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Intersections: Vegetarianism from an Ecofeminist Perspective

Anne Proescholdt

Luther College

FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 2

When I was about a month into a semester-long college course called “Buddhism,

Animals, and ,” I noticed that I was no longer eating meat. After watching and reading about the slaughter of animals for food, I was faced with the reality of what exactly I had been eating for two decades of my life, and I could not stomach it anymore. I was forced to acknowledge that I had been eating individual beings who had eyes like my cats’ but who did not get to live out the same long and happy life. American cultural norms dictate that we are not supposed to think of pet animals as food, but I began to question how and why we make distinctions between certain animal species and how we use them to our “benefit.” Dogs and cats are supposed to love us; cows, pigs, chickens, and turkeys are meant to feed us; primates, rats, and mice are science experiments; rabbit eyes are for chemical testing; horses are for laboring; and the list goes on. When I used to eat meat, I always requested my portion “well-done,” as I did not want to cut or bite into something that would bleed. “That’s not blood,” I was told.

“Those are juices.” I decided to accept the euphemism—thinking about it too much would ruin my appetite (which, in hindsight, was a big clue). The myths we tell ourselves in order to assimilate to cultural norms operate to silence dissension, critical thought, questioning of any kind. The meat I ate had to be meat—not a dead animal that bleeds. It had to look like something other than what it really was, an object for my consumption—not the remains of a life that had been taken on my behalf. I did not want to think about my having caused any kind of death and suffering in the world, needless or not. First and foremost, it was out of sympathy that I became a vegetarian.

I began to recognize parallels between vegetarian theory and in my studies. As a feminist, I wished to explore these further. I am attracted to the because it asks the difficult questions, those that address disparity among different groups and FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 3 why some are more prone to death and suffering than others. I also admire the variety of perspectives that aim to offer tangible solutions ensuring that the popular feminist mantra “the personal is the political” is not just lip-service. This concept recognizes that personal struggles women face result from systematic of all women. It suggests that women find solidarity in their individual experiences and take action under a united feminist movement.

Those calling themselves “ecofeminists” open the door to thinking about disparities beyond human relationships, and this can include vegetarian theorizing. Feminist-vegetarians have argued that the consumption of animals conflicts with the goal of the ecofeminist movement and feminist movement in general, and they call for the integration of a feminist-vegetarian critical theory into these movements. Yet, there are feminists who remain uncomfortable with full integration of vegetarian practice and theory into the movement, due to fears of oversimplifying the links between the treatment of women and other oppressed humans and animals. Based on their arguments, I propose that the relationship between feminism and vegetarianism requires further theorizing that considers multiple perspectives for a holistic approach to understanding.

The ultimate goal should be accessibility and desirability for serious inclusion in feminist discussion in and out of the academic realm and across generations.

In order to understand the context of the relationship between feminist and vegetarian theory, it is important to acknowledge ecofeminism’s role. Ecofeminism, or ecological feminism, coined in the 1970s, describes a feminist focus on the natural world and its relationship to humanity, which draws parallels between the oppression of the earth and the oppression of particular groups of human beings through the identification of dualisms that describe dominator over dominated. These dualisms include but are not limited to: culture/nature, male/female, self/other, rationality/emotion, and humans/animals (Gaard, 1993 & Adams, 1996). Ecofeminists FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 4 maintain that the found in nature emerge from the same ideology that motivates oppressions elsewhere and that the liberation of women and other oppressed groups will not be successful without the liberation of nature. It is this philosophy that seeks to emphasize interconnection between life forms in response to , which requires a separation between self and other in order to operate. This separation is used to justify rankings, power- over, and hierarchy. The self/other binary results from a wide-spread individualistic mindset reliant on fear of one another, as if competitors in a game of survival, a fight for power.

Ecofeminism brings to light the complexities involved in rights and moral understanding through the promotion of relationships and responsibilities toward one another (Gaard, 1993). Because animals are an undeniable part of the natural world concerning ecofeminists, some have pointed to and vegetarian practice, the abstention of animal consumption, as crucial components to the ecofeminist movement.

