Islam And ’s Foreign Policy,

With Special Focus On -Islamabad Relations

I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana

This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Western Australia

School of Social Sciences

Discipline of Political Science and International Relations

Centre for Muslim States and Societies

2012

Abstract

This study explores the roles of in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indonesia is a country with the world’s largest Muslim community, where the political meaning of Islam is contested in the process of nation-building. Islam has come under increasing scrutiny by international relations scholars, particularly since Islamic extremism has become one of the major challenges to the post- world order. Therefore, it is important to research whether and how the religion has impacted the basic thinking and making of foreign policy in Indonesia. To contextualize the analysis, the study pays special attention to Indonesia’s relations with as a major case study.

Chapter One examines the role of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy within three dimensions; national identity formation, elite interest and domestic politics, and external situations. The discussion on Jakarta-Islamabad relations are presented in chapters organized based on the changing political regimes in Jakarta and developments of international and regional Islamic-related issues, in a synthetic fashion. Chapter Two demonstrates that under the regime (1945-1965) there was a shift in Indonesia’s policy towards Pakistan; from avoiding to using Islamic identity. This was coupled with the change in Jakarta’s strategic interests in the relationships with Pakistan and India. Chapter Three and Four report on the weakening of Islam’s role in Indonesia- Pakistan relations, particularly as happened during the 1970s and 1980s under the of in Indonesia. Islam did not rate as an important factor because the Indonesian government tended to pursue secular interests - with an emphasis on discourses of economic development and regional stability. Chapter Five discusses the growing interest between Indonesia and Pakistan to enhance cordial ties. Following two decades of waning relations the commencement of re-engagement took place in the mid 1990s when Indonesia was performing a greater commitment towards the Muslim world, at the same time as Pakistan was pursuing closer ties with Southeast and East Asian powers. However, Islam was not reflected as an identity which Suharto wanted to

construct in foreign policy alone, but as the consistent implementation of the independent activism policy. Chapter Six explores Indonesia’s responses to the Kashmir conflict, particularly since people uprising has shaken the state in the early 1990. This chapter asserts that although Islam was not a factor in Indonesia favouring Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, Indonesia maintains the position of impartiality. Chapter Seven looks at how and why Indonesia views the importance of Pakistan in the global war on terrorism. It demonstrates that the policy is made upon the mixed context of Islamic and non-Islamic considerations.

This study concludes that Islam, to a limited degree, is used by the Indonesian government to relate with Pakistan, but it has not become the major consideration and real reference in shaping Jakarta’s foreign policy towards Islamabad. The role of Islam is marginal. The relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan is dominated by secular economic and political agendas. In contrast, policies taken by the Indonesian government have in many respects differed with the Muslim people’s voices. The Indonesian Muslims consistently articulate the Islamic identity to describe their relationships with Pakistan; - especially in dealing with issues pertinent to Islam and Muslims. This divergence surfaces because Islam has been significantly prevented from influencing the making and implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The constraints are set up by the state’s non-Islamic identity, the ruling elite’s material interests, as well as the condition of external environments.

Keywords: Islam, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, Jakarta-Islamabad Relations.

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Table of Contents

Abstract i

Acknowledgements iv

List of Abbreviations vii

Introduction 1

Chapter One: Islamic Identity, Elite Interests And Foreign Policy In Indonesia 16

Chapter Two: Islamism And Secularism In Sukarno’s Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan 54

Chapter Three: Indonesia-Pakistan Relations Under Suharto During the 1970s 93

Chapter Four: Indonesia-Pakistan Relations And Soviet Invasion Of Afghanistan 127

Chapter Five: Indonesia’s Revitalized Relations With Pakistan: Islamic Identity and Economic Cooperation 160

Chapter Six: Muslim Solidarity In Indonesian Attitude Towards The Kashmir Conflict 192

Chapter Seven: Indonesia-Pakistan Relations And The Global War On Terrorism 229

Conclusion 266

Bibliography 283

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Acknowledgements

I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to the many parties that have assisted me in completing this study. The research has been ongoing since 2008 and the final stage of writing was undertaken during the first semester of 2012. I wish to thank the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) for granting me full financial support under the scheme of Australian Development Scholarship (ADS) for my study at the University of Western Australia and stay in Perth. I am greatly indebted to my coordinating supervisor Professor Samina Yasmeen. She has stood on my side since the very beginning till the end of my candidature, during both good and difficult times. Samina is my Guru, colleague and closest advisor, an indispensable source of ideas, inspiration as well as motivation, when I felt let down by the lack of progress. I have enjoyed the privilege of learning from her brilliancy and knowledge in international relations, political Islam and foreign policies of the Muslim countries. I deeply value Samina’s never-ending empathy and understanding of my complicated emotional situation when I lost my baby girl in December 2011, the most difficult time in my life. I would also like to thank to my co-supervisor Associate Professor Jie Chen who guided me through the structure of the discussion in the thesis. I also owe lots of gratitude to Associate Professor Roderic Pitty, Chair of Political Science and International Relations, as well as Professor Van Ikin, Graduate Research Coordinator School of Social Sciences for their kind help and advices during the difficult times of my study. I am also grateful to close friends who have helped me in one way and another with regard to this study. In Australia the following deserve special mention: Ms Deborah Pyatt AusAID Liaison Officer who has done lots of good things to ensure my convenience while studying at UWA and staying in Perth; Mrs Julia Lightfoot and Ms. Tessa Burkitt who with great patience has helped correct and improve my English writing; Mr Graeme Rymill Humanities and Social Sciences Librarian at Reid Library who has always been prepared to assist me with collecting materials for my research;

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Mr Chris Massey Principal of Currie Hall who with a lot of generosity has provided nice and comfortable accommodation for me and my wife during our stay in Perth; and Ms Linley Hill, Administrative Officer, Political Science and International Relations, for supporting me with learning facilities at the department. I wish to express sincere thanks to Pak Peter and Ibu Gwen Graham, Pak Ken Frewer, Win and Margaret Jones, Professor William Morgan of the Lions Eye Institute, Claudio Cattaneo, John Tan, Will Lee, Frank Li, Adriaan Wolvaardt, Rizwan Zeb, Mas Hartono, Mas Dekar, Heru, Edi, Bli Made and Mbok Luh for their help and friendship during my stay in Perth. In Indonesia I received help and assistance from the following: Dr Baiq Wardhani, Dr Vinsensio Dugis, Dr Makmur Keliat, Dr Hariyadi Wirawan, Dr Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Mr Basis Susilo, Mr Djoko Sulistyo, Mr Joko Susanto, Mr Moch Yunus, Mr Ahmad Safril Mubah, Ms , Ms Anne Gutinger, Mrs Siti Rokhmawati Susanto, Mr Yosi Polimpung, Mr Armyn Gita, and Mr Yusli Effendi. Finally I am most grateful for all the blessings and support I receive from my family; Bapak, Ibu, Deni and Mangta. They remain my primary source of strength and inspiration. I am very grateful to my beloved wife, Liana Dewi, for her love and patience during my final stage of PhD period. She patiently endured my late-night arrivals from the campus and long months of separation. I also highly appreciate her great help with the technical aspect of my thesis. My love for her knows no end. I, however, take full responsibility for the views put forth and for any errors that may occur in this study.

Perth, 17 May 2012. I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana

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List of Abbreviations

APEC : Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

APHC : All Parties Hurriyat Conference

ASEAN : Association of South East Asian Nations

ASEM : Asia Meeting

CENTO : Central Treaty Organization

CSIS : Centre for Strategic and International Studies

D-8 : Developing Eight

DDII : Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Islamic Proselytizing)

DI : Darul Islam

FPI : Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic defender Front)

GAM : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (the Free Aceh Movement)

ICMI : Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)

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IGGI : Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia

IPECC : Indonesia Pakistan Economic and Cultural Coorperation

IPTN : Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (the National Aviation Industry)

IQR : International Qur’an Recital

ISI : Inter Services Intelligence

JI : Jemaah Islamiyah

JKLF : Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

KISDI : Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World)

KSF : Kashmir Solidarity Front

LeT : Lashkar-e-Toiba

LIPIA : Lembaga Ilmu Penetahuan Islam Dan Arab (the Institute for Islamic Knowledge and )

LJ : Laskar Jihad

MNLF : Moro National Liberation Front

MUF : Muslim United Front

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MUI : Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Ulama)

MMI : Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin)

NAM : Non Aligned Movement

NEFOS : New Emerging Forces

NU : Nahdlatul Ulama

OAU : Organization of African Union

OIC : Organization of Islamic Conference

OLDEFOS : Old Established Forces

PAN : Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party)

PBB : Partai Bulan Bintang (the Star and Crescent Party)

PD : Partai Demokrat (the Democrat Party)

PDIP : Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)

PKB : Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the )

PKI : Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party)

PKS : Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Justice and Welfare Party)

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PNI : Partai Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party)

POLRI : Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (the Indonesian National Police)

PPP : Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party)

SAARC : South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation

SI :

TII : Tentara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Army)

UNMOGIP : Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan

UNSF : United Nations Security Force

UNTEA : United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

ZOPFAN : Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

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Introduction

This study explores the roles of Islam in the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indonesia is a country with the world’s largest Muslim community, where the political meaning of Islam is always contested in the process of nation-building. Meanwhile, Islam has come under increasing scrutiny by the scholars of international relations at large, particularly since Islamic extremism has become one of the major challenges to the post-Cold War world order. Therefore, it is important to research whether and how the religion has impacted the basic thinking and making of foreign policy in Indonesia. In order to contextualize the analysis, the study pays special attention to Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan as a major case study.

Islam and International Relations Study In recent years, international relations academia has paid a great deal of attention to observing the influence of religion as a social phenomena and political force on world politics (Geislerova 2011; Juergensmeyer 2010; Sandal & James 2011). Islam is one of the largest religions in the world and as such receives special attention. This is partly related to the genuine revival of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the world (Savage 2004). An increasingly large number of Muslim women are wearing veils, more Muslim men are comfortable with growing beards, and more Muslim people appear to attend Mosque more often. A report of the Gallup Centre for Muslim Studies demonstrates that a vast majority of Muslim people - 86 percent of Turks, 90 percent of Indonesians, and 98 percent of Egyptians - confess that Islam underpins their way of life (Thomas 2010, 1-2). Daniel Philpott (2002), an international relations scholar, describes this happening as part of a process of de-secularization of the world. More importantly, what lures Islam to the centre-stage of world politics is a series of events that has taken place in the Muslim world since the late 1970s. It started with the 1979 Iranian revolution, followed by the Gulf War in 1991, and culminated in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the (US) which led to the subsequent

American invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq less than two years later. These events are important because they bring Islam and the West into antagonism (Akbarzadeh & Saeed 2003; Harris 2006; Yasmeen 2005). Speculation arises that ‘the clash of civilization’ is taking shape, a fact predicted by Samuel Huntington (1993). According to Huntington, cultural factors, rather than foreign policy or economics, will pre-eminently construct world politics in the future. The immense division amongst humankind will be formed by cultures, and consequently conflicts in world politics will manifest into the clash of civilizations. Huntington (1993) suggested ‘…the principal clash will be between Western and non-Western civilizations…’. He underscored the specific focus on the so called fundamental disagreements, actual or potential, between the West on the one hand, and the Islamic civilization on the other. Regardless of polemics on the validity of Huntington’s thesis, the practicality of the discourse of the West versus Islam has increasingly given rise to the important position of Muslim state and non-state actors in international affairs.

For its part, the Iranian revolution of 1979 highlighted Islam’s domestic political role and the behaviour of Islamic states in the world arena. In the 1980s, studies on the role and position of Islam in politics incrementally became an element of comparative politics or political science itself - in addition to sociology and anthropology - and for that reason focused first and foremost on the components of Islamist movements playing out in domestic politics. Two fine examples of this scholarly enterprise are the edited volumes by James Piscatori (1986) titled Islam in the Political Process, and John Esposito (1987) titled Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society which respectively presented a survey of the nature of Islamic religious life in some countries with a Muslim majority, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, , Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey. In these two studies, Islam is treated as a variable that along with other material motivations - mostly control of the state’s authority and resistance to modernization and secularization - drove the Islamist movement’s activism, both culturally and politically. The analysis is

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concerned more with the effects of modernization and development in those countries rather than the effects of Islam on peoples’ lives.

An interesting example of pioneering study on Islam in foreign policy is the edited volume by Adeed Dawisha (1983) titled Islam in Foreign Policy. Drawing upon Islamic countries, especially Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for case studies, Dawisha and his colleagues argue that Islam can be seen as having multiple functions as a domestic and ideological motivator, legitimacy, or simply a justifier for the states’ foreign relations. Furthermore, the role of Islam in foreign policy is derived from constitutional and institutional structure of the state as well as the role of the religious elite in the making and implementation of policy. In the case of Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, and Turkey, Dawisha’s work shows that Islam’s roles in foreign policy are observable in the dynamic interaction between the secular ruling regime and Islamic societal groups, and the contest between religious ideals and material interests in domestic and foreign policy processes.

With the emergent academic attention to religion as a current force and factor in international relations, literature on Islam’s role in foreign policy has also benefited from the trend. The theme of Islam in foreign policy can be widely read in a variety of cases. For instance, the contemporary survey encompasses foreign policies of the new independent Islamic states of Central Asia (Shaffer, ed. 2006) and Muslim states in the Balkan Peninsula such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (Messari 2001). These works are similar to Dawisha and his colleagues, in trying to discover the roles and limits of Islam in international relations for the selected countries.

Nizar Messari (2001, 237-46), who focuses on the construction of Islamic identity in foreign policy with specific reference to Bosnia-America relations, argues that Islam as a cultural factor distinguishes the way Sarajevo views relations with Washington and the Muslim world in general. It particularly happened in the 1990s following the liberation of Bosnia from Serbian oppression. Notwithstanding the need for human

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rights protection and economic aid, which encouraged the Bosnians to consider the US as important, they tended to feel more comfortable engaging with Islamic states because of their shared identity, than with the Judeo-Christian Americans. On the other side, Washington decided to intervene in the Bosnian conflict on account of Clinton’s perceptions that American multiculturalist interests and security were both at stake. Foreign policy in Bosnia was used to reinforce the image of the US as the guardian of human rights, human security and tolerant values.

Brenda Shaffer (2006, 4-5) encounters Islam as a cultural factor which can influence the ideals and implementation of foreign policies of Central Asian Muslim states. Islamic identity is especially important for the ruling regime to avoid domestic political redistribution. However, the role of Islam is not unlimited. The elite in power can broaden identities in order to enable a large variety of policy options to be taken, including ones that conflict with the state’s formalized Islamic identity. Islam, which is essentially a universal connection amongst Muslims, faces constraints derived from material interests. For example, the case of Central Asian states’ strong alliance with the US against the Taliban regime indicates the sidelining of the universality of Islamic ties by a politically-motivated action. To explain this decision to the domestic Muslim public, Islamic identity is recreated into two categories; ‘good and true Islam’ and ‘bad and false Islam’. The ostensibly good and true Islam is tolerant and originated in local cultures. On the other hand, the so called bad and false Islam is intolerant and contaminated by foreign extremism like that which originates in the . Therefore, the reproduction of identity legitimizes the regime’s non-Islamic-oriented external conduct.

In a comparative perspective on the phenomena of democratization shaking Arab countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, called the Arab Spring, Islam was present as a force of populist Muslims setting regime change and international policy reorientation (Al-Rahim 2011). The process took place in three phases. First, Islam emerged as the idea of change along with aspirations for democracy, human rights and

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egalitarianism. Second, Islam became the unifying power for protesters with divergent worldviews and strategies of movement. And third, Islam shaped the new ruling elte’s policy towards issues pertinent to the Muslim world. To exemplify, the Egyptian government has moved away from its moderate position into no cooperation with Israel over the conflict in Palestine (Brown 2012; Cook & Stathis 2012).

Recent studies also explain that Islam is not only influential on the Islamic states’ international behaviour, but also present in the foreign policy perceptions of the most secular culture-based governments of Europe and the US, leading to a particular type of outcome. This is, for example, displayed in the study by Elizabeth Hurd (2007, 345-67). Islam in the post 11 September 2001 secular culture and society of Europe and America is described as a refusal to acknowledge the privileged status of public spheres and the moral rule of the secularist categories of public and private. Hence, decision makers in Europe and the US tend to develop a view of denying the compatibility between Islam and democracy. It brings cynicism to the concept of world order in Islam, such as the caliphate. The incongruity then nurtures conditions leading to parochialism, exclusiveness, anti-modernism, and hostility towards others as seen in the ideology of jihad. Policy options available in this context are limited, and can lead to tense coexistence, violent confrontation or, to some extent conversion.

Nevertheless, amidst the resurgence of the study of Islam in international relations neither Dawisha’s volume nor the more contemporary studies have produced agreeable theories or approaches through which to analyse Islam’s roles in foreign policy. Instead, they prefer to generalize that in spite of the fact that Islam is a significant factor in shaping ideals of the Islamic countries’ foreign policy; it does not intend to be relevant for entire external action. Therefore, the role of Islam in foreign policy should be discerned in a case study basis.

Indonesia-Pakistan Relations as A Case Study

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Some studies have been conducted to explore the role and position of Islam in Indonesian foreign relations. They tend to focus on Jakarta’s participation in international Islamic affairs of the Muslim countries in the Middle East region. One of the most popular issues that the studies have looked at is how Indonesia has responded to the prolonged Israel-Palestine conflict, and whether Islam is present in the responses. It results in contending arguments. On the one hand, the Islamic factor is regarded as only a secondary consideration of the Indonesian governmental policy with regard to issues related to the Muslim world. The state’s foreign policy is accorded primarily on material interests (Leifer 1983b; Perwita 2007; Sukma 2006). On the other hand, Indonesia’s policy towards the Islamic world – especially the Middle East - cannot simply ignore the important role of Islam. This is due mainly to the longstanding Islamic connections which have been established between the Indonesian Muslim community and Muslims in that region (Azra 2006; Sihbudi 1997).

Such a disagreement provides scope to undertake a new study on the role of Islam in Jakarta’s foreign conduct by shifting the focus into Indonesian relations with an important Muslim populous country beyond the Middle East - Pakistan. Thus far, this topic has been overlooked by scholars studying Indonesia’s international relations. In fact, Islamabad has played significant roles in the development of issues related to Islam and Muslims, evident in its active participation in Islamic forum such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Pakistan is an important player in regional security and strategic issues in South Asia, and the impact expands into Indonesia’s region.

Indonesia-Pakistan relations are important to research for a number of reasons. One reason, for example, is demographics because Indonesia and Pakistan are the two largest Muslim populated countries in the world. According to the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, the 2010 census indicates that in Indonesia there are approximately 220 million people – 90 percent of the population - who profess to practice Islam. Second to Indonesia, the Population Census Organization of the Pakistani government reports that

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in 2011 the country had about 174 million Muslims, or 96 percent of the population. Theoretically, any relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan will involve Islamic identity of the two largest Muslim majority countries worldwide.

It is also essential to mention that the links between Indonesians and Pakistanis occurred prior to both countries gaining independence in the 1940s. Under the leadership of Sukarno, Indonesian and Pakistani Muslim soldiers united in the fight against Dutch colonial aggression in Indonesia. However, when Indonesia gained sovereignty in 1949 it launched onto the international diplomatic stage, intending to build closer relations with India, with the ties with Pakistan relatively ignored causing them to slowly diminish. As politics and the geostrategic milieu were dynamic, Indonesian-Indian links waned, allowing Pakistan to enter into stronger relations with Indonesia. Relations between the two countries were at their peak during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir, in which Jakarta gave full support to Pakistan.

During the course of Indonesia-Pakistan relations, patterns of highs and lows have emerged. The fall of the Sukarno regime in 1966 marked the emergence of the New Order government led by Suharto which aimed to promote a ‘good neighbourhood’ policy. Indonesia’s ties with Pakistan were maintained although not excessively close, and relations with India were subsequently repaired. It was only in 1996 that Jakarta and Islamabad attempted to revitalize the links with economic cooperation becoming the main interest. After Suharto, the development of Indonesia and Pakistan relations has been occupied by issues such as the Kashmir conflict and global terrorism and counterterrorism.

The Indonesian Muslim community also is associated with Pakistan’s international affairs, particularly when Islam or Muslims are implicated. Islamist groups in Indonesia, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Islamic Proselytizing, DDII), are noted to have vocally articulated their views on the Kashmir conflict, the Afghanistan war, and the global war on terrorism.

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Since intergovernmental and inter-societal relations are not isolated, it can be assumed that they will have an effect on each other. Therefore, it is worthwhile examining, from the Indonesian perspective, whether Islam’s role is significant in the shaping of Indonesia-Pakistan relations.

Approach and Data Collection Although there is no academic consensus on which specific theory and concept should be applied in analysing Islam’s roles and limits in foreign policy, this study considers that there are three important factors; identity of the state, elite interest, and external situations which influence the state’s foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy is defined as a set of official conducts of an independent actor (usually a state) towards its external environment. The term ‘official’ is the key point to this definition as it allows the insertion of all actions by the state government and its agencies, while maintaining limitations on the scope of observations that can include the vast number of transactions international actors do (Hill 2003, 3). The terminology of policy is, in a broader sense, perceived as the decision delineating goals, mobilization of resources, and actions taken to implement them. Hence, foreign policy is actually a process, and it encompasses three distinct but interrelated areas - the influence on foreign policy, the making of foreign policy, and the implementation and evaluation of foreign policy (Hudson 2005; Snyder, Bruck & Sapin 2002).

This study does not aim to look at such policy processes thoroughly. Instead, it concentrates on examining the actual behaviour of the state, and why the behaviour occurs. With the focus on Muslim countries’ foreign policies, it is argued that identity, elite interest, and external settings encompass ideational and material factors which determine whether, and how, Islam is present in the states’ international actions. The approach develops three propositions, as follows:

Firstly, the role of Islam in foreign policy is determined by identity of the state. The state’s identity is formed mostly by the extant culture or religion of the society. Identity

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of the state – which gives an idea of who we are and who the others are - is argued as to inform what is the state’s national interests, and accordingly directs the conduct of foreign policy to meet them (Houghton 2007; Kowert 2001). With this in mind, it is safe to say that states - which are founded on the ground of Islam or which are constitutionally accorded on Islam - are highly likely to pursue Islamic-related interests in their international relations (Kostiner 1993; Moshaver 2003). On the other hand, in the Muslim majority state which is built upon secularism, Islam’s roles face the formal constraints in influencing foreign policy, in spite of the fact that there is sometimes a juncture at which the role of leader with Islamic vision or the power of Islamic movement has to some extent challenged the state’s secular identity and foreign policy (Pope 2010).

Secondly, elite interest affects how Islam exists in the state’s foreign policy. This is to argue that internal milieu, notably set out by national ideology, domestic politics, geographical condition, degree of economic development as well as military capability, provides tangible and intangible circumstances under which the elite’s view on the country’s vital needs, or so called national interests, is shaped. Construction of the perceptible national interest is commonly untouchable by the general public and is dominated by the ruling elite, and thus it is closely associated with the regime’s interests – chiefly political legitimacy and survival. Foreign policy is formulated and carried out to serve the national interest (Brecher, et al. 1969; Kegley & Witkopf 2004). Within this context, the presence of Islam in foreign policy is determined by the policy makers’ interest and preference. Whether Islam is accommodated or marginalized in foreign policy depends on how the elite see its salience for the national interest (Barzegar 2010). In the practice of democracy, civil society association - which is particularly expressed in public opinions - possesses an important place in the decision-making process. However, in reality, they are still confined by the established domestic political structures, especially those of the conservative proponents. Islam may be played as the force of public pressure on the ruling elite, but its move is limited by the interests and power of the dominant political structures (Bird 2007; Oguzlu 2010).

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Thirdly, the dynamics of the external environment render the conditions for a regime to use Islam in foreign policy. This is created by a complexity of international outcomes, consisting of the behaviour of regional or global powers, transnational non-state actors’ movement, international norms and global issues (Klotz & Linch 2007), and crisis situations (Brecher 1979). As foreign policy functions to respond to the changes of the state’s international milieu, the patterns of regional or global politics will develop into operative input influencing the way the decision makers carry out foreign relations. Likewise, external circumstances are realities, and not those realities that generate policy choices, but decision-makers’ perceptions as to how these realities impact on the state that then leads to foreign policy (Brecher 1967; Kubalkova 2001; Novotny 2010). Based on this understanding, Islam will be present in foreign policy when it is regarded as a meaningful segment of the perceived international realities, such as ideological threat, social movement, conflict, and international regimes (Jones 2002; Kepel 2002).

This study combines theoretical and empirical surveys. The sources of these explorations were collected through bibliographical research and fieldwork. It began with consulting books, articles, academic theses, and research reports available at Australian libraries and research institutions, and also searching relevant documentations and media, particularly newspapers, magazines, and the internet. The fieldwork was conducted over a period of nine months. It was aimed at collecting more data salient for the study in addition to what was available at libraries and online. The fieldwork was carried out in Indonesia’s capital city Jakarta where additional primary sources of information could be found in research centres, several universities and government offices.

This study benefited from interviews with a number of Indonesian diplomats, military staff and investigators (not less than 20 interviewees, including those active and retired), and diplomatic officials at Pakistan, Indian, and ASEAN representatives office in Jakarta, who were able to render information and to share their experience as well as

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views relevant to the issues examined. Informal discussions were carried out with policy consultants whose expertise is founded upon Islam in Indonesian politics and foreign policy. This is important in terms of enriching perspectives on the issues investigated in the study. No less import were conversations with Indonesian Muslim activists, especially those who paid attention to issues such as the Kashmir conflict; their views were an empirical source, useful in understanding how Indonesian Muslims perceive and respond to the issue.

Discussion Chapters This study argues that at a governmental level Islam is sometimes used as a tool and is present as the consideration of Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan. Islam’s role is marginal amidst the focus on material interests that shape Jakarta’s relations with Islamabad. On the other hand, the Indonesian Muslim community constantly uses Islamic identity to describe the relationships with Pakistanis, particularly in regard to Islamic-related issues. In many respects however, the government is able to prevent Islamic ideas from significantly influencing the state’s foreign policy. The lack of Islamic credentials is part of the Indonesian governmental general attitude towards the position of Islam in the state’s international affairs. The tendency is set up by the constraints which are derived from the nature of the state’s identity, elite interests, and international system.

Chapter One explains how the constraints prevent Islam from playing an important role in influencing the discourse and conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The chapter begins by examining the pre-independence politics of national identity construction which gave rise to as the state philosophy and root of inspiration for foreign policy, thus disallowing Islam to formally manifest in the state’s international relations. It then shows that throughout the history of independent Indonesia since 1945, the dynamics of domestic politics and the ruling elite’s interests have always prevented Islamic groups from significantly influencing the government’s policies. In parallel, the nature of international politics, especially during the Cold War, did not provide the

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space for Indonesia to express the country’s Islamic identity. Accordingly, Indonesian foreign policy was formulated and guided by a doctrinal principle of independent activism (bebas aktif), suggesting non-Islamic ideas, but the pragmatic logic of the pursuance of material interests. This feature of Indonesian foreign policy is maintained after the Cold War.

In order to highlight the foreign policy impacts of the three factors mentioned above on Indonesian relations with Pakistan, the following chapters are organised on the basis of periodization of changing political regimes in Jakarta and developments of international and regional Islamic-related issues, in a synthetic fashion.

Chapter Two analyses the extent to which Islamic identity was used by the Indonesian government under Sukarno (1945-1965) to build links with Pakistan. The chapter illuminates that Islam was useful for Indonesia’s for independence and international recognition. However, the focus on the nationalist struggle made Indonesia balance its relations with both the Muslim League and the National Congress of India. After gaining sovereignty in 1949, Jakarta’s foreign policy leaned towards New Delhi for their similar emphasis on the nonalignment in the Cold War. Due to the changing strategic interest of Jakarta towards India, Sukarno had begun to gradually articulate Islamic identity in the relationship with Pakistan. It is seen in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir where Islam and the elite’s interests became the mixed context in which Indonesia favoured Pakistan against India.

Chapter Three highlights the changing Indonesian South Asia policy under the new leadership of Suharto, who replaced Sukarno in 1966 and built the New Order government. Suharto abandoned Sukarno’s confrontational discourse and directed Indonesia to foster good neighbourliness. Suharto used foreign policy as the means to meet domestic interest, in particular with economic development. This goal required the creation of regional political stability. Arguably, Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan were driven in line with this policy orientation. Jakarta eschewed articulating Islamic

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language in its relationship with Pakistan. It can be discerned in the way the Suharto government responded to the East Pakistan crisis. The focus of Jakarta’s policy towards Islamabad was on economic cooperation. However, the Indonesian government still acknowledged the important role of -Pakistan Muslim society links, although with uncommitted support.

Chapter Four looks at Indonesia-Pakistan relations in the 1980s, which waned politically. This is observable in the case of the invasion of Afghanistan that became the most significant security problem for the Zia Ul-Haq government of Pakistan. However, Jakarta gave only limited commitment to support Pakistan to oppose the Soviets’ existence in its neighbouring country. The chapter presents the contrast in Indonesia’s governmental and societal responses to the Afghan war. Indonesia’s Islamic groups’ reactions emerged as jihad against the Soviets. But, the government in Jakarta tried to bar the Islamists’ movement for the reason of maintaining national resilience and stability. This triggered Indonesian Islamists to carry out clandestine movements and develop international jihadist connections with Mujahideens operating from Pakistan. Essentially, this chapter explains that during the 1980s the growth of Islamist activism in Indonesia was to an extent a counterpoise to the government’s lack of Islamic credentials in foreign policy.

Chapter Five focuses on an important shift in Indonesian foreign policy under Suharto. Jakarta showed a greater interest in participating in international relations of the Muslim world. This new mode of external conduct began to take place in the early 1990s. The chapter points out that the change was influenced by the activism of an Islamic group called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI). The ICMI played an important role in upgrading Indonesian status in the OIC from partial to full membership. To some extent the country’s Islamic identity was featured, however the nature of interest underpinning the policy remained secular, in the need for achieving economic benefit. In consonance with this agenda, Jakarta revitalized its ties with Islamabad, which had waned. Indonesia was

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not averse to talk of the Muslim world’s issues, but it tried to reframe them into at less Islamic-pronounced agenda. This is noticeable in the establishment of the new grouping Developing Eight (D-8), in which Jakarta and Islamabad defined their engagement in economic terms, rather than the pursuance of an Islamist bloc. This chapter, to some extent, also provides some background of the topic discussed in Chapter Six.

Chapter Six explores the Indonesian response to the Kashmir issue especially since indigenous insurgency emerged in the disputed territory in the early 1990s. The chapter indicates that Indonesia’s governmental attitude was passive and impartial towards the Kashmir issue. Jakarta saw the development in Kashmir through the perspective of material interests, and therefore ignored the Islamic nuance in the issue. On the other hand, Muslim voices from Indonesia signified an adherence to Islamic solidarity with the Kashmiri struggle against India, in a way suggesting a pro-Pakistan position.

Chapter Seven is an account of Indonesia-Pakistan relations with specific reference to the global counterterrorism agenda. It became an important topic in the two countries’ links in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorists’ attacks in the US, and a series of terrorist bombings in Indonesia afterwards. The chapter demonstrates that the Indonesian governmental response to terrorism was shaped in the mixed context, that is, between caution in the face of the Islamic factor and the imperative of retaining national security. The latter context bought Jakarta towards fostering counterterrorism cooperation with Islamabad, particularly following the uncovering of transnational extremist networks – cells of terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah - operating between Pakistan and Indonesia.

The conclusion of this study presents integrated analysis and summary of the important findings of each chapter. In addition it intends to note the important contribution the study has made to the ongoing debate on the role of Islam in Indonesia’s international affairs. Finally the study proposes some significant and relevant topics for future

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research on the role of Islam in Indonesia-Pakistan relations in particular, and Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy in general.

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Chapter One Islamic Identity, Elite Interest And Foreign Policy In Indonesia

This chapter focuses on the role of Islam in the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy. It demonstrates that Islam’s role has faced constraints shaped by the nature of the state’s identity, elite interest and policy on Islam, and external situations. The formation of Indonesian national identity was characterized by the disputation between religious and secular expressions. The religious voice was represented by Islamic political groups who aspired for the establishment of an Indonesian state based on Islam, or at least the formal implementation of shari’a (Islamic law) for Muslims in the country. Against Islamic identity, the secular movements favoured a state free from religious identifications, including that of Islam. This manifested into prolonged ideological debates which emerged during the pre-independence of 1945. Such vying was, in fact, tactically and politically won by the secularists, and independent Indonesia was defined as neither theocratic nor secular, but rather a Pancasila state. The Pancasila state does not allow for Islam to become the official reference of Indonesian foreign policy.

In post-independence Indonesian domestic politics, which has been dominated by the perceptible political interest of the secular ruling elite, Islamic voices and agendas are marginalized. This, for most of the time, occurred under the governance of Sukarno (1945-1965) and Suharto (1966-1998). After Suharto, the democratic moment rendered an opportunity for Islamic political forces to become involved in the political process, but their capacity to govern has been quite limited. The lack of space for, and power of, Islamic political movements to play roles and influence governance, has resulted in the minimal use of Islamic language in, and the focus on, secular agendas in the government’s policy.

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External settings also determine the way in which Indonesian decision makers formulate and implement foreign policy. In this context, Islam has restricted scope to appear in the state’s participation in international affairs. Under the world order formed by the Cold War, Indonesian foreign policy was steered by the principle of bebas aktif (independent activism) that had been essentially devoid of any mention of Islam. In post-Cold War world politics, the feature of independent activism foreign policy has been maintained. There are some occasions where Islam has noticeably been spoken of and used in foreign policy issues, in particular with the Muslim world. However, Islam does not constitute the main substance of interests, such as the commitment to pursue Islamic solidarity.

Islam and the Making of Indonesia’s National Identity Initially, the presence of Islam as a social and political movement in Indonesia needs to be clarified. Islam in this country is not monolithic. There are various streams of identities visible in distinct social and political associations. For analytical purposes, Islam/Islamic movements in Indonesia can be compartmentalized into two inclinations; traditionalists and modernists or reformists. Also one can envisage this as the divide between santri (devout Muslim) and abangan (nominal Muslim). The difference amongst such propensities is centred on profound interpretations of the way Islam should be applied in a Muslims’ social and political life. This analytical labelling does not necessarily mean they are completely distinct or separated. In fact, Muslim individuals and groups in Indonesia frequently adjust to developments in their social, economic, and political environments, making the border between such dichotomies increasingly blurred.

Islam came to Indonesia from the Indian subcontinent through trade exchanges in the 15th century. Islamization of indigenous societies flourished due to marriages between the traders and local women. Islam expanded peacefully throughout the Malay lands. After Western powers, such as Portuguese and the Dutch, who invaded peoples in the Indonesian Archipelago, Islam turned into a force of struggle against colonialism, for

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example in the rebellion of Pangeran in Central Java and Perang Padri in West during the 19th century (Taba 1996, 115-23).

Prior to the 20th century, Islam in Indonesia specifically in Java had shared a common peculiarity with the older Hindu-Buddhist-Javanese traditions in terms of the dominant aspect of its tolerance and inclusiveness. At this stage, the friendly characteristic of Islam was another catalyst for the process of Islamization in Indonesia; at least it served as a nice introduction to Islamic teachings. Indonesian Islam refers to the followers of customary Islam, illustrated by a combination of local practices and those that are shared throughout the Islamic world. This mixed tendency is named traditional Islam of Indonesia (Abdullah 1989, 58).

