Risk of Lone Wolf Terrorism Persists Due to Al-Qaeda's Internet Strategy Kevin Iannone University Honors Fall 2013 Advisor: Ro

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Risk of Lone Wolf Terrorism Persists Due to Al-Qaeda’s Internet Strategy Kevin Iannone University Honors Fall 2013 Advisor: Robert Williams, School of International Service

1 The Boston Bombing was a landmark case demonstrating the dangers of lone wolf attacks. Likely becoming radicalized both by his brother’s influence, and from the extremist literature he had downloaded, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev displayed the shifting trends of homegrown jihadi terrorism that began with Major Nidal Hasan. The continued encouragement of these attacks by al-Qaeda makes lone wolf attacks and self-radicalization a more credible threat to the national security of the United States. We assess that al-Qaeda’s promotion of lone wolf attack marks a shift in homegrown terrorism, signaling a new phase that will continue over the next ten years. The new shift threatens U.S. national security, as al-Qaeda is able to ability to attract, radicalize, instruct, and train individuals within the United States without direct contact.

Key Judgments heavily influenced by the spread of radical KJ A. This report judges that the Internet Islam on the Internet. These two steps are plays a primary role in the radicalization the final steps towards militancy and acts process of potential terrorists. The Internet of terrorism; they pose the most gives potential terrorists the freedom to significant threat to the security of the immerse themselves in radical ideologies and United States. receive training within the comfort of their own homes. Websites, forums, chat rooms, . A4. The use of the Internet for blogs, videos and online books and magazines radicalization, instruction, and serve as the chief source of information about encouragement to join terrorist Islam for potential terrorists, and provide them organizations or commit acts of terrorism with access to jihadi ideologies and has occurred on multiple occasions. information. KJ B. This report assesses that al-Qaeda’s . A1. The Internet is almost certainly an Internet and media strategy has strengthened invaluable resource for potential terrorists. since the death of Usama bin Laden (UBL). Online content not only supports Under UBL, al-Qaeda used the Internet as a radicalization, but also provides training tool to communicate and send instructions to and tradecraft information, and serves as a operatives, as well as spread its ideology tool for preparing terrorist attacks. around the world, building a global following.

. A2. No exact formula exists for which . B1. Under Usama bin Laden’s leadership, individuals are susceptible to al-Qaeda used the Internet as an radicalization; however, there is a general organizational tool for safe process that they undergo. The process of communication, organization, planning, radicalization consists of four steps, which and training among operatives. break down the individual’s original Additionally, he began initiatives to beliefs and personality, and facilitate the establish a global network under the growth of a radical persona. The Internet ideology of al-Qaeda. likely plays little role in the first step, Pre- Radicalization, but plays an important role . B2. As the leader of al-Qaeda central, in the second step, Self Identification. Ayman al-Zawahiri continues the path set by UBL. Al-Qaeda continues its use of the Internet as a medium to share its ideology . A3. The last two steps of the radicalization and provide information for its followers process—Indoctrination and in other countries. Jihadization—have almost certainly been

2 KJ C. This report judges that the al-Qaeda . D1. Homegrown violent jihadist activity media organization, as-Sahab, poses a growing after September 11 is not easily threat to U.S. national security through its categorized. Each case varies from the increasing online presence and its growing next with very few common denominators prominence within al-Qaeda. As-Sahab has present, but there is a growing trend of evolved with modern technology, spreading its lone wolf attacks and the use of the influence across many different Internet Internet for training or guidance. venues. Attempts by the U.S. government to hinder and prevent the operations of as-Sahab . D2. The Internet has changed the trends of have not had a significant lasting impact. It is self-radicalization, as well as homegrown likely that over the next ten years, as-Sahab Islamic terrorism within the United States. will continue adapting to new technologies The abundant availability of extremist and increase the presence of al-Qaeda on the sources and tactical guidance on forums Internet. and websites has likely neutralized the need for potential terrorists to travel to . C1. As-Sahab’s functions have gradually training camps. increased over the past decade from its original task of releasing statements from . D3. In cases of Islamic lone wolf attacks al-Qaeda leadership to playing a role in among Americans, there is a trend of spreading al-Qaeda policy and ideology. anonymity. Susceptible individuals radicalize subtly, without arousing the . C2. As-Sahab, which operates under al- suspicions of their friends and families, Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and without suspicion from the authorities, almost certainly holds a prominent as is shown in two of the most crucial and position in the current hierarchy of almost successful lone wolf attacks on U.S. Qaeda affiliates. The organization over the soil in the last decade. past decade has been responsible for working with al-Qaeda leadership to release speeches and messages on the Internet.

