CHAPTER CCXCVI.
END OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.
SlTUA'IlON lN JULY, 1918- EvENTS lN FRANCE- SHORTAGE OF RESERVES AND MATERlAL--ENEMY SUPERIORlTY lN NlJMBERS-OAUTIOUS POLICY OF GENERAL DIAZ--RESULTS OF THE SALONlKA OFFENSlVE-OPENlNG OF THE ITAI.IAN ATTACK-THE OPPOSlNG FORCES-ADVANCE IN THE BRENTA SECTOR- BRlTlSH O CCUPY THE GRAVE Dl PAPADOPOLI-THE PIAVE OROSSED-WORK OF THE BRlTISH XIV. CORPs-THE MONTICANO FORCED-ITALlANS REACH VlTTORIO-RoUT OF THE ENEMY - ··AUSTRIAN NEGOTlATIONS FOR AN ARMlSTICE-RETREAT ON THE GRAPPA FRONT-THE LlVENZA OROSSED-BREAK-UP OF THE TRENTlNO ARMy-TRENTO OCCUPIED-ARMlSTICE SIGNED, NOVEMBER 3-ITAJ.IANS LAND lN TRIF:STE-RESULTS OF THE VICTORY.
HE failure of the great Aust,rian such as the Calabria, Lucca, Sesia, Ferrara, offensive of Jtme, 1918, put an end Oosen za, A ve11ino and Potenza brigadeR, * had T to the last. Anstrian hopes of gaining been practically destroyed, and others had lost p eace by victory, and in the foilow nearly 50 per cent. of their effectives. General ing spring General Lndendorff himself bore Diaz had six fresh divisions in hand on the witness to the effect of that failure upon the Piave front., but of these only thTee were ready plans and ambitions of the Austro-German for immediate use. The Ozecho-Slovak divi a11iance. The suecessf uI Italian offensi -:,re at sion was not yet flllly organised, and two the end of October, which is known as the battle Italian divisions had been hmried down from of Vittorio Veneto, was the final blow to e the line ,in other sectörs and were already tired. resistance which had no hope but to delay the An irnmediate return blow that promised a inevitable end. chance of decision while the enemy were still 'iVhen the last effort of Conrad and Boroe demoralized from defeat was not within the vitch hacl failecl, and the troops who had crossed power of the Italian Oommand, ·even upon a the Piave were clTiven back in disorder, * the calclllation of man-power. It was still less possibilities of an immediate counter-offensive possible when the question of the supply on a large scale were rapidly reviewed by the services, and that of gtms and she11s, were Italian High Command. It was elear that the taken into aCCOtmt. The enemy were still enemy troops were very badly shaken, and the superior in artillery, thongh the Italian factories temptation to strike back at once must have were now turning out gtms at a far higher rate been strong. But refleeti~ n showed that a than ever before, and the reserves of amnllmi decisive blow could not be given with the forceg tion were none too great. The supply and which were at t.he disposal of General Diaz. transport services were equally unprepared for The enemy losses were calculat.ed at about offensive operations on a laI'ge scale so soon 200,000 men, but the Italians had lost nearly afteI' the stI'ain to which they had been sub hali that nun1.ber in killed, wounded and missing. jected during the enemy attack. It was elear Twenty-seven brigades had lost mare than a that for lack of means and sufficient elabora- thousand men apiece, and at least a hali of '" The Potenza BI'i gadc, which was mainly I'esponsibIe these were unfit for furt.her fighting until they foI' the check of the AustI'ian diI'ect pUF' h foI' TI'eYiso, a!ld was in action foI' nine days, maI'ched back to were restored by rest and new drafts. Several, TI'eviso onIy 1,800 stI'ong, whiIe the Sesia lost 70 per '" See Chapter CCLXXV. cent. of its effectives. VoI. XX.-Part 256 289 290 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
tion, a counter-blow might be successful within resistance. On the other hand, success would strict limits, but could hardly be far-reaching have greatly improved the position of the in its effect s. It was resolved to wait, and to Italians for a subsequent offensive operation urge oq preparations for an important offensive on a large scale. For it would have removed, later in the year. or at least lessened, the elanger of a flank The first pIan worked out was a development attack from the north which had handicappeel of that which had been l.mder consideration their offensive campaign from the beginning, . in April and May, before the extent of the and still hampereel their freedom of action . Austrian offensive became clear. * Early in vVhile t.he military position of the Central Empires held out a possibilit.y of further offensive action on their part, it was obviously too risky for the Italians to attempt once more a m.ovem.ent eastwarels until the northern fiank hael been b etter secm ed. The report on the final battle, published by General Diaz in the spring of 1919, puts the general problem clearly. "The pIan for ttle offensive, considerecl by itself, hael to aim at assisting the general effort of the Allies to the utmost in aecorelance with two elifferent anel possible solutions; to .lrive the attack home with all available forces, throwmg even the last available man into the sca]e, m case the possibility presented itself on the fronts of the Entente of obtaining a real superiority of forces anel of gaining a elecision at one blow; 01' else to malm a preparatory attack as a first phase of a more complex effort, in case the enemy, although alreaely beat.en, shoulel succeed in r e-establishing a soliel defensive front in all t l')p GENERAL DIAZ. theatres of war." Commander-in-Chief oE the Italian Armies. It is quite clear that in J uly, in view of the general military situn,tion, extreme caution was July the Italian Command resumed' the in necessary. The German failure east anel west terrupted preparations for an attack in the of R eims in the middle of the month, followed Asiago sector. But the original pIan was by Mangin's smashing eounter-blow a few days extended to include an attack in the Pasubio later, eliel put an enel to the enemy's hope of region, which had for its object the capture of victory on the French front. But at that Col Santo and an advance upon the :Folgal'ia moment other possibilities seemeel still open to plateau, which lies north-east of Rovereto. himo Among them was the chanee that he This operation would naturally help the main might establish a suecessful defensive front in attack farther east, by threatening communi France and attempt a last joirit blow3,gain s ~ cations and 80 drawing off reserves. The Italy. Sueh an attempt was not, in fact general pIan wa8 obviously limited in 8cope. within his power; but this was not clear tili Tt is clear that even a successful attack in the later. At the end of July Geneml Diaz. had sectors mdicated could have had n o decisive still to consider t~e possibility of a rapicl result. At the most a success . might have German concentration upon his front. He had threatened Trento, for the lie of the ground, still to consieler clefence as well as offence. And the limit imposed upon operations by its h e had to be the more prudent as he was weak mountamous nature and the consequent dift1- in man-power, as well as in material. culty of swift communications, prevented the ' Vhen the losses of t.he J une battlu hac1 been hope of a fmther immediate result. The made gooel, the number of reservps iu hand was enemy might have suffered severe defeat recl ucecl to a figure that gave some cause for without losmg capacity for further obstinate uneasiness. Excl ucling the eightcon-year-old * See Chapter CCLXXV. boy " who had been under training for Bome time, THE TI M S HISTORY OF THE W AR. 291 the number of trained men available for drafts than exhaust the drafts immeOdiately avail ab l e~ .was not greatly in excess of that r equired to The boys of the 1900 class could only be used- make good "the normal losses" of . existing as a last resort. They were being trained in 0 units for six months. It was obvious, therefore, rel;Ldiness for the spring campaign, which a t that a big offensive action would deplete the that time seemed probable. There was a o ranks of the army to an extent that would more further "combing-out" of men employed in
[0 jficial jJhotograpl'. A BLOCK ON THE ROAD. 256-2 292 THE TIMES HISTORY OF E WAR.
non-milita.ry duties, who were ra.pidly put. difficulty regarding man-power. There was the through a course of instruction, but the lirnited problem of material. At a m eeting of a com supply of reserves still gave cause for anxiety. mittee of experts, held in Paris in the summer of In t.he circumstances, the choice of plan was 1918, it was agreed that t,wo essentials to a practically limited to the' more modest of the successful offensive were tanks and yprit.e alternatives indicated by General Diaz in t,he shells. Italy had neither. N or had she the passage quoted from his subseq uent report. means of manufacturing either. But it was Alld even the offensi ve in the .Asiago and fOlilld ~m.possible to spare either tanks 01' Pasubio districts, which would have meant the yprite for use on t,he Italian front. No doubt employment of half his forces, would have the decision was justified by the paramount trenched very seriously upon his, limited necessity of beating the Germans inFrance. reserves. The same reason which led to the This was the main ba,ttle front, and it was choice of the less ambitious alternative imposed essential to have there ample reserves of caution in carrying it out.. It must always be material. But it is worth noting tbat Italy remembered that the enemy were still superior had to do h eI' work without the aid of what in numbers and had a great advantage in the Allied experts considered n ecessary for the position. accomplishment of such work in France. The Although the less ambitious pIan was chosen greater part of the Italian front was impossible the Italian Command kept in rnind the possi for tanks, but there were sectors where they bility of a change in the general situatiori which might have been of the greatest nse. And should justify a decision to stake everything thcre was ample scope for the employment of upon a single supreme effort, which might all kinds of gas. Guns' and shells were also, exhaust all reserves, but shonld finally do away as always, a matter for anxiet,y. In the .Tune with. the necessity for reserves by dealing a battle the enemy had still been ahle to show kncick-out · blow. Preparations were quietly a marked superiority in weight of fire, and made for such an effort, and a scheme was though the Ita.lian production was rapidly worked out secretly, though at the time when enabling this snperiority to be wiped out, it did it was first studied there seemed little chance not seem to promise any definite advantage that it would be carried into effect, at least. over the Austl'ians. The supply of shells had before the following year. stili to be husbanded carefully. Neither shells There was the difficulty of reserves. But nor guns p.ermitted that continuous use of there were ot,her difficulties in the way of an artillery which harasses an enemy's defence and offensive on a large scale, which added to the was regarded in France as an essential feature
ITALIAN VOLUNTEER CYCLISTS MUSTERJNG. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W AR. 293
I rOffi,cial photngraph. ITALIANS GETTING A HEA VY GUN ROUND A HAIR-PIN BEND.
