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The Centrality of Freedom for Kant's Critical Thought University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1972 The centrality of freedom for Kant's critical thought. William Michael Hoffman University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Hoffman, William Michael, "The centrality of freedom for Kant's critical thought." (1972). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2157. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2157 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CENTRALITY OF FREEDOM FOR KANT'S CRITICAL THOUGHT A dissertation Presented by William Michael Hoffman Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (month) (year) Major Subject (c) William Michael Hoffman 1972 All Rights Reserved il THE CENTRALITY OF FREEDOM FOR KANT’S CRITICAL THOUGHT A Dissertation by William Michael Hoffman Approved as to style and content by: (Chairman of Committee) (Head of Department) (Member) (Member) (Month) (Year) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My deepest appreciation goes to my teacher and advisor, Dr. Leonard H. Ehrlich, who has been an insightful and sensitive critic throughout this dissertation, and a constant inspiration throughout my graduate studies. I want to thank the other members of my committee. Dr. Bruce Aune and Dr. Ann F. Brentlinger, and the Chairman of the Philosophy Department, Dr. Vere C. Chappell, for their encourage- ments and helpful comments toward the completion of this dissertation. Also, I cannot forget my first teacher, Dr. Benjamin F. Lewis, who was the first to make philosophy exciting for me. For the patience and confidence that Edwina, my wife, has given me throughout both my graduate and undergraduate studies, I shall always be grateful. And, finally, to my daughters, Christina and Rebecca, I thank you for the happiness that has come to me from your being Christina and Rebecca. To these people I dedicate this work. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ^ PART I. FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM Introduction ^2 Chapter I. KANT'S THEORY OF CAUSAL DETERMINISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF MODERN PHYSICS 14 (1) A Sketch of Modern Physics and Its Debate . 14 2 ( ) An Interpretation of Kant's Second Analogy . 17 (3) Relations between the Second Analogy and the Principle of Indeterminacy 26 (4) Kant's Causal Determinism as a Demand of Reason 31 II. AN INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S SOLUTION TO THE THIRD ANTINOMY 45 (5) An Introduction to the Problem and a Key to the Solution 45 6 ( ) Some Misunderstandings of the Solution ... 49 (7) An Attempt to Expose some Blind Alleys .... 53 ( 8 ) Reason's Explaining One Event from Different Points of View 5 8 (9) The Importance of the Regulative Prin- ciple of Reason to the Solution 68 PART II. FREEDOM AND ACTION Introduction 79 I. AN ANALYSIS OF KANT'S RATIONALITY OF ACTION ... 83 (1) Distinctions and Relations among Practical Principles 83 V 2 ( ) Kant's Theory of Rational Desire 90 (3) A Vindication of Kant's Formalism in' Moral Action 98 II. AN interpretation OF KANT'S THEORY OF WILLING MORAL 110 (4) The Distinction between Wille and Willkur 110 (5) Relations between Transcendental and' Practical Freedom 116 (6) Kant's Analysis of Freely Choosing a Moral Personality 124 III. pNT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE MORAL LAW; A LAW FOR THE ORTEr’.TT\/i:' dpattt'v/ vj:. nnnniiY UJ: TREE- DOM . 135 (7) The Development of Kant's Deduction and a Clarification of Its Apparent Circu- larity 135 8 ( ) An Explanation of the Enigma of the Critical Philosophy 152 CONCLUSION 157 KEY TO THE ABBREVIATIONS 169 FOOTNOTES .... 170 BIBLIOGRAPHY 195 INTRODUCTION The entire Critical philosophy is an attempt to understand the principles of thought in their relation to man’s experience of knowing, acting and judging. And as Kant declares in the Preface to the Critique of. Practical Reason , the concept of freedom "is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. " Therefore the relation between reason and freedom must be seen as one of the chief concerns of the Kantian program. In fact, rather than finding freedom in opposition to the necessary laws of rea- son, Kant maintains that it is the necessary presupposition as well as the essential product of such laws. This, I shall argue, is the real Copernican Revolution of the Critical philosophy, one that points to an interpretation and focus that I have found to be underdeveloped and unappreciated in Kantian scholarship. Kant s treatment of the concept of freedom is not unproblematic however. Kant goes on to say in the Preface to the second Critique that the concept of freedom is such a keystone only "in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, that is, that the concept of freedom really applies to something. But many of Kant's critics feel that this creates a disparity between the first and second Critiques . Is not the negative conclusion of the first Critique . 