. C3. As-Sahab’s leadership and operations are unlikely to have been permanently damaged by the efforts of the American government. . KJ D. This report judges that al-Qaeda’s Internet and media strategy is changing the trends of Islamic radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States. Radicalization in the United States is now hinged on anonymity after U.S. authorities foiled previous attacks. Using the Internet, al- Qaeda passively influences and trains individuals with no official links to the organization.

3 Opportunities and Risks

1. Government authorities should aim to counter Islamic extremism on the Internet through the removal of downloadable radical literature and the sponsorship of non-radical forums. The authorities should seek the help of companies, like Google, to make it more challenging to find radical literature, like the eBooks that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev downloaded. Additionally, with Google’s help, non-radical forums and sites could be made easily searchable.

. The likely risks for this opportunity are that radical ideology will find ways around these attempts to limit it. Also, non-radical forums that are publicly sponsored by the government may be seen as puppets, and ignored.

2. The United States should increase monitoring of radical websites and begin censoring and blocking sources that promote Islamic extremism and terrorism. According to Steve Stalinsky, the executive director of the Middle East Media Research Institute, some government agencies believe that radical forums and website provide sources of intelligence, but there is little usable information provided by these forums and sites, as most of it is targeted toward radicalization and training rather than planning or sharing secrets.

. The likely risk to be faced is that radical organizations will bypass censorship attempts and continue to spread al-Qaeda’s ideology and radical extremism over the Internet.

3. Establishing outreach programs to Muslim and non-Muslim youth in America will provide the opportunity to preemptively counter the feelings of estrangement that lead to the process of radicalization. By teaching younger generations about Islam and Muslims, the government may limit the racism and prejudice that likely contributes to the conflicted feelings some young Muslims experience. Additionally, outreach programs to Muslim youth may help show that they are part of American society, and limit their potential estrangement.

. There are several risks associated with this opportunity. The first is that the education programs will not be accepted by school systems, and may face challenges from older generations. Another is that since cases of radicalization are few in number, susceptible individuals will continue to slip through the cracks of the outreach programs. A third risk is that the programs are seen as government propaganda and lose legitimacy.

4. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies should seek to disrupt the publication of Inspire magazine, a magazine published in English by AQAP. Inspire magazine offers encouragement of radicalization and acts of terrorism in English, and also provides tips for conducting attacks and constructing weapons. While the intelligence community successfully delayed the launch of the eleventh issue, it was released in its full form two weeks later.1 More aggressive actions will probably delay the release of this information over the Internet more effectively and for longer periods of time.

. The risk that government agencies face with this opportunity is the likely inability to fully prevent the publication of this magazine or its individual parts. The information may still be released on forums and radical sites in sections rather than as a complete magazine.

4 Indicators of Change:

Date: Indicators of Change

November Major Nidal Hasan opened fire at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people and wounding 05, 2009 more than 30 others.

March, In an as-Sahab video, Adam Gadahn, an American al-Qaeda operative, praises Nidal 2010 Hasan as a hero and encourages more lone wolf attacks. Summer, The first issue of al-Qaeda's Inspire magazine is released, among its pages is an article 2010 titled "Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.” October, In a second as-Sahab video, Adam Gadahn encourages more lone wolf attacks against 2010 the United States. May, Usama Bin Laden is killed during an American raid in Pakistan. Shortly after, Ayman 2011 al-Zawahiri becomes the leader of al-Qaeda.

September Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, high-ranking members of AQAP and editors of 2011 Inspire, are killed in an American drone strike. It is likely that Adam Gadahn took over editing of Inspire at this time. April, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev detonate two pressure cooker bombs at the finish line 2013 of the Boston Bombings. June, Inspire 11 is published, containing articles praising the Boston Bombings and Woolwich 2013 murder.

