DOCSLIB.ORG

End of Italian Campaign

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
End of Italian Campaign CHAPTER CCXCVI. END OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN. SlTUA'IlON lN JULY, 1918- EvENTS lN FRANCE- SHORTAGE OF RESERVES AND MATERlAL--ENEMY SUPERIORlTY lN NlJMBERS-OAUTIOUS POLICY OF GENERAL DIAZ--RESULTS OF THE SALONlKA OFFENSlVE-OPENlNG OF THE ITAI.IAN ATTACK-THE OPPOSlNG FORCES-ADVANCE IN THE BRENTA SECTOR- BRlTlSH O CCUPY THE GRAVE Dl PAPADOPOLI-THE PIAVE OROSSED-WORK OF THE BRlTISH XIV. CORPs-THE MONTICANO FORCED-ITALlANS REACH VlTTORIO-RoUT OF THE ENEMY - ··AUSTRIAN NEGOTlATIONS FOR AN ARMlSTICE-RETREAT ON THE GRAPPA FRONT-THE LlVENZA OROSSED-BREAK-UP OF THE TRENTlNO ARMy-TRENTO OCCUPIED-ARMlSTICE SIGNED, NOVEMBER 3-ITAJ.IANS LAND lN TRIF:STE-RESULTS OF THE VICTORY. HE failure of the great Aust,rian such as the Calabria, Lucca, Sesia, Ferrara, offensive of Jtme, 1918, put an end Oosen za, A ve11ino and Potenza brigadeR, * had T to the last. Anstrian hopes of gaining been practically destroyed, and others had lost p eace by victory, and in the foilow­ nearly 50 per cent. of their effectives. General ing spring General Lndendorff himself bore Diaz had six fresh divisions in hand on the witness to the effect of that failure upon the Piave front., but of these only thTee were ready plans and ambitions of the Austro-German for immediate use. The Ozecho-Slovak divi­ a11iance. The suecessf uI Italian offensi -:,re at sion was not yet flllly organised, and two the end of October, which is known as the battle Italian divisions had been hmried down from of Vittorio Veneto, was the final blow to e the line ,in other sectörs and were already tired. resistance which had no hope but to delay the An irnmediate return blow that promised a inevitable end. chance of decision while the enemy were still 'iVhen the last effort of Conrad and Boroe­ demoralized from defeat was not within the vitch hacl failecl, and the troops who had crossed power of the Italian Oommand, ·even upon a the Piave were clTiven back in disorder, * the calclllation of man-power. It was still less possibilities of an immediate counter-offensive possible when the question of the supply on a large scale were rapidly reviewed by the services, and that of gtms and she11s, were Italian High Command. It was elear that the taken into aCCOtmt. The enemy were still enemy troops were very badly shaken, and the superior in artillery, thongh the Italian factories temptation to strike back at once must have were now turning out gtms at a far higher rate been strong. But refleeti~ n showed that a than ever before, and the reserves of amnllmi­ decisive blow could not be given with the forceg tion were none too great. The supply and which were at t.he disposal of General Diaz. transport services were equally unprepared for The enemy losses were calculat.ed at about offensive operations on a laI'ge scale so soon 200,000 men, but the Italians had lost nearly afteI' the stI'ain to which they had been sub­ hali that nun1.ber in killed, wounded and missing. jected during the enemy attack. It was elear Twenty-seven brigades had lost mare than a that for lack of means and sufficient elabora- thousand men apiece, and at least a hali of '" The Potenza BI'i gadc, which was mainly I'esponsibIe these were unfit for furt.her fighting until they foI' the check of the AustI'ian diI'ect pUF' h foI' TI'eYiso, a!ld was in action foI' nine days, maI'ched back to were restored by rest and new drafts. Several, TI'eviso onIy 1,800 stI'ong, whiIe the Sesia lost 70 per '" See Chapter CCLXXV. cent. of its effectives. VoI. XX.-Part 256 289 290 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. tion, a counter-blow might be successful within resistance. On the other hand, success would strict limits, but could hardly be far-reaching have greatly improved the position of the in its effect s. It was resolved to wait, and to Italians for a subsequent offensive operation urge oq preparations for an important offensive on a large scale. For it would have removed, later in the year. or at least lessened, the elanger of a flank The first pIan worked out was a development attack from the north which had handicappeel of that which had been l.mder consideration their offensive campaign from the beginning, . in April and May, before the extent of the and still hampereel their freedom of action . Austrian offensive became clear. * Early in vVhile t.he military position of the Central Empires held out a possibilit.y of further offensive action on their part, it was obviously too risky for the Italians to attempt once more a m.ovem.ent eastwarels until the northern fiank hael been b etter secm ed. The report on the final battle, published by General Diaz in the spring of 1919, puts the general problem clearly. "The pIan for ttle offensive, considerecl by itself, hael to aim at assisting the general effort of the Allies to the utmost in aecorelance with two elifferent anel possible solutions; to .lrive the attack home with all available forces, throwmg even the last available man into the sca]e, m case the possibility presented itself on the fronts of the Entente of obtaining a real superiority of forces anel of gaining a elecision at one blow; 01' else to malm a preparatory attack as a first phase of a more complex effort, in case the enemy, although alreaely beat.en, shoulel succeed in r e-establishing a soliel defensive front in all t l')p GENERAL