Polygraphy Revisited: U.S. v. Scheffer

Melvin G. Goldzband, MD

U.S. v. Scheffer is a case that poses two questions. First, must a defendant wishes to place polygraphic evidence before the court be allowed to do so for fear that refusal will create a Constitutional issue by depriving him of due process? Second, is polygraphic evidence admissible evidence at all, as defined by the Military Rule of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Evidence? The case, originally tried in Court-Martial, was reviewed by two military courts of appeal, with resulting judicial dissention leading to the granting of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. In its decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of the Court-Martial to admit the requested polygraphic evidence.

Airman Edward G. Scheffer had been tions (OSI) of the United States Air Force convicted in a general court-martial in (U.S.A.F.). Soon afterward, he told OSI 1992. Contrary to his pleas of innocence, about two men who were dealing in large he was charged with and convicted of amounts of illicit drugs. Scheffer was passing bad checks to the extent of more asked by OSI to provide a urine speci- than $3,300.00, "wrongfully using meth- men, a routine procedure for controlled amphetamine" (does the Air Force ac- informants. He readily agreed to do so, knowledge a right way to use ?), failing but asked for a delay of a day because, as to go to his appointed place of duty, and he explained, he was able to urinate only being absent without leave (AWOL) for once daily. A few days later, OSI asked 13 days. Scheffer had been picked up in him to submit to a polygraphy examina- Iowa, far distant from his California base tion. The examiner asked three questions: to which he was promptly returned. He (1) had he ever used drugs while in the had been driving at an excessive speed Air Force; (2) had he ever lied regarding and with a suspended license. any of the information given to OSI; and As further background, in March 1992, (3) had he ever told anyone other than his Scheffer had begun to work as an infor- parents that he worked for OSI? No other mant for the Office of Special Investiga- questions were noted in the descriptive histories of the case in any of the court Dr. Goldzband is Clinical Professor Emeritus of Psychi- summaries, so it is not known here if any atry and Director Emeritus of Forensic Psychiatric Training, School of Medicine, University of California, other questions were asked of the defen- San Diego. Address correspondence to: Melvin G. Goldz- dant. But regarding those three significant band, MD, 4709 La Rueda Dr., La Mesa, CA 91941; E-mail: [email protected] questions quoted, Scheffer answered all

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of them in the negative, and the examiner relevant to the credibility of a witness. In concluded that no deception was indi- part, the analysis of Scheffer's case by the cated. However, the urinalysis had proven U.S.A.F. Court of Criminal Appeals positive for methamphetamine, a situa- stated that, although there must be an tion discovered by OSI only after the assumption that Scheffer's credibility was polygraphy examination. indeed relevant and vital to his defense, The court-martial sentenced him to a ". . . do not believe that presentation bad conduct discharge, a reduction to the of polygraph evidence was vital to the lowest enlisted grade, total forfeitures, court members' assessment of. . . [his]. . . and a 30-month confinement. The credibility." That affirming Appellate U.S.A.F. Court of Criminal Appeals re- Criminal Court reviewed considerable viewed the matter and affirmed the deci- law regarding polygraphy, going back to sion of the court-martial.' On May 8, the familiar Frye test (Frye v. U.S.,293 F. 1996, the case was argued before the U.S. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). noted their Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. ". . . inability to locate any federal case. The issue to be decided by that court was either before or after the promulgation of "whether the military judge erred in de- the Federal Rules of Evidence, which nying appellant's motion to present evi- suggests that the federal rule or any sim- dence of a favorable polygraph result ilar state rule unconstitutionally interferes concerning his denial of use of drugs with an accused's rights to due process or while in the Air ~orce".~ to present a defense." They also com- The decision of that court was that the mented about the fact that, at the time original decision of the court-martial and their opinion was written, "most of the the affirmation by the U.S.A.F. Court of federal courts of appeal still hold that Criminal Appeals was to be set aside. In polygraph evidence cannot be introduced the opinion of the higher appellate court, . . . to establish the truth of statements the rule prohibiting polygraph evidence made during the examination. . . . " was unconstitutional as ". . . applied to of the U.S.A.F. Court of Criminal the case in which the testifying accused Appeals judges, in his separate, partially offered it to rebut the attack on his cred- dissenting opinion, opined that the pros- ibility." The court also held that founda- ecution's case rested entirely on the sci- tional evidence for the proffered poly- entific evidence of the urinalysis. The graph examination must establish that the judge asked: underlying theory is scientifically valid Do urinalysis machines, or their operators, and can be applied to the accused's case. make "mistakes" which go undetected through The affirmation by the U.S.A.F. Court normal quality control? We need only look at of Criminal Appeals had been made in the Pentium computer chips that cannot divide, nu- clear reactors that go haywire, and space shut- face of knowledge that a higher court, the tles that don't launch to answer that question. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed So what if are wrongfully accused of Forces, had previously held that poly- drug use based upon an erroneous urinalysis graph examinations could be considered result?. . . . Because of the nebulous nature of