5 Discussion

KJ A. The Internet plays a significant role in the . A2.1 The first step of the radicalization radicalization process among potential terrorists. process is Pre-Radicalization. This step The Internet gives potential terrorists the freedom describes an individual’s world prior to their to immerse themselves in radical ideologies and journey towards radicalization, and there is receive training within the comfort of their own likely little role for the Internet to play in this homes. Websites, forums, chat rooms, blogs, step.4 videos and online books and magazines serve as the chief source of information about Islam for potential terrorists, and provide them with access . A2.2 The second step is Self-Identification, in to jihadi ideologies and information. which the individual begins exploring radical Islam after being influenced by both internal A1. The Internet is almost certainly an invaluable and external factors. In this step, the Internet resource for potential terrorists. Online content not almost certainly acts as the chief source of only supports radicalization, but also provides information about Islam, and as a venue to 5 training and tradecraft information, and serves as a meet other like-minded individuals. tool for preparing terrorist attacks. According to a report by the CRS, the Internet serves to spur radicalization by making it . A1.1 According to a report by the easier for potential jihadists to find and 6 Congressional Research Service (CRS), interact with each other. radicalizing material is readily accessible online, as are virtual communities where it is A3. The last two steps of the radicalization possible to discuss the merits of jihad. Since 2005, video sharing websites have broadened process—Indoctrination and Jihadization—have the availability of jihadi video material, and all almost certainly been heavily influenced by the types of other texts and graphic images spread of radical Islam on the Internet. These two supporting violent jihad exist on the Internet, steps are the final steps towards militancy and acts including numerous guides for tradecraft, such of terrorism; they pose the most significant threat as bomb-making.2 to the security of the United States.

. A1.2 In addition to affecting the radicalization . A3.1 The third step in the process is process (see the following points, A2-A3), the Indoctrination, in which an individual Internet almost certainly offers potential progressively intensifies his beliefs and adopts jihadists the operational capabilities. Online radical Islam. During this step, the individual sources can aid them in collecting intelligence likely devotes their time on the Internet to extremist sites and chat rooms to reinforce about their targets, communicating with each 7 other, recruiting additional members, and their beliefs and legitimize them. According providing training and guidance.3 to the CRS, the Internet allows jihadist to “normalize” behavior considered inappropriate 8 A2. No exact formula exists for which individuals in a real-world environment. are susceptible to radicalization; however, there is a general process that they undergo. The process . A3.2 The final step is Jihadization in which of radicalization consists of four steps, which people challenge and encourage each other to break down the individual’s original beliefs and act on their beliefs. In this final step of the process, the Internet acts as a tactical resource personality, and facilitate the growth of a radical 9 persona. The Internet likely plays little role in the for gathering information. Additionally, first step, Pre-Radicalization, but plays an jihadists are able to use the Internet to displace important role in the second step, Self the culpability of their violent actions, Identification. claiming that their violence is an inevitable

1 response when faced with overpowering . A4.4 In July 2011, U.S. Army private Naser enemies, i.e. the West.10 Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in Texas for allegedly plotting a shooting spree and bombing in the area. Abdo intended to kill A4. The use of the Internet for radicalization, soldiers near the same place where Army instruction, and encouragement to join terrorist Major Nidal Hasan reportedly killed 13 organizations or commit acts of terrorism has individuals in 2009. Federal officials noted occurred on multiple occasions. In the majority of that Abdo also possessed an article on how to cases, al-Qaeda sources have been discovered in construct an explosive device, among other the possession of perpetrators. items. The article was from Inspire.14

. A4.1 From May 2009 through December . A4.5 In November 2012, Miguel Alejandro 2012, arrests were made for 42 homegrown, Santana Vidriales was arrested for allegedly jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American plotting with three others to join either al citizens or legal permanent residents of the Qaeda or the Taliban in Afghanistan. United States; two of these plots resulted in According to DOJ, he had read articles from successful attacks—the Fort Hood shooting in Inspire about bomb making and weapons Texas and shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy training.15 Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas. From September 11, 2001 through April 2009, there . A4.6 On April 15, 2013, Dzhokhar and were 21 homegrown, jihadist inspired terrorist Tamerlan Tsarnaev detonated two pressure plots; two resulted in attacks, and never more cooker bombs at the Boston Marathon. In the