-ef modern warfare. If the Italian artillery had feel h e was backed by a suffieient reserve. He gone in for counter-battery work and bom pointed out that the Austrian army seemed to barding communications to the extent that was have recovered its moral. Several minor actions taken as a matter of course in France, the undertaken with the object of testing the mood Italians would never have had a slLfficient. of the enemy had shown that there wa~ no lack :supply of shells for a big offensive, nor could of combative spirit in his ranks, and his artillery they ha,ve replaced the guns that would have fire proved to b'e particularly scientific and been worn out by such continuous usage. This, destructive. The Austrians had a numerical at least, was the case '-tiltil nearly the end of the advantage of fourteen divisions, their positions war, when production had come neal' to meeting wcre very favollrable to a defensive, and the reguirements. Eut even at the end Italy's Italians could 'only concentrate a sllfficient production of "75" shells was only one-sixth weight of guns on the ehosen sector by largely that of France. denuding t.he rest of their line. Even then the When the brilliant. successes of the French superiority would not be crushing, and very in .Tuly were followed by the tremendous Brit.ish heavy infantry losses seemed inevitable. -offensive which began on August S, it became General Diaz had to consider wha,t his position ,evident that the situation was inexorably would be aftel' his offensive, and he was anxious ,changing to the advantage of the Entente. to have an American force as a reserve. His It did not yet seem, however, that the tin1e was argun1.ents were not considered as being of Tipe ior Gene.ral Diaz to stake everything on sufficient weight t.o counter-balance those in the big offensive which he had at the back of favour of concentrating everythin:g against the his mind. Preparatiolls were therefore con· German armies, which had now for six weeks tinued for the Asiago-Pa8ubio attack, which been steadily losing ground and prisoners and was project.ed for the middle of September. guns. General Diaz was urgecl to attack with Ey thi8 time the American forces in Franc.e had the forces which he had at his command, and grown to a very large number, and whe.n General it was pointed out that the internal condition Diaz came to Pari", early in September to dis of Austria-Hungary was growing desperate, and .cuss the situation, he urged that a strong that the discontent must be affecting the army . American force be sent to Ttaly, 80 that he might It was the Italian opinion, however, an opinion 294 THE , TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
since publishe~ in General Diaz's report of the better servecl by simply keeping the Austrian situation in the summer, that "no in~portant army imme bilised and by making the ftlilest pre result was to be expected from such disinte parations against a more convenient ri~oment, grating influences until a decisive military than by attacking sin1ply for thc sake of attack defeat had been inflicted on the enemy." ing. Others again maintained that while this It was this decisive military c1efeat that he was a sound enough argmnent from the strictly feared could not be accomplished with the military point of view the politicaI reasons. means at his disposaL And there was even against inaction, owing to the criticisms to· which it exposed Italy, were too strong to be disregarded. The air was tense with argument and counter-argument, which sometimes: descended to the level of recrimination. Se~tember drew to a close and October wore· on, and still there was no news. from the Italian front. By ,this time argmrrent had almost entirely descended to the lower level. It was lmown to' a good many people that an at'tack had be-en planned ana fixed for the rniddJe of September, and, when the date lay so fat' behind that the question of a delay owing to weather or some temporary hitch in preparations could no longer be considered as a possible explanation a good many things were said. in haste which one may hope were repented at leisure. It iso to the credit of thc Italian Command, at least,. [Official photograpit. that these things ~ould be said. Fo1' they A · CAMOUFLAGED ROAD IN ITALY. meant that the secret of the Italian intentions the chance that a faiiure to obtain a notable ,"ms excellently kept. success, a failure which had to be reckoned with In point of fact the general situation was in view of the variou3 handicaps already definitely changed almost irrunediately after· indicated, might disappoint anc1 deJay these General Diaz's visjt to Paris, changed in a way disintegrating tendencies. It was a difficult that gave the Italian Command the chance for problem which the Italian Command had to which it had been watching. In the midelle of face, and after the Paris visit General Diaz was September the Allied Army of the East, which resolved to delay still further. hacl alffioqt passed out of men's minds, b ogan There was much cliscussion during the late its victorious offensive. During the summer smnmer and early autmnn, both in Italy and in a joint Franco-Italian attack L.'l. Albania, from the Allied countries, regarding the inaction on the Devil's Valley down to the Ael.riatic, hacl the Italian front. Most of that discussion was caused the Austrians a good deal of trouble_ inspired by a combination of a deep ignorance They had lost much ground and several thousand' regarding . the military situ~tion and a natural prisoners, principally on the Allied left, wherc' surprise or uneasiness caused by the ' sil'nple the Italians under General Ferrero occupied fact that while Italy's allies werc. fighting hard • both B erat and Fieri. This occupation was only and suc<:essluUy against Germany no blow wa~ temporary, for the Italians were left too fal~ being struck by Italy. There were other ahead of the French on their right. vVhen critics, however, in Italy as well as in Allied enemy reinforcements arrived in August under· countries, who, while they admitted the diftl General Pflanzer-Baltin, the Ita.lian line was culties and were not infl.uenced by the superficial withdrawn to the high ground south of Berat. argwnent of "Italy's absence" frOln the and the 'Semeni. The French also wit.hcL.'8W struggle, thought that General Diaz was ove1' slightly, but. the Allied operations had se1'ved a cautious, a,nd believed that a bold policy would very useful purpose. They had not only give good results, though they realised the improved the actual positiOl~; they had necessity of keeping something in hand. There caused much up...rest among the Albanians, and were others who argued that as things stood at they had brought down enerriy reinforcements. the beginning of September the Allied cause was from other sectors where they were badly THE T Il\;JES HISTORY OF THE liV AR. . 295 required. The time vyas approfLc0ing when army would he at the mercy of the attacking the Bulgarian line was to need stiffening which forces. Ii the first part of the scheme could be was not available. accomplished, the next step was to drive up With the prospect of a success on the so-calIed the valIey of the Piave, towards Feltre, so as to Salonika front, General Diaz finalIy abandoned turn the Grappa position, in conjunction with his project of a lin1.ited offensive. For 'suceess a frontal attack, and thence threaten the whole in the Balkans meant threatening Austria defensive system of the enemy in the EastE:rn H1mgary from a new direction, and imposed Trentino. upon the enemy the withdrawal of forces from The Austrian troops were organized in five the Italian front. There now seemed a ehanee armies 01' groups, which were aligned as follows. of earrying out the greater p Ian. The tinal details of the scheme of attaek were qnickly completed by the Staff, and " on September 25, fOl.U' days before the conclusion of the Bulgarian armistiee, orders were issued for a rapid con centration of troops, artillery and technieal ser viees in the sector chosen for the attack, which was no longer the p l ateau~ but the middle Piave." * Information showed that the enemy in accordance with anticipation, had been compelIed to detach at least seven divisions from the Italian front in order to try to fHl the breach caused by the defection of Bulgaria, and, possibly, to maintain order within the Monarchy. For it was obvious that the moral effect of this defection would be very in1.portant.. The Austro-Hungarian Armies were stil1 markedly superior in numbers, but Italy had at last obtained a definite superiority in artil lery, though this superiority was more evident in large trench-mortars than in guns. The actual figures were as follows: Italians--57 divisions (51 Italian, 3 British, 2 French, 1 Czecho-Slovak, and one American infantry regiment, 709 battalions in all), with 8,929 guns and trench-mortars; Austrians-63! divisions (827 battalions) and over 7,000 guns and trench mortars. The Italian and Allied combatant troops numbered 912,000, those of the enemy 1,070,000. The Italian pIan was to concentrate every available man and gun on the limited front between the Grappa and Ponte di Piave, east of Tre.viso, with the objeet of effecting a break GENERAL PFLANZER-BALTIN. through by way of Conegliano and Valmareno Commanded an Austrian Force against the to the town of Vittorio Veneto. T he first anTI Italians in Albania. was to divide the Austrian Fifth and Sixth On the left, wing was the so-called Piave Armee, Armies, which held the Piave line, their junction consisting of the Fifth and Sixth Armies, the being at Ponte di Priula, where the railway Fifth holding the river line from the sea to between Treviso and Conegliano crosses the Ponte eli Priula, the Sixth lying along the river Piave, a couple of miles below the MontelIo. from Ponte eli Priula to above Valdobbiadene, The main line of communication of the Austrian opposite Monfenera. N ext came t.he indepen Sixth Army was based on Vittorio Veneto, dent comn1.and known as the" Belluno Group," and if the break through could be effected, this which held the line as far as the Brenta, and was * General Diaz's R eport. thus interposed between the P iave AT?nee and t-:) <:.0 0;,
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lineat Opening of Attack _Oct.24. - __ Close 01' Hostilities -Nov.4 -
TBE AUSTRIAN ROUT, OCTOBER- NOV EMBE R, 1915. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 297 the Trentirw A.rmee. This la,tter group consisted But the army, largely cut off from news, still of the Eleventh a,nd Tenth Austria,n Armies, the held firm. EJeventh holding the line between the Brenta, The ma,in Ita,lia,n a,tta,ck was to be entrusted and the Astico, on the pla,tea,u of the Seven to the Eighth, Tenth and Twelfth Armies, Communes, while the front of the Tenth Army which were placed under the direction _of stretehed from the Astico to the Swiss frontier. General Caviglia, cOIl1mander of the Eighth During the Austria,n offensive in June the Army, which wa,s designed to play the principal 1 ta,lia,n line ha,d been held by six a,rmies. * 7'131('.. The Twelfth Army on the left, whieh This nmnber wa,s now increa,sed by three, with was placed lmder Genera,l Graziani, comma,nder the objeet of securing grea,ter "elasticity." of the French forces in Ita,ly, wa,s to cross the The a,rmies on the right a,nd left of the front, the Pia,ve a,nd push northwards towards Feltre, Third Army on the right and the First and Seventh on the left, were reduced to the utmost (the 40-mile front of the First Army was held by tlve divisions a,nd a,n Alpini Group), a,nd the troops thus ma,de a,va,ila,ble were sent to reinforce the centre, 01' ra,ther the right centre, where the main attack was to be launched. The fronts hitherto occupied by the Third and Fourth .A.rmies were slightly reduced in extent, a,nd between them, on a, front not grea,tly wider tha,n the old Eighth Army front, was disposed a group of three Armies, the Tenth, Eighth and Twelfth. Still a,nother new Army, the Ninth, was held in reserve. During the fortnight which followed the order to concentrate troops a,nd material for the gTeat effort, the battle front from the Brenta to Ponte di Pia,ve wa,s reinforced by nea,rly 2,000 gl.illS and 500 trench-mortars, bringing the total numl?er of guns to nearly 4,800, including 600 heavy trench-mortaq. Forty-one divisions, 22 in line and 19 in reserve, were ma,ssed on the front of atta,ck, lea,ving only 16 on the rema,in GENERAL GRAZIANI. ing seetors. To oppose the attack the enemy Commanded the French Forces on the Italian Front. ha,d 23 cUvisions in line or immediate support, with 10! di visions lying fa,rther ba,ck a,s a, strate astride the river. This army included the gie reserve. Owing to the seerecy with which the French 23rd Division. The Tenth Army, Italian preparations had been earried out, the which was pla,ced on the right of the Eighth, enemy had nea,rly half his force-30 divisions from below Ponte di Priula to Ponte di Piave, concentra,ted in sectors where the Italian forces included the British XIVth Corps (7th and had been reduced to a minimum. 23rd Divisions) and "vas entrusted to General The defection of Bulga,ria worked fast upon the Earl of Cavan, commanding th3 British the political situation. The Hapsburg Mon forces in Italy. The duty assigned to the a,rchy wa,s hreaking up within. Its south Tenth _Lllmy, after erossing the Piave by the eastern front was now very seriously threatened. long shoal island of the Grave di Papadopoli, Peace rumours had been coming thick and fast, was "to advanee on the Livenza, forming a and on October 4 came the Germa,n proposal defensive fiank to cover, and protect the prin for an armistice, which was backed by Austria cipal mano::.uvre of the Eighth Army in the and a,['Qused grea,t popular enthusiasm in direction of Vittorio, and at.tra,cting towards Vienna, where it seems to have been thought itself t.he enemy's reserves, ~: bieh were [l,S8e111- that a cessation of hostilities on the Ita,lian bJed in the lowest part of the plains." * Its front, based upon a, withdrawal from the immecliate objeet of attEwk was the right wing occupied provinces. wonld immediately follow. of the Austria,n Fifth Army. * See Chapter CCLXXV. * General Diaz's R eport. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE vVAR.
