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Home , Abstentionism, Bloody Sunday (1920), Bloody Sunday (1972), Gerry Adams, Irish republicanism, Irish Republican Army

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All Volumes (2001-2008) The sprO ey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry

2007 Sinn Fein Without the IRA: Legitimacy or Loss of Popular Support Catherine Hueckel University of North Florida

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Suggested Citation Hueckel, Catherine, "Sinn Fein Without the IRA: Legitimacy or Loss of Popular Support" (2007). All Volumes (2001-2008). 31. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_volumes/31

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Sinn Fein Without the IRA: reason for terrorism or an active IRA. Second, we examine the shifts in Sinn Fein’s core Legitimacy or Loss of Popular beliefs and political priorities. Finally, we Support consider the attitudes of Catholics in Northern toward IRA decommissioning and disbandment. All three point to changed Catherine Hueckel circumstances in the Catholic community in that imbue Sinn Fein with Faculty Sponsor: Pamela A. Zeiser, political legitimacy among Republicans and Associate Professor of Political Science and Nationalists1 despite – or perhaps because of Public Administration – the recently inactive IRA. Although there is no agreed-upon definition of terrorism, the scholarly literature Sinn Fein originally came into provides numerous precipitating factors and political prominence in Northern Ireland as reasons that might a group such as the the political wing of the Irish Republican IRA to terrorism. Rarely is it a single Army (IRA), yet in the last decade Sinn Fein motivating factor that causes an organization has become recognized as a legitimate to turn to violence. Instead, it is often a . As Sinn Fein joined the combination of historical, political, economic, mainstream political process, however, the social, strategic, and ethnic/nationalist factors Unionists, UK Prime Minister and that prompt terrorism (Gross, 1969; Harmon, even Irish Prime Minister 2000; Kegley, 2000; Simonsen & Spindlove, questioned its continued affiliation with the 2000; Howard, 2004). All of these factors are IRA and demanded the IRA and Republicans related and intertwined with one another. Of resort to entirely peaceful, democratic means these many factors, those specifically to their political ends. In July 2005, the IRA pertinent to Republicans in Northern Ireland acceded to this demand, “formally order[ing] are: history of violence, use of terrorism as a an end to the armed campaign” and last resort, discrimination, lack of political instructing all Volunteers to use “exclusively voice and legitimacy, and desire for publicity. peaceful means” (“IRA Statement,” 2005). In We use these pertinent factors to August, International examine the sociopolitical climate in Northern Commission on Decommissioning verified Ireland prior to and after the 1990s peace that the IRA had put all weapons beyond use. process which culminated in the 1998 Good Given its origins, can Sinn Fein Friday Agreement. We choose the 1990s remain a viable political party without an peace process as a line of demarcation active IRA supporting it? Sinn Fein President because it is during the peace process that has insisted that “There would Sinn Fein comes to be recognized as a be no peace process if it were not for the mainstream political party and because the IRA” (Adams as cited in Maillot, 2005, p. 85). Yet, it is also Adams who pressured the 1 The usage of the terms Catholics and Protestants to IRA to pursue peaceful, political means. We identify the two communities in Northern Ireland is argue that, in fact, Sinn Fein has grown common but imprecise. Those on the Catholic side are beyond it origins and can function as a viable generally Nationalists, seeking reunification with Ireland using constitutional means. With the category political party without the support of an active of Nationalists we also find Republicans, a term used IRA. This case study uses a three-part to describe those who seek immediate reunification and analysis to make this argument. First, are willing to use unconstitutional means – violence – following an exploration of the reasons to achieve it. This paper focuses on Republicans. On Northern Ireland Republicans resorted to the Protestant side, Unionists seek to remain a part of the ; Loyalists are those Unionists so violence, we assert that many of these reasons strongly committed to union that they will also use no longer hold true and, thus, there is no violence to achieve their purpose.