than six occurred in a single year. The rise in evidence presented at his indictment were homegrown activity after April 2009 suggests several jihadist books, easily found on Google, that there are Americans susceptible to radical and a copy of Inspire magazine with jihadi ideologies given the proper instructions to make a pressure cooker bomb.16 circumstances. In many of these cases, the Internet can act as a facilitator for KJ B. This report assesses that al-Qaeda’s Internet radicalization, instruction, training, and and media strategy has strengthened since the encouragement for violence.11 death of Usama bin Laden (UBL). Under UBL, al- Qaeda used the Internet as a tool to communicate . A4.2 Before his November 5, 2009, gun between operatives and send instructions. rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, U.S. Army However, in the final years of bin Laden’s Major Nidal Hasan purportedly exchanged e- leadership and after his death, the Internet and mails with the late Anwar al-Awlaki, the media strategy of al-Qaeda centered on spreading American citizen who was in charge of Al- its ideology. Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It remains publicly unknown how the contact B1. Under Usama bin Laden’s leadership, al- influenced Hasan. After the Fort Hood Qaeda used the Internet as an organizational tool shootings, As-Sahab and Awlaki issued for safe communication, organization, planning, statements dubbing Hasan a hero.12 and training among operatives. Additionally, he began initiatives to establish a global network . A4.3 In July 2010, Paul Rockwood Jr. pled under the ideology of al-Qaeda. guilty to making false statements in a domestic terrorism investigation. He closely followed . B1.1 UBL’s al-Qaeda had a central leadership Awlaki’s online pronouncements and that functioned as a figurehead and inspiration, developed an “execution” hit list that included while the daily logistics were under the 15 people Rockwood believed had desecrated domain of field commanders. This was Islam.13 maintained by using the Internet to provide, maintain, and update the ideological and

2 strategic framework within the commanders continues its use of the Internet as a medium to operate.17 share its ideology and provide information for its followers in other countries. . B1.2 Al-Qaeda had a four stage long-term strategy, which was divided into four aspects: . B2.1 The organizational structure of al-Qaeda, military, ideological/political within the with al-Zawahiri in charge, has almost Islamic world, ideological/political within the certainly remained unchanged from the populations of the US and its allies, and organization under UBL (outlined in B1.1) economic. Under its military aspect, al-Qaeda sought to become a global network through . B2.2 Under al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda manuals, affecting changes that will take al-Qaeda ideologies, and long-term strategies continue outside the scope of international security to be available on the Internet. The forums and forces. By converting al-Qaeda into a set of blogs remain active, and al-Qaeda continues to guiding principles, an ideology, it transcends provide ideological resources to make all national boundaries and makes affiliation affiliation and enfranchisement easy. and enfranchisement simple.18 . B2.3 Like UBL, al-Zawahiri placed similar . B1.3 Bin Laden placed great stock in public importance on the public relations aspect of al- relations efforts to Muslims and releasing Qaeda’s mission. In his book, Knights Under statements appealing to the Western public. the Prophets Banner, he emphasized, “We Using as-Sahab and other al-Qaeda media must win the people’s respect, conscience, and organizations, like the International Media affection. The people will not love us unless Front of Islam, UBL released dozens of videos they feel that we love them, care about them, 22 and speeches as part of his campaign to create and are ready to defend them.” Al-Zawahiri spread al-Qaeda ideology.19 also has appeared in more video messages than UBL, most of them while UBL was still 23 . B1.4 American-born operatives were placed in in charge. Based on this information, it is high positions to utilize their skills. Samir almost certain that al-Zawahiri will continue a Khan, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Adam Gadahn similar media strategy. were all placed as members of AQAP and as- Sahab. Under UBL, they were responsible for taping and releasing messages, reaching out to . B2.4 After the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki, and the Western population, and creating and Samir Khan in 2011, Inspire magazine editing Inspire magazine.20 continues to be published, likely spearheaded 24 by Adam Gadahn. . B1.5 In 2010, Inspire magazine was created to provide non-Arabic speaking supporters a . B2.5 In 2010, under UBL, As-Sahab and resource for radicalization, training, and AQAP took steps to promote a new strategy of encouragement for action. lone wolf terrorism in the United States, and 25 other Western countries. It is probable that . B1.6 In 2010, the American-born as-Sahab this strategy was a reaction to the increasing spokesman, Adam Gadahn, released two challenge, due to U.S. counterterrorism videos praising the shooting and encouraged efforts, of contacting and training operatives to Muslims in the West to conduct lone wolf successfully conduct attacks in the West. In operations in the name of the global jihad. June 2013 Issue 11 of Inspire was released. In This was the first time As-Sahab openly this issue, AQ praised the Boston Bombings encouraged and publicized lone wolf and the Woolwich murder, the beheading of a terrorism.21 British soldier in England in 2013, and called 26 for more lone wolf attacks. B2. As the leader of al-Qaeda central, Ayman al- Zawahiri continues the path set by UBL. Al-Qaeda

