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Home , Abstentionism, Conor Murphy, Irish republicanism, Mitchel McLaughlin, People Before Profit

The Politics of Sinn F´ein:Rhetoric and Reality

Kieran Allen

A recent opinion poll indicated that 2008. In the general election of 2011 Sinn Sinn F´einis now neck and neck with Fine F´eintook 10 percent of the popular vote Gael to be the majority party in the South. and became the second largest opposition In , it is already the largest party, party. Since then, it has continued to commanding 26 percent of the vote.1 This grow, mainly by presenting itself as hav- transformation is remarkable. In the early ing ‘realistic’ alternative policies to per- nineties, Sinn F´einwas almost a pariah manent austerity. This growth has im- party in the South. Its members were vis- pressed sections of the union bureaucracy. ited regularly by the Special Branch, their The SIPTU leadership, which is composed voices were banned from RTE and its ac- of die-hard supporters, gives tivists were vilified by the wider media. regular coverage to Sinn F´einin their pub- The overwhelming message of official Ire- lications and Jack O Connor frequently land was that they - rather than the British speaks at their events. Clearly, the union army or its loyalist allies - were responsi- leaders want a Plan B in the event of a ble for a war that had cost over 4,000 lives. collapse of Labour. The shift in Sinn F´ein Despite dropping their traditional policy from being ‘a welfare adjunct of the IRA of , Sinn F´eincould make no to the fastest growing political force in Ire- headway at the ballot box. In the 1992 land during the first half of the 21st cen- election, they achieved less than 2 percent tury’2 has been remarkable. of the vote. Sinn F´ein’sgrowth is the result of two main factors. From 1997 to 2007, Sinn F´einre-packaged itself as the most ardent advocate of the peace process, willing to compromise to reach agreement. By con- trast, the Unionist parties seemed unwill- ing to share power and, according to re- publican sources, were supported by ‘se- curocrats’ within the British state. In a series of audacious moves, the IRA broke

The Sinn F´einleadership, , Mary Lou Mc- a republican taboo and de-commissioned Donald & Martin McGuinness its weaponry; republican politicians joined police boards and urged support for the PSNI; Sinn F´ein accepted devolved power- However, this has changed significantly sharing within Northern . The em- after the crash of 2008. Just as brace of the peace rhetoric helped to dispel F´ailtransformed itself under the impact a Southern antipathy towards the armed of the Wall Street crash of 1929, Sinn struggle, but it also exposed a contradic- F´einhas made the same transformation tion at the heart of the ‘new’ Sinn F´ein. in response to the Wall Street crash of The affirmed that 1‘Sinn F´einlevel with , opinon poll shows’ Irish Times 9 October 2014 2J. Tonge, ‘Sinn F´einand the ‘New ’ in ’, Space and Polity, Vol. 10, No. 2 pp. 135-147, August 2007 p. 135.