IRA begins to trust political means enough to At times successful and at times not, this long enter ceasefire. By applying these reasons for history of violence between the Irish and terrorism to Northern Ireland in two time British throws its shadow upon the Northern periods, we establish that there was Ireland conflict today. The history of the IRA previously a perceived need for terrorist IRA itself traces back to earlier including violence2 but that, entering and after the the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Irish 1990s, there is much less of a perceived need Volunteers, with its formal founding in 1919 for violence on the part of Republicans. (Tonge, 2002). The 1919 – 1921 War of We focus on the Irish Republican Independence marked success Army or IRA as the predominant Republican for the IRA, as Ireland gained independence paramilitary organization as well as the one from Britain. This successful past strongly most closely associated with Sinn Fein. The influences the 1960s-1990s IRA campaigns in IRA is considered one of the best-organized Northern Ireland, giving the organization terrorist organizations of modern times hope and sense of romantic nostalgia. (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2000). The main However, the result of the Anglo-Irish goals of the IRA are and always have been to Treaty was the in 1921 remove British rule from all of Ireland and the when the twenty-six counties in the South creation of a sovereign thirty-two county Irish became the and the six . The IRA that, until recently, counties in the North, which were operated in Ireland is officially known as the predominantly Protestant, remained under Provisional , having British rule. The IRA continued to fight split in the 1970s from what was known as the partition, but with little success or even Official IRA. Any mention of the IRA in this support between the 1920s and 1960s. In fact, paper refers only to the Provisional IRA. one IRA campaign against the British in There were and are, of course, other Northern Ireland from 1956 – 1962 faded out Republican paramilitaries, including the Real due to lack of popular support and the IRA in IRA. We deal with those only insofar as they Northern Ireland all but ceased to operate relate to our research question; the literature (McKittrick & McVea, 2002). on Northern Ireland’s paramilitaries is already Partition is, of course, a direct well-developed. precipitating cause of in Any group that has an historical past Northern Ireland from the 1960s to 1990s. that condones the use of violence may be The late 1960s civil rights movement by more amenable to resorting to the use of Catholics in Northern Ireland sought terrorism. When a group has used force in the moderate political and economic reforms to past, particularly if it has achieved some end discrimination – not reunification with measure of success through violence, that the South (Stohl, 1983). Catholic Nationalist group is more likely to embrace the use or protesters marched in the streets of , threat of violence to achieve its goals Londonderry, and other cities in an attempt to (Kegley, 2000). The roots of the IRA can be bring attention to their plight. But these found in the turbulent and violent history of marches were met with violence by Unionist Ireland. extremists and police (McKittrick & McVea, From the Norman invasion in 1169 to 2002). Because the Protestant Unionist the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 to Wolfe majority controlled the government and Tone and the 1798 rebellion to the Easter police, the Catholic Nationalists felt helpless Uprising of 1916, there has been armed Irish and vulnerable. This feeling was magnified to the British presence in Ireland. when, in the late 1960s, Loyalist crowds burned down entire streets of houses in Catholic sectors, displacing some 1,500 2 We argue that Republicans in Northern Ireland believed terrorism was necessary; we do not condone Catholic families (McKittrick & McVea, terrorism ourselves. 2002). While some accuse the IRA of using the civil rights marches as cover for violence Terrorism is commonly the option of or even fronting the movement (Tonge, last resort. When other means to effect change 2002), others insist the organization was have failed, frustration and anger sometimes basically disorganized and unarmed at this lead groups to perform a cost/benefit analysis point in time. Following the burnings is when that results in the use of violence to force an “the bitter phrase ‘IRA – I ran away’ is issue. Often a group has attempted to effect famously said to have appeared on a wall in change through political means or through the Falls Road area, reflecting the feelings of peaceful protest, and when these efforts are the working-class nationalists in west and ineffective a group might explore the use of north Belfast that the IRA had failed them.” terrorism (Howard, 2004). As the civil rights In Making Sense of the Troubles, McKittrick movement disintegrated and and McVea (2002) argue that: further inflamed the Nationalist community, the disillusionment and desperation of many the practical reality was that the Catholic Nationalists in Northern Ireland majority of Catholics did not support made violence the only option remaining. the IRA, and looked to them only