Even if they were rarely allowed to formally fill leadership positions until the post-World

War II era, women motivated by connections identified between animal cruelty and human abuse in the home have played a significant role in animal rights advocacy groups since the mid-1800s.

Caroline Earle White was one founder of the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, which advocated for animal rights through the investigation of animal cruelty cases and conviction of their perpetrators, in 1867. In 1883, she founded the American Anti-

Vivisection Society, which aimed to abolish animal experimentation (Beers, 2006). A subscriber to the abolitionist movement and haunted by her childhood memories of overworked draft animals, White identified commonalities between the enslavement of human beings and animals.

No longer able to justify a separation between cow and steak, she became a vegetarian and boycotted clothing made of animals. Unsurprisingly, White and other female animal rights FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 5 activists faced intense scrutiny for acting “overly-sensitive” about the plight of animals and were accused of “neglecting” the domestic sphere (Beers, 2006, p. 57). Even though they were constantly criticized both for falling victim to the hysterical “nature” of their gender and for abandoning their “womanly duties” at home, these women stuck to their convictions and helped expose animal rights issues.

By the time World War II ended, women continued to advocate for animal rights and endure scrutiny, but the radical social justice movements of the 1960s helped bring attention to environmental issues, animal rights, and the connections between them. Resulting from a booming economy, average human meat consumption at 55 pounds per person per year in the late 1940s nearly doubled by 1970 (Beers, 2006). Demand for speed and efficiency in slaughterhouses did not necessitate concern for animal suffering, however. Animal rights activists like Helen Jones fought to bring attention to this issue, and in 1960, the Federal Humane

Slaughter Act went into effect. The law requires that cows and pigs are stunned before slaughter, with the intention of reducing their suffering. No longer convinced that this interpretation of

“humane” slaughter was enough, Jones adopted vegetarianism. Inspired by the radicalism of the civil rights movement, she renamed her National Catholic Society for Animal Welfare to the

Society for Animal Rights in 1972. From research practices to wildlife protection, the 1960s and

70s saw various legislative and consumer victories for animals, but Carol Adams’ 1974 The

Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory and ’s 1975 Animal

Liberation maintained that a huge shift in the cultural consciousness about human and animal relations had to take place. These works would become the monumental go-to resources for radical animal rights theory. At the core of their theories, Adams and Singer find “other-ing” FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 6 problematic, as they maintain that other-ing is the cause of the oppression of certain groups of people and all animals.

Singer (1990) uses the term “” to describe “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” (p. 6).

He is, of course, pointing to members of the human animal species exercising dominion over other species of animals. Singer maintains that equal treatment is a ridiculous goal for any being of any species; the goal should be “equal consideration” (p. 2). He says that there are differences between animals and humans—like the right to vote, for instance—that cannot be extended animals because they are not concerned with such an activity. Singer points out that babies and adults with cognitive handicaps cannot necessarily exercise the same intellectual ability that a non-human animal can, but they still deserve to be considered. It is really the “capacity to suffer and/or experience enjoyment” that should be of concern, as the suffering experienced by any being cannot be any “better” or “worse” than the suffering of another being (pp. 8-9). Singer demonstrates how he sees speciesism as analogous to other, more familiar “isms”:

Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate the principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex. Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case. (p. 9)

Though the point of Animal Liberation is to prove that speciesism is wrong in and of itself,

Singer occasionally cites movements against and as using the same arguments found in animal rights movements and asserts that it is often those who care a great deal about the plight of humans who tend to also show sensitivity for the plight of animals. He lists feminists Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton among them. FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 7

Adams joins Anthony and Stanton in the ranks of feminist-vegetarians who recognize links between the two movements. Though Adams is not the first or the only to define feminist- vegetarian critical theory, her work appears to be widely cited in modern theorizing. Adams

(2010) approaches her argument in The of Meat from her perspective as a feminist and asserts that one cannot practice feminism without also practicing vegetarianism— one necessitates the other. Drawing from the rhetoric surrounding meat throughout history,

Adams indentifies how those in power have used meat to exercise and maintain their power.