G.onera1 Caviglia's Army Group was to eon stationed round about F oltre, and in this way duct t.he rnain attaek, but a 'very important lighten the task of the Twelfth and Eighth role was 'lssigned to the Fourth Army, whieh Armies. But the attack was to be seFiouss oeeupied the Grappa sector, under the eorn a definite atternpt to pierce the eneTl1Y's lines mand of General Giardino. The first idea had between the Brenta and the Piave, and push been that the Fourth Army shonld merely .up to the _t\rton-Feltre road. ' fight 'a demonstrative action, in order to keep The disposition of the enemy's troops and the troops in front of it well enlployed and pre guns showed the importanee whieh he attached vent the detachment of reinforeernents t.o the to the Grappa position, and showed, too, that sectors threatened by the main attaek. But he had JJot divined the direetion of the main "the date ehosen had to be deferred for a week Italian attaek. 1n the Grappa seetor the owing to the heavy rains whieh fell in the frrst Belhmö Gl'Olip had eight divisions in lille and half of Oetober and eaused the Piave to eorne three in imrnediate reserve, while the infantry down in tiood. The week's delay made 'the \Y!1S backed by some 1,200 guns. The Austrian favourable situation of the Allies still elearer, Sixth Army, on the other hand, with seven and justified the deeision to transfer still n~ore divisions in line and two in rcserve, had only artillery from the extreme seetors of the line, about 5'00 guns as against a mass of over 2,000 and so permit the Fourth Army to play a more which the Italians hari eoneentrated against its aetive part in the forthcoming battle. A front. The enemy were still preoecupied by seneme for an offensive in this RectOI' had been the idea that the Italians intended to try for a prepared some time previously, and gun break-throue;h on the mountain front. The emplacernents were ready for the artillery Grappa was an obvious field for effort, for there reinforeements, whieh were hurried to the the Italian defensive position was weakest, tmd Grappa seetor between Oetober 19 and 23. called for improvement. Farther west the The programrne of the Fourth Arrny was preparations for the offensivtl on the Asiago changed. It was now to open the battle, plateau had been noted by the enemy, who had preeeding the main aetion by twelve hours, taken rneasures to meet them. And he observed 80 as to draw on ta its front the enemy reserves too late the quick tmnsferenee ea:,;tward of all
,>..... ,""""- ___ ~ _ _ • _ _ •.._...< . ,,~ ••• .<_ ;w [Offt.Cial photograph. NORTHAMPTONSHIRE YEOMANRY TAKING A DITCH ON THE PIA VE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 299 ' but the bare minimum of mea and 'guns. The islancls, or rather shoa1s, for in many cases they move ~as very deverly managed. It was in aro simply banks of shiugle cut by the vJ1rious order not to arouse suspicion that only two of chaunels of the river. The Orave di Papadopoli the three British divisions and one of the two was a very useful half-way hou:30, for the main French were t:r:ansferred from their old sect.or channel fiows west of it, and once the is!and is to the Piave front. The British 48th Divi:5ion reached the river is a less formidg,ble ob"tacle, ane! the French 24th Division remained on the plateau, the British divi':lion being put under the command of General Pennella, commanding the Italian XIIth Corps. "Vhen the British troops were in line in their new positions, "orders were issued that all troops visible to the enemy should wear Italian uniforill, and that no British gun should fire a shot previous to the general bombardment."* 1n this way it was hoped to lull the suspicions of the enemy. The precautions taken worked very well, and when the blow came, the enemy troops and guns were nat well disposed to parry jt. The fir:::;t difficulty that lay in the way of carrying out the attaek, once the preparations hacl been made, was the river which divided the opposing arrniec: along the greater part of the battle front. The Piuve, Jike all th0 rivers of N orthern It3,ly, is subject to rapirl ancl violent fioods, \vhich made the problem' of its crossing v€ry hazardous. Tbe sudden rising of the river in .Tune had handicapped the enemy very seriously, and the fiood waters which ca,me down suddenly in the second week in October had alreacly caused a delay in tbe Italian attack. [Lafayette. The f100d period had begun, the weather was GENERAL THE EARL OF CA VAN. Co'mmaoded the British Forces io Italy. very uncGrtain, and there was keen anxiety as ta the possibility of carrying out ~he passage of consi8ting of vari,ous c ,h~r:mels of lessec width the river in accordance with arrangements. and depth, even III tiJ:ne of fIood. And, as it turned out, the river dicl bave an At three o'clocl{ on the morning of October 24, effect upon the way in which the battle de the anniversary of the disaster at Caporetto, the veloped, though the difficulties which it caused ItaJian artillery opened fire betwee;n the Brerita were, fortunately, overcome. and the Piave, and at 7.15 a.m. the infantry Ry the evening of October :/3 all was in attacked. The weather was very bad. A thick readiness, ~md the first move of the infantry mist shroudl3d the hills, and a furious rain-storm was fixed for the following mornirlg. The calfle 011 in the early Ulorning. Onoe battle main operation was the attack of the Fourth was joined the ärtillery activity of both sides Army in the Grappa sector, but this was to was ~reatly limited, but the infantry fighting he supported by the left wing af the TW8lfth was extremely fierce and stubborn.' The enemy Armv and by strollg demonstratiolls by the had a very large nwnber of machille.guns placed Sixth Army on the Asiago plateau, while ad in CD.-vernq or rcdoubts, and the limits placed vanced detj1ehments of the Tenth Army were upon the use of the Italian artillery by the to occupy the Gmve rli Papadopoli, which was weatht\r enabled their fire t~ he very destructive. hdd in some force by the Austrians. The bed The swnrr..it of Monte Asolone was taken on of the Piave in this sector, from bank to bank, the ' run, Monte Fertica WfLS stormed hy the is roughly one and a half miles in width, but the Pesaro Brigade, and a picked body of storm greater p~rt of this vvidth ~onsists af the isla.nd troops reached Hill 1,484 0n the PrassoJan. of the Gnwe eli Papadopoli and other smaller The Lombardy Brigade enveloped Monte * Lord Cavan's Report. Solarolo and gained a footing on the point known 256 -;~ 300 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W AR.
as Hi1l 1,671. The Vttlderoa was captured by in the cac;e .of Monte Sisemol. which was the Aosta Brigade, and though a frontal att,ack ,brilliantly talum by French troops and held on the steep cliffs of MontA Spinoncia failed llntil the evöning, . before the withering fire of the ellE"my machine Meanwhile a very fine piece of work had been guns, usefLu progress was made on the ridge carried out by British troops belonging to the farther to the east. Some of theso ad varitages Tenth Army, "lmder Lord Cavan. The main were only temporary. The summits of the a.t.tack across the Piave had been fixed for the Asolone and Pertica were lost to fierce counter night of October 24-25, 24 hours later than attacks, supported by raking machine-gtm the opening move in the Grappa sector, but General Sir J. M. Babington, commanding the British XIVth Corps, had suggested the advisability of occupying the Grave di P apado poli as a preliminary step. Lord Ca:van agreed, and in the early hours of October 24, when the Italian guns were hanunering the enemy lines in the mountains, the " 2nd/1st Battalion of the Honourable Artillery Company and the 1st Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, without any previous artillery . preparation, crossed the main channel, surprised the Austrian garrison, and occupied the northern half of the island." * The crossing was accomplished in small fiat-bottomed boats, each holding six men, and rowed by two Italian pontieri. The river was in heavy fiood, and the p8.ssage of the main channel in particular was very hazardous. 1ri sOI?e places no fewer than three channels had to be crossed and relays of boats had to be used. But the arra..ngements were. perfectly made. Italian pontieri and British infa.ntry both knew their business, the diffi LIEUT.-GENERAL culties were all overcome, and the enemy SIR J. M. BABINGTON, K.C.M.G. was caught napping. The greater part of the Commanded the XIV. Army Corps. garri~ on of the island were captured or killed, harrage from right and left, !tnd t~le storm -troops and though the Austrians quickly counter ha.d to come back from l\J oute Pmssolan. 1n attacked from the left bank of the river they the l1fternoon the action was eased off owing to were unable to dislodge the H.A.C. and the the blinding mist and rain, hut I.,he Italians . \Velshmen. There was still an enemy detach had gained some useftU positions and had taken ment on the southern end of the long island, some 1,300 pri.qoners and many machine guns. but for a long stretch the main channel of the Furthermore, the furious nature of the attack, river now lay behind the advance-guard of and especially the rushing. tactics of the storm the att.ackers. A bridgehead had been formed troop~, who in moro than one place pcnetrated for the offensive, and this was consolidated far into thA enemy positions before returning, on the following day. confirmed the enemy belip.f that the first object The original intention of launching the main . of the Italians was a break-through between the attack across the river on the morning of Brenta and the Piave. Tms seemed the more October 25 was frustrated by a sudden rising likely, as the left wing of the Twelfth Army, of the river. This was serious enough for acting in support of the Fourth, came down those who had to cross the lesser channels in from. Monte 'l'omba and Monfenera, crossed the the Grave di Papadopoli sector, or to construct Ornic torrent, and established a line close to bridges to the island in order to enabIe the Alano. West of the Brenta, too, the Sixth main body and the reserves to come over .. Arrny htll. carried out demonstrative actiom; in It was more serious still for those whohad to force, occllpying various lines of trenches, but cross higl:er upo Between Pederobba and the ret,iring when the counter-attacks carne, excopt. *-Lord Cavan's Report. THE Tl1YIES HISTORY OF THE W AR. 301
[Ojjicial photugrapk.. THE REMAINS OF THE BEAUTIFUL BRIDGE ACROSS THE VAL D'ASSA.
