EXPLAINING CONTENTIOUS COLLECTIVE ACTION OVER THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF OIL:
THE STATE AND INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PERUVIAN AMAZON
(2006-2019)
by
Gabriela Alejandra Ruiz Echevarria
B.A., Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2015
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
(Political Science)
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
(Vancouver)
March 2021
© Gabriela Alejandra Ruiz Echevarria, 2021
The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled:
Explaining contentious collective action over the environmental impacts of oil: The state and Indigenous organizations in the Peruvian Amazon (2006-2019)
submitted by Gabriela Alejandra Ruiz Echevarria in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science
Examining Committee:
Maxwell Cameron, Political Science, UBC Supervisor
Lisa Sundstrom, Political Science, UBC
Supervisory Committee Member
ii
Abstract
What determines the dynamics of contention and actors' engagement in collective action? Social movement research focuses on civil society's power to organize and react to challenges and emphasizes the importance of social movement autonomy. I argue that although social movements may have the autonomous capacity to respond to and to produce changes, the state's capacity and political will to implement policy critically shapes the political environment and cycle of contention within which social movements operate. The state is at once the source of citizens' grievances and deprivations and potentially the source of solutions--whether in terms of allocating goods and services or opening and closing the policy arena for political participation. I evaluate this argument by analyzing Amazonian Indigenous organizations and their struggle regarding oil extraction in Block 192 in Loreto, Peru. The Peruvian state is often reactive but not responsive to its population's needs and demands due to its lack of capacity and political will to implement change. This thesis examines state capacity and will in terms of the exercise of authority and policy implementation. It concludes that the broader political environment creates incentives for the emergence, development and strengthening of social movements and the persistence of the social conflict between movements and the state.
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Lay Summary
What determines the dynamics of contention and actors' engagement in collective action? Social movement research focuses on civil society's power to organize and react to challenges and emphasizes the importance of social movement autonomy. However, I argue that there is a lack of understanding of the critical importance of states to sustaining social mobilization. The state's capacity and political will to implement policy critically shape the political environment and political transformations within which social movements operate. I evaluate this argument by analyzing Amazonian Indigenous organizations and their struggle regarding oil extraction in Block
192 in Loreto, Peru. This thesis examines state capacity and will in terms of the exercise of authority and policy implementation.
iv
Preface
As the author of the thesis, Gabriela Alejandra Ruiz Echevarria conducted all parts of the research.
She identified the topic of study, designed the research project and gathered and analyzed the information.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ...... iii
Lay Summary ...... iv
Preface ...... v
Table of Contents ...... vi
List of Tables ...... vii
List of Figures ...... viii
1. Introduction ...... 1
2. The state and social movements ...... 4
3. Indigenous mobilization in the Andean region ...... 9
4. Hydrocarbon industry and social conflict in the Amazon: the case of Block 192 ...... 14
5. The dynamic of contentious collective action in Block 192 (2006-2019) ...... 19
5.1. Broad change processes ...... 20
5.2. Attribution of threats or opportunities ...... 24
5.3. Organizational appropriation and brokerage ...... 27
5.4. Collective action, negotiation and demobilization ...... 33
6. Was this a social movement? ...... 40
7. Conclusion ...... 42
Bibliography ...... 45
vi
List of Tables
Table 1 Indigenous organizations in negotiation tables ………………………………17
vii
List of Figures
Figure 1 Dynamic & cyclical causal argument ………………………………………...20
viii
1. Introduction
What determines the dynamics of contention and actors' engagement in collective action?
This study analyzes the dynamics of contention between the state and social movements by analyzing Amazonian Indigenous organizations and their struggle regarding oil extraction in Block
192, located in Loreto, Peru. In particular, it focuses on the fight of the Federation of Native
Communities of Río Corrientes (FECONACO) and the movement Indigenous Peoples United in
Defense of their Territories (PUINAMUDT).
The social movement research agenda emphasizes civil society's power to push for social and political transformation. Indeed, social movements can be strong actors with the capacity to organize and mobilize against holders of power for social change. However, I argue that the dynamics of contention go beyond the characteristics of the social movement, and it is the state and its capacity and political will to exercise authority and implement policy in its territory that has a role in shaping conflict and political change. Although social movements can have the power to react to challenging situations and coordinate efforts to produce change, the state has an essential role in shaping the political environment and is a key actor that determines the emergence, development, and social movements' outcomes.
The state is the point of departure when studying social movements because it is the source of citizens' grievances and deprivations. In Latin America, the reach of the state's presence within its territory, the provision of services and the efficacy of its bureaucracies and policies is, in general, limited and truncated (O'Donnell, 1993). Although other private actors, such as extractive industries, cause several impacts in affected communities, the state is the one who fails to protect and recognize their rights and regulate the companies' activities. On the other hand, the state shapes
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the political system, creates political opportunities and determines the relationship between social movements and the representation system (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995). Lastly, movements expect the state to provide solutions in the advent of social conflict. The state decides on the openness or closure of the policy-making system, and the holders of power make the final decision regarding social and political reform. Social movements need to interact with the state to access and action for changes in the political arena. In that sense, transformations will not be possible without the support of the state.
The mobilization against Block 192 in Loreto, Peru, represents an example of how actors engage in collective action and how the persistence of environmental impacts generated by five decades of petroleum production has led to a dynamic of contention, including periods of mobilization and demobilization. Since the start of the oil extractive activity in the 1970s, the
Peruvian Amazon became the most important oil area in the country. The American company
Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) was the first that started extraction activity in the area in 1971. Later, the Argentinian company Pluspetrol and the Canadian Pacific Stratus Energy (PSE) took charge in 2001 and 2015, respectively. However, oil extraction polluted the primary water sources of
Indigenous communities (streams, lakes and rivers) for subsistence. Thus, Indigenous organizations started emerging as a political force with an agenda that included their right to territory, a healthy environment, fair distribution of extractive activity benefits and participation in decision-making processes.
The case also illustrates the Peruvian state's role, the limits of state capacity and political will. The state responds to social and political challenges either by opening the political arena with dialogue tables and agreements or closing it by denying these spaces and repressing the population in protests. As the country's social conflict history shows, the state is often reactive but not
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responsive to its population's needs and demands. This dynamic of contention between the social movement and the state in Block 192 escalated from 2006 to 2019, when different windows of opportunity and interaction with opponents allowed the social movement's constitution in a challenging environment shaped by the state's actions and inactions.
To this end, my research analyzes primary and secondary information sources to address the case. Primary sources include Peruvian newspaper articles that contain interviews and testimonies of representatives of the social movement and the state. Secondary sources encompass the review of synthesized evidence from journal articles. Furthermore, the review of ethnographic work in the Block 192 area helped understand the context and interactions between actors. I selected two Peruvian newspapers in their online format, one of national scope and one of regional scope. El Comercio, founded in 1839, is the oldest newspaper in Peru and distributed throughout the country. La Región, on the other hand, is a newspaper founded in 1992 that is distributed in the department of Loreto and based in its capital, Iquitos. For both cases, I reviewed articles published between 2012 and 2020 using the tags Lote 192 (Block 192) and Lote 1AB (Block 1AB).
The research also considered online environmental and Indigenous news platforms, such as
Servindi, Inforegión, and Mongabay Latam, to name a few.
The thesis is divided into seven sections. After presenting the introduction in the first section, the second section proposes the theoretical setting on account of the state and social movements. The third section examines Indigenous mobilization in the Andean region, and the fourth touches upon the hydrocarbon industry and social conflict in the Peruvian Amazon. The fifth section analyzes the dynamics of contentious collective action in Block 192, and the sixth presents a reflection on the foundation of a social movement. The final section presents the conclusion.
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2. The state and social movements
A social movement is a sustained collective challenge to existing holders of power. It organizes based on shared purposes and solidarity networks and uses extra-institutional means to seek changes in the social and political structures (Tilly, 1978). This definition has various elements worth unpacking. Movements challenge structures with disruptive actions against opponents.
Common interests activate solidarity networks between the members of the movement and translate their purposes into actions. Furthermore, the activity between these solidarity networks generates a sense of the common good and shared demands. However, it is only by sustaining the collective action that the contention episodes can transform themselves into a social movement. In that sense, a social movement does not consist of one episode but instead of a series of repetitive actions (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015).