134 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1999 Polygraphy Revisited: US. v. Scheffer

the prosecution's evidence, you basically have Rules of Evidence. Judges now must act only your word. But why should a judge or jury as gatekeepers. They may seek to deter- believe you, as opposed to the prosecution's "scientific" evidence, if you choose to testify? mine (with expert help, it is hoped) Credibility! whether or not a mechanism, theory, ma- in a urinalysis case, the accused's credibility chine, or what-have-you, upon which ex- becomes the whole ball game. . . since urinal- pert testimony is based, is acceptable to a ysis machines cannot be cross-examined. . . significant proportion of the members of Polygraphs are also machines operated by hu- mans which produce results interpreted by hu- that expert's profession. mans. Polygraph evidence reflects on the cred- The dissenting judge in the U.S.A.F. ibility of an accused's denial of having used the Court of Criminal Appeals. regardless of drug charged (U.S. v. Gipsoiz, 24 M. J., 253; his certainly being close either to touting US. v. McMorris, 643 F.24 at 461-2). 1s it admissible on an accused's behalf? We think so the machines purporting to uncover lies despite the absolute prohibition in Military or else selling short any and all machines Rule of Evidence 707. . . . ' purporting to tell or do anything. in the Thus, polygraphy remains a seemingly end properly based his dissent on legal constant focus of arguments in the courts. rather than scientific grounds. He stated In Scheffer, the first appellate court knew that he recognized ". . . a constitutional that the higher court would probably dis- escape clause to Military Rule of Evi- agree, but it nonetheless ruled to affirm dence 707. . . . " He noted that the Mili- the court-martial's refusal to allow poly- tary Rules of Evidence indicate that poly- graph evidence. In that court, however, as graph evidence is ". . . not admissible has been noted, a dissenting judge dis- unless it is 'constitutionally required to be agreed with the Military Rule of Evidence admitted,' that is. unless it is relevant regarding polygraphy. A reading of his material and favorable to the defense. cf. opinion may reflect the notion that if one U.S. v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. "machine" proving evidence can be ac- 1993). . . . " The dissenting judge opined cepted. another "machine" can, too, es- that the military judge in the court-martial pecially if it has an operator to cross- denied the defendant the opportunity to examine. demonstrate that his polygraph evidence On the basis of one aspect of logic, that met the constitutionally required criteria conclusion makes sense. On the basis of for admission. another, aside from the fact that even The decision of the U.S. Court of Ap- "urinalysis machines" have operators, it peals for the Armed Forces, in setting makes none at all, as most psychiatrists aside the decision of the court-martial and would agree. Dnubert v. Merrell Dow the affirmation of the earlier appellate Pharmaceuticals, Znc. (509 U.S. 579 court, noted that, at the court-martial, the (1993)) sometimes tends to affirm that as defendant had asked the military judge well, again depending upon the opinion for an opportunity to lay a foundation for of the judge. The Dnubert decision, of the favorable polygraphic evidence. That course, reset the standard for admission request had been denied. The military of expert testimony under the Federal judge in the court-martial ruled that the

