Groves walks a group through what will become Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He assigns Col. Dixon and Matt to relocate civilians near the Los Alamos test site and they‘re shown packing their belongings and leaving happily with their checks in hand.

The narrator notes, ―Without question, without protest, without even knowing that they were helping to fashion the greatest weapon of all the weapons of war, they left.‖ Dixon arrives at the test site with uranium-235 and Oppenheimer exclaims, ―Finally we‘re in the ballgame, and with a man on first base.‖

Back in Washington, FDR is notified that tests are set to take place in July.

Discussing the urgency of the project, FDR essentially muses on how awful it would be if

Hitler hit us first. To preface the weapon to come, he adds another line to his Jefferson

Day speech: ―We seek peace, enduring peace. More than an end to war, we want an end

to the beginnings of all wars. Yes, an end to this brutal, inhuman, and thoroughly impractical method of settling the difference between governments.‖ It is clear from this addition that FDR believes successfully developing and having use of the bomb will be a preventative measure in the future of warfare, although it is unclear why he thinks an atomic bomb would be less brutal or more human than existing methods. However, FDR dies the day before delivering his speech, leaving the legacy of the bombs in the hands of

Harry Truman.

Back in Los Alamos, Oppenheimer gives a briefing on how the test will go and where everything is on the test site. Groves warns that the only danger to civilians would involve an unnamed small town thirty miles from Ground Zero. As the test begins, the scientists and military personnel take their positions. At t-9 minutes, all observers apply eye protection and copious amounts of sunscreen. At t-2 minutes, they all lie face down, head away from Ground Zero. When the bomb detonates, the mushroom cloud is shown and a massive explosion takes up the entire screen as smoke shoots miles up into the sky.

All the observers turn to watch the explosion and aftermath with large rectangular goggles on. Civilians in a town somewhere feel the blast and wonder in fright if it was an earthquake, an invasion, or two bombers colliding mid-air. Enrico Fermi exclaims that the blast was ―equal to at least 20,000 tons of TNT!‖

After the successful test, Matt strolls with Col. Dixon as they discuss their thoughts for the future. Matt is distressed, remarking, ―You know, at first I thought the bomb might be terrible enough to make man choose between peace and destruction. Now

I‘ve seen it, I wish we hadn‘t made it.‖ Fermi notes that the weapon could be ―very good or very evil.‖ Oppenheimer regrets that FDR didn‘t live to see the project come to

fruition, but Groves is now convinced they will end the war soon. At the Potsdam

Conference, President Truman receives a top secret file containing information about the test. His press secretary, Charlie Ross, reports to Truman that the press received the

Potsdam Declaration transcript and they suspect that we have a weapon no one knows about. Truman tells him about the bomb, stating, ―In peacetime, atomic energy could be used to bring about a golden age…In war, the same energy has destructive power almost beyond the comprehension of man.‖ Ross replies, ―Thank God we‘ve got the bomb and not the Japanese. If they had it, they‘d surely use it on us.‖ Truman tells Ross his advisors predict the bomb will shorten the war by at least a year and informs him of the plan to drop leaflets on possible bomb sites to save Japanese lives. He argues, ―A year less of war…will mean life for three hundred thousand, maybe a half a million of America‘ finest youth. Not only that, but it‘ll mean life for thousands of British, of Russians, of

Chinese, of Japanese—these were the decisive considerations of my consent.‖ Both men agree that there is no other decision but to drop the bomb.

As the bomb is prepared for its journey to the Mariana Islands, Col. Dixon and his girlfriend Jean O‘Leary, secretary to Gen. Groves, and Matt and his wife Anne arrive at the airport to say their goodbyes. As Matt and Dixon leave to board the plane, they continue to discuss Matt‘s reservations about using the bomb. Back in the terminal, Anne and Jean discuss the secrecy of the war, prompting Anne to reveal her own secret: she‘s newly pregnant. Jean, having taken part in discussions about the war and the bomb as

Groves‘ secretary, feels sorry that she can‘t tell Anne where Matt is really going.

The film moves to Tinian in the Marianas where the team is given notice of favorable weather in the next several days. The date of the bombing is set for August 6,

but Matt is told he won‘t be with the plane when it drops the bomb because he‘s a civilian. To prepare the crew, Matt practices assembling the bomb with them the night before. Matt skips a briefing with Groves to continue working with the bomb. Groves says there will be three B-29 bombers, one to drop and two to carry photographers and video cameras to record the blast. The pilots are warned not to fly through the smoke and shown footage of the test bomb so they‘ll be prepared for what they‘ll see. Assembly is scheduled for 0300 and takeoff for 0345. In the lab, Matt continues his work, placing what the audience can assume is plutonium when suddenly he feels very sweaty and dizzy. He accidentally dumps the substance into the bomb and reaches in to retrieve it; rushing in after the meeting has ended, Dixon insists they go see a doctor but Matt says it is too late. Accepting his certain death, Matt muses, ―Maybe this is what I get for helping build the thing.‖ They head to the doctor anyway where Matt is shown with severe radiation burns from neutron exposure. He gives Dixon a letter for his wife before passing out, and the doctor tells Dixon that Matt will be dead by the following day. The audience is spared the horror of whatever death Matt faces, as his weakened state is the last we see of his character.

The next morning, a prayer is said before takeoff and the bomb is loaded onto the plane. Dixon leaves Matt‘s letter with an officer for safe keeping while he is away on the flight. An exact replica of the Enola Gay takes off and the audience is stuck with a horribly shot scene of the crew assembling the bomb. The actors are almost completely blocked by an awkwardly placed beam and not a single frame shows the actual bomb during or after assembly. The scene is block so poorly that it almost feels as if the entire scene was censored for a viewing audience. Dixon finishes the assembly (of camera, of

course) and the pilots instruct the crew to ―grease your faces‖ and put on their goggles as the observers at the test site had done. Pilot Paul Tibbets, who is never acknowledged by name except in the credits, spots Hiroshima below and suddenly begins dodging anti- aircraft fire. Dixon and another crew member look down at Hiroshima as Dixon remarks,

―Two hundred and fifty thousand people down there starting their day. A city about the size of Dallas, Texas. In about one second, they‘ll be wiped off the map, and they‘ll never know what hit them.‖ The other man recalls, ―We‘ve been dropping warning leaflets on them for ten days now. That‘s ten days‘ more warning than they gave us at Pearl Harbor.‖

This exchange implies that not only is this bomb retaliation for Pearl Harbor but that it is no worse than what was done there.

Suddenly a crew member shouts ―Bomb away!‖ and the mushroom cloud rises.

The visual effect resembles dirt expanding in water as the explosion rises straight up into the sky, then spreads out from the base. The Enola Gay begins to shake and all three planes circle around to see the aftermath. The crew looks down to see the entire city in flames and each looks sickened at the sight. Dixon remarks, ―Now I understand what

Matt feared. If ever there is another war, it won‘t be cities burning themselves one at a time but the whole world on fire, eating itself to ashes.‖ As explosions continue in the fire below, Tibbets cries, ―Let‘s get out of here. I feel like we‘re over a dead world.‖

A Morse code message is sent to the command center reading ―Hiroshima destroyed at 0815. En route Tinian.‖ Groves receives word of the successful detonation and exclaims, ―Three years‘ work by a million people, day and night, worry and sweat.

At last!‖

The next scene flashes forward to Anne and Jean waiting at the airport as the team returns from Tinian. Jean assures Anne that Matt must be on the plane since Dixon and an unnamed civilian were both on the passenger list, but when the man steps off the plane and Anne sees it isn‘t Matt, she‘s shockingly calm, as if she expected never to see her husband again. For dramatic effect, Dixon takes both women to the Lincoln Memorial and explains to Anne that Matt saved 40,000 Americans by preventing the bomb from going off but unfortunately he was killed. Dixon graciously leaves out the fact that it would have been Matt‘s fault had the bomb actually detonated. Anne breaks down in wracking sobs even as Dixon hands her Matt‘s letter. In a beautiful double-screen shot, the image of Matt sits next to Anne and reads her the letter as she reads it to herself. In the letter, Matt reveals that because Anne talks in her sleep, he knew she was pregnant when he left. He knows that by the time she reads the letter, she‘ll know about Hiroshima and why he left for the Pacific. He reasserts his doubts about the bomb and the ability of mankind to appropriately handle such powerful technology. In the end, though, he decides that just as early man learned to use fire instead of running from it, modern man can learn to use atomic energy for good. He concludes that man will look back and see everything that came before atomic energy as the dark ages. He implores Anne to understand that man has often been a vile and destructive creature yet has always risen out of chaos to make a better world; that this is mankind‘s ―chance to prove that human beings are made in the image and likeness of God.‖ Remarkably, after an entire screenplay of doubt about the project and his role in it, even up to the moment of his death, Matt seems to have experienced at least one moment of hope that mankind would figure out how not to destroy itself.