“The sexism in meat eating recapitulates the class distinctions with an added twist: a mythology permeates all classes that meat is a masculine food and meat eating a male activity,” she explains

(p. 48). Meat, constituting the meals of the aristocracy (both literal and metaphorical), sets up distinctions between not only sexes, but spins an intricate web of domination that also includes class and race. Those in power, usually white men, were the only people who could afford meat and had those “beneath” them, women and servants, prepare it for consumption. Men and the privileged were likelier to eat meat, while everyone else ate , “lesser” food. Adams tells us that nineteenth-century medical doctor George Beard used Darwin’s theory of evolution to justify “meat as white man’s food” (p. 53). Under the presupposition that white men represented the epitome of evolution, Beard recommended that they eat animals, which were higher up on the evolutionary ladder and thus better suited for the health of white men.

In Western cultures especially, meat has a history of being considered the “most important” component of a meal; a meal would not be a meal without it. As a metaphor for privileged men, meat represents strength, “[…] despite the fact that meat is only secondhand vegetables and vegetables provide, on the average, more than twice the vitamins and minerals of meat,” Adams counters (p. 57). Because the consumption of muscle has been linked to the FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 8 development of one’s own strength, and strength being a characteristic typically associated with gender constructions of men, meat has been credited with the ability to “transfer” masculinity to its consumer. Those who do not eat meat “are deemed effeminate” and therefore occupy second- class standing (p. 57). Even common metaphorical linguistic choices reveal a bias toward meat:

Thus we have the ‘meat of the matter,’ ‘a meaty question.’ To ‘beef up’ something is to improve it. , on the other hand, represents the least desirable characteristics: suggesting or inactive. Meat is something one enjoys or excels in, vegetable becomes representative of someone who does not enjoy anything: a person who leads a monotonous, passive, or merely physical existence. (p. 60)

Or, put bluntly, a or woman-like person.

It is this passive role that is applied to both animals and women in order to “justify” their oppression and consumption—animals in the literal sense and women in just about every other.

Adams explains that this occurs through an “absent reference” process. The “absent referent” describes what animals become after butchering: bodiless and renamed. Adams tells us that these practices function to help curb thinking about the fact that meat is actually dead animal, that an act of violence had to take place. To avoid acknowledging the individual beings they once were, animals become objects for consumption within a “human-centered hierarchy” (p. 67). This event occurs even before animals have been slaughtered; “calves” become “veal,” for instance.

Adams asserts that women can also be absent referents. Descriptions of , especially the act of , are turned into metaphors to relay other violent acts, “such as the

‘rape’ of the earth in ecological writings of the early 1970s” (p. 68). Adams explains that

“Women, upon whose bodies actual rape is most often committed, become the absent referent when the language of sexual violence is used metaphorically. These terms recall women’s experiences but not women” (p. 68). FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 9

Adams identifies the eroticism of meat as a crucial player in how women and animals are objectified. She maintains that images of this objectification present themselves in various forms of media. She refers to print advertisements for meat that depict only parts of female bodies juxtaposed with the meat advertised, or in some cases, the meat actually poses as if it was a female body. One image of a hanging cow carcass that appears to be “wearing” a tube top and miniskirt is accompanied by copy reading “It’s not acceptable to treat a woman like one [a piece of meat].” This anti-domestic violence advertisement uses absent reference to get its message across. Although, it is true that “Without the caption […], it’s hard to tell whether one is looking at a poster for meat-eating [emphasis mine]” (Adams, 2010, insert). One could argue that hierarchy is reinstated, as the desired reaction is something to the effect of: “I would never treat a woman like I would an animal!” The poster not only infers an existing relationship between the treatment of women and the treatment of animals, its effectiveness requires that a distinction is made between how we treat animals and women.