3 . B2.6 Despite American efforts to disrupt al- including that Arabic forums “al-Shamouq” Qaeda’s operations, the organization continues and “al-Fidad,” as well as the English “Ansar its operations to reach the goal of becoming a al-Mujahideen” forum. These forums offer global network. Official AQ presence remains potential jihadists a safe haven to discuss jihad the same, however, the information continues among each other and ask questions of al- to spread as individuals share information Qaeda and other jihadists. Ansar al- from AQ sites and videos to other sites, Mujahideen is one of the largest al-Qaeda including social media websites.27 forums, and contains forum threads from terrorist training, to physical fitness regimens, KJ C. The al-Qaeda media organization, as- to technical support. These forums play an Sahab, poses a growing threat to U.S. national important role in spreading ideology as users security through its increasing online presence and translate the material on them, and repost it to its growing prominence within al-Qaeda. As- their own websites, blogs or social media Sahab has evolved with modern technology, and accounts.30 excels at spreading its influence across many different Internet venues. Attempts by the U.S. government to hinder and prevent the operations . C1.3 Since 2010, as-Sahab has been producing of As-Sahab have not had a lasting impact. It is an English magazine titled “Inspire.” This likely that over the next ten years, As-Sahab will magazine targets non-Arabic speaking continue to utilize new technologies and increase jihadists in the West, providing tips on how to the presence of al-Qaeda on the Internet. create weapons and bombs. The publication also features interviews with upper level al- C1. As-Sahab’s functions have gradually Qaeda members, like Adam Gadahn, as well increased over the past decade from its original as messages from bin Laden in earlier copies, 31 task of releasing statements from al-Qaeda and al-Zawahiri in later copies. leadership to playing a role in spreading al-Qaeda policy and ideology. Since its first production in . C1.4 Jihadi books are available for download 2001, as-Sahab has been releasing statements and from the Internet after a simple Google search. video messages for Usama bin Laden and Ayman In the indictment of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev it was al-Zawahiri. In the past five years, as-Sahab has mentioned that he had downloaded a copy of taken on a more prominent role, reaching across Inspire magazine and numerous jihadi books, various Internet mediums to spread al-Qaeda’s including a book with a forward by Anwar al- influence. Awlaki, and a book by Abdullah Azzam, who was the mentor and teacher of Usama bin . C1.1 Since 2001, as-Sahab has been Laden. 32 responsible for editing and releasing video statements containing messages from al-Qaeda leadership. Content of the videos varies; some . C1.5 Al-Qaeda-inspired blogs are also found are messages to Western leaders or the on the Internet. Before becoming an editor of populations of Western countries; others are in Inspire magazine, Samir Khan published a Arabic, reaching out to people in the Middle blog, called “Inshallah Shaheed,” while living East. More recently, there have been in the United States.33 His blog was heavily numerous videos, either in English or influenced by radical sources, devoting an containing English subtitles, aimed at entire section to explaining and emphasizing 28 promoting lone wolf terrorism. In one video, the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian author, Adam Gadahn provided tips on how to attack educator, and Islamist theorist who was a American targets, including a section on how leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood in 29 to acquire weapons within the United States. Egypt during the rule of Gamal Abdul