Nonetheless, by the late 19th century and the early 20th century, a serious challenge to such a blended trait of Indonesian Islam began to rise as the ideology of Islamic reformism from Egypt reached Indonesia (Laffan 2003). The emergence of the Islamic reform movement in Indonesia contributed to the background of the divergence in the modern Indonesian Muslim community, and the difference between the traditionalists and the modernists or reformists. This split at the level of discourse was, and remains in its place up to now, apparent in the form of the two largest Islamic mass organizations; Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. It is the dominant approach to understand the meaning of Islam in the country. The direct impact of Islamic reformism on Indonesian Islamic society was that more Indonesian Muslims, particularly those living in urban areas, confronted the adequacy of the traditional versions of Islamic life in the face of modernity. Those who wished to reform and modernize Islam in Indonesia were influenced by the economic changes taking place at the end of the 19th century, especially those beginning in West Sumatra (Dobbin 1983, 141).

Reformist Islam opposed traditional Indonesian Muslims on two terms. Firstly, for what modernists saw as syncretistic practices amongst traditional Muslims. Modernists regarded them as the cause of decay in the faith (Ali 1971, 13). Secondly, Reformists

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contested the traditional Muslims’ like of uncritical following of the dictates of religious leaders without learning Islam creatively (Barton 1997, 324). The reformist Muslims dreamed of creating a new image of the world and their position in it, that is, essentially to be modern while remaining Muslim (Rahman 1987, 240-2).

This reform spirit spread quickly, first starting in Minangkabau in West Sumatra it soon arrived in Java, the centre of traditionalist Muslims, from where is spread to become more popular in the cities such as Yogyakarta, Surakarta, , and Kudus. The carriers of the reformism were Indonesian Muslims with Arab descent, and to a smaller extent those who came from the Indian subcontinent. Around 1900, about 18,000 Arab Indonesian Muslims lived in the Indonesian Archipelago. They mostly originated from the Hadramut region. This group continued to make contact with, and follow developments in the Middle East. Many of them had graduated from madrasahs (Islamic school) in the Middle East, especially those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For the purpose of Islamic teachings, the Djamiat Chair was established in 1905, and eight years later al-Irsyad madrasah was founded in Indonesia (Noer 1973, 68-80). The flourishing modernism and reformism in Indonesian Islam gave birth to two Islamic mass organizations; Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam.

Muhammadiyah was a modernist Islamic organization established on 18 November 1912 by K. H. in Yogyakarta. Since its inception, this organization had been aimed at propagating the idea of Islamic reformism in Indonesia. Ahmad Dahlan went to Mecca to study Islam with the Grand Imam of Masjid al-Haram Sheikh Ahmad Khatib who was originally from Minangkabau. Ahmad Dahlan was in Mecca between 1903 and 1904 when he was introduced to the thoughts of Islamic reform by some Middle East scholars, namely Ibn Taimiyah, Imam al-Ghazaly, Abduh, and Rasyid Rhida (Ma’arif 1985, 85). Upon returning home, Ahmad Dahlan had in mind that the condition of his society needed to be changed, and to this end he was encouraged and supported by other Arab Indonesian Muslims in Yogyakarta to build an organization instrumental for reform, Muhammadiyah (Salam 1968, 9).

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Muhammadiyah sought to purify Islam against the heretical doctrine and myths often trained by Indonesian traditional Muslims, especially those in Java. It wanted to banish superstition adhered to by elements of traditional Muslims (Rabasa 2003, 14-5). The reform movement of Muhammadiyah embarked upon the idea of innovation, restoration, renewal and modernization. Impressively, it succeeded in expanding branches and activities in spiritual, social and educational fields through an extensive network of youth and women’s associations, clinics, orphanages, and a large and modern school system. By the early 1930s, Muhammadiyah had developed 557 branches all over Java and elsewhere. This impressive organizational advancement was perhaps helped by the nature of the organization, which is not based on a certain ethnic tradition in particular with the Javanese, but is an inclusive Islamic movement (Alfian 1989).

Unlike Muhammadiyah that was focused on social and religious movement for reform, Sarekat Islam was founded as the first Islamic political party in Indonesia with the purpose to liberate Indonesians from the Dutch colonial rule. Stemming from a committee of local Muslim merchants who were facing competition from stronger Chinese textile importers, Sarekat Islam transformed itself into a political group in a congress in Solo 11 November 1912 (Ghani 1984, 12-3). This party leadership was entrusted to a young Muslim intellectual H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto. In 1915, Sarekat Islam developed its branches in Sumatra directed by and . As a political organization, Sarekat Islam was keen to promote an anti-colonialism consciousness amongst Indonesians. It argued that people in the archipelago had to leave their backwardness, and should not be passive against Western imperialism. In Tjokroaminoto’s words, the ‘destiny of our people, free or colonized, is beholden to ourselves…’ (Koever 1985, 271).

During the 1920s and 1930s, Sarekat Islam faced internal problems and a division of opinion on what was an appropriate Islamic movement. This began when some

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communists infiltrated the party branches, especially those in Central Java. The communists were aware of Sarekat Islam’s ability to mobilize massive support, and accordingly they used it as political vehicle. This communist move caused friction within Sarekat Islam, between the ‘green’ Islamic and ‘red’ communists. In 1926, the red faction incited an uprising in Banten and in Silungkang one year later. The Dutch took police action to terminate these insurgencies, and consequently Sarekat Islam leaders were affected. Semaun and Darsono were of those who were exiled to Tanah Merah by the Dutch government (Noer 1973, 255-60).

Later, the new Sarekat Islam leadership under campaigned for ‘purification’ of the party. In fact, he ousted cadres who were holding positions in other mass organizations. For example, Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo was fired as Sarekat Islam executive because he was too an active chair of Muhammadiyah branch of Sumatra. The sacking of Sukiman was followed by the resignation of Sarekat Islam members mainly from Sumatra; amongst them was , the then-chair of Masyumi Islamic Party after Indonesian independence. This gave rise to the sentiment of Sarekat Islam Java and Sumatra. In the Java circles, internal conflict occurred as well. Abikusno was accused by Kartosuwiryo, a leader of the West Java branch, of changing the orientation of the party to become more cooperative with the Dutch. Against this accusation, Abikusno dismissed Kartosuwiryo in 1936; the latter then established his own political base in West Java region known as the Committee for the Defence of Truth (Ma’arif 1985, 88-90). In effect, the power of Sarekat Islam diminished.

The development of Islamic reformism, especially that invoked by Muhammadiyah, was regarded as a threat by the traditional Muslim ulama (religious teachers) in rural areas of Java. For the traditional ulama, Muhammadiyah’s spirit of reconciling Islam with modernity was an implied denial to the teachings of great classical Islamic scholars. The traditional ulama felt that it was necessary for a united response to the reformism movement of Muhammadiyah. Nahdlatul Ulama was established in on 31 January 1926 to protect the existing way of life – the blend between Islam and

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local cultural traditions – and in reaction to aspirations of the purification of Islam and modernization carried by the reformists, whom the traditional ulama perceived had been greatly influenced by the practices of Wahhabism fostered by King Abd’al -Aziz of Saudi Arabia (Fealy & Barton 1996). Nahdlatul Ulama, therefore, was the representation of the religious interest of chiefly traditional Javanese Muslims.

In response to the critics of the modernists, Nahdlatul Ulama, with its traditional ulama, suggested a better adherence to the scriptural dictates, and above all obedience to established sacred leadership (Riddell 2002, 70). Nevertheless, the traditional ulama within Nahdlatul Ulama were not unwilling to change and reform. They quietly implemented reform of their own; for example, by gradually decreasing dependence on Malay and Javanese writings in religious schools, and inserting more recognized Middle East literature. Reform in the madrasah’s curricula was also conducted with some secular topics included in the teaching subjects. However, Muhammadiyah continued to be perceived as a menace to traditionalist’ teachings, even though the gap between these two Muslim groups had been narrowing. Nahdlatul Ulama lingered to adapt with newer Islamic discourses developing in the modernists’ milieu (Van Bruinessen 1994).

The diversity in Indonesian Islamic groups was not just exemplified by the divide between traditional Nahdlatul Ulama and modernist Muhammadiyah, yet it is popular for academics to make other categorization of santri (devout Muslim) and abangan (nominal Muslim) of Muslims, especially in Java Island (Geertz 1960, 172-90). Santri is used to identify Muslims who strictly practiced shari’a and payed attention to Islamic doctrines applied in social organizations or political parties. It is easy to discover that devout Muslims are linked to madrasahs and societies surrounding them. Abangan, on the other hand, tend not to obey Islamic doctrines as well, or use Islamic identity for its social and political practices. In these identities, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and Nahdlatul Ulama represent a division within santri, while the nationalist Muslims like Sukarno are known as abangan.

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The Indonesian Muslim leaders were not unaware that the ideological disagreements amongst them implicated disunity in the Indonesian peoples. An effort was made to unite Indonesian Muslims or at least to mitigate the impact of their incompatibilities. On 27 September 1937, a new Muslim organization was formed, called Majelis Islam Al’a Indonesia (MIAI). The initiators of MIAI were Mas Mansyur of Muhammadiyah, Wondoamiseno of Sarekat Islam, and Muhammad Dahlan as well as Wahhab Hasbullah of Nahdlatul Ulama. To avoid power rivalry amongst the Muslim figures, MIAI was set up as a federative organization (Noer 1973, 261). Due to the strict watch from the Dutch colonial master on potential Islamic movements, MIAI did not explicitly declare its objective in political terms. However, a statement of the statute of MIAI implicitly suggested that this federative group’s main goal was to fuse Muslim powers against the colonialism of the Dutch (Ma’arif 1988, 20).

The establishment of MIAI was well accepted by Indonesian Muslims in general. This was evident in 1941 when seven Islamic organizations committed to join the MIAI. They were Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Partai Oemat Islam, al-Irsyad Surabaya, Hidayatullah, Islamiyah Banyuwangi, and Khairiyah Surabaya. Nonetheless, Nahdlatul Ulama rejected attaching formally with MIAI despite two of its leaders being the originators of it. Again internal division was present in the Muslim movement. Nahdlatul Ulama particularly disliked the Sarekat Islam leadership’s vested interest in dominating MIAI (Taba 1996, 144-5). Internal contradiction amongst Indonesian Muslim individuals and groups was responsible for their inability to effectively struggle against the Dutch rule.

Parallel to the development of the Islamists, the seeds of secular nationalism grew in Indonesian Muslims as well. The impetus was initiated by young middle-class students who had attended Western education in Batavia (Jakarta). The secular nationalist Muslims (or in shorthand secularists) were concerned about the prolonged internal division amongst Indonesian Islamic groups. Therefore, they advocated nationalism and unity instead of religious politics as the platform of the struggle for independence. The

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spirit of nationalism impressively gained support from Muslims – from the Javanese and other ethnic groups. On 4 July 1927, a group of Muslim students formed Partai Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party, PNI) led by Sukarno, this attracted members from Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, making this party the first national- wide political movement with its membership representing plural Indonesian identities. Sukarno announced that the goal of his party was ‘Indonesian independence, the ideology was secular nationalism, and the territorial vision encompassed boundaries of the Indonesian Archipelago under the Dutch colonial government…’ (Means 1947, 245).

The coming of PNI started politics that were preoccupied with debates between Islamist political groups and the secularists in relation to the ideological base for the then- Indonesian state. Debates revolved around whether independent Indonesia would be founded on the grounds of Islam as the state ideology or a secular philosophical basis. Hence, Islam as an ideology of struggle began to face challenges from non-Islamic ones. Figures within the secularists had been more inspired by Western ideologies, including socialism and fascism, whilst the others referred to the past golden age of great kingdoms in the Indonesian Archipelago, such as Sriwijaya and Majapahit. Nationalist leaders like Sukarno, Supomo, and , although they were Muslim, were socialized by the values of nationalist awakenings in other parts of Asia, mainly Turkey, Japan, India, and .

Sukarno was conscious of the superiority of the Dutch colonials and recognized the weakness of the divided action, and hence urged that independence could only succeed if all Indonesians were united. In response, Islamic political groups such as Sarekat Islam, secular and Javanese cultural based organizations such as Budi Utomo, regional political groups such as Jong Ambon, Jong Celebes, and Jong Andalas, as well as Christian groups gathered with the secularist camp in the establishment of an organization called Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (the

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Agreement of Indonesian National Political Associations, PPPKI) (Dahm 1969, 29-34). This group pledged to promote ‘unity in diversity’ to the struggle for independence.

However, the harmony within this association proved to be short-lived and superficial, as the real differences in the ideological views of its elements came to light. Sarekat Islam withdrew from the association because nationalist leaders rejected their proposal for the recognition of Islam as the ideology of the people’s movement, and because the traditional Muslims opposed their entitlement for the privilege of the urban Muslim leadership with modernist discourse. For the secularists, religion and the state had to be separated, an idea that could not be accepted by the Islamist groups. This hole occurred between the Muslims themselves; on the one hand, secularists against the devout Muslims, and the urban modernists against the traditionalist ulama on the other. The association was finally dissolved in 1935 (Noer 1973, 340).

For the secularists led by Sukarno, Islam should not be the affair of the state, and the identity of the independent Indonesian state should not be defined in terms of any religion, including that of Islam. Sukarno argued that ‘reality showed the people of Indonesia that the idea of integrating Islam in governance for a country which its population not entirely Muslims would not be in line with democracy…’. To Sukarno’s mind, a desire for an Islamic state was the creation of some Muslim scholars, and there was no foundation for this in the Islamic teachings. Thus, it was not an obligation for Muslims to establish an Islamic state. Moreover, the formation of an Islamic state in Indonesia would engender problems with minorities (Zainuddin 2000, 18).

The secularist camp, represented by Supomo, further argued for a non-Islamic identity by noting; ‘Islam is a personal matter, and thus it is not suitable to become the philosophy of a state with pluralistic societies…Islam can be the subordinate of the nationalism ideology…’. The position of Islam in Indonesian society was well thought- out as equal to other religions even though they formed only the minority. It was also common for the secularists to criticize what they viewed as the ‘backwardness’ of the

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Islamic society, which was visible for instance in the practice of polygamy and inequality between men and women. Islam was closely related to cultural conservatism and an anti-democratic political system that impeded progress (Noer 1987, 27).

The Islamist groups objected to secularist’s notions. The spokesman of the Islamist camp Mohammad Natsir (1955, 315) argued; ‘Islam is more than just a system of theology, and Islam is a complete civilization comprising of general principles which regulated the interaction amongst individuals and between individuals and the society…’. Arguing further, Natsir contended that to make Islamic teachings and directives operative ‘religion needed to be upheld by a system of authority like a state…Hence, the accord between Islam and the state was an imperative…’. The Islamic groups held the view that Islam had to be the integral part of the state, and in an Indonesian context, it meant that Islam should shape the ideological basis of the independent Indonesian state and should be explicitly stated in the constitution.

After Japan overthrew the Dutch colonists in 1942, it tried to manage the conflict between Indonesian secular and Islamic nationalist groups. Between 1942 and 1945 under the Japanese governance, all political activities based on ideology were prohibited. Instead, Japan approached both Indonesian secularists and Islamists to build up the paramilitary, or people’s defence capabilities to protect their country. In fact, Japan was not interested in the content of the debate between the secularists and Islamists. Rather, it preferred to usher them for strategic purposes. Several local combatant units were supported by Japan’s military. They were called Pembela Tanah Air (the Defender of Nation, PETA), and were associated with the secularist camp. At the same time, Islamic paramilitary groups were established, including Laskar Syaifullah, Sabilillah, and Hezbollah in affiliation with Nahdlatul Ulama. The Japanese ruler had no socio-religious vision to uplift such Islamic groups. It was genuinely aimed at empowering local forces to aid its armed forces during the Pacific war (Benda 1980, 135-40).

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When Japan began to suffer a loss in World War II, Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso spoke at Ulimero Diet (parliament) meeting on 7 September 1944, promising independence for Indonesia. This materialized in the founding of Komite Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Committee of the Preparation for Indonesian Independence, PPKI) on 9 April 1945, which was inaugurated on 28 May that year under the aegis of the Japanese government in Jakarta. PPKI held two sessions of meetings; 29 May – 1 June and 10 – 16 July 1945. The committee’s main task was to design the constitution of the independent Indonesia (Yamin 1960, 239).

PPKI consisted of 68 members; 8 Japanese, 15 representatives of Islamist groups who wanted Islam to be the basis of the Indonesian state, and the rest belonged to secularists and regional representatives that were in favour of non-Islamic views. It was chaired by Radjiman Wedyoningrat, a mystic Javanese aristocrat. The Islamist voices were outspoken by figures such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Ahmad Sanusi, Kahar Muzakkir, and . Since the Japanese representative was not actively involved in PPKI’s discussions, the Islamist camp was again face-to-face with the secularists (Noer 1987, 30-2).

The dissenting opinions over whether Islam would be the fundamental ideology of Indonesia were repeated during PPKI’s meetings (Yamin 1959, 115-20). Supomo, who delivered his speech on 29 May, struck the Islamist camp by arguing that the latter’s demand for a creation of Islamic state in Indonesia was not supported by solid empirical evidence. It was followed by the statement made by on 31 May arguing for the need to build a nation-state based on unity of all ethnicities, not of pre- eminence by any one particular religion – this was certainly a reference to Islam. Sukarno, on his speech before the committee’s meeting on 1 June, offered an ideological formula called Pancasila, a Sanskrit (ancient Javanese language) acronym for the five principles; belief in one supreme God, humanity, national unity, people’s democracy, and social justice. Nevertheless, the spokesman of the Islamist camp

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refused all these positions, and pressed ahead with their will to adopt Islam as the state’s identity.

The deadlock resulted in PPKI’s meetings forcing the committee’s chair to form a committee of nine to discuss a solution to the difference. This committee consisted of Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Mohammad Yamin, Ahmad Subardjo, a Christian figure Alexander Andries Maramis of the secularists, as well as Wahid Hasyim, Kahar Muzakkir, Abikusno, and Agus Salim from the Islamist camp. Following intense consultations, Pancasila was accepted as a compromise solution by both camps, with an insertion of the phrase ‘with the obligation to implement shari’a for all Muslims…’ after the first principle of belief in one supreme God, in the preamble of the constitution. This agreement is known as the Djakarta Charter, issued on 22 June 1945. It was also agreed that the president of Indonesia had to be a Muslim (Zainuddin 2000, 19).

With such an agreement, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on the morning of 17 August 1945. Sukarno was appointed as the first Indonesian president and Hatta as his vice president. To the surprise of the Islamist groups, on 18 August when the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was promulgated, the clause stating the compulsion of the implementation of shari’a for Muslims, as well as the provision that the president of Indonesia must be a Muslim, were omitted from the preamble and the articles of the constitution (Zainuddin 2000, 20). This meant that the Islamic expressions in the Djakarta Charter were not incorporated in the constitution.

This exclusion of Islamic ideas caused anger to the Islamists, as expressed by Natsir (1955, 101) ‘the constitution has no legitimacy in Islam…’. However, the secularists had their own explanation. For example, Hatta (1979, 458-60) acknowledged that on the morning of 18 August, he talked with Ki Bagus Hadikusumo about the Protestant and Roman Catholic leaders who entertained reservations about the constitution, and hence in order to secure the unity of the newly independent republic, the Islamic articles were removed. Beside this, Hatta wanted the Islamist groups to understand two crucial

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situations; one was that the newly independent state had to have a constitution immediately, and two was that the political temperature in Jakarta at the time was such that prolonged contradictions would be counterproductive. Eventually, Hadikusumo accepted Hatta’s arguments, and for Hatta this meant that the Islamist camp was willing to give consent.

To the Islamists, especially revealed by Hadikusumo and Hasyim Asy’ari, one important reason for their agreement with Pancasila as the ideology of Indonesia was that Sukarno had promised to undertake general elections quickly after the declaration of independence, and this would be followed by complete reformulation of the constitution for the better. Islamist leaders were very sure that independence would by all means bring about stability and tranquillity, so that general elections could be held within six months. They were convinced as well that in the elections the majority of Indonesians who professed to Islam (at that time about 48 million of the 60 million) would vote for them. By winning the elections, the agenda of establishing a state based on shari’a would be ensured (Noer 1987, 41-2).

The deletion of the Islamic expressions of the Djakarta Charter from the Indonesian constitution formalized the identity of the independent state as being empty of Islamic mentions. Indonesia was, according to the secularist leaders, neither theocratic nor secular but a state based on Pancasila. The transcendental value in the ideological basis was inherent in the first principle of belief in one supreme God. The history of the construction of Indonesian identity demonstrates that the secular component was leading. It, in many respects, will contribute to the way the post-independence government creates the state’s international posture.

Islam, Elite Interest and Indonesian Politics after Independence In the period after independence, the Islamist camp was given minority proportion of government. Within the appointed legislative council, which comprised of 137

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members, the Islamist camp obtained only 20 seats, and under Sukarno-Hatta presidential cabinet, inaugurated in September 1945, which consisted of 26 ministries, only Abikusno and Wahid Hasyim were assigned positions, as minister of physical reconstruction and minister of religious affairs respectively (Boland 1985, 40). However, the domination of the secularists raised new awareness amongst the Islamists for the need to consolidate power through the creation of a more solid Islamic-oriented party.

The newly shaped Indonesian government gave out an administrative instruction no. 10 on 3 November 1945 signed by Vice President Hatta, suggesting the formation of formal political parties. It was welcomed by a variety of groups through the establishment of their own political parties. Essentially, there were three main streams of political orientations in the parties established; 1) Islamists represented by the Masyumi Islamic Party which was supported by Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and Nahdlatul Ulama; 2) secular nationalists still under PNI; and 3) Marxist/Leninists adhered to by, for instance, Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) (Kahin 1980, 192-204).

Masyumi was created at an Islamic congress held in the office block of Mu’allimin madrasah in Yogyakarta from 5 to 7 November 1945. It was decided at the meeting that Masyumi would become the only Islamic political party in Indonesia that would struggle on behalf of the aspirations of all Muslims in the country over the formation of an Islamic state (Ma’arif 1988, 31). The structure of Masyumi leadership resembled collaboration of the three aforementioned Islamist groups. In the Majelis Syura (council of advisors) sat Nahdlatul Ulama figures, such as Hasyim Asy’ari and Wahid Hasyim, whilst the executive board consisted of career politicians such as Abikusno, Kartosuwiryo, Sukiman, , Agus Salim and Natsir of Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah (Boland 1985, 41). With the composition of such a big Islamic mass organizations, Masyumi was likely to become the strongest political force at the time.

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Nevertheless, Islamists continued to differ amongst themselves and engage in political alignments that were not determined by their Islamic identity but by the need for power. This started in 1947 when Sarekat Islam decided to withdraw from Masyumi and ally with the socialist party under Amir Syarifuddin who needed an Islamic constituent to back up his coalition government. Masyumi leaders were opposed to Marxist/Leninist movements, and regarded Sarekat Islam’s move as an ideological betrayal. However, the motive of Sarekat Islam was to achieve executive positions in the government, and not an ideological shift as alleged by Masyumi leadership (Feith 1964, 138-9).

This friction worsened when traditional differences again arose between Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama sections in Masyumi, which in turn led to the withdrawal of the traditionalist ulama from the Islamist party. Originating from a proposal, launched by Muhammadiyah members who dominated the executive board in 1949, to relegate the authority of Majelis Syura, the Nahdlatul Ulama supporters of Masyumi protested to the modernists’ plan. As their request was not met, in 1952 Nahdlatul Ulama announced the formation of a new Islamic party separated from Masyumi, the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (Marijan 1992, 62). The impact of such internal fragmentation between the Islamists was seen later in their inability to place solid and significant influence on the governance.

After the transfer of power from the Dutch colonial master to the Indonesian government on 27 December 1949, Sukarno inaugurated the application of parliamentary democracy in the country’s political system. It was constituted in the temporary constitution ratified on 17 August 1950. The prime minister’s cabinet, which was balanced by parliament, carried out governance, the president was merely a uniting symbol of the nation. This system was coloured by the rise and fall of political parties forming the government and local parties and people’s council, which were mushrooming, fighting for greater autonomy from the central government.

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The first cabinet was operated by Prime Minister Hatta in early 1950. The cabinet under Natsir of Masyumi then replaced Hatta’s administration in 1951. Natsir’s cabinet dissolved in 1952, and Sukiman of Sarekat Islam came to power. Between 1951 and 1952, Masyumi was a strong political power that formed a coalition government with the secularist PNI. However, in the aftermath of the withdrawal of Nahdlatul Ulama from this Islamic party, its capacity to govern was overwhelmed by PNI, and Masyumi played an opposition role. The secularists took over government in 1952 under , followed by the cabinet of Ali Sastro Amidjojo, which began in 1953. The Amidjojo government stepped down in 1955. The year of 1955-1956 was a short-term tenure, of a cabinet led by , its main undertaking was to hold general elections (Lev 1966, 46-9).

The significant impact of disunity amongst Islamic political parties is observable in their vote achievements in the 1955 general elections. Islamist parties, mainly Masyumi, continued to campaign for the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia, whilst Nahdlatul Ulama focused more on developments in the rural areas. In the elections PNI and its secularist allies obtained 45 percent of the vote; Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama got respectively 20 percent and 18 percent votes; and PKI gained the rest, 16 percent. With these achievements, Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama were invited to form a coalition government with the secularists. Masyumi came back to executive together with the cabinet led again by Prime Minister Amidjojo (Noer 1987, 353-4). However, it should be noted that the attainment of only 20 percent votes by Masyumi reflected the lack popularity of its maintained political agenda for Islam.

The direct implication of the practice of parliamentary democracy for Indonesia was nothing but political instability. Sukarno was unhappy with this scheme and with the patronage of the military on 9 April 1957 the president appointed a new cabinet led by Prime Minister Djuanda. Sukarno assigned himself to engage in governance, causing protests, especially from Masyumi. In addition Sukarno created a representative council known as the constituent assembly, to formulate a new constitution. This institution was

32

composed of 230 representatives of the Islamic groups (of which 112 were from Masyumi) and 286 secular nationalists (Ma’arif 1988, 123). The old debates over the nature of Indonesian state’s identity reappeared in the constituent assembly.

During the constituent assembly meetings, three drafts of state ideology were proposed and debated, Islam, Pancasila, and economic socialism. By virtue the last draft, economic socialism, was articulated only by a minority of 9 members of the constituent assembly, it did not get significant attention during the discussions. As a result, the debates were preoccupied by the pro-Islam and pro-Pancasila poles (Ma’arif 1988, 124).

The pro-Pancasila figures such as Suwiryo of PNI retained their long held argument that if Islam were enforced as the state ideology, regions with non-Muslim populations, including Flores, Bali, Kai, Maluku, Timor, and West Irian would no longer want to be part of the republic, and therefore Indonesia needed to keep the place of Pancasila as its basis. Fundamental to this position was the secularists’ draft of state ideology which stated; ‘the Republic of Indonesia is desirous to build its society that believes in one supreme God and protects the will of all religions; including Islam, Christianity, Hindu, and Buddhism…’. On the fundamental principles of the state, it pointed to ‘the notion of the supremacy of God, respect for humanity, maintenance of national integration, implementation of people’s democracy, as well as the creation of social justice, which were incorporated in Pancasila…’ (Anshari 1986, 96-7).

For those who were pro-Islam, such an argument was greatly unacceptable. For instance, as conveyed by its faithful spokesman Natsir, ‘Pancasila is an empty ideology, it can be easily misinterpreted as separating religion from social and political system albeit acknowledging the existence of God…Indonesia, thus, requires a filled philosophical basis which is clear, powerful, firm and alive in the soul of its people majority adhering to Islam…’. Emphasizing the value of Islam, Natsir argued ‘the principles conceived by Pancasila are by all means there in Islam, Pancasila is not pure but it is originally part of Islam…’. Accordingly, Natsir advised the secularists to agree

33

to take Islam as the state ideology and national identity of Indonesia, and that there would be no disadvantages of approving of Islam (Anshari 1986, 90-3).

Until the last session of the constituent assembly’s debate on 5 June 1959 there was no agreement reached. President Sukarno, who was upset by this inconclusive argument, froze the constituent assembly through a decree on 5 July 1959. With the decree, Sukarno also reinforced the 1945 Constitution and reaffirmed the unchallengeable position of Pancasila as the state ideology, and terminated the practice of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia (Nasution 1992, 78).

Outside the political forum, the contentions between the secularists and Islamists were reduced in regional politics, as the national Islamist movements retreated to regional areas to strengthen their position. The regionalization of the Islamists, lead to more extreme manifestations of their ideologies defying the legitimacy of the Pacasila state, including ideas of revolution to replace it with an Islamic state. Darul Islam were the most vivid Islamist rebels during Sukarno’s governance. Darul Islam (the house of Islam) was a religious-political idea and movement promoted by Kartosuwiryo in 1948 (Awwas 1999). The main base of this Islamist group had initially come from West Java Province. Before starting Darul Islam, Kartosuwiryo joined the central government in Jakarta, where he was appointed as deputy minister of defence. There were two reasons why Kartosuwiryo founded Darul Islam. Firstly, Kartosuwiryo was frustrated with the diplomatic route taken by Sukarno when dealing with the colonial Dutch master. Kartosuwiryo disapproved of Sukarno’s willingness to negotiate with the Dutch, which had resulted in the Linggajati Agreement of March 1947 and Renville Agreement of April 1948. According to these agreements, Indonesia was transformed into a federation, a reality that Kartosuwiryo perceived to be a betrayal of the republic’s constitution. Secondly and more importantly was that Kartosuwiryo, since joining Sarekat Islam in the 1930s, had long kept in his mind the dream of creating an Islamic state in Indonesia as his principal political objective. He accused the secularists,

34

especially Sukarno and Hatta, of committing crimes against Islam on account of their consistent refusal to accept it as the state’s philosophy (Jackson 1980).

Kartosuwiryo built the military wing of Darul Islam on 7 August 1949, called Tentara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Army, TII). As the objective of Darul Islam was to create an Islamic state in Indonesia, this movement expanded to other regions, including Sumatra Island (in Lampung and Aceh), South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Central and . Some believed that the ideal of Darul Islam received support in these regions because of a combination of two factors; one was the regional dislike of the over-centralistic governance in Jakarta, and two was the Islamic solidarity of the paramilitary veterans in those regions, some of whom were members of Laskar Hezbollah, with Kartosuwiryo, having been established there since the Japanese rule. Darul Islam’s affiliates sparked insurgencies in Central Java led by Amir Fatah in 1949, South Sulawesi under Kahar Muzakkar, and in South Kalimantan under Ibnu Hadjar both in 1952, and in Aceh under Daud Beureueh starting in 1953 (Dijk 1981).

The central government saw the enhancement of the regional Islamic struggle as being destabilising to the parliamentary democratic process, largely because of the presence of more than one central power. By 1958, Sukarno had commanded police action suppressing Darul Islam’s rebellious activities. Darul Islam was eventually contained and neutralized in 1962 following the destruction of its central command in West Java and the arrest of its ideologue Kartosuwiryo (he was later sentenced to death). Masyumi strongly protested against Sukarno’s military operation. Consequently, Sukarno banned Masyumi in 1962, because it was alleged to have connections with the unconstitutional movement of Darul Islam (Dengel 1986).

Insurgency perpetrated by Darul Islam had adversely affected the position of Islamic political movements in the country. The central government considered radical expressions of Islam, and their zeal for building an Islamic polity, as a source of political instability and potential disturbance to national integration. The disbanding of

35

Masyumi displayed another phase of marginalization of Islamic ideas and identity in Indonesian domestic politics led by the secularists. Indonesian Muslims had to willingly accept the reality that Pancasila was their state’s ideology and national identity.

In the wake of the dissolution of the parliamentary system, in 1959 Sukarno established his own model of governance named the Guided Democracy. This was nothing more than a kind of dictatorship, whereby the central political authority lay on one chief figure, Sukarno himself. The president, however, did not entirely stop the process of Islamization in politics. This was evident in the inclusion of religious representation in Sukarno’s unifying formula of Nasakom (an acronym derived from nationalism, religion, and communism) that provided an acceptable place for the religious parties’ content to exercise patronage on behalf of the faithful. Traditionalist Islam, like Nahdlatul Ulama, was accommodated within Nasakom. Meanwhile, the modernists, who were mostly linked with Masyumi, were kept at bay. Under the Guided Democracy, Islamic groups found themselves divided and kept off-balance, by virtue of the requirement to defer to the secular nationalist’s ideology in the fight against the remaining colonialism, and to seek allies against the communists. As a result, during this time of Sukarno’s governance, Islamic political movements were domesticated, and were not in a position to confront the dominance of Sukarno’s Nasakom (Leifer 1983b, 147-8). Hence, Sukarno’s real interest was to accumulate his political power.

An abortive coup, allegedly masterminded by PKI between 30 September and 1 October 1965 paved the way for the ousting of Sukarno from power, and the rise of the New Order government under General Suharto. The communists were heavily implicated. Suharto and the army joined forces to counter the communist movement (Hering 1986). Following the successful revision of the political system, Muslim parties expected a political reward. Muslim groups could now form the majority government, they looked forward to the practice of Islam becoming the way of life throughout the country, and achieving the establishment of an Islamic state.

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They were, however, disappointed. For instance, in 1966 the military leaders supposedly identified Masyumi and the communist movement as deviants from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and rejected to rehabilitate it (Feith & Castles 1970). Moreover, the Islamists persisted on the reinstatement of the Islamic ideas of the Djakarta Charter in the constitution. Nevertheless, at the session of the People’s Consultative Assembly in March 1968, at which Suharto was confirmed as president in place of Sukarno, the demand was again rejected. The military leadership under Suharto generalized, based on the case of Darul Islam, that Islam still posed a danger to the unity of the nation (Sukma 2006, 44-6).

Islam had no place in Suharto consolidated regime, which had the full backing of the military, The New Order government designed policies on the containment and further marginalization of Islam in Indonesia’s political system. All political parties were disallowed to purse ideological agendas. Rather, the theme of political articulation was directed at creating national stability for the success of economic development. Islamic groups were allowed to advance their religious and cultural activities, but not to influence the process of governance. Suharto assigned the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was always led by an active army General, to administer all political movements, conduct the function of political socialization, articulation, and communication to the people. The space for political parties, including that of the Islamists, was limited (Taba 1996, 200-6). As a result, in the first general elections held by the New Order regime in 1971, Islamic parties obtained only 27 percent of the total recorded votes, only half of the achievement in the 1955 elections. Whilst the New Order-backed political party, , won the majority of 55 percent votes (Liddle & Emmerson 1973).

Further suppressing Islamic influences on the political system, the New Order government instructed the fusion of all existing Islamic parties into one party called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP), in which the symbol of Islam was not displayed. The PPP was inaugurated on 5 January 1973 in Jakarta, comprising of sections from Sarekat Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Masyumi

37

who had been prevented by Suharto from reviving their banned party. Because the formation of PPP was engineered by the New Order and not a grass-roots wish by these Islamist groups to merge their political power, internal incompatibilities reappeared and undermined it. Nahdlatul Ulama decided to leave the party in 1984 because of its opposition to the leadership of Sarekat Islam in PPP,. This resulted in the decrease in popular Islamic support for the party since Nahdlatul Ulama’s masses were no longer encouraged to vote for PPP (Haris 1991, 100).