The film ends on an unsurprisingly uplifting note. After everything that has transpired, and after almost all involved have repeatedly expressed doubt and fear about atomic power, the bomb detonated successfully and its biggest detractor seems to have come around. The final screen before the credits reads, ―To the people of the 25th

Century: This was THE BEGINNING. Only you, and those who have lived between us and you, can know THE END.‖ The final line suggests that the power Matt feared could be a great gift but only time would tell. The mere fact that the film places the present in the twenty-fifth century assumes that man did not destroy itself with atomic energy.

The screenplay seems to be written both as educational material as well as propaganda. While the film repeatedly tries to explain how atom splitting creates a bomb, clearly attempting to teach the audience something about the technology, it also does so in a very sophomoric way, as when Matt illustrates the process on a blackboard for Col. Dixon but mostly for the audience. Additionally, the love story between Matt and

Anne is so thin that it seems to be little more than a relatable way to illustrate human doubts and fears about the bomb and its potential. Concerning the propagandizing of the bomb, it is worth noting that Matt‘s horrible death due to radiation poisoning is only mentioned but never seen on film, and we only know he is dead because Col. Dixon tells us so. Yet when the flight crew of the Enola Gay and Col. Dixon are dropping the bomb, all they seem concerned with justice is for Pearl Harbor and Matt is already forgotten.

Perhaps his death was only a necessary, or even expected, sacrifice to the greater good.

From the start, critics had a thing or two to say about the film‘s strengths and weaknesses, and all reviews were consistent. During production, Philip K. Scheuer of the

Los Angeles Times visited the set to speak with director Norman Taurog and members of

the cast, and to get an inside perspective on what the film would say about the atomic bomb. The piece was mostly factual, including which actor played which character, where the film was shooting, and what security was like on set. Scheuer did note, though, that Taurog insisted the film would not ―preach ‗one world‘ or any other theory, but ‗will make people draw their own conclusions.‘‖6 Without seeing the completed film, though,

Scheuer could do little more than observe the process.

Once the film was released, however, both praise and criticism were almost identical regardless of which review one might have read. Just two days after the film was released in February 1947, both the New York Times and the New York Herald

Tribune published reviews that one might think had been written by the same person if not for differing bylines. Bosley Crowther of the Times commended the ―graphic and tense‖ reenactments of the Chicago pile test, the Los Alamos test, and the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, although he teased the filmmakers for their ―Buck Rogerish‖ blinking switchboard at the University of Chicago. Crowther also considered the majority of the storyline to be an exciting montage of the bomb‘s development leading to the big event at Hiroshima. What he found quite difficult to stomach, though, was the film‘s

―brashly deceptive introduction,‖ the imitation newsreel introducing the film as a docudrama being placed in a time capsule. Crowther harshly notes, ―It would seem the

Metro people actually think that they have made history….It is a slightly ridiculous conceit.‖ Also, in spite of what Crowther considered effective reenactments, The

Beginning or the End ―is so laced with sentiment of the silliest and most theatrical nature that much of its impressiveness is marred.‖ The actors, he argued, delivered generally

6 Philip K. Scheuer, ―Neutrons Battle Atoms for Movies; M.G.M. Tackles Bomb Theme; New Mexico Test Already Filmed,‖ Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1946, C1. 18

great performances, hindered only by the sloppiness of their respective storylines. One particularly illuminating excerpt argued, ―Wisely, the people at Metro have taken no obvious sides in the current atomic contentions. They‘ve simply said that the development of the bomb and is use were a necessary evil to finish a far more destructive war.‖7 Without realizing it, Crowther contradicts himself by pointing out exactly which side the film takes: it was a necessary evil and it saved lives by preventing a longer war.

On the same day, Howard Barnes of the New York Herald Tribune published his own review, and it seems the two New Yorkers must have viewed the film together because they left with nearly identical impressions. Barnes, too, noted the ―suspense and terror‖ implicit in the subject matter but bemoaned the romantic storylines as ―ridiculous in the billowing shadow of Hiroshima‘s destruction.‖ Barnes felt the only impressive parts of the film were the reenactments of ―more or less factual‖ events from the bomb‘s development and the obvious authenticity of these sequences based on Taurog‘s use of military and scientific consultants. Like Crowther, Barnes believed the acting was successful in the face of the bloated screenplay and unnecessary sap the actors had to overcome. The directing was ―jumpy,‖ with great success in tense scenes of research and testing but almost none in scenes of romance, human drama, and moral struggle. Barnes argued that ―there is actual and presumptive terror enough in ‗The Beginning or the End‘ to make the Hollywood underlining both tasteless and tiresome.‖8

Just two days later, Crowther returned again with a follow-up review, seemingly having given the film more thought but coming to similar conclusions. Crowther

7 Bosley Crowther, ―Atomic Bomb Film Stars at Capitol: ‗Beginning or the End,‘ Metro Study of Historic Weapon, Has Donlevy as Groves,‖ New York Times, February 21, 1947, 15. 8 Howard Barnes, ―On the Screen: The Beginning or the End‖, New York Herald Tribune, February 21, 1947, 13. 19

described the anticipation leading up to the film‘s release based on its subject matter and

Metro Goldwyn Mayer‘s reputation in cinema. Considering the list of stars, the budget, and the research that had gone into it, ―Who better could demonstrate the drama of nuclear fission than MGM?‖ Unfortunately for Crowther, the film did not live up to its own hype, failing to ―evidence any more than a miniature span of the full and conglomerate immensity of the subject of atomic power.‖ Again he praised the tense and thrilling reenactments of the Chicago Pile (Buck Rogers reference included), the Los

Alamos test, and the dropping of the bomb. But he decried the final product as nothing more than a ―Hollywood dramatization of the development of the atomic bomb, played by Hollywood actors in a conventional Hollywood way.‖ He also went on to criticize the

―highly artificial young people‖ portrayed in the two young couples, who he considered

―oddly disconcerting‖ when placed in a scene next to the likes of Enrico Fermi and J.

Robert Oppenheimer. What Crowther seemed most disappointed about in his second review, though, was the ―theatrical solemnity‖ with which the film treated such an important subject matter by its use of the newsreel tactic. He predicted that audiences would be ―thrown off by this corny deceit.‖ In the end, Crowther labeled the film just a romanticized version of important history and hoped ―that the screen, our greatest medium for communicating the drama of nature and man‘s soul, will do a lot better by this subject as we plunge on into this atomic age.‖9

A few weeks later, a Los Angeles critic had kinder words for the film as a whole but especially for its actors. Edwin Schallert of the Los Angeles Times criticized the

―rather naïve‖ time capsule opening of the film and called the romantic subplots

9 Bosley Crowther, ―Atomic Film: Hollywood Tries to Make History With ‗The Beginning or the End,‘‖ New York Times, February 23, 1947, X1. 20

―intrusive.‖ However, putting aside these complaints, Schallert considered it the best chronicle of atomic technology to date and enjoyed the ―earnest‖ performances given by the main characters. He was especially impressed with Godfrey Tearle as FDR, possibly in part because the actor bore such a striking resemblance to the late president. He also enjoyed the performances of Tom Drake as Matt, Hume Cronyn as Oppenheimer, and

Joseph Calleia in his small role as Enrico Fermi. Although Schallert did not enjoy the romantic storylines, he praised all the young actors in those roles as ―exceptional.‖ He also gave a favorable review to director Norman Taurog, attributing ―[responsibility] for fine results‖ to Taurog and producer Sam Marx.10

Another generally positive review came from Mae Tinee of the Chicago Tribune, although she lauded the impact of the film more than its merits or those of its cast.