4 the status of could not a third rate of income tax of 48 percent be changed without Unionist consent and on incomes over e100,000 with increased it resurrected Stormont parliament. Sinn employer PRSI contributions as well. It F´einhad traditionally opposed both these demanded a cut in the earnings of politi- propositions and at the start of negotia- cians and the imposition of a pay cap of tions declared there could be ‘no return to e100,000 on all civil and public service Stormont’.3 Even as late as the morning posts for three years.6 It also proposed a of its signing, party chairperson, Mitchell e13 billion stimulus programme to create McLoughlin declared that ‘Sinn F´ein was 150,000 jobs.7 4 opposed to an assembly at Stormont’. These proposals have been advocated The main concessions that Sinn F´einwon by left parties in other countries but in were not in the constitutional field but in Ireland, Sinn F´einstood out as the most securing the release of its prisoners and a vocal advocate of Keynesian economics. peace dividend that allowed former guerril- Its call to make the wealthy pay more las to embed themselves in community or- tax was particularly popular among the ganisations. Aside from these, it is difficult manual working class. In the 2011 elec- to dispute Brian Feeney’s assertion that tion, Sinn F´einscored nearly three times the Good Friday Agreement was ‘a pale more votes among unskilled manual work- reflection of the 1973 Sunningdale Agree- ers than among upper professionals.8 Af- 5 ment that the IRA vowed to destroy.’ ter the election, there were clear indica- The second main factor in Sinn F´ein’s tions, that it was scoring nearly twice as was a left rhetoric it deployed in the much support among the former category 9 South. Even before the crash, Sinn F´ein as the Labour Party. These developments used its outsider status to attack a polit- - combined with Sinn F´ein’smembership of ical establishment that was mired in cor- the ‘hard left’ GUE/NGL group in the Eu- ruption. It presented itself as the voice of ropean parliament - led some to conclude the most marginalised working class com- that Sinn F´einwas Ireland’s radical left munities who were left behind by the Celtic party. If Germany had Die Linke, Greece Tiger. After the crash, it developed a co- had Syriza and had the Front de herent set of policies which challenged the Gauche, then Ireland had Sinn F´einto rep- austerity consensus of the mainstream par- resent views that were to the left of social ties. This was to be achieved by taxes . on the wealthy and a stimulus programme The suggestion that Sinn F´einrepre- which helped to create jobs. The party ad- sents a radical left formation draws on vocated a 1 percent tax on net wealth over an apparent affinity between republican- e1 million with working farms, business ism and . If this connection assets and 20 percent of the family home is made simply on the basis of rhetoric, and pension pots excluded. It called for there are many signs that Sinn F´einlead- 3 J. Evans and J. Tonge, ‘From Abstentionism to Enthusiasm: Sinn F´ein,Nationalist Electors and Support for Devolved Power-Sharing in Northern Ireland’ Irish Political Studies Vol.28, No. 1. Pp 39-57, 2013, p.41-42. 4Ibid 5B. Feeney, Sinn F´ein:a Hundred Turbulent Years, Dublin: O’Brien, 2002 p.436 6Ibid p.4,5 7Sinn F´ein, Jobs Plan: Investing in Ireland’s Future Dublin: Sinn F´ein, 2012. 8Red C General Election Opinion Poll 24 February 2013 9Red C General Election Opinion Poll 24 February 2013

5 ers can employ a revolutionary left vocab- through the overthrow of both ‘partition- ulary on occasion. In 1979, for exam- ist states’. The agency for bringing all this ple, Gerry Adams declared that, ‘capitalist about was to be the IRA but as this body property cannot exist without the plunder- has now been reduced to a commemoration ing of labour (and) we desire to see capital- society, the party has given up all rhetoric ism abolished and a democratic system of about overthrowing either the Northern or common ownership created in its stead’.10 Southern state. These pronouncements led academics like Sinn F´ein’sprimary aim now is to en- Ronald Munck to argue that, ‘Republican- ter a government to manage Irish capital- ism in Ireland cannot be reduced to an ide- ism rather than abolish it. It frames its ology of the bourgeois revolution: it has alternative policies in a ‘realist’ tone that always had a radical component which has accepts that the public deficit should be tended towards socialism’. 11 In more re- reduced to 3 percent by 2016 - a param- cent times, John Doyle, has emphasised eter set by the political establishment it- how Sinn F´einhas ‘a strong leftist, pro- self.13 This ‘realism’ is also expressed in equality agenda’ and was ‘an active par- its acceptance of the limits placed on Irish ticipant in the “anti-globalisation” move- budgetary policy. Sinn F´einappears to ac- ment’. 12 However, the issue cannot be cept the strictures laid down by the Fis- analysed in terms of rhetoric alone. Re- cal Treaty which specifies that the Irish peatedly in Irish history, Irish republicans budget deficit must be reduced to 60 per- have employed a left rhetoric to win a pop- cent of GDP. It has also not committed ular base and then used positions won to itself to removing the country from the manage capitalism. Rather than simply fo- ‘excessive deficit procedure’ laid down by cussing on left rhetoric alone, it is better to the EU. This also imposes strict limits analyse the uniqueness of Sinn F´einwithin on spending. But while operating in this the wider spectrum of the Left to establish framework, Sinn F´ein does not support what its core project is. the repudiation of debt caused by the col- lapse of Irish banks. The party originally Sinn F´ein’sProject: Govern- voted for a guarantee which committed the mental Office Irish state to making up for any short- fall in the payment of bank debt. Today The first point to notice is that the leftism it fails to mention repudiation of debt in bolted onto traditional its economic programme. Currently, the is of a distinctly reformist variety. It sees annual interest payment on Ireland’s na- change coming from legislative moves in tional debt amounts to e8 billion per year the parliament and rules out any form of and, with some annual variation, the pay- revolutionary change. This is somewhat ments will continue until 2053. Sinn F´ein’s ironic as the party originally saw the D´ail promise of ‘realistic’ policy change is there- as lacking legitimacy and declared that fore immediately constricted. a could only come about The other restriction on its radical- 10Quoted in E, Moloney, A secret History of the IRA, London: Allen Lane: Penguin, 2002 p.186. 11R. Munck, ‘ and Northern Ireland’ Review of Radical Politics Economics Vol. 13, No. 3. 1981. 12J. Doyle, ‘Republican policies in practical politics: Placing Contemporary Sinn F´einin a European context’ Working papers in British-Irish Studies, UCD No. 45, 2005 p.3. 13Sinn F´ein, Making the Right Choices: Sinn F´einAlternative Budget 2013, Dublin: Sinn F´ein2012 p. 3.