DIAZ. theatres of war." Commander-in-Chief oE the Italian Armies. It is quite clear that in J uly, in view of the general military situn,tion, extreme caution was July the Italian Command resumed' the in­ necessary. The German failure east anel west terrupted preparations for an attack in the of R eims in the middle of the month, followed Asiago sector. But the original pIan was by Mangin's smashing eounter-blow a few days extended to include an attack in the Pasubio later, eliel put an enel to the enemy's hope of region, which had for its object the capture of victory on the French front. But at that Col Santo and an advance upon the :Folgal'ia moment other possibilities seemeel still open to plateau, which lies north-east of Rovereto. himo Among them was the chanee that he This operation would naturally help the main might establish a suecessful defensive front in attack farther east, by threatening communi­ France and attempt a last joirit blow3,gain s ~ cations and 80 drawing off reserves. The Italy. Sueh an attempt was not, in fact general pIan wa8 obviously limited in 8cope. within his power; but this was not clear tili Tt is clear that even a successful attack in the later. At the end of July Geneml Diaz. had sectors mdicated could have had n o decisive still to consider t~e possibility of a rapicl result. At the most a success . might have German concentration upon his front. He had threatened Trento, for the lie of the ground, still to consieler clefence as well as offence. And the limit imposed upon operations by its h e had to be the more prudent as he was weak mountamous nature and the consequent dift1- in man-power, as well as in material. culty of swift communications, prevented the ' Vhen the losses of t.he J une battlu hac1 been hope of a fmther immediate result. The made gooel, the number of reservps iu hand was enemy might have suffered severe defeat recl ucecl to a figure that gave some cause for without losmg capacity for further obstinate uneasiness. Excl ucling the eightcon-year-old * See Chapter CCLXXV. boy " who had been under training for Bome time, THE TI M S HISTORY OF THE W AR. 291 the number of trained men available for drafts than exhaust the drafts immeOdiately avail ab l e~ .was not greatly in excess of that r equired to The boys of the 1900 class could only be used-­ make good "the normal losses" of . existing as a last resort. They were being trained in 0 units for six months. It was obvious, therefore, rel;Ldiness for the spring campaign, which a t that a big offensive action would deplete the that time seemed probable. There was a o ranks of the army to an extent that would more further "combing-out" of men employed in [0 jficial jJhotograpl'. A BLOCK ON THE ROAD. 256-2 292 THE TIMES HISTORY OF E WAR. non-milita.ry duties, who were ra.pidly put. difficulty regarding man-power. There was the through a course of instruction, but the lirnited problem of material. At a m eeting of a com­ supply of reserves still gave cause for anxiety. mittee of experts, held in Paris in the summer of In t.he circumstances, the choice of plan was 1918, it was agreed that t,wo essentials to a practically limited to the' more modest of the successful offensive were tanks and yprit.e alternatives indicated by General Diaz in t,he shells. Italy had neither. N or had she the passage quoted from his subseq uent report. means of manufacturing either. But it was Alld even the offensi ve in the .Asiago and fOlilld ~m.possible to spare either tanks 01' Pasubio districts, which would have meant the yprite for use on t,he Italian front. No doubt employment of half his forces, would have the decision was justified by the paramount trenched very seriously upon his, limited necessity of beating the Germans inFrance.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Military History Anniversaries 01 Thru 14 Feb
    Military History Anniversaries 01 thru 14 Feb Events in History over the next 14 day period that had U.S. military involvement or impacted in some way on U.S military operations or American interests Feb 01 1781 – American Revolutionary War: Davidson College Namesake Killed at Cowan’s Ford » American Brigadier General William Lee Davidson dies in combat attempting to prevent General Charles Cornwallis’ army from crossing the Catawba River in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Davidson’s North Carolina militia, numbering between 600 and 800 men, set up camp on the far side of the river, hoping to thwart or at least slow Cornwallis’ crossing. The Patriots stayed back from the banks of the river in order to prevent Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tartleton’s forces from fording the river at a different point and surprising the Patriots with a rear attack. At 1 a.m., Cornwallis began to move his troops toward the ford; by daybreak, they were crossing in a double-pronged formation–one prong for horses, the other for wagons. The noise of the rough crossing, during which the horses were forced to plunge in over their heads in the storm-swollen stream, woke the sleeping Patriot guard. The Patriots fired upon the Britons as they crossed and received heavy fire in return. Almost immediately upon his arrival at the river bank, General Davidson took a rifle ball to the heart and fell from his horse; his soaked corpse was found late that evening. Although Cornwallis’ troops took heavy casualties, the combat did little to slow their progress north toward Virginia.