An extensive literature explains the emergence, development, and outcomes of social movements. Early approaches focused on psychological characteristics and interaction patterns to understand crowds' collective behaviour, deprivations, and motivations of social movements' participants (Couch, 1968; Jenkins, 1981; McAdam, 1999; Ormrod, 2009; Smelser, 1962). Other scholars added the importance of mobilization resources (McCarthy & Zald, 2014; Wilkes, 2004).
Most recent proposals focused their attention on political opportunity structures (POS) and the conditions that allow organization and engagement in collective action (Benford & Snow, 2000;
McAdam, 1999; McAdam et al., 1996; Tarrow, 2011). In contrast, others redirected their attention to culture, identity and autonomy of "new" social movements (NSM) and their operation distant from state institutions and political processes (Buechler, 2016; Klandermans, 1986; Melucci, 1980;
Snow, 2011; Touraine, 1988).
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The research agenda emphasizes the transformative power of civil society. However, critics argue that these approaches pay less attention to analyzing social movement-state relationships and the immersion of social movements within the formal arenas of institutional politics.
Furthermore, they pay less attention to how certain states' characteristics allow the emergence and development of social movements. (Davis, 1999; Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995; Mongiello,
2016).
POS theory, for instance, incorporates social movements and the state into a political opportunities cycle. In this cycle, the approach argues that one of the parties produces the opportunities and the other takes them as chances for action. However, Morris (2000) argues that the theory considers almost any favourable change in the political system produces social mobilization. Such an assumption shows a lack of understanding of the capacity and agency of the movement and its opponents to perceive or interpret political opportunities as such (Goodwin &
Jasper, 2003).
Besides, not all political opportunities emerge from the strategic ingenuity or will (or lack thereof) of the different actors involved in the struggle. The structural characteristics of the political context in which social movements, voluntarily or involuntarily, have to act can also determine them (Giugni, 2009; Koopmans, 1999). On the other hand, the approach does not entirely integrate social movements in decision-making processes or as agents that shape the state's content and practices (Mongiello, 2016; Steyn, 2012). The efforts to explain social movements need to bring the role of the state back for a better understanding of the nature and development of social movements and the interdependence relationship between them and the state.
The state stimulates and shapes the praxis of social movements. The actions and inactions of the state and the structural characteristics of the political context mould the environment and
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create opportunities for collective action. The institutional organization of the state and policy- making capacities, the political will and ideologies of leaders, and the changing structure of political power are aspects that shape social movements' actions and allow them to define their strategies (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995). Thus, when the state responds by opening the policy- making and participatory arena, social movements engage in conventional forms of expression such as negotiation tables. In contrast, when it responds by closing the political arena due to its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory, the state responds with its coercive apparatus to control and weaken social movements. In this scenario, social movements reformulate their tactics and engage in contentious collective action to portray issues and their inclusion in decision-making processes (Steyn, 2012).
The state is also the source of grievances, the target for contention, and movements expect the state to provide solutions. Social movements emerge and strengthen their claims due to the state's deprivation of valuable goods, rights and essential services. Conversely, it also needs the state to adjudicate the movement's conflicting claims and produce substantive political changes
(Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995). Besides the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, the state fulfills an administrative role that allows it to be the "ultimate arbiter" for the allocation of public and socially valuable goods, economic opportunities and rights (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995).
However, this provision of goods varies depending on the state's capacity to exercise authority and implement policy throughout the territory it controls and on the efficacy of its institutions or bureaucracies (Grassi & Memoli, 2016; Mann, 2008; Soifer, 2015).
Regarding the effective implementation of policy throughout the territory, the state's presence is uneven in Latin America, reaching some populations and geographic regions but not all (Davis, 1999). However, as O'Donnell (2010, p.121) argued, state presence is not only uneven
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but also "evanescent." Thus, we can find a permanent or sporadically presence of state-authorized powers in a specific territory (e.g. police stations, health care centers, state buildings and local representation). However, the legal system's enforcement is inefficient or never took hold to address locals' needs.
Davis (1999) argues that what explains the emergence and development of social movements in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s is the extent of citizens' distance from the state due to specific historical aspects of state formation and citizenship (e.g. geographic, institutional, cultural, class). Groups of the population closer to the state take advantage of existing and available institutional structures for participation. Political parties, lobby and other interest groups could fit within this description. On the other side of the spectrum, an extreme distance from the state can trigger the action of revolutionary movements that reject the state. We find social movements somewhere between these two extremes of the spectrum, where minimum features of democracy can allow the organizational formation and mobilization of social movements but, at the same time, can limit their activity and outcomes.
Within the social movement spectrum, groups more distant from the state would be more suspicious and disagree with the standard political process and procedures. These groups will be more prone to state repression as the government frequently perceives them as outsiders of the social contract established between citizens and the state. Such groups would have broad demands related to political inclusion, representation, and more substantial changes in political structures
(e.g., establishing new institutions of governance or mechanisms for political inclusion). Despite being distant from the state, collective actors might still have some or enough access to local authorities or decision-makers. Indigenous social movements might fit in this area due to their structural characteristics, demands, and a low or moderate degree of inclusion in Latin America's
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political sphere. The feeling of distance can trigger the emergence of the movement, but the desire to remedy this situation influences the adoption of strategies.
O'Donnell (1993) argues that in some countries of the Andean region, such as Peru, the state's responsiveness has been weak, discontinuous, captured by interests and oriented towards a pattern of capital accumulation. Although "weak states" can still contribute to domestic policy- making, the implementation is slow and inadequate, producing unintended or intended structural changes and sociopolitical reactions (Dargent & Urteaga, 2016; O'Donnell, 2010; Skocpol, 1985).
This lack of capacity to implement public policies affects the state's efficacy, effectiveness and credibility.
As stated by O'Donnell (1993, p.1361), "a state that is unable to enforce its legality supports a democracy of low-intensity citizenship." In that sense, although participatory rights are respected
(e.g. right to vote), the state's lack of efficiency of institutions (e.g. political parties and judiciary) does not assure an effective representation or proper treatment from the state apparatus. Thus, although democracy endures in Andean countries, such as Peru, these internal threats related to state capacity and its effects on citizens have been challenging and deteriorating its quality
(Zovatto, 2020).
Despite its uneven and evanescent presence in the territory, the state is "interwoven" with society, and its relationship with social movements is in constant engagement and estrangement
(O'Donnell, 2010). As Skocpol (1985) mentioned, we cannot analyze the power of the state or social movements in isolation. Finally, the state's configuration affects and encourages group formation and collective action, while social movements' actions can shape the state's actions as well. The following section will show this interaction in the Andean region.
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3. Indigenous mobilization in the Andean region
Since returning to democracy, social movements have been a feature of Latin America's daily life and important actors in shaping the quality of democracy (Bennett, 1995; Van Cott, 2007). The closure and openness of the political space and the persistence of core issues such as inequality, poverty and exclusion allowed individuals to organize and mobilize in protest to substandard living conditions, lack of representation and institutional effectiveness.
In the early 20th century, organized groups of peasants emerged to fight change forces associated with agrarian transformation, dispossession of land and means of production and proletarianization (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2011). During the second half of the century, Latin
American governments started integrating peasants into government-sponsored development plans, corporatism models and agrarian reforms with two objectives. On the one hand, to shape scenarios of economic integration of peasants to the national market; but, on the other, to appease the rural poor and avoid peasants revolutionary attempts (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2011).
The insertion of the region into the global capitalist system contributed to the adoption of neoliberal policies and the transformation of political and economic spheres by market forces.
Since the 1980s, privatization processes, reduced access to markets, the dismantling of already- weak institutions, and the rising technocratic control took peasant movements to press more effectively on land and food defence demands. Although territorial issues continued to be an important place of struggle, the nature of the demands changed when states ceded power, ancestral territories, and natural resources to private actors.
