Thomas Anderson and Simon Chapple

Grease or Sand in the Wheels of Democracy? The market for lobbying in New Zealand

Abstract What is the nature of the New Zealand market for political lobbying? hat is the nature of the market Is lobbying grease in the wheels of a well-functioning democracy for political lobbying in New WZealand? Is our lobbying – adding to overall societal efficiency – as its supporters suggest? grease in the wheels of a well-functioning Or is lobbying sand, wasting resources in buying redistribution to democracy – adding to overall societal the powerful and damaging the social fabric essential for a well- efficiency – as its supporters suggest? Or is lobbying sand in the wheels, by wasting functioning democratic mixed economy, as opponents of lobbying resources in buying redistribution from believe? And, should we regulate lobbying in New Zealand, and one social group to another and damaging the social fabric essential for a well- why? This article concludes that the question is not whether lobbying functioning democratic mixed economy, should be made more transparent via regulation, but rather how this as opponents of lobbying believe? And, can best be achieved. should we regulate lobbying in New Zealand, and why? Keywords lobbying, vested interests, transparency, OECD, nature of Broadly, lobbying is any effort by lobbying, regulation, parliamentary access individuals or collectives to directly influence decisions of legislators and public officials outside elections. So defined, Thomas Anderson is a student at Victoria University of Wellington and a research assistant at lobbying is an important element of the Institute for Governance and Policy Studies. Simon Chapple is the Director of the Institute for Governance and Policy Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. He has previously worked in the political participation outside the voting OECD in Paris, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and various government departments in Wellington. booth. This article focuses more narrowly

Page 10 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 on the local market for lobbying. Market 2011; Walters, 2017; Edwards, 2017, 2018a, lobbying. The first theory is that vested lobbying occurs via the purchase of the 2018b; Barton Deakin, 2016; Secombe, interests directly lobby policymakers with services of a profit-making lobbying 2015). There are commentaries by money to generate political change which intermediary lobbying for a third party. politicians (e.g. Mallard, 2003). There are rewards their bottom lines (Olson, 1965; Market lobbying also arises where a body, several pieces of postgraduate student or Tollison, 2014). Such ‘rent seeking’ lobbying such as a corporation, a trade federation academic research (Williams, 2014; Tyler, is entirely social sand: it wastes society’s or peak business organisation, a trade 2015; Strong and Tyler, 2017), as well as a resources. A second theory suggests that union federation or a non-governmental useful broader consideration of vested vested interests lobby policymakers with a organisation (NGO), hires a person and interests, including lobbying, by Ellie mix of private information and money (De allocates their time to lobbying activity. Argyle and political commentator Colin Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). Money When analysing a market, the usual first James (Argyle and James, 2014). There are either signals the credibility of their port of call for developing an understanding several investigative works alleging information or buys access to policymakers. is industry statistics. However, such data egregious behaviour by lobbyists (Hager This form of lobbying may be a mixture of does not exist for lobbying. Statistics New and Burton, 1999; Hager, 2002, 2012). grease and sand, if the private information Zealand industry data does not contain an There is one policy article by a professional is of social value. A third theory suggests exclusive industry category for political lobbyist (Unsworth, 2014). Information on that vested interests with similar objectives lobbying intermediaries; the industry is too some lobbyists is available from a list of to policymakers support policymakers to small. Most intermediary lobbyists are access cards to Parliament issued by the allow them to fulfil more of their shared probably included as management advice speaker of the House. There is online objectives (Groll and McKinley, 2015). and related consulting services. The market is also too diffuse. For those corporates that directly lobby government, their lobbying Empirical researchers have had limited activity will be included as measured output in their disparate industries. success in identifying whether lobbyists Additionally, data on NGO, trade union are successful because of what they and business organisation lobbying activity is not available as such. know – their knowledge base – or who In many countries, the regulation of lobbyists provides considerable informa- they know – their connections. tion with which to examine the lobbying market. While this has not resulted in a definitive overseas answer to the grease information provided by lobbying Again, this form of lobbying may be a mix versus sand question, it provides companies to promote themselves to of grease and sand. information pertinent to addressing the potential clients. Finally, there is a body of While the empirical work arising out of issue to the public, and, via a more trans- theory and empirical evidence on lobbying the rational choice paradigm has been parent system, automatically reduces the markets from overseas. It is to this unable to determine the extent to which amount of sand in the system. By contrast, international literature to which we first lobbying generates social value, or has lobbying is unregulated in New Zealand. A turn. chosen not to address these questions Lobbying Disclosure Bill was introduced (Grossman and Helpman, 2001, p.4), it has in Parliament in 2012 by the Green Party, International literature on lobbying established a number of important but it was unsuccessful, with the general There is a vast international literature on empirical regularities about lobbying. view being that it was an ill-considered and lobbying from a wide variety of disciplinary While many of these stylised facts are poorly crafted legislative response perspectives. The surface of this literature unsurprising, it is valuable to have them (Edwards, 2018b). The downstream can be scratched here only, and our focus confirmed by systematic study. These consequence of an absence of regulation is is on the economic literature, which is empirical regularities, for the United States, an ongoing lack of public information on based on a rational choice paradigm which, are as follows (all from De Figueiredo and the local market. while delivering insights (e.g. Grossman Richter, 2014). First, lobbying spending is However, various sources of and Helpman, 2001), may not be the most significantly more sizeable – five times information can be utilised to cast light on appropriate lens through which to consider larger – than private funding of political the local lobbying market, allowing a lobbying. As overseas information comes parties. Second, businesses account for the structured discussion of whether it from different political and economic vast majority – 84-86% – of lobbying provides grease for or is sand in the wheels environments, their conclusions must be spending. In contrast, issue–ideology of New Zealand democracy, if not anything applied with care to New Zealand. Yet that groups, such as environmental groups, approaching a definitive conclusion. There information is far from irrelevant. comprise a small share: between 2% and are a number of media articles on aspects There are several core theories in the 7% of spending. Corporate lobbying is not of the lobbying industry (e.g. Dudding, international literature on the market for cancelled out by the countervailing power

Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 – Page 11 Grease or Sand in the Wheels of Democracy? The market for lobbying in New Zealand

Figure 1: Number and distribution of lobbyists and non-lobbyists with swipe card of acquisition of cards, is unclear. In 2003 access to Parliament, 2012 - 2017 MP Trevor Mallard claimed that ‘[i]n the

100 many years I have spent in Parliament, I have noticed a growth in lobbying. This 90 growth is likely to continue. Lobbying as

80 a practice and a discipline is going to get more sophisticated and more common’, 70 and he repeated this view in 2015 (Tyler, 60 2015, p.18). In 2015 another long- serving MP, Peter Dunne, reported that 50 lobbying activity had shrunk, but agreed

Number of people 40 with Mallard that it had become more sophisticated in its methods (ibid., p.19). 30 After the 2017 election, the new speaker 20 of the House reduced numbers with card access. Lobbyists currently make up fewer 10 than half of those with cards; 22 of those 0 with cards appear to act as lobbyists. In 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Post-election 2017 terms of the organisations they represent, Non-lobbyists Lobbyists Year their current number and distribution are as follows: Table 1: Market shares of lobbying · seven holders (32%) represent New Zealand (estimated guess) European Union corporations; Corporates 26% 13% · seven (32%) are intermediary lobbyists; Business Associations and Unions 20% 10% · two (9%) represent industry bodies Consultants (intermediaries) 18% 15% (businesses); NGOs 18% 13% · five (23%) represent trade unions Local government 7% N/A – either the NZCTU or the PSA; Iwi 5% N/A · one (5%) is an incorporated society Government funded advocacy 5% N/A (the New Zealand Taxpayers’ Union). Trade Federations N/A 35% By way of comparison with the card data, Table 1 shows lobbyist Mark Regional representation N/A 8% Unsworth’s impressionistic estimates of International Organisations N/A 5% market share of lobbying by sector, next to Think Tanks N/A 1% his European Union figures. In terms of Source: Unsworth, 2014 the broad dominance by corporations and of issue–ideology groups. Third, large generally generates positive returns to the their proxies, the access card data looks corporations are more likely to lobby lobbyer (Borisov, Goldman and Gupta, similar to Table 1, and the local dominance independently than smaller corporations, 2015; Hadani, Bonardi and Dahan, 2017). of market lobbying by business interests is and they tend to continue lobbying over also similar to the international empirical time. Fourth, lobbying increases when Lobbyists and parliamentary access facts considered above. However, there is a larger financial stake for the Who has swipe card access to Parliament, Unsworth’s data suggests a stronger organised interest. A fifth fact is that other than staff and MPs, also allows representation of NGO lobbying in New lobbyists target two sorts of politicians: the some insights into lobbying, providing Zealand compared to overseas. powerful agenda setters, and those some, albeit imperfect, information A key characteristic common to all wavering at the margins who can most on some market participants and their corporations with cards is their size, again easily be swayed. sectoral distribution. Here we consider consistent with the international literature. Empirical researchers have had limited this data and the qualitative implications Large companies whose bottom line can success in identifying whether lobbyists are of its limitations. The numbers with card be significantly influenced by central successful because of what they know – access are small and those who appear government regulations and policies have their knowledge base – or who they know to be lobbyists is smaller. However, the a strong incentive to lobby. If they do a – their connections. The evidence suggests number of lobbyists grew rapidly from considerable amount, it is rational to both factors are operating (De Figueiredo 12 in 2012, to 41 people in July 2017 employ a person who specialises in this task, and Richter, 2014). Lastly, a large body of (see Figure 1). Whether this represented rather than purchasing lobbying services empirical research shows that lobbying industry growth, or simply higher rates from an intermediary (although