    [Show full text]
  • THE BATTLE of BARDI a U RING the 2Nd January General Mackay
    CHAPTER 8 THE BATTLE OF BARDI A U RING the 2nd January General Mackay visited each of the six attack- D ing battalions . Outwardly he was the most calm among the leaders, yet it was probably only he and the other soldiers in the division who ha d taken part in setpiece attacks in France in the previous war who realise d to the full the mishaps that could befall a night attack on a narrow fron t unless it was carried out with clock-like precision and unfailing dash . The younger leaders were excited, but determined that in their first battle the y should not fail . To one of them it was like "the feeling before an exam" . Afterwards their letters and comments revealed how sharply consciou s many of them were that this was the test of their equality with "the old A.I.F." in which their fathers had served, and which, for them, was the sole founder of Australian military tradition. "Tonight is the night," wrote the diarist of the 16th Brigade . `By this time tomorrow (1700 hrs) the fate of Bardia should be sealed. Everyone is happy, expectant, eager . Old timers say the spirit is the same as in th e last war. Each truck-load was singing as we drove to the assembly point i n the moonlight . All ranks carried a rum issue against the bleak morning . At 1930 hrs we passed the `I' tanks, against the sky-line like a fleet o f battle-cruisers, pennants flying . Infantry moving up all night, rugged , jesting, moon-etched against the darker background of no-man's land .
    [Show full text]
  • (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies A Stepping Stone to Success: Operation Battleaxe (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine Mike Bechthold On 16 February 1943 a meeting was held in Tripoli attended by senior American and British officers to discuss the various lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The focus of the meeting was a presentation by General Bernard Montgomery. This "gospel according to Montgomery," as it was referred to by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, set out very clearly Monty's beliefs on how air power should be used to support the army.1 Among the tenets Montgomery articulated was his conviction of the importance of air power: "Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain principles regarding the use of air power." Montgomery also believed that flexibility was the greatest asset of air power. This allowed it to be applied as a "battle-winning factor of the first importance." As well, he fully endorsed the air force view of centralized control: "Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resource into small packets placed under the control of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces." Montgomery concluded his discussion by stating that it was of prime importance for the army and air 1 Arthur Tedder, With Prejudice: The war memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder (London: Cassell, 1966), p.
    [Show full text]
  • Aggressor Order of Battle
    .il* VJ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE i or*' DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ■ JUNE 1955 < FOREWORD The country, peoples, forces, or individuals described herein are fictitious. Any resemblance to existing countries, forces, or indi-., viduals is inadvertent and coincidental. *FM 30-103 FIELD MANUAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 30-103 WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 23 June 1955 AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE Paragraphs Page PART ONE. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1,2 3 2. GENERAL — 3-6 5 PART TWO. IDENTIFIED GROUND ORGANIZATIONS CHAPTER 3. MAJOR GROUND UNITS Section I. Army Groups - 7-11 12 II. Armies 12-28 14 III. Corps 29-69 20 IV. Rifle Divisions 70-129 35 V. Mountain Divisions 130-134 69 VI. Airborne Divisions 135-141 72 VII. Mechanized Divisions 142-163 78 VIII. Tank Divisions 164-171 90 IX. Cavalry Divisions 172-176 95 X. Artillery Divisions 177-192 98 XI. Antiaircraft Divisions 193-206 108 CHAPTER 4. GROUND UNITS, DIVISIONAL Section I. Rifle Units 207-214 114 II. Airborne Units 215-230 117 III. Armored and Cavalry Units 231-240 120 IV. Field Artillery Units 241-257 123 V. Antiaircraft and Antitank Units 258-269 126 VI. Mortar and Rocket Units 270-281 129 VII. Engineer Units 282-287 131 VIII. Signal Units 288-292 133 IX. Service Units 293-804 134 CHAPTER 5. GROUND UNITS, NONDIVISIONAL (GHQ) Section I. Rifle Units 305-312 136 II. Armored and Cavalry Units 313-317 187 III. Field Artillery Units 318-330 138 IV. Antiaircraft and Antitank Units 331-337 141 V.