6 ism is its potential partner in government. stand arguments that SF is negative and While Sinn F´ein’sincrease in votes is im- unrealistic. pressive, no one believes that it will form a The formation of a FG-FF government majority government by itself in the imme- is certainly a distinct possibility and the diate future. Who, therefore, will it join in evidence from local councils would suggest coalition? that it may even be the most realistic sce- In the past, the position articu- nario. In 31 of the local authorities sur- lated,particularly by the Northern based veyed by the political scientist Adrian Ka- leadership, was straight forward. - they vanagh, 21 were controlled by a FF-FG al- were willing to do business with anyone. liance.16 There was no authority controlled According to Gerry Adams, ‘when you can by an alliance of SF and either FF or FG do business with , you can do even though such voting pacts were theo- business with anyone.’14 The leadership retically possible. refused to rule out coalition during the However, the scenario of a FF-FG gov- 2007 election and held open the possibility ernment presents considerable difficulties of joining one, but the election figures did for both the ruling class and Sinn F´ein. not work out. At the 2010 Sinn F´einArd Official Irish politics has been shaped by a Fheis, there were two resolutions calling on battle between the Civil War parties. Orig- the party not to enter government with Fi- inally these took different stances on the anna F´ailor Fine Gael. The leadership ‘national question’ with FF challenging the persuaded delegates to vote them down, neo-colonial status or Ireland as Britain’s promising a special conference should the ‘outgarden’ and Fine Gael favouring a con- occasion arise. Later Martin McGuiness tinuation to benefit big farmers. Both suggested that they had no interest in join- also took different rhetorical stances on the ing with Fine Gael but this left the obvious North - but, in practice, maintained the question: what about Fianna F´ail? Eoin same policy. While there is no longer any O’ Broin, a key architect of party policy, substantial difference between them, the has acknowledged that ‘in real terms’ the collapse of the civil war divide would be party’s current position ‘can only mean a risky for the ruling class. It would expose future alliance with Fianna F´ail,in a cen- the fake game that was Irish right wing tre right coalition.’15 politics and create a major space for a fu- However, as Southern society shifted ture left wing advance. Under pressure more leftward the party’s rhetoric became from a growing anti-austerity movement, slightly more ambiguous. Internally, the the ruling class might, therefore, prefer to party’s core membership are being told co-opt Sinn F´einto help demobilise that that the next government will be prob- opposition. Only time will tell. ably a Fianna F´ail- Fine Gael coalition The scenario of a long game, how- and that the party will play a long game. ever, also presents difficulties for Sinn F´ein. The rhetoric about being ‘ready for gov- First, the party is effectively a coalition of ernment’ is, under this scenario, mainly an different internal cliques that is glued to- electoral strategy to garner votes to with- gether by the authority of the former IRA 14‘General Election not a beauty contest: Adams’ , 5 January 2011 15E. O’Broin, Sinn F´einand the Politics of Left Republicanism, London: Pluto Press, 2009 p. 307. 16‘Which parties/groupings control city and county councils’ Irish Elections Blog by Adrian Kavanagh 23 June 2014 http://adriankavanaghelections.org/2014/06/23/which-partiesgroupings- control-the-city-and-county-councils/

