ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, pp 207± 223, 1997

Iranand in ` strategicalliance’

ADAM TAROCK

Formost of thepast two centuries, Russia/ theSoviet Union and Persia/ Iranhave haduneasy, frequently turbulent, relations, often to thedetriment of thelatter. In fact,the threat to Iran’ s nationalsecurity often came fromthe former’ s expansionistpolicy under both tsars andcommissars. Sothedisintegration of the SovietUnion was, not surprisingly, received with relief in Iran.Now for the ® rst timein nearly two centuries the potential threat to Iran from that country is removedand their relations are betterbalanced, or atleast less disadvantageous to Iran.1 Thecommon 2000 kilometre border between the and Iran hadallowed Soviet troops ready access toIran or parts of it.With the break-up ofthe Soviet Union, Russia is nolonger a neighbourof Iran. This measure of geographicalseparation has giventhe Iranians greater con® dence in dealingwith Russia.Ironic as itmay sound, the Islamic Republic, though itself not a Western liberaldemocracy and not aspiring to become one, may hold some hopethat democracywill take strong roots in Russia so thatit willnot again turn into the neo-impenalRussia ofthe past. President ’ s re-electionmust have beenwelcomed by the Iranian leaders, who are hopingthat Russia willtake a moreactive role in the Third World, and in the Middle East in particular, in orderto counterbalance US dominancein the region. In view of the 18-year hostility,intensi® ed since the Clinton administration, between Iran and the USA, thereare reasons tobelieve that the Iranian leadership was delightedto see YevgeniPrimakov replacing Andrei Kozyrev who, during his four years as Russia’s foreignminister, was essentiallyfavourable to a closepartnership with theWest and who gave particular consideration to Western, especially US, prioritiesand interests. Primakov, a prominentactor in the Soviet policies of intervention,is takinga moreindependent line from the West and has aspecial interestin the Middle East, given the fact that he is oneof the most prominent Russianexperts on the Middle East and the Muslim world. 2 Inthis environment, Russia andIran have moved towards a muchcloser relationshipthan at any time since the Iranian revolution of 1979, based on pragmaticand strategic considerations. For example, the catalysts for the present `strategicalliance’ are Russia’s needsfor foreign currency and the desire to have afriendlyneighbour to the Muslim states inCentral Asia, and Iran’ s needfor Russianarms, newtechnologies and, perhaps more importantly, for political supportat both regional and international levels. In addition, both countries have commonsecurity concerns and economic interests in the development of oil and gas inthe Caspian Sea. The new relations which have been developing since the endof thePersian Gulf war of 1991 exceed the Iranians’ expectations, for they

AdamTarock is at24 Francesca Street, Mont Albert North, Melbourne 3129, Australia.

0143-6597/97/020207-17$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 207 ADAM TAROCK hadassumed, and greatly feared, that ’ s policytowards the Islamic Republicmight take account of Washington’s hostilitytowards Iran. They must havenoted with special interest and satisfaction President Yeltsin’ s address to theFederal Assembly in February 1994 when he said that ` untilrecently our foreignpolicy has lackedinitiative and a creativeapproach’ , arguingthat hence `wehave to put an end to the vicious practice of unilateral concessions’ . 3 Yeltsin’s announcementsand former foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’ s visitto Tehranin Marchthe previous year to opennew avenues of cooperation,as well as Russia’s renewedinterest in the Middle East in general, have proved Iran’ s fears andassumption wrong. The relations between them have become so friendly,at least for now, that President Yeltsin is expectedto visit Iran, though thedate of the visit has yetto be decided. 4 Whetheror not such a visittakes placeis notso important to the Iranians as is thefact that he has acceptedthe invitationand that he warmly received Iran’ s ForeignMinister Ali Akbar Velayatiduring his visit to Moscow in March 1996. Following his visit to Russia,Velayati announced that Iran± Russia relations` havenever been so good inthe past 500 years’ . 5 Velayatialso helped Russia’ s reinvigoratedinvolvement inthe Middle East when, during a visitto Damascus inApril 1996 to discuss a cease® re betweenIsrael andLebanon, he arguedthat Russia, along with France, shouldalso be asignatoryto any peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel. 6 As theRussian Foreign Minister, Primakov, was alsoin Damascus atthe time, Iran’s helpfuldiplomatic gesture could not have been lost on Moscow.All these friendlygestures are infact a follow-upto what President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjanisaid in an interview in July 1995: that promotion of Iran± Russia relationsserves theinterests of both nations in ® ndingpolitical solutions to regionalcon¯ ict, ie in CentralAsia and the Middle East. He wenton tosay that thenew relations between them were so strongas notto be affectedby adverse internationalpolitics, an obvious reference to Russia’ s refusalto accede to US pressure tocancel the sale ofa nuclearpower station to Iran. 7 Inaddition, economic, trade and technological cooperation between the two countriesare expandingat the very time that Washington is attemptingto intensifyits economic sanctions against Iran and politically isolate it internation- ally.It is worthnoting here that after the end of the Cold War it was assumed thatTehran could no longer useÐ as ithad for decadesÐ the Russian card as a balancingact to neutralise economic and military pressure fromforeign powers, ieGreat Britain and/ orlater the United States. It seems thatthe old policy is beingrevived again, for in June1995 the Speaker of theMajlis (parliament) told thevisiting deputy chairman of theDuma, Alexander Vengerovsky, that the ` two strategicstates ofIran and Russia’ can limit the expansion of US hegemonyin the region.8 Thistime round, however, Russia couldbe hopingto use theIranian cardfor access tothePersian Gulf and for curbing the possibility of anti-Russian actionfrom extremist forces notonly in Iran but also in Central Asia and the Caucausus. Thisarticle will examine and analyse the reasons behindthe present warm relationshipbetween the two countries and its implications for the Middle East asawhole.It will also examine the new ties in thecontext of Tehran’s relations withthe Central Asian Republics, and of the increased hostility, under the 208 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’

Clintonadministration, between Iran and the USA. Finally,the relations will be consideredin the context of Moscow’ s MiddleEast policy since 1993 and its driveto capture, in some cases torecapture, the arms bazaar,particularly in the PersianGulf region.

