Decision in Response to the Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel
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Decision in response to the report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel October 2012 1 I. Introduction 1. On 12 September 2012 the Hillsborough Independent Panel published its report into the catastrophic event that took place at Hillsborough stadium on 15 April 1989, as a result of which ninety-six women, men and children lost their lives, hundreds were injured and thousands traumatised. 2. This decision sets out the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s response to the report and the matters we will be investigating. 3. In addition to its forensic rebuttal of the long-standing myth that the behaviour of the fans was largely responsible for the disaster, the report presents compelling new evidence that many of those who died might have survived. It also presents detailed new evidence of the way in which a large number of official statements were altered during the inquiries that followed. 4. The report provides details, among other things, of those inquiries, which include a judicial inquiry led by Lord Justice Taylor in 1989, a criminal inquiry by West Midlands Police which concluded in 1990, inquests into the deaths and subsequent challenges, a scrutiny by Lord Justice Stuart-Smith in 1997, and a private prosecution brought in 1998. 5. The report, which runs to 395 pages, backed by over 450,000 pages of evidence now published online, covers the run-up to the disaster including the unheeded warnings from previous incidents, the disaster itself, and its aftermath, including not only the inquiries but what appeared to be attempts to distort the truth. It is a testament to the tenacity of the Hillsborough families’ long campaign for truth and justice. 6. The response to the shocking revelations in the report was a demand for those responsible to be held to account. 7. It is for the Attorney General to decide whether to apply to the High Court to quash the original inquest and seek a new one, and for the High Court to decide. As the Prime Minister said in his statement to the House of Commons on 12 September 2012: “It is clear…that the new evidence in today’s report raises vital questions that must be examined, and the Attorney-General has assured me that he will examine this new evidence immediately and reach a decision as quickly as possible. “ II. What is the role of the IPCC in responding to the report? 2 8. In making a decision in response to the Hillsborough report I am very aware of the long and determined fight for truth and justice by the families and victims of the Hillsborough disaster, and the distress and anger this has caused them and the wider community. The Independent Police Complaints Commission has both the responsibility, in the most serious cases, and the power, to investigate allegations in relation to the conduct of the police. This includes powers to investigate alleged criminal behaviour. In 2004 it replaced the Police Complaints Authority, which was in existence at the time of the Hillsborough disaster but had no power to carry out its own investigations. 9. The IPCC can independently investigate matters referred by police forces or police authorities. We can also decide on our own initiative to call in matters which we believe need to be investigated by us. 10. Following the publication of the report we received referrals from the South Yorkshire Police, West Midlands Police and West Yorkshire Police Authority (in relation to Sir Norman Bettison). 11. We have also reviewed the report for ourselves to decide what needs to be investigated. We are continuing to review the underlying documentation and if further matters come to light they will also be investigated. 12. We do not have investigative powers over all of the parties referred to in the report, nor do we have responsibility for a number of key decisions that may follow from it, in particular about whether the Attorney General will apply to the High Court to quash the inquest verdicts. But we want to go forward in the spirit of the Panel’s work, to seek to ensure that there is a coordinated approach that can encompass all the issues, agencies and individuals involved, and which liaises closely with the families. III. What potential misconduct is disclosed in the report? 13. The report itself makes no direct allegations against any individual or institution. It sets out a series of disclosures, backed by documents, which raise serious and troubling questions about the actions of many parties, individuals and institutions, both in the public sector and outside it. Some of the disclosures raise potential criminal offences. Others may amount to misconduct that falls short of criminality. Many of the areas covered in the report have been investigated before, and the disclosures raise questions 3 about both the thoroughness of those investigations and the conclusions that were reached. 14. The potential criminal and misconduct issues disclosed by the report fall into two broad categories: Allegations that go to the heart of what happened at Hillsborough on 15 April 1989, that individuals or institutions may be culpable for the deaths; Allegations about what happened after the disaster, including that evidence was fabricated and misinformation was spread in an attempt to avoid blame. Issues about culpability for the deaths What has already been considered? 15. A criminal investigation into the deaths at Hillsborough was carried out by West Midlands Police. This followed a request on 16 August 1989 from the South Yorkshire Chief Constable who, on receipt of Lord Taylor’s interim report, wrote to the West Midlands Chief Constable. 16. On 31 March 1990 a report on the criminal investigation was presented to the Director of Public Prosecutions. This report ran to over 3,500 pages. The report considered criminal offences against seven South Yorkshire Police officers and four organisations - South Yorkshire Police, Sheffield Wednesday Football Club, Eastwoods (retained by the football club as consultant engineers) and Sheffield City Council. 17. On 6 August 1990, joint counsel Gareth Williams QC and Peter Birts QC provided a written advice to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The QCs considered the offences of manslaughter (on the basis of gross negligence) against the Club, Eastwoods & Partners, the Council, and South Yorkshire Police. They also considered offences of manslaughter & culpable misfeasance (misconduct in public office) against some individual police officers, including Chief Superintendent Duckenfield. They advised that no criminal charges should be brought against any individual or organisation. 18. According to the report, this opinion was “accepted by the CPS, apparently without further consideration”, and a decision was reached not to bring any criminal proceedings. MPs contested the decision, but on 29 November 4 1990, the Attorney General wrote to Douglas Hoyle MP stating that he concurred with it. 19. The Police Complaints Authority separately supervised investigations (carried out by West Midlands Police) into a number of complaints against eight South Yorkshire officers including Chief Constable Wright (and some complaints against unnamed officers). The Police Complaints Authority accepted the decision of “no further action” in relation to six of the officers following the CPS decision not to prosecute, but directed that disciplinary proceedings be brought against Chief Superintendent Duckenfield and Superintendent Murray. Following protracted correspondence between South Yorkshire Police and the Police Complaints Authority, events were overtaken by the retirement of Chief Superintendent Duckenfield on ill health grounds in October 1991. Disciplinary charges against Superintendent Murray were dropped on the basis that it would be unfair to proceed with a joint allegation of neglect of duty in the absence of the more senior officer. 20. A private prosecution for manslaughter was brought by members of the Hillsborough Family Support Group in 1998. Chief Superintendent Duckenfield and Superintendent Murray were tried at Leeds Crown Court in 2000; Superintendent Murray was acquitted and the jury was unable to reach a verdict on Chief Superintendent Duckenfield. What has not been considered? Impact of failure to declare Major Incident 21. The criminal investigation report to the Director of Public Prosecutions by West Midlands Police highlighted the response of the police in the following way: “Did the response taken by the police and other emergency services take place efficiently and effectively? Were there any neglects in the response which led to a life or lives failing to be saved? Lord Justice TAYLOR states that it was unlikely, but possible.” 22. A section of the West Midlands Police report sets out evidence in relation to the emergency response: “The Police Major Incident Plan indicates that in the event of a disaster they will inform other emergency services prefixing messages with the code word "CATASTROPHE." The Fire Service scheme understands this, but the Ambulance and City Council plans do not. Consequently, the only service effected was the Fire Brigade who on receipt of the code word would automatically have deployed ten pumping appliances and two emergency 5 tenders. In the event, it is academic because the police started by mobilising Operation Support which gradually developed to the Major Incident Plan. No code word was used to any of the services.” 23. As noted, a crucial new disclosure in the Panel’s report is the revelation that a number of people might have survived had the initial response to the disaster been better. The report sets out the failure to declare a major incident, which was the responsibility of South Yorkshire Police staff in the control box, and the consequences of this failure. At that time, people were working on the assumption that all those who died had suffered injuries from which they could not recover by 3.15pm. This assumption has now been shown on the basis of further evidence to be wrong in a number of cases.