in IRA recruitment during this period grew times of high tension. In such times, enormously. and August 1969 was one of them, the The portion of the Catholic Nationalist IRA was supposed to protect areas community in Northern Ireland that considers such as the Falls and against itself Republican shares a long history of attack. . . . The consensus in the armed struggle. In the centuries since the Catholic backstreets was that an Norman invasion, the have effective defence force was needed, fought many armed battles with the and so a new IRA came into being. Protestants, thereby creating a tradition of This new group may have emerged to violence. The IRA represents this history of defend the , but it would before armed resistance and defiance. Combined long develop into an aggressive killing with the long and failed battle against machine. (p. 59-60) inequality in Northern Ireland, it thus seems almost inevitable that some Republicans On January 31, 1972, known as would see the use of force as the only avenue Bloody Sunday, a peaceful civil rights march for change. turned violent when the fired on The failed Catholic civil rights the crowd and 13 demonstrators were killed (a movement sought to end discrimination in 14th died later as a result of his injuries). The Northern Ireland. Discrimination is frequently march had been called to protest internment, a key factor in causing a group to contemplate the imprisonment without trial of thousands the use of terrorism, especially minority of Catholic men as suspected IRA members. groups. Discrimination can take many forms: In retaliation, the IRA shot and killed thirteen lack of housing, unemployment, British army troops (McKittrick & McVea, discrimination by the police and/or the state, 2002; Tonge, 2002). This was a turning point political oppression and lack of self- for the IRA. Internment and Bloody Sunday determination (Kegley, 2000). A group, were perceived as oppression that specifically particularly a minority group, that is unable to targeted the Nationalist community in have its perceived grievances of Northern Ireland (Maillot, 2005). discrimination addressed may opt to use force Disillusioned by their failure to achieve or the threat of force in order to achieve a change through peaceful civil protest and measure of equality. In particular, if a group political pressure, many Nationalists grew believes that the police discriminate against it, more amenable to the IRA’s use of terrorist the group may feel unprotected and violence to force political change. vulnerable and this might drive the group to resort to the use of force to counterbalance the feeling of weakness. If a social movement Protestants (McKenna, 2005). The most bands together to fight discrimination, but the blatant acts of discrimination in the majority either refuses to deal with the issues distribution of new housing occurred when or perhaps does not even think that the single Protestants were given opportunities minority has any valid issues that require for new housing before Catholic families attention, then terrorism may be used by an were. There also existed discrepancies in the extremist portion of the movement (Kegley, condition of the housing for each community. 2000). Those who are weak relative to the In 1971, only 63 percent of Catholic homes in government become impatient from a lack of Northern Ireland had hot water or a private action achieved by the peaceful movement, indoor bathroom, while 72 percent of the and use terrorism as a tool to bring their Protestant homes did (McKenna, 2005). concerns to the forefront and force change Catholics were also victims of onto the majority’s political agenda. discrimination in regards to employment. In Discrimination against Irish Catholics Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, in (Northern) Ireland also has a long history, Jonathan Tonge (2002) argues that there was dating back to the of the 1600s discrimination in three main areas: location, and 1700s. Through laws restricting employment, and access to civil service education, land distribution, and practice of position. First, Catholics were disadvantaged religion among others, Catholics were when new industry was located in stripped of legal, social, political, and predominantly Protestant areas of the region. economic power (Stohl, 1983). The Penal “Areas with Catholic majorities received only Laws were repealed over time, but left a three-quarters of the amount of employment lingering perception of discrimination and location awards enjoyed by Protestants victimization among the Catholics that was between 1949 –1963” (p. 22). Second, inflamed by more modern periods and forms unemployment rates were twice as high of discrimination. While some Unionists may among Catholic workers as among Protestant deny that discrimination occurred in Northern workers (Tonge, 2002). “In the private sector, Ireland, there is general scholarly agreement many large firms, and indeed whole that it did (Tonge, 2002). As well, even industries, commonly had workforces that Unionist-sympathetic British Prime Minister were more than 90 percent Protestant . . . admitted that “There was Moreover, there were, at times of high no getting away from the fact that . . . the long tension, periodic purges in which Catholic years of Unionist rule were associated with workers were forcibly expelled from some of discrimination against Catholics” (quoted in the big companies” (McKittrick & McVea, McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 156). 