Ponte di Priula the river bed is cmnparatively tions for the m.ain attack in comparative narrow and the flood waters, instead of spread security, although the garrison of the island mg ont into numerous channels, separated was snbjected to a very heavy shelling all day by islands or shingle banks, were pent up into on the 26th." ·one 01' two channels, deeper and swiftel'. There Meanwhile the Fourth ATl1.1Y was deeply was no halfway house, such 80S . had been engaged on the Orappa front, hammering afforded by the Grave di Papadopoli. The against an enemy who resisted stoutly, hit bridges had to be made irnmediately under the back very hard, and showed no signs at all of enemy's nose. By the evening of October 24 internal dry-rot. On October 25, after a the stream was running at from seven to nine night's rest, the battle was renewed by attacks miles an honr, and at t.he so-called fords the on Col della Berretta, the summit of the .depth was over five feet. The weather was Asolone, Monte Pm-tica and the summit of improving and it seemed probab~e that the Monte 801arolo. Various detachments of storm floods W01.:tld soon go down. 1 t was decided troops distinguished themselves greatly. One to delay the main action. columll pushed through from the slopes of the On the night of October 25-·26 the Grave di Asolone to Col Berretta, Look 600 prisoners, Papadopoli was finally clen-red of the enemy and although nearly surrounded hy the enemy's .and occnpied in strength by the troops who cOl..mter-attack cut their way back and brought were to attack in this soctor as soon as the their prisoners with thom. Another ce>lumn state of the river allowecl the main battle to af storm-troops and detachments from the begin. The occupation was carried out by 9, Pesaro Brigade took Monte Pertica af tel' a j oint rnovernent of the British 7th Division desperate fight which lasted for six ho1.1rs, and on the 1eft and the Italian 37th Division on all the efforts of the enemy faiIed to dislodge the right. The preliminary preparations were the victors. Another important captm'e was now completed, and in the words of Lord that of ::Vlonte Forcelet.ta, north of' Monte Cavan's R eport, " This very successful operation Pertica, which was taken hy the Bologna put the n1.ain channel of the Piave behind us Brigade. Although 801arol0 was assaulted and enabled us to begin Olu' hridges and prepara- over and over again, the eriemy resistance could 302 THE TIMES HISTOR Y Ui!' THE W Ali.
not be overcome. The day closed v,rith two longel'. Eleven crossing-points were selected, important positions wrested from the enemy, one for the right. wing of the Twelfth Army at and the capture Qf over 1,400 prisoners. But the Molinetto (Pederobba), seven"' on the the desperate fighting had a more irnportant Eighth Army front, between Fontana. del result. The enemy was by now convinced Ruoro (beneath the north-western slope of the that the attack on the Grappa front was in Montello) and the broken Priula bridgos, three 'deadlyearnest. He had lost heavily, and there for the Tenth Army, at the Grave di rapadopoli. was no slackening in the Italian effort. H e Bl'idging began with the falI of darkness on brought up not only his immediate reserves, October 26, and the bombardment started but those which had lain between Feltre and half an hour befol'e midnight. The violence BelIuno. The number of enemy divisions ui of the cuuent and the accuracy of the enemy's ljne was increased to nine, who were now fire were such that on the front of the Eighth opposed to only seven Italian atta?king Al'my only two out of the sevea sets of bridges divisions. Although the amount of grOlmd COllkl be established, both of them between gained by the Italian attack was disappointing Fontana del Buoro and the point. \vJ:1ere the to the High Command, enough progress had river turns south-eiistwards round the MonteIlo, been made to alarm the enemy and i..'1.d"qce neal' Falze. The Twelfth Army bridges at. the him to engage the reserves which might other :lVlolmetto were, sllccessfully thrown and the wise have been available for the Middle Piave crossing rnaiutaine::l, and the Tenth Army was front. The fight continued on Octobel' 26, equR.lly successful with all its three sets of stubbornly, inconclusively, and the Italians bridges in the Grave di Papadopoli sector. capturecL anothel' 1,200 prisoners. The most serious failure was on the front The moment. was now come for the hig effort. between Falze and Ponte di Priula, where the By the evening of Octobel' 26 the weathel' had bridges thrown by the Eighth Army were ftll improved ann the river had be;p.m to falI. The destroyed by Dood and shell fire combined current stilI ran swift and deep, a very formid before any bridgehead cauld be established. able obstacle, but it was impossible to wait Repeaten. efforts failed to effect a crossing.
[Ojficial photogmPh. ITALIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH. Their characteristic method is to march on both sides of the road. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W AR. 303
Only sma.Il pal'ties of assault troops reached tho left alld the 23rd (Ber:3aglieri) Division on the left bank of the river. the right. In the evening the 37th were pushe(, 'Vhen the clay hroke on October 27, three back slightly by a strong enemy counter-attack, bridgeheads had been established. On the but a solid bridgehead was now established left, facing V
though the enemy put up R, stubbol'n fight he opposite, were a11 destroyed during the day, cou1d not ho1d. On the right the XIth Italian and the troops on th6 1eft bank of tho river were Corps, under Geneml P aolini, was "Lillab1e to not ahle to make mnch headway, The nine make much headway in the early part of the hattalions "ho had ' crossed at the l\iolinetto d;"I.y, but 1ater on they, too, ms,de excellent fought theie WFLY forward for nearly iL mile, progresl:l, and the 37th Division on the 1eft, and resist,ed a11 the effortd of the em'my to drive which had been held up in the morning, was them back. The troops of the Eighth .t\.rmy, .able to advance ·in touch with the Brltish on who attacked towards Rernaglia, gained a 304 THE TIMES HI8TORY OF THE WAR!
The situatian was nat altogether satisfactory at the end af the first c!ay's nghting, though more than 9,000 pri.soners and 51 guns hart been taken in a,ll. At llJast it gave grOlmd for' anxiety, which was chief.ly dlle to the failnre af the Eighth Arrny, and especially the. VIIIth Corps, ta ovorcame the bridging difficulty. The VIIIth Corps had becn detailed to pllSh straight t.owanls Vittario Veneta, and the fact that, it had been l..ma~jle even to start its advance t.hreateued ta throw the pIan af battle out of gen,r. This fact. had made the work of the troops to right and Idt af it much hR,r'der, faI" their 18ft and . right flanks respe(;,:ive]y were in thE: a.ir. The XIVth Briti~h Corps, which had advan·;erl fart,hest, suffered most, fol' a11 clay it had, ta l'epel f!auking attackR from the· north. The weakness af its position had been overcome, thanks t.a the stanchnoss and deterrniuatian of the 7th Divisian, but unless, the gap cauld be fi lled between the bridge heads of the Eighth and Tenth Armies, the· brilliant advance mnde by the Tenth could Ilot lead to any important ~·esult. The failure af the VIIIth Corps to e~t.ablish its bridges led to a cert.ain amaunt af criticism, especially from its neighbaurs to right and left,. wha suffered fram the gap in the attacking line. Such criticism was perfectly natural. It, accurs in a11 cases, wherever a check tåkes place, and far whatever reason. In this case" hawever, those who knaw the Piave and the general lie of the graund will he~itate ta· sustain the criticism. The general canditions. of the river from where it enters the plairt dawn GENERAL GIUSEPPE PAOLINI. to Ponte di Priula have, already been described, Commanded the Italian XI. Army Corps. and the warst sector of a l1 was from the corner considcrable amount of grOl.m BERSAGLIERI GETTING HA Y FOR THEIR MULES. 306 THE TIMES HISTORY OR THE WAR. , \ THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 307 overcame the enemy resistance and widened Fifth and Sixth Armies was made. The right the breach in lihe Kaiserstellun(J. At the end of wing of the Fifth Army was gone and the rest the day the XVIIIth Corps, which had made of it was cut off from the Sixth by Lord Cavan's a magnificent advance of nearly four miles, had troops. The Sixth Army, heavily attacked crossed the railway north of the Priula bridges in front, but still holding the Conegliano hills, and pushed its right wing up to Santa Lucia was threatened with envelopment by the di Piave. The British XIVth Corps had broken clashing aclvance of the XVIIIth Corps, which clean tlu'ough the Austrian positions, and while was now to be backed by the VIIIth. its main front lay at an average distance of On October 29 the clevelopments were rapid. four miles from the Piave, patrols had been ~ent The Tenth Army continued its ' victorloUS out towards the Monticano, and in somt' cases advance. A flying column of British cavalry had reached the river. The XIth Corps was and infantry forced the passage of the Monti threatening to take in the flank the enemy cano north-east of Vazzola, securing the troops opposite the Third Army on the Lower bridge on the Vazzola-Cimetta road before it Piave. The bridgehead was now ten miles wide could be blown upo According to Lord Cavan's and fOl.U' miles deep along an extEmded front, report, "This resolute action undoubtedJy where the enemy's lines were completely sayed us many hours of delay in th~ pursuit." . broken, a large number of prisoners being For the battle in this sector was now developing, captured. And the VIIIth Corps was passing litera11y, into a pursuit. The XIth Corps on the the river between N ervesa and Ponte di Priula. right was also rolling up the enemy line. The On the left, too, the day went well. The quick-marching Bersagliere Division (the 23rd) attack of t,h e Twelfth Army astride the Piave, passed to the Third Army in orcler to attack which was held up for a time after a slight southward, its place being taken by the 10th initial success, gradualiy wore down the enemy's Division, which joined th8 37th in the eastward resistance. On the right bank the village of advance. Alano was taken, together with many prisoners, While the Tenth Anny was pushing forward and hU'ther progress . northward was made, a in the plain beyond the Piave the Eighth Army movement which began to threaten the left was making up for the time lost owing to the of the enemy forces in the Grappa sector. bridging difficulties. The VIIIth Corps attacked Across the river troops of the 23rd French west of the Conegliano railway, and pushing Division and Italian Alpini battalions stormed back the enemy on its front, who were already the heights west of Valdobbiadene, Monte threatened in the flank by the XVIIIth Corps, Perlo and Monte PianaI', the li)8th French quickly occupied Susegana, while troops of the R egiment captming Monte PianaI' by a very XVIlIth Corps, advancing with great rapidity, fine attack, while the Alpini did their work in brushed aside 'ali resistance ,and occupied the way that is always eJl..rpected of them, and Conegliano. The situation of the Austrian seldom in vain. The Eighth Army was still Sixth Army was now hopeless. Hard pressed suffering from lack of bridges. As soon as on its front, and with one line of COlTImlmication morning broke the enemy glills from the high gone, it began to retreat, too late. 