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President of the United States, in his ca- engenders in the subjects who are pacity as Commander-in-Chief, may, ". . . strapped to it. through the Rules of Evidence, determine In reviewing their appellate decision, that credibility is not an area in which a the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals fact finder needs help. and the polygraph for the Armed Forces stated: is not a process that has sufficient scien- Polygraph examinations were relatively crude tific acceptability to be relevant. . . . " when Frye was decided. . . . The Eleventh Cir- Obviously, the court-martial judge took cuit has recognized that, "[slince the Frye de- cision, tremendous advances have been made in greater stock in the "urinalysis machine" polygraph instrumentation and technique". . . . than in the "lie detection machine," as The effect of Mil. R. Evid. 707 is to freeze the well as placing far greater weight on the law regarding polygraph examinations without other damning aspects of the record. Like regard for scientific advances. We believe that the truth-seeking function is best served by the dissenting appellate judge quoted keeping the door open to scientific advanc- above, the court-martial judge made his es. . . . With respect to appellant's case, we, like decision on legal grounds, although pro- the Fifth Circuit, cannot determine "whether viding as well his own opinion that the lie polygraph technique can be said to have made sufficient technological advance in the seventy detector is not a sufficiently acceptable years since Frye to constitute the type of 'sci- scientific instrument. entific, technical or other specialized knowl- Sometimes the law is confusing. Even edge' envisioned by Rule 702 and Daubert." U.S. v. Posado, 57 F.3d at 433. We will never though that truism often provides forensic know unless we give appellant an opportunity psychiatrists with headaches, it is proba- to lay the foundation. . . . Like the Court in bly best that we are not in the judges' Posado, "We do not hold that polygraph exam- chairs so that it would be up to us to inations are scientifically valid or that they will always assist the trier of fact, in this or any interpret the law. We can go only so far in other individual case. We merely remove providing courts with our opinions, re- the obstacle of the per se rule against admissi- gardless of how solidly scientifically bility. . . . "4 based-at least, according to our own Of course, the doors to all courtrooms points of departure- the opinions may must be held open for scientific advances be. would, of course, be the first to leap that can help fact finders in all cases. But, into the fray regarding polygraphy, point- have tremendous advances really been ing out all of the research demonstrating made in the science of polygraphy? I have its inability to be considered by serious no doubt that the techniques of many scientists as a truly scientific instrument. polygraph examiners have become far In no way, however, should it be consid- more finely honed, although I must won- ered a nonuseful instrument. It has been der about the OSI examiner who may demonstrated repeatedly that polygraphs have asked Scheffer only three questions provide investigators with considerable (insofar as we know). For a review of the data, even including confessions. That is accepted but embattled schools of poly- not a result of science, however. It is, in graphic questioning, the author's earlier contrast, often based simply upon the my- paper on the might be helpful.5 In thology of the machine and the fears it their own seminal work in this area, such

136 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1999 Polygraphy Revisited: US. v. Scheffer researchers as Sa~e,~~ykken,' aski in,^ martial should stand. On the other hand, and Ekman9 have described and touted the Supreme Court decision was not in various techniques, often disparaging any sense unanimous, and dissenting other techniques as they did so. The lit- opinions followed at great length after the erature provided by the psychologists and delivery of the majority ruling by Justice other mental health experts in the field of ~homas." polygraphy is probably most politely de- In sum and substance, Justice Thomas scribed as contentious. That description stated that a defendant's right to present alone might well be enough to demon- relevant evidence is subject to "reason- strate that there is really no fully accepted able restrictions to accommodate other science at the basis of the genuine art of legitimate interests in the criminal trial polygraphy, other than the fact that stress process." Continuing, citing Rock v. Ar- may cause well accepted changes in phys- kansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55. he wrote, "Such iologic responses. Even considering the rules do not abridge an accused's right to contentiousness of the literature, I doubt present a defense as long as they are not that any of these writers would consider a 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the pur- three-question examination a complete poses they are designed to serve'. . . . and dependable one (if, in fact. those Moreover, we have found the exclusion were the only questions posed to the ac- of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbi- cused): but no other questions, relevant or trary or disproportionate only when it has not, were mentioned in any summary of infringed upon a weighty interest of the the case. accused. . . . " The so-called "other legit- So, now cometh the United States Su- imate interests in the criminal trial pro- preme Court, granting certiorari in 1997, cess" include such quantities as "ensuring based upon the dissention in the ranks of that only reliable evidence is introduced the judicial officers in each of the lower at trial, preserving the jury's role in de- courts that had previously heard this case. termining credibility, and avoiding litiga- But there is really dissention about the tion that is collateral to the primary pur- dissention! Is the dissention in Scheffer pose of the trial." about the constitutional right to present Justice Thomas cited United States v. evidence deemed essential by the de- Barnard (490 F. 2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. fense, or is it about whether lie detection 1973)), which stated, admirably, that "a evidence ought to be attended to at all? fundamental premise of our criminal trial In brief, the answer is yes. The Su- system is that 'the jury is the lie detec- preme Court dwelt on both issues, and in tor'. . . . By its very nature, polygraph reading their decision, it seems as if both evidence may diminish the jury's role in contributed to their eventual judgment. making credibility determinations. . . . " Their ultimate ruling was that the deci- Justice Thomas's majority opinion then sions of both of the lower appellate courts noted, "Unlike other expert witnesses were to be overturned and that the who testify about factual matters outside conviction ruled by the original court- the jurors' knowledge. . . a polygraph ex-