7 leadership of Adams and McGuinness. As ercise a veto on government policy which long as there is forward momentum, the will tilt it in this direction. aura of success binds all elements together. 17 The prospect of another five years of oppo- However, the coalition partners may sition might, therefore, expose the cracks not have to exercise that veto too actively in Sinn F´einitself. Second, the party has as Sinn F´ein’s own policies are already set itself firmly against a strategy of rely- geared to the administration of Irish cap- ing on ‘people power’ to reverse austerity italism. Sinn F´ein’spolicies differ from measures (see the section on water charges both ‘old labour’ style reformism and rev- below). It tells its supporters that the only olutionary socialism in a number of key way change will occur is through Sinn F´ein ways. participation in government. But if the next government is likely to be a FF-FG First, older forms of left reformism gen- dominated one, then how ‘realistic’ is such erally favoured an expansion of public own- a strategy? ership as a way of undermining capital- ist control of industry. Sinn F´ein’sfocus, However, while discussion of the long however, is on supporting private business game scenario is confined to the party’s rather than public ownership. Its pro- core membership, externally, the party still business policies would not go amiss in claims it is open to any coalition. Mary right of centre parties in other countries. Lou McDonald claims that she would ‘pre- The 2009 policy document Getting Ireland fer’ a left leaning coalition composed of back to Work, is a case in point. It does not Labour, People Before Profit or Socialist mention any form of nationalisation and Party but would not rule out a deal with the public sector is only referenced for its Fianna F´ail.Eoin O’Broin does not want potential to help stimulate the private sec- Sinn F´einto ‘participate in a Fianna F´ail tor. The document calls for ‘support for or Fine Gael led government after the next Irish manufacturers... to reach an econ- general election’ but does not rule out ei- omy of scale, enabling them to compete ther party’s involvement in a ‘Sinn F´ein with cheaper products’.18 It proposes to led government’. There are, no doubt, provide R&D funding for ‘Irish firms and nuances between these two positions but entrepreneurs looking to set up manufac- ultimately they both acknowledges that turing business.’ 19 It wants tax cred- Sinn F´ein’s growth has come from a left its for multi-nationals which source Irish rhetoric - hence the friendly references to goods and a major drive to attract For- PbP and SP - but that its participation eign Direct Investment from international in government will involve a partnership firms in the renewable energy sector. It with either FF or the Labour Party. Yet wants a ‘venture capital fund’ for native these parties are wholly committed to the Irish capitalists to produce alternative en- Fiscal Treaty, paying off bankers’ debts, ergy products. The document calls for the and ensuring that Ireland remains thor- creation of dedicated business and science oughly prostrate before a policy of appeas- parks linked to universities 20. These pro- ing multi-nationals. Even if they are mi- posals are variations on the current strat- nority parties, FF, FG and Labour will ex- egy of the political establishment which is 17The Uniqueness of Sinn F´ein 18Sinn F´ein, Getting Ireland Back to Work, Dublin: Sinn F´ein2009 p.10. 19Ibid 20Ibid p.10, p. 12, p.14.

8 to grant more subsidies to private capital. rate of corporation tax in Ireland is a mere The difference with right parties is that 6 percent. The furthest Sinn F´eingoes is Sinn F´einwants to combine support for proposing that an extra 125 revenue staff business with an anti-austerity rhetoric. It be recruited to crack down on tax evasion does this primarily through tax policy that - and so raising an extra e70 million a favours re-distribution rather than through year. But the primary issue is not tax eva- any encroachments on the power of cap- sion - but laws which facilitate tax dodging. ital. At first sight, this might appear to Sinn F´ein’snervousness on taxing profit is reflect an ‘old Labourist’ outlook. But even evident in their failure to fully endorse Sinn F´ein’sa tax policy only targets high an EU Commission proposal for a Robin income earners and unproductive capital. Hood tax on financial speculation. This Nowhere in the Sinn F´einprogramme is blind spot on taxing profit shows that Sinn there any suggestion to increase the rate of F´ein’sproject is to forge a common front tax on profits. This is of some importance between native and foreign capitalists to because Irish society subsidises the profits develop the Irish national economy. of multi-nationals - and Irish capitalists- Second, Sinn F´einis unique among the by facilitating massive tax dodging. Ma- left in Europe being one of the best funded jor corporations such as Good or Apple parties in its country. One of the sources get away with a tax rate of less than 5 of funds is Irish America where the party percent and as a direct result taxes on is estimated to raise e530,000 a year. The PAYE workers and indirect taxes such as funds are gathered via the Friends of Sinn VAT are higher. Any mildly left reformist F´einand come from various events such party which promised to use governmental as lucrative speaking engagements or fund office to re-distribute wealth would need to raising dinners. Participants in a meal in tackle this issue. Yet Sinn F´ein studiously the Sheraton Hotel in Manhattan, for ex- avoids it. It accepts the dominant consen- ample, paid $ 500 each to attend.22 Other sus when it suggests that: donations come from trade unions with Ireland is a small open econ- Irish American connections and, crucially, omy and as such FDI (Foreign from the corporate sector. Chuck Feeney, Direct Investment) remains a the owner of a chain of Duty Free Stores crucial component of our in- was a major donor in the nineties while dustrial strategy, we need to Coca Cola donated $ 5,000 in 2003. Sinn ambitiously attract it but it F´ein’sconnections with Irish America also must be developed in balance extend to right wing politicians. One of its with native businesses.21 key allies is Peter King, who stands on the extreme right of the Republican Party. He ‘Ambitiously attracting’ multinationals was the main figure who campaigned for means not cracking down on their tax Gerry Adams’ right to enter the US and avoidance strategy. So Sinn F´einmakes no later set up introductions for him at the proposal either to increase corporation tax White House. But he has also attacked or even to impose a 12.5 percent minimum Wikileaks as a terrorist organisation and tax on profits. As People Before Profit has claimed that 80 percent of mosques in the repeatedly pointed out, the real effective US are controlled by fundamentalists.23 21 Sinn F´einAlternative Budget October 2014 p 37 22‘Sinn F´einwar chest swells as global ties pay dividends’ Irish Independent, 4 March 2012 23‘The Radicalization of Peter King’ Mother Jones, 20 December 2010.