Reasonsfor the newrelationship Thesigni® cance of the rapprochement between Russia andIran will be better understoodif it is putin thecontext of thehostility between Iran and the USA. 9 Brie¯y, a groupof in¯ uential American analysts and US foreignpolicy makers believethat the US policytowards Iran is nottough enough and Washington shouldgo farther in escalating the confrontation with Iran. 10 Theyargue that, whileIran is ®nanciallyunder pressure andmilitarily in a vulnerableposition, theUSA mustexpand its anti-Iran activity, even if this means confrontingit militarily.Nothing, the argument goes, short of Iran’ s demisewould serve Westerninterests. The stakes are so high,these analysts argue, as tojustify even theuse ofmilitary force to challengeIran, thereby averting another Middle East crisis andpossibly a newwar in the Persian Gulf. 11 TheClinton administration, morethan any of theprevious administrations, is preparedto use astickwithout acarrotagainst Iran. The ` containment’of Iran is as vigorouslypursued as was thecontainment of the former Soviet Union. For instance, in June 1995, PresidentClinton pressed (unsuccessfullythough) the Group of Seven (G7) meetingin Halifax, Canada to follow the US tradeembargo on Iranin response towhat it called ` Iran’s continuingsupport for terrorism, including support for theacts whichundermine the Middle East peace process, as wellas itsintensi® ed effortsto acquireweapons of mass destruction’. 12 Andin May 1996, former US Secretaryof State, , accused Iran of ` trainingterrorists’ , addingthat ` thereshould no longer be any debate about Iran’ s involvementin terrorismagainst the peace process [inthe Middle East]’ . 13 Thequestion of Iran’s allegedinvolvement in international terrorism depends on whetherone wants to believethe accuser, the USA orthe accused, Iran. However, the United States has yetto produce hard evidence in support of its allegations. Twocases whichreceived wide media attention in the West will illustrate the dilemmaof whomto believe.When in July1995 Warren Christopher claimed that Iranwas responsible(which Iran denied) for the bombing of theArgentine± Israel MutualAssociation in BuenosAires, the Argentine foreign minister immediately wrotea letterto Christopher asking him for any veri® cation or evidence that he had,but he said to reporters at the time that he did not expect any news from SecretaryChristopher. Failing to ® ndany evidence of Iran’ s involvement,the Argentinegovernment soon after resumed normal relations with Iran. 14 And on 2 December1995 the LosAngeles Times reportedthat the Argentine government hadarrested 12 army of® cers chargedwith planning and executing the bombing ofthesaid building. 15 Anothercase inwhich Iran was implicatedwas thatof the Shah’s lastPrime Minister, Shapour Bakhtiar, who was killedat his home in Paris inAugust1991. A Frenchcourt investigating the case acquittedin December1994 theonly one of the accused who was anadministrative secretary at the Iranian embassy inSwitzerland at the time of Bakhtiar’ s assassination.Faced with this 209 ADAM TAROCK kindof accusatory manner from the world’ s onlysuperpower which, by virtue of itsoverwhelming military presence and political dominance in the Persian Gulf canalso be countedas Iran’s newneighbour, the closer ties with Russia provide Iranwith an additional (additional to Western Europe and Japan) economic and technologicalsource. As theIranians see it,the post-cold war honeymoon between Moscowand Washington is overand has nowturned into ` coldpeace’ , the consequenceof which is thatRussia willhence follow a moreindependent and assertiveforeign policy towards the Third World. It is worthobserving here that thecold peace between Russia andthe USA and the Cold War between them have hadtheir roots in Iran. 16 Thenew phase in the relations between the two countries developed when in May1995 President Yeltsin refused President Clinton’ s requestto abandona $1 billionsale toIranof alightwater nuclear reactor, incidentally on thesame site startedby West Germany in the late 1970s. Clinton’ s argumentwas thatIran shouldbe denied the reactor because of Tehran’ s `¼internationalefforts to acquireweapons of mass destruction’. Russia arguedthat the reactor resembled areactorthat the Americans were arranging for North Korea to obtain, and that theUSA was providingPakistan with arms ofthe highest technologyÐ even thoughPakistan had neither signed the Non-proliferation Treaty, nor, unlike Iran,allowed inspection by the IAEAÐ andthat the USA was alsohelping China.17 FollowingPresident Clinton’ s requestto President Yeltsin in May, US Secretaryof Defence William Perry met Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin inMoscowin April and again expressed Washington’ s concernabout the sale of anuclearpower reactor to Iran, only to be resistedby Russia oncemore. 18 The alsoargued that US objectiveswere simply a means todeprive Russia ofa marketfor its nuclear technology and, according to Leszek Buszynski, the sellingof the water reactor to Iran was `awayof expressing independence and obtainingleverage over the West’ . 19 TheIranians, however, were jubilant becauseof thefact that Russia hadrefused to accept Washington’ s pressure; and thepress inTehran was fullof praise for Yeltsin. In September (1995), the Russians announcedthat they had signed another contract to build two more nuclearpower reactors in Iran, bringing the total value of deals to $2 billion. 20 Tothe Iranians, this was amplydemonstrated when Russia resistedpressure fromWashington to cancel the nuclear power reactor agreements. A casual readingof the Iranian press wouldshow that they have taken encouragement fromthe fact that the Russians de®ed pressure fromthe USA despitethe threat fromthe US Senateto cut aid to Russia ifit insisted on the implementation of theproject. In theend, however, the Senate did not follow through its threat. The signi®cance of Russia’ s determinationwith regard to these agreements was not loston theIranians, who must have been aware that Moscow had in anothercase submittedto US pressure.The story of the other case goesback to February 1993when Boris Yeltsin visited India and publicly assured theIndian Prime Ministerthat the Russian agreement to provide cryogenic rocket engines to India `willde® nitely be ful®lled by us, despite pressure fromother countries’ . 21 But in July1993 the deal was cancelledunder US pressure.However, aside from the politicaland commercial implications of the reactor deal, for the Iranians the offshootsof the construction of the reactors are alsothe scienti® c andtechno- 210 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’ logicalknowledge that they bring to the country. In 1995 there were 200 Russian nuclearscientists working in Iran and, according to a press report,several hundredmore were expected to participate in the project. 22 Russia has also agreedto train Iranian university scientists in nuclear technology. Inpaving the way for rapprochement with the Russians, the Iranians, for their part,have had to cast aside,at least for the time being, their inherent suspicion and distrustof the old imperial Russia/ SovietUnion. It is worthremembering that the IslamicRepublic has bittermemories of Moscow’ s militarysupport for Baghdad intheIran± Iraq war in the 1980s. It should be recalledthat it was Russianmissiles whichthe Iraqis used to hit Tehran and other major Iranian cities. The Soviets arguedthat the supply of missiles toIraq was inaccordance with a treatyof friendshipand economic cooperation which they had signed with Iraq before it invadedIran in September 1980. The Iranians, however, found that argument unconvincing.They expected that Russia wouldreward them for their anti-Amer- icanstance by refrainingfrom supplying missiles toBaghdad, or atleast remain- ingneutral in the con¯ ict. At thetime anti-Soviet feelings in Iranwere almost as intensiveas theanti-American sentiments. The post-Khomeini leadership, how- ever,appears to have overcome its old misgiving about its former neighbour.What has helpedthe present rapprochment is thatpost-Soviet Russia `belongsto neither the East nor the West’ . 23 Oras Yeltsinput it when he was addressingthe Indian Parliament in February 1993, Russia is nowa `dual-headed eagle’ ,24 lookingboth to the West and to the East. These slogans sit very comfortablywith Iran’ s mottoof ` Neitherthe West nor the East’ . Amongthe driving forces behindthe present rapprochement are, for the Russians,the sale ofweapons to Iran and its strategic position in the Persian Gulfand the Caspian Sea region.At this stage of the relationship, however, the expansionof traderather than the sale ofarms is ofgreaterimportance. (Russia’ s overallweapons strategy in the Middle East in the post-Soviet Union is apoint whichwe will return to shortly.) Suf® ce itto say herethat the sale ofweapons toIran, important as itis, should not be overestimated, since Iran’ s abilityto spendon weaponsis limited.For example, with its more than 62 millionpeople, Iran’s oilrevenue in recentyears has averaged$ 14billiona year.So other types oftrade and the geopolitical components of the new relationship will probably overshadowthe weapons factor for some timeyet. Although at themoment Iran is goingthrough some serious® nancialproblems (its foreign debt, mostly to WesternEurope and Japan, stands at about $30 billion), it isneverthelessa rich countrywith vast natural resources. With 92.2 billion barrels of oilreserves and 20.7trillion cubic metres ofnatural gas, Iran has, respectively, the fourth and secondlargest reserves inthe world. 25 Also,its copper and other mineral reserves are considerable.While Iran is aimingat self-suf® ciencyin agricultural productsand has inrecent years succeededin reducing its agricultural and food imports,it will still need to import much of its agricultural and industrial machineryand technologies from abroad. Although Russian technologies and industrialproducts are notas advancedand sophisticated as thoseof the West, theyare neverthelessgood enough for a developingcountry like Iran, particu- larlyif that country is beingdenied Western technologies. Russia’ s tradewith Iranamounted to about $700 million in 1994, while the USA’ stradewith Iran 211 ADAM TAROCK duringthe same periodamounted to about $4 billion. 26 SincePresident Clinton has imposeda totaltrade embargo on Tehran, and since Washington is putting pressure onEuropean and Japanese companiesto discontinue trading with Iran, theRussians hopethat their trade with Tehran will increase considerably. In additionto a greaterpotential trade with Iran, the latter’ s politicaland cultural importancein the Persian Gulf, and especially in the Central Asian republics and theCaucasus, are ofparticular importance to Russia’ s foreignpolicy. As a footnoteit should be added here that Iran’ s importancein Central Asia, though considerable,should not be overestimated,for Tehran is facingstiff competition inthat region, particularly in trade and commerce, from other regional and internationalpowers such as theUSA, China,Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Judgingby the Iranian policy towards the Central Asian republics, the Russians havereason to believe that Iran sees itsinterests in theregion lie more inpromoting economic development than in exporting Islamic fundamentalism. Forinstance, Iran has beeninstrumental in bringing the republics into the EconomicCooperation Organisation, a developmentalbody whose original members wereTurkey, Pakistan and Iran. Also, the visits to Iranby headsof the stateof therepublics and of President Rafsanjani to therepublics in recent years havebeen conspicuous more by the many bilateral trade, transit and economic agreementswhich have been signed between them than by theIslamic solidarity ofthe visits. 27

