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The Ardern Government's Foreign Policy Challenges

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The Ardern Government's Foreign Policy Challenges Robert Ayson The Ardern Government’s Foreign Policy Challenges In its briefing document for Winston Abstract Peters, the incoming minister of foreign With pressures growing on international rules, Jacinda Ardern’s affairs, the country’s diplomats made new government faces extra challenges in shaping a principled no bones about the challenges ahead: ‘New Zealand is pursuing its interests in New Zealand foreign policy based on the consistent assertion of a turbulent environment where the risks values. Many of these external challenges are being felt in Asia. Even for small countries are acute’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p.6). if force can be avoided on the Korean peninsula, escalating tariff This article provides a snapshot of competition between the United States and China may signal deep some of New Zealand’s leading challenges for the rules of the road that suit New Zealand. As the international policy challenges and what these mean for Wellington’s international wider storm clouds grow, the Ardern government’s focus on the policy preferences. As the reader will note, South Pacific in cooperation with Australia offers some respite. But many of these external challenges are the Labour–New Zealand First coalition may complicate the delivery occurring in the Asia–Pacific region. This is not only the location for many of New of predictable and creditable foreign policy stances. Zealand’s most significant interests. It is Keywords foreign policy, security, trade, Asia, Pacific also the region where the Ardern government will need to work doubly hard ew Zealand general election government. The new prime minister’s to find partners sharing at least some of outcomes are seldom shaped rise was propelled by domestic political Wellington’s international priorities. by foreign policy debates. No concerns about housing, child poverty and N Regional peace exception to this rule is the changed income inequality. But the new coalition political landscape which has produced has also taken office at a time of serious The first of New Zealand’s regional interests Jacinda Ardern’s Labour-led coalition doubt and fluidity in international politics. is the preservation of interstate peace in Asia. To this positive condition is closely linked the regional prosperity which has Robert Ayson is Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, where he works in close association with the Centre for Strategic Studies. allowed New Zealand companies to pursue Page 18 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 trade and investment opportunities in a volatile example of Trump’s rhetorical hazardous drawing board. With Trump’s favourable regional environment. But at pressure on North Korea was ‘not helpful’. Cabinet becoming more hawkish since the the time of New Zealand’s general election This sentiment was noticed internationally departure of Gary Cohn, Rex Tillerson and in September 2017, concern was growing (Nelson, 2017). As a middle ground H.R. McMaster, possibly only defense about a possible war over North Korea’s between proper disarmament negotiations, secretary Mattis would stand in the way of accelerating nuclear weapons programme. which have often seemed unlikely, and the a risky use of force by the United States, The United States intelligence community use of violent force, which seems potentially which would likely end several decades of was on the cusp of judging that Kim Jong- catastrophic, New Zealand has supported interstate peace in north Asia. Un’s regime could bring a nuclear-armed the use of economic sanctions to place intercontinental ballistic missile back pressure on Pyongyang. That also means Regional prosperity into the earth’s atmosphere and deliver welcoming any sign of US–China Armed conflict on the Korean peninsula a nuclear weapon onto a continental cooperation to facilitate that sanctions would be a severe test for US–China American target. Newly inaugurated pressure, including in Trump’s early relations. New Zealand’s continuing president Donald Trump had asserted that interactions with China’s leader Xi Jinping. hopes for regional stability have assumed this North Korean breakthrough would In her first speech on foreign policy significant common interests between these not happen on his watch. And he seemed since becoming prime minister, Ardern two great powers. This has been a plausible intent on doing more than matching Kim’s outlandish rhetoric. Trump gave the appearance of being willing to use force to ... both China and the United States roll back North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions. have supported pathways to closer Such a violent development could have grave implications for New Zealand and its regional economic integration need not regional partners. Even an initially limited produce an economically competitive use of force by the United States designed to destroy some of North Korea’s missiles environment, forcing New Zealand to and warheads could lead to a quickly escalating armed conflict. Many expect that make all-or-nothing choices. North Korea would respond with a barrage of artillery attacks on nearby South Korea at the very least. But if it believed that an American attack was imminent, North returned to a familiar Labour theme in hope: Beijing and Washington have long Korea might act first. And even if it waited relation to the North Korea–US stand-off: had shared interests in Asia’s remarkable for the US to initiate a conflict, North Korea New Zealand’s commitment to multilateral economic expansion. New Zealand has might decide that it needed to use its nuclear disarmament (Ardern, 2018a). This also benefited from the choices made by nuclear weapons early before it loses the approach, she has suggested, gives the vast majority of Asian economies to chance to do so. Wellington a particular angle on this vexing embrace global trade and investment. As North Korea’s ally, China would face example of nuclear proliferation. Her Some of the most recent and largest of these some very difficult choices in any of these government can be expected to give even benefits have come from China’s increasing scenarios. If Beijing did enter a growing stronger attention to the nuclear participation in global markets. But it has war, this would mean New Zealand’s largest disarmament treaty that the Key–English also been in New Zealand’s interests for trading partner was involved in a violent government supported at the United established Western economies, including conflict with the most powerful of New Nations General Assembly. But there is a the United States, to remain active in the Zealand’s traditional security partners. In long distance between this universalistic region and remain committed to an open the event that Australia came good on (and hopeful) approach and the particular and rules-based international trading and indications that it would support the kind of diplomacy Trump and Kim may investment system. United States should war break out have in mind if a meeting between them That both China and the United States (Dziedzic, 2017), New Zealand would have goes ahead. have supported pathways to closer regional even less scope for staying on the sidelines, Any such discussion is unlikely to economic integration need not produce an militarily as well as diplomatically. resolve the conundrum of North Korea’s economically competitive environment, It is a statement of the glaringly obvious desire to retain nuclear weapons as the best forcing New Zealand to make all-or- that New Zealand’s preference is for a chance of regime survival and international nothing choices. Wellington’s approach has negotiated settlement which avoids leverage. Unless Trump pulls off a miracle been to embrace as many of these options violence on the peninsula. Ardern’s (even less likely it would seem than Ronald as possible. Fears of overdependence on immediate predecessor as prime minister, Reagan’s arms reduction progress with one large partner have been balanced by Bill English, observed that an especially Gorbachev), we may be back to a more the commitment of the other: Wellington Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 – Page 19 The Ardern Government’s Foreign Policy Challenges would have found it more challenging to threatening to impose tariffs on major itself, which could attract graver concerns endorse China’s Belt and Road initiative, trading partners with whom the United from Wellington. for example, had it not been for America’s States has a deficit. Many of Washington’s active participation in the Trans-Pacific security allies – Canada, many other NATO Who is stepping up and stepping in? Partnership (TPP). partners in Europe, Japan, the Republic of As the United States steps back from This favourable equilibrium was tested Korea and Australia – have been on the international economic leadership, some by the Trump administration’s decision to receiving end of these threats, although of New Zealand’s other leading partners withdraw the United States from the TPP some of them have sought exclusions for have been trying to fill some of the process. In this new situation, Bill English’s themselves. But all along Trump’s big target vacuum. These include the European government was happy to accept the was China, and as this article was being Union (EU) and Japan, who have agreed prospect of Japan, the largest remaining finalised the president was engaged in the between themselves to a major free trade economy in the group of 11, becoming the early stages of what many fearful onlookers agreement. As well as the prospect of TPP’s unofficial leader. But National-led have depicted as an embryonic trade war. New Zealand–Japan free trade relations governments were unencumbered by Even if that more extreme situation is in a completed CPTPP, making progress serious doubts about the virtues of this avoided, almost any level of tariff escalation towards a free trade agreement between high-profile trade agreement.
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