Page 12 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 corporations may also do this). lobbying, has several important deficiencies legislative process. One explanation for this Corporations with an employee with an as a data source for the number of lobbyists absence is that NGOs gain political access card currently include Air New employed. What does it miss? First, not all influence through methods other than Zealand, Fonterra, Chorus and Westpac. professional employees of a lobbying parliamentary meetings. How relatively These people have roles as directors or company have swipe card access. For important NGOs are is unclear, and it may managers of ‘external relations’, ‘com- example, according to their website be that Unsworth has overestimated the munications’ or ‘public affairs’; many of Saunders Unsworth has five professional extent of NGO lobbying. them have previous political experience in staff, but only two have cards. A further The card list is also not fully different guises.1 major deficiency is that it does not include representative of the market because MPs Specialist lobbying firms – inter- some firms known to be part of the can be lobbied outside Parliament. mediaries – also appear to be an important lobbying market. Lobbying firms that do Lobbyists can use their contacts to instigate part of the market. These firms provide not have staff currently on the list but have meetings or conversations with politicians lobbying services for multiple clients. Who had previously include Silvereye without needing to regularly enter these clients are is unclear, and it is Communications (employing eight Parliament. Paid people can lobby unknown how much the firms are paid and people), Dart Government Relations (two government through phone calls, email, to what extent clientele engage in one-off people) and Acumen Republic (12). Taking letters, and oral or written submissions. transactions or repeat business. However, into account firms previously with card Thus, the number of paid lobbyists is likely clients are almost certainly access and still operating increases the to be by an order of magnitude larger than disproportionately weighted towards the market by around ten firms and by a much the parliamentary access card data suggests. business sector. Well-known firms such as larger number of lobbyists. Overall, the New Zealand lobbying market Saunders Unsworth, Busby Ramshaw Grice Ltd and Boag Allen SvG all have employees with cards. Many of these specialist All lobbying firms that have previously lobbyists also have extensive experience within the political system. had card access to Parliament consist The organisations representing of small teams of between one and a industries with representatives on the list are peak organisations whose activity is dozen or so employees, with one or two affected regularly by regulations and support staff and the bulk of staff being legislation. A significant number of trade unionists are also on the list. It is unclear professionals. whether union representatives on the list are full-time lobbyists. The card list suggests that a relatively small lobbying market exists in New The true size of the market is even may more closely resemble that of Australia, Zealand. Indeed, the established wisdom is larger. There are many lobbying firms and for example, than New Zealanders probably that the market is both relatively small and communications agencies which have like to believe. unimportant (see, for example, Walters, never had access cards. An internet search Additionally, the trend suggested by the 2017). In order to contextualise this for ‘government relations firms nz’ shows size of the list of people with cards creates conjecture, the per capita number of many such firms, including Exceltium, the impression that local lobbying has been lobbyists in the United States and Australia Boyd Public Relations and Adroite. And through a boom–bust cycle. However, this is of relevance. In 2016 the United States there are a number of recent new entrants perception is probably inaccurate. It is had 11,143 active lobbyists for a population to the market, including Barton Deakin difficult to effectively gauge growth in the of 323 million.2 If New Zealand had a and Hawker Britton. lobbying industry, but it is unlikely to be similar per capita proportion, there would Other significant sectors of the lobbying decreasing in size (as discussed above). be about 164 local lobbyists. Australia has market are not represented. Many major Indeed, an experienced observer suggests 554 registered lobbyists currently and a law firms provide lobbying services (such that it is growing (Edwards, 2017, 2018b), population of about 24 million.3 Having as Buddle Findlay, Simpson Grierson and a view supported by evidence of recent new an Australian per capita figure here would Johnston Lawrence). Chen Palmer, a entrants to the industry. mean about 108 lobbyists. leading specialist public law firm, has never The card data suggests that the New had card access to Parliament but provides How do specialist lobbyists operate? Zealand lobbying market is roughly 13% clients with services which most likely Based on their websites, firms offering the size of the United States’ and 20% the include lobbying (Chen Palmer, 2018). lobbying services appear to be fairly size of Australia’s. However, the access card Another sector absent from the list is uniform in how their services are structured list, while giving an approximation of the NGOs. These organisations are often a and presented to customers. All lobbying distribution of institutions engaging in significant lobbying presence during the firms that have previously had card access

Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 – Page 13 Grease or Sand in the Wheels of Democracy? The market for lobbying in New Zealand

to Parliament consist of small teams of labour is limited by the extent of the market’ translation is so important, do public between one and a dozen or so employees, seriously, the recent market entry of servants, on the other side of the divide, with one or two support staff and the bulk partisan lobby firms Barton Deakin and not hire such translators for all citizens, of staff being professionals. As already Hawker Britton may be a further indication rather than only those who can afford noted, many lobbyists have previous work of the growth of the local lobbying industry, them? experience within government (Tyler, 2015, as it is now large enough to sustain left– Due to the lack of regulation, it is pp.13–14). The Frank Bold Foundation right specialisation. Although their difficult to know both who lobbyists act for, suggests that ‘the single most valuable tool entrance into the market may signal a and whether lobbyists behave ethically. any lobbyist has is their contacts with and swing towards a partisan lobbying model Investigative journalist Nicky Hager has links to politicians and decision-makers’ more closely resembling the American or shed light on the inner workings of (Kwiatkowski, 2016). This experience Australian markets, only time will tell if it government by detailing cases where is a selling point across all lobbying is successful. lobbyists, public officials and organisations firms. Evidently, these ex-government Current charge-out rates for lobbyists have worked together to coordinate employees maintain their contacts inside are unclear, but casual charge-out rates misleading public relations campaigns: this government once they leave, and cultivate were reported as being in the vicinity of is pure sand (see also Tyler, 2015, p.17). their relationships to deliver policy results $400 per hour or $3200 per day in 2011, Hence, the claim that lobbyists always act for clients. For some, this maintenance is which suggests that comparatively high in the public interest is demonstrably aided by refreshing of their connections levels of remuneration are common incorrect. The issue is how much of such behaviour occurs relative to socially useful ‘translation’ services, and how damaging Investigative journalist Nicky Hager the former is relative to the latter.