Adams (2010) proposes that in order to practice feminism, one needs to practice vegetarianism, maintaining that theory-motivated activism has the power to make positive change. Because all of us perpetuate patriarchy, those who consider themselves feminists, or critics of patriarchal systems, must ask difficult questions about their behavior and its implications—does it challenge or support patriarchy? “For we have been swallowed and we are the swallowers. We are the consumers and the consumed,” Adams explains (p. 241). She urges feminists to question the cultural acceptance of meat eating, the dismissal and repression of critical consumption, and its effects. Feminists can vote with their forks, a relatively accessible way to lessen their own patriarchal footprint. Adams writes that vegetarianism “is a rebellion against dominant culture” (2010, p. 217). For her, feminism and vegetarianism go hand-in- FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 10 hand—privileging one as theory or practice over another does not make sense, as they both function as theory and practice concurrently.

Other feminists have critiqued Adams’ theory and those of other feminist-vegetarians in attempts to make sense of what exactly the relationships between feminism, ecofeminism, and vegetarianism should look like. (2002) applauds Adams’ stance but also offers new directions for further theorization. Suggesting that both reason and emotion should play a role in the justification of animal liberation, Gaard critiques reason-only arguments, such as Singer’s, as patriarchal in and of themselves and disregarding room for emotional knowledge. It is this denial of emotion, a “womanly” and therefore “lesser” characteristic, that has helped make patriarchy possible and thereby the oppression of women and animals. Without the acknowledgement of one’s feelings, it is much easier to carry out thoughtless acts. Gaard wants us to recognize our emotions as a valid source of knowledge and believes that they can inform our “reasonable” arguments. She goes on to assert that

Feminism's commitment to inclusiveness has meant (ideally) that when a disenfranchised group is recognized, responding to and including the concerns of that group subsequently influences the shape of feminist theory. It is through this process of increasing inclusivity and subsequent theoretical transformation that the development of feminism, ecofeminism, and vegetarian ecofeminism may be traced. (p. 128)

Gaard here reminds us that the basic principle of feminism is to recognize oppression and work to dismantle it. Once the movement recognizes the oppression of a particular group, feminist theory must evolve to include that group’s interests with the intention of avoiding a hypocritical oppression within the theory. Because feminism grew out of this philosophy and “transformed” to include racism, classism, and increasingly, environmentalism, Gaard believes that there is a place for the inclusion of animal oppression. She maintains that “coalitions” between groups in the name of “social and environmental justice” should be formed with “understanding and FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 11 appreciation” between them (p. 118). She does offer, however, some suggestions to direct future theory: 1) relevancy of speciesism to non-Western cultures, 2) ecofeminist inclusion of heterosexism, racism, and classism, and 3) attention paid to women environmental justice activists.

Val Plumwood (2000) recognizes value in feminist and ecological theorizing about animal ethics, but she points to the places where each perspective becomes problematic, in her effort to show how integration of the approaches has been and will continue to be difficult without further theoretical development. Plumwood writes that ecological theory is at risk of ignoring “individual life and justice perspectives for nonhumans” in its effort to stress that maintaining balance in nature necessitates humans as predators (p. 286). This argument that

“humans are predators, too” is one of many that has been used to justify meat-eating, but it completely disregards arguments that recognize a being’s individuality and desire to live.

Conversely, she critiques the theorists of some rights-based vegetarians as too culturally-biased, exempting humans from nature and their potential to be preyed upon, too. It is this stark culture/nature dualism that Plumwood asserts needs addressing. In response to Adams’ work and stances similar to hers, Plumwood states that “opposing all forms of oppression is a tall order

[…] leading ecofeminist accounts of animals have not themselves always escaped the dualistic, contextual, and integration problems they have criticized in others” (p. 287). Hypocrisy does little to make an argument persuasive.

For Plumwood, hypocrisy also emerges from the privileged Western perspective from which Adams and other vegetarian theorists cannot ever completely exempt themselves, yet they still assume a tone of mandatory universalizing of the practice of their theories. Plumwood claims that FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 12

Some crusading versions of rights-based vegetarianism are aggressively ethnocentric, dismissing alternative and indigenous food practices and wisdom and demanding universal adherence to a western urban model of vegan practice in which human predation figures basically as a new version of original sin, going on to supplement this by a culturally familiar methodology of dispensing excuses and exemptions for those too frail to reach their exacting moral norms of carnivorous self-denial. (p. 286)

Plumwood calls upon theorists to consider the implications of developing techniques for a