In this context, between 1970 and 1980, Indigenous peoples began to mobilize that, in addition to defending the land, added the defence of territory, natural resources and the recognition
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of autonomy and Indigenous rights. The context of the crisis of representation and their lack of connection with political institutions encouraged Indigenous people to create local organizations as an alternative to the state's exclusionary models and, later, to form larger regional and national organizations and transnational movements1 (Van Cott, 2004, 2005, 2007).
Indigenous movements demanded the participation of Indigenous peoples in decision- making processes. In addition to seeking representation, they also challenged the state's sovereignty. They demanded self-determination, multicultural policies, and the protection of traditional lands and natural resources. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
(CONAIE) in Ecuador and the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, for example, challenged the status quo and offered programmatic alternatives to neoliberal programs and
Indigenous peoples' participation in decision-making processes. These Indigenous movements achieved constitutional changes that recognized the states as multicultural nations and nature's rights (or "living well," in Spanish: buen vivir).
Peru has not gone through similar experiences. The country is home to 55 Indigenous peoples, 51 in the Amazon and 4 in the Andes, representing approximately 25% of the entire population (31 million) (Anarte, 2019; Chirapaq, 2018; Ministerio de Cultura, n.d.). Despite their strong presence in numbers, Indigenous organizations have taken longer to organize than the
Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases. Two aspects can explain intra-regional differences.
First, while in Bolivia, in 1970, movements such as the Katarista and Indianista, foundations of peasant and Indigenous movements, began to demand rights and participation in
1 For example, the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon River Basin (Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica, COICA) was founded in 1984 in Lima, Peru. This organization coordinates nine national Amazonian Indigenous organizations from Peru, Guyana, Brazil, Ecuador, Suriname, Colombia and Venezuela. 10
political spaces; Peru was going through a process of agricultural collectivization, mainly in the costa and sierra areas (Fernández Fontenoy, 2000). In that context, Juan Velasco Alvarado's military government (1968-1975) implemented a radical land reform that redefined Indigenous communities as peasant communities, or comunidad campesina, and cooperatives through the
1970 Peasant Communities Statute2.
In the Amazon, although the absence of the state in the territory allowed Indigenous people to maintain certain degrees of autonomy, the 1974 Native Communities Law challenged their efforts to preserve their sovereignty in their lands. The Law introduced the concept of native community, or comunidad nativa, and required Indigenous communities with common ethnic origins living on a limited territory to register to gain political recognition and official title to their ancestral lands (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005).
Even though the Law provided incentives to organize, it forced Indigenous peoples to do it in the state's terms for its legal recognition. The Law did not base the concept of comunidad nativa on Amazonian forms of organization and use of the territory, but on the Andean agrarian experience and the use of the land in family networks after implementing the Agrarian Reform and the 1970 Statute. Besides, the government only recognized common ownership areas for communities in territorial but not in ethnic terms. Furthermore, the Law provided Indigenous communities titles of areas smaller than the ones in use. This situation provoked the atomization of the Amazonian Indigenous population in multiple native communities localized in dispersed parts of the Amazon and their confrontation over their properties' limits (Orta-Martínez & Finer,
2010). Later, the 1993 Constitution cut Indigenous peoples' territorial rights and left open the
2 Velasco Alvarado promulgated the 1970 Peasant Communities Statue on February 17, eight months after the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law. Years later, during his first government, Alan García promulgated the Peasant Communities General Law in February 1987 (del Castillo & Castillo, 2005; Robles Mendoza, 2002). 11
privatization of Indigenous lands. Hence, these recent reforms kept the Indigenous peoples neither assimilated nor autonomous, recognized as communities, but with not recognized Indigenous rights.
Native communities living in shared territories constituted organizations, centrales and federations articulated by river basins with legal structures and forms of governance based on an assembly, statutes and representation (a leader or apu). During the second half of the 1970s, these organizations start assembling more prominent national structures (Chirif, 1997; Chirif & García,
2009; Van Cott, 2005). One representative case is the foundation in 1979 of the Interethnic
Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Amazonía Peruana, AIDESEP). To this day, AIDESEP groups 64 Amazonian Indigenous peoples represented by 109 local and regional federations and organizations and recognized internationally.
On the second intra-regional difference, while CONAIE's foundation in Ecuador in 1986,
Peru was going through an adverse context that impacted Indigenous resistance. Van Cott (2004) identifies key features of such a context. The presence of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso, particularly in the Amazon, resulted in Indigenous communities' massacre and massive migration processes from rural to urban areas between 1980 and 1990. On the other hand, the 1990s authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori restricted the activity of social movements and civil society organizations (Hoetmer, 2006; Van Cott, 2004). Furthermore, the negative connotations towards Indigenous people in urban areas resulted in the loss of traditional practices, languages, and Indigenous identity. The dispersion of the Indigenous population among the territory caused the emergence of numerous Indigenous organizations in different regions and disputes within the areas for the control and representation of the territory (Van Cott, 2005). Consequently, according
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to Yashar (2005), political associational spaces were elusive, mainly localized, and community networks and mobilization capacities of Indigenous groups were weak.
The return to democracy after Fujimori's authoritarian government and the defeat of
Sendero Luminoso allowed, to a certain extent, the activation of claim-making performances by
Indigenous people. However, the decentralization process in 2002 later strengthened the country's sharp geographic and institutional division. Despite the attempt to distribute power through the separation of functions in three levels of government (national, regional, local), the lack of effective resource management capacities and the continuing concentration of government institutions in the capital, Lima, demonstrated the deficiencies of the process and increased the distance between the state and citizens.
It is important to mention that the late 1990s evidenced an effort to unite the peasant populations of the Andes and native people of the Amazon into a single organization. In 2001, the
Permanent Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples of Peru (Conferencia Permanente de los Pueblos
Indígenas del Perú, COPPIP) was formed but not consolidated into an institutionalized political actor. Furthermore, there is no successful example of ethnic party formation like in the cases of
Pachakutik (CONAIE's political platform) in Ecuador and MAS in Bolivia. Although AIDESEP launched its electoral vehicle, its lack of success in elections and electoral laws changes limited its impact. Furthermore, self-governance prioritization as the primary goal provoked Indigenous organizations to implement Indigenous parliaments based on traditional values over political parties (Van Cott, 2005). The absence of indigenous political parties in Peruvian politics takes potential indigenous candidates to run for public representation positions through other national or regional parties or political movements.
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4. Hydrocarbon industry and social conflict in the Amazon: the case of Block 192
Loreto, located in the north of Peru, is the largest department in the country and covers almost one- third of the territory. 32 out of the 55 Peruvian Indigenous peoples inhabit the area, which is also one of the departments with higher poverty rates: between 32.9% and 36.2% of the population lives in poverty, 11.5% of the population whose first language is an Indigenous language has access to drinking water (INEI, 2018). Despite early efforts to explore and control the Amazon, the weak penetration of the state, institutional weakness and lack of public services provoked that the zone remained as an unincorporated space. Both the absence of the state and impoverishment has come hand in hand with resource extraction (Yashar, 2005).
The extraction of natural resources has been central to Peru's economic development. The rubber economic boom extraction in the 19th century marked the beginning of an era of extractive- commercial activities followed by wood and gold extraction and coffee production (Mayor &
Bodmer, 2009). In the 1920s, the Amazonian economy developed new economic activities such as oil extraction, and the discovery of oil fields in the Corrientes river basin in the 1970s represented a starting point of the oil extractive boom. Despite the almost non-existent environmental regulation and being the state the owner of the territory's natural resources3, the government granted Oxy, in 1971, a contract to start its operations in Block 192.
Block 192, located in Loreto, close to the Ecuadorian border, occupies the most important oil extraction area in the Peruvian Amazon, between the Pastaza, Corrientes, Tigre, and Marañón river basins. It has an extension of 290,000 hectares and is Peru's largest oil reserve. In 1979, Block
3 The 1993 Peruvian Constitution, and its previous version of 1979, establish that the state is the owner of the natural resources of the territory and that it is the state who can grant them to private actors and set the conditions for their use. 14
192 was the largest oil producer in the country (Lu, 2009). Currently, it produces 17% of Peru's oil production and has a capacity of production of 125 million barrels, valued at S/. 21 billion soles. 45% of oil revenue or canon4 received by Loreto comes from the exploitation of Block 192, which for the Regional Government and some municipalities represent almost 20% of their annual budget (El Comercio, 2020). Oxy exploited 150 oil wells and expanded the operations to adjoining blocks until 2001, when Pluspetrol took Block 192 for exploitation until August 2015. In turn, PSE obtained a two-year concession of Block 192 in August 2015. The government extended the contract with PSE first to January 2019, next to September 2020 and finally to the first quarter of
2021.
