The Politics of Sinn F´ein:Rhetoric and Reality Kieran Allen A recent opinion poll indicated that 2008. In the general election of 2011 Sinn Sinn F´einis now neck and neck with Fine F´eintook 10 percent of the popular vote Gael to be the majority party in the South. and became the second largest opposition In Dublin, it is already the largest party, party. Since then, it has continued to commanding 26 percent of the vote.1 This grow, mainly by presenting itself as hav- transformation is remarkable. In the early ing `realistic' alternative policies to per- nineties, Sinn F´einwas almost a pariah manent austerity. This growth has im- party in the South. Its members were vis- pressed sections of the union bureaucracy. ited regularly by the Special Branch, their The SIPTU leadership, which is composed voices were banned from RTE and its ac- of die-hard Labour Party supporters, gives tivists were vilified by the wider media. regular coverage to Sinn F´einin their pub- The overwhelming message of official Ire- lications and Jack O Connor frequently land was that they - rather than the British speaks at their events. Clearly, the union army or its loyalist allies - were responsi- leaders want a Plan B in the event of a ble for a war that had cost over 4,000 lives. collapse of Labour. The shift in Sinn F´ein Despite dropping their traditional policy from being `a welfare adjunct of the IRA of abstentionism, Sinn F´eincould make no to the fastest growing political force in Ire- headway at the ballot box. In the 1992 land during the first half of the 21st cen- election, they achieved less than 2 percent tury'2 has been remarkable. of the vote. Sinn F´ein'sgrowth is the result of two main factors. From 1997 to 2007, Sinn F´einre-packaged itself as the most ardent advocate of the peace process, willing to compromise to reach agreement. By con- trast, the Unionist parties seemed unwill- ing to share power and, according to re- publican sources, were supported by `se- curocrats' within the British state. In a series of audacious moves, the IRA broke The Sinn F´einleadership, Gerry Adams, Mary Lou Mc- a republican taboo and de-commissioned Donald & Martin McGuinness its weaponry; republican politicians joined police boards and urged support for the PSNI; Sinn F´ein accepted devolved power- However, this has changed significantly sharing within Northern Ireland. The em- after the crash of 2008. Just as Fianna brace of the peace rhetoric helped to dispel F´ailtransformed itself under the impact a Southern antipathy towards the armed of the Wall Street crash of 1929, Sinn struggle, but it also exposed a contradic- F´einhas made the same transformation tion at the heart of the `new' Sinn F´ein. in response to the Wall Street crash of The Good Friday Agreement affirmed that 1`Sinn F´einlevel with Fine Gael, opinon poll shows' Irish Times 9 October 2014 2J. Tonge, `Sinn F´einand the `New Republicanism' in Belfast', Space and Polity, Vol. 10, No. 2 pp. 135-147, August 2007 p. 135. 4 the status of Northern Ireland could not a third rate of income tax of 48 percent be changed without Unionist consent and on incomes over e100,000 with increased it resurrected Stormont parliament. Sinn employer PRSI contributions as well. It F´einhad traditionally opposed both these demanded a cut in the earnings of politi- propositions and at the start of negotia- cians and the imposition of a pay cap of tions declared there could be `no return to e100,000 on all civil and public service Stormont'.3 Even as late as the morning posts for three years.6 It also proposed a of its signing, party chairperson, Mitchell e13 billion stimulus programme to create McLoughlin declared that `Sinn F´ein was 150,000 jobs.7 4 opposed to an assembly at Stormont'. These proposals have been advocated The main concessions that Sinn F´einwon by left parties in other countries but in were not in the constitutional field but in Ireland, Sinn F´einstood out as the most securing the release of its prisoners and a vocal advocate of Keynesian economics. peace dividend that allowed former guerril- Its call to make the wealthy pay more las to embed themselves in community or- tax was particularly popular among the ganisations. Aside from these, it is difficult manual working class. In the 2011 elec- to dispute Brian Feeney's assertion that tion, Sinn F´einscored nearly three times the Good Friday Agreement was `a pale more votes among unskilled manual work- reflection of the 1973 Sunningdale Agree- ers than among upper professionals.8 Af- 5 ment that the IRA vowed to destroy.' ter the