Mao Zedong Volume 1: 1893–1949 Frontmatter More Information
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January 04, 1939 Translation of a Letter from Governor Shicai Sheng to Cdes
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified January 04, 1939 Translation of a Letter from Governor Shicai Sheng to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov Citation: “Translation of a Letter from Governor Shicai Sheng to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov,” January 04, 1939, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGASPI f. 82 op. 2 d. 1238, l. 176-182. Obtained by Jamil Hasanli and translated by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121890 Summary: Governor Sheng Shicai expresses gratitude to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov for the opportunity to visit Moscow. After reporting critical remarks made by Fang Lin against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, Sheng Shicai requests that the All-Union Communist Party dispatch a politically experienced person to Urumqi to discuss Party training and asks that the Comintern order the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang to liquidate the Party organization. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the MacArthur Foundation. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation Scan of Original Document Top Secret Copy Nº [left blank] TRANSLATION OF A 4 JANUARY 1939 LETTER OF GOVERNOR SHENG SHICAI TO CDES. STALIN, MOLOTOV, AND VOROSHILOV "Deeply respected Mr. STALIN, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars MOLOTOV, and Marshal VOROSHILOV! Although a quite long four-month period has passed since I left Moscow, recalling my stay in Moscow, it seems that it was not long ago at all. When my wife and I were in Moscow, you gave us a good reception and devoted much of your valuable time to us. My wife and I were not only grateful to you for this, but were also left with an unforgettable deep impression. -
The Darkest Red Corner Matthew James Brazil
The Darkest Red Corner Chinese Communist Intelligence and Its Place in the Party, 1926-1945 Matthew James Brazil A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy Department of Government and International Relations Business School University of Sydney 17 December 2012 Statement of Originality This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted previously, either in its entirety or substantially, for a higher degree or qualifications at any other university or institute of higher learning. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources has been acknowledged. Matthew James Brazil i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Before and during this project I met a number of people who, directly or otherwise, encouraged my belief that Chinese Communist intelligence was not too difficult a subject for academic study. Michael Dutton and Scot Tanner provided invaluable direction at the very beginning. James Mulvenon requires special thanks for regular encouragement over the years and generosity with his time, guidance, and library. Richard Corsa, Monte Bullard, Tom Andrukonis, Robert W. Rice, Bill Weinstein, Roderick MacFarquhar, the late Frank Holober, Dave Small, Moray Taylor Smith, David Shambaugh, Steven Wadley, Roger Faligot, Jean Hung and the staff at the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong, and the kind personnel at the KMT Archives in Taipei are the others who can be named. Three former US diplomats cannot, though their generosity helped my understanding of links between modern PRC intelligence operations and those before 1949. -
September 27, 1972 Excerpt of Mao Zedong's Conversation With
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified September 27, 1972 Excerpt of Mao Zedong’s Conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka Citation: “Excerpt of Mao Zedong’s Conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka,” September 27, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Chinese Communist Party Central Archives. Translated by Caixia Lu. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118567 Summary: Mao claims that, as a result of Tanaka's visit to China, "the whole world is trembling in fear." In addition to discussing international politics, Mao and Tanaka also delve into ancient Chinese history and Buddhist philosophy. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the MacArthur Foundation. Original Language: Chinese Contents: English Translation Excerpt of Mao Zedong’s Conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka 27 September 1972 Chairman Mao: With your [the Japanese] visit to Beijing, the whole world is trembling in fear, mainly one Soviet Union and one United States, the two big powers. They are fairly uneasy, and wondering what you [the Japanese] are up to. Tanaka: The United States has declared its support for our visit to China. Chairman Mao: The United States is slightly better, but they are also feeling a little uncomfortable. [They] said that they didn’t manage to establish diplomatic relations during their visit in February this year and that you [the Japanese] had run ahead of them. Well, they are just feeling a little unhappy about it somehow. Tanaka: On the surface, the Americans are still very friendly to us. Chairman Mao: Yes, Kissinger had also informed us: Don’t set barriers. -