2002, p. 11-12). In the 1960s, Catholics suffered Third, Catholics were excluded from discrimination in three main areas: housing, the higher positions in both the public and employment, and elections. In Belfast, where private sector. Catholics accounted for only the population of Catholics had risen, the 10 percent of the jobs in the civil service, and Nationalists faced poverty and many lived in virtually none of these jobs were in the higher slums. After World War II there was a surge ranks. A 1943 survey illustrated that there in the building of new housing in Northern were “no Catholics in the 55 most senior jobs Ireland, but even though the Catholics lived in and only 37 Catholics in 600 middle-ranking the poorest sections, much of the new housing posts” (McKittrick and McVea, 2002, p. 11). was allotted to the Protestant population In the private sector, most of the jobs held by (Tonge, 2002). The Protestants held most of Catholics were unskilled labor and lower the positions in the city councils and were the paying jobs such as factory workers, while ones who determined the distribution of the Protestants occupied higher paying jobs in new housing, therefore granting Catholics industries such as shipbuilding. In general in proportionately less housing than the all types of professions, Catholics tended to occupy the lowest ranks. For example, in the in order to force the government and other white-collar industries Catholics held the entities to take notice (Harmon, 2000). clerical positions while Protestants held the Terrorism is used to expose the state as managerial positions (Hancock, 1998; discriminatory, oppressive, and illegitimate McKittrick & McVea, 2002; Tonge, 2002). (Kegley, 2000). “Insurgent groups use terror The Catholics were also subject to to undermine the status quo and to achieve discrimination in the electoral process. some political power” (Harmon, 2000, p. 45). According to the 1920 When terrorism is used to force political Act, elections in Northern Ireland were to be change on the agenda, a government that had conducted under proportional representation, chosen to reject to the goals of a political which was designed to include representation movement cannot ignore the actions of that of the Nationalist minority. However, by now-terrorist group (Howard, 2004). 1922, the Unionist government abandoned Terrorism is also used to gain this system and implemented a “first-past-the- recognition, attention and/or publicity. A post” system in local elections. This system group that feels disenfranchised and without a ensured an enduring single-party Unionist political voice may use terrorism to publicize government (Tonge, 2002). In addition, only its cause and to force its opponent and also its local home-owning ratepayers were allowed allies to take it seriously. Quite often, after a to vote. Since the majority of Catholics did terrorist organization has taken violent action, not own homes, many could not participate in a public announcement will follow in which it local elections, ensuring Unionist dominance takes responsibility for and outlines its in local government. And, to complete the justifications for that act. Terrorism is utilized circle, those Unionists elected to local to bring attention to the terrorists’ ideology by councils determined the future distribution of causing an act that is shocking and forces the housing – and, therefore, votes. public to take notice (Simonsen and , the practice of Spindlove, 2000). Terrorists use the media to manipulating electoral boundaries, also gain the most attention possible. further disenfranchised the Catholics. Voting In addition to being denied a political districts were created to ensure a Unionist voice through electoral discrimination, the majority, even in predominantly Nationalist Republicans in Northern Ireland were denied areas. In 1922, “as a result of the changes a public voice. Both the Nationalists lost their majorities in thirteen of and United Kingdom censored the Republican the twenty-four councils they had originally media. For almost twenty years Sinn Fein was controlled.” The city of Londonderry had a banned from the state-owned media in the firm Nationalist majority, but gerrymandering Republic of Ireland (Maillot, 2005). Section allowed Unionist control of the city council: 31 of the 1960 Broadcasting Act gave the “7,500 Unionist voters returned twelve Irish Minister for Post and Telegraphs the councilors while 10,000 Nationalist voters authority to ban broadcasts of any returned only eight” (McKittrick & McVea, organization that promotes the use of 2002, p. 8). violence. Sinn Fein’s connection to the IRA Through such political discrimination was the basis of this proclamation, and and purposeful political structural changes, therefore any interviews with Sinn Fein party the Catholics were left virtually without a members were not allowed to be broadcast on voice in the political system of Northern state television or radio. In 1988, British Ireland. This lack of political influence was Secretary of State Douglas Hurd stated that compounded when the