'i\Thile the grOlmd began hitting the bridges, and the XVlIIth Corps, which had been retmned to stream did the rest. The Austrians made the Eighth Army, held a line running up to frequent attacks, but with no success, and Conegliano and pinned the enemy to the hiUs, towards evening the Italians were fighting the VlIIth Corps pushed with a11 speed for their way forward, step by step, irresistibly, in Vittorio. , A flying column of cavalry and the Sernaglia plab::t. Their left wing, too, was Bersaglieri cyclists reached the town in the wor~ing up towards the right wing of the .evening of October 29, with the infantry Twelfth Army, towards the hills that rise to marching hard behincl it. lVIeanwhile, the right the east of Valdobbiadene. The Italian artillery wing ancl centre of the Austrian Sixth Army was giving the enemy a very hard tinle, and, were retreating into the foothills, closely pressed though there were no bridges over the river by the XXIInd and XXVIIth Corps. At the Italian aeroplanes were getting over a certain end of the day the left wing of the Austrian amount of food and blanket s, and, above a11, Sixth Anny was pinched in the salient, of high ammLmition. ground that projects towards the river from The prosp ects for the fo11owing clay were R efrontolo and Conegliano, both held by the fair incleed, for the breach between the Austrian Italians, and was struggling to get back to 308 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Vit.borio, while the main body had been pushed of long and stubborn fighting at the end of thA' into the hills north of the Sernaglia plain, and previous year. The enemy was holding on was trying to retreat by the Valmarino. grimly, and all the eleven divisions of the The . Twelfth Army had also made splendid "Be11uno Group" had now been engaged,. progress in its push northwards astride the but the position was becoming untenable. Piave. 'iV est of the river the left wing advanced The Twelfth Army had worked its way up from Alano, and aftet stiff fighting crossed the astride the Piave, and was turning the enemy's. Calci.no torrent, thus increasing the threat to left. The capture of Pertica arid the threat. the enemy's left fiank in the Grappa sector. to Prassolan menaced his positions east of the East of the river the "Belluno Group" was Brenta. The whole line in the Grappa sector' now being' menaced with the fate which had was cracking. befallen the Sixt.h Arrny on its left. The Up tilI the evening of October 29 the t.alian Italians were now in strength in this sector, Command was engaged in out-manCBuvring,. , and an advance in force by the 1st Corps, the and the forces under it in out-fighting, an enemy French 23rd Division and the Alpini of the who resisted stoutly. From the next day 52nd Division was brilliantly successful. In onwards the attackers were pursuing anri spite of the difficulties of the ground (the hiUs "roun<;ling up" a bea,ten army, which dis rose steep and frmvning on their front), in integrated rapidly. On the evening of October' spite of the tenacious resistance of the enemy, 29 the total number of prisoners taken by the backed by the fue of a great mass of guns, the Fourth, Twelfth, Eighth a~d Te.-:th Italian attack ate deeply into the Austrian mountain ArmieEi was 3:~,000, not yet a great number in positions, and the capture of Monte Cesen view of the large armies. engaged and the wide (5 197 feet) by the Alpini determined the area of the battle. In a few days more the· Italian success. For Monte Ce~en dominates figm'e was to be multiplied 'by ten, and that the Quero gorge and the road leading to the nmnber was to be doubled before the last Feltre basin. stragglers gave ·themselves into Italian hands. In the Grappa sector, meanwhile, the enemy On October 30, the Austrian line from the had passed from defence to attack. Convinced Brenta to the sea, alreacly pierced in place$ and that the chief threat lay in this sector, he cracking in others, began to waver backwards brought up his reserves from the Feltre region and break upo In the Tenth Army area the and c01illter-attacked on the very day that the Austrians made their last stand on the Monti main Italian action began on the Piave cano, but on the morning of October 30 the October 27. On that day a great effort was passage of the river was forced at various. made to ' re-capture Monte Pertica and the points. In these operations, Lord Cavan Valderoa. On Monte Pertica in particular reported, "Very gallant work was done by the a long ~nd stubborn fight took place. The 8th Battalion Yorkshire Regiment," alld, in Austrians r abtacked eight times, and more the words of the British General, "from this than once they gained a footing on the summit. moment the defea,t . became a rout." The But in the end, after six hours' fighting, they' Third Army no~ came into action on the were finally driven back, and accepted defeat. extreme right, on the Lower Piave. Crossings, The attack on the Valqeroa was no 1ess l.ill were forced in various places, the front,a1 successful, the Aosta Brigade resisting a11 the attack being helped by the work · of the 23rd attempts of the enemy to drive them off the Division, which had been transferred from the 8ummit. And next day the Italians kept a11 Tenth ATmy, and took the enemy in the fiank. the enemy positions under a heavy bombard· Th13 Austrians were now on the move, and only m6nt; preparatory to a renewal of the offensive. rearguards contested the Duke of Aosta's On October 29, while the Armies to the east advance. It was the same in the Eighth Army of it were triumphantly breaking up the enemy sector, where the enemy was striving desperatdy resistance, the Fourth Army ret.urned to its to get back by means of insufficient communica heavy and ungratefu1 task of hammering against tions. For his main lin.e was cut, and he was fortified mountain positions by a direct frontal being manCBuvred and pllshed into the hills. attack with inferior forces. ,Useful gains Hls rearguards were putting up> a fight in the were made in the direction of Monte Prassolan, passes that lead from the Valmarino and Vittorio and an advance was made from the slopes of to Belluno and the Upper Piave, but th:eiT task the Asolone to Col della Berretta, the scene was hopeless. Farther west, the Twelfth THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W AR. 309J ·310 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Army forced the Quero gorge and definitely no authoritative document::; to show his quality .turned the Grappa positions. as an official emissary. He was therefore sent Late in the evening of October 30, the back to the enemy lines with a mes ~;age to the Austrian command issued the following com-' effect that if the proposal were serious a properly munique,' "Taking into account theresolve . accredited mission should be sent, with a senior 'so often expressed to bring about the conclusion officer at its h ead. Twenty-four hours later -of an armistice and peace, putting an end to the the white fl.ag was raised again, and a small :l3truggle of nations, our troops fighting on Italian group of men left the Austrian trenches. 'soil will evacuate the occupied region." On the At their head was General von Weber, com previous evening the enemy had admitted a mander of the Sixth Corps, and the group withdrawa.I "to a rearward line," a withdrawal included eight other representatives, naval and which he confessed was the result of pressure, military; they were followed by a dozen but the announcement that the occupied attendants. territories would be ... evacuated came un- The night was spent in a villa near Borghetto, .expectedly to the world and signalled the final betw'een Ala and the frontier, and n ext day, breakdown of the Austrian resistance. The in closed motor-cars, with the blinds down, the malller of the bulletin was sufficiently un missior: was accompanied to the Villa Giusti, .soldierly to have been inspired from Berlin. not far from Padua. T elegrams fl.ashed to and In point of fact the Austrians had raised the from Paris, where Signor Orlando and Baron 'white fl.ag, literally, the evening before, in a Sonnino had gone to attend the Versailles sector far from the field of battle. Towards Conference, the Supreme Allied War COllliCil, ,.the evening of October 29 an Austrian officer , which had met to discuss the questiol1 of a with a white fl.ag was seen advancing from the reply to Germany's request for anarmistice. enemy trenches in the VaI Lagarina, near But meanwhile the fighting went o'n . •Serravalle, about half-way between Ala and The n ext event was the en emy r etreat on Robereto.The officer, whose rank was only the Grappa: front. This had been clearly that of captain, declared that he had come to foteshadowed by the successes farther east, '·broach the question of an armistice, but h e hart and it was no surprise when, on the night of [0 jficial photograph. A MODEL BRITISH FIELD AMBULANCE DRESSING ST A TION ON THE ITALIAN FRONT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 311 Oetober 30-31, the movement - began. The difficulties of bridging the Piave led at first to, rearguards w ho were detailed to cover the an inevitable shortness of supply. In spite of retreat broke down under the pressure of the lack of food and sleep, and in the faee of eonstant. Fourth Army, who now at ]ast found their fighting, the 37th Italian Division and the 7th. work directly rewarded. Till . now they had . and 23rd British Divisions have advanced with laboured for others, but at last they too out relief to their final objectives."* ware to join in the general advanc6. By the The Piave Armee and the" Belluno Group" evening of October 31 the left wing of the Fourth Army was in possession of Monte Roncone, looking down upon the VaI Cismon, with· patrols thrown out towards Fonzaso; the centre had pushed right through to Feltre, while the right, advancing from Monte Spinonei~, reaehed Monte Tomatieo and eut off the Austrians who were still resisting the left wing- of the Twelfth Army, north of Quero. Aeross the river the right wing of the Twelfth Army was coming down upon the Upper Piave from the Monte Cesen region, and farther east the river was reached by troops of the Eighth Army, who had a long running fight in the mountains and were held up for some time in. the San Boldo pass. Farther east again Belluno ~as being threatened from the south and patrols were sent out from the Fadalto pass towards , Ponte nelle AIpi, north-east of Belluno. In the hills east of the pass and in the plain equally good progress was made. The right wing of the Eighth Army pushed north and north-east from Vittorio, and the Tenth Army pursued its lffideviating way across the plain, extending its front in a northerly direetion to keep in toueh with the Eighth Army, which had swung to the left into the hills. But cavalry was now being pushed forward between the two Armies north of THE AUSTRIAN GENERAL WEBER Saeile, which had been reaehed almost simul VON WEBERNAU, taneously by British troops of the Tenth Army Who surrendered to the Italians. and a detaehment of Italian cavalry. The had ceased to exist. Their broken remnants· First and Third Cavalry Divisions crossed were straggling east and north, eastward into the' Livenza north of the little town and sent Friuli or up into Cadore, retracing the path out patrols on the roads leading to the Taglia they had trodden as triumphant victors barely mento. From Sacile down to the sea the a year before. Their faees were set for home,. Tenth and Third Armies reached the line of the and it was only from time to tin1.e that the Livenza and in places erossed the river, though stammer of machine-guns showed where groups. they found several bridges destroyed. Rere still resisted. And whether they stood or· it is apposite to quote Lord Cavan's tribute whether they fled, it was not a great pro- to his Arrny, for their fighting was practieally portion that escaped the quiek-f ollowing over. Indeed, it had really ceased on the Italians. previous day with the crossing of the Monticano. 