Since foreign companies started working in the area, and due to the absence of public services, Indigenous communities, mainly the Achuar peoples, started becoming more dependent on oil extraction. Oxy and Pluspetrol were a steady source of wage employment and commonly hired workforce, especially Indigenous adult men, for road maintenance and cleaning of spills. In the advent of an oil spill, PSE provides food and water to the affected communities. Moreover, the companies provide services, build health centers, and train health promoters (Orta-Martínez &
Finer, 2010). Therefore, the companies started filling the place the state left. However, when facing protests, Oxy and Pluspetrol reduced the services provided as a way of retaliation (Lu, 2009).
Despite its high value, Block 192 is one of the most polluting reserves in the country, which has affected Kiwcha, Achuar, and Quechua Indigenous peoples that inhabit the area. By 2015, approximately 211 oil spills occurred in this and the adjacent area of Block 8, and the pouring of
4 Oil canon and sobrecanon is defined by Peruvian Law as the right of the areas (departments) where the natural resources are located to participate adequately in the rent produced by the exploitation of oil and natural gas. It is made up of 12.5% of the Production Value obtained by the state for the exploitation and is paid with the royalties derived from such activity (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, n.d.). 15
oil wastewater into the Corrientes river is constant (La Región, 2016). In response, since the early
1990s, several Indigenous groups started organizing to defend the rights of territory and a healthy environment. Nevertheless, since the 2000s, they began holding protests in the oil field areas and
Loreto's main cities while learning about environmental and health risks and Indigenous rights protected by Peruvian law and international conventions. This situation produced a rise in social conflicts between Indigenous peoples, the state, and the extractive companies5. However, their demands for dialogue with the state and the company were more visible after 2006.
Some of the most influential organizations in the Block 192 area that raised their voice regarding the issue are in Table 1. FECONACO, in particular, represents more than 4,000 Achuar
Indigenous peoples grouped in 31 communities, and it has been the organization that had relatively more significant mobilization and success than its counterparts. For this reason, the research will focus mainly on FECONACO and the alliances that this organization constituted. These are not the only organizations that represent the river basins. However, they are more relevant when analyzing Block 192 to understand the dynamics of contention.
5 In March 2020, the Peruvian Ombudsman's Social Conflicts Report registered 128 social conflicts associated with environmental issues. 82 were related to mining but a significant number, 22, were related to hydrocarbon. 18 of them where located in Loreto. (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2020). 16
Table 1: Indigenous organizations in negotiation tables
N° Indigenous Organization River Acronym
Federation of Native Communities of Río
1 Corrientes (Federación de Comunidades Nativas Corrientes FECONACO
del Río Corrientes)
Quechua Indigenous Federation of Pastaza 2 Pastaza FEDIQUEP (Federación Indígena Quechua del Pastaza)
Cocama Association of Development and
Conservation San Pablo de Tipishca (Asociación 3 Marañón ACODECOSPAT Cocama de Desarrollo y Conservación San Pablo
de Tipishca)
Organization of Kichwa Amazonian Indigenous OPIKAFPE (a Peoples of the Peru-Ecuador Border 4 Tigre division of (Organización de los Pueblos Indígenas Kichwas FECONAT) Amazónicos de la Frontera Perú-Ecuador)
Federation of Native Communities of Alto Tigre
5 (Federación de Comunidades Nativas del Alto Tigre FECONAT
Tigre)
Inter-Ethnic Organization of Alto Pastaza 6 Pastaza ORIAP (Organización Interétnica del Alto Pastaza)
These organizations faced some moments of success but also the lack of implementation of agreements by the state. Orta-Martínez & Finer (2010) mentioned that through the years,
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Indigenous peoples alleged that the state has been using a strategy of inviting Indigenous organizations to dialogue spaces in main cities but, at the same time, not attending to their claims.
This precarious situation motivated organizations to change their strategies, abandoning dialogue and negotiation attempts to engage in collective action (Orta-Martínez et al., 2018; Orta-Martínez
& Finer, 2010; Yashar, 2005). Such a process was evident from 2006 to 2019, and the following section presents it.
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5. The dynamic of contentious collective action in Block 192 (2006-2019)
According to McAdam et al. (2009, p. 261), a fruitful way to understand action "is to construct analytic narratives of episodes of contention and to break them down into the mechanisms and processes that connect them to their origins and outcomes." In that sense, to analyze the relationship between social movements and the state and understand how Indigenous organizations engage in collective action, the research will follow the set of mechanisms proposed by McAdam et al. (2004). These mechanisms are broad change processes, attribution of opportunities and threats, organizational appropriation and collective action. Besides them, the research adds the mechanisms of negotiation and demobilization. Graph 1 shows the interaction between the mechanisms, and the following subsections explain them briefly before diving into the case.
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Figure 1: Dynamic & cyclical causal argument
Broad change processes
Attribution of threat/ opportunities
Organizational Demobilization appropriation
Collective Negotiation action
Source: adapted from McAdam et al. (2004)
5.1. Broad change processes
Broad change processes trigger transformations in the political, cultural and economic settings and expose segments of the population to an environment of opportunities and threats for collective action. Simultaneously, such change processes allow the development or reconstitution of identities, discourses, strategies, and practices (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992). Challengers and holders of power respond simultaneously to these change processes and others' actions by developing strategies to push or impede social change.
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In Peru's case, my research identifies the shift from Alan García's closure of the political arena to its openness during the campaign and first months of its successor Ollanta Humala as a change process that produced a stimulating environment for Indigenous mobilization.
Alan García and "The Dog in the Manger" (2006-2011). During his second term in government,
Alan García made clear his intention to make the Amazon territory available for oil and gas extraction. In October and November 2007 and March 2008, he published three articles in the national newspaper El Comercio titled "The Dog in the Manger," "Recipe to End with the Dog in the Manger," and "The Dog in the Manger Against the Poor," respectively. The articles expressed a clear speech of racist accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004), the importance of giving territories in the Amazon and Andes to foreign investors, and the characterization of Indigenous peoples as obstacles to prosperity. Garcia's government, as well as his successor Ollanta Humala, responded to social outbreaks from this and other groups of civil society with high levels of repression.
García's government started its economic plan by promoting policies favouring logging and oil entrepreneurs that wanted to profit by exploiting Indigenous lands without Indigenous peoples' consent or ensuring environmental damage mitigation. One of these intentions was the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and two decrees that allowed the appropriation and use of communal rural agricultural land, forest and wildlife resources.
Amazonian Indigenous communities considered the decrees a violation of their territorial rights and demanded their right to consultation, as stipulated in the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention (ILO-Convention 169)6. The state denied this request, and violent protests started from
6 The ILO-convention 169 was ratified by the Peruvian government in 1994. 21
August 2008 onwards led by AIDESEP, reaching their peak on June 5, 2009, in Bagua, province of the department of Amazonas, when the police and Awajun and Wampi Indigenous peoples clashed, causing 33 casualties. The conflict, known as Baguazo, revealed the need to establish mechanisms of inclusion of Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes and spaces of debate regarding the extractive model and its impact on Indigenous territories.
After the conflict, García created the "National Group for the Organization of the
Development of Amazonian Groups" to discuss a prior consultation law (Alva, 2010). The
Congress debated a proposal in November 2009 and approved the law project in May 2010.
President García showed disagreement and stalled its progress towards its publication. García mentioned that although the government defends the right to prior consultation, it cannot prioritize the particular interest over the national interest nor the communities' right to veto (Monge et al.,
2011). The government, therefore, kept the political arena closed for Indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making processes.