Tehran’ srole in Central Asia Onesuch example is thevisit to Tehran in mid-May 1995 by the Armenian PrimeMinister, Herand Bagratian, and the signing of 10 trade agreements betweenthe two countries. The most important of these agreements is the purchaseof Iran’ s naturalgas byArmeniaand the construction of agas pipeline andthe transfer of electricity to Armenia. 28 Iran’s goodstanding with Armenia comes fromthe fact that Iran mediated, though unsuccessfully, between Chris- tianArmenia and Muslim Azerbaijan in the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. Anotherpiece of evidence, and this is importantto Russia, is that,in the civil con¯ict in Tajikstanbetween the government and the Islamist opposition groups, Irannot only did not tilt towards the latter but in fact tried to act as an` honest’ brokerbetween the two factions. In August 1995 Tajikistan’ s President,Imamali Rahmanove,and Addullah Nouri, the leader of Tajikistan’ s Islamicmovement, wereinvited to Tehran and, in the presence of Iran’ s PresidentRafsanjani, signedan agreementto settletheir differences peacefully and not through armed struggle.They agreed, among other things, to extend the cease® re theyhad agreedon, again in Teheran,a yearbefore, as wellas toform a jointdeliberative councilto narrow their differences. The new agreement is notwithout its faults, however;for instance, it leaves open the questions of when the council will meet,how many will be on the council, and how and whether the members of thecouncil will be selected or elected. In any case, thecivil war in Tajikistan hadfor a timedrawn the attention of the international community because of Russia’s militaryinvolvement there in support of the Tajik government, which ledto Russia gettingbad media coverage. 212 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’