Moreover, PPP faced two other problems (Haris 1991, 148). Firstly, this party faced an identity crisis due to the government prohibition of the formal use of ideological symbol for the party. The symbol of Ka’bah, which reflected its Islamic identity was not accepted by the Ministry of Home Affairs, instead it had to identify itself with a star which referred to the first principle of Pancasila; belief in one supreme God. Therefore, the Islamic party could not express its religious identity. Secondly, PPP as a political party had never got the chance to perform its political functions, especially in relation to communication to the grass-root masses. This was because the role was dominated by the government’s bureaucracy under the ministry of home affairs. The PPP cadres could communicate with their constituents only during the general elections campaign. As a result, the distance between PPP’s elite and the masses led to the lack of grass-roots attraction to this Islamist party, and as a result in a way Islam became more marginalized from Muslim public’s political narratives.

On the grounds of retaining political stability, President Suharto signed the Law no. 5/1985 insisting the government’s policy of Pancasila be the sole ideological foundation for all social (including religious) and political organizations in Indonesia. This policy had been announced in 1982, yet protests from Islamic groups caused its implementation to be delayed. It was actually aimed at decreasing and, if not, removing the influence of ideology and religion in politics (Prawiranegara 1984, 74-5). Furthermore, the New Order regime wanted to homogenize political aspirations for the stability of its power base. For the Muslim community and political parties, this policy

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was conspicuously seen as an attempt by the New Order to prevent Islam from ever again becoming an independent and potential political force (Taba 1996, 273-5). During the 1970s and 1980s, the New Order ruler effectively paralysed Islam’s political power.

By the late 1980s and through the 1990s, a sign of change was visible in Suharto’s policies toward relations with the Muslim people. Suharto tried to reengage with the Muslim community. Suharto approved the establishment of an Islamic organization called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI) in December 1990, then led by B. J. Habibie who was serving as minister of research and technology in the New Order cabinet. Despite endorsing the creation of the ICMI, Suharto favoured the founding of Islamic Bank Muamalat, the Abdi Asih Foundation, and the Centre for Information and Development Studies in 1991 functioning as a Muslim think-tank. An Islamic-oriented newspaper Republika linked to the ICMI was allowed to publish. Additionally, Suharto approved the initiative by Muslim leaders for the banning of lottery games, as it was regarded as gambling. Islamic propagation activities were upheld by Suharto’s foundation of Pancasila Muslim (Azra 2006, 93-4). The ICMI attained the endorsement of Indonesian Muslim community, especially the modernist Muslim figures, such as Amien Rais who was chairing Muhammadiyah.

The establishment of the ICMI and Suharto’s favour for the various kind of Islamic activism at that time did not reflect his growing Islamic credentials, but rather was related to his need to retain legitimacy for his regime. Islam began to be viewed as potential, and actual, additional source of power beside the regime’s large bureaucracy and Golkar Party. The ICMI was founded by Muslim intellectuals whose political vision did not suggest adherence to Islamic doctrine. It did not talk of the struggle for the formation of an Islamic state, and its focus was on economic issues pertinent to Muslims rather than politics1. Thus, the New Order leader could safely connect the ICMI to the discourse of national development, and at the same time appear to be more

1 More details about the background of the ICMI and its roles in domestic and international affairs will be discussed in Chapter Five. 39

cordial with Islam. In parallel, Suharto felt that he was in a power contest with his traditional ally, the military, which was perceived to have shown a decline in its political backing to the New Order leadership (Suryadinata 1996). As a consequence, Suharto considered that being seen as more Islamic in his appearance would be effective for gaining Muslim support.

In May 1998, the New Order regime collapsed in the aftermath of social disorder prompted by the government’s ineffective management of the economic and financial crises that began in mid 1997. Subsequently, democracy was institutionalized to supplant the three-decade long Suharto authoritarianism. Under the democratic system, access to political participation was opened for Indonesian Muslims. During the governance of Habibie, dozens of new political parties were established with various ideological spectrums, including a number of Islamic-oriented and/or Muslim parties. Muslims were allowed to form social organizations with Islam present in their formal identity. Under President , freedom of speech was guaranteed and fortified by the law. Islam remerged as a legal political force in democratic Indonesia. The successive governments of and strengthened the multiparty system in Indonesian democracy.

Since 1999 there have been about 20 Islamic-oriented and/or Muslim parties registered with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Based on their ideological reference and membership characters, they can be classified as exclusive Islamist, and inclusive or pluralist Muslim parties (Azra 2004, 140-1). The exclusive Islamist party used Islamic symbols, including Ka’bah and Qur’an, as its official identity. Membership was restricted to Muslims whose political views were identical, for instance the ideal of implementing shari’a in Indonesia, anti-Suharto’s legacies, and democracy in Islamic perspective. Several parties can be included in this category; Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Justice and Prosperous Party, PKS), Partai Bulan Bintang (the Star and Crescent Party, PBB), Partai Masyumi Baru (the New , PMB), and PPP.

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The inclusive or pluralist Muslim party kept Pancasila as its political ideology, although identification with Islam was clear in terms of its major grass-root supporters originating from mass Islamic organizations. Generally, the membership of this party was not confined to Muslims. It was open to encompass members from other religions, and had a tolerant attitude toward affairs concerned with Muslim and non-Muslim relations. This party has showed a tendency to endorse non-religious agendas, for instance, good governance and democratization. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the National Awakening Party, PKB) supported mostly by Nahdlatul Ulama and Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party, PAN), which is affiliated with Muhammadiyah, can all be considered to be pluralist Islamic parties.

Besides political parties, socio-religious Islamic groups have been mushrooming and operate freely. The most dramatic phenomenon has been the emergence of radical Islamic organizations, such as Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defender Front, FPI), and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin, MMI)2. They are labelled as radicals by virtue of their unchallengeable belief in Islam, which must be applied in its full and literal form without compromise, as set out in Qur’an and Sunnah (ways of life exemplified by Prophet Muhammad) and their penchant for reactive ideas, languages, and violent physical actions toward what is envisaged as atheists, materialists and corrosive deviationist movements (Fealy 2004, 104). It is commonly known that the radicals have circumstantial connections with exclusive Islamic parties.

Muslim political groups have benefited from the democratic moment. They are free to express and promote ideas and activities in the political arena. However, Islam still receives only restricted acknowledgement in governance. This can be discerned through the continuing pre-eminence of the secularists’ features and interests. Pancasila has sustained its position providing the basic philosophy and national identity for the state,

2 More information on the background and activities of these Islamists will be presented in Chapter Seven. 41

despite the fact that Islam has been used in social and political identities, and shari’a has still not been implemented as national law governing all aspects of Muslim life. This trend has perhaps been influenced by internal and external factors shaping the weakness of Islamists. The internal factor has been that various Islamic parties participating in the elections have had an impact on the attitudes of mass voters (Azra 2004, 141-2). Firstly, ideological contestation within the Islamic parties has bought back political fragmentation amongst them. This has manifested into inter-elite conflict, as well as clashes between fanatic masses during the election campaign. As a result, Islam has not yet become the force that unites those Muslims.

Secondly, in internal party affairs, elites competing for individual political gain have caused frictions. For instance, intense conflict between and Hartono Mardjono in PBB, caused a general split in the party’s management, which in turn was followed by the resignation of Mardjono, and the subsequent establishment of his new party called Partai Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Party, PII). This has caused a decline in the party’s solidarity, and a subsequent reduction in its political power.

Thirdly, the Islamic parties, especially radical Islamic groups and those with the exclusive vision, have not demonstrated enough communication skills to argue their agendas. To exemplify, during the 1999 election campaign PPP and Laskar Jihad leaders urged the Muslim public not to cast their vote for party that was led by a woman, the reference was to Megawati, because it was not in accordance with Islamic interpretations of female obedience. The sentiment of gender bias behind these political motives bought about political repercussions for the Islamic parties. More importantly, Islamists wanting the realization of shari’a did not formulate the discourse with clarity, and thus this appeared to the public as being more rhetorical than real.

The external factor is derived from the fact that secular political powers - such as the established Golkar party, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (the Indonesian

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Democratic Party of Struggle, PDIP), and Partai Demokrat (the Democrat Party, PD) – performed stronger and were more capable than the Islamists in controlling governance. In the parliamentary election of June 1999, the exclusive Islamic parties, such as PBB, PKS, and PPP could obtain only 16 percent of the whole recorded vote, while the secularists like Golkar and PDIP got of total 70 percent of the vote for both of them, and the rest belonged to the inclusive Islamic parties PAN and PKB (Riddell 2002, 67). Islam was less popular as a political platform than secularism and nationalism. The issue of national reform and economic recovery pursued by the secularist parties as well as pluralist Muslim parties proved to be more effective in attaining the political support of the voters.

In the second general election conducted in July 2004, the exclusive Islamist parties did indeed increase their strength from 16 to about 21 percent of the total vote. This success, however, was ascribed primarily to the moderation of their Islamic rhetoric before the election. Aware of Indonesian society’s reservations about shari’a implementation, they downplayed their Islamic profile during the campaign. Their candidates chose to fight on issues that Indonesians cared about, such as the eradication of corruption, social injustice, job creation, and food prices, rather than discuss the possibility of making Indonesia an Islamic state and implementation of shari’a (Eliraz 2007, 5). In the April 2009 elections, the achievement of the exclusive Islamist parties decreased to 15 percent of the total recorded vote, whilst the secularists were able to maintain an outcome of no less than 70 percent; the rest went to pluralist Muslims (www.pemiluindonesia.com). This suggests the popularity of Islam in political ideas and movement has gradually decreased amidst the persistent dominance of secularist powers.

With this result, in order to get a ticket to participate in government the Islamists have had to join a coalition with the secularists. Because the Islamists are weaker, their ability to direct the government’s policies has been limited. In parliament their performance has also been curbed by the voices of the majority comprised of secularists

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and pluralist Muslims. All of these factors contribute to the enduring insignificance of Islam in Indonesia’s domestic politics, and foreign policy. In contrast, the secularists have remained able to dictate policies based on their favoured material interests.

Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Guided by Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, as well as perceptions about the nature of external milieu, the secularist leadership of the newly independent Indonesia defined the basic principle of the state’s foreign policy. Islam has been formally absent since the very beginning of the Indonesian foreign policy formulation. This is visible in the country’s 1945 Constitution, which was promulgated one day after independence on 17 August 1945. The constitution mandates that Indonesian foreign policy uphold universal values, mainly anti-colonialism. As stipulated firmly in the first paragraph of the preamble of the constitution; ‘independence is the fundamental right of every nation, and accordingly colonialism must be opposed because it is not suitable with the values of humanity and justice…’. The constitution also commands the nation to contribute to the creation of international order based on independence, permanent peace, and social justice (Alami 2007, 27; Singadilaga 1970, 4-5; 1964, 5).

This assertion means that the values referred to are strongly inspired by the historical background of being colonised nation. Therefore, nationalism and anti-colonialism, not Islam, developed into the principal discourse of Indonesian foreign policy makers’ worldview (Weinstein 1976, 161). The spirit of anti-colonialism strengthened when the Dutch colonial master wanted to reimpose colonialism upon Indonesia by launching military aggressions in the country in 1947 and again in 1948.

In addition, the newly independent state encountered international politics that was evolving into the Cold War. The world was polarized by the ideological and military rivalry between the Western capitalist bloc of the United States (US) and the Eastern socialist bloc of the Soviet Union. In response, Jakarta decided not to join either of the blocs. In a speech on foreign policy direction entitled Mendayung Dua Karang

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(Rowing between Two Reefs), Indonesian Vice President and at the time acting Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta, articulated this independent activism foreign policy (politik luar negeri bebas aktif), which up until today continues to be the indisputable doctrine of the state’s international relations. Before the meeting of Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (the Indonesian Central National Committee, KNIP) at Yogyakarta on 2 September 1948, Hatta (1953, 446) revealed that the country would seek to find a different way in the world that was divided by the two power blocs. Indonesia would not act in consonance with neutral or allied policies with either American or the Soviet Union blocs. Indonesia would not draw back from world affairs. It would seek to participate in international affairs to contribute to the creation of a better world, yet would do so without the commitment to alliances.

Hatta emphasized that every issue would be analysed on the ground of Indonesian qualities, and in accordance with the state’s pivotal national interests. In this light, the independent activism foreign policy reflected pragmatism in the obvious reference to the importance of protecting national interests as its main course of action. About this Hatta (1958, 484) affirmed, ‘the policy should be executed in line with Indonesian interests, and must be resolved in line with the fact it has to face…’. Therefore, there are three underlying values expressed in Indonesian foreign policy doctrine, anti- colonialism, independence, and pragmatism (Sukma 1995, 306).

Although not formally mentioned as a reference for state foreign policy, in reality Islam had a significant role in supporting the conduct of Indonesia’s international diplomacy. This was especially the case when the Dutch attempted to use military action to reoccupy Indonesia. The Indonesian government stipulated that the focus of the state’s foreign conduct was to meet the twin needs of securing international recognition for, and defence of, its independence. Islamist figures – such as Agus Salim and Mohammad Roem – used their Islamic identity to approach the Muslim world to gain recognition for Indonesia’s independence. As a result of this diplomacy, Muslim countries of the Middle East were the first to recognize Indonesian independence. On ground level,

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foreign Muslim soldiers, especially those from the British Indian army stationed in Indonesia, fought with Indonesian nationalists against the Dutch aggression. Islamic solidarity was echoed during the physical revolution3. In this capacity Islam was factually instrumental in obtaining the state’s material interests.

During the time of parliamentary democracy, when governments alternated between the Islamist-led and the secularist-led coalitions, Islam was absent in both the interest and instrument of foreign policy. For instance, under the governance of Mohammad Natsir’s Masyumi Islamic party, Indonesia promoted relations with the US and not the Muslim world. Domestic needs dictated such a policy. The Natsir government was facing problems of insurgencies in some regions. Hence, it needed to modernize and empower Indonesian military, with assistance from the US. Prime Minister Natsir emphasized that the Indonesian-American military cooperation being fostered was intended to maintain integrity and sovereignty of the republic (Bintang Timur 11 March 1952). However, this move was unpopular as both the public and elite regarded it as pro- American, and afterward pro-Western imperialism. Accordingly Natsir was toppled from the prime ministership, and was replaced by successive secularist governments under Prime Minister Wilopo and Ali Sastro Amidjojo. In 1955 their narrative of anti- colonialism culminated in the holding of an Asian African conference. Indeed, the most important issue in Indonesia’s foreign policy during the 1950s was the recovery of the western half of the Island of New Guinea (West Irian/Papua) (Sukma 2006, 31-2).

Under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, foreign policy served both collaboration between Jakarta and Beijing, with their shared anti-imperialism, as well as the domestic function of sustaining volatile political equilibrium amongst the nationalists, religious, and communists. In August 1962, a stormy episode occurred when Sukarno rejected to grant entry permits to Israeli and Taiwanese athletes at the Asian Games held in Jakarta. At the time this double exclusions easily fitted into Sukarno’s anti-colonial rhetoric and an appeasement of China. The barring of Israeli athletes did not show any indication of a specifically Islamic cause. It could have been related to an attempt by the president to

3 This story will be developed more fully in Chapter Two. 46

sweeten ties with the Indonesian Muslim community, who together with the communists, had expected to keep out Israeli participation (Leifer 1983b, 151-2). Nonetheless, Sukarno demonstrated a slight leaning towards Islamic identity, especially when supporting Pakistan against India in the 1965 Kashmir war. Essentially, this attitude was not genuinely motivated by Islamic solidarity. The backing for Islamabad was given as a part of Sukarno’s geostrategic calculation to counter India4.

During the years of Sukarno, Islam had occasionally been used in support of particular foreign policy goals. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, Islam’s roles conspicuously waned in Indonesian international relations. For one thing, this was in line with Suharto’s policies marginalising domestic Islamic voices. Suharto inherited from Sukarno a collapsed economy, partly caused by intense political conflict both inside and outside the country. The new regime placed economic development and cooperation as the highest priority of foreign policy. The need to reap international economic benefits brought Indonesia closer to the Western-industrialized powers. Economic development and cooperation required regional stability. Therefore, Suharto’s foreign policy was focused on the management of a stable Southeast Asian regional order (Mehdi 1973, 20-44). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 to accommodate regional political, economic, and security cooperation amongst Indonesia, Malaysia, , , and the Philippines. One strategic aim of ASEAN was to resolve regional conflict through peaceful means (Anwar 1994).

The behaviour of communist superpowers in Southeast Asia was the major concern of Suharto and his foreign policy circles. It was foremost related to the danger that the expansion of communism in North Vietnam posed to Indonesian domestic security. Suharto and the military establishment held a common interest in countering the communists, following the 1965 coup, allegedly engineered by the Indonesian communists. Beijing was accused of assisting PKI; this resulted in the freezing of Indonesia’s relations with China. Furthermore, the New Order held suspicious views on the Soviet Union’s behaviour in the region. With this assessment, Suharto focused

4 Chapter Two will also look at this case in more detail. 47

foreign policy more on Indonesia’s immediate regional affairs rather than other international issues, including those pertinent to the Muslim world (Leifer 1983a). Indonesian foreign policy came to be dominated by issues associated with the creation of stability and cooperation development amongst non-communist states in Southeast Asian region.

Nevertheless, regarding the position of Islam, since the early 1990s Suharto had started to show greater interest in fortifying Indonesia’s relations with the Muslim world. This was in line with the New Order leader’s friendlier attitude toward domestic Muslim expressions. Thus, it is safe to assume that Suharto used foreign policy as a tool to support his domestic need to attract the support of the Muslim community. Islam was not the main cause of the enhanced ties with the Muslim world. To exemplify, by 1991 the ICMI’s figures, with the approval of Suharto, were keen to upgrade Indonesian status within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) from observer to full member. Within the OIC, Indonesia paid more attention to Muslim-related issues. However, the policy was not designed to pursue international Islamic solidarity5. Instead, with a secular and pragmatic logic, Suharto saw Indonesia’s relations with the Muslim states in an economic context (Azra 2006, 101-3; Sihbudi 1997, 19-25). This case again indicates that Islam played some part in foreign policy, if only a limited one.

Material interests continued to dictate the foreign policy of successive governments after Suharto, Particularly the need to resolve economic problems left by the New Order. But, in limited contexts Islam/Islamic ideas had begun to receive consideration in the state’s international projection.

The short-term administration of President Habibie (May 1998 – October 1999) did not place Islam as a discourse of foreign policy. Instead, Habibie indicated an interest in prioritizing Indonesian relations with the US and international financial institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with the primary objective of mobilizing economic resources for supporting national economy, which

5 Chapter Five will analyse this case more fully. 48

was plagued by terrible financial crisis (Kivimaki 2000). Habibie was replaced by Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999.

Under President Wahid, the tendency to focus on non-Islamic agendas in Indonesian foreign relations was sustained. Wahid, who was known as an Islamic intellectual and former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama during the 1990s, did not see the relevance of Islam as the basis of governance in a multicultural country like Indonesia. Wahid recognized there were Muslims who had became familiar with the formalization of Islam. Therefore, they attached the entire manifestation of Islamic teachings to the creation of a state system based on Islam. However, the presence of an Islamic state system in Indonesia would automatically put people who were not Muslims or devout Muslims in a defensive or even marginalized position. Hence, the insistence on establishing an Islamic state as the framework of nation building in Indonesia was questionable (Wahid 2007).

In the foreign policy area, Wahid paid attention to the relationship between Indonesia and the Middle Eastern countries in two areas. One was on political issues pertinent to Israel-Palestine conflict and the second was on the need to reap more alternative foreign economic resources to help ease the impact of prolonged financial crisis (Smith 2001, 520). Wahid’s Middle Eastern policy became controversial with the Indonesian Muslim public, when he began preparing to open diplomatic ties with Israel. His argument was that to effectively building peace for Israel and Palestine, Indonesia had to recognize Israeli state existence, and advanced a formal relationship with Tel Aviv. By doing this, when trade links with Israel were unlocked, Indonesia would also benefit from the strong worldwide Jewish-businesses. For his unusual initiative, Wahid was widely criticized by Muslim leaders and the public, including those in Nahdlatul Ulama, many of whom accused him of begging for Jewish money and ignoring the sensitivities of Indonesian Islamic society. Due to mounting opposition, Wahid backed down on his plan (Panggabean 2004, 33). This case demonstrates that although the ruling elite did

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not have an interest in incorporating Islam in foreign policy, it did not necessarily mean that the other actors could not influence the decision-making process.

President Megawati came to power in July 2001. The government under the secular Megawati did not alter Wahid’s policy direction. It persisted in paying more attention to non-religious economic and political agendas. The government intensified efforts to attain economic benefits from abroad by promoting regional economic cooperation in a liberalization scheme, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which was applied formally on 1 January 2002. This was coupled with other Indonesian initiatives that further fostered the formation of an ASEAN Security Community, though which it hoped to regain the primus inter pares status in Southeast Asian region, a status that had been unclear since the country’s national power weakened in the aftermath of the economic turmoil (Weatherbee 2005).

Nonetheless, amidst the preoccupation of material interests, the events of the 11 September 2001 attacks brought a consideration of Islam into Megawati’s foreign policy, but it did not shape it. This was especially evident when international pressure mounted on Indonesia to take firmer action on radical Islamic groups. Megawati needed to respond cautiously, on one hand, the policy had to deal with radical Islamists who posed a threat to national and international security, and on the other hand it could not appear as anti-Islam or anti-Muslim. This caused dilemmas for the government. As a result, Megawati took an ambivalent position, condemning terrorism but not making significant efforts to counter domestic Islamic radicalism as requested by the US (Perwita 2007, 160-5)6.

The successor of Megawati, President Yudhoyono who was inaugurated in October 2004, has tried to insert new thinking and view in Indonesia’s foreign policy. According to Yudhoyono, nowadays Indonesian foreign relations are ‘navigating in a turbulent ocean’. This statement was intended to be an encroachment upon Vice President Hatta’s vision stated in 1948 that Indonesia should be ‘rowing between two reefs’ to manage

6 Chapter Seven will look at this issue more closely. 50

with the Cold War challenges. In the current context of changing global settings, the independent activism foreign policy has to be able to adapt with and properly respond to the challenges the state is facing, ranging from economic, social, cultural, security and political issues. The turbulent ocean is a metaphor for an environment characterized by these challenges (Tan 2007). The pragmatic nature of foreign policy has been maintained, as the president suggested, independent activism should entail an understanding of independence of judgement, and freedom of action (Anwar 2010, 44).

On 19 May 2005, Yudhoyono delivered his first foreign policy speech titled ‘An Independent and Active Foreign Policy for the 21st Century’, before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) meeting in Jakarta. The Indonesian leader stressed the need to produce a constructive image of the country in the eyes of the international society. It must be rooted in a strong sense of who Indonesians are; ‘We cannot be all things for all peoples. We must know who We are and what We believe in, and project them in our foreign policy…’. The president went on to define Indonesian identity, ‘We are a proud nation who cherish our independence and national unity; We are the fourth most populous nation in the world; We are home to the world’s largest Muslim population; We are the world’s third largest democracy; We are a country where Islam, democracy and modernity go hand-in-hand…’ (Yudhoyono 2005, 389-90).

The country’s Islamic identity has been articulated over and over again as the state’s projection onto the international arena, including the main world economic forum of G- 20, in which Indonesia is the only representative from Southeast Asia. The current Foreign Minister pointed out ‘as the G-20 has confirmed itself for the status of the major forum on world economic issues, Indonesia is challenged to carve a niche within the group that is unique to itself as the world’s third largest democracy, the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, and a voice of moderation…’ (Anwar 2011, 132). Compared to what Hatta (1953, 450) had mentioned back in 1948, ‘Indonesian identity is not bound to either particular religiosity, yet acknowledging the omnipotent and invisible power of God that controls human

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actions…this is why the first principle of the state ideology of Pancasila refers to the belief in one supreme God…’, the Yudhoyono government has openly spoken on Indonesian Muslim identity, and as such has taken a firmer position on Islam.

Yudhoyono showed that he intended to play an important role in the Muslim world. For example, he supported the Hamas-led Palestinian authority with humanitarian aid, and further offered to mediate peace between Israel and Palestine. To advance Indonesia- Middle East ties, the president appointed an Indonesian special envoy to the region, , whose main job was to foster cooperation and peace (ANTARA 12 December 2005). Islam is also present as the perceptual context in which Yudhoyono’s objectives are likely to be established. After the 11 September 2001 tragedy, the West has held negative perceptions about Islam and Muslims. It had depicted Muslim communities as being backward, committed to violence – including terrorism, authoritarianism, and discrimination against women. Yudhoyono may attempt to show to the West a better image of Islam, that is, its peace-loving face (Anwar 2010, 45). If this campaign is effective, it will promote Yudhoyono’s personal, international and domestic reputation. In other words, it is an image-building project rather than truly motivated by Islamic ideas.

Beside this, Yudhoyono’s initiative is apparently limited by the lack of real international capability, and therefore it appears to only be aimed at demonstrating that the Indonesian government is trying to make efforts for peace, rather than doing nothing. Indonesia has no concrete prospects to mediate peace for Israel and Palestine, by virtue Jakarta has not had any official links with Tel Aviv. Diplomacy without a real vehicle will not be viable, even if the Israeli government perceives Yudhoyono’s proposal as favourable. More importantly, President Yudhoyono has no close relations with any of the Middle Eastern leaders required to make such a plan viable (Fealy 2006, 29). Therefore, Islam comes about only in the rhetoric, rather than substance of Jakarta’s policy.

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In a nutshell, Islam’s role is mostly marginalized in Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. This is influenced by a combination of factors such as the unchallengeable non-Islamic nature of the state’s identity, the ruling elite’s material interest, and external constraints. Besides these factors, the persisting fragmentation and conflict within Indonesian Islamic political groups have affected to the strength of Islamization in the arena of domestic politics and foreign policy.

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Chapter Two Islamism And Secularism In Sukarno’s Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan

This chapter aims to investigate whether it is Islamic solidarity or the elite’s material interests which has shaped Indonesia and Pakistan relations during the Sukarno era. It argues that Islam was relevant for Indonesian diplomacy and the struggle against the Dutch colonialism. However, the focus on nationalist interest caused Indonesians to balance relations with Indian National Congress and Muslim League. In the post- colonial era, there were occasional, and then increasing references to Muslim identity, but that Indonesian response was determined by their geostrategic and ideational interests in promoting anti-colonialism and nonalignment. As these interests shifted, the tendency in Indonesia to mainly rely on secularist discourse was modified to bring in Islamic identity or language as well. Within this context, Indonesia engaged with Pakistan in the Asian African forum and Islamic conference. At the height of the two countries’ relationship, Sukarno strongly favoured Pakistan against India at some stage in their armed conflict over Kashmir in September 1965.

Islamic Solidarity and Anti-colonialism As soon as Japan was defeated by the American allied forces in August 1945, the Indonesian nationalist leaders gained the momentum to proclaim independence on 17 August 1945 amidst a power vacuum in the country. The nationalist’s move was responded to anxiously by the former colonial ruler before Japan, the Dutch. As stated by the Dutch Minister of Far East Affairs, Logeman, ‘…the Indonesian nationalist, who was uplifted by Japan, does not have the rights to determine Indonesian destiny…. [All] territories under Japan have to be returned to their former rulers, including the Dutch Indies…therefore, the declared independence is not legitimate, and the Dutch deserves to re-impose administration on the country…’ (Mochtar 1989, 4). The Dutch resisted

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Indonesian independence, and for the Indonesian nationalists it meant that the threat of aggression from the ex-colonial power remained to shadow the country’s independence.

The international environment emerging soon after the World War II was also not sympathetic to nationalist sentiments among colonized areas. The great powers which won World War II, such as the United States, Britain, and were reluctant to recognize Indonesian independence. The United States (US) even had extended diplomatic and military assistance for the Dutch (Patterson 1998, 1-4). One example of this was the US attempt to block a proposal on 21 January 1946 by Ukraine to hold a special discussion session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting concerning the existence of the British troops in Indonesia which were used by the Dutch as a vehicle to deploy troops to Indonesia (Times of Indonesia 31 January 1946). In March 1947, the American government extended de facto recognition for Indonesian sovereignty only in three islands; Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The territories beyond these islands were not recognized to be part of the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia (Wuryandari 2008, 65).

Under these circumstances, the Indonesian nationalists realized the indispensability of finding their own ways to protect independence, as Prime Minister Sutan Syahrir asserted ‘…We have to maintain independence with our own minds and might…’ (Times of Indonesia 29 January 1947). The twin needs of survival and security as well as international recognition in order to obtain the status of a legally legitimate independent state became the urgent concern of the Indonesian leaders and nation. Such definitive national interests directed Indonesia’s twin policies on; conducting diplomacy and struggling physically against external powers during the formative period between 1945 and 1949.

The reluctance on the part of the Western powers to endorse Indonesian independence prompted Jakarta to appeal to the Muslim world for political support and recognition. The responsibility to secure recognition from Muslim countries was undertaken by

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Deputy Foreign Minister Agus Salim – a prominent figure of Sarekat Islam - who made a goodwill trip to the Middle East in March 1947. The Indonesian envoy emphasised the country’s Islamic identity to achieve recognition. According to Salim (Times of Indonesia 29 March 1947), he requested support of the Egyptians for the freedom of Muslim brothers in Indonesia, and the Egyptian government saw the importance of longstanding Islamic connections that had been built by Indonesian Muslim youths studying in the country. These religious ties contributed to the political support by Egypt for Indonesia. As a result, on 25 March 1947 Salim concluded with the Egyptian government the Treaty of Indonesia-Egypt Friendship. This formal relationship meant that the Egyptian government had conveyed its recognition for the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian emissary acknowledged that Islam in its very universal form of the Muslim ummah (community) had helped his country to secure international recognition. Following the recognition from Egypt, other Middle Eastern Muslim states, such as Iraq on 2 April, Saudi Arabia on 16 April, and Syria on 24 June (all in 1947) extended de jure recognition for Indonesian independence (Bintang Timur 26 June 1947). Islam was at this stage relevant for the Indonesian diplomatic struggle.

The same trend could be seen in the expressions of sympathy and support from South Asians prior to the departure of the British from the Indian subcontinent. Indonesian diplomacy in South Asia intended to get support, and develop communications with, the independence movements in India, including leaders of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. A few months before the end of the British rule in India, an Indonesian delegation attended the first Asian Relations conference that was convened by the Congress in New Delhi, April 1947. The Indonesian delegation was led by Prime Minister Syahrir, and was accompanied by Agus Salim and Mohammad Roem (Solichin 1963, 45-6). On this occasion, Syahrir availed the chance to express the Indonesian view on issues facing Asian nations and to underscore the real threat colonialism brought to peace in Asia. More importantly, Indonesia called upon other states to extend recognition for its independence. In response, Jawaharlal Nehru of the Congress

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affirmed Indians support for Indonesian independence, and urged other Asian nations to do the same (Times of Indonesia 30 April 1947).

At this conference the Muslim League was not present - perhaps because its leaders were intentionally uninvited by the convener. Given the existing negativity between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, the Indonesian delegation may have avoided contacts with the Muslim league. But despite formal support of the Congress leader during the Asian Relations conference, the Indonesian delegates played their Islamic card to secure political endorsement of the Muslim League. Roem was assigned by Syahrir to meet with and ask the support of the Muslim League leaders in Karachi. On 23 April 1947, the Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah warmly welcomed Roem in his office. There the two Muslim figures talked about the plight of millions of Muslims under Western imperialism around the world, and pledged to intensify communications between them. When asked about the Muslim League’s position on the Indonesian cause, Ali Jinnah said to Roem: ‘…I would send my personal letter to the Dutch ruler in Indonesia to protest its persistent lust for colonizing the Muslim land of Indonesia…of the Indonesian struggle for freedom, this is the obligation of all Muslim peoples to support it…’ (Roem 1983, 53-4). Once again this demonstrated the use and efficacy of the language of Islamic identity features in Indonesian conduct of diplomacy to muster international support.

But from the outset, the limits to which Indonesian leadership would use the language of Islamic identity were evident. President Sukarno, for instance, personally appealed to Ali Jinnah for support but avoided using Islamic language. As reported by an Indonesian daily Siasat (10 May 1947) Sukarno on behalf of the Indonesian people wrote a letter to Ali Jinnah dated 1 May 1947, calling for support from leaders and peoples of the Indian subcontinent in order to assist Indonesian nationalists struggle for defending independence. In response to Sukarno’s request, Ali Jinnah on behalf of the Muslim League urged all Muslims in India to pray for their Muslim brethren’s struggle for a better place on earth; free from suppression by the Western powers. To highlight

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the Islamic aspect of the Indonesian struggle, Ali Jinnah identified it as ‘the mixture of jihad and nationalism’. Further according to the Muslim League leader, ‘…every Muslim is obliged to defend their homeland from invaders as this is part of iman (Islamic moral)…’.

It may be argued that Indonesia was adopting a twin track diplomacy to obtain international support. Islam was used as an element of Indonesian diplomatic strategy to attain international recognition: the references to the Islamic identity in its diplomacy, it was able to secure support of other Muslim countries that were willing to endorse Indonesian independence due to their sentiment of Islamic solidarity with Indonesian Muslims. This was apparent in the way Pakistan articulated its stand in favour of Indonesia against the Dutch. But at the same time, the Indonesian secularist leadership, mainly Sukarno, also referred to secular notions of independence. It was reflected in diplomacy vis-a-vis the Indian National Congress and was used to secure support of non-Muslim countries, including Australia, Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam (Reid 1996).

The international recognition for the existence of an Indonesian state did not mean the end of the Dutch threat to Indonesia. The allied troops, especially those of the British army that were dispatched to Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia since September 1945, had not yet been withdrawn. They still assisted the Dutch troops with warring Indonesian nationalists (Sabir 1987, 52). The revolutionary struggle for independence, therefore, did not cease until the Dutch acknowledged Indonesia’s sovereignty on 27 December 1949. Up until then, the Dutch had carried out military operations aimed at bringing Indonesia back under their control (Nasution 1977). The first Dutch aggression began on 21 July 1947, and was designed to occupy industrial centres in East Sumatra as well as Central and East Java. The Dutch wanted to paralyse the most important economic resources of the nationalist government and at the same time control agricultural and oil products there to meet their own needs. This military operation was opposed by the Amir Syarifuddin government of Indonesia which then appealed to Australia to raise the issue in the UNSC. Canberra supported Indonesia, arguing that the

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latter had been a legitimate entity in international law due to recognition from other countries. Thanks to Australian diplomacy, the UNSC issued resolution S/459 on 1 August 1947 ordering a ceasefire between the Dutch and Indonesia. Both sides reached a peace agreement in April 1948. However, it did not stop the Dutch who deployed troops on 18 December 1948 to invade the Indonesian capital city that had been temporarily moved to Yogyakarta in the aftermath of the Dutch taking over of Jakarta. This second wave of Dutch aggression generated intense international reactions to the Dutch on the one hand, and greater sympathies for Indonesia on the other.

