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Mcgranahan Diss May 29 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ WILLIAM JAMES’S EVOLUTIONARY PRAGMATISM: A STUDY IN PHYSIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY AT THE CLOSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in PHILOSOPHY by Lucas Robert McGranahan June 2012 The Dissertation of Lucas McGranahan is approved: ____________________________ Professor Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Chair ____________________________ Professor David Couzens Hoy ____________________________ Professor Ellen Kappy Suckiel ____________________________ Professor Colin Koopman _________________________ Tyrus Miller Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies Copyright © by Lucas McGranahan 2012 Table of Contents List of Tables ..........................................................................................................vii List of Abbreviations..............................................................................................viii Abstract....................................................................................................................ix Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................xi Introduction...............................................................................................................1 Part I. 1. The Darwinian Structure of James’s Vision.....................................................26 1.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................26 1.2. Ways of Reading James’s Darwinism ...........................................................27 1.2.1. Free-Willism..........................................................................................31 1.2.2. Anti-Platonism.......................................................................................33 1.2.3. Fallibilism..............................................................................................36 1.2.4. Summary................................................................................................43 1.3. The Varieties of Selectionism .......................................................................43 1.3.1. Biology..................................................................................................47 1.3.2. Social Theory.........................................................................................56 1.3.3. Psychology.............................................................................................61 1.3.4. Epistemology .........................................................................................65 1.3.5. Ethics.....................................................................................................69 iii 1.3.6. Summary and Table ...............................................................................72 1.4. Selectionism as the Key to James’s Philosophical Darwinism .......................76 1.4.1. Free-Willism Revisited ..........................................................................77 1.4.2. Anti-Platonism Revisited .......................................................................80 1.4.3. Fallibilism Revisited ..............................................................................83 1.5. Conclusion....................................................................................................86 2. James’s Evolutionary Worldview in Focus ......................................................89 2.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................89 2.2. The Distinctiveness of James’s View ............................................................91 2.2.1. Social Darwinism...................................................................................92 2.2.2. Sociobiology........................................................................................ 100 2.2.3. Generalized Selectionism..................................................................... 105 2.2.3.1. Proliferation and Generalization .................................................... 106 2.2.3.2. Externalism and Internalism .......................................................... 118 2.2.3.3. Recipes and Replicators................................................................. 119 2.2.3.4. Criteria for Selectionism................................................................ 126 2.2.4. Summary.............................................................................................. 129 2.3. James’s Evolutionism Revisited.................................................................. 130 2.3.1. Against Asymmetric Externalism: Selectionism, Constructionism, Saltationism................................................................................................... 131 2.3.2. James’s Current Allies: Dialectical Biology, Developmental Systems Theory........................................................................................................... 135 2.4. Conclusion.................................................................................................. 143 iv 3. Physiology, Psychology, Pragmatism: The Individual at the Center of James’s Vision ................................................................................................................... 146 3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 146 3.2. James’s Philosophical Anthropology........................................................... 151 3.2.1. Taxonomy of Philosophical Anthropology: Four Types........................ 151 3.2.2. Reflex Action and Selectionism ........................................................... 158 3.2.2.1. Reflex Action 1881: “Reflex Action and Theism” ......................... 161 3.2.2.2. Reflex Action 1890: The Principles of Psychology ........................ 163 3.2.3. The Jamesian Will: Ideo-Motor Action, Freedom, Creativity................ 176 3.2.4. Summary.............................................................................................. 186 3.3. The Continuity and Unity of James’s Work................................................. 187 3.3.1. On James’s Seeming Dividedness ....................................................... 188 3.3.2. Character Ethics from Psychology to Psychology................................. 190 3.3.2.1. Character Ethics 1902: The Varieties of Religious Experience ....... 194 3.3.2.2. Character Ethics 1907-09: Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth 197 3.4. Conclusion: On James’s Continuity and Unity ............................................ 206 Part II. 4. James in Context: Nietzsche, Husserl, Hegel, and Philosophical Anthropology Redux ................................................................................................................... 213 4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 213 4.2. Master’s and Saints: James, Nietzsche, and the Ethics of Character............. 214 4.2.1. James on Nietzsche in The Varieties of Religious Experience .............. 221 v 4.2.2. The Irony of James’s Reading of Nietzsche.......................................... 226 4.2.3. Summary.............................................................................................. 237 4.3. James and Husserl on Temporality.............................................................. 238 4.3.1. James’s Specious Present ..................................................................... 238 4.3.2. Husserl’s Tripartite Present .................................................................. 241 4.3.3. Comparison.......................................................................................... 244 4.3.4. Summary.............................................................................................. 245 4.4. Vicious Intellectualism: James on Hegel’s Idealism .................................... 246 4.4.1. Vicious Abstractionism, AKA Vicious Intellectualism ......................... 247 4.4.2. Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic............................................................... 249 4.4.3. James’s Critique of Hegel .................................................................... 253 4.4.4. Morse’s Analysis ................................................................................. 256 4.4.5. Summary.............................................................................................. 260 4.5. Philosophical Anthropology Redux............................................................. 261 4.6. Conclusion.................................................................................................. 268 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 270 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 275 vi List of Tables Table 1. James’s Selectionist Systems .....................................................................75 Table 2. James’s Internal Selectionist Systems ...................................................... 173 vii List of Abbreviations Except for correspondence and where otherwise noted, all citations to James’s writings are to The Works of William James (Harvard University Press, ed. Burkhardt, Bowers, and Skrupskelis). Full references are provided in the Bibliography.
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