9 The US flow of funds and the polit- the extension of the 1967 Abortion Act to ical connections with right wing figures Northern Ireland. As a result, abortion law such as King impacts on Sinn F´ein’sac- in the North is governed by the 1861 Of- tivities in many ways. While Sinn F´ein fences against the Person Act, which in- opposed Bush’s war on Iraq, it refused an cludes life imprisonment for any woman anti-war movement request to boycott St found to have terminated a pregnancy.25 Patrick’s Day celebrations with the White 24 The weakness of Sinn F´einin the area House. It consistently welcomed visits of women’s liberation and gender equality by Bill Clinton as a friend of Ireland and has also been highlighted by the Mairia was relatively quiet about his foreign im- Cahill allegations that have come to the perial adventures. Broadly, the party takes fore just as this article goes to press. De- a standard left nationalist position in sup- fenders of Sinn F´einwill doubtless claim porting the Palestinian and Basque strug- that this issue is promoted by the media gles but it increasingly does so by urging (including the British media) and the right support for a ‘peace process.’ wing parties in order to undermine Sinn Third, Sinn F´eindiffers from those left F´einjust as it emerges as a real contender wing parties who have been to the fore for office. There is a lot of truth in this but in defending women’s rights. Sinn F´ein unless Marie Cahill’s story were to turn has taken up some progressive positions, out to be a complete fabrication - and Sinn appointing a gender equality co-ordinator F´einspokespersons are NOT claiming this within its own ranks and periodically issu- - the way her case was dealt with is evi- ing statements on International Women’s dence of a very sexist culture within the Day. But on the crucial issue of women’s organisation. right to control their own bodies, the party These distinctive features of Sinn F´ein is at variance with the broader interna- arise from its . The adapta- tional left. In 1985, a feminist current tion to a religious conservatism, the appeal within the party won a resolution at the to a wealthy diaspora, the articulation of Ard Fheis to support a woman’s right to working class grievances alongside those of choose but the year afterwards the lead- native capitalists are features common to ership convinced delegates to reverse this. many nationalist movements. The contin- After the death of Savita Halappanavar in uing appeal of nationalism in Ireland arises 2012, the party supported legislation to al- from the historic experience of colonialism low abortion where a women’s life was in and the uneven development in the world danger but wanted it restricted to cases economy. No matter how much talk there of rape, incest or sexual abuse. Sinn F´ein is of globalisation and progress, capitalism spokespersons made it clear that they were is organised under the aegis of dominant totally opposed to ‘abortion on demand’ nation states. As Tom Nairn pointed out, and what exactly this meant could be this forces political organisations within gleaned from the party’s stance in North- peripheral nations into ‘a profoundly am- ern Ireland. There it joined with the arch bivalent reaction against this dominance, conservatives in the DUP in voting against seeking at once to resist it and somehow 24M. Frampton, The Long March: The Political Strategy of Sinn F´ein1981-2007, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2009 p.149. 25G. Horgan and A. M. Gray, ‘Devolution in Northern Ireland; a Lost Opportunity’ Critical Social Policy Vol. 32, No. 3, 2012 pp. 467-478, 2012, p. 470. 26T. Nairn, ‘The Modern Janus’ New Left Review Vol. 1 No. 94 November-December 1975, p. 12