Admitting that it was hardly the best film that could have been made, she remarked that the final version ―has a tense, exciting, and historic story to tell about a force which can be just what the title indicates‖ and that viewers will ―understand at least [atomic energy‘s] enormous potentiality—for good or evil, as man see fit to use.‖ Tinee worried that the film‘s use of corny flashing lights and science-fiction-movie light and sound effects might distract from the important subject matter, but she implored readers that the film was ―no dry, scientific treatise…Those who must sugar-coat everything, who like their drama obvious will be satisfied, and those who care about their world and their future will find ample food for serious thought.‖11 While not exactly a glowing

10 Edwin Schallert, ―Drama and Film: ‗Beginning or the End‘ Evinces Air of Notable Reality,‖ Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1947, A5. 11 Mae Tinee, ―Atomic Bomb Film Worthy Despite Flaws: ‗The Beginning or the End,‘‖ Chicago Daily Tribune, March 10, 1947, 24. 21

endorsement of the film, Tinee did seem to understand the social impact a film about the bomb could have on her contemporaries.

With a similar tone, scientists and critic Harrison Brown criticized the film for its shortcomings but also insisted that The Beginning or the End was a film absolutely every

American should see. Making an important point about cultural awareness of the bomb,

Brown argued that despite its pitfalls, ―it is, at the present time, the only means by which the greater part of the American population can be given at least some feeling as to what atomic bombs are, what they can do, and what they may mean to the society in which we live.‖ As a scientist, he found it necessary to see the film twice so as to ignore the scientific inconsistencies and review the film as a work of historical fiction. He admitted that his second viewing left him with a far better impression and he presented an important litmus test for judging the success of a bomb movie by asking three questions:

First, forgetting about history, character portrayal, and educational value, how is it as a motion picture? Second, how accurately does the picture represent the facts? Third, and most important from the point of view of all the atomic scientists, what sort of an over-all impression will be given the American public as to the dangers that we face?

In his opinion of the film as a motion picture, he rated it ―poor,‖ decrying especially the ―insipid‖ love stories. He also complained about the misrepresentation of the scientific process behind the Chicago pile but admitted that it would be unlikely to bother anyone outside the physics community. His most important complaint, however, may be the screenplay‘s assertion that Hiroshima had been forewarned of the attack.

Brown argues that Hiroshima was not even considered a primary target and those cities that were papered with leaflets were never warned of the possibility of an atomic weapon.

Additionally, Brown was disappointed, as was this viewer, that no mention was made of

Nagasaki or even the other bombs which were developed.

Concerning the general impressions of the film on the American public, though,

Brown predicted that the film would receive favorable reviews, especially the well- produced scene of the bombing of Hiroshima. But when reflecting on how the film might change Americans‘ perceptions of their own roles in atomic power, Brown was concerned: ―The picture leaves one with the impression that so much good can come from atomic energy that it is sure to over-balance the evil…Just how this will happen is not explained.‖12 Perhaps Brown‘s concern could be alleviated by a reimagining of The

Beginning or the End‘s plot more than four decades later.

12 Harrison Brown, ―The Beginning or the End; A Review,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3 (1947): 99. 23

2. FAT MAN AND LITTLE BOY

Fat Man and Little Boy cannot be considered a landmark film in twentieth century cinema. Although it boasted an impressive cast of talented actors, including Paul

Newman and 1980s heartthrob John Cusack, the script is somewhat boring and the story slides along at too leisurely a pace to condense four years of scientific research into two entertaining hours. However, its technical flaws do not discount it as a valuable document for study; in fact, the film is made more valuable as an example of 1980s invincibility and forgetfulness about the years of war gone by.

The film opens abruptly with eponymous weapons hanging silhouetted in the entrance of an airplane hangar. The audience is informed that the temporal moment is

1942, nine months after Pearl Harbor and General Leslie Groves‘ last day in the Army

Corps of Engineers. Believing he‘s finally being summoned to command in the field,

Groves is called into the office of his commanding officer and informed that he‘s an engineer and not a battle-ready soldier, but his expertise is needed on a scientific project in Chicago. Like the loyal soldier he is, he begrudgingly obeys.

Groves travels to Chicago to meet with an almost cartoonish Leo Szilard in his bathtub for an impossibly brief explanation of Uranium 235 and its incredibly destructive

potential. With a ―hallelujah,‖ Groves flies out the door and on to northern California where he holds an awkward meeting with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer and convinces him to head the science division while reminding him that he‘ll never outrank Groves. When

Groves finally arrives at Los Alamos, New Mexico, in April 1943, work is far beyond schedule and he begins his tenure by gathering the scientists to remind them that nothing they come up with belongs to them but instead to the US Army and that their only purpose is to make an atomic bomb. One scientist snidely remarks, ―Why bother with the bomb? Why not just drop that man on Berlin? It‘ll have the same effect.‖ Finally, John

Cusack as scientist Michael Merriman clumsily appears after having been lost on his way to the remote location.

The film is something of a buddy film in reverse, focusing primarily on the hostile but seemingly symbiotic relationship between Oppenheimer and Groves as the ―good guy‖ and ―bad guy‖ respectively. In contrast to Groves‘ first meeting with the men at Los

Alamos, Oppenheimer coolly explains to them the three-part plan for development: physics and plutonium and uranium testing, creating the bomb‘s materials at Oak Ridge, and building and testing the bomb there at Los Alamos, all of which must be accomplished in the following nineteen months. Cusack‘s Merriman keeps a journal in which he writes how stern he finds Groves but how much he trusts in Oppenheimer regardless of the daunting timeline.

Director Roland Joffe cuts abruptly to a rushed and rather farcical scene portraying and ―a-ha‖ moment of inspiration to use an implosion device with a plutonium core. Merriman and real-life Los Alamos scientist Seth Neddermeyer, played by Joseph

D‘Angerio, are tossing a tennis ball in frustration when their ball suddenly strikes them

with the inspiration for a new type of bomb. Both men rush off to collect Oppenheimer and share their brilliant plan with the other scientists at a pub.

When Groves discovers the public area where the plan was hatched, he scolds

Oppenheimer for his disregard of security protocols. This, however, sparks further complaints from the scientists who feel trapped under the Army‘s thumb, forced to wear security badges, live inside barbed wire surrounded by dogs, their letters censored and their families constantly harassed by the FBI. Groves and Oppenheimer argue over the need for intellectual and spatial freedom for the scientists to work as well as possible, but in the end Groves insists that the lab is their only haven and the rest of the compound falls under his strict rules.

At an odd party at the Oppenheimer‘s rather well-appointed home, Groves assists

Mrs. Oppenheimer in the kitchen and accuses her of breaking her husband‘s concentration, mentioning that his own wife has the ―courage‖ to stay in the background.

Meanwhile, Oppenheimer sneaks away to place a call to Jean Tatlock, a woman confirmed later in the film to be his mistress. The audience learns that Oppenheimer‘s communications are monitored like everyone else‘s as an operator listens in and transcribes his illicit call. Groves‘ aids present him with a transcript of the call, informing him that Jean is a known Communist, but Groves expresses faith in Oppenheimer, insisting he just needs to be ―straightened out.‖

The next scene introduces the audience to the film‘s primary, if underdeveloped, romantic storyline. During testing, a scientist is caught in the blast and Merriman runs out to save him before rushing him to the hospital. There he meets a pretty nurse, Kathleen, whom he‘d seen briefly at Oppenheimer‘s party and she compliments him on his

heroism. He admits that he has a brother serving in the Army, that he feels a need to prove himself to his father since he is not a soldier, but that he‘s become a big fish in a little pond since arriving from Chicago where he was one of the best scientists. In one of the film‘s first moments of reticence about the bombs, Kathleen ponders the difference in the way they‘re each serving their countries, asking, ―If it‘s instinct that makes us want to save a man, what is it that makes us want to kill him?‖

Oppenheimer continues to be distracted by his mistress, Jean Tatlock, even after

Groves warns that exposure of the affair could ruin his place on the project and insists he break it off. Flashing forward to January 1944, Oppenheimer is picked up at a San

Francisco train station by his brother and complains of how his every action and word is monitored. He goes to meet with Jean to end their affair and she begs him not to go. He agrees to stay and they spend a passionate night together, but in the morning when she demands to know what he‘s working on, he refuses to tell. She begs him to abandon her for something tangible like his wife, but not for a secret, and she threatens that if the man she loved is gone, she doesn‘t want to live. The implications for her character become obvious, although the film gives her a rather unsatisfying conclusion—more on that later.