Kang Sheng/Wang Ming's Return from Moscow
Kang Sheng/Wang Ming's Return From Moscow by Ah Xiang [Excerpts from “Red Terror & White Terror” ] Kang Sheng, while in Moscow, became deputy chief for CCP Delegation To Comintern. During four year stay in Moscow, Kang Sheng became a devout supporter of Wang Ming and implemented the "Purge of Trotskyists" measure among CCP members in USSR by learning from the experiences of NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs). NKVD, when the OGPU (q.v.) was abolished in 1934, became the commissariat that conducted the police and terror activities on behalf of Stalin, and it was replaced by KGB in 1946. Kang Sheng, in Aug 1935, was appointed "backup commissar" for Comintern Central Executive Committee. In late Oct of 1937, Wang Ming & Kang Sheng returned to Dihua of New Dominion Province and hinted that Yu Xiusong & Zhou Dawen etc (who had antagonized Wang Ming while studying at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow) were Trotskyist suspects, and two months later, Sheng Shicai arrested Yu & Zhou and handed over to Russian Red Army which stationed its USSR Red Army 8th Regiment in Hami. On June 25th 1938, Russians transported Yu Xiusong to USSR where NKVD executed him as a Trotsyist. Also killed in early 1938 in New Dominion Prov, in the hands of Deng Fa and under the nose of Chen Yun, would be Li Te & Huang Chao, two surviving officers from Zhang Guotao's Western Route Red Army. (Numerous Chinese communists, during the Russian Purge, had been either executed or sent to Siberia's gulags. Per Zheng Yi, Wu Xianqing, i.e., wife of Liu Ding [aka Kan Zunmin], was killed by Russian Purge in USSR. -
Kampen MAO ZEDONG, ZHOU ENLAI and the CHINESE COMMUNIST
Kampen MAO ZEDONG, ZHOU ENLAI AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP MAO ZEDONG, ZHOU ENLAI Thomas Kampen MAO ZEDONG, ZHOU ENLAI AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP NIAS AND THE EVOLUTION OF This book analyses the power struggles within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party between 1931, when several Party leaders left Shanghai and entered the Jiangxi Soviet, and 1945, by which time Mao Zedong, Liu THE CHINESE COMMUNIST Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai had emerged as senior CCP leaders. In 1949 they established the People's Republic of China and ruled it for several decades. LEADERSHIP Based on new Chinese sources, the study challenges long-established views that Mao Zedong became CCP leader during the Long March (1934–35) and that by 1935 the CCP was independent of the Comintern in Moscow. The result is a critique not only of official Chinese historiography but also of Western (especially US) scholarship that all future histories of the CCP and power struggles in the PRC will need to take into account. “Meticulously researched history and a powerful critique of a myth that has remained central to Western and Chinese scholarship for decades. Kampen’s study of the so-called 28 Bolsheviks makes compulsory reading for anyone Thomas Kampen trying to understand Mao’s (and Zhou Enlai’s!) rise to power. A superb example of the kind of revisionist writing that today's new sources make possible, and reminder never to take anything for granted as far as our ‘common knowledge’ about the history of the Chinese Communist Party is concerned.” – Michael Schoenhals, Director, Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden “Thomas Kampen has produced a work of exceptional research which, through the skillful use of recently available Chinese sources, questions the accepted wisdom about the history of the leadership of the CCP. -
The Third Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 1945–49
Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:24 09 May 2016 The Third Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 1945–49 This book examines the Third Chinese Revolutionary Civil War of 1945–49, which resulted in the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang (GMD) and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. It provides a military and strategic history of how the CCP waged and ultimately won the war, the transformation of its armed forces, and how the Communist leaders interacted with each other. Whereas most explanations of the CCP’s eventual victory focus on the Sino- Japanese War of 1937–45, when the revolution was supposedly won as a result of the Communists’ invention of “peasant nationalism,” this book shows that the outcome of the revolution was not a foregone conclusion in 1945. It explains how the eventual victory of the Communists resulted from important strategic decisions taken on both sides, in particular the remarkable transformation of the Communist army from an insurgent / guerrilla force into a conventional army. The book also explores how the hierarchy of the People’s Republic of China developed during the war. It shows how Mao’s power was based as much on his military acumen as his political thought, above all his role in formulating and implementing a successful military strategy in the war of 1945–49. It also describes how other important figures, such as Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, Liu Shaoqi, and Chen Yi, made their reputations during the conflict, and reveals the inner workings of the First generation political-military elite of the PRC. -