Ollanta Humala's government and social inclusion policies (2011-2016). During his presidential campaign between 2010 and 2011, Ollanta Humala addressed social inclusion as one of the central aspects of his political agenda (Rodríguez & Francke, 2017). His speech was openly critical of the neoliberal model and its continuity represented by right-wing candidates. Based on the recognition of the country's multicultural nature, Humala supported the right to prior consultation as a pillar of social inclusion. Furthermore, he argued on the benefits of dialogue as an instrument for decision-making and conflict resolution.
Indigenous and peasant groups supported his questioning of the political class and the need for economic policy reforms. He represented a radical change towards the inclusion of vulnerable and marginalized populations. Rural and Indigenous people favoured Humala's election, and his
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platform influenced Indigenous advocacy regarding the extractive activity and other issues (Baker,
2015; Durand, 2014).
Right after his election, in September of 2011, Humala promulgated the Prior Consultation
Law and its Bylaw in 2012. The Law stipulates that Indigenous peoples have the right to prior consultation about measures that directly affect their collective rights, physical existence, cultural identity, quality of life or development (Congreso de la República, 2011)7. Advocates expected that the Law would positively transform the relationship between the state, the private sector and the Indigenous peoples and open up participatory dialogue spaces.
The change in government from García to Humala represented a broad change process that shifted the political arena, from repression and closure of the former government's political arena to an (at least promised) open space of dialogue that allowed the formulation of legal tools for political inclusion. Garcia's government represents a moment of closure of the political arena due to the lack of political will, prioritization of investments, dispossession of territories, repression and political space's limitation for civil society's participation in decision-making processes. This situation has, as a consequence, the Baguazo social conflict, which inspired the Indigenous peoples to take action and other civil society groups to organize protests around the country. Likewise,
Baguazo put the issue not only on the Congress' agenda but also on the public opinion.
On the other hand, Humala's campaign and first months in government showed the policy arena's openness after the context of repression during his predecessor's government and the
7 Indigenous peoples are consulted through their representative local or national organizations by the state entity responsible for promoting the measure, in seven stages: (i) identification of the measure, (ii) identification of the Indigenous peoples to be consulted, (iii) presentation of the measure and consultation plan, (iv) information, (v) Indigenous organizations’ internal evaluation, (vi) intercultural dialogue between Indigenous peoples and the state, and (vii) decision by the state entity. The process should last 120 days, approximately; however, back and forth processes and negotiations make them last much more than expected. To 2019, the government completed around 40 consultation processes in the Amazon and Andean territories. 23
Baguazo social conflict. His social inclusion platform gave hope regarding the increase of inclusiveness and decrease repression acts (Baker, 2015). Humala's platform and the Law's approval recognized Indigenous peoples as agents of social and political change who have achieved legally backed recognition as holders of political, civil, social and cultural rights
(O'Donnell, 2010). However, during 2012, Humala turned to favour extraction, implemented norms in favour of foreign investment and proposed an ambiguous speech about the defence of
Indigenous rights and natural resources. The levels of repression and social unrest increased as well after his turn, being the Block 192 one of the cases of conflict.
Nevertheless, the shift in power relations from García to Humala facilitated the increase of political activism on the excluded group by increasing its political leverage (McAdam, 1999).
Furthermore, the Prior Consultation Law allowed the creation of deliberation spaces for negotiation and policy-making, which created, as well, a sense of representation by the Peruvian state. Consequently, recognition, deliberation and representation empowered the formation and recognition of collective bodies, goods and agendas.
5.2. Attribution of threats or opportunities
Political opportunities are the different socio-political environment features that influence the social movement's emergence and development (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). As mentioned by
Jenkins & Klandermans (1995, p.16), "the state organizes the political environment within which social movements operate, creating opportunities for action and, alternatively, imposing restrictions on movement activities." Traditionally, scholars analyzed political opportunities in terms of institutional access (i.e. civil and political rights); however, we can also examine them in terms of state capacity and the state's political will to implement or not change.
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Besides, McAdam et al. (2004) argue that political opportunities are subject to attribution.
In that sense, social movements attribute them depending on the perception that such a visible threat or opportunity will be useful for the common objectives and according to the movement's values. That said, my research identifies the 2006 DIGESA health report's publication as a critical political opportunity.
The Block 192 case shows the existence of previously organized actors that strengthened their structures or constituted broader organizations. One of them is FECONACO. Since the early
2000s, the organization took an important role in defending the Achuar people's demands affected by oil extraction. Health and environmental damages and the state and companies' negligence have been the core of the claims. Oxy and Pluspetrol denied the existence of pollution in the area, and the state had not strengthened monitoring mechanisms nor environmental agencies. Pluspetrol, in particular, refused to remediate the environmental liabilities produced by the extractive activity in the past decades and to pay fines8 imposed by the Environmental Assessment and Inspection
Agency (OEFA). The limits in the institution's capacity to establish and enforce sanctions limited any attempt of environmental remediation.
In that matter, in May 2005, FECONACO filed a petition to demand the state to verify the impacts of Oxy's oil extraction on the health of people from the Trompeteros district. The Ministry of Health and the General Directorate of Environmental Health (DIGESA) carried out a test in
July 2005 but delayed the publication of the results until May 2006. The results showed the
8 Between 2010 and 2014, the Environmental Assessment and Inspection Agency (OEFA) sanctioned the company 12 times for infractions to the environment with fines that add a total of S/. 39.4 million soles (Ojo Público, 2015). The company rejected to pay the fines and started a judicial fight against the environmental institution. The fine imposed in 2014 was suspended by a local judiciary in Loreto. 25
presence of heavy metals and the prevalence of oil-related diseases9. Consequently, leaders of
FECONACO and other Indigenous organizations went to Lima to set a health emergency plan to attend to the report results; however, Alan García's administration ignored their claims (Lu, 2009;
Orta-Martínez et al., 2018).
The report's results and the state's lack of attention allowed Indigenous organizations to push for change in the national and international arena. After the publication of the report in 2006, the strategy changed due to the state's inaction. FECONACO, along with its ally, the Peruvian
NGO "Racimos de Ungurahui" and the international organization EarthRights International, sue
Oxy in California for the severe harm caused to the environment and health of the Achuar people.
Later, between 2013 and 2014, Humala's administration declared an environmental and health state of emergency in the Pastaza, Corrientes, Tigre and Marañón river basins due to the massive amounts of produced water. However, despite this response, the government did not formulate or implement policies to address pollution.
Although the existence of a few previous reports, the DIGESA report had a more significant impact. It provided the Indigenous organizations with the necessary evidence and leverage, supported by international actors, to sustain their claims. The report transformed FECONACO's speech into a legitimate strong message. Furthermore, it produced in the Indigenous organization a feeling of a chance of success. Such a moment allowed the organization to rethink its strategy, change organization patterns, and pursue mobilization.
9 The report concluded that 66% of children between 2 and 17 years old exceeded the maximum permissible limits for lead, 13% had levels considered dangerous to health, and 24% of the adult population exceeded the maximum permissible limits (Bebbington & Scurrah, 2013; Servindi, 2010). 26
The DIGESA report and its implications were an opportunity for action. Although the state reacted to the Indigenous peoples' claim for impact studies, after knowing the results, it was not willing or capable of adjusting policies, responding with health or environmental action plans, nor strengthening their agencies. Besides understanding the state's inaction by addressing the lack of capacity, we can also give some comments about the limits of political will to implement change and the political advantages of not applying state authority (Dargent & Urteaga, 2016). The recognition of environmental impacts by the government of García represented a threat to the extractive model's continuity and the close relationships with oil companies, especially during a favourable economic growth context10. On the other hand, despite its primary focus on inclusiveness and protection of Indigenous rights, Humala's response ended up following García's path and perpetuating the extractive model. These actions and inactions of the state finally motivated the organization and mobilization of the Indigenous peoples.
5.3. Organizational appropriation and brokerage
Political opportunities opened a window for the organization as they created incentives and motivated the Indigenous peoples to create or activate mobilizing structures or appropriate and transform existing ones. Furthermore, FECONACO and other organizations got involved in brokerage to make connections and alliances with previously unconnected or weakly connected actors. Organization, appropriation and brokerage allow the movement to get a pool of financial and human resources and to build consensus regarding their grievances and a sense of identity.