Itshould be remembered that at one time there were 15 000Russia± CIS soldiershelping the Tajik government to guard the 1000 km Tajik± Afghanistan frontierfrom where the Tajik rebels crossed intoAfghanistan to be trained and receiveweapons. Moreover, after 11 years ofexperience in Afghanistan, the Russians didnot wish to get involved in the ® ghtbetween the neo-communist governmentin Dushanbe and the anti-communist alliance of Democrats and Islamists.So the Russians pressed theTajik government to reach some kindof agreementwith the opposition to resolve their differences. The Afghan govern- mentvolunteered to mediate between the Tajik government and opposition, but withoutmuch success, mainlybecause the Afghans lacked control over the Tajik±Afghan border region, and so werein no position to pressure theTajik oppositionin the way Moscow was ableto lean on the Tajik government. 29 The Afghans’failure to mediate successfully between the two warring factions in Tajikistancan also be attributed to thefact that the Kabul government itself was (andhas been)engaged in ® ghtingthe various oppositions groups inside the country,and therefore lacked the necessary moralauthority and political muscle tobroker a peaceagreement between the Tajik opposition parties. However, Iran’s strongcultural, linguistic and racial links (the Tajiks speak Persian) with theTajiks, and its moral, Islamic credentials with the Tajik Islamic opposition, enabledTehran to help bridge the gap between the Dushanbe government and theopposition. So the Tajik peace accord worked out by Iran must have come as agreatrelief to the Russians andthus have enhanced Iran’ s standingwith themas astabilisingforce in the region. It also must have come as areliefto Uzbekistan,where 934 000 Tajiks live and where tension in Tajikistan could haveeasily spilt into Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’ s fear ofthe ripple effects of chaosin Tajikistan was animportant factor in its intervention against the anti-communistopposition in the Tajik civil war. According to Rajan Menon, `theTajik nationalist opposition’ s emphasison the promotion of Tajik culture andlanguage made Uzbekistan’ s presidentIslam Karimovefear thatsuch ideas might® nda receptiveaudience among Uzbekistan’ s Tajikpopulation, and that anationalistgovernment in neighbouring Tajikistan might support the political andcultural autonomy of Uzbekistan’ s Tajiks’. 30 Iran’s quali®ed successful mediationin the Tajikistan con¯ ict must not only have been welcomed by the Russians butalso by the other republics, ie Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,which were also pushing for a negotiatedsettlement in Tajikistan. Accordingto MarthaOlcott, all three countries in concerthad urged Moscow to forceTajik President Imamali Rahmanove to change his behaviour toward the Tajikopposition. 31 However,Iran’ s brokeringof apeaceagreement in Tajikistan was donemore in promoting its own national interests in the region than in the spiritof `brotherhood’. Forhad Iran supported the pro-Islamic opposition forces, whichwere already in retreat, then Tehran would have been left with little in¯uence or goodwill, not only in Tajikistan but also in the other republics. Furthermore,the Iranian government has notcondemned, as havemany Islamic groups,the Russian military intervention in Chechnia, nor has ittriedto portraythe waras onebetween Christian Russia andMuslim Chechnia. The Guardian has quoteda Russianof® cial as saying,` Iranconsiders that Chechnia is aninternal matterfor Russia’ . 32 Infact, in a lettersent to the in lateApril 1996, Russian 213 ADAM TAROCK deputyforeign minister, , denied Iran’ s allegedinvolvement in the war inChechnia,as hadbeen claimed by Izvestiya.Thenewspaper had reportedly said thatIranian airports were being used to sendarms toChechnia.Ivanov’ s lettersaid thatthe allegations were made by ` outsiders’(a referenceto the USA) and were intendedto discourage the expanding relations between Iran and Russia, according to KayhanHavai .33 However,had Iran put its Islamic ideological weight behind Chechnianindependence, it couldhave provoked other Muslim Caucasian peoples toshake off Russia’ s in¯uence. Thus, Iran’ s policy vis-aÁ -vis thecon¯ ict in Chechniacan only be very pleasing to the Russians, considering Iran’ s self- declarationas defenderof the Islamic faith, and considering its cultural and religiousin¯ uence and contacts which spread far andwide, from Tajikistan in CentralAsia to the northern Caucasus, and even to central Russia, Bashkortostan andTatarstan. In other words, for Moscow, Teheran’ s policytowards the Central Asianstates andthe Caucasus sincethe end of the Cold War has beenconstructive andnon-ideological. This is verymuch in contrast with Tehran’ s position vis-aÁ -vis CentralAsia before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when some prominent andin¯ uential members ofthe clerical leadership were publicly insisting that the republicsof Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan, as wellas some districtsin Georgia,were originally Iran’ s nationalterritory, taken from it inthe 19th century, andought to be liberated. 34 Itcould be argued that Iran’ s non-ideologicalapproach towardsCentral Asia is arecognitionby theIranians that, after 70 years ofruleby communistsin theregion, the Muslims there are notas receptiveto political Islam as are Muslimsin the Middle East and, therefore, Tehran would not succeed in promotingIslamic radicalism here even if it tried. That may be true, but it is also equallytrue that Iran’ s moraland cultural in¯ uence in these republics is suf® cient, forexample, to in¯ ame anti-Russiansentiments among the populations, ie in Chechniaor Azerbaijan. In other words, Iran had (and has) thecapability of `spoiling’things for Russia inthe region. Whatever the case, Iran’s non-ideological approachtowards Central Asia has madeMoscow less concernedthan Europe and theUSA about the ` Islamicthreat’ so closelyassociated with Iran. For instance, no high-rankingRussian of® cial has publiclyspoken out about Russia’ s national securitybeing under threat from fundamentalism. Among the strongest accusations levelledagainst Iran by the Russian media has beenthat Iran is spreading `unhealthy’and ` nationalistic’Islam inCentral Asia. 35 Contrastthat with the statementmade by theformer Nato secretary general, Willy Claes, who warned of thedanger posed by religious fundamentalists to the security of Europe. Claes is ontherecord as sayingthat ` Islamicfundamentalism is atleast as dangerous[to the securityof Europe] as communismwas. Please donot underestimate this risk arisingfrom fundamentalism.’ 36

Thelegal status ofthe CaspianSea Thedisintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent division of that countryinto a numberof independent states has tripledthe number of Iran’ s northernneigbhours and has increasedthe number of CaspianSea littoralstates fromtwo to ® ve.When the two countries were the only two littoral states ofthe CaspianSea, they enjoyed secure borders,no smallthanks to the bipolar system. 214 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’