Back at Los Alamos, Oppenheimer grows weary of Neddermeyer‘s failure as implosion tests continually fail. The scientists fear the plutonium won‘t explode properly and that Oak Ridge can‘t produce enough U-235 uranium for an alternative. In another abrupt flash-forward, it is November 1944 with eight months until the project deadline and Groves is on a train when he receives a telegram stating that Germany is nowhere close to having nuclear technology. His fervor for the troubled project is renewed as he

insists, ―If we can give the country the biggest stick on the playground, then I intend to do that.‖

Flashing forward another five months to April 1945, with only three months until the project deadline, scientists are in the field assembling the bomb for testing—although the audience can‘t really be certain which type of bomb they‘re observing—but the tests go well and they achieve the reaction they were searching for. Meanwhile, in an oddly interruptive and somewhat emotionless scene, Oppenheimer receives a telegram that his mistress Jean had committed suicide three months before in January—a full year after their tryst in San Francisco—and falls into a deep depression. Groves goes to

Oppenheimer‘s wife and tries to convince her to snap him out of it for the sake of the work. Oppenheimer refuses, saying he neither needs nor wants to finish the project when

Germany seems sunk, but even if they could recover, he just can‘t handle the work anymore. Groves unapologetically tells him to regain his fire wherever necessary.

Seeming to have emerged from his depression, Oppenheimer is reviewing a bomb schematic with Groves and another scientist when they‘re interrupted by a phone call announcing V-E Day and the entire compound erupts in celebration. At a party celebrating the Allied victory in Europe, Merriman finally gets the girl, kissing Kathleen for the first time in what must have been eighteen months of friendship—a rather delayed development for the primary romantic storyline. In Groves‘ office, Oppenheimer believes the work can now be finished, but Groves decides Japan is now the primary threat.

Oppenheimer insists Japan doesn‘t have the technology and we don‘t need ours, but as the two men stroll to examine the bombs in progress, Groves insists just the threat of having them is important, so we must have them. Back at the party, Mrs. Oppenheimer

finds a note written by her husband, debating the pros and cons of leaving the project. He insists he won‘t be resigning but muses on the possibilities of the new technology in creating a new world.

The film‘s final act begins at the Trinity Test Site in June 1945, one month before the bomb‘s appointed deadline. Merriman and the other scientists on his team perform tests which appear to be successful, although it is never explained exactly what they‘re testing. Regardless of their success, there are whispers of moral dissention to the bomb in the Chicago scientific community, including from noted nuclear physicist Leo Szilard. In a debate at Oppenheimer‘s home, some of the Los Alamos scientists insist Oppenheimer must discuss it with Groves since none of the other generals will listen to them. While some of the scientists have no moral qualms about the bomb or its potential use, some ask, ―How can you rationalize premeditated murder?‖

In Washington, DC, in mid-July with just two weeks until the deadline,

Oppenheimer accompanies Groves to meet with the Secretary of Defense. Oppenheimer tries to explain the scientists‘ ―crisis of conscience,‖ but Groves argues, ―You want to sit on your hands and polish your conscience when we might be able to end this whole thing with one shot?‖ He tells Oppenheimer to bathe in the reality of the bomb and consider the

Senate inquiry he would face if the government spent $2 billion on a weapon that didn‘t happen before bellowing, ―You got one job doctor, give me the bomb. Just give it to me!‖

When meeting with the Secretary of Defense, Groves learns of ongoing negotiations for a Japanese conditional surrender but insists that he can end the war without an invasion. However, he feels undermined upon learning that Oppenheimer‘s scientists are trying to see the president to make their case for diplomacy. A furious

Groves confronts Oppenheimer at dinner, insisting that demonstrating the bomb but not using it, as the scientists advocate, will not turn the Japanese from the warpath.

Pressuring Oppenheimer to have the courage to see the project to fruition, he tells him one must ―show the enemy in the harshest terms you can muster that you play in the same league as they do.‖ Unequivocally, he warns Oppenheimer, ―You‘re either for us or against us.‖ On cue, Groves watches smugly as two uniformed officers recognize

Oppenheimer and stop to thank him for being a part of the work that will end the war for the men on the ground.

In their final meeting in Washington, Groves and Oppenheimer meet with a group of high-ranking officers who are as conflicted as the scientists at Los Alamos. One worries about inciting paranoia in the Russians if they aren‘t warned about the bomb. A general threatens to resign if the bomb is dropped without warning, a dishonorable way to win the war. Oppenheimer, seeming to have resigned himself completely to the bomb, proclaims that if a mere demonstration failed, the Japanese would refuse to surrender and the United States would be out of resources, proclaiming, ―The dropping of the device has always been implicit in this project.‖

Back at Los Alamos, the plutonium cores meant for the final iterations of the bombs are delivered. Merriman and Kathleen discuss how scared everyone around them seems to be—Kathleen wants to make love and build a life and a future together but fears for their fate. Merriman takes the Chicago petition for withholding the bomb to

Oppenheimer but he turns Merriman away, arguing the scientists were chosen to do the technical work and ―we‘re not responsible for its use.‖ Later, as Merriman and his team are assembling the plutonium cores and performing dry runs of the test, a disturbance in

the lab causes him to lose his grip, allowing the cores to touch. To prevent a detonation,

Merriman grabs the plutonium to knock the pieces apart and is fatally infected with radiation poisoning.

At the Trinity Test Site three days before the deadline, Oppenheimer begs Groves for an extra day, fearing they won‘t be ready, but Groves orders him to finish and give

President Truman something big to take to the Potsdam Conference. As has become

Oppenheimer‘s character, he submits. Meanwhile in the hospital, Merriman‘s heart and brain are swelling and his gastrointestinal tract has been destroyed by the radiation. His skin is pale and swollen, his hair has mostly fallen out, and his body has filled with fluid.

His enraged roommate and closest friend, played by John C. McGinley, accosts

Oppenheimer for refusing to stop the bomb after seeing what it can do to a human being, shouting insubordinately at the lead physicist, ―You ought to stop playing God, ‗cause you are not good at it and the position is taken!‖

The night of the first real test of the bomb, Groves pushes Oppenheimer to go through with it in spite of a horrible rainstorm. The scene cuts to Kathleen visiting

Merriman at the hospital to tell him she loves him before he dies. Back at the test site, a team prepares the bomb for assembly and testing as Groves declares, ―I‘ve always believed that the Lord was on our side. Now we‘re going to prove it.‖ From far away, reporters and scientists don huge goggles and apply sunscreen as the Nutcracker Suite unstoppably plays over a loudspeaker. When the bomb detonates, the camera catches the mushroom cloud in the reflection of Oppenheimer‘s goggles as his face is blown back by the force of the wind. The following day, a parade-like convoy rolls through the town as onlookers cheer for Oppenheimer. In the hospital, Kathleen packs up Michael‘s things

and finds a letter written for her before his death. Reminiscent of The Beginning of the

End, in style if not tone, Merriman‘s voice-over recites,

Kathleen my love, you asked me a question once: was it instinct to save a life or to take it? Well I don‘t know, my darling. All I do know is that if we are free to choose, I hope to God we choose life over death, not because I believe the implacable universe cares a damn, but because as I look at you, my darling, I realize how glorious, how magical life can be.

As the voiceover finishes, a celebratory Oppenheimer looks over at a self- satisfied Groves and grows somber.

The end screen text informs the audience that Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima exactly three weeks later on August 6, 1945, followed three days later by the dropping of Fat Man on Nagasaki. At least 200,000 people died as a result of the bombings and Japan surrendered unconditionally on September

2. Oppenheimer immediately became a national hero, but he refused to support the ―Hydrogen Super Bomb‖ in 1949, was stripped of his security clearance in

1954, and was forced from public service before dying of cancer in 1967.

Meanwhile, General Groves lost control of the nuclear arms program and went into business before dying of heart disease in 1970.

Unlike some formulaic Hollywood films, Fat Man and Little Boy ends quite abruptly and certainly without a happy conclusion. The bombs are never detonated except during testing, the audience sees no victims except for an

American scientist, and in the end, the two men leading the project who were seldom waging the same war, let alone fighting on the same side, died unremarkably after achieving almost nothing else.