    [Show full text]
  • VICTORY at SIDI BARRANI 28 Nov-6 Dec Preparations That Were Being Made Around Them
    CHAPTER 6 VICTORY AT SIDI BARRAN I HE stage was now set for the opening of the desert battle which Genera l T Wavell and his subordinates had discussed before the Italian invasion of Greece. Thus far the new theatre of war had made relatively smal l demands on Wavell's and Longmore's forces, and the Italian Army's failure to overcome the Greeks lowered an already low estimate of it s efficiency . Although Western Desert Force was still greatly outnumbered by General Bergonzoli's army, it had received useful reinforcements . It will be recalled that in October two tank regiments from England ha d joined the 7th Armoured Division, bringing its two armoured brigade s each to their proper strength of three regiments ; and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment had arrived, equipped with heavy "Matilda" tanks to be use d with infantry to break into strong defensive positions . In September the 4th Indian Division had been completed by adding to it the 16th Britis h Brigade ; in November its own third brigade arrived . In the Matruh Fortress was assembled a force equal to two infantry brigades . The 4th Ne w Zealand Brigade, had, since September, been in reserve either at Dab a or Bagush ; and on the edge of the Delta were the 6th Australian Division , now more or less complete, and the Polish brigade . Thus in three month s the forces west of Alexandria had increased from two weak divisions t o three at full strength or close to it, plus four infantry brigades ; and within a few weeks the New Zealand and the 7th Australian Divisions woul d be complete, in units if not equipment, and the 2nd Armoured Divisio n would have arrived.
    [Show full text]
  • EFORE Bardia Fell General Wavell Had Decided That Tobruk Also Shoul D B Be Taken, Partly Because the Possession of That Port Would Ease Hi S Supply Problems
    CHAPTER 9 THE CAPTURE OF TOBRU K EFORE Bardia fell General Wavell had decided that Tobruk also shoul d B be taken, partly because the possession of that port would ease hi s supply problems . Lack of vehicles and the consequent shortage of food, water, ammunition and petrol in the forward area was a cause of anxiet y to the British staffs. To an extent the advancing army was living on the country; it was employing captured vehicles and consuming captured petrol and rations, but these were dwindling assets and if the harbour of Tobruk was secured most of the needed supplies could be carried forward fro m the base in Egypt by sea. It was with the object of advancing swiftly on Tobruk as soon as Bardia had fallen that General O'Connor ha d sought to keep the 19th Australian Brigade out of the fight there an d ready to move forward promptly with the armoured division . However, within a few days after the fall of Bardia Wavell received a warning from London that a halt might soon be called to the advance through Cyrenaica. On 6th January Mr Churchill wrote for his Chiefs of Staff an appreciation of "the war as a whole .71 In the course of it he said that when the port of Tobruk had been taken it should become a main supply base for the force in Cyrenaica, and land communications with Alexandria dropped "almost entirely." For a striking force in Cyrenaica, he wrote, "the 2nd and 7th British Armoured Divisions, the 6th Australia n Division, the New Zealand brigade group, soon to become a division , with perhaps one or two British brigades .
    [Show full text]
  • 29-An Army in an Army
    1 1945 July 16-22 An Army in the Army (La Crosse Tribune, 1945 July 22, page 12) 2 In June and July 1945, there were many newspaper articles about La Crosse County men and women being brought back to the United States for reassignment or being discharged to civilian life. There are undoubtedly more to come the rest of the year. The article above, concerning Private First Class Louis Gueltzow of La Crosse, is typical. Gueltzow was a member of the 345th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division. At various times, the 345th Infantry Regiment, as part of the 87th Infantry Division, was part of the 7th, 9th, 1st, and 3rd Armies in the European Theater. The concept of Armies in the Army may be confusing, so what does all of this mean? The key to understanding the nomenclature, and also appreciating the scope of World War II, is decoding the hierarchical structure of the United States armed forces, in this case the United States Army. Since United States Army infantry divisions were the most numerous units in World War II, this analysis will use them as an example. Squad = 8-12 men: commanded by a Corporal or a Sergeant Platoon = 3-4 squads: commanded by a 2nd Lieutenant (48-50 men) Company = 3-4 platoons: commanded by a 1st Lieutenant or Captain (150-200 men) Battalion = 3-4 companies: commanded by a Major (800 men) Regiment = 3 battalions: commanded by a Lt. Colonel (2,400 men) Division = 3 regiments: commanded by a Lt. [3-star] or Major [2-star] General (10,000 - 15,000 men) Corps = 2 or more divisions: commanded by a Lt.