civil rights movement there would be ‘restrictions’ on electronic was outlawed and destroyed by the Northern media coverage of Sinn Fein (Welsh, 2005, Ireland government at Stormont. When the p.2). The British government’s restrictions concerns of a group have gone largely were not as severe as those of the Republic, as ignored, a group may decide to use terrorism Sinn Fein was allowed coverage during elections. However, the censorship by both are sick of war, weary of anxiety and fear. governments increased perceptions of They still have differences, but they want to oppression among Republicans as well as settle them through democratic dialogue” (p. unfair reporting of Republican events and the xii, 19). The history of violence that made dissemination of misinformation. terrorism acceptable was superseded by war By closing legitimate channels of weariness. publicity and communication for Sinn Fein, There were, of course, attempts at the British and Irish governments peace over the years; only rarely did those inadvertently accelerated the IRA’s use of attempts include Sinn Fein as the political violence. Terrorism was perceived by many to representatives of the Republicans and the be the only way to draw attention to the plight IRA. Republicans, roughly 30-40% of the of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. Nationalist community, still had no political In conducting a well-organized campaign of voice and, thus, still perceived the need to terrorism, the IRA achieved success in resort to violence to gain a voice. But when focusing world attention on its cause. While the Hume-Adams talks and “back channel” the worldview was not always sympathetic between the British and Sinn Fein bore towards the Republicans, the IRA’s acts of political fruit in the early 1990s and, more terrorism did ultimately serve to gain importantly, Sinn Fein was allowed into peace publicity and recognition for the Republicans negotiations in the mid-1990s, the (Harmon, 2000). Republicans again had a political voice. A combination of history, desperation, Moderate Catholic Nationalists had long since discrimination, and lack of political and regained a political role, making violence no public voice contributed to the IRA’s use of longer necessary as a last resort in their view. terrorism during the Troubles. According to As Republicans’ own policies evolved from Gross (1969), conditions contributing to violence only to the “ballot box and armalite,” political terrorism include: “the perception of they began to regain their political voice. As sociopolitical conditions of oppression” and the British and Irish governments and the “the presence of active personality types who Nationalists began to hear that voice, and are willing to make a political choice and began to recognize Sinn Fein as a legitimate respond with and violence to political party, Republicans such as Gerry conditions of oppression” (p. 120). These Adams used that voice and increasingly conditions were present in Northern Ireland sought political means to their ends. from the 1960s until the 1990s; therefore, Republican concerns were no longer going terrorism was present in Northern Ireland unheard and violence was no longer their only from the 1960s until the 1990s. perceived means for achieving their goals. But conditions in Northern Ireland By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the slowly changed through the 1980s and into Irish Catholic minority in Northern Ireland the 1990s. The pertinent factors that prompted also saw a decrease in discrimination. Once terrorism earlier in the Troubles began to the British established direct rule from decrease or even disappear. The long history London, they began policy initiatives that of Republican violence certainly did not reduced discrimination in housing, change, but the much more recent violent employment, and politics. By 1972, local history of the Troubles did. According to councils dominated by Protestant Unionists former US Senator George Mitchell (1999), no longer controlled allocation of housing; the the independent chairman of the peace talks Northern Ireland Housing Executive was a that led to the , as the regional government body that solved the 1980s turned into the 1990s, “families began “problem of systematic unfair housing to long for a more normal life, one not allocation” (Darby, 1997, p. 80). According to dominated by fear and hatred.” Even among John Darby (1997), Scorpions in a Bottle, by Republicans, “the people long for peace. They the 1990s, “Catholics and Protestants occup[ied] houses of similar quality . . . On 1970s, the British government enacted voting balance, housing is a rare example of a major reform legislation that ended gerrymandering, grievance which has been virtually removed unequal franchise rights tied to home from the political agenda through changes in ownership, and other unfair voting practices government policy and practice” (p. 80). The in local elections. “Electoral grievances were 1973 Northern Ireland Constitution Act also effectively removed from the political established the Standing Advisory agenda” (Darby, 1997, p. 60, 80). Commission on Human Rights to evaluate The British government has been whether the laws against discrimination were withdrawing its troops from Northern Ireland. being upheld (Fitzduff, n.d.). In 1998, the Efforts were also made to change the make-up Equality Commission was established under of the mostly Protestant police force, by the Good Friday Agreement. It monitors and actively recruiting Catholics and changing its investigates any charges of discrimination in name from the Royal Constabulary housing or employment (Equality (RUC) to the more benign sounding Police Commission, n.d.). Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). These The British government strengthened changes in legislation and organization reduce its fair employment legislation in 1976 and structural discrimination against Catholics in again in 1989 in an effort to mitigate Northern Ireland, which in turn helps create employment discrimination against Catholics. an atmosphere less conducive to terrorism. Since this legislation went into effect, the State-sponsored censorship has also proportion of Catholic men and women has ended. Both the Irish and British governments increased in virtually every occupational have lifted bans on Sinn Fein interviews and group (Bew, Patterson, Teague, 1997). publicity. Sinn Fein is free to publicize its Unemployment remains disproportionately cause in the media, and does so. Gerry Adams greater for Catholics than Protestants. is very vocal, and gives speeches and According to the British government, in 2003 interviews on a daily basis. The Republicans the unemployment rate for Catholic men was also publish their own newspaper, An 9 percent compared with 5 percent for Phoblacht. No longer is there a need to draw Protestant men. Among women, the attention to Republican issues through means unemployment rates were 6 percent for of spectacular violence. In the global political Catholics compared with 3 percent for climate since the terrorist acts on September Protestants (“Northern Ireland Labour 11, 2001, the use of terrorism is abhorred and Market” 2004). Still, this is better than before unlikely to draw sympathetic support from the the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. For international community. In fact, the use of example, statistics furnished by the terrorism by the IRA could have the opposite Continuous Household Survey in 1983 states effect; it would most likely repulse the public that the male unemployment rate for and alienate the international community. It is Catholics was around 35 percent, while the definitely to the advantage of Republicans to rate for Protestants was 15 percent (Rawthorn utilize their restored political and public and Wayne, 1988). This illustrates a dramatic voices rather than violence. improvement in the proportion of In Gross’ (1969) terms, then, the unemployment figures, and the Good Friday “perceptions of sociopolitical conditions of Agreement has provisions to further reduce oppression” have diminished among Northern the disparities. Irish Republicans to the extent that they no Like housing discrimination, unfair longer feel terrorism is their only option. As electoral practices ended with direct rule. well, we can take Sinn Fein President Gerry “Paradoxically, the removal of local Adams as an example of an “active in Northern Ireland may have personality type . . . willing to make a accelerated the systematic removal of political choice and respond with direct minority inequalities.” During the early action” – but no longer willing to have that action be violent. Adams’ rhetoric has methods to the forefront of the Republican changed over the years, from overtly campaign. The decision was made to utilize supporting the armed struggle to a firmer both political and military means to achieve stance against using violent methods to Republican goals. This decision sets the stage achieve Sinn Fein’s goals. In a speech for later developments such as the Hume- directed to the IRA on April 6, 2005, he Adams talks, the 1990s IRA ceasefire, and, acknowledged the IRA’s role in the struggle ultimately, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement for a , but also urged them to (Tonge, 2002). consider purely political means: As these developments unfolded, Sinn Fein asserted its independence of the IRA3 In the past, I have defended the right and altered it core beliefs and political of the IRA to engage in armed positions, both subtly and dramatically. While struggle…Now there is an alternative. the unification of Ireland remains a core I have clearly set out my view of what belief, Sinn Fein has accepted the existence of that alternative is. The way forward is Northern Ireland, the (at least temporary) by building political support for legitimacy of the British government to rule republican and democratic objectives Northern Ireland, and the across Ireland and by winning support for both Nationalists and Unionists. There for these goals internationally. also began to be a desire to move from “a (Adams, 2005, para. 19) tactically unarmed strategy . . . [to] a totally unarmed strategy,” which fundamentally Just as the overall situation in shifts the core Sinn Fein position of Northern Ireland has changed, under Gerry militarism (Tonge, 2002, p. 148). Adams’ leadership Sinn Fein itself has Tonge (2002) further argues that those changed. As Jonathan Tonge (2002) argues in who believe this shift is dramatic also believe Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, Sinn