. C1.2 Al-Qaeda maintains several forums,

4 Nasser.1, 34, 35 C3. As-Sahab has become a tool for not only C2. As-Sahab almost certainly holds a prominent announcing new strategies to its followers around position in the hierarchy of al-Qaeda. The leaders the world, but also for providing instruction and of as-Sahab have been American educated guidance to them. Through as-Sahab, al-Zawahiri operatives, who also hold high ranking positions in and Adam Gadahn released statements al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, like Anwar al- encouraging individual action and praising lone Awlaki and Samir Khan. The experienced wolf attacks, setting a new direction for al-Qaeda. leadership along with UBL’s emphasis on publicity placed early importance on as-Sahab. . C3.1 In 2010, following the 2009 Fort Hood After UBL’s death, the organization maintains its shooting, as-Sahab released two videos, featuring prominence under al-Zawahiri. Adam Gadahn, praising Nidal Hasan, and encouraging more lone wolf attacks against the . C2.1 Since 2001, as-Sahab has consistently West. 38 worked closely with Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to produce statements and messages . C3.2 Al-Qaeda’s new emphasis on lone wolf for broadcast. operations has placed increased importance on the online presence of al-Qaeda ideologies and . C2.2 As-Sahab’s leadership has consisted of literature. As-Sahab publications, like Inspire, infamous and prominent Muslim-American AQ forums, like Ansar al-Mujahideen, and video operatives including: Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir messages now aim to provide online training for Khan, and Adam Gadahn. These three attained potential terrorists. their positions due to their background as American citizens and built as-Sahab into the media production center it is today. C4. As-Sahab’s leadership and operations are unlikely to have been permanently damaged by the . C2.3 According to individuals at the Middle efforts of the American government. The drone East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), operations of the U.S. government, along with following the deaths of UBL, Anwar al-Awlaki, cyber operations, aimed at limiting al-Qaeda’s and Samir Khan in 2011, AQ media is produced operations have seen some success. However, key by a new generation of producers, including Adam operations of as-Sahab continue under the purview Gadahn and Naser al-Wahishi, the current head of of Adam Gadahn. AQAP.36 . C4.1 After the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki and . C2.4 In 2012, the prominence of as-Sahab’s Samir Khan, both editors of Inspire and members leader, Adam Gadahn, was confirmed in the of AQAP and as-Sahab, there was an eight month Abbottabad letters, seventeen of the documents hiatus in the publication of Inspire. From July recovered from UBL’s compound in Pakistan that 2010 to September 2011, as-Sahab released seven were translated and analyzed by the Combating issues of Inspire. In May 2012, Inspire 8 and 9 Terrorism Center at West Point. Gadahn’s letter to were released. Overall, seven issues were released high ranking al-Qaeda officials contained media in the year and a half before the deaths of al- advice for bin Laden’s next statement, as well as a Awlaki and Khan, but in the two years following critique of al-Qaeda strategy and the actions of al- their deaths, only four issues have been released.39 Qaeda affiliates.37 . C4.2 Following the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan in 2011, it is likely that Adam

1 Gadahn, the American al-Qaeda operative, is now Sayyid Qutb’s writings had great influence on Ayman one of the leaders of as-Sahab. Despite being al-Zawahiri, who was a student of Qutb’s brother, and indicted for treason and hunted by the government, on UBL, who attended weekly lectures of Qutb’s brother. Zawahiri paid homage to Qutb in his book Gadahn has evaded all attempts to capture or Knights under the Prophet’s Banner. assassinate him. There have been numerous

5 reports of his arrest and/or death, but they have all attacks and plots since 9/11 do exhibit some been proven false. With the other two American broad themes, including: little stomach for editors already dead, the death of Adam Gadahn suicide or martyrdom among plotters, would likely cripple the English-language successful attacks by lone wolves, and varied magazine.40 capabilities among the plots. Many of these plots have notably benefited from al-Qaeda’s . C4.3 The eleventh issue of Inspire was use of the Internet, including those mentioned released on Twitter on May 14, 2013, but the of this paper (see Section A3).44 file was corrupted and only 20 blank pages were visible after the cover page. While it is . D1.3 The broad themes that have developed unclear how exactly the file was corrupted, since 9/11 are likely indicators of the shift U.S. security officials said the recent operation towards anonymity, subtlety, and discretion in was only the latest American attempt to cases of self-radicalization and homegrown disrupt al-Qaeda’s online propaganda. terrorism. Reduced desire for martyrdom However, the issue was re-released on May 30 likely indicates a desire to survive the attack to in its full form.41 either continue living or continue the fight. Either way, this requires a low profile and . C4.4 During the summer in 2013, Adam limited attention from authorities. The other Gadahn was featured in two videos. He has theme, varied capabilities among terrorists, not been in any videos since, and is likely in likely indicates that the perpetrators of these hiding in Pakistan. This is not the first time attacks receive informal training, i.e. through that Gadahn has gone into hiding, and it is the Internet, or the training at hand rather than unlikely that he will remain silent.42 formal training from camps. As seen in the cases of Nidal Hasan in 2009 and the Tsarnaev brothers in 2013, (see Section D3) their KJ D. Al-Qaeda’s Internet and media strategy is discretion and low profile allowed them to changing the trends of Islamic radicalization and carry out successful attacks on in America homegrown terrorism in the United States. Due to using the tools at their disposal. the increased role of the Internet it is likely that radicalization within the United States is now D2. The Internet has changed the trends of self- hinged on anonymity, after U.S. authorities foiled radicalization, as well as homegrown Islamic previous attacks. Using the Internet, al-Qaeda terrorism within the United States. The abundant passively influences and trains individuals with no availability of extremist sources and tactical official links to the organization. guidance on forums and websites has likely neutralized the need for potential terrorists to D1. Homegrown violent jihadist activity after the travel to training camps. Additionally, self- September 11 attacks (9/11) is not easily radicalized individuals seem to blend into society categorized. Each case varies from the next with with little notice of their radicalization. very few common denominators present, but there is a growing trend of lone wolf attacks and the use . D2.1 While terrorist training camps still play a of the Internet for training or guidance. role in Al-Qaeda’s strategy, and are sought out by homegrown terrorist operatives, the . D1.1 Since 9/11, there have been 38 information needed to conduct a successful homegrown plots focused domestic targets, 22 attack can be found online. plots focused on foreign targets. Of these o D2.1.1 An Islamic terrorist cell in plots, 35 involved intent to or actual travel southern California was discovered in abroad for training or to plan for terrorist 2012 planning to join either an al- attacks.43 Qaeda or Taliban affiliated training camp in Afghanistan.45 . D1.2 According to the CRS report, “American o D2.1.2 Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Jihadist Terrorism,” 60 homegrown jihadist Tsarnaev were able to execute