10 The second government of Alan García began with high prices of minerals and hydrocarbons and with economic growth rates above 4% (Monge et al., 2011). 27
In Block 192, different SMOs already grouped Indigenous peoples before the beginning of the struggle. The Native Communities Law provided, or imposed, incentives for their association into communities later represented by different organizations. During the awakening of
Amazonian organizations, centrales and federations throughout the 1970s and the 1980s,
Indigenous peoples of the Block 192 area did not visibly mobilize outside their communities and rarely challenged Oxy's operations (Orta-Martínez et al., 2018). The impulse came mainly from the Achuar people and FECONACO, who redirected its efforts towards the state and demanded land titles, hoping that this could be a way to control their territory against oil extraction. Later, the organizations established more significant alliances to report systemic violations of their rights to a healthy environment (Orta-Martínez et al., 2018). Thus, from the 1990s, the organizations of the Pastaza, Corrientes, Tigre and Marañón river basins started working together and adopted strategies in search of tools to address their situation.
My research identifies six stages in the process of organizational appropriation and brokerage of the Indigenous organizations of Block 192. The first stage is the implementation in
1974 of the Natives Communities Law during Juan Velasco Alvarado's military government
(1968-1975). As mentioned, this Law produced and imposed incentives to indigenous groups to register as native communities for legal recognition. This first stage later motivated the new native communities to create bigger structures to defend their interests.
Therefore, in the second stage, I identify the constitution of the Achuar organization.
FECONACO was established in June 1991 to represent the 25 native communities of the
Corrientes river basin. FECONACO has as its primary objective the defence of rights, the promotion of respect for Indigenous culture and values, and the development of the Indigenous peoples and communities that comprise it. Despite limits for organization and action due to the
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context of political violence and Fujimori's authoritarianism, FECONACO proactively began to configure community networks in the few available political associational spaces.
In the mid-1990s, FECONACO realized that to pursue their goals, they needed an echo of their demands at a broader level, not just locally. The leaders, therefore, looked for Indigenous allies at the national level. I identify this as the third stage. Leaders of FECONACO started to coordinate with leaders of AIDESEP to build an alliance to strengthen their mobilizing structures and get guidance and support to effectively communicate their claims to Oxy and government authorities (Lu, 2009). Through the years, the backing of AIDESEP helped FECONACO set the discussion on the national agenda and have more presence in the political arena. Financial resources also helped the Achuar organization to have more access to negotiation tables held in
Iquitos and Lima. Furthermore, AIDESEP was an essential link to other actors for further alliances.
After securing the support of a broader Indigenous organization, FECONACO looked for legal and technical support from the civil society. AIDESEP had support from the Peruvian NGO
"Racimos de Ungurahui," which, since 1995, provided advice on Indigenous rights issues.
FECONACO took advantage of Racimos' international NGO networking and achieved the support of several international organizations during the 1990s11 (Guzmán-Gallegos, 2018). From the mid-
1990s to 2006, Racimos and AIDESEP had a crucial role in FECONACO's attempts to expand their scope and gather evidence on the extractive activity's health impacts to support their negotiations and mobilization. Furthermore, the association between these three actors allowed
FECONACO to articulate a more persuasive rights-based language (Lu, 2009).
11 The International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), EarthRights International (ERI) and Amazon Watch; and during the 2000s of Solsticio Peru, financed by a Peruvian-British NGO Alianza Arkana, the Rainforest Foundations Norway, and the Rainforest Foundation U.S. 29
After the consolidation of alliances among Indigenous representation and civil society, and after gathering evidence that proved the impacts of oil extraction, FECONACO looked to gather more allies in the national and regional political sphere, constituting the fifth stage. The organization and the DIGESA report attracted the attention and support of the Ombudsman's
Office. Since 2006, it launched an advocacy campaign with members of the Peruvian Congress and regional authorities (Scurrah et al., 2010). In particular, the Ombudsman's Office had a key monitoring role of previous agreements between the Indigenous organizations, the government and the company. The Ombudsman, likewise, demanded the immediate, effective and systematic action of the state and the respect for the right to live in a healthy environment.
Regarding Congress, during 2011, the organizations of Block 192 had the support of
Verónika Mendoza, Marisol Pérez Tello, and Eduardo Nayap, members of the Congress'
Indigenous Peoples, Environment and Ecology Commission and the Working Group on the
Environmental and Social Situation of Block 192, who continuously presented the issue in the debate during the plenaries. Moreover, the representatives visited the area along with the media to participate in meetings and gather evidence. Concerning the regional level, in 2015, Fernando
Meléndez, Loreto Regional Governor, had an active role in defending the department's energy sovereignty and their right to the economic benefits of oil extraction, as well as the following governor, Elisbán Ochoa, in 2018 (La Región, 2015). The support of congress members and regional governors was vital for FECONACO to place the issue on the public agenda and pressure higher powers to fulfil their agreements.
Now that FECONACO had the support of a national Indigenous organization, civil society, and the regional and national government representatives, its leaders attempted, in 2011, to put together a broader Indigenous social movement during the sixth stage. Despite brief moments of
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coordinated action, each Indigenous federation of Table 1 performed their actions independently regarding the particular demands of the communities they represented in each river basin. As mentioned, FECONACO had relatively more success, achieving alliances with key actors and agreements with the state and the company and moving their claims from a local to a national political arena (Baker, 2015).
Among the reasons for their relative success was the different degrees of proximity to the state regarding the extractive activity. In the Pastaza river basin (FEDIQUEP area), for example, it is argued that the state is absent, and the company is indifferent to the impacts of the oil extraction activity. In the Tigre river basin (OPIKAFPE area), the state acknowledged the environmental liabilities but diminishing the degree of the impact. ACODECOSPAT, on the other hand, was able to get short-term support from the company and food and water supplies. In the Corrientes river basin, FECONACO's initiative achieved a level of dialogue with the state that, although still inefficient, reached some agreements (OPSur, 2012).
To be more effective in representing collective interests, the Indigenous organizations
FECONACO, FEDIQUEP, ACODECOSPAT and OPIKAFPE12 established the political movement Indigenous Peoples United in Defense of their Territories, PUINAMUDT, to work collectively against the injustices of the oil industry (Orta-Martínez et al., 2018). PUINAMUDT was born from the initiative of FECONACO, which put together a workshop and invited its fellow organizations to discuss common issues related to oil extraction in Loreto. By the end of the workshop, the organizations appropriated the space and institutionalized PUINAMUDT (Baker,
2015). The organizations set a shared political agenda that included broad demands related to
12 These organizations not only represented the communities located in the area of Block 192 but Block 8 as well. 31
titling, self-determination, participation in decision-making processes and direct economic benefits from oil extraction. Furthermore, it touched upon education and health policies and political accountability. The platform also argued the need to stop giving up Indigenous territory for resource extraction.
The agenda included several political reforms: a regional reform of the Loreto Regional
Government to include an area of Indigenous issues managed directly by Indigenous peoples and a constitutional reform to recognize the integrity of Indigenous territories and the principle of buen vivir. PUINAMUDT acknowledged that the situation had its origins in the government's capacity to manage extractive activity, not necessarily in the company's activity. Such shared assessments and agendas allowed the new organization to build a collective identity and produce a necessary degree of cohesion to keep the movement together.
The new movement set a commission formed by the leaders (apus) of each organization to deliver its agenda to government officials in negotiation processes (Baker, 2015). One of its achievements was the creation of a Multi-Sectoral Commission in charge of analyzing, designing and proposing measures to solve the issue in the Pastaza, Corrientes, Tigre and Marañón river basins. However, the lack of will of the state limited the continuity of this commission.
The state planted the first seed and provided incentives for the creation and organization of peasant and native communities during Velasco's military government. These native communities of the Corrientes river came together to constitute FECONACO. In the following years, the organization established its mobilizing structure by the consolidation of alliances. State representatives from the state (Congress, the Regional Government and the Ombudsman) were key allies that supported the demands and mobilizations. PUINAMUDT, finally, represented a real attempt to create a unified collective actor, a social movement in defence of the four river basins,
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with an identity based on shared values and goals and a political agenda. Without these resources and alliances, it would have been difficult to sustain the movement's effort. Consequently, the movement started demanding spaces for negotiation with the state and the company that, when frustrated, took the movement to adopt strategies towards contentious collective action.
