Drones, Balance of Power, and “Just War”: Assassination and Warfare in a New Century

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Drones, Balance of Power, and “Just War”: Assassination and Warfare in a New Century Social Education 82(1), pp. 53–58 Boys inspect the wreckage of a car hit by a drone air strike near the ©2018 National Council for the Social Studies northern city of Marib, Yemen, November 3, 2017. Reuters/Ali Owidha Reuters/Ali Drones, Balance of Power, and “Just War”: Assassination and Warfare in a New Century Mark Pearcy On September 30, 2011, in Yemen, Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American-born mon good.”3 Teachers can prepare stu- Islamic cleric, was struck by missiles fired from an American drone. Al-Aulaqi—who dents for this responsibility by explor- frequently delivered radical speeches in colloquial English—had been designated an ing the use of weaponized drones within “operational [terrorist] leader”1 by the U.S. government. Also in the car was another a pedagogical framework called “just U.S. citizen, Samir Khan.2 These were the first American citizens to be killed by a U.S. war” theory. drone strike, though apparently no one connected to the operation knew that Khan, the editor of al-Qaeda propaganda magazine Inspire, was with al-Aulaqi that day. PPG: New Policy for a New Khan was not an intentional target. Less than three weeks later, al-Aulaqi’s 16-year- Weapon old son, Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi (also a U.S. citizen), was also killed in Yemen by a While the president of the United States U.S. drone strike that was targeting someone else. is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the power to actually declare war The issues that arise surrounding ing in the world. The C3 Framework belongs to Congress (though no such drone strikes can be important topics asserts that “our democratic republic declaration has been issued since 1942). for classroom discussion and inquiry. will not sustain unless students [know] After the Vietnam War, Congress passed The subject not only impacts public the past; read, write, and think deeply; the War Powers Resolution, which estab- policy, but determines our moral stand- and act in ways that promote the com- lished that the president can send forces January/February 2018 53 abroad only in the case of a declaration The Perils of “Targeted” Killing have the same force and effect as assas- of war or in a “national emergency.” The Drones present certain advantages sinations. In February 2010, before the latter would require, from Congress, an that allow combatants to circumvent attack on al-Aulaqi, a memorandum “authorization for use of military force” many of the traditional risks of war- written for the attorney general argued (AUMF).4 fare—drones are comparatively inex- that “killings in self-defense are not In the wake of the September 11, pensive and they don’t get tired, thirsty, assassination[.]” Moreover, the memo 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed or hungry. The first “targeted killings” argued that al-Aulaqi’s citizenship did an AUMF that empowered the presi- with drones occurred in 2002, under not automatically prohibit a lethal dent to engage with a stateless, trans- George W. Bush, when the CIA killed action—“being a U.S. citizen … does national enemy. This authorization, six suspected members of al-Qaeda in not give a member of al-Qaeda a consti- however, has led to almost 16 years of Yemen.9 These attacks have apparently tutional immunity from attack.”16 This counterterrorism operations, including been effective in disrupting terrorist raises difficult questions: has a public the use of lethal drones in 8 countries. operations. According to an official U.S. desire for safety created a perpetual The AUMF states: estimate, approximately 2,600 terror- state of war with (and in) other nations? ists have been killed by targeted drone Have targeted killings been “normalized” [T]he President is authorized to strikes. However, several human rights into a tool of U.S. foreign policy? Are we use all necessary and appropriate organizations think the number is much comfortable with other nations utilizing force against those nations, higher and includes civilian fatalities.10 similar tools and policies? And are we organizations, or persons he Drone proponents point out that the comfortable with such methods being determines planned, authorized, risk to noncombatants is lower than with applied to Americans? committed, or aided the traditional air strikes. According to one terrorist attacks that occurred on study, the 2004–2013 civilian casualty Teaching with the PPG and Just September 11, 2001, or harbored rate from drone strikes in Pakistan was War Theory such organizations or persons in 28 percent—certainly lamentable, but The Presidential Policy Guidance is order to prevent any future acts lower than comparable casualty rates not only a mechanism for determining of international terrorism against in other modern conflicts.11 However, the use of drones, it is also a defense of the United States by such nations, a 2016 review of the evidence asserted that policy. Teachers