Duringthe Cold War a moveby either side to change the borders would probablyhave sparked an international crisis. Even as earlyas themid-1980s, whenIran was nolonger seen byMoscow as asatelliteof theUSA, aproposal bythe Iranian oil ministry for a jointSoviet± Iranian exploration of offshore naturalgas reserves inthe Caspian was receivedwith little enthusiasm by the Kremlin.Thus, both before and after the establishment of the Islamic Republic neitherside had reason to pay detailed attention to such issues as theregion’ s exactlegal status. The history of Persia± Tsarist Russia relationsconcerning the CaspianSea goesback to the early 19th century and the conclusion of the GolestanTreaty in 1813, following Iran’ s defeatin the Russo-Persian War. Underthat treaty, Iran was barredfrom the deployment of itsnaval forces inthat sea. Thesecond war between the two countries again ended in defeat for Iran andresulted in the conclusion of the Turkomanchai Treaty of 1828. The latter treatydid not change the limitation put on Iran in the ® rst treaty.After the Bolshevikstook over in Russia, Iran and the Soviet Union signed the 1921 FriendshipTreaty, which recognised the two countries’ borders in the Caspian Sea,though it did not lead to a differentsituation in regard to Iran’ s navigation rights.The latter treaty continued to provide the legal status of the Caspian Sea untilthe break-up of the Soviet Union. 37 However,when Azerbaijan, Turk- menistanand Kazakhstan joined the littoral states fold,and when they began independentactivities in the ® eldsof ® shing,shipping, exploitation of gas and oilreserves, itbecame apparent that the establishment of a legalstatus for the CaspianSea was notonly necessary buta matterof priority. Mohammad-Reza Dabiriargues that, given the signi® cant changes in the region’ s political geographyand the rising importance of geoeconomic considerations at the expenseof geopolitical ones, the previous legal status of the region requires a newapproach to the issues oftheuse oftheCaspian Sea, the largest lake in the worldand the third area interms ofhydrocarbonresources afterthe Persian Gulf regionand Siberia. 38 Asnewoil reserves are discovered,for both Iran and Russia, and more so for theformer, the question of the legal status of the said sea callsfor urgent attention.It is believedthat the western, eastern, and northeastern parts have about150 billion barrels of oil and 75 trillion cubic metres ofgas reserves, or 16%of the oil and about 53% of the natural gas reserves ofthe globe. By the beginningof the next century, the littoral states are expectedto produce 12 millionbpd of oil,roughly half of itforexport. 39 Forseveral decades the Soviet Unionexploited oil from the Baku oil® eld in Azerbaijan but, faced with a not toofriendly superpower, Iran had little choice but to keep political silence in orderto maintain the peace. Objections or even complaints from Iran about the situationwere likely, at best, to be ignored; at worst Moscow could have attemptedto create troubles along the Soviet± Iranian borders, or encourage the Tudeh(communist) Party to create internal disturbances for the government. Nowthat that superpower has disintegrated,and Iran is nolongerconstrained by theconsiderations of theold global rivalry between the , it can push fornew arrangements and provisions concerning the optimal use ofthe sea’ s resources.Some Iranian writers specialising in Iran/ Russia/CentralAsia affairs haveargued that the exploitation of the Caspian Sea resources shouldby 215 ADAM TAROCK administeredby a `condominium’under an international authority comprising thelittoral states involved,and that the sea shouldbe declared a demilitarised zone.40 Withbetter relations between Moscow and Tehran, the establishment of such acondominiumis nownot only a possibilitybut perhaps a necessityin viewof thefact that Azerbaijan has nowconcluded contracts with a consortium composedof Westernand non-Western oil companies for the exploration of oil inthe Caspian Sea. 41 Theproject is a$7.4billion deal to develop reserves estimatedat 4.4 billion barrels. Iran was alsoto be a partnerin the consortium witha ®ve%stake in it, and the Iranians congratulated themselves for having managedto become a partnerin an international oil consortium. But in April 1995Azerbaijan cancelled the agreement with Iran, reportedly under pressure fromthe USA. As ifintending to add insult to injury, Azerbaijan at the same timeincreased the Turkish stake in the consortium to 6.75%. The apparent favouringof Turkeyover Iran was adoubleblow to theIranians. For one thing, ithas givenan extra edge to Turkey, which has beenIran’ s traditionalrival for in¯uence in Azerbaijan,indeed in allCentral Asia; foranother, Iran had thought ithad secured a favourableposition with the government in Baku. After all, Tehranhad taken Azerbaijan’ s sidein its war with Armenia, and the Iranian ForeignMinistry had in a statement` warned’the Armenian government of the consequencesof their ` aggression’.42 AndIran’ s spiritualleader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,told the Azerbaijani President, Heidar Aliev, who visited Iran in July 1994,that the people of Azerbaijan were the victims of an aggression by the Armeniangovernment. In addition, Iran had provided shelter, with little ®nancialcontribution from either Baku or international agencies, to over 100000 Azeri refugees who had ¯ edto Iranduring the war between Azerbaijan andArmenia. Azerbaijan’ s cancellationof theoil agreement triggered an angry responsefrom the Iranians, who described the new arrangement as a`hostile’ actand threatened to question the legality of the consortium. A bulletin broadcaston Iranradio said that ` Iranreserved its rights to theCaspian Sea’ and warnedthat ` Caspiancoastal states cannotunilaterally exploit its resources’ 43 becausethe oil® elds are ina `lake’and not in the sea (moreon this distinction below).An Iranian newspaper has quotedthe Deputy of the Russian Foreign Ministryas sayingthat his country supports Iran’ s positionconcerning the establishmentof a legalregime for the use ofCaspian resources. 44 And in October1994 the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated a similar point,saying that ` Russia andIran share veryclose views on theissues relevant tothe Caspian Sea¼ Its resources belongto the states borderingthe lake. 45 Finally,Russia andIran signed a jointdeclaration in early November 1995 sayingthat they opposed unilateral action by the littoral states toexploit the resources oftheCaspian Sea. It said, ` Allissues concerningthe exploitation of thelake and its resources shouldbe settled and handled within the framework ofinternational contracts and with the participation of all the Caspian Sea littoralstates. 46 Turkmenistan’s President,Saparmurad Niyazov, said during his statevisit to Tehran in July 1996 that he shared Iran’ s andRussia’ s viewson thestatus of the Caspian Sea. 47 Theargument advanced by both Tehran and Moscowis thatthe Caspian Sea is nota `sea’ perse andtherefore not subject 216 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’ tostandardinternational practice and laws with regard to delimitationof offshore areas closed.Rather, the Caspian is a`lake’and as suchthe property of all the states borderingit, and so agreements on oil or gas productionhave to beagreed byall the littoral states. Excludedfrom the deal, Iran is nowpressing ahead with a strategyto import oilfrom the nearby Caspian basin states. Connecting Iran’ s CaspianSea portof Bandar-e-Anzalito Iran’ s owntransport network would require the building of only100 km of pipeline.Iran can then feed the oil via an east± west pipeline to re® neriesin Tehran,Tabriz, Arak and Isfahan, which are currentlysupplied from Iranianoil® elds in the Persian Gulf. Iranian crude oil would then be sold on behalfof the Caspian exporters. 48 Iranhas alsosigned trade agreements with Kazakhstan,one calling for building a pipelinefrom Kazakhstan’ s Tengiz oil®eld to the Caspian port of Aktau. The 10-year old agreement calls for oil exchangeof upto120 000 bpd a year. 49 Upto two million tons a yearof crude oilfrom the Tengiz ® eldcould be shipped to north Iran. Iran and Turkmenistan havealso reached an agreement for Iran to constructa $190million gas pipeline (4000km) to transfer Turkmen natural gas toEurope via Iran and Turkey. In the® rst phase,the pipeline will allow the delivery of 15billion cubic metres of gas toEurope, while in the second phase of the project, expected to be completedby the year 2000, up to 28 billion cubic metres willbe exported to Europe.50 Again,the US government,supported by Turkey, has opposedthe Iran± Turkmenistanagreement, arguing that oil and natural gas fromTurkmenistan couldreach Europe via the Caspian Sea andon through Georgia and via Chechnia.Oil and gas pipelinesalready exist in Chechnia that carry oil and gas fromAzerbaijan and Chechnia to points in Russia. However, Turkmenistan’ s president,Saparmurad Niyazov, has favouredthe Iranian route, which he considersto be more stable. Apparently Russia has alsofavoured the Iranian route,indicating that both Russia andIran have a commoninterest in weakening relationsbetween Turkey and the Central Asian republics and thus indirectly reducingAmerica’ s in¯uence in the region. As RobertOlson has pointedout, `Russia’s approvalfor the building of a gas pipelinefrom Turkmenistan across Iranis atodds with US policyon Iran’ . 51 Iran’s worryis that,just as theArab states inthePersian Gulf have become so closeto theUSA, theoil rich Central Asianrepublics might adopt a similarpolicy. In other words, there is asuspicion thatthe republics, like some oftheArab states, could be persuadedto keepIran atarm’ slength.Since the economies of Central Asia are verymuch tied to Russia,and since Russia is alsoa partnerin the oil consortium, Iran is hoping tobene® t fromthe new phase of friendship with the Russians, who could go furtherthan their hitherto verbal support for Iran’ s positionand press Azerbaijan andKazakkhstan to enter into serious negotiations for the establishment of a legalstatus for the Caspian Sea. In other words, the Iranians hope that Russia willtry to counterbalancethe USA’ sincreasingin¯ uence in Central Asia where Iranhas muchat stake both from the point of view of tradeand national security. As afootnoteit should be added that Iran’ s relationswith the Central Asian republicsappear to be more encouraging than its relations with the Arab states ofthe Persian Gulf. Witness the frequent visits to Iran by the heads of the 217 ADAM TAROCK republics,and contrast that with the long intended visit to Iran by the king of SaudiArabia and the Sheikh of Kuwait.