10 take over its vital forces for their use.’26 Or ernment and the failure of union leaders to put it differently, parties like Sinn F´ein to back the fight. In a draconian move, try to mobilise different social groups to Labour Party and Fine Gael TDs voted to challenge Ireland’s role in the global cap- give their government power to seize the italist economy - while remaining within charges from the wage packets and social that global capitalism on better terms. For welfare of homeowners. But even though a period, therefore, the rhetoric of nation- this was an outrageous attack on workers’ alist parties can sometimes appear to be to rights, the leaders of the ICTU and SIPTU the left of conventional social democrats. did nothing. Both these organisations are But one should not confuse a rhetoric de- controlled by individuals who are totally signed to create an electoral base with any loyal to the Labour Party. Cathal King serious determination to challenge the na- chose, however, to attack those who led a ture of capitalism itself. fight rather than the Labour Party and the union leaders who stabbed it in the back. The Water Charges To make matters worse, the leaders of Sinn F´einstated publically that they The gap between rhetoric and action in would be returning Irish Water’s applica- Sinn F´einstrategy exploded dramatically tion pack and would be paying the charge. over the water charges issues. During They suggested that this was the only re- the bye-election campaign in Dublin South sponsible position that could be taken as West, Sinn F´einfaced a challenge from the people might be penalised if they refused radical left who were promoting ‘people to pay. However, Irish Water is a pub- power’ as a way to fight water charges. lic utility company and is not part of the Their candidate, Cathal King, re- revenue gathering apparatus of the state. sponded by claiming that ‘Sinn F´einwas Legislation, therefore, does not exist to al- the only party with a workable strategy to low them to seize the charge from peo- defeat water charges’ It was a big claim but ple’s income. But even if such legislation King said that he was opposed to ‘other were to be introduced, a huge movement groups who prefer to concentrate on fos- of ‘people power’ could force the govern- tering aspects of campaigns which will ul- ment to back down. Unjust laws have timately hurt hard-pressed families in the always been challenged from below and long-run. This happened during the cam- sometimes, if the movement is big enough , paign against the property tax. Politicians governments get defeated. It happened in on the “extreme-left” encouraged members 1996 when the government backed down of the public not to fill in forms but then on implementing an EU Water Services abandoned them when those people re- directive which demanded water charges ceived hefty financial penalties’.27 from domestic users. The only basis of a The reference to the ‘extreme left’ was claim that people might be penalised with to People Before Profit and the Anti- heavy bills is that allowances might be lost Austerity Alliance who both ran candi- by those who failed to comply. But one dates in the election. The charge that would only need allowances if the move- they ‘abandoned’ people was simply rub- ment to defeat water charges was thor- bish. The reality is that a mass movement oughly defeated. The commitment to pay to fight property charges was defeated by their water charge bill by Adams, McDon- a combination of fear tactics used the gov- ald and Doherty was, therefore, a stab in 27Cathal King press release