“moral high-road” from the position of Western privilege. Fearful that vegetarianism will become the new way to claim “holier-than-thou” status, therefore reinstating a hierarchal system which justifies dominance over others, Plumwood employs metaphors from Christianity, the

“Western” religion, to demonstrate a potential double-standard:

Alienated ascetic forms of vegan strategy also fit snugly into the spaces of neo-Christian and neo-Puritan salvational projects and narratives of original sin, bodily temptation, individual struggle and fall, personal virtue and righteousness, and revulsion at the flesh, narratives that have been liberally applied in the Christian past to sexuality. (p. 292)

Plumwood interprets Adams’ association of animal flesh consumption with that of female violence as suggesting a sort of sexual impurity subject to “damnation.” Because Western ideals such as this have been the standard by which the world has been measured and ranked subsequently in order to justify oppressive treatment, it is imperative to remain sensitive to potential new forms of oppression coming out of a vegetarian ideal. Otherwise, the justificatio n for such a practice loses credibility.

The solution Plumwood proposes for the successful integration of feminist, vegetarian, and ecological perspectives is a contextual approach that avoids troubling, polarizing dualisms and skewed assumptions about nature and culture. She remains hopeful in thoughtful intersections, the places at which cultural and natural considerations meet. “So here is an alternative path to breaking down human/animal dualism and its dualization of food practices,”

Plumwood writes, “[…] we can reposition ourselves back in the food chain, acknowledge our FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 13 own edibility, and start our project of recognizing kinship from there” (p. 296). She also emphasizes the importance of redefining how each movement, animal rights and ecological, conceives of “the individual’s relationship to life,” which is neither completely subject to

“exclusive use and control of it for your own exclusive benefit,” nor “subject to immediate recall

[like a library book] by other borrowers [before you are finished with it].” It is in this realization that common ground can be found for the formation of a new “ethical framework” (p. 317).

Kathryn Paxton George (1994), a feminist and vegetarian with doctorates in genetics and ethics, questions the feminist argument for vegetarianism. She admits, “[…] I continue to affirm that we have moral obligations to animals and that killing or harming any animal is an evil and is often wrong” (p. 407). George takes issue with a vegetarian requirement for feminists when the realities of certain social-cultural advantages and disadvantages for different groups come to play in one’s ability to adhere to such a strict moral ideal. In this way, George views “idolized” vegetarianism as another possible tool used to perpetuate patriarchal means, similar to the concerns voiced by Plumwood. She also proposes potential consequences impacting negatively on disadvantaged groups who attempt a vegetarian diet, maintaining that the Western world with all of its innovations has little reason to worry about protein and other deficiencies. In her analysis of Western moral theory as justification for vegetarianism, such as the one put forth by

Singer, George declares, “Traditional moral theory is dead” due to its biases (p. 422). “The central tenets and methods of both rights and utilitarianism rely on a common subjective perspective and context […] the group in power is most likely to assume itself to be closest to realizing it” (p. 422). She also accuses feminist-vegetarians of ethnocentrism by celebrating a universal vegetarian ideal formed within a Western context:

By arguing that the vegan lifestyle is an ideal to be aimed for, moral vegans are compelled to accept the presuppositions that attend it-that our Western way of life is best. FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 14

But with that way of life comes an industrialized complex that has implications for culture, the environment, and the expenditure of labor and resources, that is, wealth. If the only way to have a truly ethical relationship with animals is to adopt a vegan lifestyle, it also means that we must live in a society like ours; all other ‘less advanced’ societies would be (magnanimously) excused as morally ignorant or culturally backward or both. (p. 427)

George joins other theorists who have pointed out that feminist-vegetarians must be careful to avoid creating an oppressive doctrine that undermines feminism’s validity as a movement.

Although there are those who have suggested that exemption from vegetarianism is possible based on one’s contextual affinity for added oppressive burdens because of the diet,

George maintains that this category would exempt “nearly everyone in the world except Western young adult males from ‘true morality,’” therefore suggesting that the logic behind the morality is flawed (p. 427). “Feminists perhaps should be careful not to make a virtue of our oppression.