In South Asia, this support for Indonesia found expression in the convening of the Second Asian Relations Conference by the Indian National Congress in New Delhi in January 1949. The Indonesian case of freedom was the main agenda of the meeting. The conference passed a resolution calling for an immediate end of hostilities in Indonesia and, suggested a number of steps, including negotiations under the United Nations mediation, the formation of international peace observer team for peace in Indonesia, which in turn led to the transfer of authority from the Dutch ruler to the nationalist government of Indonesia (Times of Indonesia 24 January 1949). India followed up the outcome of the second Asian Relations conference and mustered international support for the cause of Indonesian independence by bringing the issue to the UN, and seeking the members of the UNSC to intervene in terminating the Dutch aggression. The UNSC adopted resolution S/689 on 28 February 1949, asking both Indonesian and the Dutch forces to observe a ceasefire and to release all Indonesian nationalists apprehended by the Dutch authority. Later, an agreement was signed in Den Haag on 7 May 1949, providing for a cessation of hostilities, restoration of the Indonesian nationalist governance and, preparation for a complete handing over of power from the Dutch to the Indonesian government (Majumdar 1982, 23).

Pakistan supported Indonesia throughout this struggle. Soon after gaining independence on 14 August 1947, the Pakistan government extended formal recognition to Indonesia. The Pakistani government declared a public holiday throughout the country on 17

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August in celebration of the second anniversary of Indonesian independence (Times of Indonesia 16 August 1947). As broadcasted by the Indonesian government-owned radio (ANTARA 18 August 1947) the founding father of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah also stated: ‘…I would like to take up the opportunity to congratulate our Muslim brothers in Indonesia for their great efforts to retain independence celebrated today…’. This articulation of Pakistan’s support for Indonesia was located in the tendency among the leaders of the nascent state to refer to their Islamic identity as a means of securing support from other Muslim states. On 17 August 1948, for instance, Mohammad Ali Jinnah stated that his message to all brother Muslim states was one of friendship and goodwill, and ‘…they were all passing through perilous times…the drama of power politics being staged in Palestine, Indonesia, and Kashmir should serve an eye opener to them…’. The Pakistani leader stressed that it was mainly by putting up a united front that could make Muslim voices heard in the counsels of the world (Jinnah 1967, 156). Indonesia’s struggle against the Dutch, therefore, was easily presented in terms of Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Later, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan declared ‘…the fact that over 90 percent of the Indonesian peoples are Muslims meant to Pakistani that Indonesian suffers and grievances were also of ours…’ (Arora 1975, 220).

The Pakistani leaders and peoples also expressed their concern over the Dutch aggression and, provided moral and tangible support for Indonesia. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, on his Eid address to the nation on 18 August 1947, sent a message of sympathy to Indonesians who were repeatedly called ‘brothers Muslim’. The Pakistani leader avowed that Pakistan would support Indonesia against the invaders (Ahmad 1964, 409). Ali Jinnah ordered the detention of some foreign planes at Karachi Airport and the Pakistani government subsequently suspended the license of the Dutch airline KLM, on 23 December 1948, which was suspected to have helped carry armaments for the Dutch troops arranged to attack Indonesia. The Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan also declared that the government of Pakistan would not lift the suspension if the Dutch did not reverse its tactics in Indonesia. Furthermore, Zafrullah Khan asserted the possibility

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of further actions by his government should the Dutch invasion not immediately end (Times 24 December 1948). In the Pakistan’s parliamentary hearing, Zafrullah Khan condemned and described the Dutch raid in Indonesia as ‘…barbarous, an affront to the heart of Asia, and an outrage to human decency…’ (Arora 1975, 220).

The Pakistani Constituent Assembly and press denounced the Dutch violent actions against Indonesia, claiming that such attacks were condemned by all Pakistanis. For example, Chaudry Nazir Ahmad of West Punjab moved a motion in the Constituent Assembly that mentioned that the Dutch military operation was condemned by every Pakistani. The press in Pakistan, such as Dawn, widely covered consequences of the Dutch police actions toward Indonesians under the editorial titled ‘Murderers of Freedom’, saying that such military assault on Indonesia was ‘…a perfidious war of the latest colonial plunder…’. All these anti-Dutch deliberations prompted the Indonesian representative in Karachi to acknowledge that Pakistanis’ resentment to the Dutch was very empathetic (Arora 1975, 220-1). In January 1949, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, , participated in the convened Second Asian Relations conference held by India at New Delhi, with the Indonesian case for freedom as the main agenda. By supporting the resolutions passed at the conference, the Pakistani leader expressed their support for the continuing Indonesian struggle (Times of Indonesia 24 January 1949).

The support for Indonesia, it is important to note, predated the independence of Pakistan as a state for Muslims in August 1947. Muslim soldiers of the British Indian army as part of Gorkha regimen/recognized as Gorkhas had helped the struggle of Indonesians. They had been sent to Indonesia in September 1945 as part of the allied troops landing in Tanjung Priok Harbor Jakarta commanded by Vice Admiral Patterson. Some of the Muslim troops within this military unit were Ghulam Rasul, Gilamar Bani, Ghulam Ali, Mohammed Jacub, Umar Din, Mohammad Khan, Muhammad Siddique, Fazul Sensyah, Fasul Din, Sawkat Ali, Mohammad Syafi, and Basjir Rachman. All were devout Muslims. The Muslim soldiers were then assigned to operate in East Java landing in Tanjung Perak Port, under the Division 5 led by Major General E. C. Mansergh and in

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West and Central Java under the Division 23 commanded by Major Gen. D. C. Hawthorn (Syam & Khan 2005, 32).

According to Ghulam Rasul (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 February 1984), the Muslim soldiers began to feel sympathetic to the struggle of Indonesian peoples after arriving in Jakarta. When they heard Allahu Akbar echoed by Indonesian fighters whenever military clashes occurred, the Muslim soldiers felt that they were warring against their Muslim brethren. Moreover, in every sweep towards Indonesian people’s districts which the allied troops were undertaking, the Muslim soldiers found copies of the Qur’an at their homes and Arabic of Bismillah Ar Raham-e Raheem written on the front door. All these discoveries touched the hearts of the Muslim soldiers. Thus, they started to be wondering whether or not to continue to fight against the Indonesian nationalists.

Ghulam Rasul said that he and his compatriots felt convinced that their feelings were true and that they were being asked to fight against a Muslim country and society. The fact that most of the Indonesian peoples were Muslims was confirmed to Ghulam Rasul and others by an Indian Muslim Zaristan Khan – who had long lived in Jembatan Merah Street of Jakarta. When a group of Muslim soldiers was visiting Zaristan’s house, he explained that the leaders of the Indonesian independence movement were fighting for the freedom of Muslims of Indonesia from colonial powers, the Dutch and its allied troops. Although the Muslim soldiers were not allowed to listen to local radio broadcasts, at Zaristan’s home they disobeyed such a prohibition, and had the opportunity to pay attention to Sukarno’s and other Indonesian nationalist leaders’ addresses to their peoples and other nations. Additionally, they were informed by Zaristan of the news about the Muslim League leader Ali Jinnah encouraging Muslims to fight with Indonesia on the colonial ruler (Shaifuddin 2005, 5).

As a result, some Muslim soldiers started clandestine assistance for Indonesian nationalist fighters. Two of these groups, Laskar Hezbollah and Laskar Sabilillah consisted of Muslim youths mostly affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama organization.

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They were founded in the early 1940s under the auspice of the Japanese troops with the aim of defending Indonesia from external attacks. Two prominent leaders of the Laskar, Kiai Masykur and Kiai , were known as the leading guardians of the idea of Indonesian Islamic state. However, they had put aside their differences on ideology with secularists when the country and Muslims were facing threats from the invaders (Ma’shum 1998, 181-2). These groups provided the first point of contact for the Muslim soldiers in British army. The process started with these soldiers making contacts and agreements with groups such as Laskar Hezbollah and Laskar Sabilillah. Ghulam Ali and his compatriots told local fighters that they would like to fight with them (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 February 1984).

It was agreed that the Muslim soldiers would say greeting Assalmu’ allaikum so that Indonesian fighters would recognize them as fellow Muslims and avoid confrontations between them. This agreement was passed on to the leaders of the Indonesian army, such as A. H. Nasution, Sarbini, Kawilarang, Suharto, and Sarwo Edhi as well as Vice President Mohammad Hatta. The nationalist leaders followed up by circulating letters instructing all Indonesian fighters not to clash with the Muslim soldiers who wanted to join local combatant units (Nasution 1977, 37).

Some 600 Muslim soldiers from the British Indian army left their rank units in Jakarta, Bogor, Banten, Medan, Surabaya, Semarang, and Yogyakarta. Initially, the deserters provided assistance in military logistics to Indonesian fighter units, gave information of allied troops’ patrols, and trained local fighters. Such secret support turned overt and massive when the Muslim soldiers were involved in shielding Indonesia against the second Dutch military invasion in December 1948 (Khan 2004, 26-32). By 1950, after a five-year-war on colonial powers in Indonesia, only 75 of these Muslim soldiers had survived. Most of them died on the battlefields. Some of those survivors chose to return home and be identified as Pakistanis. They were recognized by the Pakistani government as Muslim heroes and received their full rights as armed force members. Some of them were employed by the Indonesian embassy in Islamabad. Others

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remained to live in Indonesia, for example, Ghulam Ali and Ghulam Rasul joined staff of the Indonesian national armed forces (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 February 1984).

The Pakistani government sent a special envoy to attend the transfer of power from the Dutch to the government of Indonesia on 27 December 1949. At the event the envoy said to President Sukarno that he noted the strength of Muslim solidarity that connected peoples of the two countries, which had helped unite their powers against the colonial Dutch forces in Indonesia (Sutopo 1973, 1). In return, the government of Indonesia expressed gratitude and deep appreciation of the services rendered by the Pakistani Muslim soldiers in defence of Indonesian freedom. The Indonesian Minister of Defence, Djuanda, and Army Chief of Staff General awarded the Satia Lencana medal to 20 Pakistani soldiers who had survived the war and joined the Indonesian army. Others who died during the war were posthumously honoured. At the same time, the Indonesian government awarded the highest medal of the Indonesian Republic, Adi Purna, to Ali Jinnah for his moral and tangible support during the critical years of Indonesian struggle for independence (Khan 2004, 34).

The Indonesian Prime Minister, Mohammad Natsir, who was also the leader of Masyumi Islamic Party, accompanied by Kiai Masykur (who was serving as Minister of Religious Affairs), visited Pakistan and thanked the Pakistani government and peoples. At a meeting of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (Karachi) on 9 April 1952, when delivering his speech titled ‘The Contribution of Islam to World Peace’, Natsir declared ‘…the spirit of Islamic solidarity [had] proven to be a solid basis for the Indonesian and Pakistani relationship…’ (Natsir 2000, 17-8). One may argue that Natsir’s use of Islamic language in describing the link between Pakistan and Indonesia may have reflected his personal views on the prominence of Islam for Indonesian governance and foreign relations. But it also indicated that Islam was present as an idea in the Indonesia’s worldview and foreign policy in spite of the privileging of the secular nationalists’ identity.

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However, apart from these occasional examples, Islam did not emerge as a major reference point in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Pakistan. Indonesia tried to avoid frequent use of language that focused on religious sentiments. Instead, Indonesia defined its foreign policy as being governed by the pursuit of as much support and friendship as possible to develop a respectable position in the international community. In contrast, Pakistan often identified Indonesia in terms of their Muslim connections - an approach that was not always shared by the Indonesian secular nationalists. The impact of these different views and approaches became apparent as the two states operated in the post Second World War international system.

The Focus on Anti-colonialism and Nonalignment Policy Similarities existed between Indonesia and Pakistan in terms of the formation of their respective states and foreign issues faced by them. Like Indonesia, Pakistan was born out of a post-colonial state with its anti-colonialism vision. Similar to Indonesia which was struggling for maintaining its territorial integrity from the Dutch aggression, Pakistan had felt its country susceptible to foreign attacks, particularly from India. Hence, Indonesia should have a sense of tenacity to build strong relations with Pakistan. However, after the transfer of power in 1949 Indonesia pursued policies different from those pursued by Pakistan especially with its reference to Muslim identity. Identity and the elite’s interests mattered since Sukarno and the secularist leadership had paid little attention to Islamism, instead articulating the discourse of balanced relationships toward India and Pakistan, and focusing on Asian African solidarity for anti-colonialism. The section highlights this tendency but locates it within the context of Pakistan government’s references to Islam’s role in its relationship with other Muslim states.

Pakistan became independent from British colonialism on 14 August 1947. Since it had secured independence on the basis of the Two Nation Theory that argued for the rights of Muslims to have their own state carved out of British India – Pakistan - it was understandable that the language of Islamic identity would be a feature of the country’s international projection. This was particularly so as the Muslim League leaders had

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insisted that the difference between the two communities of faith could only be resolved should the Muslims be allowed to have their own country. The projected vision of Pakistan was also of a state where Muslims of the subcontinent were able to practice the teachings of Islam in life, divorced from Indian secularism (Hussain 1966, 55). But also, sentimentally Muslims of the subcontinent felt more attached to the Islamic world because of their commonality in belief (Ahmad 1968, 67).

In fact, the formation of Pakistan did not finish religious-based differences between the Hindus and the Muslims. It even escalated into the first open conflict between Pakistan and India over the state of Kashmir in 1948. The war was provoked by the Pathan tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province with the backing from the embryonic Pakistani army who descended on Kashmir to support overwhelmingly Kashmiri Muslims uprising against the Hindu ruler of the princely state (Khan 1992). Fighting between Pakistan and India ended with the UN intervention; between 1948 and 1954 the ceasefire line was monitored by the United Nations Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). One-third of Kashmir, the far northern and western areas of the state was under Pakistan’s control, whilst the Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh which comprised two-thirds of the state were under Indian rule. The UN called for a plebiscite to determine the final status of the disputed territory. After initially accepting the idea, India soon rejected it on grounds that Pakistan’s membership of the US led alliance had changed the situation on ground. Pakistan, on its part, continued to demand that the plebiscite should be held on the assumption that the Muslim majority population of the state would join Pakistan (Gupta 1966, 6-16; Schofield 2000, 15-49). Both Pakistan and India continue to claim possession of the Kashmir territories.

The newly independent Pakistan had to design its foreign policy to address two crucial security problems; dealing with the Kashmir dispute, and the most appropriate strategies to counter a possible threat by the larger India (Delvoie 1995, 141). Its response was to seek patrons who could protect the nascent state, while simultaneously making friends with other countries to meet its economic needs. In search of protection, Islamabad

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aligned with the great power, especially the US under the umbrella of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) which was formally concluded in 1954. It also joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) to protect East Pakistan. At the same time, to meet its economic interests, Pakistan looked for help from Japan as well as members of the British Commonwealth, mainly Australia and Canada (Sattar 2007, 32- 41). This policy was certainly not designed on the basis of the Pakistan’s identity as a state for Muslims, but material needs.

However, having been created on the basis of its Islamic identity, Pakistan was equally keen to develop ties with the Islamic world. Islamabad used the language of Pan- Islamism in its foreign policy. This could be seen in its attempt to consolidate a united Islamic bloc. On 25 November 1949, members of Pakistani business community organized the Islamic economic conference in Karachi. About 60 delegates and observers representing Egypt, Iraq, Persia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, North Africa, Muscat and Oman, the Maldives Islands, Spanish, Transvaal, Morocco, and Arab League participated in the conference. The support from the Pakistan government for the conference was noticeable when the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, inaugurated the meeting on 26 November 1949. In his inaugural address he emphasised ‘…the need for the presence of Islam as a panacea for the diverse issues faced humanity at the time…’. He expressed his country’s strong commitment to Islam by stating that Pakistan had the ambition to serve Islam and to serve humanity. Pakistani Finance Minister at the same meeting identified features that united the Muslim world; their faith, culture, and economic underdevelopment. The conference recommended Muslim solidarity as the context in which economic cooperation, trade expansion, as well as knowledge exchanges could take place among the Muslim states. The goal was to develop the commonwealth of Muslim states (Times 28 November 1949). Pakistan also proposed that the conference of Muslim countries be held annually. Participants in the meeting agreed with this plan (Times 28 November 1949). Thus, this became Pakistan’s success in initiating the unity amongst Muslim countries.

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Developments in the 1950s showed that Muslim countries held diverse views on the idea of Muslim. In 1950 the second Islamic conference, convened in Tehran, established a permanent secretariat of the Islamic forum and several committees were appointed. They had done some valuable work on ways and means in which to achieve economic cooperation. In Tehran the constitution was also changed requiring every participant country to channel membership through its own government. The Muslim conference continued to function after 1950 during which another conference was held by Syria in 1951, and in 1954 Pakistan accepted to play host again. But the 1954 Islamic conference received little enthusiasm, perhaps because some other Muslim countries were unhappy with Pakistan’s membership of the US led alliance. The idea of Pan- Islamism was promoted by other Muslim states as well. In 1957 Nigeria attempted to gather 30 Muslim countries for another holding of the Islamic conference. In May 1958, an Iranian newspaper Etelaat called for the holding of a conference of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Egypt also came out with the idea of Pan-Islamism limited in cultural cooperation. This was widely supported in the Muslim world. Favouring the Egyptian idea, Pakistan remained active communicating its commitment to Pan- Islamism as part of its Muslim identity – even when the notion of Muslim ummah was interpreted mostly in cultural terms (Hussain 1967, 137-9).

Indonesian policy towards Pakistan, however, was not shaped with reference to Islam. Sukarno considered the references to the Two Nation Theory and its implications for Pakistan’s relations with India to be the country’s internal matter. The focus on secularism led Jakarta to adopt an equidistant position towards Pakistan and India. Indonesia professed friendship with both Pakistan and India. Just after the declaration of independence by Pakistan and India, President Sukarno sent messages to congratulate them on their success in struggling against colonialism and the establishment of their respective states (Times of Indonesia 16 August 1947).

Indonesia shaped its relations with both Pakistan and India on the basis of commonality of ideas and policies. It limited formal space provided to Islam in its foreign policy was

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already conveyed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Hatta (Bintang Timur 5 February 1950) when he had stated: ‘…Indonesia’s international diplomacy should be made flexible but strong to pursue the national interests mandated by the 1945 Constitution in which religions as formal reference are not known…’. This secular notion shaped the context in which Indonesia related to Pakistan.

Indonesia did not respond with keenness to Pakistan’s rhetoric of Pan-Islamism. It did not attend the first Islamic economic conference held in Karachi in 1949. It was perhaps because Jakarta was concentrating on diplomatic efforts to smooth the way for the handing-over of authority from the Dutch to be held in December that year. However, Indonesia was not averse to participating in the Islamic conference convened by Pakistan in Karachi in February 1954, but communicated the limited significance accorded to Pan-Islamism by sending just a small group of foreign affairs officials, and only as observers (Times of Indonesia 10 February 1954). There is no evidence reporting on Indonesia’s participation in the later conferences of Islamic states during the 1950s.

Formally, Indonesian and Pakistani ties were consolidated by the signing of the Treaty of Friendship on 3 March 1951 in Jakarta, laying the foundation of mutually beneficial relations between the two nations. Once again, Islam was not mentioned as the foundation of the two countries’ relationship in the text of the treaty, but it did contain universal values such as social justice, respect to sovereignty, mutual cooperation, and peace (Sutardjo 1951, 3-10). This treaty was followed by the agreement between the two governments on bilateral trade cooperation, on 7 February 1953 concluded in Karachi. The two sides agreed on promoting cooperation to improve trade between them particularly in the agricultural sector. Trade would also be enhanced on an exchange scheme by which Indonesia would make available crude oil for Pakistan in return for some jute and cotton products as well as industrial goods from Pakistan (Text of Trade Agreement between Indonesia and Pakistan 1953).

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While playing down the relevance of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan’s focus on Pan-Islamism, the government in Jakarta was eager to foster stronger relations with India with its pronouncement of Asian African solidarity. India and Indonesia on 3 March 1951 signed the Treaty of Friendship declaring a perpetual, peaceful and unalterable friendship between New Delhi and Jakarta. Trade and cultural relations agreements were concluded on 30 January 1953 and 29 December 1955 respectively (Text of Treaty of Friendship between Indonesia and India 1951; Text of Trade Agreement between Indonesia and India 1953; Text of Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between Indonesia and India 1955).

The Jakarta-New Delhi links became more powerful when Indonesia agreed with the Indian concept of nonalignment in face of the Cold War blocs rivalry. In return India was eager to introduce Indonesia at formal and informal groupings of states, for instance, the Colombo power meeting in 1954 (Singh 1967, 656). Jakarta considered that Indian support could help Indonesia obtain an elevated status in the international arena. Both Jakarta and New Delhi held similar views on matters related to Asian and African countries. While building on this similarity, Indonesia sided with Indian assessment of the situation in South Asia. According to the Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastro Amidjojo (1973, 5), when invited by Ceylon’s Prime Minister John Kotelawala to take part in the Colombo conference in April-May 1954, Premier Amidjojo identified two requirements before he could consent; first, the issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan was not to be discussed in order to avoid unnecessary arguments, and second, that as the follow up of the Colombo meeting, Indonesia had to be given an opportunity to develop the idea of holding a larger forum embracing Asian and African nations. Kotelawala approved these requests, and Nehru supported Indonesia.

Indonesian diplomacy went well and in November 1954 with the support of Colombo powers it successfully convened the Bogor conference for the preparatory forum to discuss the holding of the first Asian African conference to be held in Bandung in April

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1955 (Abdulgani 1964). At the Asian African conference, which was attended by 29 Asian and African countries, Prime Minister Amidjojo proudly mentioned that the was unique as it was the first time Asian and African states were able to convey their intention to make decisions on their own without interference from Western powers. The Bandung Declaration, issued at the end of the conference, expressed Afro-Asian position against colonialism, racial discrimination, and a commitment to world peacemaking (Agung 1973, 222-4). Another Afro-Asian conference was scheduled in June 1956 at but had to be postponed due to the unstable situation of the Middle East caused by the Suez crisis. By 1960 Indonesia intended to revive the proposal, but met with little success. This was mainly because of the strong opposition from India which had felt that Indonesia would rival its leadership role in the Third World affairs. Pakistan, on the other hand, supported the Indonesian proposal (Burke & Ziring 1990, 310-11). This meant that even though Indonesia had displayed only little interest in supporting Pakistan, it could still establish links with it in the Asian African forum. The later developments indicated that Indonesian gradual disengagement with India served as a wider space for Jakarta and Islamabad to strengthen ties.

Indonesia’s Stronger Relations with Pakistan During the 1960s, Indonesian foreign policy was centralized in the figure of President Sukarno whose ideas and interests dictated the state’s external relations. Ever since the installation of Guided Democracy in 1959, Sukarno had assumed a complete direction of Indonesia’s foreign policy; gradually giving it an ideological ground as the struggle of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS) mostly referred to the West. Modelski (1963) and Legge (1972) explain that Sukarno considered an international conflict theory between the new and the old powers as the determining feature of world society. This conflict would, in his view, lead to the ultimate and inevitable destruction of the old. In Sukarno’s view, the root cause of international tensions lay in imperialism and colonialism and not the Cold War ideological enmity. This worldview was the radicalized form of the discourse of anti-

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colonialism and anti-imperialism in Indonesian foreign policy with confrontational characters of Sukarno dominating the state’s international relations in the 1960s.

The changing dynamics of regional and global settings also influenced Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Pakistan. Jakarta had viewed with alarm the emergence of Malaysia with the help of Britain and India and considered it to be a potential threat to Indonesia. It was also suspicious of Indian improved relations with Washington after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. Meanwhile, Jakarta had improved military ties with the Soviet Union, particularly during the dispute over West Irian against the Dutch, and had remained aloof from Washington. After the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, tensions escalated between Indonesia and India. Jakarta allied with China against the perceived expansion of the British Empire and Indian power in Southeast Asia. This contributed to the improvement of qualified relations between Jakarta and Islamabad.

The strengthening of Indonesia and Pakistan ties can be divided into three phases. Firstly, between 1960 and 1962 Indonesia and Pakistan tried to identify common views and policies. Secondly, during 1963-1964 the two sides were keen to show reciprocal support and develop mutual cooperation based on common interests. And finally, Jakarta and Islamabad actively collaborated in the creation of a strategic front against India when the Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir broke out in September 1965.

The first phase of the improvement of ties between Jakarta and Islamabad took shape during Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s visit to Jakarta in the early December 1960. The meeting of the two countries’ leaders was not planned to discuss serious matters related to bilateral relations. It was like a friendly exchange of views between Sukarno and Ayub Khan. Nonetheless, they agreed to forge a more cordial relationship: as indicated in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks, the two sides committed to review economic and cultural ties which over the last decade had not shown much progress, aiming to discover ways and means to progress them to a more satisfactory degree (Text of Joint Communiqué between Indonesia and Pakistan 1960).

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The sign of improvement in the relationship was further evident when Sukarno and Ayub Khan expressed in front of cheering crowds at Bandung their full support for the rights of self-determination of all peoples. Sukarno was happy with Ayub Khan’s statement that Pakistan would continue to endorse Indonesia’s position in the West Irian issue. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an official announcement saying that Pakistan was a true supporter of Asian peoples struggling under foreign domination (Bintang Timur 6 December 1960).

However, despite this growing amity, the two states differed on certain foreign policy issues. Though they agreed upon the rights of self-determination for all peoples, Indonesia did not mention specifically the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India - a silence that slightly disappointed Ayub Khan (Times of Indonesia 8 December 1960). Pakistan’s membership of the US alliance system also remained a point of disagreement: Ayub Khan tried to explain Pakistan’s position by arguing that his country required an umbrella against the communist expansionism. Indonesia disagreed with Pakistan’s position. Sukarno, in reply to Ayub Khan’s clarification, maintained Indonesian policies of non-commitment to either bloc of the Cold War, saying that Asian African powers would become the victims of the bloc opposition if they submitted to them (Times of Indonesia 8 December 1960). The two leaders also differed on the plan to convene the second Asian African conference: President Ayub Khan had not yet supported Indonesia’s plans to hold this conference by stating that ‘…the gathering of Asian and African nations might not be needed urgently…’ (Times of Indonesia 12 December 1960). Pakistan’s position was perhaps a reaction to Indonesia’s unwillingness to support Islamabad’s Kashmir policy.

The nature of Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan changed as Jakarta’s friendship with New Delhi to deteriorate. The setback in Indonesia-India relations was primarily caused by Nehru’s open refusal to Sukarno’s proposal for convening a second Asian-African gathering. Ever since the Bandung conference, Indonesia was keen to host such a

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meeting by which Jakarta had attained tremendous international prestige. Nehru argued that a second Asian-African conference would do more harm than good to Afro-Asian states by reiterating publicly that Asia’s and Africa’s problems would sharpen dissimilarities amongst them. Nehru’s actual reason was an unwillingness to see Indonesia earn more credit from the forum. On the other hand, China ardently endorsed the Indonesian proposal. India, with its old allies Yugoslavia and Egypt, both of whom resented Indonesia, hindered the proposal of a second Bandung-type meeting, and instead planned a conference of nonalignment countries that eventually took place at Belgrade in September 1961 (Singh 1967, 658).

On his journey to Belgrade, Sukarno declined Nehru’s invitation to visit New Delhi. Instead, he chose to have a short stop-over at Karachi Airport. At the airport the Indonesian leader expressed his fondness for the people of Pakistan by admitting that he liked Pakistan and its people (Bintang Timur 1 September 1961). In spite of the remaining different views and policies between Indonesia and Pakistan, this episode demonstrated that, parallel to a certain degree of coolness between Jakarta and New Delhi due to Sukarno’s disappointment with Nehru, and on the other hand, Indonesia had asserted its preference for Pakistan. It was to provide an important path towards the improvement of relations between the two states.

At the Belgrade conference, Indonesia strongly challenged India’s preeminent position. Sukarno insisted and was allowed to deliver his major address after Tito’s welcoming speech. The Indonesian daily Bintang Timur (2 September 1961) reported that in the group photo of the participants Sukarno was at the centre, accompanied by Tito, Nasser, and Nehru. It could be interpreted as suggesting that Sukarno wanted to eliminate the prevailing notion that Nehru was the originator of nonalignment stand in the Cold War. However, India had succeeded in ensuring that the declaration of the non-alignment position subordinated all issues to its ideological commitment of neither pro Western nor Eastern bloc for averting threats to world peace. The outcome of the Belgrade conference upset Sukarno since no mention had been made for the cause of the West

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Irian issue, while the twenty-seven-point Belgrade Declaration mentioned nationalists’ issues in Algeria, the Congo, Angola, Palestine, and Iberia (Indonesian Observer 10 September 1961). Hence, the Belgrade conference had furthered tensions between India and Indonesia, opening up a wider space for Indonesia and Pakistan to promote each other’s interests.

Pakistan overtly supported Indonesia’s challenge to the nonaligned group. The editorial on 1 September published in a prominent Pakistani English daily - Dawn - expressed doubt if the non-aligned forum could play a crucial role in the resolution of world’s problems. The editorial was critical of Nehru’s idea of neutrality as not being based on sincerity and honesty. Specifically it criticized India’s response to Indonesian preference for a second meeting: it reported that previously most Afro-Asian states had approved Indonesian demand for a second gathering, but India endeavoured to impede it due to a fear of China’s and Pakistan’s attendance. Dawn alleged India had never had the sensitivity towards the plight of Asian and African peoples (Arora 1975, 231-2). Such coverage was in line with the harsh criticism of the Belgrade conference in the Indonesian press: the editorial entitled ‘The Betrayal of Anti-colonialism’ in a pro- government daily Angkatan Bersenjata (4 September 1961) pointed out that ignorance of the preponderant anti-imperialism struggle in West Irian by the Belgrade conference was the bias of nonalignment policy. It suggested the Indonesian government review the friendship with India. Another daily Siasat (3 September 1961) even more asked the government to freeze ties with India. Importantly, Indonesian Observer (2 September 1961) identified similarities between the Pakistani policy in Kashmir and Indonesian struggle for integrating West Irian. It identified the two cases as evidence of anti- colonial powers’ policies against foreign aggressors.

During the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, India expected Indonesia to condemn China. But Indonesia remained impartial. Public opinion in India reflected considerable annoyance at Indonesia not taking a firm stand against China that was portrayed as the aggressor. India reminded Indonesia of the solidarity founded earlier in Colombo,

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Bogor, and Bandung. However, Indonesia confirmed its neutral position when in the six-nation-Colombo conference in December 1962 the Indian proposal for joint action against China was refused by Indonesia, Burma, and (Singh 1966, 172).

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 also had a profound impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy, which made it possible for Islamabad and Jakarta to stand side by side against New Delhi. The war had created an interest between India and the United States in their common desire to contain China. India, which had long rejected Washington’s offer of military aid and refused to adopt a friendly attitude towards the West, was compelled by its military debacle in 1962 to seek military assistance from the Anglo-American alliance. New Delhi’s request for military aid was favourably received in and Washington which in addition promised long-term military aid. This formed an informal alignment of India and the Western military powers. The improvement in Indian-US relations affected Pakistan’s relations with the US; realizing that Islamabad’s strategic importance for the US had declined, Pakistan reacted to the altered environment by forging closer relations with China. Beijing and Islamabad shared an interest in retaining the balance of power in the region vis-à-vis India, and containing the possibility of Indian aggression (Hyder 1966, 20).

Still in 1962, Jakarta rejected the Indian role in the transfer of power from the Dutch to Indonesia in West Irian. The , concluded on 15 August 1962, had provided for the ’ administrative power to be reassigned to Indonesia within seven months beginning on 1 October 1962 to conclude on 1 May 1963. In the meantime, West Irian was to remain under the authority of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). To assist with the task, UNTEA invited India to provide the services of six military officers who would be led by Brigadier General Inderjeet Rikhey. Indonesia preferred Pakistan’s participation to that of India. Hence, at Indonesia’s request, Pakistan was appointed as an alternative to India to form the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) for West Irian, with a 1500 strong contingent commanded by Major General Said Uddin Khan (Indonesian Observer 2

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October 1962). This was a clear sign of Indonesian preference for, and recognition of, the importance of Pakistan, paving the way to improve their qualified relationships.

Between 1963 and 1964 the relations between Jakarta and Islamabad improved within the context of a triangular relationship involving Pakistan, Indonesia and China. The triangular relationship was directed against the emerging alliance between India, the US and the Soviet Union. Jakarta was interested in countering the Indian efforts to block its plans for the Afro-Asian world. But it also sought support for its ‘crush Malaysia’ policy which included elements of confrontation without going to war with Malaysia. As elaborated by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Subandrio, in his speech before the Resimen Mahakarta in Yogyakarta on 20 , the policy towards Malaysia was guided by Indonesian commitment to ‘pursuing confrontation against colonialism and imperialism in all its manifestations’. But since Malaysia had unfortunately ‘let itself become the proxy of colonialism and imperialism…[Indonesia was] compelled to adopt a policy of confrontation….’ (Djiwandono 2001, 2). Malaysia was depicted by Jakarta as the extension of Western colonialism, especially of the British in Southeast Asia.

Pakistan, on its part, sought a new patron after reduced US support in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war. It also looked for endorsement by Asian and African states of its Kashmir policy that was always couched in terms of the rights of the Muslim population to become part of the Islamic state of Pakistan. China needed Afro-Asian countries to stand by its efforts in countering the perceived American domination as well as Soviet communist revisionism expressed in its fear of encirclement. These interests brought the three states together (Singh 1980, 44-5), and Indonesia and Pakistan discovered common interests. This was a step in the direction of closer relations than had been the case so far.

The emergence of the triangular relations of Indonesia-Pakistan-China marked the end of the discourse of independent and active foreign policy, and led to a more radicalized

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worldview proposed by Sukarno. On many occasions, Sukarno had been more outspoken of the necessity for the Third World countries to ally with NEFOS. At the Cairo meeting of nonaligned states in September 1964, Sukarno challenged Indian peaceful coexistence policy by arguing how NEFOS and OLDEFOS could coexist peacefully in situations like the conflict in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Still in the same month, Sukarno took Indonesia out of the UN, severely criticizing the world organization of a stronghold of the OLDEFOS. In its place, Sukarno wanted to establish the conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFOS). When Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaya, proposed the joining together of conservative Malaya, with the British colony of Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak, and build a new more powerful nation called Malaysia, Sukarno felt it was an onslaught of the OLDEFOS. For Sukarno, Indonesia should have been consulted about the disposition of colonies around its borders. Further for Sukarno, the creation of Malaysia was designed to encircle and control the revolutionary NEFOS, Indonesia (Tan 2007, 155).

Pakistan’s position on Indonesia’s NEFOS discourse was unique: Pakistan was a member of CENTO and had been beholden largely to American economic and military aid for nearly 15 years. But it had also come to realize the significance of an alliance with Jakarta and Beijing under the guidance of the then Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. However, during the height of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation in 1964- 1965, Pakistan remained neutral with its proposal for mediation to resolve the dispute. Indonesia did not respond to this peace initiative, but Malaysia did (Times 25 February 1965). However, Pakistan’s failure to side with Indonesia did not affect its strengthening ties with Jakarta.

President Sukarno paid a visit to Pakistan in June 1963 where he was warmly welcomed. On his arrival, the Indonesian leader urged Pakistan and all NEFOS sympathizers to rally against the OLDEFOS order which retained domination, exploitation, and suppression of peoples around the world. President Ayub Khan praised Sukarno for his tough diplomacy and determination to advocate for the liberation of

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West Irian, and hoped that Indonesia would lend its remarkable support for the similar struggle of freedom being undertaken by the peoples of Kashmir. Sukarno did not pronounce Indonesian support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir (Indonesian Observer 24 June 1963). Nevertheless, in a speech in Murree on 25 June, Sukarno emphasized the need for more solid cooperation and real friendship between Indonesia and Pakistan. Furthermore, Sukarno declared that the tumultuous welcome he was receiving reflected spontaneous brotherly feelings the Pakistanis had for Indonesians (Bintang Timur 26 June 1963).