5.4. Collective action, negotiation and demobilization
Contentious collective action is the use of disruptive techniques by actors who lack resources, power, and regular access to representative institutions to make a political point and induce changes in the socio-political or economic structures. These forms of contention, such as repetitive routines of protests and occupations, target the state as the primary source of their problems but also as the source of the solution.
The organization, appropriation and brokerage allowed FECONACO and the Indigenous movement PUINAMUDT to gather resources and prepare for negotiation and protest potential scenarios. After the formulation of their political agenda, FECONACO and PUINAMUDT looked for negotiation spaces to present their program and redefine the course of mobilization and strategies. Seeing that many of the requests were frustrated, the organizations performed protests to get the authorities' attention and push for new negotiation spaces. The social movement deactivated contentious action and demobilized after receiving some favourable response from the state in the form of agreements.
However, far from seeing the accords' implementation, the organizations experienced uncertainty due to the state's inactions and the perception that their position might face new threats or opportunities to accomplish its goals. This situation obligated the movement to reassess
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strategies. Through the study period, my research identifies three moments to assess the link between collective action, negotiation and demobilization: 2006, 2012 and 2015.
2006: first significant mobilization. The DIGESA report revealed the health impacts on
Indigenous peoples of Block 192 (Chirif & García, 2009). After its publication, leaders of
FECONACO travelled to Lima for a meeting with representatives of the Ombudsman's Office,
MINEM, MINSA, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and the Congress. The organization demanded an official declaration from the President or a minister that formalized agreements and a budget for the Indigenous representatives to attend meetings in Lima and Iquitos (Scurrah et al.,
2010). In September 2006, the organization and the state coordinated a new meeting in Iquitos, but the administration representatives did not attend. Government representatives tried to make up the situation by creating a high-level commission to respond to the issue. However, due to the government representatives' imposition of conditions and the Indigenous organizations' mistrust, the meeting never happened.
As mentioned by Bebbington and Scurrah (2013), after the failed attempts to look for dialogue through formal channels, the organization needed to take extra-institutional spaces and perform episodes of collective action that could force the attention of the government and their participation on negotiation tables under the conditions of the Indigenous peoples. Thus,
FECONACO decided to change the strategy and, for the first time, seize control of Pluspetrol's installations in Block 192 and Block 8. Such was the most significant mobilization of the Achuar people (Pinto, 2015). FECONACO shut down oil production for 16 days and declared in a public statement that the Achuar would not accept more oil extraction operations in their territories.
After two days of occupation, the government sent a delegation to negotiate an agreement.
However, the delegation pushed its conditions and did not allow advisors from AIDESEP and
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Racimos to participate in the dialogue space. It was not before the Ombudsman's Office's intervention as a mediator that FECONACO, the government, and Pluspetrol reached an agreement in October 2006: The Dorissa Accord. The agreement set a precedent throughout the country. It obligated the state to create a law that forces oil companies to reinject the produced waters into the subsoil, including areas where oil extraction contracts have existed for decades
(Chirif & García, 2009).
The Achuar people called off the blockade and declared the signing a victory (Bebbington
& Scurrah, 2013). The agreement included health care, water and food supply, and redirection of
5% of all oil royalties received by the Regional Government to the Achuar community for development and education (Lu, 2009). However, FECONACO did not prioritize other issues related to titling or compensations, which later were the center of their demands.
2006-2012: Accords and first victories of the Indigenous movement. The state's actions towards the signing of the Dorissa Accord with FECONACO motivated demobilization. Its inactions and lack of implementation of the accords, however, created an environment of uncertainty. The lack of technical capacity made the monitoring process hard for FECONACO that, despite the support of AIDESEP and Racimos, lacked financial funding to afford continuous visits to Lima and Iquitos. The Ombudsman's Office provided some support in the process of tracking and accountability without having much success.
The period of uncertainty started another cycle of contentious action. FECONACO felt threatened, mistrusted, and believed that the state was disrespectful to the agreements and
Indigenous peoples. The leaders in numerous declarations claimed that the government partially met some of the commitments out of time: the health plan was only 50% executed and did not
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focus on pollution, the development plan in 10%, and there were doubts about the re-injection of water from oil production by Pluspetrol (La República, 2012).
The threat allowed FECONACO to change its strategy in 2011 to be more effective in representing collective interests. It was evident that the Block 192 area organizations had experienced similar challenges and that common concerns were the extractive-based model, corporate social responsibility and the lack of compliance of the state (Baker, 2015). This context allowed the creation of PUINAMUDT, which permitted each member to present their demands in a unified political movement. Likewise, the strategy helped the organizations to have a pool of resources and capacity to fulfill each of the river basins' specific demands that were very similar: compensation for land use, environmental remediation, and public services provision.
One of the first actions together was the support of FEDIQUEP's protest in 2012 regarding the non-compliance of a separate accord, the Pastaza Accord, signed in 2011 between the state and such organization. The Quechua people started a peaceful mobilization in the Alianza Topal community to demand a new dialogue table. As a result, in June 2012, the state and PUINAMUDT signed the Alianza Topal Accord to create a new multisector commission that could attend to the four river basins' demands. Furthermore, Loreto Regional Government agreed to provide services, fund environmental studies in Block 192, and fulfill the role of a bridge between the central state and PUINAMUDT. Consequently, once again, the agreement produced demobilization.
2012-2015: Prior consultation process. From 2012 to 2015, PUINAMUDT leaders travelled back and forth from their communities to Iquitos and Lima, where they attended meetings to monitor the agreements' implementation. Moreover, the Indigenous organizations, the government and Pluspetrol were in the advent of implementing the first prior consultation process for Block 192. Although the starting date was on April 13, 2012, PUINAMUDT stopped the
36
process. After a period of uncertainty on the implementation of the Alianza Topal Accord and previous agreements, PUINAMUDT saw in the consultation process a new opportunity to assure minimum conditions for a fair process, the commitment of the state and a more prominent role of the Indigenous organizations in the extractive activity as direct partners (PUINAMUDT, 2015).
Furthermore, PUINAMUDT demanded that Petroperú, a Peruvian state-owned company, take the
Block's administration after the end of Pluspetrol's contract in August 2015 (La Región, 2014).
PUINAMUDT performed episodes of contentious action, such as the blockade of oil wells and transportation routes (e.g. roads, rivers and the Andoas aerodrome13) to push for the consideration of their conditions. However, two critical events caused the conflict to reach its peak.
On August 21, PSE obtained the two-year concession of Block 192 without Indigenous peoples' consultation. Later, the government announced that Petroperú would not take charge of the extraction due to its lack of capacity, human and financial resources to manage the oil fields. In response, the organizations continued with violent mobilizations. Furthermore, the contention action episodes diffused from the local areas (or the area of influence of Block 192) to the regional level through organizational linkages and networks.
When expanding the mobilization, PUINAMUDT and its network of local Indigenous organizations, AIDESEP and NGOs such as Racimos, touched on new civil society actors' interests and values that were key for spreading mobilization. One of them was the Patriotic Front of Loreto
(Frente Patriótico de Loreto, FPL). FPL was created in 1978 to defend Loreto's rights and sovereignty, and for years it has been a strong contender within the debate of canon and logging concessions (Chirif, 2002). FPL aligned most of their interests with PUINAMUDT's agenda and
13 The Andoas aerodrome is the main connection between the area of influence of oil extractive companies of Block 192 and the city of Iquitos. 37
helped enlarge the scope of collective action from the local level to Iquitos, Loreto's capital, and some other cities in the department. Thus, in 2015, the Front organized several regional mobilizations that caused confrontations between protesters and the police, blockades, and business and trade slowdown. Local mayors supported the demands and helped with the diffusion of contention among the department.
The escalation of collective action allowed the consolidation of the social movement in defence of the four river basins. It helped PUINAMUDT sustain collective action in repetitive episodes that were now visible not just in the area of influence of Block 192 but also among the department of Loreto. Trans-community and other solidarity networks with civil society and state representatives allowed the movement to reach more territory areas, have more leverage and the government's attention. The economic consequences were considerable. Each day not in Block
192 worked represented more than US$ 400,000 in income not received by the company.
