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Home , Compatibilism, Predeterminism

Predeterminism and Moral in the Hodayot

Carol A. Newsom

1 Introduction

For reasons that are not yet entirely clear, sharp disagreements about pre- and free became a significant feature of Jewish theological stances in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Josephus provides the most ex- plicit consideration of these issues in ancient Jewish sources, as he attempts to distinguish the positions of the three major Jewish sects with respect to the philosophical category of “fate” (εἱμαρμένη). Josephus identifies the position of the Essenes as believing strongly in fate, to the apparent exclusion of (Ant. 13.172). Similarly, modern scholarly treatments of the Qumran yaḥad have acknowledged the very strong predeterminist element in their thinking, attested in a variety of sectarian or closely related texts.1 At the same , there has been a degree of perplexity as to what to do with the obviously volun- tarist statements and assumptions that are present in these same documents. A variety of suggestions have been made, mostly to the effect that the sectar- ians were inconsistent or not fully systematic in their beliefs.2 This may in- deed be the case, though Jonathan Klawans argues that, properly understood, all deterministic systems are consistent with voluntarism in a rather minimal

1 I take the Qumran yaḥad movement to be Essene, though I consider it possible that the term “Essene” may also have referred to groups not formally part of the yaḥad. For examinations of the phenomenon of in Qumran sectarian literature and closely related texts, see J. Licht, “The Concept of Free Will in the Writings of the Sect of the Judean Desert,” in Studies in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Lectures Delivered at the Third Annual Conference (1957) in Memory of E. L. Sukenik, ed. J. Liver (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1957), 77–84 (in Hebrew); E. H. Merrill, Qumran and Predestination: A Theological Study of the Thanksgiving Hymns, STDJ 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1975); A. Lange, Weisheit und Prädestination in den Textfunden von Qumran, STDJ 18 (Leiden, Brill, 1995); J. Klawans, “The Dead Sea Scrolls, the Essenes, and the Study of Religious : Determinism and Freedom of Choice,” in Rediscovering the Dead Sea Scrolls: An Assessment of Old and New Approaches and Methods, ed. M. L. Grossman (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 264–83. See also J. Klawans, “Josephus on Fate, Free Will, and Ancient Jewish Types of ,” Numen 56 (2009): 44–90; and idem, Josephus and the of Ancient Judaism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 2 So Merrill, Qumran and Predestination, 58; E. Schuller, “Petitionary Prayer and the Religion of Qumran,” in Religion in the Dead Sea Scrolls, ed. J. J. Collins and R. A. Kugler (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 29–45 (45); A. Jassen, “Religion in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” Religion Compass 1 (2007): 1–25 (11).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004384231_010 194 Newsom way, in that they distinguish “between intended and unintended behavior.”3 Moreover, some systems of are really more about divine fore- of actions that are undertaken freely than about divine causation of actions.4 The form of predeterminism Klawans considers most similar to that found in Qumran literature, however, is one in which predetermines the dispositions of persons, who then choose according to those dispositions.5 In my opinion, Klawans is correct in identifying the predetermining of disposi- tions as key to understanding Qumran predestinarian beliefs, at least as these are articulated in the Hodayot. Moreover, if this is the case, then examining how moral agency is constructed and represented in the Hodayot may provide a more detailed understanding of how predeterminism functioned to provide a distinctive sense of self for Qumran sectarians. One might object, of course, that the very term “moral agency” is a volunta- rist category and so incompatible with a predeterminist system of belief. I do not think that is the case, though the agency constructed within predetermin- ism will have different characteristics than agency within a voluntarist system of thought, as I will attempt to demonstrate with respect to the Hodayot. Since the term moral agency could be subject to somewhat different definitions, it is important to clarify how I will use the term here. When I speak of a moral agent, I mean a self who has (1) personal awareness and knowledge, coupled with (2) emotional investment (desire/aversion), which can be directed toward (3) intentional, purposeful action. Agency is “moral” in that the person is held accountable for his or her understanding, affect, and action. Agency in gen- eral is a key component of what it means to be a self, and so at various points discussions about the nature of the self will be relevant to the issues at hand. The texts that are the focus of my study are the so-called Hymns of the Community in the Hodayot; that is, the compositions in cols. 1–9 and from col. 18 to the end of the scroll.6 These compositions are more explicitly concerned with issues of moral agency than are those often designated as the Hymns of the Teacher in cols. 10–17. In what follows, I will focus on three aspects of the problem of predeterminism and moral agency. The first aspect is the issue of apparently contradictory claims. What oth- ers have observed with respect to contradictory assertions about radical di- vine predeterminism and voluntary human action within Qumran thought

3 Klawans, “Compatibilism,” 63. 4 Klawans, “Compatibilism,” 63. 5 Klawans, “Compatibilism,” 64; citing Schuller, “Petitionary Prayer,” 40–41. 6 Column and line numbers are cited according to the edition of H. Stegemann and E. Schuller, translation by C. Newsom, Qumran Cave 1.III: 1QHodayota with Incorporation of 1QHodayotb and 4QHodayota–f, DJD 40 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2009).