At this event too, there had emerged a mixed context within which Indonesia viewed its ties with Pakistan; secular and Islamic discourses emerged as common ground on which it became possible to promote the relationship amidst the strategic shift in Indonesia- India relations. This was an important modification in Indonesia and Pakistan relations, by which the former had indicated greater willingness to recognize the role of its Islamic identity, albeit the dominant theme remained the struggle of NEFOS and Bandung spirit. It can be discerned in the way Sukarno approached relations with Pakistan as stated in the joint communiqué which on the one hand reaffirmed that the Asian African solidarity was the main basis for the two countries relations, and on the other hand mentioned Islam as the bond of historical friendship between Indonesians and Pakistanis. They referred to the period when soldiers of the two nations fought together against the Dutch in Indonesia (Text of Joint Communiqué between Indonesia and Pakistan 1963).

Pakistan committed to favour the Indonesian plan for the holding of the second Afro- Asian meeting and was prepared to take part in the NEFOS Games to be held in Jakarta in 1964 instead of the Asian Games (Indonesian Observer 1 July 1963). By confirming its support of a second Bandung-like forum, Pakistan was able to place its relations with Indonesia on a better footing than the deteriorating Indian-Indonesian ties. Foreign Minister Subandrio - when accompanying President Sukarno on his visit to Karachi – was assured that Indonesia had formed a promising friendship as was clearly shown by

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the sincerity of the people and government of Pakistan, and that this was very meaningful for the struggle of NEFOS (Bintang Timur 28 June 1963). Indonesia felt more confident with its closer relationship with Pakistan, which was sending a signal to India that the Jakarta-Islamabad collaboration was entering a new phase.

The conflict between India and Indonesia was meanwhile widening. Sukarno, eager to convene the second Asian African conference, hoped to seek recruits to his proposed NEFOS grouping. Nevertheless, India was determined to stall the holding of such a Bandung type meeting. The Shastri government of India, on the diplomatic front, made a concerted attempt with Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Ceylon, to host a rival conference, the second nonalignment meeting. It was quite likely that a meeting between nonaligned states might render unnecessary a second Bandung-like conference because most Afro- Asian countries were taking part as well. At any rate, India considered a conference of Asia and Africa would have been delayed had the nonalignment group held their gathering in 1964 earlier than the planned Bandung gathering (Singh 1980, 45).

As Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai set out on a tour of Africa to secure support of the second Afro-Asian conference, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs took active steps to convince Ceylon and Egypt of the desirability to speed up convening the second nonalignment conference. To New Delhi’s surprise, Colombo and Cairo were only too willing to oblige; the preparatory meeting at the ambassadorial level was held at Colombo in March 1964. Indonesia, Pakistan and China did not want to be outmanoeuvred by India, and Indonesia hosted the preparatory meeting of the second Afro-Asian conference in April 1964 (Singh 1966, 172-3).

At the meeting held in Jakarta, the two blocs vainly opposed each other’s position. Controversies cantered on the Indian proposal to invite Malaysia and the Soviet Union. For Indonesia, Malaysia did not exist. China could not accept the attendance of the Soviet Union at the conference which Peking had been long expecting to dominate and able to gain a good image. Indonesia at the time was close to the Soviet Union in the

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military field since its dispute over West Irian with the Netherlands. However, Jakarta was inclined to favour China, and Sukarno saw this as more helpful to his ‘crush Malaysia’ campaign. The trio Jakarta-Beijing-Islamabad put up a strong fight against the proposed Malaysian and Soviet participation. This issue further strained relations between Indonesia and India. The national media, controlled by the Indonesian government, accused India of insulting Indonesian sensibility through the controversial initiative of trying to bar the Afro-Asian conference (Singh 1967, 663).

Again, Indonesia felt hindered by India and likeminded parties. Indonesia, with the support of China and Pakistan, wanted to convene the second Asian-African conference in an Indonesian city, which was to be held prior to the nonalignment meeting at the end of 1964. Once more India struck at the very root of Indonesian bid. To the great disappointment of Indonesia, Pakistan and China, India succeeded in confirming support of African delegations, in that not only the second Afro-Asian gathering would be held in 1965 after the nonalignment conference, but also the venue would be in an African country, to be decided by the Organization of African Union (OAU). Algiers was identified on 10 March 1965 as a likely venue for the conference. To give more time to Algiers to make preparations, the schedule of the meeting was changed to 29 June 1965 (Millar & Miller 1965, 311). By this time, Indonesia and India were engaged in a contest in respect to the ideas, venue, and participants in the convening of the Bandung-like meeting.

Amidst growing tensions with India, in September 1964 Sukarno visited Pakistan to seek a more solid commitment in support of Indonesia. The joint statement issued at the visit established the framework for a stronger relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan. It was on this visit that, for the first time, Sukarno asserted his political support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Sukarno openly acknowledged that the Kashmir issue was of the Indonesian government’s concern from now on, so that the people of Indonesia were called to support the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination. Any action by an external ruler – the reference to India - to thwart the efforts of the

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majority of Kashmiri peoples was opposed in line with Indonesia’s continuing fight against imperialism of the OLDEFOS (ANTARA 22 September 1964). Indonesia had made it clear that it was leaning towards Pakistan.

Indonesia and Pakistan economic ties grew as well. The commitment to enhance cooperation produced a trade protocol signed between Pakistan and Indonesia on 11 January 1965 in Jakarta. Pakistan granted Indonesia an export credit package worth US$ 10 million, and agreed to export cotton textile yarn and jute to Indonesia (Text of Trade Protocol between Indonesia and Pakistan 1965). From 1 to 8 March 1965, Indonesia and Pakistan held a conference on economic and cultural cooperation in Karachi, with Indonesia agreeing to import Pakistani films instead of the Indian and agricultural goods (Text of Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation between Indonesia and Pakistan 1965).

While Indonesia and Pakistan were fostering ties, further tension arose with India. Observers were convinced that the split between Indonesia and India within the Asian- African powers was a considerable factor in the failure of that second Bandung-type gathering (Weinstein 1965, 335). Beside this, unsettled situations in Algiers following the overthrow of President Ben Bella on 19 June 1965 had paved the way for India to work actively with Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, and Japan to reschedule the conference to 5 November 1965. In fact, the conference never took place (Singh 1967, 664). The year 1965 witnessed the height of Indonesian hostility towards India.

This development served as a fresh opportunity for Indonesia and Pakistan to further consolidate their political relations. Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia made a three-day visit to Pakistan beginning on 19 February 1965. In Pakistan, Subandrio assured the people of Pakistan that his government would carry on working with Pakistan for the strengthening of their relationship. An Indonesian press correspondent in Karachi wrote that the Pakistani media gave wide coverage of Subandrio’s visit. Indonesia – especially President Sukarno - was symbolized as the champion of freedom

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in Asia, and the greatest leader of the Indonesian nation and Muslims. Moreover, under the leadership of the revolutionary Indonesia, the NEFOS movement was identified as the denominator of changes in the neo-colonized world. India, in contrast, was illustrated as the perpetrator of brown imperialism in the region (Bintang Timur 20 February 1965).

Since Indonesia was improving relations with Pakistan, Islam began to be relatively more present than was the case before in Sukarno’s rhetoric. Sukarno used the language of Islamic identity in an inaugural address at the Asian-African Islamic conference held at Bandung in the first half of March 1965. He exhorted ‘…to seek freedom from colonialism in all its forms [as] it had oppressed and suppressed the Muslim world…colonialism has put Islam in the chains against which Muslims are obliged to oppose…’ (Indonesian Observer 15 March 1965). Sukarno attempted to construct an image that the struggle against colonialism featured in his worldview and policies were congruent with the Islamic duties.

According to Sukarno’s supporter, who was also an activist of Nahdlatul Ulama, H. A. Notosutardjo (1963, 11-5), the ideological policy of NEFOS against OLDEFOS reflected the revolution of Islam when Prophet Muhammad struggled for the changes to his society; from uncivilized into a civilized one. Such an interpretation of Islamic values in Sukarno’s policy was supplemented and supported by the Indonesian media. For instance, Bintang Timur (16 March 1965) which published an editorial on the day Sukarno was addressing the Asian African Islamic conference, paid tribute to the Indonesian leader as the champion of Muslims and freedom. Therefore, beside holding the title of a revolutionary supporter of the Third World struggles, Sukarno and Indonesia had been branded with Islamic identity.

Islam was used in flavouring Indonesian political interest in humiliating India: in a reception for the participants of the Asian African Islamic conference, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, said ‘…Islam should be the basis of worldwide human

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revolution…’. Despite complaints from the Indian delegates, the Indonesian foreign minister called upon the worldwide Muslims ‘…to present a united front against non- Muslim aggressors, and provide all assistances for Muslims being attacked by non- Muslims such as what happened in Kashmir…’ (Bintang Timur 17 March 1965). This statement indicated that Indonesia had been willing to adopt Islamic languages in the foreign policy more openly, although the change was not simply due to a heightened awareness of Islam as the bond with Pakistan and others in the Muslim world.

In any case, Pakistan benefited from this change. During the mid 1960s, the Islamic identity was more obviously and strongly applied in Indonesia’s approach to describe its relations with Pakistan. For instance, Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan Brigadier General Roekmito Hendraniggrat wrote in Pakistan Horizon (1965, 142) ‘…the people of Pakistan had shown to us (Indonesians) an amount of goodwill and affectionate feelings to their brothers in Islam, a kind of relationship that would be hard to find in any other bilateral ties…’. The ambassador added ‘…it is true that Islam makes indestructible bonds for the two nations...’. As the Pakistan Horizon published by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs was a significant space where foreign policy issues were discussed in the country, the publication of the opinion of the Indonesian ambassador in the space indicated that he wanted to engage Pakistani opinion and policy makers with Indonesian Muslim identity.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and the Indonesian Attitude In September 1965, India and Pakistan fought their second war on Kashmir. Prior to the war, the two armies had clashed over the Rann of Kutch, a piece of marshy land along the border of India and adjoining Sindh. The issue was settled through an accord signed between the two states on 30 June 1965 (Choudhury 1972, 242). One of the points in the agreement mentioned that the Kashmir dispute, if unresolved, would be submitted for arbitration of an international tribunal. Pakistan expected that this principle could be applied to the Kashmir issue in the future (Sayeed 1966, 8). The Rann of Kutch fighting was perceived by Pakistan’s leadership as a solid demonstration of its strength. This

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encouraged Pakistan that an uprising could be spurred on in Indian-governed Kashmir. The Pakistani government’s assessment was that India, having lost the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, would not be confident enough to risk an all out war, especially after its experience in the dispute over the Rann of Kutch. Additionally, Pakistan was confident that the well equipped military personnel as a result of the American aid it received over the last ten years would be able to thwart Indian moves. Only four months after the clash in Rann of Kutch, Pakistan commenced an underground operation – called ‘Operation Gibraltar’ – to send Mujahideen infiltrators across into the Indian-held Kashmir area to incite people insurgence (Burke & Ziring 1990, 333).

The Pakistani provocative actions worried India, and New Delhi retaliated by mobilizing troops to seize Kargil. It was followed by Indian advances along the ceasefire line between Pakistani and Indian occupied Kashmir. Events started moving at rapid speed. Pakistani tanked troops moved up to occupy the Chamb sector of Southwestern corner of Indian-occupied Kashmir on 1 September 1965. India was concerned that if the Pakistani troops took over Aknur and Jammu, New Delhi’s communications with Srinagar would be cut off, and Indian troops would be bottled up between the ceasefire line and the valley. Thus, on 6 September 1965, India positioned troops to cross over the international borders between India and Pakistan. A full scale armed conflict was fought between India and Pakistan on the outer edges of Lahore and Sialkot in West Pakistan during the next two weeks. The war ended on 23 September 1965 without any side achieving a decisive breakthrough (Sayeed 1966, 9).

The war caused a major concern among the international community, and the UN intervened on the diplomatic front. On 4 and 6 September, the UNSC passed resolutions 209 and 210 respectively, calling for an immediate ceasefire. The Pakistani government responded to these moves by stressing that the Kashmir dispute remained the sole cause of conflict between India and Pakistan and that it needed to be resolved to ensure peace in the region. Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan expressed these views in his meeting with the Secretary General U Thant who visited Pakistan during the conflict. He

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emphasized that the UN had a responsibility to ensure that self-determination rights of the Kashmiri people were realized (Gauhar 1993, 340). Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto also rejected allegations that Pakistan had prompted the war to occur. He pointed out that the cardinal principle of Pakistan’s foreign policy was to establish peace with its main neighbour India. He emphasized that ever since Ayub Khan became the leader of Pakistan, he had made all efforts to make a peaceful settlement with India. For example, in 1959 Pakistan made an offer to India to bring about a meaningful settlement so that their armies would not face each other in combat. In line with Pakistan’s established position, he argued ‘…the people of Jammu and Kashmir [had] never been part of India, and that they [were] part of the people of Pakistan…’ (1965, 4-5). Therefore, India had to accept that the people of Jammu and Kashmir have the absolute rights of self-determination. Pakistan sought India’s respect to this as the principle of good neighbourly relations.

Despite being in an alliance relationship with Pakistan, the American response was to not take sides, and to leave it to the UNSC to seek an end to the war (Sattar 2007, 97-8). American strategic policy makers in South Asia saw the war between Pakistan and India in frustration, mainly due to the use of American weapons by both sides to fight each other and not for combat against Washington’s enemies. On 8 September, the US stopped supplying arms to both Pakistan and India. Pakistan reacted to this policy by questioning Washington’s commitment as an ally. In reply, Washington argued that Islamabad had sparked the war with India. This introduced an element of disillusionment among the Pakistani government: President Ayub Khan felt ‘let down’ by American view that it was not bound to support Pakistan and did not consider that Indian attacks were an act of aggression. Pakistan felt betrayed: though the US had ceased supplies of arms to both India and Pakistan, India could still have access to the weapons provided by the Soviet Union - contributing to power disequilibrium.

China, in contrast, stood by Pakistan. Having signed a series of agreements with Pakistan in 1963, and keen to use Pakistan as a link with Middle Eastern Muslim states,

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Beijing extended full support to Pakistan both tangibly and intangibly (Gauhar 1993, 347-8). China, at the Pakistan’s request for assistance, was prepared to provide munitions and spare parts, and fly in the material on fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Chen Yi of China was outspoken in denouncing Indian military actions in Kashmir. In Karachi on 4 September Chen Yi expressed the Chinese government’s criticism of Indian unjust armed provocations in Kashmir. Three days later, the Chinese foreign minister condemned what he mentioned as India’s criminal aggression against Pakistan, and accused India of trying to intimidate its neighbour through whatever deeds it liked. On 12 September, China reaffirmed its stance on the Kashmir issue, that it completely endorsed Kashmiri people’s rights of self-determination, and could not approve Indian attacks on Pakistan. The position was in line with the stand taken by Pakistan. So, even though China was not physically involved in the conflict, it adopted a strong pro-Pakistani position on the conflict.

Generally, the Muslim world stood by Pakistan (Sayeed 1966, 10), except for Malaysia which opposed Pakistan’s position; which was expressed by a Malaysian diplomat with Indian origin during the UNSC discussions on the war. Iran and Turkey rendered planeloads and ammunition to Pakistan despite restrictions imposed on American arms transfer to a third party by Washington. President Nasser of Egypt, together with the Arab countries, assured Pakistan of their sympathy, and called upon India and Pakistan to settle the Kashmir conflict in accordance with the UN resolution passed in 1949 asking for a plebiscite. This was significant as Egypt had earlier been in favour of the nonalignment policy of India.

Indonesia also supported Pakistan during the 1965 War thus marking the third phase of the improvement in their relations. Indonesia declared readiness to militarily support Pakistan. According to the former Chief of Pakistan’s Air Force, Air Marshall Asghar Khan (1979, 44), he went to Jakarta and carried a personal letter from Ayub Khan for Sukarno, explaining the situation Pakistan was facing. Responding to the Pakistani plea for military aid, Sukarno said that Pakistan’s terrible need was Indonesia’s as well.

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Sukarno considered Indian attacks on Pakistan as though it was an aggression to Indonesia, and pledged, upon the ground of Islamic solidarity, to provide all assistances necessary for Pakistan. The Pakistani emissary was told to regard Indonesia as his own country and take from it whatever might be helpful to Pakistan in the emergency circumstances. This commitment was materialized into Indonesia’s military support for Pakistan.

Indonesia went so far as to ask Ceylon permission to use its airports for transferring military aircrafts for Pakistan, which were manned by personnel of Indonesian Staff College. In fact, it was reported that Ceylon rejected this request on account of its neutral policy towards India and Pakistan. In mid September, Sukarno sent the Indonesian Chief of Staff Vice Marshall to China for a secret mission to obtain spare parts of military airplanes as Indonesia was arranging to dispatch them for military assistance to Pakistan. Then, Indonesia gave eight MiG-19 jet fighters to Pakistan without asking for permits from Soviet’s authority (Khan 1979, 47).

In addition to air force aid, the Indonesian government agreed to give naval aid. Indonesia at Pakistan’s request for aid was ready to take over the Andaman group of islands. The Chief Commander of Indonesian navy believed that India did not deserve to be there in Andaman and Nicobar islands since they are an extension of Indonesian territory of Sumatra, and are located between Indonesia and East Pakistan. Therefore, the Indonesian navy commenced patrols and undertook inspection of these areas to see what India had done there (Bintang Timur 10 September 1965). An observer even said that India had postponed launching its sea strikes on Pakistan after realizing that the Indonesian navy was already in Pakistan’s seas7. The Indonesian military aid to Pakistan illustrates that Indonesian support was not confined to sheer rhetoric.

The Indonesian elite gave statements suggesting that they viewed India as an aggressor in Kashmir and the perpetrator of conflict in the state. Assertive languages backing

7 From an interview with Wahyudi Purnomo who is an expert of Indonesian foreign policy in South Asia under Sukarno, February 2010. 88

Pakistan were heard in Jakarta during the war. Sukarno gave a press conference expressing the fellow feeling and prayers of Indonesians for Pakistanis who were fighting sternly against aggression to the sovereignty of their country and people (Pakistan Horizon 1965, 364). The Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament, Arudji Kartawinata, and Chairman of Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) D. N. Aidit, shared similar views and depicted Indians as the representation of neo-imperialists in Asia. They also advised the Sukarno government to devote more humanitarian assistance to Pakistanis in need (Bintang Timur 8 September 1965).

It may be argued that the Indonesian support for Pakistan was extended within the context of the China-Pakistan-Indonesia triangular alliance that had evolved since the turn of the 1960s. Jakarta was willing to cooperate with China in supporting Pakistan during the war both diplomatically and militarily. But the explanations of Indonesian policy on Pakistan located the support within the context of Indonesia’s struggle against imperialism, and its Islamic identity. In explaining the Indonesian government’s policy on supporting Pakistan, the Minister of Communication spoke to journalists in Jakarta, saying that India was in doubt about anti-colonialism, endorsing the birth of colonial puppet Malaysia, as well as betraying the Bandung Spirit. On the other hand, Pakistan had developed friendship and solidarity with Indonesia in the struggle against colonialism, faithful with the respect to the rights of self-determination, and complied with the Bandung Spirit. Therefore, Indonesia decided to support Pakistan’s struggle for the Kashmiri people’s rights of self-determination (ANTARA 7 September 1965).

Generally, media in Indonesia was in favour of the government’s policy towards Pakistan. For instance, an editorial of the nationalist daily Kompas (10 September 1965) wrote an appraisal to Indonesia’s tangible support for Pakistan which was of help in fortifying the struggle of the Kashmiri people. The daily expressed that every nation has an inalienable rights to self-rule. In the case of Kashmir, its people’s rights were denied by India due to the latter’s selfish national interest. The policy adopted by Indonesia

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was correct because it was aimed at defending the rights of self-determination for peoples in Kashmir. Based on the Bandung Spirit of Asian and African solidarity, the government of Indonesia was urged to help heighten Pakistan’s bargaining position in international diplomatic arenas.

Ambassador Hendraninggrat – when inaugurating the Indonesian consulate in Dhaka on 19 September 1965 – stated that the Indonesian government and Muslims gave Pakistan their full political and moral support without reservations. Emphasizing on solidarity in the name of Islam, Hendraninggrat mentioned ‘…no power on earth that could disturb Islamic bonds binding Indonesia and Pakistan…’ (ANTARA 20 September 1965). With this statement, it is clear that the Indonesian government had offered its support for Pakistan by both acknowledging the need for the pursuance of Muslim solidarity and the struggle against imperialism manifested in Kashmir; a dual-approach that admitted - even if to a limited extent - the importance of Islam in Indonesia and Pakistan relations.

Societal groups in Indonesia also supported Pakistan with reference to their common Islamic identity. As the war started on 6 September, about 2,000 angry masses organized by the youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama Party demonstrated in front of the Indian embassy in Jakarta, mouthing anti-India and pro-Pakistan slogans. Two days later, another bigger mass rally took place, and on 9 September massive gatherings turned violence. The Indian embassy was stoned and ransacked, three cars belonging to the embassy were burnt out, and the Indian information service office was occupied through force by angry Indonesian mobs (Sayeed 1968, 236). It was reported that in West Java property of Indians was placed in custody. In Medan , the Indian consulate and Khalsa English School were seized by rowdy elements. The Gandhi Memorial School and office of the Air-India in Jakarta were also attacked. In this troubled atmosphere, the Indian embassy in Jakarta decided to evacuate the wives and children of its staff (Singh 1966, 174).

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Nahdlatul Ulama pledged a readiness to send volunteers to Kashmir to fight against Indian forces there. The former leader and founder of Laskar Hezbollah and Laskar Sabilillah, affiliated mostly with Nahdlatul Ulama, Kiai Masykur expressed his great sympathy to Pakistan. He said that he was called upon to do that by the history of his and other Muslim fighters who had struggled hand-in-hand with Pakistani Muslim soldiers to defend the freedom of Indonesia during the 1940s. Therefore, it was his duty to pay back those services given by Pakistani Muslim brothers by supporting them against the attacks of foreigners - the reference was to Indians (Kompas 11 September 1965).

Despite its professed secularist identity, the Sukarno government, represented by Foreign Minister Subandrio, appreciated the commitment and actions by the Islamist activists of Nahdlatul Ulama. He claimed ‘…the show of solidarity by the Indonesian masses is highly appreciable…it reflects the genuine feeling of support of Indonesian peoples for Pakistanis who are fighting powerfully to safeguard their independence and territorial integrity…’ (Indonesian Observer 10 September 1965). Although there was no report suggesting that the Indonesian government facilitated volunteers to go to Kashmir, the events taking place in Jakarta and other cities where mass protests against Indians continued violently, with no effort made by the security authorities to control or stop them, indicated that the government favoured the violent actions.

The Indian parliament and government complained about all these destructive actions by Indonesians. However, the government in Jakarta ignored it and continued to launch anti-India propaganda. In Pakistan, efforts to strengthen relations with Indonesia continued. On 8 October 1965, Sukarno Day – in honour of the Indonesian nationalist leader – was celebrated throughout the country, despite the fact that a coup, on 30 September/1 October, ousted him from power (Singh 1966, 174). Later, on 20 February 1966, the Revolution Brigade of Kashmir sent a letter to Sukarno to express their gratitude towards the Indonesian government and peoples (Kompas 21 February 1966).

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During the Sukarno era, Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan indicated gradual changes - from the position of avoiding the use of Islam as the reference to describe the relationship, to acknowledging the importance of and emphasizing Islamic identity as a factor in their relationship. Although this development was not caused by the growing Islamic orientation of the Indonesian elite’s interest and policies (which remained predominantly secular in its outlook), it was made possible through the shift in Indonesian-Indian strategic relations which opened up the space for Pakistan to forge stronger ties with Indonesia. Though Pakistan was motivated by more than merely its Islamic identity in relating to Indonesia, the use of Islam by the Pakistani government enabled the Sukarno regime to at least use the rhetoric of Islam in improving Indonesian and Pakistani ties. Indonesian Islamist groups, with a history of joint struggle against colonialists in Indonesia, supported the references to Islamic identity and used similar references to describe their relations with Pakistanis.

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Chapter Three Indonesia-Pakistan Relations Under Suharto During The 1970s

Following the fall of the Sukarno government, a new regime known as the New Order was installed under the guidance of President Suharto. This new administration, which was backed up by the military establishment, subsequently shifted the direction of the state’s foreign policy, including Indonesia’s South Asia policy. Jakarta sought to maintain friendship with Islamabad and at the same time reinvigorated relations with India by abandoning enmity inculcated by Sukarno. This chapter investigates the presence and use of Islam by the Suharto government as a reference point in the relationship with Pakistan within its changing South Asia policy.

The chapter argues that Islam received little attention as the framework in which Indonesia conducted its foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. Instead there was an increased focus on management of regional stability for economic development that, in turn, resulted in Jakarta promoting balanced relationship with Islamabad and New Delhi. This change could be discerned in the early years of Suharto (1966-1971). Then, Indonesian attitudes to the crisis in East Pakistan - which led to the independence of Bangladesh in December 1971 - also indicated an absence of the use of the language of Islamic identity in Suharto’s foreign policy towards Pakistan. After the crisis, Indonesian and Pakistan ties remained cordial in economic and cultural fields. The New Order government acknowledged the importance of Islam in relations between Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims at the societal level, but shied away from supporting or promoting these links.

Suharto’s Foreign Policy Direction Unlike the early years of Sukarno rule when the most crucial foreign policy problem was to retain independence from external threats, the New Order government under

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Suharto found the state in a serious predicament caused by its predecessor’s radical international policy. Thus, Indonesian foreign policy during at least the first five years of Suharto was dictated by the interrelated domestic demands for economic recovery and political stabilization.

The New Order government inherited three serious problems from the preceding regime that needed to be resolved urgently. Firstly, the distortion of Indonesian national identity articulated in the conducts of foreign policy particularly during the final years of Sukarno. There were two gross misrepresentations of Indonesian identity; one was that Indonesia strayed from a state with the peace-loving independent activism policy into the confrontational revolutionary leader of the Third World powers in its rhetoric of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS) (Weinstein 1971, 97) and, the second was the reference to sources of identity other than Pancasila, especially the use of the language of Islamic identity visible in Indonesian support for Pakistan against India during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.

Secondly, with such an identity construction Indonesia adopted hostile attitude vis-à-vis the West which, as the OLDEFOS, was accused of sustaining the world order of neo- imperialism and neo-colonialism. In addition, Sukarno was aggressive towards the neighbouring Third World countries such as Malaysia, which was accused of the proxy of the Western imperialism, and India, which was labelled as the brown imperialist. This radical international activism was combined with Indonesian reliance on China and the Soviet Union for economic and military cooperation (Singh 1986). So, as the relations with China were frozen after the alleged communist coup in Jakarta at the end of September 1965, and links with Moscow were cool, Indonesia had no reliable partners. And the relations with the Western economic powers had seriously deteriorated (Bandoro 1994, 2-4).

Thirdly, the economy had collapsed due to the Sukarno regime’s international political adventurism. By , the country’s foreign debt had mounted to US$ 785

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million whilst the national reserve held were only about US$ 400 million - enough for the purchase of goods for the next six months. The inflation rate had reached an unprecedented 600 percent. People’s purchasing power declined. This was exacerbated by the problem of insufficient supplies to meet people’s basic needs, especially rice due to the failure of the agricultural sector (Kompas 14 March 1966). Under these circumstances, it was imperative for the new government to obtain international economic support and to develop cooperation with countries alienated by the previous regime.

The New Order government reasserted the central role of Pancasila as the state’s national identity and pledged to reconstruct Indonesia’s foreign policy which had been abused by Sukarno through bringing it back in consonance with the constitutionally guided principle of independent activism foreign policy. The main architects of this revised approach were President Suharto, Vice President Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, and Foreign Minister and Foreign Economic Relations Coordinator . For the New Order government, the restoration of Indonesian economic condition was linked to the creation of regional security and stability that was identified as Indonesia’s main foreign policy priority (Sindunegara 1991, 19). Suharto expressed these ideas, constituting the new Indonesian international outlook, in his first foreign policy speech in the House of Representatives on 17 August 1966. He affirmed the central role of the 1945 Constitution in shaping Indonesian foreign policy (ANTARA 17 August 1966). Drawing attention to the fourth paragraph of the preamble, Suharto asserted that Indonesia wished to ‘…contribute to world order based on peace, freedom, and social justice’ and to ‘live in peace and friendship with all nations in the world…’. The policy of nonalignment and anti-interventionism was brought back to the centre stage and economic and financial recovery was identified as the first. The new policy comprised of both idealism and pragmatism with a declared preference to foster friendly and mutual relations with all nations. However, this was not to mean that other countries could intervene in Indonesia’s affairs, and jeopardize the country’s independence.

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Foreign Minister Adam Malik (1967) translated Suharto’s vision to include a focus on the broadest possible international cooperation economically, politically, socially, as well as culturally. The new government would endeavour to build Indonesia’s ties with all countries if these could be beneficial to the state’s national interests and welfare of the people. Stressing this point still further, Adam Malik remarked ‘…Indonesia’s foreign policy would be aimed at an extension of economic and financial cooperation between Indonesia and the outside world; both East and West as long as such cooperation does not harm Indonesia’s national interests…’. This indicated that there was a change from a provocative policy to good neighbourliness and open international cooperation. Such a position also indicated a stark contrast between the foreign policy postures adopted by the Suharto government and that by Sukarno.

The good neighbourly policy was at first implemented in the formation of a regional institution of Southeast Asian countries called the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in a meeting of five head of government on 8 in Bangkok Thailand. The ASEAN Declaration (1967) stated that the regional grouping is ‘…the collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia to bind themselves together with friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, and secure for their peoples for the posterity the blessings of peace, freedom, and prosperity…’. Within the spirit of stability under ASEAN, Indonesia managed to overcome its dispute with Malaysia. Still in 1967, in an attempt to broaden the scope of economic cooperation, Indonesia joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank which enabled its economy to be integrated with the international system. Under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), Jakarta made efforts to improve Indonesian ties with the Netherlands, Japan, the (UK), and the United States (US) (Malik 1968).

Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in South Asia The change in Suharto’s foreign policy affected Indonesia’s relations with South Asian countries as well. Suharto saw that links with the two South Asian major powers, India

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and Pakistan, had to be placed in a balanced proportion, with emphasis on mutual cooperation for economic benefits and the creation of regional stability and security. This was the context of Indonesia and Pakistan relations during the early years of the New Order.

Indonesia remained friendly towards Pakistan. However, the pro-Pakistan policy and the references to Islamic identity made in the 1965 Kashmir conflict as the basis of Jakarta’s relations with Islamabad diminished significantly. The new Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan was appointed not long after Adam Malik became foreign minister in March 1966. Sutopo, who was an active military officer, took over ambassadorship on 1 April 1966 from Ambassador Roekmito Hendraninggrat who had been appointed by Sukarno. The new ambassador made a statement that Indonesia acknowledged friendship with Pakistan that had begun during the 1940s, and that those ties had grown relatively without political disturbances ever since. Indonesia appreciated the support that the Pakistani government had extended in various international arenas. The foreign policy priority of the new national leadership in Indonesia was to promote regional stability and economic cooperation, and according to Ambassador Sutopo, relations with Islamabad would follow the same direction (Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1967, 5). There was no reference to the Islamic bond between the two states.

The reduction, if not absence, of Islamic reference in Indonesia and Pakistan relations at that time was noticeable in the joint communiqué issued after the meeting between the visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, and the Pakistani Foreign Minister Syed , on 6 November 1966 in Karachi. It expressed a commitment to maintain the ‘deep rooted relations between the societies of Indonesia and Pakistan’. These relations were to be based on ‘…the principles of mutual cooperation, peaceful settlement of international dispute, and the respect to each other national interests and sovereignty…’ (Kompas 7 November 1966). There was no mention of Islam as the bond for either the long-established relationships or future interactions (Text of Joint

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Communiqué between Indonesia and Pakistan 1966). This sent a clear signal that Pakistan may not expect unqualified support from Jakarta, especially on the Kashmir issue, based on common religious identity. The tone and content of the message were different from the policy adopted by Sukarno.

The Pakistan government also shied away from extending unqualified support to the Indonesian government. For instance, Adam Malik underscored the need for establishing regional security and stability in the Indian Ocean. Indonesia’s major concern was the activities of Soviet naval forces in the ocean, the developments in Vietnam and the possibility of communism expansion in Indochina. After all, Indonesia was observing with alarm China’s policy in Southeast Asia. This view was understandable on account of the establishment of a military regime in Indonesia with its fierce anticommunist orientation. Pakistan acknowledged the importance of building up regional security and stability in the Indian Ocean without commenting on the (ANTARA 8 November 1966). However, the renewed focus on economic recovery was reflected in the agreements signed between Indonesia and Pakistan. Indonesia was to import US$ 29.5 million worth of a variety of goods, mainly agricultural and surgical products, from Pakistan on deferred payment during 1966 and 1967 (Angkatan Bersenjata 8 November 1966).

The significance of economic links was reemphasized by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, when he visited Pakistan in early April 1968. He referred to the importance of Pakistan in the Indonesian plans to enlarge the area of economic cooperation (Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1973, 7). The focus on economic relations built upon the efforts made during the Sukarno era: As early as 1953 Indonesia and Pakistan had concluded a treaty of trade cooperation, but it did not work. Only after the visit of President Sukarno to Pakistan in September 1964, was the framework of collaboration revived. Further on 19 August 1965 it was institutionalized and augmented by the formation of Indonesia-Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation (IPECC) organization on a ministerial meeting held in Jakarta. Some of the projects

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identified by IPECC for joint ventures were jute manufacturing, cotton textiles, metal processing, fisheries, rubber processing, and ship building. Also in the IPECC scheme was joint technical cooperation in oil exploration and sugar plants (Text of Joint Declaration of IPECC 1965).

The IPECC was essentially the legacy of Indonesian-Pakistani strengthened ties under Sukarno. However, how the New Order government measured its existence remained relevant. At the first anniversary of IPECC, Adam Malik was keen for the cooperation under IPECC with Pakistan to continue because it had been satisfactory. Then, the ministerial councils of IPECC were set up to hold annual consultations for reviewing progress having been achieved by the two sides under the IPECC agreements (Kompas 7 November 1966). After its establishment in 1965, IPECC had contributed to intensifying commercial activities between Indonesia and Pakistan. By 1969 the Indonesian embassy in Islamabad (1969, 11) reported the grant of separate US$ 5 million and US$ 10 million by Pakistan to Indonesia. The aim was to give a boost the value of Indonesian imports from Pakistan from US$ 22.1 million in 1967 to US$ 32 million in 1968, consisting of agricultural products especially rice, sport goods, cotton yarn, textiles, surgical equipment, and machineries. Meanwhile, Indonesia supplied Pakistan with palm oil, fertilizer, tea, spices, and petroleum products valued at US$ 11 million.