Furthermore, the situation put at risk more than US$ 30 million for canon, in addition to US$ 50 million in royalties and nearly 3,000 jobs (El Comercio, 2015). Broader protests provoked the paralyzation of economic activities in the main cities of Loreto and the police intervention.
In parallel to the protests, the prior consultation process's dialogue stage started in July and continued until the end of the process on August 14, 2015. Just two organizations (ORIAP and
FECONAT) signed the act that approves PSE contract and agreements related to health, education, employment, Indigenous peoples' participation in dialogue spaces, better distribution of canon, commercial flights, land titling, compensations, and environmental remediation. PUINAMUDT, on the other hand, considered that the government-imposed conditions and that the agreement was unsatisfactory because of its lack of focus on the main historical issues related to environmental remediation and easement payments. Therefore, PUINAMUDT did not sign and continued the
38
protests. The government established an independent dialogue table with the movement, which resulted in new accords: the Teniente Lopez Act and José Olaya Act. These included additional investment in developing programs and public services, remediation of environmental liabilities, and prioritizing territorial demands.
The signing of agreements led to demobilization and, once again, uncertainty regarding the implementation of the accords. Besides, PUINAMUDT awaited Congress's approval for the exploitation of Block 192 by Petroperú, which president Humala later granted. Consequently, during the first months of 2017, FECONACO and FEDIQUEP began to demand a second prior consultation process to approve the new contract with Petroperú before the end of the PSE's contract in January 201914. However, the Ministry of Energy and Mines responded against the claim because the new deal did not involve the authorized terms' variation approved in the 2015 prior consultation process regarding PSE activities.
This new opportunity, the non-compliance of the agreements of 2015 and the persistent oil spills in the area started a new cycle whose conclusion is still pending. Despite the situation, the government extended the PSE contract until September 2020 and again until the first quarter of
2021. From that date, Petroperú, along with a partner, would take the activity for 30 years.
14 The contract was extended from August 2017 to January 2019.Out of 730 days that the company has had to work under contract (2 years), the company was only able to work normally 454 days, reason why the contract was extended. 39
6. Was this a social movement?
Through the years, academics have supported the argument that it is wrong to say that Peru has no
Indigenous movement or no significant Indigenous organizations (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005).
Movements and organizations have existed, but, in comparison with other countries of the region, they have been "less active, less institutionalized and less successful" (Van Cott, 2005, p.143). As discussed, some of the reasons that explain this phenomenon were the lack of open associational spaces, participation and trans-community networks (Yashar, 2005). On the other hand, the prevalence of individualized interests produced, over the years, different attempts to form various organizations but not grouping them into a single social movement.
However, some individual efforts were fruitful. In the Block 192 case, FECONACO was relatively successful in proposing and implementing strategies and demands related to oil activity in the area. Since its foundation, but mainly after 2006, it started collecting evidence on the impact of oil extraction. These efforts and the support of allies such as AIDESEP and Racimos led the organization to consolidate as a political actor with a set of demands sustained in evidence that used collective action to demand dialogue spaces for remediation and compensations.
Following FECONACO's initiative, in 2011, there was an effort to form an Indigenous
Amazon movement comprised of different SMOs representing the Pastaza, Corrientes, Tigre, and
Marañón river basins communities. On the other hand, Humala's social inclusion policies and the
Prior Consultation Law opened participation spaces for Indigenous peoples. This context gave
FECONACO the capacity to strengthen trans-community networks and put together similar organizations with shared interests to push for and participate in consultation processes and other negotiation spaces.
40
In that sense, PUINAMUDT represented the Indigenous organizations' opportunity to present their demands as a unified social movement in defence of the four river basins. The platform developed an agenda in defence of Indigenous territory and life. It constituted a collective identity that was not entirely against the oil activity but favouring environmentally responsible extraction, fair redistribution of revenues, compensations for the use of lands and the inclusion of
Indigenous communities in the economic activity. On the other hand, it gave PUINAMUDT the capacity to mobilize its platform in the Amazonian region.
However, it may not be a solid movement. Adapting the argument presented by Lu (2009) for the case of environmental movements, strong organizations and their association into a larger organization do not necessarily imply that there is a solid Indigenous movement. Despite
PUINAMUDT's achievements, there is a sort of conformity after signing the numerous agreements between the movement, the state and the oil companies. The organizations declare each of them as a victory and, consequently, demobilize. However, the state's lack of capacity and the lack of technical knowledge of Indigenous peoples to successfully push the agreements' compliance lead the movement to retake action to force the implementation and new negotiations. This situation finally traps the organization into the cycle of contention that, despite reaching agreements, it does not achieve substantive changes.
41
7. Conclusion
Peru experienced a process of democratization after a transition from authoritarianism in
2000. Despite the regime's stability over time, the actions of state officials and political leaders have often been detrimental to the quality of Peruvian democracy. Democracy has remained weak due to the state's low levels of presence in certain parts of the national territory and low levels of state capacity to respond to citizens' demands with essential goods and services provision.
Moreover, democracy has often been affected by the long-standing presence of undemocratic practices such as deficits in public deliberation or the lack of full and effective recognition of citizenships rights.
As a result of these governance problems, social conflicts continue to be a persistent feature of Peruvian democracy. Collective action is a necessary tool for citizens to pressure the state to respond to their demands, provide valuable social goods, and open the political arena for their participation. The case of Block 192 shows how the response of the state towards the persistence of environmental and health impacts generated by five decades of oil extraction led to Indigenous groups' organization into bigger structures and the use of contentious collective action towards the defence of their right to a healthy environment and participation in decision-making processes.
My research shows that while the Peruvian political regime is democratic enough to ensure that governments react to pressures, the response varies depending on two factors: the capacity of the state to exercise authority and implement policy throughout the territory and the political will to produce substantive economic, social and political changes. When there is a lack of state capacity to respond to conflict or political will to attend to the population's demands, the state loses credibility. This situation and the persistence of conflict allow the organization and collective action of social movements and contention cycles between them and the state.
42
The case of Block 192 shows that the state is reactive to social outbreaks but not responsive to Indigenous peoples' needs and demands. When pressed, it reacts with repression or palliative measures such as dialogue and negotiation roundtables. The state formally responds to issues on paper, sometimes redirecting resources and attempting to implement changes. However, the implementation of the agreements is slow, inadequate or rarely put into consistent practice. The state developed an institutionalized practice of addressing social conflict with numerous but hollow agreements that are more symbolic than tangible steps towards the enforcement of pacts, strengthening agencies or more substantive reforms.
The lack of political will can also explain such limitations on its actions. In Peruvian politics, there has been little political will to attend to Indigenous peoples' demands regarding the dispossession and affectation of territories due to the importance of resource extraction for Peru's economic development. As mentioned by Orta-Martínez et al. (2018), such a state's response has been a convenient norm for extractive industries' activity in Latin America for the continuity of the extractive model. The Block 192 case, in particular, evidenced the long history of active oil extraction in the Peruvian Amazon, the lack of remediation of environmental liabilities by the companies and the state's lack of enforcement of sanctions. Consequently, the state ends up being the target of social mobilization from Indigenous organizations against this pattern of capital accumulation.
In conclusion, my research has shown that the state's capacity and political will to implement change are crucial to understanding the dynamic of contention and interdependence between social movements and the state. Using the case of Block 192 and the analysis of the
Amazonian indigenous organizations and their struggle with the state regarding the impacts of oil extraction, I have shown that the state's response to indigenous peoples' demands for remediation
43
and protection is both weak and negligent. This situation creates repetitive windows of opportunities for the organizations to mobilize in a continuous cycle of contention against the state.
Future research projects should expand on the analysis of state capacity as a determinant of social conflict and social movements' nature and development. Additionally, it would be valuable to compare mobilization cases over the environmental impacts of resource extraction in the Peruvian
Amazon and the Andes to assess the differences in the state's response and influence in the cycle of contention over the extraction of oil and minerals.
44
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