Iran,Russia andthe Middle East As pointedout at the beginning of this article, the new relations between Iran andRussia shouldalso be looked at from the perspective of the latter’ s overall policytowards the Middle East since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The subsequentinternal problems faced by the new government, and the priority that itsforeign policy elites gave to Russia’s relationswith the West in orderto bring thatcountry into the family of ` civilised’nations, put a brakeon Moscow’ s previousactive role in the Middle East. In other words, the Middle East, which was averyimportant part of theglobal rivalry between the two superpowers, lost itsprevious geopolitical pre-eminence in the thinking of Russia’s foreignpolicy makers.The Soviet Union’ s lastgrand posturings in the Middle East were its unsuccessfulattempts to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwaitand avoid a warwith the US-led coalition forces, and its secondary role asaco-sponsorof themiddle East peace conference in Madrid in 1991.The end ofthe Persian Gulf war of 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union ® rmly establishedthe USA as thedominant power in theregion, a positionunlikely to changefor years tocome. For a whilethe Russian leadership, consumed by its owninternal crises (iethe con¯ ict between President Yeltsun and the previous Parliament)gave relatively low priority to the Middle East. However, it did not takelong for the government to seek anewspace foritself in the region; the tragicevents in Hebron,when an Israelisettler killed 25 Palestinianworshippers ina mosquein February 1994 provided Russian diplomacy with an opportunity tostep up its activity by offering a newset ofproposals, principally the convocationof asecondinternational conference on theMiddle East in Madrid, andthe sending of international observers to the West Bank and Gaza Strip for theprotection of thecivilian population. Not unexpectedly, these proposals were rejectedby both Israel andthe United States. Also, as partof Moscow’s renewed interestin the region, one should mention the visit to Tehran in March 1993 by Kozyrevto look for new avenues of cooperation with Iran at a timewhen Washingtonhad called the former an ` outlaw’state which must be contained. Weshouldalso mention the of® cial visits to Russia bythe PLO chairman,Yasser Arafat,and later by Israel’ sPrimeMinister Yitzhak Rabin in April 1994 and theirmeetings with Boris Yeltsin. These showed that, far fromthe early days of thepost-Soviet Union, Russia nowintended to regainsome ofthe ground it had leftto other great powers (ie the USA, UKandFrance) and make the Middle Eastone of its foreign policy priorities. However, while attempting to regain some ofitspre-Cold War political in¯ uence in theMiddle East, the new attempts are commerciallyand not ideologically oriented. The sale ofweapons by any countrymakes upa veryimportant component of the attempt and it is usedas aninstrument of in¯ uence. This is as trueduring the Cold War as itis truein thepost-cold war era. Accordingto Anatoly Kasatkin of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations,since 1993 there have been noticeably greater contacts between high 218 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’ rankingmembers ofthe Russian government and the Middle East states, particularlythe Persian Gulf states. 52 Russia’s primaryobjective, he argues, is thatthese countries help Russia’ s disintegratingeconomy. Russia’ s majorinter- est intheThird World, particularly in the reasonably rich countries, is relatedto resources,® nancialcapital and new markets, ie the Middle East. Also at stake isthenational security factor, which makes itnecessary forRussia tocooperate withmoderate regimes in the region who can help maintain peace and security closeto the Russian boundaries, ie Iran. For30± 40 years theSoviet Union was themain supplier of weapons to the WarsawTreaty Organisation member states andmany Third World countries. Nowthat that treaty no longerexists, and the East European states havelessened theirdependence on the former Soviet Union’ s arms andwant to buy their weaponsfrom the West, the Third World is justabout the only arms bazaarleft tothe Russians. Also, while during the Cold War most of the Soviet weapons wentto socialist or anti-Western states ofthe Third World, at present the politicalorientation and the ideology of the recipient countries are nolonger a considerationfor the Kremlin when it comes toexporting weapons to another state.As LeonidFriedman points out, ` theonly restriction in trading military equipmentand technology are treatieson the non-proliferation of mass extermi- nation(sic) weaponsand the desire not to in¯ ame theª hotspotsº of the planet¼ ’ 53 Theworld-wide reduction in Russia’ s share ofarms exports promptedRussia toset upa newstate company responsible for the promotion ofthearms tradein January1994. The company, Rosvooruzhenie, is headedby aMarshalof theAir Force, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, as thePresident’ s represen- tativesupervising its work. The risk, as theRussians see it,is tolose their alreadyweakened position on the world arms market,as Russia’s foreign currencyearnings had dropped from 10 billion rubles in 1989 to 3.4 billion rublesin 1993. 54 Accordingto Pyotre Litavrin, ` thingshad come to apass where thePresident said that he would personally supervise this important foreign economicactivity’ . 55 Thedelivery of threesubmarines to Iran and the agreement tobuilda nuclearpower plant in Bushehrare partof thateconomic activity, and ofRussia’ s demonstrationto the Iranians that Moscow intends to enter into a newphase of relationshipswith them, despite objections from the USA. Infact, ina meetingwith Mehdi Safari, Iran’ s ambassadorto Moscow, the Russian Defence-Minister,Pavel Grachev, assured Iranthat Russia was determinedto continuecooperating with it on defence matters and that ` nocountry’ would be allowedto dictate Russia’ s policy. 56 The` nocountry’ was anoblique reference totheUSA, whichhas consistentlyurged Russia notto sellarms toIran.In other words,as arms exportsremain a majorsource of foreign currency for Russia, sales ofweapons to Iran should be considered as partof Moscow’ s pushfor increasingits share ofarms tothe Middle East, and in particular to the oil producingstates. It isperhapswith this in mindthat Grachev has acceptedIran’ s invitationto visit Tehran to discuss defencematters with the Iranians. 57 Thesale ofarms is facilitatedby three factors. First, the legacies of the Cold War,the Arab± Israeli wars, the Iran± Iraq war and the Persian Gulf war of 1991 haveall helped develop a greatsense ofinsecurity in the Middle East. This in turnhas createdwhat one can call a `weaponsculture’ which, it seems, is 219 ADAM TAROCK nourishedand satis® edby acquiring ever more quantities of weaponswhich are beyondany internal security needs and defence purposes, but are importantmore forinternational prestige and the actualisation of national pride. For how else can thepurchase of billionsof dollars-worthof weaponsbe justi®ed when it will be cheaperfor the Arab states toseek outsideassistance, as inthe case ofSaudi Arabiaand Kuwait, who paid for much of thecosts ofOperationDesert Storm. Second,whatever changes the end of the Cold War might have brought to the natureof relationships between the West and the East, their competition in the sale ofweapons to the Third World has remainedalmost unaffected. Arms exportsto Third World countries have increased since the end of 1990 because thecountries manufacturing weapons have reduced their own arms defence budgets,thanks to the agreement reached between the USA andthe former SovietUnion. 58 TheThird World markets are thusnot only the best option but theonly ones left to the weapons manufacturing states. Despite the fact that, beginningin 1986 to the present time (1997), oil prices have been much lower thanin the preceding period, and that, if in¯ ation is takeninto account, oil prices at1995 were barely higher than they were during the Arab oil embargo in 1973,59 theoil producing states inthe Persian Gulf are stillby far themost lucrativearms bazaarfor both the West and Russia. Third, Russia, as themain successor stateto the Soviet Union, is nonewcomer to the Middle East arms bazaar,as ithad a largeshare ofthemarket during the Cold War. For example, astheresult of theinternational arms embargoon Iran and Libya, Russia’ s loss inarms sales isestimatedat $16 billion. Whereas in 1984± 89 theSoviet Union’ s share inworldarms exportsto thenear and Middle East was 27.3%(® rst place), in1989±93 itdroppedto 10%(fourth place after the USA, Britainand France). 60 ThusRussia feels that,for the health of its own economy, if not for political in¯uence, some ofthe Middle East arms marketsshould be recaptured. Iran is onesuch market. However, as pointedout earlier, this aspect of the new relationshipshould not be overemphasised for, compared with the much richer Arabstates ofthe Persian Gulf, Iran cannot be a majormarket for arms. For instance,while Iran’ s militaryexpenditure for 1991 was only$4.27 billion, that ofSaudi Arabia for the same yearwas $35.5billion. 61 Tohighlight this comparisonis notto argue that Iran has aparticularaversion to acquiring more weapons;after all, in the 1960s and the 1970s Iran under the Shah was among thebiggest buyers of weapons among Third World countries. What is being arguedhere is that,although at present Iran is unableto spendlavishly on arms, itnevertheless has greatpotential to do so inthe future, increased oil revenues andimproved economic conditions at home permitting.