6 successfully a large and public attack to his country. However, his co- on American soil, using mostly online workers did not suspect he was sources for training and guidance, like radical. One nurse recalled discussing Inspire magazine. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 9/11, and bias against Muslims with Major . D2.2 In cases of self-radicalization and lone Hasan, he said that he detected no wolf attacks, the individual is able to receive trace of radicalism.49 training and encouragement from the comforts of his own home. For example, in 2011, as- . D3.2 The case of the Boston bombings Sahab released a video in which Adam suspect, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, demonstrates the Gadahn gave numerous tips, including how influence of the Internet on the radicalization easy it is to obtain weapons at gun shows in and training of potential terrorists, and the the U.S. and then attack American targets.46 continuation and escalation of lone wolf terrorism in the United States. D3. In cases of Islamic lone wolf attacks among Americans, there is a trend of anonymity. o D3.2.1 Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s path to Susceptible individuals radicalize subtly, without radicalization (see Annex A) differed arousing the suspicions of their friends and from his brother’s. Tamerlan Tsarnaev families, and without suspicion from the had a criminal past and had traveled authorities, as is shown in two of the most crucial abroad, possibly to a training camp.50 and most successful lone wolf attacks on U.S. soil However, the younger brother, in the last ten years. Dzhokhar, had not traveled abroad, but had instead been enrolled at college. . D3.1 The radicalization of Major Nidal Hasan (see Annex A) demonstrates the beginning of o D3.2.2 The indictment of Dzhokhar the use of the Internet to influence susceptible Tsarnaev revealed that he had individuals to actions in cases of homegrown downloaded numerous radical Islamic terrorism. publications from the Internet. Among them were three extremist o D3.1.1 Major Nidal Hasan met Anwar books, one of which was downloaded al-Awlaki when he was the imam at from an extremist web forum called the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls at-Tibya. He also downloaded was Church, VA in 2001. Since 2008, Volume One of Inspire magazine, Major Hasan sent approximately which includes instructions on how to sixteen emails to al-Awlaki. In his e- build improvised explosive devices mail inquiries, Major Hasan appears using pressure cookers.51 to have been deeply engaged with applying religious values to o D3.2.3 Despite a few minor hints of violence.47 Dzhokhar’s radical attitude, like a post on his Twitter feed on Marathon o D3.1.2 Nidal Hasan was a self- Monday last year referred to a Quran radicalized jihadi. He reportedly verse often used by radical Muslim visited several extremist websites on clerics and propagandists, he was his personal computer, and indicated thought of as a normal teenager. his extremist tendencies in his emails According to friends and family, to Anwar al-Awlaki.48 Dzhokhar was a friendly, relaxed teenager. For example, his uncle o D3.1.3 Some senior faculty members described him as an angel, and his at Walter Reed were questioning his friends characterized him as a party ability as a psychiatrist and his loyalty loving “pothead.”52