1 t was now the turn of the Trentino A rmee,. Renceforward there werf! only a few skirmishes ; * The 37th was the only It.alian division which remained the main work of the Army lay in ,ieking up under Lord Cavan's command throughout the battle._ prisoners and guns. Lord Cavan wrote as The 23rd Bersaglieri Division was transferred to the Third Army on October 29, being replaced by the 10th. follows :-" The ..energy and determination of The Eighteenth Corps was attached to the Tenth Army' the infantry have been beyond all praise. The for less than two days. ~ 312 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE vVAR. first' to give and then to break. The process marching hard to cut off the retreat of the was much shorter, for the day was already Austrians in the Asiago district, and by the hopelessly lost when serious fighting began in evening of N ovember 1 the 21st Division had ,this sector. On October 28 the enemy troops overwhelmed the enemy troops at Grigno and in the Seven Commw~es (Eleventh Army) cut off the retreat of large bodies of troops had withdrawn to the so-called Winterstellung, who were coming down from the Seven Com north of the Asiago b asin, a line which ran munes by the Marcesina-Grigno road. On -from the wood by Gallio along the slopes of N ovember 2 the enemy resistance broke Monte Interrotto and Monte Rasta. A couple down al together. Early in the morning the of days later munerous conflagrations and British 48th Division took Monte Mosciagh ·explosions behind the lines seemed to indicate and thus turned the enemy positions on Monte that the enemy was preparing for a move 1nterrotto. This was the end. The Eleventh northward, and the Italians decided to attack Austrian Army broke uP, completely, and its in this sector also, although , they were greatly crumbled pieces were for the n~ost part over inferior in numbers. It was on this clay, as a taken by the pursuers 01' picked up without J.uatter of fact, that' the Austrians announced resistance as they came down weariIy from their that they would retire to the old frontier line, m::)witain positions and fOlmd the valleys already in the hope, no doubt, of securing a cessation of in possession of the victors and their retreat hostilities by this "voluntary" withdrawal. cut off. 'They were, of course, too late. It was not The Austrians had put up a good fight the likely that proposals based on this withdrawal first day, and if the rearguards had held on to would be considered when General ,Diaz was their positions with the same t enacity on the ,already sure of a great victory. second day a much larger m ,lmber of troops On October 30 and 31 the Italian Sixth Army would have got away, though the retreat of 'was testing the 'enemy's new positions, and many .vas already bal'red by the advance on the mornihg of N ovember 1 an attack was of ti.e Fourth Army in the VaI Bre7;ita. But on :launched On the extreme right, immediately N ovember 2 everything seemed to come ta w~st ef the VaI Brenta, the Italians took full an end at once. Perhaps it was the knovvledge 'advantage of the SUGcesses of the Fourth Arrry of their desperate position that made the ,and.rolled up the Austrian left. Troops of the commands give upo For they certainly did Ancona Brig 1de came up the precipitous throw up the sponge. 1n some cases it seems 'sides of Monte Spitz and Monte Chior and took to have been believed that the m ere acceptance the defenders in the flank. By the end of the of the request to discuss an armistice signified ,day the right of the Sixth Army was on Monte the end of hostilities. A divisional general Lisser and ran nearly westward from there. who was captured with his staff on November 1n the centre the Thirteenth Corps with the 2 by troops of the British 48th Division French 24th Division broke right through the express ed a lively indignation with the action ,enemy's rearguard, and af tel' pushing up the of his captors. H e insisted that the armistice VaI Campomulo turned westward and occupied had aIready been signed, and that he and his ' the ridge dividing the VaI Campomulo from the men should have b een permitted to go their VaI di Nos. On the left the Twelfth Corps way without interference. It is uncertain .(Italian 20th Division and British 48th Division) how the n 6WS that an armistice had been signed went straight for the enemy's m '1in line of had its origin. Probably it arose from the retreat and found a stiffer resistance than else knowleclge that a mission hacl b een sent to where. A hard day's fighting found the 48th negotiate a cessation of hostilities and from a Division held up in front of Monte 1nterrotto, calculation how long the discussions would last. though progress had been made on the slopes of Or it may have been a mere rumow', founded Monte Mosciagh. The 20th Division on the on nothing at all save the fact that discussians 1eft crossed the Assa between Rotzo and Roana, had beeri undertaken. That was evidentIy 'but was held for a tune by the enemy Narguards, widely known, and the breakdown in the enemy who were strongly posted in prepared positions rasistance may b e put down as due ta a reIuc ,on the western section of the Seven Communes, tance to ,0 on fighting when the end was so the plateau b etween the Assa and the Astico. n ear. The delay was' of little use, for in the Brenta On N ovember 2 the Austrian EJeventh Army vallev the lAft wing of the Fow,th Army was crumbled to fragments, and on the, sama 'THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 313 Jmorning the first attacks were launched against a stand being made at Pozzacchio. It was only ,the Tenth Army, which occupied the rest of a flash in. the pan, but it gave a chance to the rthe Trentino front, from the VaI d' Astico to Liguria Brigade to distinguish itself. N early -the Swiss borders. In the early morning of two and a half years earlier, at the most, anxious November 2 the 6th Division attacked in the moment of the Austrian drive of May, 1916, Å stico v~ll ey. The first attack failed. A the Liguria Brigade, then newly formed, had :second broke right through the enemy's resis won great honour by its heroic resistance on tance and cleared the way up the valley. A one of the spurs of Monte Pau. At a most [Official photograph, BRITISH ARTILLERYMEN IN ITALY HAULING THEIR GUN INTO POSIlION. lback from the Seven Communes before the out of battle a mere remnant.* It'was fitting :attacks of the Sixth Army. Next to move that it should win new laurels at the very End Iwas the left wing of the S'ixth Army, in VaI of the long struggle in the same region as the ILagarina. Storm , troops and Alpini attacked scene of its first great feat of arms, but across ~the enemy lines which ran across the valley the frontier, well into enemy country., near SarravaUe and overwhelmed the defence. On the night of ' N ovember 2 the Seventh "The whole af ,the Twenty-ninth Corps'supported Army also jolned the general forward move ,this attack, and the enemy line was broken ment. Troops attacked Monte Pari, coming :from Garda to Zugna Torta. By nine. o'clock up from the L edro basin,. and descended iin the evenin.g the A.lpini were in Rovereto, upon Riva from the west, to join with 'the left 'with other troops hastening after them. Mean of the First Army, which was pushing down 'while the FiftkCorps had attacked on Pasubio' upon Torbole from Monte Altissimo, the :and the Borcola Pass, and after overcoming northern ridge of Monte Baldo. N ext day the resistance of the enemy's fi.Tst line, which the attack west of Garda became general, 'was very weak, also pushed for Rovereto by and progress was very rapid, as it was all way of the Vallarsa and VaI Terragnolo. along the line. In the ,afternoon Trento was 'There was SQme stiff fighting in the Vallarsa, * See Chapter CXXXIX. 3J4 THE TIMES H1STORY OF THE W AR reached by a flying column which advanced the slow-moving transport of the enemy and from Rovereto, and late the same evening cut off gtIDS_ and men and material. 1n the cavalry of the.Fourth Army, which had pushed plains of the Veneto and Friuli the pursuit went 'up the VaI Sugana from Borgo, also entered on, and a flying column of cavalry hastened up Trento. One of the goals on which the mind the valley of the Tagliamento towards Pontebba. of Italy had b een set for so long was reached Here and there detachments of the enemy at last. turned at bay and made resistance, but in most In the western Trentino flying colwnns of cases the weary, starving men laid down their the Seventh Army advanced from the Stelvio arms without much ado. Prisoners were taken and Tönale passes, while there was a general in hundreds, in thousands. When the hour move forward in the VaI Giudicaria. The fixed for the cessation of hostilities struck over troops from the Stelvio came down upon the 300,000 prisoners ·were already counted. vVhen Upper Adige ana, effectually blocked the way of all those who had been cut off by the Italians those who were trying to retreat by this route. were taken and enumerated the total figure The Tonale colmnn, consisting mainly of cavalry approached 700,000. Three divisions which and Alpini in motor lorries, with some mountain were cut off in the Tagliamento valley, neal' artillery, made all speed down the VaI Vermiglio Gemona, were allowed to pass through Pontebba till they reached Dimaro, and so cut off the into Austria after being disarmed. · The enemy troops retiring from the Giudicaria by Italians had, indeed, far more prisoners than way of Madonna di Campiglio. Those who had they knew what to do with, and the task of tried to come back by Vezzano were caught by feeding them imposed a very heavy strain on the advance on Trento. the supply services. Nearly 7,000 guns were Similall scenes were taking place all a.Iong left in Italian hands . . the front. In the mountains quick-marching When the conditions to be imposed upon colum,ns of Italians pushed through the valleys Austria-Hungary had been agreed upon between and picked up Austrians as they came down General Diaz and the Allied representatives at. from their mountain positions, 01', leaving the Versailles, the terms were presented to the valleys, picked troops pushed direct across the Austrian Mission and quickly accepted. On mOUntains by hill paths, and came down upon the morning of N ovember 1 General Badoglio" • [(lfficiai phofolraph. AN AUSTRIAN LORRY HIT BY A HRITISH SHELL. THE T!MES H18T0RY OF THE W AR. 315 [Italian official pJwtograph. THE STELVIO. Sub-chief of the Itaiian General Staff, first that nearly followed that of the old frontier, 'visited General von Weber at Villa Giusti. The passing a little west of Caporetto and east n ext day there was a long conversation between of Cormons to Cervignano, Aquileia and 'General Badoglio and the enemy mission, when Grado. But before the hour arrived, before ·the general lines of the armistice were laid down, even the signature of the armistice, a more and on November 3, at five o'clock in. the distant goal was reached by another route afternoon, General Badoglio, accompanied by Trieste. ,his staff and a naval representative, arrived at The following account of the Italian landing Villa Giusti for the final act, the signature of at Trieste and of the events which immediately .the armistice. The signatures were affixed at preceded it was given by a special correspondent ·6.30, and it was agreed that hostilities should of The Times, who crossed from Venice to -come to an end the following day, N ovember 4, Trieste on November 3, and landed with the at 3 p.m. first troops :- ,\iVhen the hour struck, and fighting ceased, "Trieste is at last in Italian hands. This the Italian line ran roughly as follows; evening at dusk 1 landed with the Bersaglieri, * ,Schluderns, Spondinig and Prad in the VaI the first troops to reach the city. On the Venosta, blocking the western exit from the harbour front were thousands of people, who Upper Adige; Male, Cles and the Mendola Pass, gave them a wild and unforgettable welcome. 'in the hills south-west of Bozen ; Salorno in the There was not any sort of opposition; VaI d'Adige, nearly midway between Trento indeed, for several days the Austrian regime .and Bozen ; Cembra in VaI d'Avisio and thence had been at an end in Trieste, dying in a sort in a curve by Monte Panarotta, above Levico of inanition, without glory, and making no in the VaI Sugana, to Fiero di Primiero in Va] fight at all. Cismon; thence to Cencenighe in VaI Cordevole, "On October 28 all kinds, of rumours were Chiapuzza and Domegge in the VaI d' Ampezzo circulating of historic events in other parts of ·and Upper Piave respectively; thence in a the Empire. The Emperor Charles was said-to I ,curve south of the Upper Tagliamento to * The troops which cros ed consisted of the 2nd B ersaglieri Brigade and other details. A battalion .of Tolmezzo and from Tolmezzo up the VaI F ella B ersaglieri and a company of naval machine-gunner3 ,to' Pontebba; thence down to the sea in a line b egan to land at four o'clock in the afternoon. 