Humb. 37628 3261 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY the 2$th of JUNE, 1946 ty Registered as a newspaper WEDNESDAY, 26 JUNE, 1946 The War Office, May, 1946 OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT FROM DECEMBER 7TH, 1940, TO FEBRUARY 7TH, 1941. The following despatch was submitted to the and troops concerned, and all possible arrange- Secretary of State for War on 2ist June, ments made to put it into effect, if the enemy 1941, by GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD advanced against Matruh in the manner that P. WAVELL, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., Com- we judged most probable. mander-in-Chief in the Middle East. PART I.—FIRST PSASE-»-BATTLE OF Sim 2. Preparation of Plan of Attack. BARRANI—DECEMBER 7 TO 13, 1940. 3. About the middle of October, when the I. Introductory. enemy had been stationary for a month and 1. In a former despatch I gave a summary there seemed no immediate probability of his of events in the Middle East Command down to further advance, I began to consider the the I5th November, 1940. The present possibility of an early offensive action in spite despatch will deal with events in one part of of our numerical inferiority. The enemy's the Middle East only, the Western frontier of defensive arrangements seemed to me to be Egypt and Cyrenaica, from the 7th December, thoroughly faulty. He was spread over a wide 1940, when the counter-offensive against the front in a series of fortified camps which were Italian army began, down to the 7th February, not mutually supporting and were separated by the date on which Benghazi surrendered. wide distances. His defences seemed to lack 2. In the previous despatch the advance of depth. the Italians to Sidi Barrani was described. In On the 20th October I issued a personal note accordance with our pre-arranged policy, little to General Wilson instructing him to consider opposition had been offered to the enemy's the possibility of an attack on the enemy advance, and it was not proposed to oppose forward camps. The plan I directed him to him in strength until he reached our prepared consider was an attack at both ends of the defences at Mersa Matrah. It was not, how- enemy's line, by the 7th Armoured Division ever, intended that the defence should be a reinforced with some mobile infantry battalions passive one. On the 2ist September I had against the enemy's right flank on the escarp- issued orders for a counter-stroke to be pre- ment near Sofafi, and by the 4th Indian pared against the enemy, so soon as he became Division, reinforced, if possible, by one addi- engaged with the defences of Matruh. I found tional brigade, against the camps immediately that General Wilson, Commander of British east of Sidi Barrani, near the coast. If the Troops in Egypt, and General O'Connor, Com- initial attacks were successful, I proposed that manding the Western Desert Force, had already the Armoured Division should exploit its made the preliminary arrangements for such a success northwards towards the coast and the counter-stroke. During the next month, as our 4th Indian Division westwards. I stated that defences and our forces grew in strength, so the the operations'would be dependent on all the plan for the counter-stroke was developed; and troops being made mobile and being able to a scheme was eventually prepared for striking move 30 to 40 miles in a night, so as to cover at the enemy as he approached Matruh. This in two successive nights the distance between plan was studied in detail by the commanders our front and the enemy's and to attack on 3262 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1946 the morning following the second night march. and General Wilson issued a paper laying down I suggested that it would probably only be certain methods, which were used in the actual possible to stage an operation lasting four or attack and proved to be sound. five days, since that appeared to be the limit for 7. Co-operation with the Royal Navy was which supply arrangements could be made. arranged through a naval liaison officer 4. Meanwhile, General Wilson and General attached to General O'Connor's headquarters, O'Connor had also been considering plans for and the air plan was drawn up by Wing Com- an offensive. After discussion with them, it mander Collishaw, commanding the Air Force was agreed that there were objections to an in the Western Desert. Needless to say, both attack on the Sofafi group of camps owing to Royal Navy and Royal Air Force co-operated their comparative strength and to the greater most whole-heartedly, both in the plans for distance from our starting base at which they attack and in maintaining complete secrecy. lay. It was decided to make the attack against the enemy's centre, leaving his flanks, on the 3. Enemy's Position and Strength. coast and at Sofafi, to be contained by small 8. The Italian force East of the Egyptian forces. I directed that detailed plans and pre- frontier was believed to consist of 6 or 7 parations should be put in hand at once. divisions (of which two or three were Libyan At this time Mr. Eden, the Secretary of divisions, two were Blackshirt divisions and State for War, visited Egypt and was made two Metropolitan divisions) and an armoured aware of the plans, to which he gave approval group. The total strength was believed to be and promised his full support. It was largely about 80,000 (63,000 Italian, 17,000 Libyan), this support which enabled us to obtain the air with 250 guns and 120 tanks. reinforcement on which the success of the plan 9. These forces were distributed in a series of greatly depended. fortified camps, from the sea East of Sidi The provisional date originally selected was Barrani to the escarpment about Sofafi, a in the last week of November. It soon, how- distance of about 50 miles, in echelon from the ever, became obvious that the preparations for left flank. The camps were usually circular, the attack, especially the provision of addi- with an anti-tank obstacle round them and tional transport and the re-equipment of the defences consisting for the most part of stone artillery with 25-pdrs., would not be completed sangars. There was a gap of over 20 miles in time. Further, the invasion of Greece by between the enemy's right flank at Sofafi and Italy at the end of October brought a demand the next camp at Nibeiwa. It was through this for support from Greece, and instructions from gap that General O''Connor intended to pass the War Cabinet to send certain troops from the attacking force. Arrangements were made the Middle East to occupy Crete and to assist during the planning stage to prevent the enemy Greece. It looked at one time as if this might establishing a camp to close this gap. cause the postponement or abandonment of the To the North of Nibeiwa lay the Tummar plan, since it very seriously weakened the air group of camps, occupied by the 2nd Libyan support available and also removed from the Division, and to the North-East of these lay the Western Desert some anti-aircraft guns, enemy's most advanced camp near the sea engineers, transport and other troops which it coast at Maktila, occupied by the ist Libyan had been intended to employ in the operation. Division. There 'were further fortifications Owing to the intervention of the Secretary of round Sidi Barrani, but there did not otherwise State, reinforcements of aircraft were promised, seem to be any organised second line of and it was decided to stage the operation if the defence. air situation made it at all possible. The date 4. Plan of Attack. was postponed till about the end of the first week in December. 10. The troops taking part in the attack were: — 5. In order to maintain secrecy, as few persons as possible were made aware of the 7th Armoured Division ... General Creagh. plan. Its details were worked out by Generals 4th Indian Division .,. General 'Beresford- O'Connor, Creagh (commanding 7th Armoured Peirse Division), and Beresford-Peirse (commanding i6th Infantry Brigade ,.. (Brigadier Lomax, 4th Indian Division). General Wilson and attached to the 4th myself visited the Western Desert at frequent Indian Division.) intervals and discussed the progress of the plan 7th Battalion R.T.R. ... (Infantry tanks.) and the additional troops required in the Matruh Garrison Force ... (Brigadier Selby—a Western'Desert. Practically nothing whatever brigade group was put on paper, and not more than a dozen made up from the senior commanders and staff officers knew of Matruh Garrison.) the plan until shortly before its execution. Total force consisted of approximately 31,000 men, 120 guns, 275 tanks, of which more than 6. On the 25th and 26th November a train- half were light tanks, 50 were infantry tanks ing exercise was held near Matrah, which was, and remainder cruisers, and 60 armoured cars. in fact, a rehearsal of the proposed operation. Entrenched camps were marked out on the n. In view of the limited amount of trans- ground to represent the enemy camps to be port available it was necessary to form dumps attacked, though this was of course known only of ammunition, water and petrol in the desert to the few who were aware of the forthcoming between our lines at Matruh and those of the operation.