that “the softening of approach heralds the Fein has grown beyond its status as the death of ” (p. 150) – the end of “political wing of the IRA” and shifted some violence and strict adherence to the historic of its core beliefs and political positions. goals of the party. This conclusion was Although Sinn Fein as a political party obviously reached before the IRA ended its predates partition, the incarnation that we campaign, but it emphasizes the fact that, in know today began as “little more than a flag moving away from its own core beliefs, Sinn of convenience for the IRA” (McKittrick & Fein moved into the realm of “a mere McVea, 2002, p. 158). Its main ideological Nationalist party” or mainstream minority and political goals emphasized a united party (Tonge, 2002, p. 150). It is perhaps a Ireland, the end of British colonial control of minority party within the entire Northern Northern Ireland, the existence of a unique Ireland context, but Sinn Fein is now the Irish culture and nation, and the historical majority Nationalist party, gaining more votes right to use force to achieve these goals than the Social Democratic and , (Tonge, 2002). During the height of IRA which represents moderate Nationalists. Sinn activity in the 1970s, few Republicans Fein is also the only Northern Ireland party accepted the use of political tactics to achieve active in the south as well as the north. these goals. Republicans, including Gerry Today, Sinn Fein enjoys greater voter Adams at the time, were afraid that “what backing in both the Republic of Ireland and in they pejoratively referred to as ‘electoralism’ . . . would blunt the IRA’s revolutionary edge” 3 There is, of course, still considerable debate as to how (McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 158). independent Sinn Fein is of the IRA. For the purposes In the 1980s, however, the military of this paper, we accept the party’s line that the two organizations no longer share leadership; therefore, we stalemate, war-weariness, and the IRA hunger accept that their insistence that there is no longer an strikes brought Sinn Fein and political “organic” relationship.

Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein support has origins as the political wing of the IRA and its slowly increased in the Republic over the last core beliefs. For example, Sinn Fein’s 1986 ten years (Maillot, 2005). In the May United decision to enter the Irish Dail after decades Kingdom General Election, Sinn Fein won an of angered many Republicans, additional seat, making them now the second some of whom split off and formed most popular political party in Northern Republican Sinn Fein (Tonge, 2002, p. 144), a Ireland (behind the Democratic Unionist party still active today. Sinn Fein’s Party), and the largest Nationalist party in involvement in the 1990s peace process Northern Ireland (“Sinn Fein Win ,” further fractured its Republican support, with 2005). Gerry Adams took seventy percent of a small but visible group of the vote in his Belfast West constituency in creating the Thirty-Two County Sovereignty the recent 2005 General Election (Adams and Committee in 1997. Dissidents formed not Paisley retain Ulster seats, 2005). only rival political parties, but also rival In March 2005, the paramilitary organizations. The now-defunct commissioned Millward Brown Ulster to Real IRA (rIRA) opposed the IRA ceasefire conduct a sweeping public opinion poll in and the 1990s peace process; they were Northern Ireland. According to this poll, responsible for the infamous 1998 forty-four percent of Sinn Fein voters believe bombing. The Continuity IRA (CIRA), which that the IRA should disband and almost sixty is believed to still be active, also opposes the percent of Sinn Fein supporters say that the IRA ceasefire and the 1998 Good Friday IRA should disarm. Forty-eight percent of all Agreement (McKittrick & McVea, 2002). Sinn Fein voters responded that Gerry Adams During September and October 2005, several performed “very well” as party leader; news sources made general references to although this does represent a slight drop “republican dissidents” attacking police and from 2003, it is the highest approval rating attempting bombings. Such dissident parties among all party leaders in Northern Ireland. and paramilitary groups oppose Sinn Fein’s The poll also indicated the highest percentage current policies and, in some cases, the of female Sinn Fein voters in 15 years, at 48 emphasis on peaceful means to end the percent (“What Ulster Thinks Now,” 2005). conflict. The literature has always explained away the Sinn Fein recognizes the need for low percentage of women Sinn Fein voters support from the IRA’s members and other based on that gender’s distaste for violence traditional Republicans. As Mark Harrington (Malliot, 2005). These statistics indicate that (2005) reports in “New hope, and unease, in Sinn Fein voters no longer require backing N. Ireland,” some Republicans are very from the IRA to go hand-in-hand with their nervous about IRA decommissioning, with political party and that Sinn Fein is attracting one interviewee responding, “Who’s going to more women voters as they seek primarily protect us now?” As noted above, many political means. Republicans expect IRA protection in The above elections results