2 concerning the limitation of the categories to appearances, nullified in the second Critiqu e when Kant begins to speak positively of the cate- gories relation to noumenal being in his attempt to show the reality of freedom ? Kant himself recognizes this to be the riddle of his program. Now is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, which les in the fact that we must renounce the objective reality of the supersensible use of the categories in speculation and yet can attribute this reality to them in respect to the objects of pure practical reason.'^ The solution to this riddle, which goes to the very heart of the relation between reason and freedom, is offered by Kant in the same paragraph: The inconsistency vanishes because the use which is now made of these concepts is different from that required by speculative reason. To understand this answer, which is an essential part of the program of this dissertation, is to understand the unity of the three Critiques as they provide different principles necessary for the theoretical, moral and teleological aspects of our experience. To put it differently, it is to understand the unity of reason itself as it seeks to satisfy ail of its pur- poses--a unity which would be impossible independent of its reciprosity with freedom Intimately bound up with this solution is the seemingly paradoxi- cal explanation of the compatibility of freedom and determinism presented Critiq ue of Pure Reason . How is it possible to regard one and the same event as being in one aspect a determined effect of nature and in 3 another aspect an effect due to freedom? Or, if we make the same point with relation to man himself, how can one regard one's self as noumenally free and yet from the point of view of nature, as phenom- enally determined? To my mind, Kant' s answer to this question has not been fully understood. Furthermore, if his attempt to show the compati- bility of freedom and determinism i s not sound, then, as he himself realizes, his entire efforts in the second Critique to prove the reality of freedom must be seen as in vain. Therefore, a critical examination and vindication of his solution to the Third Antinomy constitutes another essential part of my dissertation. The legitimacy of Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy depends upon Kant's theory of transcendental idealism, which provides a frame- work within which the correct limitation and employment of the funda- mental categories of mind can be described. The practical concept of causality through freedom is only applicable within the realm of noumena making morality possible, while the theoretical concept of natural causality is only applicable within the realm of phenomena, making science possible. In his reflections on metaphysics Kant reaffirms the importance of freedom as well as his transcendental idealism: "There are two cardinal principles of all metaphysics; the ideality of space and time and the reality of the concept of freedom. But it is exactly in joining these two cardinal principles that the above mentioned riddle appears. Given 4 the first cardinal principle and what Kant says about the categories of mind in the first Critiqu e, namely that their objective reality is justi- fied only with the ideality of space and time, how can he account for the second cardinal principle? Ironic as it may seem, however, it is Kant's transcendental Idealism that allows him to solve this riddle as well as the antinomy of freedom and natural necessity. To understand Kant's transcendental Idealism as a mere limitation of reason is to miss the power and free- dom that it gives to reason in its efforts toward a proper metaphysics. It provides a theory of meaning and a framework for setting up different models of interpretation and justification. This is central to under- standing what Kant means by referring to one and the same event from different standpoints, by speaking of an extension of the category of causality into the practical sphere® and, in the Critique of Tudgment . by extending the use of this same category even further to cover teleologi- cal causality, another important aspect of our experience which demands interpretation and justification. There is no way to understand this Critical program independently of how Kant unfolds his transcendental idea of freedom. In reconciling its problems and in substantiating its reality Kant is at the same time unpacking the freedom or spontaneity of reason itself.
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