    [Show full text]
  • The Co Clare War Dead Individual Profiles WW2
    Clare in WW2 / The Emergency The Co Clare War Dead Individual Profiles WW2 D Day 1944 - The 2nd US Rangers By Ger Browne The aim of this project is to find out how many men and women from Clare took part in WW2, and the effect of the war on Clare. It is hoped that an extension will be added to the Great War Memorial in Ennis that will include the names of the Clare War Dead from WW2 / The Emergency. At the moment we know that 86 died from Clare as well as in Clare. I would like to thank Keir McNamara, and his late father Peadar McNamara for all their research on WW1 and WW2. Eric Shaw, who has been providing me with amazing WW1 and WW2 information for years, and all the following who have helped make this project possible. Paddy Waldron, The Local Studies Centre, Peter Beirne, Brian Doyle, Guss O’Halloran, Sean Glennon, Jim Molohan, Joe Ó Muircheartaigh, Eddie Lough, Local Parish Booklets, The Clare Champion and The Clare People. I have also named the sources, with many of the names below. I thank them all. The following websites: findagrave website, ancestry.com, fold3.com, http://www.ww2irishaviation.com, and the Commonwealth War Grave Commission. Finally thanks to the Clare Library for publishing all the information, and Larry and James Brennan along with the Clare Roots Society, for all their help. 1 Trooper Martin Barry Trooper Martin Barry: Kilrush. 18th (5th Bn. The Loyal Regt.) Regt., Reconnaissance Corps 6915422. He died as a POW on the 22nd June 1945 aged 26 in Hong Kong, where he was buried in the Sai Wan War Cemetery.
    [Show full text]
  • American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe
    United States Cryptologic History American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa Series IV World War II Volume 1 American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe i46074 This publication is a product of the National Security Agency history program. It presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. government entity. UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Sources in Cryptologic History Series IV Volume 1 American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe George F. Howe National Security Agency 2010 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Table of Contents Page Foreword . ix Author’s Note . x Introduction . .1 PART ONE: THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA Chapter 1: Situation Report . .7 Early Conditions . 7 Early British Experiences with Field SIGINT . 10 German Army and Air Force SIGINT Organizations . 11 U.S. Preparations for SIGINT Service in the West . 13 The Call of the Mediterranean . .16 Chapter 2: Beginnings in Northwest Africa . 19 Planning SIGINT Service in Operation TORCH . 19 Operation TORCH . 23 Tunisia: Organization for the Second Phase . 28 Action during January 1943 . 30 Chapter 3: Axis Initiative in February 1943 . 35 Axis Plans — Allied Expectations . 35 Allied Reversals, 14-17 February 1943 . 36 Through Kasserine Pass . 38 Recapitulation . 39 Two Opposing Army Groups . 40 Chapter 4: The March Offensives . 45 Expectations . 45 II Corps Attacks: Gafsa, Maknassy, and El Guettar . 46 The Enemy Retreat to the Bridgehead . 48 Chapter 5: The Final Phase of Tunisia . .51 Summary . .51 The Attack Begins . 51 The End in Tunisia .