The Foundations of Mao Zedong's Political Thought 1917–1935
The Foundations of Mao Zedong’s Political Thought The Foundations of Mao Zedong’s Political Thought 1917–1935 BRANTLY WOMACK The University Press of Hawaii ● Honolulu Open Access edition funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities / Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Humanities Open Book Program. Licensed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 In- ternational (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits readers to freely download and share the work in print or electronic format for non-commercial purposes, so long as credit is given to the author. Derivative works and commercial uses require per- mission from the publisher. For details, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. The Cre- ative Commons license described above does not apply to any material that is separately copyrighted. Open Access ISBNs: 9780824879204 (PDF) 9780824879211 (EPUB) This version created: 17 May, 2019 Please visit www.hawaiiopen.org for more Open Access works from University of Hawai‘i Press. COPYRIGHT © 1982 BY THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF HAWAII ALL RIGHTS RESERVED For Tang and Yi-chuang, and Ann, David, and Sarah Contents Dedication iv Acknowledgments vi Introduction vii 1 Mao before Marxism 1 2 Mao, the Party, and the National Revolution: 1923–1927 32 3 Rural Revolution: 1927–1931 83 4 Governing the Chinese Soviet Republic: 1931–1934 143 5 The Foundations of Mao Zedong’s Political Thought 186 Notes 203 v Acknowledgments The most pleasant task of a scholar is acknowledging the various sine quae non of one’s research. Two in particular stand out. First, the guidance of Tang Tsou, who has been my mentor since I began to study China at the University of Chicago. -
Staking Claims to China's Borderland: Oil, Ores and State- Building In
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Staking Claims to China’s Borderland: Oil, Ores and State- building in Xinjiang Province, 1893-1964 A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History by Judd Creighton Kinzley Committee in charge: Professor Joseph Esherick, Co-chair Professor Paul Pickowicz, Co-chair Professor Barry Naughton Professor Jeremy Prestholdt Professor Sarah Schneewind 2012 Copyright Judd Creighton Kinzley, 2012 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of Judd Creighton Kinzley is approved and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Co-chair Co- chair University of California, San Diego 2012 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page ................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. vi Vita ..................................................................................................................................... ix Abstract ................................................................................................................................x Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 -
KMT-CCP Armed Conflicts – New 4Th Army Incident by Ah Xiang
KMT-CCP Armed Conflicts – New 4th Army Incident by Ah Xiang Excerpts from “Resistance War” at http://www.republicanchina.org/war.html For updates and related articles, check http://www.republicanchina.org/RepublicanChina-pdf.htm Continuing from 1) THE ENEMY FROM WITHIN: CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACKS AT GOVERNMENT TROOPS - 1940 2) The Battle of Huangqiao – Communist forces routing Haan Deqing’s Jiangsu Troops. In the opinion of Zhang Yufa, Nationalist Government was very much aware of the communist sabotage but chose to refrain from taking action as a precautionary measure for maintaining the collaboration scheme with the Soviet Union & Chinese communists and securing the wartime support. Tolerant policies would include: 1) allowing the establishment of Shen-Gan-Ning Borderline Government [March 1939] and Jinn-Cha-Ji-Sui Borderline Government which were empowered with printing own currency and assignment of administrative officials; 2) conferring the post of "politics participants [councilor] of national government" onto seven senior communist leaders including Mao Tse-tung, Zhou Enlai, Chen Shaoyu [Wang Ming], Qin Bangxian [Bo-gu], Dong Biwu, Wu Yuzhang & Deng Yingchao, and the post of deputy director of "politics department of the military committee of the national government" onto Zhou Enlai; and 3) approving the communist publication & distribution of "New China Daily" newspaper in Chongqing and establishment of representative offices of the Eight Route Army in Chongqing, Xi'an & Chengdu etc. However, Mao Tse-tung had taken the path of expansion right after the Shanxi Province campaign by ordering Lin Biao's 115th Division, Heh Long's 120th Division and Liu Bocheng's 129th Division to Shandong-Hebei provinces. -