Contemporary reviews of the film were unforgiving about the film‘s script, casting, and portrayal of actual events. J. Samuel Walker of the Unites

States Nuclear Regulatory Commission stated, ―It is deficient in plot, character development, dialogue, drama, and historical authenticity.‖ Regarding

Hollywood‘s tendency to take liberties with historical accuracy, he noted, ―Fat

Man and Little Boy is filled with howlers that go far beyond the bounds of reasonable dramatic license. The selection of Paul Newman to play the corpulent, chocolate-munching Brig. Gen. Leslie R. Groves in itself is rather ludicrous, particularly in light of the weak script, which wasted his talents.‖

Walker complained that the film invented motivations for both Groves and

Oppenheimer which were not supported by history. He also noted that the film falsely represented the decision to abandon a gun-type uranium bomb and falsely claimed unconditional Japanese surrender.13

Hal Hinson of the Washington Post, on the other hand, seemed to be a big fan of the film as a whole, including its ―documentary matter-of-factness‖ and what he considered to be the brilliant casting of Paul Newman as General Leslie Groves. Hinson felt that Newman gave ―dimension and strength of purpose‖ to the character of Groves which Hinson believed was written as a master manipulator. The character of

Oppenheimer, however, was hopelessly miscast in Hinson‘s professional opinion. Stage actor Dwight Schultz made his film debut playing the famous scientist as ―stiff and actorly; like an irredeemably tone-deaf singer, he hits only false notes.‖ Schultz‘s

Oppenheimer couldn‘t stand up to Newman‘s Groves as was needed to make him a

13 J. Samuel Walker, Review of Fat Man and Little Boy, by Tony Garnett, The Journal of American History, 77 (1990): 1120-1121. 33

convincing costar. Even secondary characters portrayed by John Cusack and Bonnie

Bedelia earned a positive review from Hinson as ―strong, moving contributions,‖ but poor Schultz could do no right. It‘s worth noting, however, that Hinson‘s remembrance of the Manhattan Project shows through in his interpretation of Fat Man and Little Boy as a

―great man‖ film. He lauded the filmmakers for not turning the movie ―into an anti-nuke platform,‖ instead making a film to prove ―that though what these men created was perhaps apocalyptically monstrous, they behaved heroically.‖ Hinson took away from the film the message ―that men, not governments, shape history‖ and that this was the filmmakers‘ ―offering of hope for the future.‖14 From the tone of his review, Hinson seemed to argue not that Newman was a better actor than Schultz but that Groves was a greater man than Oppenheimer.

While Hinson appreciated the film as a character study of its two leads, The

Chicago Tribune’s Dave Kehr saw the opposite, arguing, ―[director Roland] Joffe is much more interested in issues than people, and the personal exchanges in his new film are almost completely unilluminating and uninvolving—they take the form of speeches, and they‘re blunt, histrionic and passionless.‖ Kehr blamed the film‘s casting for its failure as much as Hinson praised it for the same reason. Kehr didn‘t decry Schultz‘s performance or casting so much as his casting alongside Paul Newman. Schultz ―seems like a decent, hard-working actor,‖ but his mere humanity next to Newman‘s bright star made him seem ―pouty and dull.‖ However, Kehr wasn‘t wowed by Newman‘s performance either, complaining that his profoundly liberal reputation and natural charisma poked through the crude ―manipulativeness‖ he tried hard to embody. But it

14 Hal Hinson, ―‗Fat Man‘: The Tangible Character of History,‖ The Washington Post, October 20, 1989, B1. 34

wasn‘t just the main characters Kehr was dissatisfied with. He criticized the dawdling, clichéd love triangle among young scientists played by John Cusack and John C.

McGinley and their lady love, a nurse played by Laura Dern. This criticism is fair enough, though, as director Roland Joffe spent so little of the film on this storyline and did almost nothing to develop the characters in the context of their relationships, leaving the audience to wonder if McGinley was really in the triangle at all. Additionally, the subplot regarding Oppenheimer‘s Communist mistress ―played for pure melodrama, though it too fizzles out when Joffe, with excessive prudence, places its climax offscreen.‖15 The mistress, played wonderfully by Natasha Richardson, had so little character development that her abandonment by Oppenheimer and her underplayed suicide only made Oppenheimer‘s character less worthy of the audience‘s sympathy for the man meant to be the moral center of the film. Kehr seemed to be so distracted by his disappointment in the casting, underdeveloped characters, and dull screenplay that he forgot he was supposed to be watching a film about the development of the world‘s first atomic bomb.

The criticism of Joffe‘s direction went much further in a review by Vincent

Canby of the New York Times. Canby described Joffe‘s success in collaborating with screenwriter Bruce Robinson to create ―a movie of terminal dimness.‖ Canby was disappointed with the oversimplification of the two main characters, Groves as a typical tough guy who couldn‘t contribute to the conversation except to reassert his position as the boss, and Oppenheimer as a pretentious and neurotic egghead whose morals were somewhat clouded by his love of women and booze.

15 Dave Kehr, ―Issues Overshadow Personal Side of ‗Fat Man,‘‖ Chicago Tribune, October 20, 1989, CNA38A. 35

Canby‘s primary complaint is the film‘s utter lack of focus. Canby remarked, ―It doesn‘t worry its head too much about scientific phenomena, though the audience is there when an eager young scientist, squeezing an orange, more or less (in this film‘s terms)

‗discovers‘ implosion.‖ Indeed, the film makes no attempts to explain to the audience exactly what the scientists are doing or why, even in the condescending way in which The

Beginning or the End scribbled its theories on a blackboard. Canby did not lament

Schultz‘s uninspired acting as had other critics, instead blaming Joffe for restraining him, over-directing Schultz into near catatonia until he looked ―like an actor who isn‘t sure of where to put his hands.‖ Canby also noted how vocal Joffe had been about his anti-nuke sentiments, making it all the more frustrating that the film ―was so stunningly ineffective, that General Groves‘ hawkish statements are more persuasive than the dove-ish apprehensions expressed by the scientists. Even the sight of a scientist dying horribly of radiation poisoning fails to be moving.‖ Canby described the screenplay as ―hapless‖ and

Joffe‘s direction as ―imperial.‖16 While not exactly compliments to the film or the man at the wheel, Canby barely approached the level of snarky disregard displayed by The

Washington Post’s Desson Howe.

Howe‘s review could make a reader wonder if critics were being paid to hate

Dwight Schultz and love Paul Newman, but even bribes couldn‘t fully accomplish the latter. After calling Schultz ―the worst ‗J. Robert Oppenheimer‘ ever to chainsmoke his way through a docucrama,‖ Howe refuses to even discuss him for the remainder of the review. Of Newman, he remarked, he was ―the only one in the ensemble who displays vital signs, and fitfully at that.‖ Even the poor beleaguered supporting cast gets no recognition from Howe except as unfortunate victims of the film‘s jumbled and

16 Vincent Canby, ―Creating the Bomb, In ‗Fat Man,‘‖ New York Times, October 20, 1989, C15. 36

unfocused subplots. What bothered Howe more than anything, though, is the way the

―resoundingly disastrous‖ (yet simultaneously ―innocuous‖17) film made him long for the images of nuclear blasts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki just to see some semblance of action or emotion, only to be left unfulfilled by a text-only epilogue.

In a far less scathing review, Gene Siskel neutrally summarized the plot and only briefly lamented the ―corny romantic subplots‖ which dragged the film into mediocrity.

Siskel was satisfied with the way the screenplay handled the complex relationship between Groves and Oppenheimer, boiling it down to a difference in priorities. While he complains only briefly about the romantic storylines involving John Cusack, Laura Dern,

Dwight Schultz, and Natasha Richardson, what Siskel was more disappointed in was the lack of realism in the film due to its ―awkwardly written sequences‖ which spoke more to conventional entertainment rather than ―documentarylike reality.‖18

In his inimitable style, Roger Ebert of the Chicago Sun-Times explained the film‘s pitfalls in the context of film at the time as well as in comparison to another great film from the same decade. These comparisons reveal the insurmountable task it must have been to tell a fictional story about a real event with both emotion and realism based on such a poor screenplay and with such poor direction. The other film Ebert referred to was ―The Day After Trinity,‖ a 1980 documentary which used both documentary footage and interviews with scientists who worked at Los Alamos. Ebert recalled writing ―that it

‗delivered more suspense than most of the thrillers I have seen,‘ and now that we have a fiction film to compare it to, that is even more clear.‖ Ebert called the story of the creation of the atomic bomb one of ―intellectual drama‖ in which the scientists constantly