    [Show full text]
  • 6 Augu8t, 1918, File 10. 55 Henry L
    GROUP RESEARCH GROUP VII. AMERICAN EFFORT, WORLD WAR AISHU - MARKS OFFERSIV! 18 JULT - 6 AUGU8T, 1918, FILE 10. 55 OPERATIONS OF THE 1s t DITI8I0N. SUBMITTED BT: HENRY L. P. KING, OAPT. 8IG.CORPS. THE COMMAND ft GENERAL 8 TAFF 80H00L, FORT LEATEHWORTH* KAM3A8. MEliORANDUU FOR: The Director, Second Tea* Glass, The Command ard General Staff Sohool, Fort Leavenwortht Kansacw SUBJECT: Operation of the 1st Division In the AISHaJ-MARHI offensive 18 July - 6 August, 1918, I. PAPERS AOOOMPAHTING. 1* A Bibliography for this study. 3. Maps. Ho, 1. Operations Map* 18 July, 1918. Icu 3. Operations Map, 19 July, 1918. lo, 3* Operations Map, 20-33 July,1918• III- HISTORICAL FACT8 RELATIIG TO THS SUBJECT. THE AX8IE-UARR OFFEISIVE: (l). The CHATEAU THISRRT salient or pooket, was formed as a result of the German attack on 37 May, 1918, be­ tween RHEIMS and 80I8SONS, Before the formation of the pocket had been completed ways and means were being considered for a counter attack southwest of 30IS30HS. General Pershittg states that he suggested such aotion to Fooh on 30 May and was informed that such action was being given consideration* How­ ever, practically all available reserves were required to t)ol4 the advanoe of the Germans and all plans for offensive aotion had to be deferred to a later date* Shortly after June 1, Fooh began assembling a new general reserve* Before any plans for offensive action could materialize the bulk of the reserves (1). Men Bank 3 to 6 incl. - 1 ­ then assembled were required to stop a new German offensive made on 9 June in the direotion of OOMPIEGIE in order to improve the German lines of oommunioation and threaten PARIS* This offensive was stopped on 11 June by a violent oounter attack on the MERY-OOUROfcLLES plateaus by a foroe hastily oonoentrated under General MAGI*.
    [Show full text]
  • FM 30-103 Aggressor Order of Battle 1951
    ffl DtPA OF TIE ANY TECBNICAI MANIAL AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE UNCLASSIFIED BY DOD DIR. 5200.1 R REFERENCE USE ONLY NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM LIBRARY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY • MAY 1951 WARNING Authority for re/ease of this document fo a forelgi government must be secured from fne Asiisfanf Ch/e yf Staff, G-2. When this document is released to a foreign govern nent, it is released subject to the following con litions: This information is furnished with the under itanding that it will not be released to another natioi vithcut specific approval of the United States o America, Department of the Army; that it will not b< ised for other than military purposes; that individua >r corporation rights originating in the informatioi vhether patented or not will be respected; and tha he information will be afforded substantially the sami legree of security as afforded by the United States o America, Department of the Army. DM©ARTMP.M© Ol Tilt: ARMY TW.IIMCAL MAM A I. 1M W.HH Thin manual su/>«-rv//*-i I-©M M-HH, II June l©HV AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE DEPARTMK\T OF THE ARMY MAY 1951 United States Government I©rinting Office Washington : 1951 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 21 May 1951 FM 30-103 is published for the information and guidance of all con cerned. [AG 370.2 (22 Jan 51)] BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: OFFICIAL: J. LAXVTON COLLINS Wm. E. BERGIN Chief oj Staff, United States Army Major General, USA Acting The Adjutant General DISTRIBUTION: GSUSA (5) except G-2 (50); SSUSA (5); Adm Svc (10); Tech Svc (10); Arm & Svc Bd (2); AFF (60); AA Comd (5); OS Maj Comd (40); Base Comd (10); MDW (5); A (40); CHQ (50); D (12); B (10); R (10); Bn (6); C (1);FC (2); Sch (15);PMS&T(3).
    [Show full text]
  • Operation SHINGLE Milan Vigo
    Naval War College Review Volume 67 Article 8 Number 4 Autumn 2014 The Allied Landing at Anzio-Nettuno, 22 January–4 March 1944: Operation SHINGLE Milan Vigo Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Vigo, Milan (2014) "The Allied Landing at Anzio-Nettuno, 22 January–4 March 1944: Operation SHINGLE," Naval War College Review: Vol. 67 : No. 4 , Article 8. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Vigo: The Allied Landing at Anzio-Nettuno, 22 January–4 March 1944: Op THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO, 22 JANUARY–4 MARCH 1944 Operation SHINGLE Milan Vego he Allied amphibious landing at Anzio-Nettuno on 22 January 1944 (Op- eration SHINGLE) was a major offensive joint/combined operation. Despite TAllied superiority in the air and at sea, the Germans were able to bring quickly large forces and to seal the beachhead. Both sides suffered almost equal losses during some four months of fighting. The Allied forces on the beachhead were unable to make a breakout or to capture the critically important Colli Laziali (the Alban Hills) that dominated two main supply routes to the German forces on the Gustav Line until the main Fifth Army advanced close to the beachhead.
    [Show full text]