J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1999 137 Goldzband pert can supply the jury only with another polygraph test detects deception better opinion, in addition to its own, about than chance, but with error rates that whether the witness was telling the could be considered significant. . . . "I1 truth. . . " My earlier paper5 quotes the long-since Can one argue the notion, however, retired, then-Deputy Director of the that an interest of the accused to try to be Counterintelligence and Investigative found innocent is not weighty? My own Programs of the Department of Defense, bias toward civil libertarianism is of- who was kind enough to allow an inter- fended here. On the other hand, my other view for the purpose of that article. In relevant bias, that of disputing the valid- defense of the Department's very fre- ity of polygraphy examinations except quent use of polygraphy, his major thesis when they result in the subject "spilling about the instrument and the controversy the beans" about whatever the case is over it was: "We never said it was scien- about. is satisfied by Justice Thomas's tifically valid but, rather, that it was use- reference that "only reliable evidence" ful." He later amplified this: with consid- may be introduced at trial. erable, joyful affect, when he exclaimed, This is a forensic psychiatric journal, "You just wouldn't believe what people however, not a law review. My civil lib- tell us when we have them on the ma- ertarian bias will have to be defended by chine! You'd be amazed at what some lawyers or law professors, who have far people open up and talk about!"12 more to say about the law and the consti- The Deputy Director emphasized the tutional issues than I do. Suffice it to say, difference between scientific validity and that as much as I mistrust polygraphic usefulness in his descriptions of the value evidence (again, other than confessions of the polygraph. In my opinion, that dif- made during those examinations. or other ferentiation continues to ring true. Is information extracted during them), I be- polygraphy "junk science," 'a la Daub- lieve that the defense ought to have a ert? Is it science at all? All of the attempts right to petition the court to present this in the psychological and forensic litera- evidence. Obviously, I would be first in ture to validate the scientific basis of line (were I still in practice) to try to polygraphy have gone for naught because demolish such evidence, and many cur- of the dissention among its proponents, rently active colleagues are probably ea- whereas the usefulness of the instruments ger to step into that line too. And they cannot be disputed by even its strongest could do it well, even if they restrict their critics-admittedly, such as me. Its indis- testimony to discussing the polygraphic putable usefulness, however, does not ex- literature generally and its manifold inter- tend to the distinction between the sub- nal contradictions. Even the 1983 report ject's truthfulness and falsehood. Instead, by the Congress's Office of Technology it enters into the area of creating an aura Assessment concluded that ". . . the cu- of fear that causes the subject to break mulative research evidence suggests that down and either confess whatever there is when used in criminal investigations, the to confess or else to contribute to the

