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Iran and Russia in ' Strategic Alliance'

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Iran and Russia in ' Strategic Alliance' ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, pp 207± 223, 1997 Iranand Russia in ` strategicalliance’ ADAM TAROCK Formost of thepast two centuries, Russia/ theSoviet Union and Persia/ Iranhave haduneasy, frequently turbulent, relations, often to thedetriment of thelatter. In fact,the threat to Iran’ s nationalsecurity often came fromthe former’ s expansionistpolicy under both tsars andcommissars. Sothedisintegration of the SovietUnion was, not surprisingly, received with relief in Iran.Now for the ® rst timein nearly two centuries the potential threat to Iran from that country is removedand their relations are betterbalanced, or atleast less disadvantageous to Iran.1 Thecommon 2000 kilometre border between the Soviet Union and Iran hadallowed Soviet troops ready access toIran or parts of it.With the break-up ofthe Soviet Union, Russia is nolonger a neighbourof Iran. This measure of geographicalseparation has giventhe Iranians greater con® dence in dealingwith Russia.Ironic as itmay sound, the Islamic Republic, though itself not a Western liberaldemocracy and not aspiring to become one, may hold some hopethat democracywill take strong roots in Russia so thatit willnot again turn into the neo-impenalRussia ofthe past. President Boris Yeltsin’ s re-electionmust have beenwelcomed by the Iranian leaders, who are hopingthat Russia willtake a moreactive role in the Third World, and in the Middle East in particular, in orderto counterbalance US dominancein the region. In view of the 18-year hostility,intensi® ed since the Clinton administration, between Iran and the USA, thereare reasons tobelieve that the Iranian leadership was delightedto see YevgeniPrimakov replacing Andrei Kozyrev who, during his four years as Russia’ sforeignminister, was essentiallyfavourable to a closepartnership with theWest and who gave particular consideration to Western, especially US, prioritiesand interests. Primakov, a prominentactor in the Soviet policies of intervention,is takinga moreindependent line from the West and has aspecial interestin the Middle East, given the fact that he is oneof the most prominent Russianexperts on the Middle East and the Muslim world. 2 Inthis environment, Russia andIran have moved towards a muchcloser relationshipthan at any time since the Iranian revolution of 1979, based on pragmaticand strategic considerations. For example, the catalysts for the present `strategicalliance’ are Russia’ sneedsfor foreign currency and the desire to have afriendlyneighbour to the Muslim states inCentral Asia, and Iran’ s needfor Russianarms, newtechnologies and, perhaps more importantly, for political supportat both regional and international levels. In addition, both countries have commonsecurity concerns and economic interests in the development of oil and gas inthe Caspian Sea. The new relations which have been developing since the endof thePersian Gulf war of 1991 exceed the Iranians’ expectations, for they AdamTarock is at24 Francesca Street, Mont Albert North, Melbourne 3129, Australia. 0143-6597/97/020207-17$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 207 ADAM TAROCK hadassumed, and greatly feared, that Moscow’ s policytowards the Islamic Republicmight take account of Washington’s hostilitytowards Iran. They must havenoted with special interest and satisfaction President Yeltsin’ s address to theFederal Assembly in February 1994 when he said that ` untilrecently our foreignpolicy has lackedinitiative and a creativeapproach’ , arguingthat hence `wehave to put an end to the vicious practice of unilateral concessions’ . 3 Yeltsin’s announcementsand former foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’ s visitto Tehranin Marchthe previous year to opennew avenues of cooperation,as well as Russia’ srenewedinterest in the Middle East in general, have proved Iran’ s fears andassumption wrong. The relations between them have become so friendly,at least for now, that President Yeltsin is expectedto visit Iran, though thedate of the visit has yetto be decided. 4 Whetheror not such a visittakes placeis notso importantto the Iranians as is thefact that he has acceptedthe invitationand that he warmly received Iran’ s ForeignMinister Ali Akbar Velayatiduring his visit to Moscow in March 1996. Following his visit to Russia,Velayati announced that Iran± Russia relations` havenever been so good inthe past 500 years’ . 