316 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. be in flight; prisoners of war were being liberated everywhere; National Councils were being formed; the Entente Fleet was said to have entered Pola after a ·battle. "More immediate signs of Austria's dis integration were not wanting. Disbanded. soldiers, joining with some of the criminal. elements, had begun to prowl about the out skirts of the city, and even made their appear ance at the Punto Franco, a part of the docks,. robbing and firing rifles and revolvers. " On the 29th flags were flying everywhere,. both the Italian national flag and the flag of the Italian Socialist Party. In the afternoon masses of young men began to parade the city, b earing in front of them a large red, white and green banner. · They went through the chief streets,. and soon thousands began to join them. Some one hurried off and came .back with a band playing airs that had been forbidden for years,. , The Bell of San Giusto,' .and other patriotic songs of Italian Trieste. "Meanwhile some of the principal personages of all parties decided ta form a Committee of Publie Safety. Twelve members of the Italian Nationalist Party, twelve of the Italian Socialist . Party, and four representatives of the Slav population took over the governmen t and issued a proclamation declaring their intention to effect the separation from Austria of Trieste and the cOl.mtry of the littoral. . . . "On the afternoon of the 29th delegates of the Committee went to the palace of the Lieutenant-Governor, Baron von Fries Skene,. and decIared ' that they wished to see himo Soldiers were on guard in the hall and on the, great staircase. " 'Who are you ?' asked the officer of the guard. 'The Committee of Public Safety, come to take over the government of the city from the Lieutenant-Governor,' answered the spokesman .. "The officer hesitated a moment, smugged his shoulders, and gave tho message to Baron von Fries Skene. '1'he lattor Haid h e was ready to receive the doputation, and they were led into one of the upper rooms of the palace. The Governor bowed slightly to the spokesman of the deputation, who, stepping forward, said it was his duty to inform hirn that a Committee of Public Safety had been formed and was· about to take over the government of Trieste. "The Governor, who had listened calmly,. turned to the deputation and said, 'But what am 1 to do? You must let me communicatr with Dr. Lammasch' (then Premier at Vienna). THE 'llIMES HISTORY OF THE W AR. 311' [OJftc~at photograph. A CAPTURED AUSTRIAN MORTAR AND DUG-OUT. The deputation said they would await the almost at once. 'AlI right; quite alI right.' reply, and then left the palace. Then the Committee asked for an answer to be "They came back b efore 8 o'clock, Dr. given by nine in the evening, as they had only Lammasch's answer having come in the interval. one operator ; and at nine ptillctually Venice Again they were ushered into the Governor's sent them a short message saying: 'Very well ; presence. He said immediately: 'Gentlemen, to-morrow morning after nine.-Officer Com- 1 shalI hand over authority to you.' H e asked manding Venice.' if they would arrange a safe-conduct for him, "As soon as they had this reply three and the Naval COlnmander of the Port, who delegates boarded an ex-Austrian torpedo-boat. was present, asked to be included. Both and left for Venice. They explained to Admiral showed, if not an obvious, at least an under Marzolo the great need of Trieste, and he' lying fear of popular revenge. promised to assist them and to give them an answer on the morrow. Here, perhaps, the' "Next morning at 10 o'clock the Governor story may be' taken up from the other end. left his palace quietly in a motor-car and was " In response to the invitation of the delegates driven off along the Lubiana road. . . . it was decided .that an expedition should leave " Soon after midday on the 31st there b egan for Trieste. In the dark of the early morning a dramatic wireless conversation between 1 went on board a torpedo-boat from a Venice' Trieste and Venice. 'To Commander of Fleet quay. ' IVe were 24 units in all, spread in a long of Entente,' came a telegraIn out of the blue, line over the sea, among them all sorts of ships , Committee of Publie Safety of Trieste, in view that had been pressed into servico by reason of of grave state of city, wish to treat with Entente the need of haste. Fleet. Come and meet us off Point Caorle. "Ahead of all the Italian vessels was a Answer if you have received. 'IV e are waiting.' destroyer, with General P ettitti di Roreto on M~ emb ers of the Committee were standing rouncl board. The Podesta could not wait for hirn to Trieste's solitary wireless operator as he sent COlne ashore, and hastened on boal'd from a off this m essage, and waited with an anxiety smalI boat.... that can be ll11agined as he listened for an " All the cordons wore broken by the mass acknowledgment of the message: It came of people strugglll1g to approach the ships_ '318 THE TIJYIES HlSTORY OF THE WAR. TRIESTE. -vVhen th~ veneral put his ,IoQt to the ground he tions, were finally redeemed. Only t en days -said in a tirm voice, '1n the name of His Majesty before they had 'seelPed s,till far off, and though ,the ~g of It~ly r take possession of the city their eventual possession h ad b een assm'ed by ' of Trieste.' With difficulty he got into a the common victory which showed clearly on -waiting motor-car, which, moving at a walking th~ horizon, f ew~ p erhaps none, would h ave -pace, finally reached the Piazza Grande, flanked dared to pred~~~ their occupation by Italian " by high white palaces on every side, and entered arms b efore active h ostilities came to an end. that of the Lieutenant-Governor. H e and all But the offensive on the Middle Piave had the officers and soldiers who disembarked after dealt the tinal, irresistible blow to the worn-out, "hirn were cheered and p elted - with flowers tottering E mpire of the H absburgs. The cincessantly. Bersaglieri were embraced by rap 1mperial Army had h eld out to the last, and -turous women, who tore the plumes from the tilI the day was irretrievably lost the troops -steel h elmet s and thrust them in -their bosoms, of the Monarchy fought stubbornly and "Stirring speeches folIowed at an official courageously. But when they were b eaten the ' reception. - General P ettitti told the Mayo~ that Armies of the Monarchy crumbled away as the he had upon him his appointment n ot only as civil power had done b efore them. "Governor of Triest e but alsa of Ven ezia Giulia. B efore the hour came for the arms of the • . . 'Triest e,' said the General, 'ha~ fulfiJled its . Monarchy to be laid down in acknowledgment -aspirations. It is henceforward indissolubly of unconditional surrender, another centre of ' united to Italy.' He then dissolved the Com Italian hopes was occupied by a handful of mittee of Publie Safety, and said that he desired Italian troops. At 2.30 p.m. on November 4 'that the Town Council sliould Te-enter into an Italian torpedo-boat ehtered the little port possession of those special rights of which it had of Zara, the administrative centre of Dalmatia ' been deprived in May, 1915. under the Austrian regime, and landed a patrol " The aspect of the city as it faces this evening of infantry. As they landed the Italian flag -its unknown future is extraordinary. The was run up over the Pala zzo Municipale, - tumultuous mixture of its s ~ eets can hardly b e replacing the Yugoslav flag which had b een described. One watches the scene with a sort flown by order of the local Yugoslav representa of stupor, and cannot r ealize that here, before tives recently appointed by the central Yugoslav one's eyes, one of the great war aims stands administration at Spalato, itself acting under gained-that an Emp-i.re has crumbled away directions from the Yugoslav Council, which had he1'e, and Italy, after three years of passion, has formed itself into a Government at Zagreb , come to h er reward." (Agram). As the torpedo-boat drew n ear the It was on t,he sam e day that Trento and quay those on board saw a v,ery moving sight. ' Triest ecame into Italian hands. The two The crowd which had gathered to welcome the ancient Italian cities, whose 'nam:es, united in a fust Italian troops to this faithful stronghold of single formula, had formed the symbol and the italianita fell on their knees. Alone of all the -war-cry of Irredentism throughout two genera.- Dalmatian towns, Zara had been able t o preserve THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. it.s Italian majority. At length its fidelity was it will follow the crest of the Rhaetian Alps up rewarded. to the sources of the Adige and the Eisack", The conditions of the armistice, which came passing by the Reschen and Brenner passes and into force at three o'clock on the afternoon of the Oetztal and Zillertal Alps; the line thence N ovember 4, were as follows :- turns south, crossing Mount Toblach (pre sumably the Toblacher Feld) and meeting the 1 MILITARY CLAUSES. present frontier of the Carnic Alps. Itfollows this 1. The immediate- cessation of hostilities by frontier up to Mount Tarvis (?), and after Mount.. land, sea, and air. Tarvis the watershed of the JLuian Alps by the 2. Total demobilization of the Austro-Hun Predil Pass, Mount Manhart, the Tricorno , garian Army, and immediate withdrawal of (Triglav), and the passes of Podbrdo, Podlan all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the iscam, and Idria. From thi.s 'point the line front from the North Sea to Switzerland. turns south-east towards the Schneeberg._ TRIESTE'S WELCOME TO THE ITALIANS. The photograph was taken from the deck of the Italian destroyer, the fore part of which is seen on the right._ Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited excluding the whole basin of the Save and its as in Clause 3 below, there shall only be main tributarie-s; from the Schneeberg it goes down tained as an organized military force a maxi towards the coast in such a way as to include mum of 20 Divisions, reduced to pre ~ war peace Castua, Mattuglia and Volosca in t-he evacuatedl 8ffective. Half the Divisional, Corps, and territories. ' Army 'artillery and equipment shall be collected It will also follow the administrative limits at points to be indicated by the Allies an Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza and Balkan fronts, but from all Austro-Hungarian Lagosta, as well as the neighbouring rocks and territory. _islets and Pelagosa, but without the islands of Internment of all German troops which havu . Grande and Piccola Zirona, Bua, SoIta, and not left Austria-Hungary within that date. Brazza. ö. The administration of the evacuated AlI territories thus evacuated will be occ"upied terrltori0s of Austria-Hlmgary will be entrusted ' by the troops of the Allies and of the United to the Iocal authorities under the control of the States of America. Allied and Associated Armies of Occupation. AlI military and railway equipment of all 7 . The inunediate repatriation without r eci 'kinds (including coal), belonging to 01' within procity of all Allied prisoners of war and interned these territories, to be left in situ, and subjects, and of civil populations evacuated -s11rrendered to the Allies according to special from th€ir homes, on conditions to be laid down orders given by the Commanders-in-Chief of the by the Commanders-in-Chief of the forc8s of -forces of the Associated Powers on the different the Associated Powers on the various fronts . fronts. No new destruction, pillage, or requisi 8. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed tion to be done by enemy troops in the territories from evacuated territory will be cared for by -.to be evacuated by them and occupied by the Austro-Hungarian p ersonnel, who will b e left _forces of the Associated Powers. on the spot with the medical material required. 4. The Allies shall have the right of free movement over aU road and rail and waterways II. N AVAL CONDITIONS. in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use-af 1. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at ,the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means sea, and definite information to be given as to ..of transportation. The Armies of the Associated the Iocation and movements of all Austro Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Hungal'ian ships. ,Austria-Hungary at such times as they may N otification to be made to n eutrals that . deem necessary to enable them to conduct' freedom of navigation in all territorial waters military operations 01' to maintain order. They is given to the naval and mercantile mar!