138 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law,Vol. 27, No. 1, 1999 Polygraphy Revisited: U.S. v, Scheffer investigation by discussing issues that he truthful when Scheffer denied the voli- or had kept veiled until then. In short, tional ingestion. just as I have previously said about the Both the military judge in the court- polygraph in the earlier paper, it is actu- martial and the majority of Supreme ally a coercive instrument. It uses the Court justices seemed to agree that this trickery of enormous suggestion to be as situation per se invalidated the validity of effective as it is. As a coercive instru- the polygraph in this matter, even its use- ment, in my opinion, its use should be fulrzess in this specific differentiation be- off-limits to psychiatrists. l3 tween truth and falsehood. Whether the The examiners are the main issue here. defendant still should have had the right Skilled examiners can play the game of to present the opinion evidence of the creating that aura of fear like virtuosi. polygraph, as stated before, is a legal The subjects begin to develop the impres- question, as is the relevance of that data. sion that it is fruitless to try to hide before I would not intervene there, despite my this highly touted, supposedly invincible, civil libertarian bias. Even so, it seems to supposedly scientific machine. Not-so- me that a better case than this ought to skilled examiners may not know how to serve as the basis for a full-blown discus- work as well with the subjects or may sion by legal authorities regarding admis- totally misinterpret the subjects' re- sion of polygraph evidence. sponses. Many courts have echoed to the Justice ~ennedy'~seems to agree. He arguments between polygraphers, just as wrote a partially dissenting opinion for they have to arguments between all prof- the Supreme Court in Scheffer, in which ferers of opinion evidence-certainly in- he was joined by Justices O'Connor, cluding forensic psychiatrists. Ginsburg, and Breyer. "In my view, it In Scheffer, as in many other cases, the should have been sufficient to decide this courts are faced with the specific di- case to observe, as the principle opinion lemma of determining whether the instru- does, that various courts and jurisdictions ment can actually distinguish truth from 'may reasonably reach differing conclu- lying, especially when a subject is sions as to whether polygraph evidence charged with an offense. The real issue is should be admitted."' Justice Kennedy whether the polygraph examiner/inter- continued later, "Given the ongoing de- preter is able to make that distinction on bate about polygraphs, I agree that the the basis of the autonomic responses reg- rule of exclusion is not so arbitrary or istered by the instrument. All of the other disproportionate that it is unconstitu- evidence indicates that Scheffer had in- tional. I doubt, though, that the rule of per deed ingested methamphetamine (he in- se exclusion is wise, and some later case sisted that it was given to him without his might provide a more compelling case for knowledge) and that he was operating as introduction of the testimony than this if he knew he had got himself into terribly one does. . . . ,914 serious trouble. But the polygraph exam- On the other hand, in a more far-reach- iner decided that the responses were ing dissenting opinion, Justice st even^'^

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believed that the polygraphic evidence shared gratefully with many colleagues. ought to have been admitted. As he wrote, But that "feel good indulgence, if shared ". . . [The defendant's] principle defense by the courts, is at the terrible cost of a lot was 'innocent ingestion;' even if the uri- of time and money and terrifically wasted nalysis. . . correctly indicated that he did energy. Remarkably inconsistent determi- ingest the substance, he claims to have nations have always been the remarkably been unaware of that fact. The results of consistent results when these battles have the lie detector test conducted three days been fought over and over again in the later, if accurate, constitute factual evi- courts. Seeds are sown thereby only for dence that his physical condition at that further conflict over an issue that should time was consistent with the theory of his have been put to rest long ago, because defense and inconsistent with the theory the objective literature shows that the of the prosecution. The results were also polygraph is neither scientific nor reliable relevant because they tended to confirm as a teller of truth. the credibility of his testimony. Under So what? The bigger deal is that Daub- Rule 707, even if the results of the poly- ert wins again. At this time, as always, it graph test were more reliable than the is up to the expert witnesses to present results of the urinalysis, the weaker evi- opinion and other evidence regarding the dence is admissible and the stronger evi- validity of so-called scientific or other dence is inadmissible. . . . "I5 opinion evidence, whether self-presented The above-referenced writing is a little or in response to other experts on either confusing. Even though Justice Stevens side. It is currently legally correct to say goes on, later in his dissent, to appear to that such evidence does not have to be believe relatively strongly in the validity reliable to a specific degree. Its basis of the polygraph and the examiners, I might not now, under Daubert, even have think he is really saying here that, regard- to be accepted by a majority of the prac- less of whether evidence is stronger or titioners of that particular discipline or weaker, it should all come in. Toward the science. Experience shows that separate end of his dissent, he summarizes his hearings are often held to determine ad- position: "There is no legal requirement missibility. Those "battles of the experts" that expert testimony must satisfy a par- are now usually held pretrial, away from ticular degree of reliability to be admis- the hearing of the jury. sible. Expert testimony about a defen- Trial judges, for the most part, in or out dant's 'future dangerousness' to of the military, continue to look askance determine his eligibility for the death pen- at the admission of polygraph evidence, alty, even if wrong 'most of the time,' is regardless of a few changes in some ju- routinely admitted. Barefoot v. Estelle, risdictions, and even there the admissibil- 463 U.S. 880, 898-901 (1983)."16 ity hearings often lead to exclusion. As Thus, Justice Stevens seems to support, one distinguished jurist told me, quite in- at least to some degree, my own, previ- formally and anonymously, "After all, ously acknowledged civil libertarian bent, some might believe that examination of