5 Velayatialso helped Russia’ sreinvigoratedinvolvement inthe Middle East when, during a visitto Damascus inApril 1996 to discuss a cease® re betweenIsrael andLebanon, he arguedthat Russia, along with France, shouldalso be asignatoryto any peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel. 6 As theRussian Foreign Minister, Primakov, was alsoin Damascus atthe time, Iran’s helpfuldiplomatic gesture could not have been lost on Moscow.All these friendlygestures are infact a follow-upto what President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjanisaid in an interview in July 1995: that promotion of Iran± Russia relationsserves theinterests of both nations in ® ndingpolitical solutions to regionalcon¯ ict, ie in CentralAsia and the Middle East. He wenton tosay that thenew relations between them were so strongas notto be affectedby adverse internationalpolitics, an obvious reference to Russia’ srefusalto accede to US pressure tocancel the sale ofa nuclearpower station to Iran. 7 Inaddition, economic, trade and technological cooperation between the two countriesare expandingat the very time that Washington is attemptingto intensifyits economic sanctions against Iran and politically isolate it internation- ally.It is worthnoting here that after the end of the Cold War it was assumed thatTehran could no longer useÐ as ithad for decadesÐ the Russian card as a balancingact to neutralise economic and military pressure fromforeign powers, ieGreat Britain and/ orlater the United States. It seems thatthe old policy is beingrevived again, for in June1995 the Speaker of theMajlis (parliament) told thevisiting deputy chairman of theDuma, Alexander Vengerovsky, that the ` two strategicstates ofIran and Russia’ can limit the expansion of US hegemony in the region.8 Thistime round, however, Russia couldbe hopingto use theIranian cardfor access tothePersian Gulf and for curbing the possibility of anti-Russian actionfrom extremist forces notonly in Iran but also in Central Asia and the Caucausus. Thisarticle will examine and analyse the reasons behindthe present warm relationshipbetween the two countries and its implications for the Middle East asawhole.It will also examine the new ties in thecontext of Tehran’s relations withthe Central Asian Republics, and of the increased hostility, under the 208 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’ Clintonadministration, between Iran and the USA. Finally, the relations will be consideredin the context of Moscow’ s MiddleEast policy since 1993 and its driveto capture, in some cases torecapture, the arms bazaar,particularly in the PersianGulf region. Reasonsfor the newrelationship Thesigni® cance of the rapprochement between Russia andIran will be better understoodif it is putin thecontext of thehostility between Iran and the USA. 9 Brie¯y, a groupof in¯ uential American analysts and US foreign policy makers believethat the US policy towards Iran is nottough enough and Washington shouldgo farther in escalating the confrontation with Iran. 10 Theyargue that, whileIran is ®nanciallyunder pressure andmilitarily in a vulnerableposition, theUSA must expand its anti-Iran activity, even if this means confrontingit militarily.Nothing, the argument goes, short of Iran’ s demisewould serve Westerninterests. The stakes are so high,these analysts argue, as tojustify even theuse ofmilitary force to challengeIran, thereby averting another Middle East crisis andpossibly a newwar in the Persian Gulf. 11 TheClinton administration, morethan any of theprevious administrations, is preparedto use astickwithout acarrotagainst Iran. The ` containment’of Iran is as vigorouslypursued as was thecontainment of the former Soviet Union. For instance, in June 1995, PresidentClinton pressed (unsuccessfullythough) the Group of Seven (G7) meetingin Halifax, Canada to follow the US tradeembargo on Iranin response towhat it called ` Iran’s continuingsupport for terrorism, including support for theacts whichundermine the Middle East peace process, as wellas itsintensi® ed effortsto acquireweapons of mass destruction’. 12 Andin May 1996, former US Secretaryof State, Warren Christopher, accused Iran of ` trainingterrorists’ , addingthat ` thereshould no longer be any debate about Iran’ s involvementin terrorismagainst the peace process [inthe Middle East]’ . 13 Thequestion of Iran’s allegedinvolvement in international terrorism depends on whetherone wants to believethe accuser, the USA or the accused, Iran. However, the United States has yetto produce hard evidence in support of its allegations. Twocases whichreceived wide media attention in the West will illustrate the dilemmaof whomto believe.When in July1995 Warren Christopher claimed that Iranwas responsible(which Iran denied) for the bombing of theArgentine± Israel MutualAssociation in BuenosAires, the Argentine foreign minister immediately wrotea letterto Christopher asking him for any veri® cation or evidence that he had,but he said to reporters at the time that he did not expect any news from SecretaryChristopher. Failing to ® ndany evidence of Iran’ s involvement,the Argentinegovernment soon after resumed normal relations with Iran. 14 And on 2 December1995 the LosAngeles Times reportedthat the Argentine government hadarrested 12 army of® cers chargedwith
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