and dangerous times; decommissioning and the opinion polls pre-date the announced end of end to IRA campaign introduces insecurities the IRA campaign and decommissioning. Yet into Catholic neighborhoods – at the very the polls and election results do indicate that time that Protestant Loyalist feuds are Sinn Fein gained in voters and positive public exploding into violent riots. Harrington opinion as it shifted its political ideals and (2005) also points out that Gerry Adams has distanced itself from the IRA. This indicates a acknowledged the need to unite factions strong likelihood it can survive and even within the party, quoting from an earlier thrive without an active IRA. Adams speech: “There’s a big job of It is, however, important to note that leadership to be done, because many not all Republicans have been pleased with Republicans are only now absorbing the Sinn Fein’s gradual shift away from its impact of the IRA disarmament . . . But it is up to us to make sure that everybody stays Northern Ireland is still under direct rule from united” (n.p.) Former BBC Ireland London with no firm estimate of when Correspondent Mark Simpson (2005), gives devolved government will return. Even more Sinn Fein leaders considerable credit for importantly, while Sinn Fein seems willing to having kept Republicans united thus far: accept an interim arrangement in a power- “There have been minor defections along the sharing executive with the Unionists, it is way, but Gerry Adams and Martin vital to remember that the ultimate goal is a McGuinness have steered the IRA through a united Ireland. Recent political history in period of dramatic change without a major Northern Ireland has shown us that success in split – and without being killed. . . . It is a the peace process did not translate into lasting remarkable political success story, albeit after electoral or political success for either the 30 years of death and destruction” (n.p.). Nationalist SDLP or ; While militarism may have ended, their respective inabilities to deliver upon Sinn Fein promises to remain activist. The promises related to the Good Friday perceived romanticism of the Republican Agreement and the interrelated failure of the movement included a strong community new Northern Ireland government led to the commitment to the cause. For those very increase in Sinn Fein support we herald Republicans unwillingly to engage in violence here. If Sinn Fein is unable to meet its during the Troubles, Sinn Fein served as an political goals and keep its promises, it could alternative form of participation. Membership face a similar loss of popular support. These figures, both past and present, are difficult to are, however, the challenges faced by any obtain, though the party claims to be “the mainstream political party – they do not stem fastest growing party in Ireland.” However from the absence of an active IRA. many there are, Sinn Fein has always It is also important to note that there expected and continues to expect a high level remain important avenues for further research of commitment from its members, requiring relative to Sinn Fein’s legitimacy. We focus them to volunteer their time to sell primarily on the party’s ability to maintain newspapers, hand out leaflets, and participate legitimacy within its own community; other in fundraising and publicity events. The party players in the Northern Irish political game puts special emphasis on the young, and has must also grant it legitimacy. While the had appeal among them due to its strong British and Irish governments and non-violent involvement in local communities and anti- Catholic Nationalists seem to have done so, drug campaigns (Maillot, 2005). A grassroots- the Unionists – especially the extremist Ian based organization and active membership Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party – helps integrate Sinn Fein into the have no faith or trust in the end of the IRA’s communities of both Northern Ireland and the campaign or Sinn Fein’s insistence upon Republic; this allows it to become ingrained solely political efforts to manage and resolve in communities and provides a firm base of the conflict. support for the party. The future of Northern Ireland It could be an oversimplification to remains to be written, but the region seems to insist that Sinn Fein would continue to gain be at a very promising crossroads. Changing support now that the IRA has ended its sociopolitical conditions, popular support, and campaign and decommissioned. The polls and internal politics have led Sinn Fein to a election results do indicate that Sinn Fein has position of political legitimacy and gained in voters and positive public opinion prominence that allows it to represent the as it has ever so slowly shifted its ideals and interests of a majority of the Catholic distanced itself from the IRA. However, it has community. It no longer must rely on IRA been eight years since the Good Friday violence to gain political attention. The IRA Agreement was signed and it has yet to be ceasefire – and, very recently, end to the IRA fully implemented. The fact also remains that campaign – gave Sinn Fein the chance to prove that political means can achieve Fitzduff, Mari. Changing History – Peace Republican ends. 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