140 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1999 Polygraphy Revisited: US. v. Scheffer owl entrails can produce truth. If that is courtroom via a legislated blanket exclu- all the defendant can produce, would we sion, one problem may be solved. How- be obliged to admit it at trial?" The an- ever, the price we as a society may have swer is that the "we," representing the to pay for that luxury is the possible even- judges themselves, must make that deter- tual, generalized disuse of the polygraph mination under Daubert. Does preventing as a useful investigative tool by law en- polygraphic testimony from entering into forcement or security agencies. Its value the courtroom represent interference with in such settings has been proven time and a defendant's due process guarantees? time again-but not so much as a truth- Can everything be brought in, regardless determining instrument as an instrument of validity, reliability, or proven scientific with an "aura" that causes people to open basis; even owl entrails? We civil liber- up and talk. That eminently worthwhile tarians are quick to say, "Sure!" But use may gradually disappear under the somewhere a line will have to be drawn. burden of the legislatures' and courts' Is polygraphy that line? Are closed Daub- blanket exclusion of the instrument. ert-based hearings enough to determine The ability of the polygraph specifi- that line? If some judges allow poly- cally to determine validly and reliably the graphic testimony to be admitted after truth of what an individual is saying, es- Daubert hearings. will they allow expert pecially given the heightened emotional testimony in open court, during the trial, stance of the type of situation in which it to impeach that evidence, or might they is usually used, remains dubious at best. say that the pretrial hearings had already That, however, is unfortunately the spe- decided that issue? cific use to which polygraphy is put cur- In sum and substance, Schefer seems rently in courtrooms. The examiners to leave us at just about the same place as might be even more dubious than their before. Polygraphy remains a sticking instrument, at least as described often by point in our courts, both military and ci- examiners or professors from conten- vilian. Although the arguments in Schef- tiously competing schools of polygraphic fer may try to emphasize the controversy inqu~ry. over a possible blanket exclusion, I doubt Finally, throwing all false reticence that the same battles would be fought aside, I am left with one more question. over something other than the polygraph. "Mr. Justice Thomas, why didn't your As in President Clinton's problems, clerks find nzy paper to cite?" where the situation really centers around sex and not perjury. here it seems to be References polygraphy, not legality. The solution is basically legislative, not 1. U.S. v. Scheffer, 41 M.J. 683 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) judicial. Evidentiary rules and other court 2. U.S. v. Scheffer,44M.J.442(C.A.A.F. 1996) procedures are determined by state and 3. 41 M.J. at 695 4. 44 M.J. at 446 federal legislative action. If the polygraph 5. Goldzband MG: The polygraph and psychia- is definitely denied admittance to the trists. J Forensic Sci 35:391-402, 1990

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6. Saxe L: Business has no business with lie Kircher J: The scientific status of research on detectors. Washington Post. Dec 29, 1988 polygraph techniques: the case for polygraph 7. Lykken D: Psychology and the lie-detector tests, in Modern Scientific Evidence. Edited industry. Am Psychol Oct:725-34, 1974 (See by Faigman D, Kaye D, Saks M, Sanders J. also: Lykken D: A Tremor in the Blood. New 1997, pp 575 et seq.) York: McGraw-Hill, 1981, pp 118 et sey.; see 9. Ekman P: Telling Lies. New York: Berkeley also: Lykken D, lacono L: The scientific Books, 1986 status of research on polygraph techniques: 10. U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) the case against polygraph tests, in Modern I I. Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Scien~ificEvidence. Edited by Faigman D, Research Review and Evaluation (technical Kaye D, Saks M, Sanders J. 1997, pp 575 memorandum). Washington, DC: Office of et seq.) Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1983 8. Raskin DC: The truth about lie detectors. 12. Supm Ref. 5, at 398 Wharton Magazine. Fall 1980, pp 29-34 (See 13. Ibid. at 401 also: Raskin DC, Podlesny JA: Truth and de- 14. 523 U.S. at , 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1269 ception: a reply to Lykken. Psychol Bull 86: 15. 523 U.S. at , 1 18 S. Ct. at 1270 54-62, 1979); see also: Raskin DC, Hunts M, 16. 523 U.S. at , 118 S. Ct. at 1276

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