1St Army Group
Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-09272-3 — Mao Zedong Volume 1: 1893–1949 Index More Information INDEX 1st Army Group (see also 1st Front campaign, 260–9; third Army): debate on wisdom of anti-‘encirclement and suppression’ attacking Nanchang, 240–3; campaign, 269–78; troop numbers establishing a Soviet regime in Jianxi, and troop reorganization, 244, 240; formed, 240; from guerrilla to 253, 261, 271, 371–3, 416–17; mobile warfare, 240, 245; march westward expedition to Gansu towards western Fujian, 297; troop Province, 406–7; Zhou Enlai as numbers and troop reorganization, political commissar, 308–9, 315; 240, 244, 297; victory at Longyan, Zhu–Mao joint leadership, 244, 300; victory at Wenjiashi, 243–4; 245, 248, 250, 252, 254, 256, 258, Zhangzhou Campaign, 298–305; 261, 264, 265–6, 267, 268, Zhu–Mao joint leadership, 240, 241, 271–6, 310 242, 244 1st Route Army. See 1st Army 1st Army of North China, 879 Group 1st Field Army, 951, 953–4 2nd Field Army, 948, 950, 951–2 1st Front Army: abolition and 2nd Front Army, 416–17 reinstatement of general 3rd Army Group, 243–4 headquarters, 285, 308; consolidating 3rd Army of the North China Military the revolutionary base area, 330–5; Area, 900 debate on wisdom of attacking 3rd Field Army, 948, 950, 951–2 Nanchang, 249–52; eastward 3rd Red Army, 248 expedition to Shanxi Province, 4th Field Army, 951, 952 398–404; establishing a Soviet 4th Front Army: splits from Red Army, government in Jianxi, 248, 249; failed 376, 381–2; troop numbers and troop attacks on Changsha, 247; first anti- reorganization, -
The People's Liberation Army General Political Department
The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao October 14, 2013 Cover image and below: Chinese nuclear test. Source: CCTV. | Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Political Warfare | About the Project 2049 Institute Cover image source: 997788.com. Above-image source: ekooo0.com The Project 2049 Institute seeks to guide Above-image caption: “We must liberate Taiwan” decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s mid-point. The organization fills a gap in the public policy realm through forward-looking, region- specific research on alternative security and policy solutions. Its interdisciplinary approach draws on rigorous analysis of socioeconomic, governance, military, environmental, technological and political trends, and input from key players in the region, with an eye toward educating the public and informing policy debate. www.project2049.net 1 | Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Political Warfare | TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….……………….……………………….3 Universal Political Warfare Theory…………………………………………………….………………..………………4 GPD Liaison Department History…………………………………………………………………….………………….6 Taiwan Liberation Movement…………………………………………………….….…….….……………….8 Ye Jianying and the Third United Front Campaign…………………………….………….…..…….10 Ye Xuanning and Establishment of GPD/LD Platforms…………………….……….…….……….11 GPD/LD and Special Channel for Cross-Strait Dialogue………………….……….……………….12 Jiang Zemin and Diminishment of GPD/LD Influence……………………….…….………..…….13 -
Purge of Socialist Democratic Party
Purge of Socialist Democratic Party by Ah Xiang [Excerpts from “Red Terror & White Terror” ] Purge of Socialist Democratic Party - Western Fujian Prov Purge of Socialist Democratic Party (SDP), which first started in early 1931, had led to 6352 victims and two similar mutinies termed Kengkou Mutiny on May 27th and Fu Bocui Rebellion. (Fu Bocui was a finance minister of western Fujian Province Soviet who severed himself with CCP in an armed confrontation.) Purge of SDP went into peak around March. After the purge, communist members had dwindled to 5000 from 8000 in Western Fujian Prov. On April 4th, Zhou Enlai wrote to Fujian Province CCP special commissar committee that Chiang Kai- shek and Fu Bocui must have a tightly-knit master plan for sabotaging the Soviet government. Gao Hua speculated that it must be Zhou Enlai who made the instruction since Zhou, a person in charge of military affairs and Soviet governments, had made simultaneous instructions to CCP special commissar committees in Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi border area and in Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area. Similar to Southwestern Jiangxi Prov's AB League Purge, Zhou Enlai's CCP Central Committee had first supported the Purge of Socialist Democratic Party and then advised against 'simplification' and 'over- implication' in late Aug 1931. Zhou raised his question mark as to Purge of SDP in his Aug 29th letter. In Western Fujian Prov, Deng Fa, a veteran who led the picket forces during Hongkong-Guangdong Strike, was the secretary for the special commissar committee after he was dispatched to Longyan of Fujian Province in Dec 1930.