11 the back for the anti-water charges cam- a e100 household levy was imposed, a paign. Thousands saw it this way and as mass campaign arose to promote a boy- a result Sinn F´einpaid a heavy price by cott. Sinn F´einrefused to join in such losing a bye-election in Tallaght to Paul a call, claiming the tactic was danger- Murphy of the Anti-Austerity Alliance. ous. When this was followed by a property All the contradictions that lie that the tax, Sinn F´einagain disputed the ability heart of Sinn F´ein’sleftism have come to of a mass civil disobedience movement to the fore on water charges. They are op- mount a challenge. Today they repeat the posed to an organised boycott campaign same approach on water charges. Whereas because they believe that change only in the past armed guerrillas acted as the come from on high - by their party oc- ‘cutting edge’, today it is the TDs in the cupying governmental office. Despite the Dil, but in both cases the capacity of peo- amazing twists and turns that have charac- ple to act for themselves is downplayed terised their positions, Sinn F´eindisplays In support of their stance of urging the an important continuity in this approach. mass of people to wait until Sinn F´einen- The modern Sinn F´einis a product of ters government, the party’s leaders point discontinuity and change rather than sim- to their apparent success in abolishing wa- ply adherence to a republican vision that ter charges in the North. But a closer ex- stretches back to the 1916 rebellion and amination of the case shows the very op- before that to ’s United Irish- posite. A major campaign of public resis- men. But from this tradition, Sinn F´ein tance forced both Sinn F´einand the DUP drew on one central belief: that brave mi- to backtrack on plans to introduce water norities could substitute for a passive ma- charges. Some months before the final de- jority. The transformation of a mass civil cision was made a key Sinn F´einspokesper- rights movement of Northern Catholics in son, Mitchel McLaughlin, said in a tele- the late 1960s into an armed struggle of a vision interview: ‘If we separate out the few hundred guerrillas appeared to be evi- legacy cost and we set in front of the peo- dence of this. When that developed into a ple the legitimate cost of running and de- ‘long war’, republicans became even more livering a clean and healthy water supply entrenched in the belief that their military to people’s houses, people are fair minded actions were the ‘cutting edge’ that would - they will pay that.’28 bring . The justification for that war - even when it was unpopular with Lessons from the North the Catholic working class - arose from a mythology that the 1916 martyrdom re- The break between Sinn F´ein and the awakened a passive population. Alongside older republican tradition arose from its this was a subterranean belief that the IRA willingness to change policies and strate- Army Council represented the real govern- gies abruptly. The party tries to achieve ment of Ireland in waiting. This tradition a constant upwards momentum by mak- led to a strong scepticism about the capac- ing bold changes, guided by the politi- ity of the mass of people to take actions cal context in which they operate. This which could liberate themselves. entails dropping beliefs that were previ- This approach is evident in how Sinn ously considered ‘hard core’, whether in F´einhas related to key struggles in the the armed struggle itself or the use of hard South of Ireland in recent years. When left rhetoric. When the collapse of the 28 ‘We won’t pay say hundreds of demonstrators in Belfast’ Socialist World website 4 April 2007

12 Berlin Wall was followed by moves of the ficiency savings’ each year from 2008 to ANC and the PLO into the camp of the 2011. The effects were soon felt in reduced western powers, Sinn F´einmade its own public services and a greater resort to pri- strategic shift from ‘the subjective poli- vatisation. Sinn F´ein’sEducation Minis- tics of the revolutionary vanguard to diplo- ter, Caitriona Ruane, launched a policy matic forms of manoeuvre’.29 for ‘sustainable schools’ and began a clo- Nowhere has this shifting of position sure policy for those with less than 500 been clearer than on the ’national ques- pupils. She also reduced provision for chil- tion’ itself. In the past Sinn F´ein ar- dren with special needs and cut the num- gued, that the would ber of teaching assistants. The teachers’ be ended by an armed struggle. Then its unions estimated that at least 4,000 teach- main objective became the construction of ers and 12,000 support workers would lose 31 a pan-nationalist alliance. Whereas pre- their jobs as a result. Sinn F´ein’sof- viously Sinn F´einhad criticised the legiti- ficial policy was to oppose privatisation macy of the Southern state, it now saw the yet it made extensive use of Public Pri- Dublin government as a potential ally. If vate Partnership and Private Finance Ini- they acted in concert with the US and the tiative Schemes. These are a sophisticated EU, they could pressurise Britain to be- form of privatisation as they involve the come a ‘persuader’ of the Protestant pop- state buying in services from private firms. ulation. The party also argued that the Sinn F´ein’sRegional Development Minis- Good Friday Agreement created structures ter, , transferred large parts that - if used fully - could help to develop of the water network to these schemes. all Ireland institutions. He also went ahead with plans to meter This pan-nationalist strategy has fur- houses for water supply despite promises ther accentuated their desire to get into there would be no charges. The same Min- government. As O’ Broin sees it, ‘Sinn ister also introduced the Transport Act in F´einin government in the north, and at 2011 which forced Translink to both con- tract out bus-services and compete with a future date in the South, would place 32 the party in key positions of institutional private firms for control of routes. power from which to drive the agenda for Sinn F´ein often claims that the gap 30 re-unification.’ However, the experience between rhetoric and policy implementa- of the party’s participation in the North- tion arises from the North’s dependency ern Executive shows what might happen if on the British Exchequer. Stormont Min- they were to succeed. It points to a con- isters, it is argued, have to work within tinuing use of left rhetoric even as its Min- constraints imposed by their British over- isters implement neoliberal policies. lords and therefore have to make ‘hard One of the implicit agendas behind the choices’. However, a similar justification Northern peace process was to reduce the is frequently used by Labour Party Minis- size of its public sector and to create a low ters in the Southern government when they wage, low business cost base for foreign in- argue they had to take harsh measures be- vestors. In line with this, Sinn F´einagreed cause they are constrained by a Troika fi- with other Ministers to make 3 percent ‘ef- nanced programme. The weakness of this 29K. Bean, The New Politics of Sinn F´ein, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007 p.190. 30O’Broin, Sinn F´einand the Politics of Left Republicanism, p. 307 31Horgan and Gray, ‘Devolution in Northern Ireland’, p. 475 32S. McVeigh, ‘Sinn Fein in Government’ Irish Marxist Review, Vol. I, No. 1 2012, pp. 34- 40