Women and children have been consistently denied meat and animal product protein and have suffered ill health and starvation in all male-dominated cultures. Why should it make sense now to adopt this limitation as an ideal?” George postulates (p. 429). It is important to the integrity of the feminist movement to recognize that we yet live in a hierarchical world where access to a balanced diet differs for people, perhaps making it difficult to practice a healthy vegetarianism.

George worries that a feminist insistence on vegetarian practice would serve to initiate a new hierarchy where vegetarians are “morally-superior” to their non-vegetarian counterparts, thus undermining the entire basis of feminism.

George’s 1994 article created quite a stir, inspiring a handful of feminists, including

Greta Gaard and Lori Gruen (1995), (1995), and Carol J. Adams (1995), to publish articles directly in response to her claims. Gaard and Gruen take issue with the validity of studies cited by George on potential nutritional deficiencies caused by a diet free of meat and cite studies that suggest more complexity to the concern. FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 15

[…] George is right to point out that too many studies of diet and nutrition assume a male norm, […] [but] her uncritical acceptance of the findings that do fit her hypothesis means she must virtually ignore those feminist critiques of science that address the role of bias. (pp. 234-235)

Gaard and Gruen identify George’s privileging of scientific support as flawed, due to its coming out of a social-cultural context. This issue has been well-examined by feminist theorizing. Gaard and Gruen go on to explain that while George critiques “the universal nature of Singer’s […] arguments, as feminists and ecofeminists have done before her,” she negates her own argument by critiquing “feminist vegetarianism for failing to provide a systematic universal ethic” (p. 237).

Donovan refutes George’s assertion that wealthy societies have more ability to practice vegetarianism by pointing out that “most non-Western diets are largely vegetarian (perhaps by virtue of necessity)” (p. 227). Gaard and Gruen continue to cite feminist-vegetarian theorizing on the importance of contextualizing vegetarian practice and the valuing of both individual rights and responsibility to relationships. They point to “[…] ‘contextual moral vegetarianism,’ a sophisticated strategy for making ethical dietary decisions that take into account one's race, gender, class, ethnicity, and other contextual variables,” and write that

While feminist vegetarians and ecofeminists have deplored the abuse of animals […], nowhere has anyone issued a mandate for universal ethical vegetarianism. To suggest, for example, that indigenous Aleutians must now grow broccoli because some academic ecofeminist has decided such behavior is the moral high ground is patently absurd. Yet this kind of absurdity is precisely what George is opposing. It is a straw woman argument, a slanderous misrepresentation of some very intelligent and passionate feminist theory. (p. 238)

It is important to these theorists that issues of class and race are taken into account, and they insist that feminist-vegetarian theory has worked to highlight dominant practices which ignore these issues without insisting upon a universal standard of ethics.

Adams (1995) takes offense to George’s disregard for feminist theorists with her choice to discuss theory developed by mostly men, but she is simply appalled by the accusation that FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 16 feminist-vegetarians “are supposedly making a ‘virtue of [their] own oppression’!” Adams counters, “To the contrary, we recognize the interlocking nature of the oppression of women and the other animals. is one aspect of patriarchal violence; as we challenge this violence, we will not consume its victims” (p. 223). Adams proceeds to undermine George’s credibility as a vegetarian by pointing out that she falsely includes fish as allowable for ingestion. Reiterating that feminist-vegetarian critical theory in practice requires that no dead bodies are consumed (the whole point to the theory itself), Adams denounces George’s so-called vegetarian perspective.

The debate over whether ecofeminists and feminists in general should be vegetarian is not dissimilar to on-going discussions about how to implement feminist practical theory, nor are discussions about places of cross-over and the function of alliances between feminists and other groups sensitive to social justice unfamiliar. This would suggest that because patriarchy requires permeation of all spheres of life in order to operate as effectively as it does, feminists recognize the need to dismantle the system from a variety of spheres. It is a wide-range of perspectives that are necessary to identify and challenge oppressive hegemonic discourses.