Conclusion TheIran± Russia rapprochementhas severalimportant advantages for both countries.For the Russians perhapsthe most important ones are theeconomic bene®ts whichit brings to the Russian economy, and the access tothe Persian Gulfthrough Iran. For the Iranians, the most important are (a) Russia’s political supportat both the international and the regional levels (ie in Central Asia) at atimewhen the USA is attemptingto isolate Iran internationally and pressing 220 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’ itsWestern allies to do likewise; and (b) Russia’ s sale ofweapons, building nuclearpower stations, and assisting Iran with new technologies which are deniedto it byother countries. At this stage it istooearly to say towhatextent thepresent rapprochement between the two countries will remain, or even expand.But it issafe toassume thatit willcontinue as longas relationsbetween Tehranand Washington remain hostile, and as longas Moscowand Tehran can ®ndcommon grounds for cooperation in Central Asia. Thegrounds for cooperation in theestablishment of anewlegal status for the CaspianSea alreadyexist. With the new gas andoil discoveries in the Caspian Sea,and the recent signing of agreements between the republic of Azerbaijan anda consortiumof oil companies, plus the exclusion of Iran from the consortium,Iran is nowpressing for the establishment of a newlegal status for theabove-mentioned sea. Whilesome ofthe new littoral states haveas yetto showinterest in Iran’s proposal,Russia andTurkmenistan have supported Iran’ s statedposition on the issue. Russia has alsosupported the Iran± Turkmenistan agreementwhich calls for the construction of apipelineto carry Turkmenistan’ s oiland gas tothe international markets through Iran. Whathas alsogreatly helped the two countries move towards the present rapprochementis Iran’s policytowards the Central Asian republics. That policy isbasedless onreligious ideology and more on tradeand cultural links between itand the republics. Iran’ s rolein mediating, unsuccessfully, between Armenia andthe Republic of Azerbaijan in their war over Nagorno-Karabakh, its mediating,successfully at least for the present time, between the pro-Moscow Tajikgovernment and the nationalist and Islamist opposition groups, and its neutralstance vis-aÁ -vis thecon¯ ict between Russia andMuslim ChechniaÐ all thesehave apparently given a positiveimage of Iranin Russia.For the Iranians, Russian’s resistanceto the USA’ spressure tocancel their agreement to build a nuclearpower station in and expand trade with Iran has openeda newera in Tehran±Moscow relations. Considering the two centuries of turbulent relation- shipsbetween them, for the Iranians to dealwith a Russia whichis neitherruled bytsars norby commissars is refreshing.In short, both countries have found obviouscommon grounds for closer economic, political, trade and military cooperation.The Iranians appear to be particularlyelated about the new chapter inrelations with Moscow.

Notes 1 Foran excellent historyof Iran± Tsarist Russia (later SovietUnion) relations see MartinSicker, The Bear andthe Lion: Soviet Imperialism and Iran ,Praeger: New York,1988. 2 See ShireenT Hunter,` YevgeniPrimakov and Russian foreign policy’ , MiddleEast International , No 521, 15March 1996, p 18.See alsoLee Hockstader,` Yeltsinselects spychief as ForeignMinister’ , Washington Post,10January 1996. 3 RichardK Herrmann, `Russianpolicy in the Middle East: strategic changeand tactical contradictions’, MiddleEast Journal ,Vol48, No 3, 1994, p 462. 4 See Russianambassador, Sergei Tretiakov’ s interviewin KayhanHavai ,31May 1995, pp 5, 24. 5 Iran News,9March1996, p 3. 6 AustralianBroadcasting Corporation ( ABC)News Bulletin,24 April 1996. 7 See `Interviewwith Ali Akbar Rafsanjani’ , MiddleEast Insight ,July/August1995, p 13. 221 ADAM TAROCK