13 argument is also evident when Sinn F´ein party can play at being both the opposi- supports neoliberal strategies even when tion and the government at the same time. it is not constrained by external forces. This style of doing politics was per- It has led the way in calling for a reduc- fected by Fianna F´ailin the South. It has tion in the corporation profits tax rate to long supported policies which favour the 12.5 percent- the same as the South. Yet, wealthy but, as a populist formation, it al- as Richard Murphy, has pointed out this lowed individual TDs to oppose local cuts would lead to an immediate loss of be- while never voting against the Ministers in tween e200 and e300 million in Westmin- government. Sinn F´einand Fianna F´ail ister subsidies.33 Northern Ireland would are very different formations because one then be forced into a tax dumping compe- is part of a corrupt, political establishment tition with the South to meet the revenue - the other is seeking to enter the main- shortfall. Moreover, in areas where Stor- stream. But despite these key differences, mont has greater autonomy over decision there is a remarkable parallel between the making, there is also little evidence of a rise of Sinn F´einin the South and the early break from neoliberalism. The Northern growth of Fianna F´ailin the late 1920s. Ireland Executive had power to change the Contrary to its current image, Fianna F´ail workfare proposals promoted by the Con- was once a left republican party whose servative Minister, George Osborne, but leader, Eamonn de Valera, declared him- despite verbal opposition from all parties, self a follower of . It advo- all agreed to implement it.34 cated the replacement of the banking sys- Participation in the Northern Ireland tem with credit unions; it called for the re- Executive has exposed Sinn F´ein’s eco- placement of army barracks with a citizen’s nomic policies to full scrutiny. A pat- militia; it supported strikes in foreign com- tern has emerged of using a rhetoric that panies and often defined itself as the real is similar to left of centre Labour parties workers’ party.35 It overtook the Labour while implementing neoliberal strategies Party by adopting a more left rhetoric, designed to re-structure the North’s econ- mocking that party’s support for comply- omy. Although the Northern Ireland exec- ing with the law during a land annuities utive is composed of parties who fight over campaign. Its entry into government also cultural symbols, they achieve a remark- coincided with the global economic crash able unanimity on economic policy. The after 1929 that shook the foundations of Good Friday Agreement has, in fact, cre- Western Capitalism. Yet Fianna F´ail’sleft ated an ideal terrain for neo-liberal double- rhetoric soon disappeared in government. speak. Ministers designate themselves as Sinn F´einwill not necessarily follow the the representatives of ‘their communities’ exact same path, but the experience shows and compete for scarce resources. They how Irish republicanism has had two faces publicly differ over cultural symbols in or- - it appeals to the poor and downtrodden der to re-assure their home base - and then but it aims to unify the nation. It attacks agree on policies which disadvantage the the inequalities of global capitalism but it poor. Even when there are rare disagree- also seeks entry into its structures by lead- ments, Sinn F´einnever vetoes the more ing an energised national movement. All right wing DUP lest it ‘endanger the peace of which shows why Ireland needs a more process’. Through these mechanisms, the genuine and more radical left formation. 33R. Murphy, Pot of Gold or Fool’s Gold, Dublin: ICTU, 2010 34‘Rage at Stormont over Workfare (or Not)’ Journal, 29 March 2012 35K. Allen, Fianna F´ailand Irish Labour, London: Pluto Press, 1997

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