The continued friendly relations with Pakistan were not to compromise Indonesia’s effort to repair the damage done to Indonesian ties with India by the Sukarno regime. Instead of criticizing India for its imperialism, the new regime identified India as an important power in the Asian and African halls of diplomacy as well as nonalignment in which Indonesia was taking part. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, expressed his government’s commitment on 4 April 1966 in an address to the Indonesian parliamentary committee to put the misunderstandings of the past behind and improve the relationship with India to give it more substance (Indonesian Department of Information Paper 1966, 13). Indonesian leaders repeated these

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expressions of interest in repairing the damage in relations and openly acknowledged that over the past two years Jakarta-New Delhi links had not been harmonious. India responded to the moves by supporting Indonesia: the Indian Ambassador Perala Ratnam provided textiles and medical supplies worth US$ 5,000 for the victims of a flood in Central Java on 19 July. Adam Malik identified this India’s humanitarian aid as symbolic of Indian friendship with his country and the people (Arora 1981a, 289).

The attempts to improve relations with India were made both at governmental and non- governmental level: towards the end of August 1966, some members of the Indonesian House of Representative, student committees, and journalists travelled to New Delhi for the same missions. Adam Malik made a five-day-visit to India from 3 to 7 September, followed by the visit of Vice President Hamengku Buwono IX on 22 September (Kompas 23 September 1966). According to Roesnadi (1975, 181), the shift reflected an assessment by Adam Malik that the tilt towards China and Pakistan during the first half of the 1960s had led Indonesia to ignore the spirit of the 1955 Ten Bandung Principles, and that the situation needed to be corrected. In his view the time had now come for both sides to rediscover the commonality in views and policies for better future ties. The main value of the improved relations with India was the pursuance of an image that Indonesia was a peace-loving and friendly nation.

Adam Malik was aware of the offense to Indians caused by the Indonesian pro-Pakistan position on the Kashmir conflict. Therefore, in gaining improved ties with India, Jakarta launched its equidistant policy towards India and Pakistan over Kashmir. On a monthly foreign policy review held at Pejambon Jakarta on 6 November 1966, Adam Malik issued a statement saying ‘…different from the bitter past, now we hold impartiality towards the Kashmiri conflict...’ (Kompas 7 November 1966). The expectation was that the neutral position taken by Jakarta would certainly appease New Delhi’s objection to foreign party’s intervention in the Kashmir issue.

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New Delhi welcomed changes in Jakarta’s worldview and foreign policy. The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, in Rajya Sabha on 8 August 1966, said that he noticed with pleasure Jakarta’s goodwill gestures to revitalize relations with New Delhi. Singh referred to the setback in the two countries relations as temporary, and that sooner or later kindly relations would have been restored. As a goodwill gesture, India provided a credit loan worth Rs 100 million in support of Indonesian program for acceleration of economic rehabilitation (Ramachandran 1966, 166).

The change in the nature of relationship between India and Indonesia coincided with the assumption of power by Indira Gandhi in 1966. Under her leadership, India continued to declare its commitment to a policy of nonalignment but also made efforts to establish close links with the Soviet Union. It also continued the upward trend in its relations with the US. Attempts were also made to improve India’s image in the eyes of its immediate neighbours in South and Southeast Asia. Although there existed a view in India that Asian independence movements were a by-product of Indian nationalism, Indira Gandhi tried not to identify with such an excessive view, and focused on dealing with Southeast Asian states on the basis of mutual partnership (Roesnadi 1975, 182-3).

It was the visit of Prime Minister Gandhi to Indonesia in June-July 1969 which marked the building of a more solid foundation for the reestablishment of close interactions between the two sides. The Indian prime minister described her visit as ‘one more link in the chain that binds friendship between India and Indonesia’. Such a visit enabled the two governments to arrive at a common approach towards regional and global issues; the Vietnam War, a proposal of solidifying the function of the United Nations (UN), and reducing the prevailing unequal relations between the Developed and Developing World. Under Gandhi and Suharto, Indian-Indonesian ties were directed at expanding mutual cooperation in the field of economics, culture, and technology (Kompas 30 June 1969).

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As mentioned earlier, the Suharto regime viewed making Southeast Asia secure and stable as the main priority of its foreign policy, as it perceived that the region was facing threats from great power politics and their intervention in the region. The involvement of great powers such as the US, the Soviet Union, and China, in Jakarta’s view, could escalate into regional confrontations. The need to avoid such confrontation provided the context for Indonesian South Asia policy and specifically relations with Pakistan: the crisis in East Pakistan 1971 heightened concerns among the elite in Jakarta, and shaped their response to the crisis that ultimately resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971.

The East Pakistan Crisis Bengalis of East Pakistan had actively supported Quaid-i-Azam Ali Jinnah in his struggle for the founding of Pakistan. Yet, not long after Pakistan was independent in 1947 East Pakistanis began to experience inequitable treatment. The politics of power sharing between Islamabad and Dhaka, economic disparity between the West and East Pakistan, and cultural mistreatment of East Pakistanis contributed to tensions between East and West Pakistanis (Sattar 2007, 112). Even though East Pakistanis comprised the majority in Pakistan, they were suffering from a deep-rooted fear of domination by the minority West Pakistanis (Owen 1972, 206). Over two decades after Pakistan independence, East Pakistani groups strongly felt obliged to struggle for equal treatment, and when it was not fulfilled, their sub-nationalism got the momentum to turn into a movement for the creation of a separate state (Choudhury 1972, 244). This finally led to the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971.

Under the parliamentary system instilled between 1947 and 1958, democracy in Pakistan did not work. The central government did not even carry out general elections, whilst the provincial elections were shrouded by undemocratic conducts of the electorate. There were no well-organized political parties either. There was no national party operated since the decline of the Muslim League. The failure of parliamentary democracy led to the development of a powerful but irresponsible executive aided by

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formidable structures of bureaucracy. Pakistan governance was monopolized by bureaucrats and military officials (Almond & Coleman 1963, 572). After Ayub Khan ascended to presidency in 1958, the democratic political system guaranteed by the constitution was, in fact, implemented in an oligarchy. There were cabinet and parliament but the real power was centralized in the hands of one figure – the general or the president himself (Wilcox 1968, 87).

Under the authoritarian ruling elite, few East Pakistanis were allowed to obtain high- ranking official positions in Islamabad. The central government was composed of mostly West Pakistani civil and military officers. Therefore, East Pakistanis had no role in the governance. Every vital decision on public policy, economic development, diplomacy and defence was, in the final analysis, made by the West Pakistani bureaucrats (Ahmad 1972, 14). With regard to the application of the federalism, in provincial matters the central government appointed West Pakistani officials to hold key positions in East Pakistan to carry out day-to-day administration. Pakistan was adopting federation, but in reality the regional government was completely subordinate to the central ruling elite - particularly with financial arrangements (Wilcox 1968, 89).

The East Pakistanis found that the West Pakistani civil and military stationed in their province were never willing to build real bonds with the local population. There were few social contacts between them. The West Pakistani officials regarded themselves to be socially superior to Bengali Muslims living in East Pakistan that were labelled as converts from the lower-caste Hindus called Sudra. The result was bitterness and social disharmony. It was through shared responsibilities and social communications that a feeling of nationalism was planted. There was, however, no media for East Pakistanis to have a thread of national feelings with West Pakistanis, apart from commonality in Islamic religion. The focus on Pakistan as the homeland for Muslim, which was advocated by Ali Jinnah, began to fade away in East Pakistan. Instead, secessionist sentiments grew fast in the province (Choudhury 1972, 246).

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The demands for regional autonomy of East Pakistanis sharpened after the 1965 Indo- Pakistan war. There was a myth that if India attacked East Pakistan, the Pakistani army would move up to New Delhi. The war disproved this myth. Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto claimed that during the war East Pakistan had been protected by China. It was perceived by East Pakistani groups that their survival could not be guaranteed by Islamabad. East Pakistani intelligentsia in Dhaka and abroad started to think about developing their own diplomatic links, should they be left alone by Islamabad. India was aware of such a secessionist emotion, and initiated infiltration into East Pakistan to spark a people uprising (Ahmad 1971, 13).

The economic disparity between West and East Pakistanis during 1960 and 1970 further complicated the situation. The centralized economic policies pursued by Islamabad prevented even distribution of national revenue for East Pakistan. The East Pakistanis felt as though they were under colonial rule due to economic exploitation by the central government. For instance, most income from jute as the chief export commodity of East Pakistan went to Islamabad’s defence expenditure. East Pakistanis did not enjoy benefits from its production. The economic discrepancy was illustrated in the income per capita of West Pakistanis in 1970 which was 61 percent higher than that of the East Pakistanis. This figure was doubled compared to the record in 1960 (Owen 1972, 206- 7). Under these circumstances, East Pakistani disaffection towards West Pakistanis was not hidden. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League designed the demand for greater autonomy (Thorp 1987, 144). However, Ayub Khan’s administration associated the request for autonomy with East Pakistani separatism, envisaging Awami League leaders as having been duped by Indian propaganda with its ambitions to dominate West Pakistan. President Ayub Khan could appreciate that East Pakistanis no longer wanted to be with Pakistan (Gauhar 1994, 441).

In December 1970, the Pakistani general elections took place, in which Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League not only won 99 percent of the seats in East Pakistan (167 of 169 seats), but also acquired a majority in the Pakistan National Assembly. Mujibur

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Rahman had fought elections on the basis of the six demand points for East Pakistani full autonomy. Elite in Islamabad immediately showed unhappiness with the East Pakistani aspirations, because they would lose the absolute cultural, political and economic control over Pakistan’s eastern wing (Owen 1972, 208). While at the same time, it was apparent that Mujibur Rahman and Awami League followers would not accept anything less than what they had stated. Pakistan, inevitably, was going to undergo an unexpected political turmoil (Ahmed 1971, 8).

Nature too played an important role in the crisis. A gigantic cyclone in November 1970 caused death and devastation in its path through the countryside. A quarter of a million people were drowned. The federal government was charged with indifference to the plight of East Pakistani peoples (Sattar 2007, 113). India, which had been observing the developments in East Pakistan, came to take the lead to assist with organizing humanitarian aid for the natural disaster victims on its borders (Owen 1972, 208). This project was used by New Delhi as a route to intervene in Pakistan’s domestic affairs. India readied itself to intensify separatist sentiment of peoples living along its borders. Indian intelligence units known as Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was designed and assigned to undertake the mission in East Pakistan (Ahmad 1971, 14).

Political situation in Dhaka heated up as the radical element of Awami League started to loudly voice demands for independence, ignoring the fact that the erstwhile six points articulated by Mujibur Rahman were negotiable in respect to the demand of greater power-sharing, foreign affairs and defence matters, and particularly economic arrangements. The Awami League leader could not control the radicals in the party. Islamabad, nonetheless, failed to talk with the Awami League about power-sharing by virtue the latter showed no more interest in negotiation. Consequently, the government of President imposed Martial Law on 26 March 1971 and, instructed the crackdown of secessionist movement of East Pakistan. The Pakistani army commenced a massive military operation in East Pakistan which caused an exodus of refugees to contiguous Indian states (Klatt 1972, 109).

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Indian opinion makers, the media and politicians, exaggerated the impact that the East Pakistan crisis was having on India. The Indian government said that it had tried to feed, house and clothe about nine million refugees. However, the Indian economy was unable to feed the refugees for an unlimited period. Therefore, they had to be brought back home soon otherwise the Indian economy would have collapsed (Bose 1972, 13). Media editorials in India amplified the feeling of being overburdened by the East Pakistani exodus and being extremely disappointed with the intransigent attitude of the Pakistani leaders. This was effective in directing public support for the government. In addition, as tales of murder, loot, burning, and torture in East Pakistan began to spread throughout India, public opinion was stirred to sympathy and wrath. New Delhi, was confident with the decision to fully endorse the liberation movement in East Pakistan, and was prepared for military action to terminate the crisis (Barnds 1971, 319-20).

The Pakistani government viewed Indian response as evidence that India was eager to separate East Pakistan from the Western wing of the country. This claim is not baseless. Some Indian strategic thinkers, for example, K. Subrahmanyam stated ‘...the undoing of Pakistan is in its vital interest and Indians now have the opportunity the like of which will never come again…’. For India to be a major power of the subcontinent, dismemberment of Pakistan was an essential precondition (Faruki 1971, 27). These assessments prevented the Pakistani government from responding to the concerns of the East Pakistanis, while the Indian military intelligence units started crossing over the borders into East Pakistan. Soon India and Pakistan were fighting a ground war in 1971 (Ahmad 1972, 15).

The Pakistani government adopted the position that the crisis in East Pakistan was entirely its internal affairs. On the other hand, India made an effort to internationalize the problem. The Indian representative for the UN attempted to bring up the issue at ECOSOC meetings, with a view to justify Indian interference in East Pakistan by accusing Pakistan of violating human rights of the East Pakistanis. Pakistan, in turn,

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accused India of intruding into Pakistan’s domestic jurisdiction and deplored that New Delhi gave its own version of events, an example of which was that the Indian press had intentionally uncovered the stories of killings of non-Bengalis by the secessionists. claimed that Pakistanis had not committed such atrocities (Far Eastern Economic Review 15 May 1971). Pakistan claimed that the Indian move at ECOSOC meeting had failed since in the resolution issued at the end of its sessions, there was no mention of the human rights issue in East Pakistan (Far Eastern Economic Review 17 May 1971). Foreign Minister Ali Bhutto accused India of utilizing the East Pakistan problem as a pretext to invade East Pakistan (Bhutto 1972, 44).

Formally the UN had agreed that Pakistan’s stand on keeping the issue in its eastern province was ‘strictly within Pakistan’s jurisdiction’. Secretary General U Thant in his letter to President Yahya Khan dated 17 May 1971, observed that the situation in East Pakistan did not justify intervention in the matters of internal authority of the UN members, and any countries should not submit a request for that settlement under the UN Charter (Ali 1971, 33). But in reality, the crisis in East Pakistan involved superpower politics that actually had taken shape since the 1965 Kashmir war. The US, although it chose to be impartial in the 1965 war, was still allied with Pakistan under SEATO and CENTO. The Soviet Union openly backed India with air force equipment during the 1965 Kashmir war. China, as discussed in the previous chapter, was strongly in favour of Pakistan. These power alignments became more settled by 1970. India had continued to receive Soviet’s military aid. But it was critical of the US decision to resume arms supplies to Pakistan on 8 October 1970. The Pakistani government, led by General Yahya Khan, sought to balance the Indian relationship with the Soviet Union by keeping the US onside and seeking Chinese military assistance (Walter 1972, 4).

However, when the situations in East Pakistan became tense in the aftermath of Islamabad’s harsh crackdown on East Pakistan in March 1971, the superpowers’ attitudes were ambivalent to the events. The US refrained from public criticism of the Pakistani government while making informal diplomatic efforts to urge a cessation to

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the military operations. The Soviet Union publicly deplored the murders of East Pakistanis by the Pakistani military, and advised a political solution, making initial offers of economic aid to Islamabad to indicate its good intention. The Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai sent a letter to President Yahya Khan dated 12 April 1971, urged Pakistan ‘to make a distinction between the masses of people and the collective of people who wanted to avert the unification of Pakistan’. But publicly the Chinese government consistently maintained that the East Pakistan situation was the internal affairs of Pakistan which should be overcome by the Pakistani people themselves without external interferences (Marwah 1979, 561-2).

The Muslim world demonstrated diverse responses to the crisis in East Pakistan. Supporters of Pakistan, such as Iran, Iraq, Morocco and Turkey, extended their favour in three ways; firstly, adhering to the principle of non-interference; secondly, treating the development in East Pakistan as Pakistan’s domestic affairs; and thirdly, asking foreign powers not to meddle in what is Pakistan’s internal matters. But Egypt and Afghanistan were silent on the crisis in East Pakistan. It was perhaps because of differences in political orientations between them (Ali 1971, 45-6). Malaysia too did not express solidarity in the name of Islam with Pakistan as it did not wish to upset India (Chandola 1972, 1224-5).

As the tensions mounted, in June 1971, the Soviets guaranteed protection for India from China’s reprisals in case of a war with Pakistan. On 9 August 1971 India and the Soviet Union concluded the Twenty Year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty provided for consultations of major international issues of concern to the two sides and, required each to refrain from giving assistance to any third parties which were part of an armed conflict with the other. In fact, the treaty was aimed at eliminating fears of China’s intervention. India received from the Soviet Union 52 Sukhoi SU-7 fighter-bombers as well as SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles. In addition, Soviet delivered to India 450 T-54/T-55 battle tanks, 150 PT-76 amphibious tanks, and F-class submarine. With the Soviet’s protection and assured of a Soviet veto in the

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Security Council deliberations, India moved fast on the trace of military operations. It combined the military moves with building up of international opinion through propaganda and high levels of official diplomacy (Iqbal 1972, 26).

By mid November 1971, border incidents between Indian and Pakistani troops increased. By late November 1971, Indian troops opened fire with Pakistani forces inside East Pakistan and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi charged Pakistan with aggression and placed India officially on a war footing 27 November 1971. On 3 December 1971 the full scale war broke out when India invaded East Pakistan. On the same day, President Yahya Khan commended the army and air forces to carry out a retaliatory attack across the borders from West Pakistan (Sattar 2007, 115-7). Assisted by about 100,000 Mukti Bahini forces trained by the Indian army, India took Dhaka from the Pakistani army on 16 December 1971, and accepted the surrender of the Pakistani military personnel in East Pakistan. This was despite the efforts at the UN Security Council to secure a ceasefire - a project that was undermined by the Soviet veto. On 17 December 1971, President Yahya Khan accepted a general ceasefire, and on 20 December Ali Bhutto replaced him as President of the residual Pakistan. President Ali Bhutto adopted a policy of conciliation, and released Mujibur Rahman on 7 January 1972 (Burke 1973, 1036-49). Mujibur Rahman took office as the first prime minister of an independent Bangladesh on 12 January 1972.

The 1971 war caused material and immaterial damage to Pakistan (Sattar 2007, 120). Following the defeat of the Pakistan’s contingent, over 93,000 civilians and soldiers were taken prisoners by India. The Indian forces occupied 5,139 square miles of territory in Western part of the country. In addition, about one million people were displaced. Pakistan lost its confidence. There were doubts if the remaining Pakistan could survive after losing its eastern wing.

The Indonesian Response

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As the breakup of Pakistan became imminent, the Pakistan Government sought to project Indian policy as directed against a Muslim state. This resembled the references adopted by Islamabad during the 1965 war. But, despite being a country with a majority Muslim population, Indonesia opted to remain neutral or impartial in dealing with the East Pakistan crisis. Jakarta set aside its pro-Pakistan policy taken during the 1965 Indo- Pakistan war. Indonesia did not provide tangible support for Pakistan in the 1971 war, but at the same time did also not want to offend Pakistan by showing a leaning towards India. During the crisis, Jakarta avoided using the language of Islamic solidarity like it had done for Pakistan in 1965. The New Order government preferred to refer to secular agendas, such as the respect for state sovereignty and anti-foreign interference, humanitarian aid to the crisis affected peoples, and the willingness to expand friendship with any parties having the same policy orientation. On top of this, Indonesia emphasized the need for maintaining internal and regional security. The Islamic component had disappeared from Indonesia’s foreign policy.

This policy unfolded throughout the duration of the East Pakistan crisis of 1971. Indonesia’s emphasized the principle of non-interference in dealing with developments in East Pakistan, implicitly suggesting an agreement with Islamabad’s position on the issue. Jakarta was in favour of the view that all developments in East Pakistan were completely of Pakistan’s domestic affairs. Foreign Minister Adam Malik – when addressing the press in Jakarta on 23 April 1971 – announced that his government opposed outsiders that were escalating the crisis since they had no legitimate rights to do that. Furthermore, Adam Malik revealed that Jakarta would not recognize the existence of whatever new entity generated from disintegration of the sovereign nation- state of Pakistan (Kompas 24 April 1971).

When armed conflict broke out between Pakistan and India in December 1971, Jakarta repeated its previously declared opinion, and urged a peaceful settlement of the conflict. From Jakarta, Adam Malik on behalf of the government of Indonesia affirmed that the best way of settling the open conflict that occurred again between Pakistan and India

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was for the two sides had to sit down and talk. The show of force would simply be affecting stability in the region. Indonesia called for an immediate ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and for the two armed forces to be withdrawn from East Pakistan. Indonesia hoped for the speedy return of normality in the subcontinent (Kompas 5 December 1971).

Jakarta was eager to stress its concern regarding the possible impact of India’s intervention in East Pakistan on regional stability and peace. The New Order military elite in particular did not feel convinced of the correctness of India’s position in its war with Pakistan. Indonesia thus showed reservations about Indian foreign policy of the crisis. Jakarta viewed the East Pakistan crisis was a by-product of external power politics of interference – the reference was to India and its ally the Soviet Union – promoting a cause of a dissident movement which could ultimately lead to the bifurcation of an existing state of Pakistan. This, Indonesia feared, could possibly spread to neighbouring states. In other words, Indian foreign policy behaviour at the time was considered as having the potential to prompt internal and regional problems for its other neighbours.

Regarding the potential effect to Indonesian internal affairs, an Indonesian army commander Lieutenant General (Angkatan Bersenjata 12 December 1971) commented that the developments in the subcontinent and the war had created undesirable precedents and uneasiness amongst Indian neighbours in the Indian Ocean rim - particularly Indonesia which was focusing on its efforts to create domestic stability and peace. According to the Indonesian general, this trend might drive the latent separatist groups to consider asking for foreign power assistance, and undermining state sovereignty and integrity in other countries. The assessment indicated that Indonesia considered the possible national disintegration of Pakistan as posing a direct threat to other states’ political stability and economic development. At that time, the government in Jakarta was facing the rise of Muslim minority ethno-nationalist sentiment in the Aceh Province. It may be argued that Indonesia was apprehensive that

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Indian action in East Pakistan would set a precedent for similar dangerous possibilities for other Southeast Asian countries beset with secessionism problems.

Indonesia’s response to the crisis and the war was based on its strategic assessment of developments in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. Jakarta located the developments within the context of the Cold War politics, and Sino-Soviet rivalry. Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo (1976) – who was the chief of Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional (the Institute for National Resilience) in Jakarta, a think-tank group and part of Suharto’s policy circles - articulated the Indonesian viewpoint as to how the Soviet Union was engaged in the East Pakistan crisis by actively providing its backing to India. Suryohadiprojo (1976, 110-12) argued that Soviet rivalry with China pushed Moscow to lean towards New Delhi. The Twenty Year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between New Delhi and Moscow was significant as it was concluded just four months before the India-Pakistan war broke out at the end of 1971. The treaty became a guarantee for India that the Kremlin would not adopt a neutral posture in the case of a war with Pakistan. At the same time, the treaty could be meant as deterrence to Peking as well with a message that Soviet had supported the secessionist movement of East Pakistan. Furthermore, regarding superpowers’ rivalry, America who was facing too much trouble in Indochina was not in a position to meet the Soviets in South Asia. New Delhi was aware of the fact that Washington did not want to be physically involved in the crisis. At the same time, China, which had a great desire in neutralizing Indian and Soviet moves in East Pakistan, could not do much to help Pakistan with military support during the war. This was mainly due to China’s material inferiority to Soviet. It was a distinct disadvantage for Pakistan. On the other hand, the crisis in East Pakistan which led to the liberation of Bangladesh was a political and military triumph for India and the Soviet Union. Indonesia was particularly concerned at the increasing involvement of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean region in the process of supporting India. Hence it opposed interference, and talked of regional implications of the crisis and the war leading to Pakistan’s dismemberment.

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Although the Indonesian government eschewed using the words of Islamic identity to support Pakistan, and took a neutral stand, it did not avert others to express opinions through critical languages. Non-state actors were allowed to play a role in communicating Indonesian concerns. Youth and student organizations – not identified as affiliated to a particular Muslim group - protested against Indian military intervention in East Pakistan and conducted some small and sporadic demonstrations in Jakarta. The protesters who gathered in front of the Indian embassy denounced India as a hypocrite; claiming itself as the champion of nonaligned powers and a peace-loving state, but in fact tightly bound with the communists to invade a smaller and weaker state. The mass actions were not as violent as what occurred during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war because the police guards blockaded them (Kompas 7 December 1971). It was apparent that despite the anxiety felt by some Indonesian leaders at the Indian intrusion into East Pakistan, the New Order government did not want to strain relations with India by allowing angry protesters to attack Indian properties.

The media in Indonesia tended to comment critically on what they depicted as the Indian illegitimate involvement in the East Pakistan crisis, while not broadcasting much coverage on the Pakistani side. Newspaper editorials such as of The Tribune of Indonesia (14 December 1971) pointed out that India’s main objective in its interference in East Pakistan was to weaken its neighbour, and through the mutilation of Pakistan, New Delhi could ensure its definitive desire for the Greater India, which in turn, dominated the whole region of South Asia.

Other Indonesian media agreed with the government’s strategic views on the East Pakistan crisis. For instance, an editorial by Kompas (18 February 1972) titled ‘India and Pakistan War’ which warned about the side effect of the East Pakistan crisis to the larger framing of Cold War politics in the region. The national daily wrote that Indonesia envisaged the unwanted implications of the potential superpowers rivalry for regional stability where the growing Soviet naval penetration and existence in the Indian Ocean would prompt the US to increase its presence as well. The paper argued

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that superpowers rivalry should be reduced; it also suggested that the littoral states of the Indian Ocean had to take the responsibility of regional security and; suggested that the region should be made as a zone of peace.

The Jakarta-based publication of Angkatan Bersenjata (20 December 1971) wrote that in Southeast Asia there seemed to be a common denominator for the political mood prevailing from Kuala Lumpur to Jakarta; mistrust of superpowers that had used the cause of regional conflicts to further their own political objectives, far too often to the detriment of weaker states. In the context of the war in the Indian subcontinent, the Indonesian daily claimed that ASEAN members - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore - were strongly motivated by a realization of common interests to keep the region free from vying superpowers. They referred to the UN Declaration on Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, issued on 16 December 1971, stating that the littoral states of the Indian Ocean commit to preserve their independence, sovereignty, and national integrity, and to overcome political, economic, and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquillity. The three countries’ primary concern was by all means to maintain the stability of the Malacca Strait, which was the main line of trade and transportation in Southeast Asia, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The Indian government considered that Indonesia’s apprehension was quite misplaced. New Delhi explained that the crisis in East Pakistan was caused by President Yahya Khan’s brutal military repression policy in East Pakistan. India argued that its interference in East Pakistan was the act of humanitarian relief (Arora 1981a, 315). In an attempt to secure Indonesian support, the Indian Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh discussed the crisis with Adam Malik in Jakarta. However, Jakarta carefully avoided supporting the Indian position: it agreed that Pakistani leaders were responsible for the unstable situation in East Pakistan, but did not stop considering the crisis there as merely Pakistan’s internal affairs. The Indian references to the political and economic problems faced by New Delhi due to excessive refugees from East Pakistan caused Adam Malik to express a common view with his Indian counterpart that it was urgent to

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create conditions conducive for the returning home of the refugees from camps in India, but he did not support Indian military intervention in the crisis. (Dewanto 1994, 139).

Such an exchange of views between the Indonesian and Indian high-ranking officials reinforced Jakarta’s middle-of-the-road policy on the issue. It continued to refer to the universal principles of non-foreign intervention as the basis on which the crisis needed to be resolved. The neutral position taken by Jakarta was translated into support for humanitarian aid to peoples who were adversely affected by the crisis in East Pakistan. The Indonesian government through its representative office in New Delhi helped distribute food, clothes, and medicine worth Rp 10 million to aid refugees from East Pakistan (ANTARA 1 February 1972).

Post-war Problem and Diplomacy The most crucial problem faced by the new government of President Ali Bhutto was how to maintain the remaining territories of Pakistan. The Pakistani government expected India to abandon every attempt to further disrupt Pakistan’s territorial integrity (Bhutto 1973, 544). At the same time, it had to design a policy on dealing with Bangladesh as a new state.

The issue was first dealt with in terms of recognition of Bangladesh. Islamabad did not recognize Bangladesh promptly, claiming that it was part of Pakistan and also opposed the continuing presence of the Indian army there. Several countries mainly those having had special economic and political connections with India, such as Burma, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore, were quick to extend recognition for the newly born state of Bangladesh (Straits Times 14 February 1972). Britain and members of the Commonwealth, such as Australia and New Zealand, also gave formal recognition for Bangladesh immediately. The British government then persuaded Western European countries to recognize Bangladesh. In retaliation, Pakistan withdrew from the Commonwealth. The US and the Soviet Union were also reluctant to side with Pakistan. Ali Bhutto could only rely on old friends such as China and the Muslim world for

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sympathy and support. As always, China pledged to stand by Pakistan and extended economic and military aid. Some Muslim states of the Middle East and Africa assured Pakistan of their political support (Sattar 2007, 120-2).

Jakarta did not rush to recognize the existence of Bangladesh in order not to offend Pakistan and waited for the situation to become clearer. On 1 January 1972 Adam Malik instructed Hassan Arif – a senior diplomat – to lead the Indonesian representative office in Dhaka. To the government of Mujibur Rahman, it meant that Indonesia was going to recognize Bangladesh in the coming days. However, Adam Malik likened it to a ‘…story [that] had not yet finished…’. Indonesia did not provide any political support yet for Bangladesh, and waited for further developments there. This was because Jakarta wanted to see if an agreement could be reached between Dhaka and Islamabad to find a political solution in the scheme of confederation (Kompas 5 February 1972).

Speculations again circulated in Dhaka about Indonesia having recognized the independence of Bangladesh. It was due to Jakarta’s warm welcome to the Bangladeshi envoy S. K. Pani who visited Jakarta at the end of January 1972. Moreover, the Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Zaad spoke on Radio Dhaka, saying Indonesia had recognized Bangladesh. Adam Malik still did not confirm the claim. The Indonesian foreign minister declared that his government would recognize Bangladesh should two requirements be accomplished by parties in the conflict. One was there had to be a peace agreement between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and two, was that Indian troops had to be withdrawn from East Pakistan. This was important to establish that Bangladesh would not be the puppet of a foreign power; his reference was to India (Kompas 4 February 1972). The demand for the withdrawal of Indian troops was similar to the one being made by the Pakistani government at that stage.

Adam Malik reemphasized the Indonesian position on Bangladesh. On 17 February 1972, he urged Pakistan and Bangladesh to meet and talk about peace, and Jakarta – when asked – agreed that would like to mediate between them in accordance with the

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objectives of Indonesia’s foreign policy of international peace. In response, Bangladesh conveyed it would have only talked to Pakistan if the latter had recognized its existence as an independent state. Pakistan gave no prompt reply to Indonesia’s initiative. Instead, President Ali Bhutto planned to send his special envoy Ghulam Mustafa in late February 1972 to Jakarta to discuss peace talks with Dhaka. The Pakistani envoy was due to arrive in Jakarta and meet with President Suharto later on 22 February (Kompas 18 February 1972). However, the visit was cancelled. On the same day, Adam Malik called six foreign ambassadors from Pakistan, India, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma to have discussions. At that stage, Indonesia was the only ASEAN country which had not yet recognized Bangladesh. Adam Malik talked to S. K. Pani just a few hours before his meeting with the other ambassadors.

The mediation role being played by Indonesia was formally acknowledged by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, who announced that Pakistan and Bangladesh had in principle agreed to hold peace talks in Indonesia. Japan had also offered its mediation services, but Indonesia was finally chosen because its majority Muslim population was more popular with both the Pakistani and Bangladeshi peoples. However, it was still aware of the role that other Muslim countries could play (Kompas 23 February 1972). These references were an indication of the importance attached by the Indonesian government to its Muslim identity. But it was careful not to categorically refer to it as the main reason for the mediation being offered by Jakarta.

At the same time, Indonesia decided to formally recognize Bangladesh before 1 March 1972. Adam Malik communicated the decision in a long discussion with the Pakistani Ambassador Ghulam Gayur. He explained to the Pakistani government Indonesia’s position on Bangladesh in terms of both sides’ shared view to expand friendship (Kompas 25 February 1972). This Indonesian attitude indicated that the careful approach towards Bangladesh was aimed at not offending Pakistan. Jakarta regarded good neighbourliness with Islamabad as important, yet at the same time did not want to

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ignore the emergence of Bangladesh. Indonesia had altered its earlier policy on committing to resist the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan.

The pragmatic and flexible nature of Suharto’s foreign policy disappointed Pakistan. A written note from the Indonesian embassy in Islamabad informed Jakarta of the disappointment. Instead of ignoring the reaction, Adam Malik planned to discuss the issue with President Ali Bhutto’s special representative when they met in Saudi Arabia for the third Islamic Foreign Ministers conference scheduled to be held in early March 1972 (Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1973, 18).

Indonesia met its promise to give the official recognition for Bangladesh. On 25 February 1972, the department of foreign affairs in Jakarta announced the recognition and sent a diplomatic note to New Delhi in order to be forwarded to Dhaka (Kompas 26 February 1972). One month later, on 25 March, Indonesia and Bangladesh opened embassies in each other’s capital city. The agreement was achieved just one day before the first anniversary of the Bangladeshi national day (Kompas 26 March 1972).

At the Islamic foreign ministers meeting conducted in Jeddah between 29 February and 8 March 1972 – in which the Indonesian delegation was led by Adam Malik - the Pakistani delegates attempted to give delegations of other participating countries their interpretation of the crisis in former East Pakistan. Putting all the blame on India, Pakistani diplomats argued that the problem of East Pakistan arose on account of the machination by foreigners. This reference was certainly towards India. It was the external power that wrecked peace and tranquillity of the region and, as it continued at work there, according to the Pakistani delegates ‘...neither the Pakistani government would be able to reach the heart of the East Pakistanis nor could the East Pakistanis speak with their true voices...’. To the conference participants, Pakistan’s position was generally endorsed. The Secretary General of the Islamic conference made a move towards peace by suggesting Bangladesh and Pakistan meet and talk at the holy city Mecca (Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1972). The conference also agreed to

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send a delegation of six Muslim states to Pakistan and Bangladesh to promote reconciliation for the two sides. Dhaka declined the initiative, arguing that most Muslim countries’ delegates had not yet officially recognized Bangladesh. In October 1972, foreign ministers of some Muslim states decided during the UN General Assembly session to reactivate the settlement mission, which again was thwarted for the same reason retained by Bangladesh (Mahdi 1999, 253-4). It to some extent displays the success of Pakistan’s diplomacy in holding recognition for Bangladesh.

The Indonesian government participated in the Jeddah Islamic conference as an observer, not yet formally attached to the Islamic grouping. The attendance indicated Jakarta’s willingness to join other Muslim states. However, this did not extend to Jakarta following the lead of other Muslim states in shaping its position on the East Pakistan crisis. Respecting the existence of Bangladesh, Indonesia focused on resolving the humanitarian problems of Bangladeshi refugees. A diplomatic note outlining policy orientation for the Indonesian delegates at the Jeddah conference confirmed it, and even told of another important mission that the Indonesian government wished to pursue by attending the meeting despite talking of humanitarian issues; ‘…that the participation aims at widening cooperation with the conference members, especially for economic development…’ (ANTARA 21 February 1972). It demonstrated that the participation in the OIC was designed to assist Indonesia economically and that it was not to get Jakarta embroiled in the tricky issue of Bangladesh’s recognition by other Muslim states.