8 KayhanHavai ,21June 1995, p 22. 9 See myarticle, `US±Iran relations: heading for confrontation’ , ThirdWorld Quarterly ,Vol17, No 1, 1996, pp 149±167. 10 Writers whotake ahardline position against Iran include Jack Anderson,a syndicatedcolumnist in the USA;Michael Collins Dunn, senior analyst at theInternational Estimate, Inc,Charles Krautharmner, syndicatedcolumnist in the USA; Daniel Pipes,editor of the MiddleEast Quarterly ;andFuad Ajami, academic andwriter onMiddle Eastern affairs; amongthe US policymakers onecan includeMartin Indyk, currentlyUS ambassador toIsrael; RobertH Pelletreau,US assistant secretary ofstate forNear Eastern Affairs; former CIA Director James Woolsey,as well as thepresent one, John Deutch; Anthony Lake and Warren Christopher. 11 GeoffreyKemp, Forever Enemies?American Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran , a Carnegie EndowmentBook, Washington DC, 1994, pp 12± 13. 12 FinancialTimes ,12June 1995, p 4. 13 Cited in Australian±Jewish Review ,Vol21, 1± 16 June, 1996, p 11. 14 See `Symposium:US policytoward Iran: from containment to relentless pursuit?’, MiddleEast Policy , Vol 4,No 1± 2, 1995, p 7. 15 LosAngeles Times ,2December 1995,p 18. 16 Thebeginning of the Cold War was neverformally declared, butit was inIran that the policies of the superpowers vis-aÁ -vis oneanother took shape when a pro-Moscowparty, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, triedto create anautonomous state whichwould then be detachedfrom Iran and incorporated into the Soviet Union.After muchmanoeuvring by the USA at theUN, Soviettroops left Iranand the aforesaid party disintegrated.It is alsoworth mentioning that not only the ® rst `political’but also the ® rst `economic’rivalry between thesuperpowers in the Third World occurred in Iran.In 1944 the Soviets demanded that Iran give them anoil concession for a periodof 75 years inan area innorthern Iran, near theSoviet border. Iran refused,and it was stronglysupported by the USA. For this important and interesting early periodof the superpowers’rivalry in the Third World see Sicker, TheBear and the Lion ,especially ch4. It could be arguedthat the ` coldpeace’ alsostarted inIran when the Russians refused to cancel, at theUSA urging, theconstruction of two nuclear power plants in Iran. 17 Guardian,31May 1995, p 10. 18 Leszek Buszynski,` Russia andthe West: towardsrenewed geopoliticalrivalry?’ , Survival,Vol37, No 3, 1995, p 120. 19 Ibid. 20 KayhanHavai ,13September 1995, p 24. 21 Thequotes here are citedin Herrmann, `Russianpolicy in the Middle East’ ,p45. 22 KayhanHavai ,16August 1995, p 24. 23 Thequotations used here are fromthe title of anarticle byNatalya Narochnitskaya,Vice-Chairperson of the ConstitutionalDemocratic Partyof Russia. See InternationalAffairs (Moscow),Nos 1± 2, 1994, p 33. 24 Herrmann, `Russia policyin the Middle East’ ,p456. 25 KayhanHavai ,6September1995, p 23. 26 Guardian,31May 1995, p 10. 27 Fora discussionabout the relations between Iranand the Central Asian republicssee myarticle, `Iran’s foreignpolicy since theGulf War’ , AustralianJournal of International Affairs ,Vol48, No 2, 1994, pp 267±280. 28 KayhanHavai ,17May 1995, p 23. 29 MiddleEast International ,No459, 24 September 1993, pp 22± 23. 30 See Rajan Menon,` Inthe shadow of the bear’ , InternationalSecurity ,Vol20, No 3, 1995, pp 161± 162. 31 MarthaBrail Olcott,` CentralAsia: thecalculus of independence’ , CurrentHistory ,Vol94, No 594, 1995, p 339. 32 DavidHearst, `Russia sees richreward inIranian links’ , Guardian,31May 1995, p 10. 33 KayhanHavai ,1May1996, p 23. 34 Sicker, TheBear and the Lion , p 129. 35 Herrmann, `Russianpolicy in the Middle East’ ,p456. 36 See Peter Elligens,` Momentof truth for nation’ , The Age (Melbourne),13 February 1995, p 8. 37 Forthe above historical background regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea, Iam indebtedto MohammadReza Dabiri,` Anew approachto the legal regime ontheCaspian seas as abasis forpeace and development’, IranianJournal of International Affairs ,Vol6, Nos. 1± 2, 1994, pp 30± 31. 38 Ibid., p 29. 39 KayhanHavai ,20December 1995,p 22. 40 Dabiri,` Anew approach’, p29. 41 Theconsortium, led by an alliance between BritishPetroleum and Norway’ s Statoil,includes Amoco, Pennzoil,Unicocal, McDermon International, Exxon, Ramco Energy,Russia Lukoi,Saudi Arabia’ sDelta Nimir andTurkish Petroleum Corp. 222 IRAN AND RUSSIA IN`STRATEGIC ALLIANCE’

42 KayhanHavai ,18August 1993, p 1. 43 See Keasing’s Recordof World Events ,Vol41, No 4, 23 May 1995, 40527. 44 KayhanHavai ,19July 1995, p 17. 45 IranianJournal of International Affairs ,Vol7, No 2, 1995, p 510. 46 KayhanHavai ,8November1995, p 23. 47 KayhanHavai ,24July 1996, p 23. 48 Reuter,dateline Alma-Ata, citedin KayhanHavai ,31May 1995, p 22. 49 KayhanHavai ,26June 1996, p 23. 50 KayhanHavai ,13September 1995, p 23. 51 RobertOlson, ` Russia,Turkey and the Turkmenistan gas pipeline’, MiddleEast International , No 509, 22 September1995, pp 18± 19. 52 AnatolyKasatkin, ` Willthe Middle East become aRussianpriority’ , InternationalAffairs (Moscow),No 7, 1993, p 60. 53 LeonidFriedman, ` Russia’ seconomicrelations with Third World countries: problems and perspectives’ , IranianJournal of International Affairs ,Vol4, No 2, 1992, p 285. 54 See PyotrLitavrin, ` Russia arms export:new aspects ofan old business’ , InternationalAffairs (Moscow), No7, August 1994, p 33. 55 Ibid. 56 KayhanHavai ,18October 1995, p 24. 57 KayhanHavai ,1November1995, p 4. 58 See William DHartung, AndWeapons for All ,Harper Perennial:New York,1995, pp 1± 20. 59 Gawdat Bahgat,` Regionalpeace andstability in the Gulf’ , SecurityDialogue ,Vol26, No 3, 1995, p 318. 60 KrasnayaZvezda ,6November1993, cited in SecurityDialogue ,Vol26, No 3, 1995, p 62. 61 See ShahramChubin, Iran’s NationalSecurity Policy: Interests, Capabilityand Impact , a Carnegie EndowmentBook, Washington DC, 1994, p 36,Table 3.

Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations

EDITORS John L. Esposito and Jùrgen S. Nielsen

Islam and Christian Muslim Relations (ICMR) was launched in June 1990 and has been hailed by scholars of Islam, Christianity and religion in general, as well as by social scientists, educationists, community and religious leaders.

ICMR provides a forum for all those who wish to enhance their critical appreciation of the two religious traditions on historical, empirical, ideological and theoretical issues. Since its new partnership with the Center for Muslim- Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, Washington DC commenced in 1996, the journal has broadened its scope to encompass issues concerning Christian-Muslim relations in politics and international affairs. Volume 8, 1997, 3 issues. ISSN 0959-6410.

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