17 Desson Howe, ‗‖Fat Man and Little Boy,‖ The Washington Post, October 20, 1989, G43. 18 Gene Siskel, ―Subplots Mar Main Story of ‗Fat Man, Little Boy,‘‖ Chicago Tribune, October 20, 1989, CNA38A. 37

contemplated the implications of the weapon they were building. Fat Man and Little Boy, however, ―reduces their debates to the childish level of Hollywood stereotyping, giving us a simplified personality conflict‖ between Groves and Oppenheimer. Joffe depicts

Groves as a ―saner, gentler version of George Patton,‖ Oppenheimer is ―brilliant but unworldly,‖ and ―since the two men do not really violently disagree on anything, their conflict reduces itself to emotional speechmaking, which…is not really about anything.‖19

Unlike the documentary Ebert so enjoyed, Fat Man and Little Boy showed the social life of Los Alamos without any of the tension. As did other reviewers, Ebert complained about the oversimplification of the scientific process and criticized the way the film seemed to delegitimize its own characters who should have the viewer‘s respect:

―After work, the scientists attend cocktail parties that seem to exist only to introduce minor characters, or they sit around holding earnest (but very brief) discussions that are so simplified by the screenplay that they sound like parodies.‖ Ebert also bemoaned

Joffe‘s haphazard attempt to include some romance and character development, noting that the film is ―cobbled together so ineptly that Cusack‘s death scene is intercut with the night of the first bomb test and is so thoroughly upstaged that it never really gets the emotional reaction it deserves.‖ Ultimately, Ebert believed the actors could not overcome the shortcomings written into their characters. Newman couldn‘t create anything from a character written as a ―schoolmaster and scold,‖ Schultz was stuck playing a ―muted and befuddled‖ version of the real Oppenheimer, and the unbelievably young and naïve cast of scientists ―look like high school kids playing adults in the class play.‖ Even the

19 ―Fat Man and Little Boy,‖ RogerEbert.com, accessed February 24, 2013, http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/fat-man-and-little-boy-1989. 38

realistic desert setting couldn‘t save the tone of the film when cinematographer Vilmos

Zsigmond cast the set in dull brown tones instead of bright southwestern sun. Ebert seemed mostly disappointed in the film about the Manhattan Project that was so ―thin and unfocused and hardly even suggests the enormous moral and practical questions that the scientists wrestled with in the New Mexico desert.‖20

In the end, it seems Fat Man and Little Boy, if it is indeed a remake of The

Beginning or the End, only served to recreate the original film‘s shortcomings for a new generation.

20 ―Fat Man and Little Boy.‖ 39

3. REFLECTING AND CREATING REMEMBRANCE

As previously mentioned, historical accuracy is one of the most commonly debated issues concerning historical films. Of course, both films depict a true event, the creation of the atomic bomb. But since both films rely on a small group of main characters with which to drive the narrative, some creative liberties were bound to be taken to serve a more effective narrative for film.

In February 1947, the same month The Beginning or the End was released, former

Secretary of War Henry Stimson published his account of the events leading up to the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He recalled that after a meeting with the president‘s Interim Committee on June 1, it was decided that, ― The bomb should be used on Japan as soon as possible,‖ that it should be used on a target that would inflict both military and collateral damage, and that ―it should be used without prior warning [of the nature of the weapon].‖21 This directly contradicts the statement in The

Beginning or the End that leaflets had been dropped on Hiroshima warning them of an impending atomic attack. Stimson also noted that rural targets and demonstrations in

21 Henry L. Stimson, ―The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 3 (1947): 39. 40

uninhabited areas of Japan had been considered but were ruled out because they were not considered likely to compel Japanese surrender, especially if they proved ineffective.

Another moment in the film which has raised concern with historians is Truman‘s conversation with his aide about the lives that could be spared by dropping the bomb and preventing a long ground war. Stimson recalled plans before the bomb to launch a

Japanese attack by air bombing and ground and naval invasion, all of which would take place over the course of eighteen months from 1945 to1946. The strategy called for five million U.S. soldiers; Stimson predicted at least one million American casualties and many more for the Japanese. Such predictions actually make the film‘s prediction of

500,000 lives spared seem conservative.

Stimson noted in his account one major reason he had given President Roosevelt for why he believed in a favorable outcome for the bomb—―We have great moral superiority through being a victim of her first sneak attack.‖22 Stimson clearly believed that the bomb was not only necessary to ending the war before it cost more lives but that it was a morally justified response to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The tone of this line is reflected in the brief conversation the on-screen crew of the Enola Gay has before dropping the bomb when they muse on how much warning the Japanese were given after giving none before Pearl Harbor. Stimson also came to the same moral conclusion as young Matt Cochran about the bomb as a necessary evil, remarking,

The face of war is the face of death; death is an inevitable part of every order that a wartime leader gives. The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand Japanese. No explanation can change that fact and I do not wish to gloss over it. But this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put

22 Stimson, ―Atomic Bomb,‖ 41. 41

an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids, and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies.23

Also similar to the film was Stimson‘s belief that man now had a certain method for destroying himself and that the dropping of the atomic bomb made certain there could never be another war.

While the tone of Stimson‘s account is generally similar to that of the film, perhaps the group most disappointed in the liberties taken by the filmmakers were not historians but the scientists who took part in the Manhattan Project. In an attempt to have their story told and to capitalize on the potential fame of being connected with the scientific advancements made on the project, some scientists encouraged members of their own community to collaborate with Hollywood producers to create a film which would glorify their work. Metro Goldwyn Mayer assured atomic scientists that it was not concerned with speed over accuracy in the production of a film about atomic energy, but

―working on a limited budget, [it] was primarily interested in profitable mass entertainment.‖24 In his study of the atomic scientists and their involvement in the film,

Michael Yavenditti noted, ―Despite its technical flaws, historical inaccuracies and dramatic shortcomings, The Beginning or the End popularized selective images of the atomic bomb project and the bomb‘s use on Japan that reassured American viewers who wanted to believe the atomic attacks were justifiable.‖25 Edward Tompkins, the scientists responsible for bringing the idea to MGM, believed that the only scientists who had real control over the film‘s content were those who agreed to be portrayed in the film. He

23 Ibid, 67. 24 Yavenditti, ―Atomic Scientists,‖ 77. 25 Ibid, 77. 42

even believed that it was worthwhile to sacrifice some degree of scientific accuracy in the film for the sake of spreading the story of the atomic bomb to a large audience.

Yavenditti pointed out that the scientists were mostly concerned with the potential glorification of Gen. Groves as the hero of the project. Producer Samuel Marx insisted that Oppenheimer be portrayed as the man giving orders and as someone ―extremely pleasant…with a love of mankind, humility and a pretty fair knack of cooking.‖26

Yavenditti also pointed out, though, that the military may have been even more successful in pulling production screens. In one example, the original scene in which

Truman comes to the decision to use the bomb was perceived as too flippant regarding such a grave choice and the entire scene was rewritten and reshot to create an image of

Truman‘s careful deliberation and solemn decision after meeting with military, scientific, and political advisors. However, instead of attributing moral ambiguity about the implications of possessing such a powerful weapon to the entire community of scientists on the project as in Fat Man and Little Boy, The Beginning or the End assigned the entirety of the moral dilemma to one man in the character of Matt Cochran.

Yavenditti posited four main themes The Beginning or the End used to convey the

―wisdom and justice of building and using the bomb:‖ the success story of American scientists, military, and government to achieve such a feat in secret; the scientific race with the enemy; the careful deliberation of both FDR and Truman before using the bomb; and hope for an atomic future in which man could decide whether to use his new creation for good or evil. The character of Matt represents almost all of these themes, yet while he was created to portray the moral quandary of saving lives by creating a devastating weapon, his eventual death caused by that very weapon was inadequately portrayed.

26 Ibid, 80. 43

Rather than experiencing the full range of symptoms of radiation poisoning, Matt simply faints after pondering whether he‘s being punished for creating the bomb. His experience was nearly opposite of poor Michael in Fat Man and Little Boy who died horribly while wrapped in impressive visual effects. Despite its many inaccuracies, though, Yavenditti pointed out that based on the number of viewers who saw The Beginning or the End and the small percentage of Americans who knew much of anything about the atomic bomb, if only a small number of Americans saw the film, ―its impact could have been significant; countervailing information was still classified, unpublished, or available to the public in fragmentary or highly technical accounts.‖27 Ultimately the film told audiences what they wanted to hear: those who built the bomb were intelligent and wise as well as moral and humane, and the bomb was a necessary evil used to prevent even further loss of life.