The Indonesian and Pakistani delegates discussed the question of recognition during the Islamic conference. Adam Malik told the Indonesian press correspondence at Jeddah that he had had a constructive discussion with his Pakistani counterpart on some issues, including Bangladesh, and Jakarta’s decision to recognize Bangladesh for expanding partnership was finally understood and then accepted by Islamabad (Kompas 9 March 1972). Indonesia retained this policy of good neighbourliness towards Bangladesh and Pakistan, even though the Pakistani cause was raised again in the following year’s Islamic foreign ministers conference (Merdeka 27 March 1973).

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On 27 June 1972, Indira Gandhi and Ali Bhutto met at Simla to discuss post-war settlement. Pakistan avoided negotiating the release of prisoners of war with recognition for Bangladesh. Islamabad also rejected the connection between the post-war settlement and the Kashmir issue. It focused on gaining the Indian commitment to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty. Explicitly, the Simla Agreement signed by Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi on 2 July 1972 favoured Pakistan’s territorial integrity. It was stated in subparagraph 1(2) of the accord that both sides would resolve any differences by peaceful means (Sattar 2007, 128-32). Pakistan interpreted it as the Indian acknowledgment of its unchallengeable rights of sovereignty protected by international law, whilst for India it implied that Islamabad could no longer ask for third party involvement in bilateral issues nor raise any bilateral problems in the UN and other international forum. Pakistan could not agree with such an Indian interpretation, nonetheless it seemed to be happy with another important indication of the repaired relationship, in particular with India’s assurance for Pakistan that it was not making efforts to encourage disruptive activities in Baluchistan as well as the North West Frontier Province (Ziring 1982, 43).

Jakarta responded favourably to the Simla Agreement. Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan Sutopo, on behalf of the Indonesian government, said to the press in Islamabad that the willingness of both India and Pakistan to forego the engagement of force in dealing with bilateral issues would contribute positively to the normalization of situations in the subcontinent and its surrounding regions (Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1973, 38). The secretary general of Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs – while attending an ASEAN ministerial meeting in Bangkok – stated that Indonesia and other ASEAN countries welcomed the sign of peace shown by Islamabad and New Delhi (Kompas 4 July 1972).

Pakistan used the Islamic world forum to seek for support of its demand especially in regard to the release of prisoners of war. It was successful diplomacy. The fourth

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conference of foreign ministers of Muslim countries took place in Benghazi Libya between 24 and 26 March 1973. The conference called upon Pakistan and Bangladesh to reconcile. It strongly urged India and Bangladesh to expedite the return of the civilians and military officers held during the 1971 war (Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1973). At the meeting, the Indonesian attitude was in line with the conference’s outcome; advising Pakistan and Bangladesh to leave the past and look instead for better relations (Merdeka 27 March 1973). It meant that Jakarta had paid more attention to Pakistan’s position than its hesitant attitude seen at the 1972 Jeddah Islamic conference. This might have been influenced by the prospect of peace following the reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan.

With the mediatory efforts of the OIC, eventually Pakistan was willing to extend its formal recognition for Bangladesh in 1974. After recognizing Bangladesh, the Pakistani leadership did not entertain negative feelings toward Bangladesh. President Ali Bhutto identified them in terms of the requirements of Muslim fraternity. This was clearly mentioned in Ali Bhutto’s book titled The Third World: New Directions, ‘…such a reconciliation process in the spirit of Islamic fraternity will now bury a past that both peoples of the two countries can prefer to see forgotten…’ (Bhutto 1977, 77).

This episode demonstrates the reduction, if not the absence, of Islamic ideas and identity in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Pakistan in dealing with the development of the East Pakistan crisis. This was primarily caused by the New Order elite’s preeminent interests in adhering to the framework identified earlier as the main pillars of Indonesian foreign policy. The response to Pakistan had altered from adhering to the principle of non-interference for preserving Pakistan’s national integration and territorial integrity, into understanding the circumstances surrounding India’s position, and further extending recognition for Bangladesh. Pragmatism and flexibility were Indonesia’s foreign policy considerations towards Pakistan. Jakarta – although expressing concern at regional security potentially affected by Indian activities – did not want to confront India, with which relations were being repaired. In parallel, links with

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Pakistan were not sacrificed even though they were not politically as close as they were during the Sukarno era.

Indonesia-Pakistan Ties after the Crisis After the East Pakistan crisis, there seemed to be a mixed context in Indonesian relations with Pakistan; that is, not using the language of Islamic identity when issues did not permit, but accepting the presence of the country’s Muslim identity in the areas where Islam became important. This trend mainly happened in inter-society links.

Both Indonesia and Pakistan pursued complementary economic cooperation and mutual trade achievements through the scheme of IPECC. After the crisis in East Pakistan, this organization continued to function. However, the pace of development of Indonesia- Pakistan collaboration under IPECC remained slow. There were some projects approved by IPECC which existed only on paper awaiting implementation. During its 15 years of existence IPECC had not been able to make significant strides toward the realization of all the approved deals. This was perhaps caused by both sides’ internal economic upheavals and weaknesses at the time, and therefore, there were not enough funds for supporting IPECC’s joint ventures (Ali 1981, 100-1).

Adam Malik acknowledged this at the seventh session of IPECC annual meeting in 1975 held at Karachi, that there had been some insurmountable obstacles hindering the progress of IPECC’s joint ventures. Although the Indonesian foreign minister did not mention what those obstacles were, it was noticeable that the slow progress of IPECC’s industrial projects had given an impression of the partnership for some times having lost its warmth of the past. The 1975 ministerial consultation agreed to review the ongoing projects for improvements (Mustafa 1982, 7-8). However, there was still no clear strategy resulting from both Indonesia’s and Pakistan’s attempts to enhance cooperation in IPECC. The Pakistan Secretary of Foreign Affairs Riaz Piracha avowed that his government was also concerned about the slow progress of IPECC, and would like to sort the problem out. According to Piracha, the Indonesian government realized the

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problem, and had the goodwill to resolve it. Yet, the two sides did not come up with strategies to tackle the problem (Kompas 27 February 1981).

Parallel to IPECC developments, trade between Indonesia and Pakistan during the first half of the 1970s indicated that Pakistan enjoyed a surplus of Rs. 813 million due to the simultaneous increase in its exports to Indonesia. Nevertheless, since 1975 the restriction of cotton imports imposed on Pakistan’s export goods by Jakarta had decreased severely in Pakistan’s balance of trade with Indonesia worth minus Rs 364.9 million (Ali 1981, 104). Taking note of this trade imbalance, IPECC at its eighth session in Jakarta in mid 1976 recommended certain measures to rectify the situation. Efforts were promoted to remove some bottlenecks, diversify trade goods, and arrange direct shipping. However, no greater outcomes had been achieved. Pakistan, consequently, reciprocated the unfair treatment of Indonesia with the suspension of a tea import agreement which subsequently affected Indonesian exporters - especially those in the agricultural industry. The volume of Indonesian exports declined from Rp 120 million in 1976 to Rp 50 million in 1977. Nonetheless, this number was not significant in respect to the country’s total international trade that counted about Rp 340 billion which was mostly composed of oil products exports (Kompas 8 December 1977).

This trade dispute was finally sorted out in December 1978 following the deal signed by Pakistani and Indonesian business delegates worth US$ 20 million for two years, in which tea from Indonesia was exchanged with various Pakistani engineering goods, and as well the Pakistani cotton restriction was lifted. Such an agreement was of help to boost bilateral trade at least until the end of the 1970s, although Indonesia’s balance of trade with Pakistan suffered a deficit of US$ 17.4 million (Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1980, 38).

In cultural terms, the New Order government acknowledged the importance of the country’s Muslim identity to the development of links between Muslim societal groups in Indonesia and Pakistan. Islam was present as the bond for Indonesians and Pakistanis.

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Indonesia and Pakistan had signed a cultural agreement in 1960. Since then, a number of cultural delegations were exchanged. With the purpose of developing stronger inter- Islamic society relationships, Pakistan’s Department of Education established an organization called International Qur’an Recital (IQR) that was in charge of implementing programs for exchange of Islamic missions. Indonesia has participated in the IQR activities since 1972. The first delegation of Indonesian students to take part at the IQR was on the invitation by the Pakistani government. When attending the event, the Indonesian Consul in Karachi acknowledged that Indonesia was happy to take part in the Islamic intercultural event, and hoped for it to be continued (Aziz & Ahmad 1973, 15).

There was an initiative by the Indonesian Muslim Youth Committee affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama organization to convene an inter-Islamic society conference in Jakarta with the primary sponsorship of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was designed akin to IQR. However, such an event – taking place in June 1979 - did not receive enthusiastic responses. Pakistan sent its representatives there along with Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Iraq. There is no record of important output from the Islamic youth meeting, except for a joint declaration by the participants of the commitment to encourage sustainable friendship amongst Muslim youth around the world. There was no mention of any plans to hold a similar Muslim youth gathering (Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs 1980, 24).

Social organizations such as Pakistan-Indonesia Cultural Association (PICA) as well as Indonesia-Pakistan Friendship Society (IPFS) were founded in November 1972 by Indonesian Muslim students in Karachi to serve as channels for societies of the two countries to forge closer interactions. Reportedly, the Indonesian consulate in Karachi became the major sponsor of both Muslim groups’ activities, including Islamic culture exhibitions and student exchanges between Pakistani and Indonesian universities (Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1973, 21). These are examples of the

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acknowledgement by the government of the importance of Islamic identity in Indonesian and Pakistani ties.

However, the participation of Indonesian Muslim groups at Islamic-related events such as IQR of Pakistan was not sustainable. The last time Indonesian Muslims took part at IQR was recorded in 1977. A report made by the Indonesian embassy in Islamabad (1990, 42-8) covering social and cultural field of cooperation between Indonesians and Pakistanis from 1978 to 1989 did not record any more Indonesian participation in IQR. There was a problem facing Indonesian Muslim groups in taking part at the international Islamic society forum. It was perhaps because the Indonesian government’s lack of committed support for the enhancement of Muslim activities. The government signed agreements and allowed Muslims to expand cultural and religious activities, but did not back them up with sufficient resources. This was not against Pakistan. However, the policy was part of a general attitude. Institutional cooperation amongst Muslims in Indonesia and other Islamic societies was not prioritized in Jakarta’s agendas. This was confirmed by a member of Indonesian parliament from the Islamic-oriented Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP) that in line with the program of national development, Indonesia’s Islamic identity was not relevant. Rather, an image of a neutralist developing country was regarded as the appropriate depiction for the nation. This was in particular crucial for Suharto’s heightening relationship with the secular economic donors of the IGGI (Merdeka 9 April 1980).

The changing context of Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan illustrates that the primacy of the interest in economic development favoured by regional stability marginalized Islamic identity. This was mostly visible in Indonesia’s avoidance to refer to Islamic identity and interest in its response to the crisis in East Pakistan that gave birth to Bangladesh as a sovereign state in December 1971. The rationale of geopolitical considerations guided Indonesian diplomacy not to take a place in the crisis. The position was in contrast to Sukarno’s tangible support for Pakistan against India during

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the 1965 war over Kashmir. Nevertheless, both Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims remained keen to interact to support cultural ties, and Islam came about more in inter- societal relations. The government did not stop such Islamic links, and even to some extent supported them. However, as part of the general policy design of not being committed to Islamic ideas, the support for Islam was minimal.

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Chapter Four Indonesia-Pakistan Relations And Soviet Invasion Of Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ushered the world into the second Cold War. As the frontline state, Pakistan bore the brunt of the Soviet presence in its neighbouring state, while at the same time benefited from the United States (US) aid. Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan came to rely on, and expect, support from other Muslim states. This chapter explores the extent to which Indonesia provided this support, and the factors that shaped Jakarta’s responses to the Soviet presence along Pakistan’s borders. It also assesses if a divergence of responses developed between the Indonesian government and Muslim groups to the Afghanistan issue.

The chapter argues that the Indonesian government expressed only a moral commitment to support Pakistan, but did not want to be directly involved in the problem. At the time the elite in Jakarta did not consider the Afghan war as an important issue to the state’s national security and stability. Instead they were mostly focused on creating national and regional resilience to further Indonesia’s internal security. Islamic identity did not occupy any space in this policy. However, on the societal level Muslim elements were critical of articulating their views on and able to build movements of jihad for Afghanistan. The government took a repressive approach to these dissenting Muslim voices. As a result, critical Muslim expressions were quietened, while some underground Islamist elements developed outside links and engaged in jihad activism for Afghanistan. Pakistan became an important transit point for Indonesian jihadists, where they could receive sanctuary as well as guerrilla training. The events in Afghanistan, to some extent, sowed the seeds for the formation of ongoing transnational militant Muslim networks between Pakistan and Indonesia.

Pakistan and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

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In December 1979 the Soviet Union troops moved into Afghanistan. Pakistan saw the Soviet military presence in that country as a serious threat to its national security. The government in Islamabad was faced with Soviet presence on the country’s entire thirteen-hundred-mile frontier with Afghanistan. For Pakistan the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan generated two alarming security threats. One was founded in Pakistan’s growing concerns over domestic ethnic tensions. There was wariness of Soviet and Afghan attempts to organize Baluchistan dissidents, who were resentful that Baluchistan was not yet given due recognition as a fully-fledged province of Pakistan. Hence, the external threat was compounded by internal ethnic politics, complicating Pakistan’s security problems (Wriggins 1984, 287-8). The second security threat was the concern in Islamabad that the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan might escalate and lead to Soviet-Indian collaboration for further military intervention; in this case Pakistan would be exposed to the nightmare of Indo-Soviet aggressiveness (Sattar 2007, 156).

As a consequence of the war, thousands of refugees sought sanctuary in Pakistan. In midsummer 1987 Afghan refugees in Pakistan were officially estimated to have reached 3.45 million – almost 3.5 percent of Pakistan’s entire population. The refugees were settled in 325 camps, most of them were located in the provinces bordering Afghanistan, the North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan (Wirsing 1991, 24).

Pakistan turned out to be the frontline state vocally opposing the Soviet presence near its borders. For this role, Pakistan was upgraded in America’s global strategy to roll the Soviets back. The American concern was to secure the oil lanes stretching from the Middle East to Afghanistan. Therefore, within a few days of Soviet aggression, President Jimmy Carter declared that Washington would supply military, food, and other aid to defend Pakistan’s independence and security. The American president, in addition, reconfirmed his government’s commitment to Pakistan under the 1959 Executive Agreement, and made it known that it was ready to use force if necessary to safeguard Pakistan. Soon afterward, on 2 January 1980, the Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi went to Washington for further negotiations. Four days later, the American

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National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski visited Pakistan, a highly publicized event, to reinforce his government’s commitment to assisting Islamabad (Mustafa 1981, 473).

The American aid package offered to Pakistan had economic and military components; US$ 200 million worth of economic assistance to be spread over two years and US$ 200 million worth of military hardware for Islamabad (Mustafa 1981, 474). Various arguments were presented with reference to the advisability of accepting or rejecting the Washington aid offer. The most compelling reason against its acceptance was that the aid offered was too little to be meaningful; it would only cause Soviet enmity without providing real security for Pakistan. Accordingly, President Zia Ul-Haq rejected the US offer describing it as ‘peanuts’ (Cornell 2006, 311).

The advent of the Reagan government gave rise to a new trend in American policy in Southwest Asia. The main idea of the new policy was to establish US military reliability in the region, thereby containing Soviet expansionism. Washington saw all East-West relations in strategic terms. The evolving American global strategy was to combat Soviet power by promoting the defence of countries inclined to the West; this included a free flow of arms and economic support (Girling 1981, 407-13). Pakistan was identified as a frontline state and worthy of significant assistance from the US. Pakistan responded positively to such a policy and began to receive billions of dollars of American economic and military assistance, from June 1981 onwards.

With the US support, Pakistan confidently engaged in multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations (UN), aimed at putting moral pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. Initially, Pakistan attempted to play down the legitimacy of the Soviets in Afghanistan. With a letter dated 3 January 1980, the Pakistani representative addressed the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent session on Afghanistan in order to consider the situation in that country, and its implications for international peace and security. The letter was circulated amongst the UN members,

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and received support of 51 other countries. In the 2185th meeting of the Security Council held on 5 January 1980, the president of the Security Council started deliberations on whether it was necessary to respond to the letter of request by the 52 countries by the convening a special session on Afghanistan. At the procedural discussion, the initiative was barred by the Soviet Union and East Germany, but approved by China and 12 other member countries. Despite a unanimous voice of the Council’s permanent members, the president announced that, following consultations with member countries of the Security Council, the request of the 52 states was included in the meeting agenda, and the issue on Afghanistan was adopted (UN Discussion Paper 5 January 1980, 1-2).

The Security Council held a special session on the matter of Afghanistan in six meetings from 6 to 9 January 1980. All signatories of the letter of request were invited to the meeting without the right to vote. On the first day of the meeting, the Pakistani representative reviewed the events of the last week of December 1979, specifying that the sovereign country of Afghanistan had been subjected to a military intervention by the Soviet Union on the pretext of saving the state from external interference. During this event, the legitimate government of President Hafizullah Amin was removed and the president was executed along with members of his family. Furthermore, the arrival of refugees pouring out of the country into Pakistan had increased since April 1978, putting a heavy burden on Pakistan’s economy with its scarce resources. Pakistan, therefore identified the situation as a threat to peace and security in the region, and insisted the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and leave the country alone. This position was strongly opposed by the representative of the Soviet-backed Afghan government. The Afghan representative challenged the legitimacy of the meeting to discuss matters belonging to the realm of Afghanistan internal affairs, and gave an account of the ongoing political events which were said to have culminated in the deployment of Soviet troops. These events, the argument continued, justified the deployment - not invasion - of the Soviet troops in accordance with the mutual treaty of friendship signed between the two countries (UN Discussion Paper 6 January 1980, 1- 3).

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In the course of debates during the first two days of the meetings, most of the participating countries spoke in various degrees of criticism of the Soviet Union’s dispatch of its troops to Afghanistan. Generally, they expressed opposition to such an intervention, noting that it posed instability and a threat to the region’s security. Some openly asserted that the Soviet military in Afghanistan was a kind of invasion, violating the Charter of the UN and the principles of international law. Claiming that it was aimed at shaping a puppet regime, which would easily adopt a foreign ideology over the people and thereafter endorse what they considered to be the Soviet’s strategy for world domination. Others complained that the absorption of Afghanistan, a neutral country, in the sphere of the Soviet Union’s influence would weaken the nonalignment movement. They urged the council to take appropriate measures to stop and reverse Soviet action in the country. In the meeting of 7 January, the President of the council drew attention to a draft resolution, sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, the Niger, the Philippines, and Zambia, which would have the Security Council deeply censure the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan. It called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan and requested the Secretary General to submit a report of progress on the implementation of the proposed resolution within two weeks (UN Discussion Paper 7 January 1980, 5-6).

Prior to the vote on 9 January, the delegation from China stated that the draft resolution would be inadequate since it had not officially condemned the Soviet Union. This omission was intended to prevent the delegation of East Germany from arguing that the proposed resolution was unacceptable because, amongst other things, it had sidelined the process of mutual bilateral treaty. The draft resolution was put to the vote receiving 13 in favour to 2 against (the Soviet Union and East German objected). As a result, the resolution was not passed due to the veto from a permanent member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union. After the vote, the President of the council announced that the meeting would be postponed and might be reconvened following further consultations (UN Discussion Paper 9 January 1980, 2). Although accepting the result

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of this process, the Pakistani delegation acknowledged that the Security Council had actually failed to pursue its most important function - to keep world peace. This opinion was endorsed by others, such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines (The New York Times 10 January 1980).

Pakistan went on to mobilize the support of the Muslim world. Pakistan hosted the Islamic conference of foreign ministers from 27 to 29 January 1980 in Islamabad, at which they condemned the Soviets; demanded expeditious and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghan territories; called for the termination of tyranny against the people of Afghanistan; and urged all countries and peoples of the world to secure Soviet withdrawal through all possible means. This joint declaration of the conference was issued almost with a single voice, only Syria, Libya, and South Yemen dissented (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1980).

Indeed, Soviet military actions in Afghanistan prompted anxiety amongst Middle East Muslim states. The governments of Iraq, Iran, and Syria considered that the invasion further dramatized the fragility and disunity of the region. However, the Muslim states’ declared collective feelings about the Soviet Union were not followed up by staging a concerted action to effectively put pressure on Moscow to withdraw. Another Islamic conference was held by Pakistan in May 1980, but it still tended to show inaction. The promise of financial support for the Afghan resistance movement included in the January declaration was omitted in May, replaced by a provision for negotiations between Iran, Pakistan, the Karmal government, and the resistance movement spokesmen. At the conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia in January 1981, the Islamic meeting did not even issue any public statements about the Soviet’s military intervention in Afghanistan. Instead, it called for further negotiations under the good office mechanism of the Secretary General of the United Nations (Newell 1981, 173). Verbal expressions of the Muslim world would not dislodge the Soviet troops.

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By and large Afghanistan had been converted into an arena for the superpowers’ proxy war. The roles played by the foreign powers were to support the Afghan resistance movement against the Soviets. To be able to function successfully, the resistance movement required the fulfilment of three conditions; a group of fighters; sanctuaries; and a dependable supply of food, money, and arms. Foreign powers committed to give assistances to the Afghan guerrillas were the US, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Washington aid was channelled to the Afghans through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in collaboration with the Pakistani intelligence especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). China supplied weapons. Pakistan, while becoming the site of collaboration of a number of states, played the key role in providing sanctuaries for the Afghan guerrillas based in Peshawar, despite having consistently denied ever having made official efforts to arm the rebels,. Afghan resistance groups could take refuge along the Pakistan-Afghan border. They were able to conduct training for the recruits and further operations in the areas where guerrilla warfare was going on (Ahmed 1983, 97-8). In the name of the protector of the Muslim ummah (community), the Saudis had backed calls for jihad fighting in Afghanistan. The Saudi government, in collaboration with Muslim Brotherhood and some other Islamist groups, assembled volunteers from Arabia and other Muslim countries. Thus, thousands of volunteers were able to take part in jihad for Afghanistan. The jihadists were consolidated in the office of the Muslim Brotherhood and Rabita al-Alam al-Islami (Muslim World Council, RAI) in Peshawar which had become the centre for recruitment, training, and coordination of volunteers, and further developed into the Service Bureau of Arab Mujahideen run by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. They too received the blessings of Washington. Almost all Afghan Mujahideen factions, including the Hizb-i-Islami, the Jami’at-i-Islami, and the Jama’at al-Da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl al-Hadith, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and Jamil al-Rahman respectively enjoyed the support of the Muslim volunteers (Rubin 1997, 185).

Response of the Indonesian Government

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In comparison with the reactions of the US, China, and other states which condemned the Soviet invasion and were willing to counter the Soviet military action in Afghanistan, and particularly the Muslim world that firmly backed Pakistan’s position on the Afghan issue, the Indonesian governmental response was weak and restricted. The New Order government perceived the developments in Afghanistan as a matter that would not have direct and significant implications for Indonesian national security and stability. Hence, Indonesia responded to the issue only with limited moral support for Pakistan, and a reluctance to become tangibly involved in the campaign against the Soviets. Significantly, at a time when a number of Muslim states were referring to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a Muslim issue, the Indonesian government’s position was also devoid of reference to Islamic identity. The nature of this support was apparent in Indonesian policy at the UN and in the speeches made in Indonesia by its leaders.

When Pakistan brought its concern over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the UN Security Council meeting, Indonesia was a co-signatory to the letter with other 50 states. The Indonesian representative Mario Viegas Carrascalao, who signed the letter on behalf of Jakarta, spoke of the Indonesian position on the Soviet military action during the Security Council debate of 7 January 1980 on the Afghanistan issue. Instead of using the language of Muslim solidarity, Indonesia applied the perspective of nonalignment movement when Carrascalao stated ‘…the course of events taking place in Afghanistan should be managed immediately in order to avert escalation of conflict into regional instability…There had been an act of external interference in a sovereign state’s domestic problems, and this was not in consonance with the view to respecting international law and order…’ (Indonesian UN Representative Office 1981, 12).

Indonesia shared the view of Pakistan that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan would pose a threat to regional security and peace. Indonesia directly used the language of criticism of the Soviet Union military action as invading Afghanistan and violating international law and as such employed the language of the nonaligned movement.

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However, the theme of Islamic solidarity was not used to refer to the Indonesian policy. This was in contrast to the position taken by a number of other Muslim states. For example, Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Muhammad, denounced the Soviets as infidels attacking the Muslim state and peoples of Afghanistan. The Malaysian leader further urged Muslims around the world to give their prayers for Afghanistan and to unite behind the Islamic forces fighting jihad against the Godless communists. The Malaysian government, he declared, would facilitate Muslim fighters from the country who wanted to go to Afghanistan for jihad (Nair 1997, 35).

That the Indonesian support for Pakistan was indeed weak and confined to merely moral commitment was also noticeable in the statement made by Foreign Minister after the vote in the meeting of the Security Council on 9 January 1980. He stated that Indonesia would endorse Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts to raise the issue on Afghanistan again later in the UN special session if asked, and the meeting might be rescheduled. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Indonesian foreign minister had just pushed the Soviet Union to immediately withdraw its military units from the Afghan land (Kompas 11 January 1980). Though this statement indicated a shared view with Pakistan, yet Jakarta did not express how it would speed up the process beyond the UN mechanism. Pakistan got no more than this limited commitment of moral support.

The reluctance of the Indonesian government to articulate its opposition to the Soviet invasion in terms of Muslim solidarity, while remaining sympathetic to the Afghan people being occupied by the Soviet Union, was also apparent in the statements made by President Suharto. When visiting Islamabad in December 1980, Suharto did share Pakistan’s anxiety about the persisting presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and supported the call for a dialogue under the UN Secretary General to arrange for the disengagement of Soviet troops and honourable return of Afghan refugees (Kompas 8 December 1980). But there was no declaration of how Suharto would support Pakistan as the state facing an immediate threat to its own security as well. Later, on 7 January 1980 when addressing the Indonesian parliament, President Suharto used references to

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anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and avowed ‘…We Indonesians have the feeling of empathy to the people of Afghanistan whose friendly nonaligned government has been seized by a foreign power for its own political and strategic objective…’. Suharto, then, equated Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the establishment of Soviet-supported government with ‘…what Vietnam did in Kampuchea and China did in Vietnam…’. To the Indonesian president, this was intolerable due to the clash with the values of Indonesian 1945 Constitution opposing foreign power intervention in a sovereign state’s affairs (ANTARA 8 January 1980). Nevertheless, this strong policy pronouncement was not coupled, once again, by concrete action in assisting the Afghan resistance. Thus, it meant that Indonesia did not want to be part of the evolving strategy to roll the Soviets back. It could be argued that the Indonesian position on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan followed the trend established in the past. Ever since Suharto ascended to power in 1966, there had been no definitive intention shown by his government to place Pakistan in its international affairs. During the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971, Jakarta - despite endorsing a peaceful settlement to the Indo-Pakistan conflict - did not do more than providing verbal moral support for Pakistan’s sovereignty. This position was retained during the Afghanistan war.

The talk of moral commitment was repeated in November 1982 on a diplomatic visit made by President Zia Ul-Haq to Jakarta. The two governments did not advance beyond what had been agreed since the 1980 meeting. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting between Suharto and Zia contained just an expression of their concern over the lingering foreign military presence in Afghanistan. Additionally, the two leaders called upon withdrawal of Soviet troops to allow Afghan people to exercise their rights of self-determination (Kompas 7 November 1982).

Indonesia’s inattention to Pakistan’s need for support against the Soviet Union during the 1980s contributed to a degree of coolness in Jakarta and Islamabad links in the 1980s. When Pakistan attended the Jakarta meeting of April 1985 for the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Asian African conference, Suharto made

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no mention in his inaugural address of issues being faced by Muslim countries, including what was taking place in Afghanistan. There were three important agendas underscored by Suharto to be discussed in the meeting; economic development of the developing world, international telecommunication advancement and information technology, and maintenance of peace and security in conflict areas such as Kampuchea and some African Sahara hot spots. At that gathering in Jakarta, Pakistan’s delegation was not led by the head of government, instead Islamabad sent only lower level diplomatic officials (Kroef 1986, 33-8). Pakistan probably realized that the agenda being discussed did not have a great deal of salience for its major foreign policy concerns.

To place the limited nature of Indonesian support for Pakistan against the Soviet Union, it is essential to appreciate that from Jakarta’s point of view, unless they posed direct challenges to Indonesia’s national interests, issues pertaining to conflict in the Muslim world were only of secondary consideration for Suharto and the Indonesian elite. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the threat that it could spread to Pakistan and throughout Southwest Asia was not a serious concern for policy makers in Jakarta. This was perhaps caused by a strategic calculation that Afghanistan was far enough from Southeast Asia that the war in that country would not immediately impact on Indonesia. The New Order maintained that the focus of Indonesian foreign policy was on the management of security and stability of Southeast Asia. Indonesia was more inward- looking by the early 1980s. The communist Vietnam was regarded as constituting the most urgent threat to ASEAN members by virtue of its interest in overthrowing the Kampuchean regime which could further expand the Sino-Soviet conflict in relation to Russia’s presence in Vietnam. It also could inflame the US to become involved.

The communist Vietnam was indeed viewed as hostile towards Indonesia. Embassy personnel in Hanoi acknowledged this. Vietnam gave recognition and protection to the members of banned Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) fleeing Indonesia’s harsh military crackdown between 1966 and 1967. In addition,

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Hanoi expressed sympathy for the socialist Fretilin Party - which was a separatist movement in Province – by opposing Indonesian annexation of the former Portuguese colony in 1975 (Suryadinata 1991, 335).

The perceived threat had intensified by 1979, in the wake of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Although the Chinese intervention was claimed merely to teach Vietnam a lesson, speculation circulated in ASEAN capital cities that Peking was prepared to expand its ideological influence and interests in Southeast Asia. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja advanced this position in an interview with the army daily Angkatan Bersenjata (28 February 1979). The foreign minister suggested that it was time for all ASEAN member countries to fortify their commitment to the preservation of intraregional security. Without this the region would fall into protracted conflict involving outside powers, especially the communists.

Aware of the challenges to its immediate regional security, the New Order government responded with a more inward-looking policy. Originating from the concept of national resilience – Indonesia’s most pronounced strategic view in the 1980s (Anwar 1996) - this vision positions internal affairs as the determining factor to Indonesia’s national and regional security. However does not necessarily rank military affairs as the most important factor. As a concept, national resilience is based on the proposition that national security does not lie in the military alliance or umbrella of great powers, but rather in the self-resilience emanating from domestic factors, such as economic development, political stability, and a sense of nationalism (Irvine 1980, 40). The initiator of this concept was Suharto’s right-hand man Brigadier General Ali Moertopo. To Moertopo’s mind (1977, 197-219), national resilience reflected the conviction that every nation had its own potential, including economic, political, socio-cultural, and ideological strengths, to maintain internal and external security without dependence on outsiders. For Indonesia, this vision suggested that national self-confidence building was the paramount element of its security policy.

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Jusuf Wanandi (1984, 305) – a leading international relations scholar affiliated with the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies – explained the application of the Indonesian concept of national resilience at the regional level. When every member of ASEAN could reach overall economic development, and overcome their internal threats, regional resilience ‘[would] result much in the same way as a chain derives its power from the strengths of its constituent parts…’. The integrality of the element’s strength is vital to underpinning regional resilience. With this in mind, the so- called regional resilience is the extension of the national resilience of the immersed states.

Despite its normative and unpractical nature, the primacy of national resilience as Indonesia’s strategic view was strongly endorsed by the New Order leader Suharto. When giving his national address of 16 August 1975, Suharto urged entire sections of the Indonesian nation to promote national resilience through a solid attachment to Pancasila, as a way of retaining national security, and to progress economic development (ANTARA 17 August 1975). The Indonesian president socialized this idea on many occasions. Universities were invited to explore the relevance of the national resilience in depth. By the end of 1975 Suharto had made a regional tour to confer with leaders of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, with a further meeting with President Marcos of the Philippines in January 1976, to gain their approval of the concept of national resilience (Hansen 1976, 176).

As a result, the Indonesian strategic vision was well accepted by ASEAN leaders. The concept of national resilience, together with deliberation and consensus, as well as non- interference, was included in the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation issued by the first ASEAN heads of government summit in Bali 1976. Article 11 of the treaty stipulated that in order to preserve their national identity, all member states should endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in political, economic, socio- cultural, and security fields, to adhere with their respective aspirations, free from external interference and internal subversive activities (ASEAN 1976).

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This normative structure backed by Indonesia created a regional order for Southeast Asian nations relationships, formalized as the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The ultimate aim of ZOPFAN was to enable ASEAN to develop concerted goodwill to determine its own destiny in the international environment. The underlying premise of ZOPFAN was the regional resilience of ASEAN as a group, which in turn would prevent conflict, and promote cooperation with the three communist countries in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), as well as structure a balanced relationship with the great powers (Wanandi 1982, 503).

This was the corridor through which the Suharto government implemented foreign policy and prevented confrontation with the communists in order to keep Southeast Asia stable. In relation to the Afghan war, Jakarta was not averse in supporting Pakistan, but was aware that involvement in a strategic alliance against the Soviets would have only increased the potential for the sphere of conflict to be expanded into Southeast Asia.

Reaction of the Indonesian Muslim Community The Indonesian Muslim community followed the trend of the Islamic world’s responses to the Soviets occupation of Afghanistan. They showed tangible support for the Afghan resistance by echoing and undertaking jihad against the Soviets. However, this was unfavourable for the government. Suharto, with full favour of the military institution, made domestic security and stability his regime’s first priority of policies through the rhetoric of achieving effective national resilience. Those perceived as potentially opposing them needed to be tightly controlled and domesticated. As a result of the military’s persistent perception that ethno-religious politics could cause national insecurity problems, as happened in the 1950s and 1960s, critical Muslim voices were adversely implicated. Within this line of policy, the Islamic component did not have the space to appear in the formal policy of the New Order government.

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Since the mid 1970s, relations between Indonesian Muslim society and the New Order government had been mediated by a nation-wide organization known as Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Ulama, MUI). For the first time at conference held in Jakarta between 30 September and 4 October 1970, by the Centre for Indonesian Islamic Propagation, a governmental agency associated with the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs, an initiative to found a group that could accommodate the religious activities of ulama (Muslim preachers) throughout the country was articulated. Initially, Indonesian Muslim leaders and the public responded sceptically to the plan. They supposed that the New Order regime was trying to create another instrument to curb Islamic political movements and power. This was closely related to Suharto’s refusal to allow the reestablishment of the Masyumi Islamic Party that had been proscribed by Sukarno in 1962. However, the New Order leader did not totally ignore the power of Muslims, especially the leadership role of ulama in the Islamic society. Hence, Suharto wanted to bring ulama into part of his political structures, and as such the Ministry of Religious Affairs was assigned to materialize this idea (Ichwan 2004, 47).

The Centre for Indonesian Islamic Propagation held another national conference of ulama in Jakarta, from 26 to 29 November 1974. This event was important because the idea to set up a nation-wide institution for Indonesian ulama was discussed and reformulated. The convener succeeded in gaining the approval of the participants for the establishment of MUI. Twenty six representatives of all provinces attended the inauguration of MUI; including 10 representatives from Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and other national Islamic groups, 4 government representatives, and 13 independent Islamic scholars (www.mui.or.id). This reflected a large variety of Islamic identities in the country. The emergence of MUI received a favourable response from the government. President Suharto expressed support for the newly formed Islamic organization. The Ministry of Home Affairs followed up by instructing local governments to institute their own councils of ulama. By the end of May 1975, with the support of the governmental structures, MUI branches had been founded in all 26 provinces and a number of regencies (Ichwan 2004, 48).