On the other hand, what are the principles on which these groups must agree to show solidarity with one another and make effective change? This is where the lines are blurred between valuing a multiplicity of perspectives and agreeing upon universal principles that have the best interests of all at heart, in order to unify the movement. Is it as important to agree on tactics as it is on theory (or vice versa)? Must we agree on both tactics and theory? These are the questions that keep the movement glacier-slow, but the asking of these questions at all makes the movement contrast starkly against unquestioning patriarchy. FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 17

Plumwood’s prerequisite that humans refrain from exempting themselves from nature, as it has been done for so long, seems to be a wise framework—provided that humans remain aware of their own potential biases in how they perceive of “natural,” for fear of playing party to the dualistic thought that encourages other-ing. We must remain cognizant of a culture/nature dualism, or one which privileges vegetarianism as an ideal that disregards needs of other cultures and avoid operating from the kind of position of power that we are hoping to dismantle.

Although George (1994) offers some arguments of questionable worth to the opinions of Adams

(1995), Gaard and Gruen (1995), and Donovan (1995), she does bring our attention to the issue of privileged feminism in the Western world. Issues surrounding cultural relativism continue to trouble feminists when it comes to theory enactment. Though Donovan points out that much of the non-Western world already practices vegetarianism, it is important to examine the whole picture.

It is clear that many women throughout history cared and continue to care about and find solidarity in the animal condition—human and non-human. Because parallels have been drawn between the oppression of women and the oppression of nature, and because nature has to include human and non-human animals, ecofeminism has a space for vegetarian debates in its quest for ecological justice and elevation of women. By addressing issues of power, domination, dualism, and other-ing through the lenses of class, race, sex, gender, and perhaps even speciesism, we can begin to identify how oppression is linked to realms beyond the human experience. Once we begin to illuminate these links, we may be better equipped to improve the plight of the planet—not just humans—and, as ecofeminist theory suggests, it may not even be possible to do so without the consideration of a holistic system: the ecosystem. FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 18

In the case of vegetarianism as theory and tactic, more dialogue needs to take place.

Adams (1995, 1996, 2010) and Gaard (1993, 1995, 2002) maintain that feminism necessitates vegetarianism, while Plumwood (2000) suggests a more holistic approach in justifying the abstention of animal consumption. It appears that all of the theorists reviewed here agree on one thing: animals, as a part of nature, are worth consideration. I would argue that the reasons need to go beyond the symbolism that Adams puts forth, in order to keep the argument relevant— although that is not to disregard the power of rhetorical tactics. Adams’ concept of the “absent referent” begs for more exploration in its relationship to ecofeminism. To what extent should we objectify life and land formations? Is it even important to transfer animal life characteristics to environmental still life? How do we navigate a balance of reason and emotion in the formation of our arguments for the consideration of animals (and possibly other inhabitants of nature), as

Gaard suggests?

As a feminist and a vegetarian, I am constantly called upon to justify why I have chosen to identify with these particular movements. I struggle to find the right words to represent these movements in a way that does them justice. It would be enormously helpful for feminist- vegetarians to propose useful solutions for resisting silencing tactics by those whose choices are already affirmed by the dominant culture. Tangible techniques for increasing the likelihood of assertive educational moments over that of an embarrassing and demeaning dinnertime crucifixion would not only serve to empower feminist-vegetarians and their practice, but also help to give credibility to the movement. While Adams does identify vegetarian silencing as an issue and provides some tools to resist it, I feel that it is important to glean these sorts of suggestions from multiple theorists, so that practicing feminist-vegetarians may choose a theory or combination of theories that best represents the motivation behind their stances. FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 19

Though much work has already been done, I maintain that we should remain receptive to new viewpoints on exactly how vegetarian theory based in rights ethics can operate in conjunction with ecofeminist ideals. It may be useful for feminists of the younger generation to develop theory that is accessible and appealing to their peers, as the work of theorists coming out of the counter-cultural movements of the 1960s and 70s can be viewed as dated and no longer applicable or brushed off as the “stuff of hippies.” Instead of glossing over the animal question as is usually done, institutions of higher education which value critical thinking could take on this topic for discussion in a variety of disciplines, giving way to a variety of unique viewpoints that could prove valuable for theorist dialogue. In any case, it is important to keep in step with feminist values by listening to a variety of perspectives. Feminism can be appealing for its encouragement of asking the difficult, uncomfortable questions, and as a movement, it does not shy away from constant evaluation of its own convictions. In keeping with feminist bell hooks’ theory, there is a place within this movement for everybody.

FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 20

References

Adams, C. J. (1995). Comment on George’s “Should Feminists Be Vegetarians?”. Signs: Journal

of Women in Culture and Society, 21(1): 221-225. Adams, a leading feminist-vegetarian

critical theorist, defends her position that feminists need to be vegetarians. When

criticized by George for purporting universal ethical standards, Adams responds by

showing how her theory actually works to dismantle universals in this journal article.

Adams, C. J. (1996). Ecofeminism and the eating of animals. In K. J. Warren (Ed.), Ecological

feminist philosophies (pp. 114-136). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Feminist-vegetarian critical theorist Adams offers a more in-depth look at how

ecofeminism and vegetarianism align in this journal article and identifies the places

where ecofeminism fails to live up to its principles by ignoring the vegetarian question.

Adams, C. J. (2010). The sexual politics of meat: A feminist-vegetarian critical theory (20th

anniversary ed.). New York, NY: Continuum International. This monograph represents

Adam’s leading work on feminist-vegetarian critical theory in 1974 and its first-ever

comprehensive analysis.

Beers, D. L. (2006). For the prevention of cruelty: The history and legacy of animal rights

activism in the United States. Athens, OH: Swallow Press. Historian Beers outlines U.S.

animal rights activism in this monograph. Her attention paid to women’s involvement

helps to give a historical perspective to modern-day feminist theorizing about animal

rights.

Donovan, J. (1995). Comment on George’s “Should Feminists Be Vegetarians?”. Signs, 21(1):

226-229. Donovan, a feminist and animal ethics scholar, responds to George’s article in a FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 21

way similar to Adams’ and Gaard and Gruen’s. She maintains that George’s arguments

are mis-informed and that her evidence is either faulty or interpreted incorrectly.

Gaard, G. (1993). Living interconnections with animals and nature. In G. Gaard (Ed.),

Ecofeminism: Women, animals, nature (pp. 1-12). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University

Press. Ecofeminist scholar Gaard introduces the principles ecofeminism and justifies her

collection of articles for this anthology by including diverse approaches to theory.

Gaard, G., & Gruen, L. (1995). Comment on George’s “Should Feminists Be Vegetarians?”.

Signs, 21(1): 230-241. Feminist scholars Gaard and Gruen defend their stance as

feminist-vegetarians by addressing George’s critique point-by-point in this journal article.

They question her interpretation of nutritional data and .

Gaard, G. (2002). Vegetarian ecofeminism: A review essay. Frontiers: A Journal of Women

Studies, 23(3): 117-146. In this journal article, Gaard reaches beyond Adam’s arguments

and suggests that both reason and emotion should play an important role in justifying

feminist vegetarianism. She also suggests coalitions between groups with similar interests

in order to further their causes.

George, K. P. (1994). Should feminists be vegetarians?. Signs, 19(2): 405-434. As a so-called

feminist and vegetarian, philosopher George challenges feminist-vegetarian critical

theory in both provocative and questionable ways. She maintains that the theory supports

an ethnocentric universal ethical standard.

Plumwood, V. (2000). Integrating ethical frameworks for animals, humans, and nature: A critical

feminist eco-socialist analysis. Ethics and the Environment, 5(2): 285-322. In this journal

article, ecofeminist Plumwood suggests that both ecologists and feminist-vegetarians

utilize harmful dualisms in the construction of their animal rights theory. She offers a FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, & VEGETARIANISM 22

middle ground that emphasizes the “re-introduction” of humans into nature’s food chain,

while simultaneously recognizing individual’s self-interests.

Singer, P. (1990). Animal liberation (2nd ed.). New York, NY: The New York Review of Books.

Singer represents a leader in utilitarian animal rights theorizing. His monumental 1975

perspective offers a male, reason-based ethic that serves as a comparison to Adam’s

theory.