In another study of the collective memory created by The Beginning or the End,

Louis B. Mayer reportedly told Albert Einstein in regard to historical authenticity, ―It must be realized that dramatic truth is just as compelling a requirement on us as veritable truth is on a scientist.‖28 He also reminded Gen. Groves that MGM was not Harvard and was not beholden to historical truth. Author Nathan Reingold made note of the use of clichéd romantic subplots to move the narrative along. While Oppenheimer seemed pleased with the way he was portrayed, Groves was sorely disappointed in his character‘s gruff, forceful relationship with the project‘s investors and in the ―womanizer and wise guy‖ the screenplay cast as his subordinate, a man the Army Corps of Engineers would

27 Ibid, 85. 28 Nathan Reingold, ―MGM Meets the Atomic Bomb,‖ The Wilson Quarterly 8 (1984): 158. 44

never have tolerated.29 Reingold concluded that despite the studio‘s occasional conflicts with scientists from the project and attempts to manufacture romantic drama alongside real wartime drama, the film failed to make it into even the top seventy-five highest grossing films of 1947. He wondered, ―Did the Beginning or the End really matter? Not in any way that is easy to describe. Although its distortions went largely unremarked, they also went largely unseen.‖30 This poor return begs the question, would the film have been more successful if it had stuck with only the true drama of the bomb, or perhaps if it had invented further scientific drama instead of manufacturing silly romances?

In similar ways, Fat Man and Little Boy manufactured dramatic relationships, although the romantic story was less prominent than the spitfire relationship between

Paul Newman‘s Groves and Dwight Schultz‘s Oppenheimer. Director Roland Joffe compared the film‘s two main characters to two pieces of the bomb, stating, ―the way

[Groves and Oppenheimer] reacted to each other is to me very much a mirror image of the way these two things respond when they are brought together.‖31 The 1989 film contributed as much to the collective memory of the bomb by its casting as it did by its screenplay. Both actors were cast as the opposites of themselves. Newman, an outspoken opponent of war and the bomb, was cast as a tough, intimidating version of Groves who constantly demanded of Oppenheimer that he buck up, finish the work, and deliver the bomb. Dwight Schultz, previously known mostly for his comedic role on The A-Team, was a conservative in favor of the bomb but who played a version of Oppenheimer who constantly vacillated between power hungry and morally conflicted.

29 Reingold, ―MGM,‖ 160-161. 30 Ibid, 163. 31 Larry Rohter, ―The Road to Critical Mass: Fat Man and Little Boy Looks Back at the Personalities Who Ushered in the Nuclear Age,‖ New York Times, October 15, 1989, H15. 45

Joffe‘s agenda in making the film was clear when he said, ―It was inevitable that the bomb should have been built, but my own view is that it would have been much more courageous not to have dropped it…If enough people care, if enough people feel that their values are offended by spending an enormous amount of time creating weapons of mass destruction, we‘ll take that step and stop them.‖32 Regarding the film‘s place in history, Newman believed, ―If they young people manage to get a history lesson out of this at the same time, in a comfortable and entertaining way, that will be useful.‖ He also enjoyed the opportunity to step out of the mold he felt Hollywood was trying to cast him in and play the opposite of himself: ―It is like a puritanical lady playing a whore, and there‘s got to be something liberating about that.‖ But in spite of Joffe‘s political agenda and Newman‘s obvious enthusiasm for the film‘s potential to inform young people, Joffe seemed content with stretching historical truths, even if he seemed a bit confused about what they were. He remarked, ―I think the facts will shine through quite clearly. I mean, where we have made stuff up is quite clear. I think we have done our research very well and been very serious about all of the facts.‖ Schultz, however, felt very strongly that the film would do little good as a historical fiction, saying, ―I hope that no one comes to this thinking that it is an accurate representation of reality. If the film is successful, it will not dictate an answer. It should spur you to go into the library and get your book out and see what is real.‖33 While Schultz seemed to have an opinion opposite his director, he seemed to better grasp the film‘s potential to inspire historical curiosity in its audience.

One scene in which the film most accurately represented a true story from the development of the atomic bomb was John Cusack‘s Michael accepting and then

32 Rohter, ―Critical Mass,‖ H15. 33 Ibid, H15. 46

experiencing the horrible death that resulted from his accidental radiation poisoning.

While the true story of Canadian scientist Louis Slotin happened in 1946 after the end of the war, his contamination after jumping in to prevent a plutonium detonation, his immediate symptoms and analysis of others in the area, and his slow, brutal death, as chronicled by Martin Zeilig at AtomicHeritage.org, were all portrayed accurately and vividly by Cusack in Fat Man and Little Boy. This instance is one where invoking creative license to bring a true example of the dangers of atomic research into the timeline of a historical fiction serves the story without misconstruing the message.

Additionally, the deaths of both the real Slotin and the fictional Michael took place at Los

Alamos, making it likely the most appropriate addition to the film‘s narrative.

Unfortunately, in spite of its cast of stars, its clear theme, and its effective portrayal of a complex relationship between two very different men of power, Fat Man and Little Boy had no more commercial or cultural success than The Beginning or the

End had more than forty years earlier. Critics lampooned the character of Oppenheimer as a weak man who sold out to the military and abandoned the scientists who expressed dissent. It also took criticism for including in the script accusations that the Los Alamos scientists were aware of radiation testing on medical patients and for including the factual post-war radiation poisoning story in the film‘s timeline before the bomb was dropped.34

Some critics also seemed annoyed with Joffe‘s retelling of the bomb‘s creation as a sort of buddy drama about Groves and Oppenheimer rather than a more relatable story about the scientific process and the great many men who contributed to the project.

34 Bryan C. Taylor, ―Fat Man and Little Boy: The Cinematic Representation of Interests in the Nuclear Weapons Organization,‖ Critical Studies in Mass Communication 10 (1993): 374-375. 47

Surprisingly, though, what critics seemed to miss completely was that Joffe‘s script, while detailing the development of the bomb and the relationship between the project‘s two main leaders, completely omitted the final product: the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima. Additionally, neither Fat Man and Little Boy nor The Beginning or the End even addresses Nagasaki or the second bomb dropped except in the title of one film. Especially considering Joffe‘s firmly anti-bomb stance, showing not only one but both bombs destroying Japanese cities after the final scene of Oppenheimer looking dejected at his success could have driven home a point about the inhumanity of the atomic bomb. Unfortunately, the film‘s lack of commercial success and somewhat misguided screenplay left something to be desired and failed to make the film culturally impactful.

In spite of the commercial failure of both films, each holds an important place in the lexicon of both war films and atomic bomb films. Neither was as popular as Saving

Private Ryan or as successful in their genre as Dr. Strangelove, but each makes a mark for their effort toward historical truth. The argument about whether historical films can be true is unlikely to conclude any time soon, but enough study has been done to support the inclusion of both The Beginning or the End and Fat Man and Little Boy in the conversation based on their attempt at historical storytelling.

In their book American History and Contemporary Hollywood Film, Trevor

McCrisken and Andrew Pepper tried to develop an argument about Hollywood film and

American history along three critical lines: 1) consider films as texts to help us engage with historical issues and consider what such films can teach us, 2) examine what historical films reveal about the social, political and cultural concerns of the time in

which they were made, and 3) explore how historical films revise ―official‖ understandings of history and what such revision reveals about the nature of historical truth.35 They also note the typical nitpicking common in reviews of historical films about minor factual errors or appropriate props and costumes, arguing instead that ―good‖ historical films should engage and raise questions for the viewer without necessarily answering all of them.

Robert Rosenstone also argued against the criticism of historical film by traditional historians, accusing them of distrusting historical film not because they falsify history but because the historians themselves are given no control over what is shown, and because historical films are commonly more popular than historical literature.36 One of the most common themes in the study of historical film is that movies reflect the social and political landscape of the time in which they were produced. However, the same argument is equally valid for historical literature as well. Rosenstone asked, ―Why consider history books in terms of contents and historical films in terms of reflections?‖37

To assume that historical films are less capable than books to tell the ―truth‖ also assumes that historical literature is completely factual and undisputed.

