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Page | 1 Bibliography of the Iraq War Bruce Gilley, Associate Professor Bibliography of the Iraq War Bruce Gilley, Associate Professor, Division of Political Science, Portland State University //Overviews DeFronzo, J. (2010) The Iraq war : origins and consequences, Bolder, Colo.: Westview Press. Kinsella, D. T. (2007) Regime change : origins, execution, and aftermath of the Iraq war, Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth. Fawn, R. and Hinnebusch, R. A. (2006) The Iraq war : causes and consequences, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Mohamed El-Shibiny, Iraq : A Lost War (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) //Research and Teaching Burgos, Russell (2008), “Teaching the Iraq War”, PS: Political Science & Politics, 41:1, 173- 178. (PDF Available) //Descriptive Aspects Kaldor, Mary (1999). New and Old Wars : Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. Angstrom, Jan (2005). Puzzles and Propositions of the Iraq War. The Iraq War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy, and Operations. J. Hallenberg and H. Karlsson. New York, Routledge: 1-18. Kennedy, Liam (2009), “Soldier photography: visualising the war in Iraq”, Review of International Studies, Volume 35, Issue 04, October, pp 817-833. //Causes: Overviews Frank P. Harvey, Explaining the Iraq War : Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence (2011) (New York: Cambridge University Press.) Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall (2011) Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (Milton Park, Abingdon ; N.Y.: Routledge.) //Causes: Saddam’s Iraq Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party (Cambridge, 2012) Mlfrid Braut-Hegghammer (2006), “Rebel Without a Cause? Explaining Iraq's Response to Resolution 1441”, Nonproliferation Review, Volume 13, Issue 1, pages 17 – 34 Brands, Hal. “Inside the Iraqi State Records: Saddam Hussein, ‘Irangate’, and the United States.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 34 (2011): 1, 95-118. Brands, Hal. "Making the Conspiracy Theorist a Prophet: Covert Action and the Contours of U.S.-Iraq Relations," International History Review, 33, 3 (Sept 2011): 341-408. Brands, Hal and David Palkki. "Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?" International Security, 36, (6 July 2011): 1, 133-166. Brands, Hal and David Palkki. "Why Did Saddam Want the Bomb? The Israel Factor and the Iraqi Nuclear Program." Foreign Policy Research Institute (Aug 2011). Page | 1 Nathan, Elizabeth A. “Saddam and the Tribes: How Captured Documents Explain Regime Adaptation to Internal Challenges (1979–2003).” Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal, Vol. XII, Issue 1, Spring 2010 p. 12-30. Palkki, David D. and Shane Smith. "Contrasting causal mechanisms: Iraq and Libya" in Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation: Sanctions, Inducements, and Collective Action, ed by Etel Solingen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Rubin, Lawrence P. "Research Note: Documenting Saddam Hussein's Iraq." Contemporary Security Policy, 32, 2 (Summer, 2011): 458-466. Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Woods, Kevin. and Mark E. Stout. "New Sources for the Study of Iraqi Intelligence during the Saddam Era." Intelligence and National Security, 25, 4 (Dec 2010): 547-587. Woods, Kevin M. The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey. “Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents.” Institute for Defense Analyses, November 2007. Woods, Kevin M., and Mark E. Stout. “Saddam’s Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of ‘Desert Storm.’” Journal of Strategic Studies, 33 (2010): 1, 5-41. Woods, Kevin M., Michael Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey. The Iraqi Perspectives Report-Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006. David Wurmser,Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999) Achim Rohde, State-Society Relations in Ba'thist Iraq : Facing Dictatorship (2010) London ; New York: Routledge. Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki and Mark Stout, The Saddam Tapes (2011) The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978-2001 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.) Joy Gordon (2010), Invisible War: The United States & the Iraq Sanctions (2010) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Mazaheri, Nimah. , “Iraq and the Domestic Political Effects of Economic Sanctions.” Middle East Journal, Spring2010, Vol. 64 Issue 2, p254-268, Marr, Phebe (2004). The Saddam Husain Regime, 1979-1989. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, Westview Press: 177-215 Woods, Kevin, James Lacey, et al. (2006). "Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside." Foreign Affairs 85(3): 1-13. B.W. Jentleson (1994), With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. King, John (2006). Iraq Then and Now. Chicago, Ill., Raintree Litwak, Robert (2000). Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy : Containment after the Cold War. Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press Eppel, Michael (2004). Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny : From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam. Gainesville, University Press of Florida Page | 2 Record, Jeffrey (2004). The Unfinished Business of 1991. Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq. Annapolis, Md., Naval Institute Press: 1-16. Gallagher, Jim (2005). Causes of the Iraq War. Stockton NJ, OTTN Publishing Keegan, John (2004). Saddam's Wars. The Iraq War. New York, Alfred A. Knopf: 56-87. Sponeck, H. C. (2006). A Different Kind of War : The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq. New York, Berghahn Books; Makiya, K. (1989) Republic of fear : the inside story of Saddam's Iraq, New York: Pantheon Books. Stansfield, G. R. V. (2007) Iraq : people, history, politics, Cambridge: Polity. Steavenson, W. (2009) The weight of a mustard seed : the intimate story of an Iraqi general and his family during thirty years of tyranny, New York: Collins Pub. Group. Hamadani, R. d. M. i., Woods, K. M., Murray, W., Holaday, T. and National Intelligence Council (U.S.) (2009) Saddam's war : an Iraqi military perspective on the Iran-Iraq War, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Baram, A. and Rubin, B. M. (1993) Iraq's road to war, New York: St. Martin's Press. Bulloch, J. and Morris, H. (1991) Saddam's war : the origins of the Kuwait conflict and the international response, London ; Boston: Faber and Faber. Dawisha, A. (2009) A political history from independence to occupation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hiro, D. (1989) The longest war : the Iran-Iraq military conflict, London: Grafton Books. Hiro, D. (2002) Iraq : in the eye of the storm, New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books. Karsh, E. (1989) The Iran-Iraq war : impact and implications, New York: St. Martin's Press. Knights, M. (2005) Cradle of conflict : Iraq and the birth of modern U.S. military power, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. Long, J. M. (2004) Saddam's war of words : politics, religion, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Austin: University of Texas Press. Willett, E. (2004) The Iran-Iraq War, New York, NY: Rosen Pub. Group. Tompkins, Anne and Gregory Paw (2007), “Gathering Evidence against the Regime of Saddam Hussein”, Litigation, 34. Bacevich, A. J., Inbar, E. and Merkaz Besa. (2003) The Gulf War of 1991 reconsidered, London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass. Cashman, G. and Robinson, L. C. (2007) An introduction to the causes of war : patterns of interstate conflict from World War I to Iraq, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, Ch. 6. Hsieh, Chang-Tai; Moretti, Enrico (2006), “Did Iraq Cheat the United Nations? Underpricing, Bribes, and the Oil for Food Program”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121, no. 4, November, pp. 1211-48. //Causes: Iraqi Exiles Richard Bonin, Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi’s Long Journey to Triumph in Iraq (New York: Doubleday, 2011) United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence (2006), The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, S. Rpt. 109-330, Available at: http:intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiinc.pdf Page | 3 Vanderbush, Walt (2009), “Exiles and the Marketing of U.S. Policy toward Cuba and Iraq”, Foreign Policy Analysis, July, 5:3, p287-306. Roston, A. (2008) The man who pushed America to war : the extraordinary life, adventures, and obsessions of Ahmed Chalabi, New York: Nation Books. //Causes: Oil Michael Klare, “Blood for oil, in Iraq and elsewhere”, in Jane K. Cramer, and A. Trevor Thrall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (Milton Park, Abingdon ; N.Y.: Routledge., 2011) John S. Duffield , “Oil and the decision to invade Iraq”, in Jane K. Cramer, and A. Trevor Thrall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (Milton Park, Abingdon ; N.Y.: Routledge., 2011) Hussein, S. (1973) On oil nationalisation [in Iraq], Baghdad: Ath-Thawra House. Pelletiere, S. C. (2001) Iraq and the international oil system : why America went to war in the Gulf, Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Klare, Michael T. (2007), “Oil, Iraq, and American Foreign Policy: The Continuing Salience of the Carter Doctrine”, International Journal, 62, 31 to 42. Kubursi, Atif (2006), “Oil and the global economy”, in Fawn, R. and Hinnebusch, R. A. The Iraq war : causes and consequences, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Leech, G. M. (2006) Crude interventions : the US, oil and the new world (dis)order, New York Palgrave Macmillan. //Causes: The Role of Neo-Conservatism Binoy Kampmark, “The first neo-conservative: James Burnham and the origins of a movement”, Review of International Studies , October 2011, 37: 4, pp.1885-1902 . Andrew Flibbert, “The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War,” Security Studies , 15, no. 2 (April-June 2006): 310–52, Brian C. Schmidt & Michael C. Williams (2008): “The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists”, Security Studies, 17:2, 191-220 Hobbs, Mitchell. , “Neo-conned: The Murdoch press and the Iraq War”, International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics, 2010, p187-207 Stephen J.
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