can use it to help organizations or persons.5 that the civilian casualty rate under the students determine whether or not the Obama administration was “in the hun- PPG is, as it claims, “consistent with In effect, the 2001 AUMF grants the dreds or low thousands.”12 The stigma the laws and Constitution of the United president extraordinary authority over of civilian casualties is compounded, to States.” With it, teachers and students war with no specific end date or over- many critics, by the use of “signature can explore the changing nature of war sight. The Bush and Obama adminis- strikes.” These rely on an algorithm- powers in America: To what degree can trations both argued that the AUMF driven decision-making process, instead the president foresee “any future acts provided the legal foundation for the of human operators, and have their own of international terrorism”? Are there ongoing use of drones, a position which distressing record of mishap.13 Though adequate checks and balances of power has been adopted by Donald Trump.6 drones may, in fact, be an effective deter- when a U.S president orders a drone In 2013, the Obama administration rent to terrorism, they may also cause strike? Is it advisable (or even possible) released “written policy standards and unintended, lasting hostility in nations to determine a concluding date to a procedures that [formalized the] rigor- where support for U.S. policies is cru- president’s use of weaponized drones? ous process for reviewing and approving cially needed—a paradoxical outcome Teachers can begin with the PPG’s operations to capture or employ lethal often termed “blowback.”14 philosophical foundations. The con- force against terrorist targets.”7 The Another question about the use of ventions that govern the conduct of Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) drones revolves around what may seem war between nations (including the was publicly released in 2015 (though like a semantic distinction—the differ- UN Charter, The Hague and Geneva parts of it had been redacted8) and pro- ence between war and assassination. Conventions, and most international vided a glimpse into the decision-making The George W. Bush administration law and treaties) are rooted in a philo- process. It did not resolve many of the rescinded Executive Order 12333, which sophical tradition known as just war thorniest questions around drone strikes. had barred political assassination, argu- theory. Its basic tenet is that for war to It does, however, provide teachers with ing that it no longer had legal force, after be considered moral, it must be limited. a valuable resource for exploring how September 11th, as applied to national There are three broad components of drones are used. self-defense.15 The AUMF has created just war: jus ad bellum, “justice before a foundation for targeted killings, which war” (conditions under which wars may Social Education 54 be initiated); jus in bello, “justice during one person, there is no guarantee that EKIA, for “enemy killed in action” war” (acceptable conduct in waging war); those [others] deserved their fate … it’s after the attack—a standard practice and jus post bellum, “justice after war” a phenomenal gamble.”19 for bystanders killed in drone strikes.22 (requirements for a stable peace).17 For Students might consider how this des- the purposes of this activity, the first two Collateral Damage: Two U.S. ignation affects our conception of the components are most relevant. Students Citizen Fatalities victims of these attacks. can analyze the process described in the The deaths of U.S. citizens in drone President Obama did not comment PPG by comparing it with internation- strikes raise complex questions for teach- publicly on the death of Abdulrahman ally recognized (and largely accepted) ers and students. For instance, students al-Aulaqi, although he was reportedly restrictions on war-making (see Handout can consider whether or not the govern- “surprised and upset.” Administration B). By comparing these two handouts, ment’s arguments were adequate: was the officials privately acknowledged the students can analyze which elements attack on al-Aulaqi justified? After the nature of the error, terming it “an outra- of the drone program are rooted in just attack, then-President Obama referred geous mistake.” One acknowledged, “we war tradition—and to what degree (see to al-Aulaqi as “the leader of external killed three U.S. citizens … two of them Teacher’s Key below). operations for [Al-Qaeda in the Arabian weren’t even targets. That doesn’t look Other just war concepts provide com- Peninsula (AQAP)],” saying he had been good. It’s embarrassing.”23 pelling avenues of inquiry for students. responsible for several terrorist opera- For example, an argument in favor of tions, including a 2009 plot to blow A Classroom Discussion drones lies in the diminished risk to mili- up an airliner.20 But Samir Khan, who The redacted nature of the PPG makes tary personnel, which makes the use of died in the same attack, had not been determining the degree to which it is con- drones easier to contemplate.
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