Pierre Sorlin points out one important component of historical films which help to define them and which both films examined here have in abundance: historical capital.38

Both films are set in the locations where the events actually took place. Both use the names and likenesses of actual scientists and personnel who worked on the Manhattan

35 Trevor B. McCrisken and Andrew Pepper, American History and Contemporary Hollywood Film (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005): 2. 36 Robert A. Rosenstone, ―The Historical Film: Looking at the Past in a Postliterate Age,‖ in The Historical Film: History and Memory in Media, ed. Marcia Landy (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001): 50. 37 Rosenstone, ―Historical Film,‖ 51. 38 Pierre Sorlin, The Film in History: Restaging the Past (Totowa: Barnes & Noble Books, 1980), 20. 49

Project. Including such details, especially visual details, help to place the audience in the intended time period and make the film more effective. When analyzing a historical text, one would consider the social and political circumstance not only of the time in which it was written but of the historian who wrote it. The same judgments can be made about historical film. We must always consider that both mediums are interpretations of the past rather than a mere reporting of it.

One valid reason historical films might enjoy more success than historical text is that, ―In reenacting the past, the Hollywood historical film employs a variety of techniques to produce a heightened sense of fidelity and verisimilitude, creating a powerfully immersive experience for the spectator.‖39 In other words, reenacting a historical moment with contemporary actors with whom the audience is likely familiar allows the audience to experience the moment as if it is happening to them in the present.

Additionally, historical films are only capable of providing knowledge of history at the time in which they were produced. For example, The Beginning or the End is a reflection of how Americans felt about the bomb in late 1946 when the film was in production but does not reflect what they felt in the summer of 1945 immediately after the bombs were used. More specifically, The Beginning or the End reflects the collective memory of the writers, producers, and director who were responsible for creating it.

Robert Burgoyne also notes that ―the Hollywood historical film has played a decisive role in articulating an image of America that informs, or in some cases challenges, our sense of national self-identity, an image of nation that is then projected to the world.‖40 With this understanding, The Beginning or the End reflected America as a

39 Robert Burgoyne, The Hollywood Historical Film (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008): 8. 40 Burgoyne, Hollywood Historical Film, 2. 50

proud and accomplished nation full of hope for its future but fear of losing control of its new power. Forty years later, though, Fat Man and Little Boy reflected an America had begun to sell out to success at the expense of personal integrity and concern for the greater good.

Mark Carnes made an excellent point about both the potential and the drawbacks of historical film when he wrote,

Hollywood history…fills irritating gaps in the historical record and polishes dulling ambiguities and complexities. The final product gleams, and it sears the imagination…Like drama and fiction, movies inspire and entertain…They do not provide a substitute for history that has been painstakingly assembled from the best available evidence and analysis. But sometimes filmmakers, wholly smitten by their creations, proclaim them to be historically ―accurate‖ or ―truthful,‖ and many viewers presume them to be so. Viewers should neither accept such claims nor dismiss them out of hand, but regard them as an invitation for further explanation.‖41

While it is exciting to get carried away into the pseudo-reality of the past on film, it is important to question why the film is exciting and what it might be like if some of the drama was removed. The audience must also remember why the filmmaker has chosen a specific type of drama. In Fat Man and Little Boy, Joffe overlaid the Trinity test with the light and airy ―Dance of the Reed Flutes‖, as if it was a jolly occasion. He also included a scene explaining the petition signed by the Chicago scientists to warn the Japanese and provide them ample time to surrender, yet he neglected to mention that most of those same scientists still supported dropping the bomb. As Carnes noted, ―By fastening the blame on Groves (and, by implication, his successors in the military), Fat Man and Little

41 Mark C. Carnes, ed., Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995) 9-10. 51

Boy mostly absolves the scientists of the moral responsibility for the nuclear build-up of the Cold War era. But they should not be let off so easily—nor should we.‖42

In his article ―Can Movies Teach History?‖ Richard Bernstein seemed determined not to let anyone off the hook, including the filmmakers and actors. Expressing fear that the viewing public would take seriously the opinions of actors portraying historical figures and filmmakers assembling historical films, Bernstein seemed deeply offended that the public would deign to allow actors who have studied their roles thoroughly to comment on the history they were portraying. He remarked that the production of historical film turned actors and filmmakers ―into commentators and philosophers.‖ He was further concerned that the public might take seriously the opinion of the actors rather than seeking out their own research or that of the scientists whose work was chronicled in a film on such an important subject. Bernstein seemed to suggest that an artist who portrayed anything other than the absolute truth was making bad history and thereby a bad historical film. Unfortunately, Bernstein‘s suggestion assumes that historians are more like reporters than interpreters, presenting irrefutable facts, and also presumes that historians would be producing ―real‖ history and a filmmaker could only produce fiction.

Bernstein, however, also declared the Los Alamos scientists ―the most brilliant team of scientists ever assembled anywhere.‖43 Not only is this a radically bold statement, it also seems insulting to all other scientists anywhere, including those who worked on other aspects of the Manhattan project in Chicago, Oak Ridge, TN, and Washington state.

Perhaps the actors shouldn‘t feel offended at all.

42 Carnes, Past Imperfect, 249. 43 Richard Bernstein, ―Can Movies Teach History?,‖ The New York Times, November 26, 1989. 52

Bernstein shouldn‘t take much offense at the influence of actors either, however, since it was the historical figures behind the creation of the bomb who played the largest role in creating collective memory about the bomb. Gen. Leslie Groves was compensated as much as $10,000 for the use of his likeness and his terms also included veto authority on the script for The Beginning or the End. As previously mentioned, Oppenheimer had been assured his character would be written humbly and admirably, and other scientists including Enrico Fermi were persuaded to allow their likenesses to appear on film with promises either of notoriety, monetary compensation, or both. The influence of the men behind the characters helped drive the film‘s pro-bomb narrative which asserted that the bomb was necessary to save lives. Even the White House demanded changes to the script, especially to scenes involving FDR and Truman decided to use the bomb. The Beginning or the End was billed as ―basically a true story,‖ equivalent today‘s ―based on a true story‖ which appears in front of so many so-called historical films. Historians Robert Jay

Lifton and Greg Mitchell posited that while the film was a commercial flop, it was the first atomic bomb film and, seen by thousands of American moviegoers, was likely accepted as fact.44 Fat Man and Little Boy was, of course, also influenced by the people and events surrounding it. Released in the late 1980s, it was likely influenced by the

―antinuclear upheaval‖ of the early 1980s as well as the Reagan-era pursuit of almost science-fiction-like weapons technology.45 Additionally, Newman‘s casting as the hard- nosed general out to bully Oppenheimer into atomic success surely drove home the film‘s antinuclear agenda with gusto. Director Joffe also had new information to work with, including evidence released during the Cold War that radiation experiments on patients

44 Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, ―Hiroshima Films: Always a Political Fallout,‖ New York Times, July 30, 1995, H9. 45 Lifton and Mitchell, ―Hiroshima Films,‖ H9. 53

had indeed taken place both before and after Hiroshima, information the filmmakers behind The Beginning or the End could not have known and likely would have excluded anyway.

SO WHAT?

To answer to the question of whether facts and historical ―truth‖ matter in a historical film, it‘s useful to return to an observation made by historian Robert Brent

Toplin:

Hollywood movies do not bring closure to discussions about history. But they do have the potential to open them. When popular movies are viewed in this manner, the familiar complaint that cinema gives young people the wrong ideas about history seems irrelevant. Stories in motion pictures should never be treated as the last word on a subject. They should be considered useful aids for raising questions and launching informed and insightful discussion about the past.46

If films like The Beginning or the End and The Patriot were to be taken at face value, moviegoers the world over could presume that Matt Cochran was a real scientist and possibly the only one who ever spoke to his colleagues about his moral qualms with the work he was conducting, and Benjamin Martin was one of the greatest soldiers of all time who single-handedly launched the Southern campaign of the American Revolution. The narrative framework of historical fiction in cinema can launch culturally underrepresented history into popular culture, thereby not only raising awareness of a topic at least one filmmaker finds interesting but also inspiring young movie lovers to ask new historical questions and seek out their own answers. The critical failures of The

46 Toplin, ―In Defense of the Filmmakers,‖ 134. 55

Beginning or the End and Fat Man and Little Boy do not negate their attempts to tell a cohesive story of the creation of the atomic bomb and to bring light to the hard work of the men and women who participated on one of the most secret missions of all time.

These films and others like them can be used as tools to begin public discussion of previously unknown or underdeveloped histories or used to introduce classrooms full of young students to a new topic in a way they can relate to. History on film is no less valuable than published professional history because it has the same potential to create controversy and drive the topic forward by inspiring investigation and debate.

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