election, there were clear indica- The second main factor in Sinn F´ein's tions, that it was scoring nearly twice as rise was a left rhetoric it deployed in the much support among the former category 9 South. Even before the crash, Sinn F´ein as the Labour Party. These developments used its outsider status to attack a polit- - combined with Sinn F´ein'smembership of ical establishment that was mired in cor- the `hard left' GUE/NGL group in the Eu- ruption. It presented itself as the voice of ropean parliament - led some to conclude the most marginalised working class com- that Sinn F´einwas Ireland's radical left munities who were left behind by the Celtic party. If Germany had Die Linke, Greece Tiger. After the crash, it developed a co- had Syriza and France had the Front de herent set of policies which challenged the Gauche, then Ireland had Sinn F´einto rep- austerity consensus of the mainstream par- resent views that were to the left of social ties. This was to be achieved by taxes democracy. on the wealthy and a stimulus programme The suggestion that Sinn F´einrepre- which helped to create jobs. The party ad- sents a radical left formation draws on vocated a 1 percent tax on net wealth over an apparent affinity between republican- e1 million with working farms, business ism and socialism. If this connection assets and 20 percent of the family home is made simply on the basis of rhetoric, and pension pots excluded. It called for there are many signs that Sinn F´einlead- 3 J. Evans and J. Tonge, `From Abstentionism to Enthusiasm: Sinn F´ein,Nationalist Electors and Support for Devolved Power-Sharing in Northern Ireland' Irish Political Studies Vol.28, No. 1. Pp 39-57, 2013, p.41-42. 4Ibid 5B. Feeney, Sinn F´ein:a Hundred Turbulent Years, Dublin: O'Brien, 2002 p.436 6Ibid p.4,5 7Sinn F´ein, Jobs Plan: Investing in Ireland's Future Dublin: Sinn F´ein, 2012. 8Red C General Election Opinion Poll 24 February 2013 9Red C General Election Opinion Poll 24 February 2013 5 ers can employ a revolutionary left vocab- through the overthrow of both `partition- ulary on occasion. In 1979, for exam- ist states'. The agency for bringing all this ple, Gerry Adams declared that, `capitalist about was to be the IRA but as this body property cannot exist without the plunder- has now been reduced to a commemoration ing of labour (and) we desire to see capital- society, the party has given up all rhetoric ism abolished and a democratic system of about overthrowing either the Northern or common ownership created in its stead'.10 Southern state. These pronouncements led academics like Sinn F´ein'sprimary aim now is to en- Ronald Munck to argue that, `Republican- ter a government to manage Irish capital- ism in Ireland cannot be reduced to an ide- ism rather than abolish it. It frames its ology of the bourgeois revolution: it has alternative policies in a `realist' tone that always had a radical component which has accepts that the public deficit should be tended towards socialism'. 11 In more re- reduced to 3 percent by 2016 - a param- cent times, John Doyle, has emphasised eter set by the political establishment it- how Sinn F´einhas `a strong leftist, pro- self.13 This `realism' is also expressed in equality agenda' and was `an active par- its acceptance of the limits placed on Irish ticipant in the \anti-globalisation" move- budgetary policy. Sinn F´einappears to ac- ment'. 12 However, the issue cannot be cept the strictures laid down by the Fis- analysed in terms of rhetoric alone. Re- cal Treaty which specifies that the Irish peatedly in Irish history, Irish republicans budget deficit must be reduced to 60 per- have employed a left rhetoric to win a pop- cent of GDP. It has also not committed ular base and then used positions won to itself to removing the country from the manage capitalism. Rather than simply fo- `excessive deficit procedure' laid down by cussing on left rhetoric alone, it is better to the EU. This also imposes strict limits analyse the uniqueness of Sinn F´einwithin on spending. But while operating in this the wider spectrum of the Left to establish framework, Sinn F´ein does not support what its core project is. the repudiation of debt caused by the col- lapse of Irish banks. The party originally Sinn F´ein'sProject: Govern- voted for a guarantee which committed the mental Office Irish state to making up for any short- fall in the payment of bank debt. Today The first point to notice is that the leftism it fails to mention repudiation of debt in bolted onto traditional Irish republicanism its economic programme.