has shed light on the inner workings Should New Zealand regulate lobbying? of government by detailing cases The OECD has advocated developing non-reactive and coherent regulatory where lobbyists, public officials and approaches to lobbying in order to maintain and enhance public trust in organisations have worked together to the democratic process (OECD, 2009). coordinate misleading public relations The above discussion has examined the limited information on local lobbying. campaigns: this is pure sand ... Acknowledging its limitations, it does not support the notion that the lobbying market in New Zealand is sui generis. Given what we know about local lobbying, via revolving door appointments, from (Dudding, 2011). Pay rates, billable hours, is there then any strong reason why lobby organisations to political staff and overheads and hence profitability are New Zealand should not follow OECD back (Edwards, 2018a). Some lobbyists unclear. recommendations and implement well- make their way in from the other direction: What lobbyists actually do on a day-to- considered, transparency-enhancing current National Party MP Chris Bishop day basis to earn their coin and who they reforms? and former National Party MP Todd do it for is not transparent (see Tyler, 2015, Market-based lobbying is an area of Barclay were both lobbyists before entering pp.33–4 for a discussion of the possible human engagement where two opposing Parliament (Emanuel, 2018). range of activities which may be part of values come into contact and thus into Another notable characteristic of the lobbying). Indications are that most conflict. The first value is that of the market, market is that not all firms solely offer clientele are businesses (Dudding, 2011). where one dollar equals one vote, and lobbying services. Many firms also offer Mai Chen, a public lawyer who prefers not where dollars are unequally distributed public relations, public law, strategic to identify as a lobbyist, says that lobbyists across the population, local and communications or crisis management as offer translation services between two international. The second is that of services. Indeed, perhaps to avoid the groups, public policymakers and businesses, democratic citizenship, where, ideally, one public stigma of ‘lobbying’, firms tend to which speak different languages (Dudding, adult citizen of a nation state has one vote avoid describing their work as such. Instead 2011; see also Emanuel, 2018). From this and votes are equally distributed across the they tactfully choose to describe their work perspective, a large proportion of the work voting population (or, more broadly, hours using terms such as ‘government relations’, lobbyists do is grease, improving available for non-market lobbying activities ‘influencing policy’ or ‘advocacy’. information provided to public officials. are roughly equally distributed across Most firms operate across the political The translator metaphor raises a question citizens). spectrum. However, if one takes Adam of justice: who can and can’t afford to pay There are further contextual factors in Smith’s famous dictum ‘the division of for ‘translation services’? And why, if this conflict that are important. There has

Page 14 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 been a worldwide rise in wealth inequality for all elected members of Parliament, as he has rejected clients in the past on ethical and shift in the functional distribution of representatives of the people. Extension of grounds (Emanuel, 2018). Barton Deakin’s income towards corporate profits in recent this form of transparency to elected local website includes an ‘Ethics’ page, which times (Piketty, 2015). This shift has also government officials is also desirable. states that the firm ‘acts in the broader been taking place locally (Rosenberg, 2018). In addition, it is time to again consider public interest in all its dealings with clients At the same time, an increasingly a register of lobbyists and their clients, and governments’ (Barton Deakin, 2017). authoritarian and kleptocratic China is adoption of a formal code of conduct along Ethics statements are uncommon on other flexing its growing economic muscle in the lines of that in Australia, and regular lobbyist websites. The insistence by sophisticated efforts to influence domestic collection and publication of data on who lobbyists that they act ethically and that political processes, including in New spends what on market lobbying. Again, their industry is effectively self-regulating Zealand (Brady, 2017).4 Hence, lobbying this form of policy response is a relatively can be seen, not mutually exclusively, as activities – by increasingly wealthy low compliance cost measure which makes honest, unbiased observation, self- individuals, by increasingly profitable local the process more transparent, and thus interested business protection or cognitive and multinational corporate entities and more consistent with principles of dissonance about what they are doing. The by increasingly anti-democratic nation democratic citizenship. lack of industry transparency means that states – are coming into growing conflict The publication of ministerial diaries, separating the signal from the noise in with notions of democratic citizenship. At and the creation of a register of lobbyists these claims is impossible. the same time, with union membership in and their clients and publication of the However, the creation of low New Zealand declining from 42.9% of the value of their spending would provide the compliance cost regulation, with a strong workforce in 1991 to 17.7% in 2016, organised labour’s countervailing lobbying power has been significantly eroded relative Given New Zealand’s high levels to the corporate sector (Ryall and Blumenfeld, 2017). These shifts in power of transparency and relative lack of have intensified, and likely will continue to corruption ... some might question exacerbate the ongoing conflict between market values and democratic citizenship. whether even light-handed regulation of There are good reasons to believe that lobbying may directly throw sand into the the lobbying market is necessary ... wheels of society, as well as indirectly undermining values underpinning democratic citizenship, and these problems public with a body of pertinent information transparency focus, would likely not be are going to be larger in the absence of to enable them to better understand the strongly objected to by those within the transparency. There are also reasons for decisions made by their elected industry. In the report of the government believing that these problems are likely to representatives. Transparency will help administration select committee regarding become worse over time. Hence, action on citizens to better judge for themselves the 2012 Lobbying Disclosure Bill, it was these matters today is likely to be easier whether lobbying is socially valuable grease noted that most of the 103 submissions than action tomorrow, as growing vested or anti-social sand in the democratic received ‘supported [the bill’s] intent of interests will make stronger efforts to hide wheels. enhancing trust in the integrity and lobbying activities that are privately Some level of regulation of the lobbying impartiality of democracy and political beneficial but socially damaging. industry would also discourage unethical decision-making by bringing more Low compliance cost approaches which behaviour. Given New Zealand’s high levels transparency to political lobbying’ provide the raw material for a better of transparency and relative lack of (Government Administration Committee, informed democratic citizenship and do corruption (Transparency International, 2013). Furthermore, lobbyists Jenna not impose high costs on legitimate 2016), some might question whether even Raeburn and Neale Jones are not opposed lobbying are likely to be the most light-handed regulation of the lobbying to a register similar to those in Australia appropriate policy responses. The OECD market is necessary. One view is that and Canada, since their firms’ Australian has recommended significant change in regulation is unnecessary, because lobbyists operations have not been negatively this area, change which occurs in a are self-regulating and ethical (Dudding, affected by the mandatory register of considered manner, unprompted by the 2011; Emanuel, 2018). Neale Jones, lobbyist lobbyists and their clients (Emanuel, 2018). heat of major scandal (OECD, 2009). for Hawker Britton, believes that because Lobbying may be grease in the wheel of Recent Green Party commitments to Wellington is a ‘small town’, lobbyists can’t politics, or it may be sand, or – perhaps publish details of ministerial diaries and get away with what he calls a ‘breach of inevitably – it may be a complex mixture receipt of perks are to be applauded (Cook, faith’. Barry Saunders of Saunders of both. Although this study has produced 2018). There is no reason why such public Unsworth agrees, again seeing the small some idea of the nature of the lobbying disclosures should not be enforced by law industry as self-policing. Jones insists that market, it is still unclear who lobbyists

Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 – Page 15 Grease or Sand in the Wheels of Democracy? The market for lobbying in New Zealand

work for and how they act, with little hard process. The aim of regulation would also access list. Pages accessed 15 February 2018. 2 From https://www.statista.com/statistics/257340/number- evidence available to illuminate the true be to contribute positively to making the of-lobbyists-in-the-us/, downloaded 20 March 2018. 3 From http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/who_register_lobbyists.cfm, nature of the industry. The key point industry more about grease and less about downloaded 20 March 2018. uncovered is that citizens lack convincing sand. With multiple stakeholders, as well 4 In this context, note that Saunders Unsworth advertise their services in a Chinese language section: see http://www. evidence for sand or grease. This is why as the OECD, in agreement that well- sul.co.nz/page/chinese-section.aspx. Whether they have clientele from China, as opposed to Chinese New Zealanders, regulation is needed – to shine a brighter designed regulation is necessary, the and if so who they are and what they may be lobbying about light on a currently shadowy industry question must surely be: why not? is unknown. Silvereye also appear to have an advertised presence directed at China: see http://www.silvereye.co.nz/ which has significant long-term potential 1 Information was obtained by viewing the LinkedIn pages of about-us/ (accessed 20 March 2018). to corrode the integrity of the democratic lobbyists who have been, or currently are, on the swipe card

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2019 International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM) Annual Conference ReNewing Public Management for Stewardship, Innovation and Impact Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 16 – 18 April 2019

Call for Panels On behalf of the Scientific and Organising their panel, both through the conference Committees for the 23rd Annual IRSPM web-site and their own networks. Panel Conference, which is being held at Victoria proposals should address either the University of Wellington from 16-18 April conference theme (of which there are full 2019, we cordially invite you to submit detail on the conference website) or another proposals on conference panels key issue in theory and knowledge in public IRSPM uses a two-stage process in management. compiling the conference programme. This first stage is for PANEL proposals. The For detailed instructions about submitting panel Scientific Committee will evaluate these proposals, see the website at: in terms of their contribution both to our http://irspm2019.com/irspm19/call_for_panels research community and to the coherence of the Conference programme. In the second stage, successful panel chairs will then be invited to circulate a ‘call for papers’ for

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