-ns~ shall have the right of requisition on payment of the Allied and Associated Powers, all -ior the troops of the Associated POWEr3 questions of neutrality being waived. wherever they may be. 2. Surrender to the Allies and United States 5. Complete evacuation of all German troops of America of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines, \\within 15 days, not only from the Italian and completed between the years 1910 and 1918, and LOftciat phot ograph, AN ITALIAN GUN BLOWN VP BY THE ITALIANS ON THEIR RETREAT, RE CA.PTURED FROM THE AUSTRIANS IN THE ITALIAN ADV ANCE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 321 TRENTO. -of all German submarines which are in 01' may 5. The existing blockade conditions set up by hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain waters. AlI other Austro-Hungarian submarines unchanged, and all Austro-Hungarian merchant -to be paid off and completely disarmed, and to vessels found at sea are to remain liable to remain under the supervision of the Allies and capture, save exceptions which may be made the United States of America. . by a Commission nominated by the Allies and 3. Surrender to the Allies and United States United States of An:ierica. of America, with their complete armament and 6. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated .equipment, of;- and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to Three battleships, be designated by tile Allies and United States of Three light cruisers, America. Nine destroyers, 7. Evacuation of all the Italian coasts and of Twelve torpedo-boats, all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside One minelayer, their national territory, and the äbandonment Six Danube monitors, of all fioating craft, naval materials, equipment, to be designated by the Allies and the United and materials for inland navigation of all kinds. States of America. All other surface warships 8. Occupation by the Allies and the United {including river craft) are to be concentrated in States of America of the land and sea fortifica Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated tions and the islands which form the defences by the Allies and thö United States of America, and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola . .and are to be paid off and completely disarmed 9. AlI merchant vessels held by Austria and placed under the supervision of the Allies Hungary b elonging to the Allied and Associated and United States of America. Powers to be returned. 4. Freedom of navigation to all warships and 10. No destruction of ships 01' of materials to merchant ships of the Allied and Associated be permitted before evacuation, slU'render 01' Powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the restoration. River Danube and its tributaries in the terri 11. All naval and mercl;tntile marine prisoners torial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary. of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in The Allied and Associated Powers shall have Austro-H\mgarian hands to be returned without the right to sweep up all minefields and obstruc reciprocity. tions, and the positions of these are to be The terms of the armistice were the natlU'al indicated. sequel to the crushing defeat which had brought In order to ensure the freedom of navigation it about. It is cIear that Austria-Hungary was on the Danube, the Allies and the United States on the point of giving up the game when Qf America shall be empowered to occupy or to General Diaz attacked, but the conditions on dismantle all fo; tifications or defence works. which she was preparing to retire were very 322 THE TIMES HIS'TORY OF THE WAR. different from those which were finally imposed. were sustained by the Fourth Anny in the Italy won a crushing victory, and as a result Grappa sector, whose casualty list totalled over the Allies were able to impose upon the repre 20,000. Next came the Tenth Army, which sentatives of the broken Monarchy conditions had some 5,000 casualties, inc1uding those of whic?, not only left the Habsburg lands at the the British Fourteenth Corps (close upon 2,000)_ mercy of the victors, but opened new routes for The Eighth Army casualties were well over attac1{ upon Germany if the war should con_ 4,000, those of the Twelfth Army about 2,400. The losses in the Third and Sixth Armies were slight, less than a thousand in each case, while those of the other Armies and the cavalry were negligible. The casualty list is sufficient indication that the troops of the falling Empire began by put ting up a stout resistance. If they had been better handled tne price of victory would have been heavier still, and there ~as a moment when th~ result o{ the battle seemed to hang in the balance, wheh the flooded river held up the right wing of the Ejghth ,Army, and threatened to thwart the movement which was the centre point of the Italian pIan. The brilliant advance of the Tenth Army could have brought about no more tIlan a loca] success, and one which it might have been difficult to maintain, if the push through Conegliano upon Vittorio had been further held upo The advance upon Valdobbiadene and 'that in the Sernaglia plain were equalIy ?-ep~ndent 'for their fulI result upon this ' push. The difficulty was overcome by General Caviglia's prompt dis patch of the XVIIIth Corps to attack north ward from the Tenth Army bridgehead, and by the quickness and decision with which ITALIAN ARMOURED CAR. . General Basso ' carried out this attack under tinue. The victory of Vittorio Veneto had Lord Cavan's orders. This movement eased far-reaching results, but the breakdown of the the' whole situation at once, and enabled the enemy was so dramatically sudden and complete general pIan to be accomplished successfully. that the effort which brought it about was The enemy was fairly outmanceuvred and out underestimated both at the time and afterwards. fought. His guns and reserves were in the It was no wonder that this should happen. The wrong place. Th~ galIant attacks and heavy last week of October and the first fortnight of sacrifices of the Italian Fourth Army were not N ovember made up a period so crammed with in vain, for their stubborn fighting kept the great events that it was almost impossible for way clear for the movement farther south, , the mind to grasp them. And each nation while the splendid advance of the Tenth Army naturally fixed its attention on the triumphs prevented the reserves in the southern part of which touched it most c1osely. One fact which the plain from being brought up to the danger was not generally appreciated was that the point. price paid for the tinal victory over the Armies Some of these latter reserves, moreover, of the Monarchy was not light. though it did had little stomach for the fight. They had not compare with the very heavy toll of dead been more affected than the comparatively and wounded which had marked the other isolated troops in the mO'Lmtains by the news great battles on the Italian front. The Italian of the political breakdown of the Monarchy. losses in killed, wounded and missing were over While the troops in line were still held up to 33,000, while the casualties of the British troops the mark by the old discipline, some of thot:e were some 2,000. By far the heaviest losses in reserve had already b egun to show signs of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W AR. 323 the dissolution that followed so quickly upon but essentially intact. The struggle of the clefeat. To sum up, the troops of the Monarchy subject races would have been for an autonomy fought stoutly to begin with, especially in those under the Habsburg Crown. If the Southern sectors which had been regarded as most Slavs had attained union, it would probably critical and where the best divisions had con~ . have been within the Empire which loosed war sequently been placed. But there was no upon the world by its determination to crush reserve of m01'al, either among the troops 01' in the Kingdom of Serbia. the commands, sufficient to bring about a It was the resistance of Italian arms, the recovery that would have limited defeat and staying power of the Italian troops and the averted disaster. Italian people, that assured the chance to the It was a wonderful achievement, this victory, subject races to develop their progr.amme of crowning and comp]ete, that was won a year political disruption. The chance was taken, A J UGO-SLA V DEMONSTRA TION IN LUBIANA (LAIBACH). af tel' the great disaster of Caporetto. It was and the surruner and autumn of 1918 saw a not ' Italy's greatest victory. To those who gradual failure of the ctntral Government of followed the deeds of heI' Armies, month af tel' the Empire to cope with the various national month and year af tel' year, heI' greatest victory movements. Czechs, Yugoslavs an~ Poles, a ll was the long struggle and successful resistance pronowlced their wilI. On October 2 repre between Asiago and the Piaye that followed sentatives of these subject nationalities declared the mOlirnful retreat. . But that great triunph openly that the offer of "autonomy" m.ade by over despair, which will a.lways be vivid in the Baron Hussarek came too late. The peoples m emories of those who witnessed its tragic would decide for themselves. circumstances, seemed at the time to have only Ali through October the news showed that the a negative result. The sa.rr.e is true in a lesser Monarchy was breaking up, and it was clear degree of the Piave battle six months later, that the end could not be far off when Hungary when the offensive power of the Austrians was showed a tendency ta break away from heI' broken for ever. Yet these were the necessary partner in the iniquitous Dual Syst em. But steps to the victorious battle which brought it was not until battle was joined on the Piave down the Empire of the Habsburgs to utter and in the mountains that the final crack came. ruin. But for the successful defence in the While the soldiers of the Monarchy were still mountains and on the Piave, the political fighting stubbornly the civil Government melted fabric of the Monarchy would have remained away. Revolution, which had been working - tinkered, repaired and altered, no doubt, fast, in secret, 01' only half in sight, came out 324 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. into open day. N ot only did the subject races Immediately after the fleet had been handed grasp their fate. Austria and HLmgary them· over to the Yugoslavs an incident took place selves rose against the Emperor, and republics which had the unfortunate effeet of exasperat were proclaimed. While the Army still resisted, ing the already unsatisfactory relations between dissolution overtook the Navy. At Pola the Italians and Southern Slavs. On the afternoon sailors rose against their officers, headed by of Oetober 31 two Italian naval officers left Croatian officers acting Lmder the orders of the Veniee with the objeet of entering the harbour Yugoslav National Council at Agram, and the of Pola and blowing up an Austrian battleship. dying Government of the Monarchy solemnly Skortly afterwards the news eame from Pola by handed over the Fleet, a considerable part of wireless that the fleet was in possession of the which was already out of their control, to the Slavs and would be handed over to the Entente, newly eonstituted Southern Slav authority. but it was too late to stop the enterprise. The The erews were largely out of hand, and there two adventurers succeeded in entering Pola was a riot oflooting and destruetion-so much harbour under cover of darkness, and towards so, that when the Italians subsequently entered dawn they blew up the battleship Viribus Pola and the other ports very few of the vessels Unitis, which was commanded by the senior lately belonging to Austria-HLmgary were in a Yugoslav officer, Capt. Vukotitch, who had condition to put to sea. And there was no taken over the ships in the name of the N ational one to take them, for the greater part of the ir Council. It was a daring exploit, but it had an crews deserted in the general confusion and unfortunate effect, arid the Italians were ma.de for their homes wherever they could. bitterly criticized for an unavoidable mistake.