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ESRA Budget 2019 Report ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH AOTEAROA Budget 2019 Report June 2019 ESRA Budget 2019 Report ESRA researchers have teamed up with community researchers and activists to consider what the 2019 ‘Wellbeing budget’ means for those who are worst served by our current system. Just over a week after the release of the environment that is near uniformly oriented Government’s ‘Wellbeing Budget’ one narrative toward creating and maintaining favourable has come to dominate: Despite well meaning conditions for economic growth at any cost.1 The intentions, the Government has failed to deliver Government’s recognition that economic growth anything close to a transformational budget. is ‘not an end in itself’ certainly seems radical In this report, ESRA researchers have teamed in an age obsessed with austerity and fiscal up with community researchers and activists conservatism.2 It is, however, worth putting this to consider what this budget means for those sentiment aside for a moment to consider what who are worst served by our current system. sits behind the focus on wellbeing. The report does not intend to be an exhaustive response to the budget, however it does shine a The approach to wellbeing found in the budget light on the stark realities faced by large portions is largely informed by the Living Standards of the population. While the move toward a Framework (LSF) developed by the Treasury. The wellbeing focus is a welcome development, the LSF is a policy tool designed to help assess the Government will need to do much more if it diverse impacts that government policies have on hopes to address the material hardship currently intergenerational wellbeing, beyond ‘traditional’ standing in the way of wellbeing in Aotearoa indicators such as Gross Domestic Product New Zealand. (GDP).3 The LSF builds upon the OECD’s ‘four capitals’ analysis, which offers definitions and a Wellbeing set of indicators for measuring intergenerational The Government has received praise both locally wellbeing.4 The four capitals: natural, human, and internationally for the progressive sentiment social, and financial/physical provide a framework of its 2019 ‘Wellbeing Budget’. This is not to help policymakers measure wellbeing over surprising. Putting social and environmental time and to assess the broader social and considerations on an equal footing with environmental impact of policy decisions. These economic ones is innovative in a global policy capitals form the ‘core’ of the LSF.5 ESRA #13 01 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH AOTEAROA Budget 2019 Report June 2019 It is important to note that Treasury is explicit intertwined, suggesting that they work together, in stating that these measures are far from bonding the social and allowing it to thrive. perfect or complete. Indeed, the measures are This, however, is not the image presented by still very much in the development stage and it the Wellbeing Budget. What many suspected could be many years until we see a fully fleshed- and what this budget has confirmed is that one out framework. With this in mind, it is useful of the four capitals ultimately takes precedence to think of the wellbeing focus as aspirational over the others. The Government’s ongoing rather than a fixed and functional policy tool. commitment to the Budget Responsibility Rules, as well as its broad rejection of meaningful tax Still, moving beyond a narrow focus on economic reform, both discussed in detail below, point to indicators is a welcome step in the right the predominance of financial capital as a policy direction. This renovated focus shines through driver over and above the other ‘capitals’. in the budget. For example, the recognition that poor housing impacts mental health negatively, What we are left with is an image of two or the implicit recognition that ‘child poverty’ is budgets. One, aspirational and geared toward a symptom of adult poverty, found in initiatives wellbeing with the potential to be truly around removing school fees, suggests a shift transformative, yet, as the below analysis shows, toward a more structural analysis informing predominantly rhetorical. The other, sitting in policy decisions. This is echoed in the plain sight in the actual figures outlined in the Government’s stated ambition to break down budget, a business-as-usual representation of agency ‘silos’.6 Taking wellbeing seriously is a where the Government’s heart truly lies. This is positive step toward recognising the fact that the a shame, but it is worth trying to imagine what social problems standing in the way of wellbeing a truly transformative budget might look like are structural in nature and should not be if government was prepared to take wellbeing treated in isolation. seriously. This, at least, is what we hope to outline in this report. Whether the wellbeing focus will live up to its ambitions, in this budget or the next, will be The Framework of decided by the way the Government and Treasury Responsible Fiscal conceive of the relations between the four Management ‘capitals’. On this question both the Government Budget 2019 has been formulated in accordance and Treasury have had little to say; and while the with the Budget Responsibility Rules (BRR) that Treasury discussion papers offer more analytical the Labour and Green parties developed in the depth for each category, they are not reflective of run-up to the 2017 General Election. The most the Treasury’s own position. significant of these rules are commitments to keep core Crown expenditure below 30 percent The LSF presents the relation between the four of GDP, to reduce net core Crown debt to below capitals as one of symbiosis, where each category 20 percent of GDP within five years of taking works with the others to promote wellbeing. The office, and to run sustainable operating surpluses. LSF communicates this relation with the image These rules, arbitrary in nature, place limitations of a weave, in which each of the four strands are on the Government’s capacity to borrow and spend. ESRA #13 02 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH AOTEAROA Budget 2019 Report June 2019 During the election, the BRR were a means of earthquakes, successive governments have signalling to voters that the left bloc would be focused on producing operating surpluses and responsible stewards of the economy, a political consolidating Crown debt, something that, in necessity partly created by the unfounded the absence of significant tax increases, means perception that a Labour Party is by definition austere fiscal investment. This has contributed fiscally irresponsible. They also signalled the left to the degradation of civic infrastructure and the bloc's long-standing complicity in the creation hollowing out of many public services over the of a wider political culture of ‘responsible last three decades. economic management’. This culture has been shaped in large part by the Fiscal Responsibility While the austerity demanded by fiscal Act 1994 (FRA). The FRA was developed by responsibility is regularly justified in mainstream the National Government in the early 1990s, political and policymaking circles in terms of championed by the then-finance minister Ruth New Zealand’s exposure to natural disasters, Richardson. Folded into the Public Finance Act financial shocks, climate change, and an ageing 1989 (PFA) in 2004, it provides the framework population, less commented on is the role of within which government and the Treasury domestic and international investor sentiment. conduct the budget process. Since 1973, declining terms of trade have seen New Zealand run a consistent current account Particularly important are the PFA’s first four deficit, averaging around 5 percent of GDP.9 ‘principles of responsible fiscal management’: This deficit has been sustained over time by a reducing and maintaining prudent levels net inflow of foreign capital.10 As a result, New of Crown debt, maintaining operating Zealand has also run a considerable International surpluses across a financial year, achieving and Investment Position (IIP) deficit over this period. maintaining a level of net worth that provides As of December 2018, New Zealand had an IIP a buffer against macroeconomic shocks, and deficit equal to 57 percent of GDP, the majority prudently managing the long-term fiscal risks of which were debt liabilities concentrated in the facing the government.7 The PFA does provide financial sector.11 flexibility for the government of the day by allowing for the temporary departure from these The sustainability of this large stock of net principles should the macroeconomic conditions international liabilities relies on the continued necessitate. The relatively vague wording of the willingness of investors to lend to New act also leaves the government with room to Zealand.12 Should investor confidence turn sour, manoeuvre.8 Despite these caveats and despite for example in the event of an international the fact that it is non-binding, any significant financial crisis, a major run-up of New Zealand divergence from this framework bears a political Crown debt, or significant tax reform, this net cost, with a government likely to face heavy inflow of capital could dry up, significantly criticism for being irresponsible economic weakening the exchange rate and exposing the stewards should they do so. Consequently, with financial sector and ultimately households to the exception of the increase in Crown debt increased debt-servicing burdens and potential and the moderate fiscal stimulus in response illiquidity. As such, a crucial platform
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