7 Annex A: Paths to Radicalization peers, and at least one lodged a complaint with the professor.57 Nidal Hasan: Step 1: Pre-Radicalization . According to investigators, Hasan sent approximately sixteen emails sent to . A quiet man, Nidal Hasan had few social Anwar al-Awlaki including questions of ties and is remembered by his colleagues Islamic interpretation, which reflected as a man “out on the periphery”. During Hasan’s familiarity with al-Awlaki’s his time stationed at Walter Reed, Hasan sermons and texts supporting violent was struggling internally with the conflict jihad.58 of being a Muslim soldier during a time when his country was at war in Muslim . By December 2008, around the time he lands.53 began emailing Anwar al-Awlaki, Hasan appeared to be deeply engaged with . While working at Walter Reed in 2001, applying religious values to violence. In a Hasan occasionally attended services at web posting investigators believed was the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, written by him, Hasan suggested that a VA. At this point, Anwar al-Awlaki was suicide bomber might have just as noble a the preacher of this mosque, and presided purpose as a soldier who throws himself over the funeral of Hasan’s mother in May on a grenade to protect his comrades.59 2001.54 Step 4: Jihadization . Fearing deployment, Hasan researched ways to obtain an early discharge from the . Major Hasan was transferred to Fort Hood military, but he abandoned the effort when in July 2009. At an unknown time after his he decided that he could not succeed, transfer, Hasan learned that he was likely adding to his growing internal scheduled for deployment to Afghanistan. struggle.55 By September, he had purchased a handgun, almost certainly in preparation Step 2 and 3: Self Identification and Indoctrination for the shooting.60

. Part of his disenchantment with the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev: military was his deep and public Step 1: Pre-Radicalization opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shaped by his growing . Before his radicalization, Dzhokhar almost religious fervor. In a PowerPoint certainly faced an identity crisis. Dzhokhar presentation in 2007, Hasan argued that was the youngest of four children. He was the Quran forbids Muslims to kill other born in the former Soviet republic of Muslims, placing Muslim soldiers in an Kyrgyzstan, but his family constantly moved impossible position. If they are not placed in search of a stable home. Eventually, the in conscientious objector status, he argued Tsarnaev’s moved from Dagestan, Russia, to that there might be adverse events, like the the United States.61 case of Sgt. Hasan Akbar, who killed two soldiers and wounded fourteen others in . While he thrived in school, as both a student Kuwait.56 and an athlete, Dzhokhar kept his home life private, deflecting his peers’ curiosity about . For a Master’s program in Public Health, his personal affairs. Hasan gave another presentation titled, “Why the War on Terror is a War on . About two to three years ago, Dzhokhar’s Islam.” It was found inappropriate by his mother, Zubeidat, and his brother, Tamerlan, had a deep religious epiphany. At the time,

8 Tamerlan’s new devotion irritated Dzhokhar. . According to the Anti-Defamation League, During one visit two years ago, Tamerlan Tamerlan and Dzhokhar were inspired by ordered Dzhokhar and one of his friends to sit online sermons by Anwar al-Awlaki. These and force the two teenagers to read a book sermons shared an ideology of extreme about the fundamentals of Islam and prayer; intolerance and justified violence against non- after that, the boys began avoiding his believers.68 apartment. 62 Step 4: Jihadization . Dzhokhar’s crisis likely came to fruition when his parents divorced in 2011, right before . There is little information available about the Dzhokhar entered college. His father, Anzor, last step in the radicalization process for returned to Russia, and soon so did his mother. Dzhokhar. Tamerlan stepped in to fill the void as head of the family.63 . According to his indictment, Dzhokhar had downloaded several jihadist books, including: . According to one of his friends, Dzhokhar “The Slicing Sword, Against the One Who looked up to Tamerlan, who never gave him Forms Allegiance With the Disbelievers and bad advice, and became dependent on him Takes Them as Supporters Instead of Allah, after their father went back to Russia.64 His Messenger and the Believers (with a foreword by Anwar al-Awlaki),” “Defense of Step 2 and 3: Self Identification and Indoctrination the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation After Imam,” by Abdullah Azzam, “Jihad and the . During high school, as his mother and brother Effects of Intention Upon It,” and also a copy became more religious, Dzhokhar began to of Inspire magazine with instructions on how attend a small prayer group that met at lunch. to build a bomb.69 One of the members of this prayer group described Dzhokhar’s faith, “Islam isn’t casual o These books glorified jihad and to Dzhokhar, he took his religion very martyrdom, advocating violence seriously. This likely marks Dzhokhar’s shift designed to terrorize the perceived from not caring about Islam, demonstrated by enemies of Islam.70 his previous reluctance to visit his brother’s apartment, to beginning to identify it as a serious part of his life.65

. In college, Dzhokhar’s grades plummeted. He no longer cared about his dream of becoming an engineer, and he was plagued by violent nightmares.66

. He began to make comments that indicated a change in his beliefs. He expressed wonder that more people did not realize that 9/11 was an inside job. He became defensive about the confluence of Islam and terrorism. According to his friends, he said, “God is all that matters. It doesn’t matter about school and engineering, when it comes to school and being an engineer, you can cheat easily. But when it comes to going to heaven you can’t cheat.”67

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