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The first national congress of MUI was convened from 21 to 27 July 1975 in Jakarta. On 26 July the national structure of the organization was shaped, and Buya was appointed as the first general head of MUI. The charter of MUI was promulgated on the following day (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 1995, 18-20). According to the MUI charter, this organization was not explicitly pursuing political objectives. The leadership of MUI defined the function and role of their organization as; 1) the inheritor of the Prophetic duties (warasatul anbiya), 2) the enforcer of shari’a (Islamic law), 3) the protector of Muslims (riwayat wa khadim al ummah), 4) the forum for Muslims to discuss religious matters, and 5) the mediator between the government and the Muslim people (Noer 1978, 79-81). The last point could be interpreted as political since it involved the state and society interactions.

Officially MUI was not a legislative institution attached to the administration machinery. It operated like a semi-governmental organization and in many cases functioned like an Islamic NGO. Although Suharto engineered its foundation, and it carried on receiving funding from the New Order government, MUI was independent in its ability to select its chairpersons from the members’ preferences, as well as its ability to determine which issues to discuss at meetings. MUI consists of ulama and scholars from the two largest Islamic groups of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. However, the outcome of MUI’s consultation – fatwa – does not necessarily and formally bind the Islamists. This is because fatwa is not an official product of a supervisory body, but rather it advises Indonesian Muslims on issues related to Islamic religious life (Hosen 2003). With the authority to issue a fatwa MUI frequently claimed the righteousness of its Islamic interpretation, sometimes causing debate amidst the Muslim public (Olle 2009).

Since a conference in 1980, MUI had decided to be active in voicing its position on international affairs of the Muslim world (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 1980, 15-6). On 2 January 1980, MUI demonstrated a strong protest and condemnation to Soviet

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aggression against Afghan peoples. According to the chairperson of MUI, Buya Hamka, the Soviets had stricken Islam, and as such he urged Muslims all over the world to oppose it. He went further to encourage Indonesian Muslims to carry out jihad, and fight with Muslim fellows in Afghanistan against the Soviet infidels (Kompas 3 January 1980). A similar assertion appeared in the public statements made by MUI ulama in West Java, West Sumatra, and South Sulawesi (Jawa Pos 1 January 1980).

Ulama in those provinces even urged the leaders of MUI to approach the New Order government in order to take a more solid stand on the Afghan war. Voices of Muslim solidarity were resonated by the ulama. They urged Islamic government officials not to be silent on what was going on in Afghanistan, because it was the duty of every Muslim to care about the struggle of their brethren against the invaders of Islam. Ulama who led traditional Islamic boarding school pesantren readied themselves to organize volunteers to go to Afghanistan for jihad (Jawa Pos 1 January 1980). However, there was no fatwa or further statement about Afghanistan made by MUI in response to this grass roots’ demand.

The Indonesian government responded toughly to the Islamists’ expressions. The Home Affairs Minister, Lieutenant General Supardjo Roestam, said that the avowal to send volunteers to Afghanistan against the government provision could be classified as an act of subversion. Furthermore, illegal paramilitary activities were considered as disturbing to national resilience and security (Angkatan Bersenjata 8 January 1980). From the President’s office, Suharto was reported to have commented on the ulama opinions. The Minister of Information Ali Moertopo, in lieu of Suharto, said that the President requested that the ulama calm down their followers by avoiding making provocative statements. Also that they should be aware of the government’s policy on the issue that the war in Afghanistan was not a war against Islam, but more precisely an action violating the universal norm of sovereignty and self-determination (Berita Yudha 9 January 1980). This sent a signal that Suharto did not like rival voices to his government’s position in the Afghan war. Thereafter MUI did not argue against such a

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governmental stand. This was perhaps because they did not want to take the risk of the New Order government’s repression towards dissenting Islamic views.

A response to the Afghan war also came from a group of Indonesian Muslim youths identifying itself as the Muslim Youth Movement – whose activists were mostly linked to Nahdlatul Ulama organization. Their voices were similar to that of MUI. The youth masses held a rally in front of Soviet embassy in Jakarta. They called for the withdrawal of Soviet’s troops from the Muslim land of Afghanistan. Some of the demonstrators even stated readiness for jihad fighting against the Soviets. Yet, the rallies did not become violent. The Indonesian security authority guarded them stringently, and the masses dissolved themselves in few hours (Kompas 4 January 1980).

The leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama did not come up with public statements about the Afghan war or take action at that time. This was different from their position in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War when they joined Sukarno in supporting Pakistan vis-a-vis India. The inaction of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic group in Indonesia, could be related to the changes taking place within this organisation instead of the repressive handling by the Suharto’s regime.. By the end of the 1970s, Nahdlatul Ulama had developed an idea to ‘return to kithab’. The return to kithab discourse meant that Nahdlatul Ulama moved away from practical political affairs, especially in their affiliation with the Islamic-oriented Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP), and returned to being a jam’iyyah dimiyyah organization, which focused on the social and cultural activities of life of an Islamic society. Formally, this change was declared at the Situbondo muktamar of 1984. Since then, activities of the organization, including sermons, seminars, and social gatherings, have no longer been under strict scrutiny by the government, in fact in some cases they were even facilitated (Ida 2004). This was the way that Nahdlatul Ulama avoided the New Order repression, while at the same time looked for accommodation.

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With the jargon of achieving national resilience, the New Order regime justified its repressive actions to crack down on all potential dissent to its policies. This affected Islamic publications as well. In the wake of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, a group of Islamic university students in the city of Yogyakarta published a daily named Ar-Risalah. In the January and February 1980 Fridays column, Ar-Risalah actively discussed themes including the ideology of Darul Islam, the state based on Islam in Indonesia, while also urging Muslims everywhere to unite under the banner of jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Ar-Risalah even provided a special column to publish opinions of Indonesian Muslims on what they felt were attacks on Islam. The Indonesian authorities responded negatively to this publication, the editor of the daily was arrested and jailed on the charge of subversion, and the daily was closed down by April 1980. Nevertheless, two years later Ar-Risalah reincarnated into Ak-Ikhwan, with the same vision and mission of jihad, and representation of voices of Muslims that were being suppressed. Again the government cracked down this publication (Tapol 1995, 119).

The Suharto regime was able to reinforce tight control over Islamists’ voices in public space. Paradoxically, the repression experienced by some elements of the Indonesian Muslim community gave rise to Islamists’ clandestine activities. Cells, called usroh, operated widely in the areas surrounding Islamic universities, particularly in Central Java, Lampung, and South Sulawesi. Usroh was formed as a study group of Islamic teaching and learning. Its ideological contents referred entirely to the struggle of the Darul Islam group in the 1950s and 1960s, and portrayed them as opponents to the Pancasila state. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar who led the al-Mukmin madrasah in Ngruki Sukoharjo, Central Java, were the originators of usroh, and responsible for the blowout of this activity throughout Central Java. The usroh networks were greatly implicated in the aftermath of the government’s harsh crack down on critical Muslim voices. Some of them were incarcerated and imprisoned without a fair trial, while others continued with their underground movement in the countryside, especially in Central Java and Lampung, or fled to Malaysia. In 1985 Ba’asyir and

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Sungkar escaped to Malaysia, and established an usroh-like group there (Van Bruinessen 2002, 124-5).

With the emergence of global Islamism in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Muslims from around the world organized themselves to fight jihad in defence of Islam. Indonesian Muslims also followed in this campaign. Malaysia became the shelter for the New Order opponents affiliated with Islamic identity movements. Hundreds of thousands of Indonesians travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan for jihad, and to receive guerrilla training. Ba’asyir and Sungkar were engaged in organizing their associates in Indonesia to recruit Muslim volunteers for jihad. Recruits were from West Java, Central Java, Sumatra, and South Sulawesi areas, where usroh previously mushroomed (Van Bruinessen 2002, 125). Some of the recruits were Agus Dwikarna, Hambali, Fatur Rahman al-Ghozi, and Ali Gufron (Barton 2004, 51).

Intelligence analysts do not provide exact information about the Indonesian Muslim volunteers’ journey of jihad to Afghanistan. Information available only indicates that they were involved with Mujahideen factions in Peshawar and connected closely to Ba’asyir and Sungkar. After arriving in Pakistan, many Indonesian jihadists enlisted Abdullah Azzam’s Maktab al-Khidamat (office bureau), before continuing the journey to the training camp run by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. At the Sayyaf camp those Indonesians probably met Osama bin Laden and other future al Qaeda figures, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. A small number of Indonesian volunteers went to the camps of other Afghan mujahideen leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jamil al-Rahman (Bubalo & Fealy 2005, 52-3). The Darul Islam spokesman Al-Chaidar, confirmed the involvement of jihadists from Indonesia in the Afghan resistance movements. He even mentioned a number of 30,000 Indonesian volunteers fighting with Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Half of them were the veterans of Tentara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Army, TII), the military wing of Darul Islam, with which Ba’asyir and Sungkar were affiliated (Van Bruinessen 2002, 125).

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Indonesian Muslims who undertook jihad in defence of Afghanistan were not necessarily connected to usroh and the movement organized by Ba’asyir and Sungkar. There were individuals with personal conviction who made their own way to Pakistan and Afghanistan for a jihad. One of the Indonesian jihad fighters who acknowledged his involvement with Afghanistan Mujahideen is Jafar Umar Thalib, who founded the radical group called Laskar Jihad in Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto. The rise of Jafar in particular, and Indonesian jihadists more generally, was related to some extent with the activities of two important Islamic institutions; Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Council for Islamic Proselytizing, DDII), more popularly known as Dewan Dakwah, and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam Dan Arab (the Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic, LIPIA) located in Jakarta. To some extent, both Islamist institutions had been intellectually connected with Pakistani Islamists. The key role of Dewan Dakwah and LIPIA was to give birth to the younger generation of Muslim militants who would refuse to accept the legitimacy of the Pancasila state.

Dewan Dakwah was the creation of Mohammad Natsir – the former leader of the banned Masyumi Islamic Party. He was supported by Muslim activists and ulama who were loyal to the idea of Darul Islam, to establish Dewan Dakwah at a meeting held in Masjid al-Munawarah Tanah Abang Central Jakarta on 26 February 1967. At the time, Natsir was aware of the political atmosphere in which Islam had been suppressed and marginalized by the New Order government. Therefore, in order to avoid the government’s suppression he declared the founding of Dewan Dakwah with a modified mission, declaring that in the past they had carried out Islamic duties through political practice, but that they should conduct politics through Islamic missionaries (www.dewandakwah.org).

Natsir and others wished to achieve twin objectives, maintaining their existence amidst Indonesian Muslim groups, and safely promoting Islamic identity in the secular political milieu. To this end, Dewan Dakwah adopted domestic and international strategies; mobilizing Islamic preachers throughout the country to hear briefings by the

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government’s officials on Suharto’s national development policies, and immediately associated themselves with anti-communist Saudi Arabia. Dewan Dakwah became the representative of Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (World Muslim Council) of Saudi Arabia in Indonesia. This international linkage placed Dewan Dakwah in line with Suharto’s policy to eradicate the remaining force of communists in the country (Hasan 2006, 37- 8). As a result, Dewan Dakwah could exist with its Islamic feature under the New Order repressive polity.

Parallel to the spirit of global Islamic resurgence in the early 1980s, Dewan Dakwah sought to popularize Islamic themes. Through the network of Muslim preachers and Mosques, Dewan Dakwah spread the ideas that the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i- Islami represented, by popularising the writings of Islamic ideologues such as Banna, Qutb, Maududi of Pakistan, Hawwa, and Mustafa al-Siba’i. Funding for Dewan Dakwah’s Islamic activism came mostly from the Saudi government channelled through institutions such as Hai’at al-Ighatha al-Alamiyya al-Islamiyya (International Islamic Relief Organization), al Majlis al-Alami Li’i Masjid (World Council of Mosques), al- Nadwa al-Alamiyya li al-Shabab al-Islam (World Assembly of Muslim Youth), and Lajnat Birr al-Islami (Committee of Islamic Charity) (Hasan 2006, 39).

The significant financial support of the Saudis enabled Dewan Dakwah to expand its missionary programs. It was active in distributing free copies of Al-Qur’an and Islamic books to Islamic schools and organizations, as well as organizing Islamic preacher training (www.dewandakwah.org). Under the framework of the preacher-training program, Dewan Dakwah entered into cooperation with MUI in the project called Da’i Transmigrasi. The project was aimed at sending Muslim preachers to remote areas of transmigration throughout the country (Hasan 2006, 39-41). Essentially it was created to teach Muslims about their religion, and prevent them from being subject to the influences of Christian missionaries (Hasanuddin & Angek 2000).

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To ensure financial support for the wider Islamic activism in Indonesia, Dewan Dakwah served as a mediator between Saudi funding institutions and a number of local Muslim groups, particularly those who had puritanical views, such as al-Irsyad and Persis (Hasan 2006, 41-3). Additionally, Dewan Dakwah arranged for Saudi scholarships to be given to Indonesian Muslim youths wanting to study Islam in the Middle East and other countries, including Pakistan. This project took place during the 1970s and 1980s (Singh 2007, 46). Dewan Dakwah’s most important role was facilitating Indonesian Muslims to gain contacts with Islamic activists in the Middle East and Pakistan while studying there, and then in turn contribute to the expansion of radical teachings, such as Salafi Wahhabism.

During the 1980s, activism of Dewan Dakwah was supported by LIPIA. They collaborated in spreading the teaching of Salafi Wahhabi throughout the country. LIPIA, established by the Saudi’s representative in Jakarta in 1980, concentrated on the teaching of Arabic, and introducing those awarded scholarships by Dewan Dakwah, to Islamic universities in Pakistan and the Middle East. LIPIA’s curricula were adopted from the Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud Islamic University Riyadh. LIPIA still provides its students with pre-university intensive Arabic courses for two semesters. Then, students are directed to major in faculties, such as Islamic history, Islamic theology traditions, Qur’an exegesis, and Islamic law. Teaching staff are recruited from Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen (LIPIA Prospectus 2009). In the 1980s LIPIA’s students were mostly talented preachers who had completed the task of Islamic missionary in the isolated areas of transmigration under the Da’i Transmigrasi project of Dewan Dakwah and MUI. With significant financial support from the Saudis, LIPIA was subsequently able to broaden its programs, and started to apprentice talented students from numerous madrasahs in East Java and South Sulawesi (Hasan 2006, 43- 4).

It is difficult to accurately evaluate how deeply LIPIA could influence the growth of Salafi Wahhabism in Indonesia. But in fact, LIPIA’s students were indoctrinated in

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various aspects of the Salafi Wahhabite ideas. Ulil Abshar Abdalla, who studied at LIPIA between 1988 and 1993, acknowledged that he was required to master the study of Salafis such as Ibn Taymiyah. In addition, Ulil described the LIPIA’s teaching faculty as very intolerant of the local Islamic culture and practice (Bubalo & Fealy 2005, 57). The students acquired the knowledge of Salafi Wahhabism in various halqas and dauras where they had the opportunity to interact with the Middle Eastern and Pakistani Salafis. It is also important to note that thoughts of Islamist ideologues, such as Banna, Qutb, Maududi have found fertile soil in the institute. During the 1980s, LIPIA annually sent approximately 30 Indonesian Muslim students to study Islam in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabian universities, the most favoured of which were Imam Muhammad ibn Sa’ud Islamic University and Medina Islamic University, as well as the Pakistani Maududi Islamic Institute (Hasan 2006, 46-7). In the eyes of Indonesian Muslims, for many years, studying Islam at foreign Islamic universities has been regarded as a privilege. This is the major attraction of LIPIA to Indonesian Muslim students, despite the various traditions of Islam they have ascribed.

As mentioned earlier Indonesian Islamists not only expressed their voices for Afghanistan, but also joined in jihad with Mujahideen there. The Wahhabite connections of Dewan Dakwah and LIPIA, had in a sense contributed to the making of jihadist like Jafar Umar Thalib. Jafar was born in December 1961 in East Java. He is a descendant of a religious Yemeni-Madurese family. His father Umar Thalib was an activist of al-Irsyad - an Arab descendant organization in Indonesia that was affiliated with Dewan Dakwah. Jafar underwent three kinds of educational streams that led to his Islamic militancy; informal Islamic education from his father; formal education at Islamic schools; and non-formal education especially during his involvement with the Salafi Wahhabi movement in Pakistan, and holy war experience in Afghanistan. That Jafar had no formal education in Pakistan is an indication that Muslims from the two countries had begun to build links beyond formal Islamic education.

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His father introduced Jafar to Islamic teachings and Arabic. He mostly familiarized himself with puritan Islamic teachings recommended by al-Irsyad and Dewan Dakwah. Then, Jafar began his formal education at an al-Irsyad madrasah in his hometown, led by his father. Jafar’s higher educational degree was obtained at the religious teacher training school, run by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, also in Malang. After graduating from this school, in 1981, Jafar continued his Islamic studies at the Persis madrasah of Bangil East Java; Dewan Dakwah had also supported this madrasah. Jafar spent only two years in Bangil because he was dissatisfied with teaching-learning process there. So he went to Jakarta to study at LIPIA. Again the young Jafar left the institute without completing his degree, although he had been there for three years. This was on account of a dispute with one of his lecturers. It was not clear what its cause was. With the help of the institute director al Amir, Jafar was awarded a Saudi government scholarship to proceed to study at the Maududi Islamic Institute in Lahore Pakistan and left for this country in 1986 (Umam 2006, 21-2).

The Maududi Islamic Institute is an educational institution directly linked to the Jama’at-i-Islami Party of Pakistan. The institute was built in 1982 within the party’s headquarters in Mansoora complex. It is named after Abul Al’a Maududi who had received support from the Saudi government. The institute’s curricula consist of Islamic and non-Islamic subjects, including English, economics, sociology, political science, ethics and morals, Qur’an studies, Islamic theology traditions, Islamic law, and prophetic studies. The non-Islamic subjects are taught in English, and the religious ones in Arabic. The chief goal of the institute was to produce cadres for Islamist movements prepared to spearhead a global Islamic revival (www.islamistwatch.org). At this institute, Jafar once again quarrelled with his lecturer over what he claimed was an interpretation of a hadith. This made him decide to leave the institute in 1987, without finishing his studies (Tempo Interaktif 27 December 2000).

While the Indonesian government was reluctant to support Pakistan and Afghanistan, Indonesian Muslims like Jafar went to these countries to carry out jihad with the

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Mujahideen. When Jafar visited Peshawar in 1987, he started empathizing with the struggle of Afghan Muslims against the Soviet invasion. Jafar, then, joined in jihad with the Afghan Mujahideen. He was involved in jihad between 1987 and 1989. The Indonesian jihadist enlisted with the faction connected to Saudi Salafi Wahhabi movement, the Jama’at al-da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa ahl al-Hadith, led by Jamil al-Rahman (Forum Keadilan 20 November 2001). Jafar acknowledged that he volunteered in Afghanistan because of the feeling of Islamic solidarity (ukhuwah Islamiyyah) with the Afghan peoples. He regretted that such feelings were not existent in the hearts of the Indonesian rulers, who were mostly Muslims, and criticized them for doing nothing for Afghanistan. Furthermore, Jafar emphasized that jihad is the highest obligation of every Muslim which they have to conduct in life (Buletin Laskar Jihad 6 June 2001, 1). The strict adherence and strong commitment by Jafar to do jihad in terms of violent action demonstrates his militancy. This is also a general attitude of the Indonesian jihadist.

Jafar is just one of thousands of Indonesian jihadists believed to have undertaken jihad fighting in Afghanistan. An intelligence source in Jakarta corroborated that the majority of them were students studying in the Middle East especially in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The jihadist activities cannot be separated from the roles of either the Saudi Arabian government in providing financial support, or the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in organizing training for guerrilla warfare. On returning home to Indonesia the jihadist brings a jihad ideology inspired by Salafi Wahhabism, combined with warfare proficiency. They also continue to have regular contact with each other, mostly clandestine, and are eager to wait for the opportune time to carry out jihad to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia8.

Indonesian Responses after the Soviet Withdrawal The improvement in American-Soviet relations by the end of the 1980s had swift implications for the conflict in Afghanistan. The UN sponsored talks in that had came to a stalemate, on account of Washington and Moscow’s inflexibility, showed signs of progress. The two superpowers acted as guarantors for Pakistan and

8 From an interview conducted in February 2011. 152

Afghanistan which signed an agreement on 14 April 1988 regarding the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel, to commence on 15 May that year. The withdrawal was due to be completed by 15 February 1989 (Yasmeen 1994, 115).

On 26 February 1989 the Indonesian government decided to open its diplomatic office in Kabul to link with the Soviet-backed regime there at a charge d’ affair level. This policy sustained the difference in approach taken by the government, and the Muslim community on the Afghanistan issue. Indonesian Muslims were more sympathetic to the Islamic Mujahideen leadership. For example, a group of Muslims called Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity with the Islamic World, KISDI) openly expressed its sympathy to the Mujahideen fighters and opposed the continuing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

The KISDI was founded in 1987 in Jakarta with the support of the prominent figure of Dewan Dakwah, Mohammad Natsir. The strong connection between Dewan Dakwah and KISDI can be seen in the Islamist figures that were appointed as executive members of the KISDI organization. Amongst them were: Hasan Basri, the former chairperson of MUI and an activist of Dewan Dakwah; Husein Umar, the former secretary general of Dewan Dakwah; Abdul Rasyid Syafi’I, from Perguruan; As Syafiiyah, who was affiliated with Dewan Dakwah; some of Dewan Dakwah’s younger cadres such as Kholil Ridwan of the Council of Cooperation amongst Madrasah in Indonesia; Ahmad Sumargono who led the Jakarta-based Mubaleigh groups; and Mazni Yunus, an activist of Dewan Dakwah. KISDI was originally established to react to the brutal military offensive of Israel in Palestine. Later on, this Islamist group broadened its advocacy to voice Indonesian Muslims’ views on issues related to Islam throughout the Islamic world (Rahmat 2005, 80).

Between 1987 and 1993, KISDI was assertive about advocating its aspirations for solidarity with Afghanistan. In addition it spoke out harshly in denouncing the American-led multinational troops that warred on Saddam Hussein’s regime of Iraq in

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1991. Indonesian Muslims were encouraged by this group to undertake jihad fighting with Bosnian Muslims against the infidels’ troops of Yugoslavia. The KISDI was also active in collecting Indonesian Muslims’ donations for humanitarian aid purposes for Muslims in Moro, Southern Philippines, who were suffering from the prolonged conflict between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the central government in Manila (Sumargono 1999).

According to KISDI, in reference to the Soviet’s continuing involvement in Afghanistan, Muslims should have been led by an Islamic government, not a Godless communist regime. The Indonesian government’s decision to open formal contacts with the communist regime of Afghanistan was questioned, and regretted, on the grounds it had not empathized with Afghan Muslims, and had not accommodated the feelings of the majority of Indonesian Muslim peoples. Furthermore, the KISDI kept on encouraging Muslims to promote jihad against the aggressor to Islam. It insisted on the high meaning of jihad for Muslims, and stated readiness to organize Islamic fighters to be sent to the conflict areas (Suara Merdeka 28 February 1989). This vision shows that the KISDI had a militant character, interpreting the struggle of jihad merely in terms of physical violence.

The military disliked such activities, and warned the group not to conduct any actions that could be categorized as dissident acts. The Commander-in-Chief, General , stated to the press that he would take all necessary measures to maintain national stability and resilience, and prevent it from being disrupted by provocative actions (Berita Yudha 1 March 1989). The general did not point explicitly to whom this warning was aimed at, but it could easily have been directed at organizations like the KISDI. Again, the New Order government showed the use of repressive measures to try to quieten dissenting Muslim opinions. This was not directly in opposition of foreign parties, either Pakistan, Afghanistan, or the wider Muslim world, but rather part of a general attitude to sideline Islamic languages in the state’s international affairs.

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On 25 February 1989, Mujahideen, with the backing of Washington and Islamabad, established an interim administration in Peshawar in the wake of the departure of the last Soviet troops on 15 February. The fundamental idea was to shape a state-like political organization, which would take over power once the Kabul regime was toppled. The many factions of Mujahideen convened a Shura (assembly), to choose who would be authorized to run the interim government. However, the Shura reflected splits and disunity rather than the commonalities which existed between the Peshawar-based Mujahideen, dominated by Pushtuns, and the inside Afghanistan factions. The Pushtuns in Peshawar excluded the non-Pushtuns, and the Shi’ite resistance group in Iran. The elimination of the Iran-based Mujahideen embittered the non-Pushtuns who felt alienated, and feared that the interim government might be repeating the history of Pushtun hegemony (Rashid 1989, 26).

One clear example of the upheavals and disunity inside Mujahideen was that the Rabbani’s party was only assigned a marginal role in the Shura. Rabbani was a Tajik, and his party consisted of mostly non-Pushtun followers. Rabbani’s party received just a small share of votes in the Shura, unbalanced to their relatively large size, and as a result, Rabbani was given an unimportant position in the interim government. It was assumed by Rabbani’s proponents as an attempt by the Pushtuns to keep them out of power (Rubin 1990, 156). The rifts and disunity amongst Mujahideen were certainly more complex in nature. Ethnic lines divided the Mujahideens.

Although the interim government was supported by the US and Pakistan, the international community was doubtful about the viability and feasibility of such a fragmented leadership. Accordingly, some countries held reservations about extending political recognition to them. However, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Bahrain did not take long to recognize the Afghan government-in-exile (Kyodo News 12 April 1989). This was perhaps related to their ongoing support for the Mujahideen since the outbreak of the Afghanistan war.

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At the Riyadh conference of Islamic foreign ministers held between 13 and 16 March 1989, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) extended recognition to the Afghan Mujahideen provisional government. The conference invited the Afghan Mujahideen to occupy the seat of the state of Afghanistan, which had been vacant since the extraordinary session of the Islamic conference of foreign ministers convened in Pakistan, January 1980. The secretary general of the conference explicitly reiterated that the conference lauded the heroic struggle of Afghan peoples under the leadership of the Afghan Mujahideen alliance for restoring their identity as an independent Islamic state. Furthermore, the conference participants welcomed the formation of the Shura and the latter’s selection of provisional government on free and independent will. The OIC affirmed its desire to carry on humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in collaboration with the Pakistani government (The Islamic Conference Foreign Ministers 1989).

Indonesia attended the Riyadh meeting, however it did not extend its recognition to the Mujahideen government. According to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, although the Islamic conference had recognized the Mujahideen leadership, there was no obligation for the participating members to do the same. More importantly, the principle of independent activism in Indonesia’s foreign policy did not allow the government to support a government-in-exile. Indonesia had endorsed the Geneva Agreement, on the 14 April 1988, on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, thus suggesting that Jakarta was taking a position in favour of the Afghan peoples’ rights for self-rule (Kompas 31 March 1989).

In mid April 1989, Foreign Minister of the interim government Gulbuddin Hekmatyar visited Malaysia and Indonesia in order to seek recognition. As a result, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar announced his government’s recognition of the Mujahideen government-in-exile. This decision was reportedly taken after a series of contacts and appeals made by the Saudi’s diplomats in Kuala Lumpur. Fortunately, the Saudis were able to convince the Malaysian government of the ability of the Afghanistan interim government to create a stable condition, and unite their war-torn

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society. Then, Malaysia was also firm in extending its recognition on the grounds of the spirit of Islamic solidarity with Afghanistan Muslims (Kyodo News 12 April 1989).

When arriving in Jakarta from Kuala Lumpur, at the Sukarno-Hatta International Airport, Hekmatyar spoke to local media and urged the government and peoples of Indonesia to show their support for the struggle of Afghan Muslims (Kompas 13 April 1989). The KISDI responded favourably to such a request. It published a statement welcoming the visit of Hekmatyar, and further pledged to endorse his Islamic government. The KISDI claimed that they represented the feelings of most Indonesian Muslims about solidarity with Afghanistan (Suara Merdeka 14 April 1989). However, there is no information as to whether the Indonesian Muslim group met with Hekmatyar, or organized a mass gathering to express support, despite releasing a press statement to that effect.

The Pakistani government tried to secure Indonesian recognition for the Mujahideen leadership, but it did not receive the expected response. The government in Jakarta still refused to recognize the Afghan government-in-exile. Unlike Malaysia, which declared recognition upon the ground of Islamic solidarity with Afghanistan, Indonesia did not refer to it in shaping its policy on Afghanistan. Ali Alatas, after receiving Hekmatyar in his office on 13 April, in a meeting that was facilitated by the Pakistani representative in Jakarta, reemphasized the earlier position that Indonesia strongly supported the struggle of Afghan people. However, Jakarta had extended diplomatic contacts with the government in Kabul, and thus it did not want to appear ambivalent by recognizing another government. Furthermore, to Ali Alatas, Indonesia would not want to strain the peace process, as the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan had been completed since 15 February 1989 (Kompas 14 April 1989).

Critics of the policy of not recognizing the interim government of Afghanistan, particularly by the Muslim elements, claimed that it was a result of an attempt by Indonesia’s at appealing to the Soviet Union for a better relationship. The indication of

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which was clear in a plan made for the visit of President Suharto to Moscow scheduled for June 1989. In the eyes of the critical Muslims, the government was more favourable to the communist superpower than to its Afghan Muslim brothers (Suara Merdeka 16 April 1989).

The New Order government rejected criticisms that they did not care about the plight of millions of Muslims in Afghanistan. The Indonesian government argued that it did not want to interfere in the conflict of a foreign state. Moreover, the formation of a government-in-exile would only complicate the conflict in Afghanistan. At the same time, the government and peoples of Indonesia invariably paid much attention to the Afghan peoples, as evinced in the extensive humanitarian aid deployed to assist the refugees and war victims of Afghanistan (Kompas 9 May 1989). An editorial in a pro- government daily, Angkatan Bersenjata, argued on 14 April 1989 that Indonesia did not need to undertake an emotionally-based foreign policy like that of other countries, such as Malaysia, by giving recognition to a rebel government on behalf of Islamic solidarity. Indonesian foreign policy should be conducted in line with the principle of the respect for the sovereignty of every nation, and principals of non-interference, according to which the existence of a government-in-exile backed by foreign power was unacceptable.

The New Order government felt that no urgent actions needed to be taken in dealing with what was happening in Afghanistan. In January 1990, Jakarta decided to upgrade its diplomatic ties with Afghanistan to ambassadorial level. Abdul Ghani was assigned to head the Indonesian embassy in Kabul. This decision ignored a request from Pakistan that Indonesia should reconsider its policy towards Afghanistan (Kompas 11 January 1990).

This case demonstrates that there was variance of the governmental and non- governmental responses in Indonesia towards what happened in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s invasion of the Afghan country was viewed by the elite in Jakarta as an

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event far from Indonesia, and hence they considered that Indonesian national and regional stability was not threatened directly. This caused the Indonesian government to express limited commitment to support Pakistan’s policy on the Afghan war. Islam did not appear to be the feature of this attitude. On the grass-root level, however, Indonesian Islamists were assertive about expressing their feeling of Islamic solidarity with the Afghans, and were able to relate with other Muslims, especially based in Pakistan, for the jihad war against the Soviets. In this pattern of the state and Islamic group interaction, the use of Muslim identity was apparently absent in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

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Chapter Five Indonesia’s Revitalized Relations With Pakistan: Islamic Identity and Economic Cooperation

The beginning of the 1990s saw the newfound feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy turn towards the Muslim world. There was a shift taking place in the way that the New Order government dealt with Muslim countries; from avoiding using the language of Islamism, as had been the case in the past two decades, Jakarta moved towards an acknowledgement of the country’s Muslim identity. For example, in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Developing Eight (D-8), Indonesia spoke of issues pertinent to Muslims. However, the nature of interests underpinning the policy did not change. It continued to be shaped by the material need for expanding economic cooperation. This chapter attempts to explain how and why the trend happened and, to examine its implications for Indonesia-Pakistan relations.

The chapter argues that a shift had taken place within the Suharto regime on acknowledging the country’s Islamic identity. This was connected to the rising power of an Islamic organization called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI). The ICMI emerged at the societal level, but due to its presence as a Muslim group with vision supporting the government’s policies on national development, it also gained the support of the New Order leaders. Therefore, to some extent it could have an influence on foreign policy agenda as evident in its changed policy on the OIC. But Islam did not emerge as the dominant notion of Indonesian identity. Other interests continued to shape Jakarta’s policy as well. In this context, Indonesian ties with Pakistan improved, with the economic area becoming the focus of their connection. The changing geostrategic environment of Pakistan played a significant role in the process: after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the failure of the United States (US) to continue the aid relationship with Pakistan, Islamabad needed to find new partnerships. As part of

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this strategy, Pakistan initiated the ‘look east’ policy with a focus on improving relations with Southeast Asian states. As a major Southeast Asian state, Indonesia received significant attention with economic arena showing signs of improved Indonesia-Pakistan relations.

The Emergence of ICMI By the mid 1980s there was global resurgence of Islamism around the world, as a reaction to events in the Muslim world – mainly the war in Afghanistan. In Indonesia, this was reflected in some sections in the middle-class Muslims in urban areas strongly expressing the need for acknowledging the country’s Islamic identity. They were keen to establish a Muslim organization that could accommodate aspirations of Indonesian Muslims. Between 1984 and 1986, Muslim activists, mostly from Islamic universities, held several conferences to realise the goal. However, none were successful in achieving concrete results in the formation of a solid Islamic movement (Tempo 8 December 1990).

The major challenge faced by Muslims in Indonesia in consolidating their activities was the government’s disapproval and intervention. For instance, in 1989, a national Muslim intellectual gathering was planned to be held in Yogyakarta. Initiated by a senior modernist Muslim activist, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, the aim was similar to the previous proposals, to unite Indonesian Muslim activists in a group with national vision. Imaduddin invited 50 Muslim intellectuals, yet only 39 participants attended the meeting in October. Unfortunately, before they finalized their discussions, the meeting was dissolved by the Indonesian security authorities, as they had not secured the permit from the Indonesian government (Berita Buana 3 October 1989).

After observing the failure of the efforts made by Imaduddin, and feeling frustrated by the continuing fragmentation and disunity amongst Indonesian Muslim activists, a group of students at Brawijaya University of Malang East Java, decided to prevent this problem from reoccurring. Those students – Eric Salman, Ali Mudakir, Mohammad

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Zaenuri, Awang Surya and Muhammad Iqbal – committed to revive the initiative launched in Yogyakarta. They were aware of the need to acquire support from the ruling elite, and that this endorsement would require a concession be given to the New Order rulers (Pelita 4 December 1990). Eric Salman and others began to organize a Muslim Intellectual conference at Brawijaya University scheduled in October 1990. In search for support, they travelled to Jakarta to appeal to some Muslim figures. They were advised by Nurcholish Madjid, Imaduddin Abdulrahim and Dawam Rahardjo, to meet with B. J. Habibie to seek his support for a permanent Muslim intellectual organization, to be led by Habibie himself, and that they should obtain the government’s blessing before holding the national Muslim intellectual meeting (www.icmi.or.id).

With the help of Syafi’i Anwar, a reputable journalist of the Islamic weekly, Panji Masyarakat, Madjid, Imaduddin, Dawam, and the five students arranged a meeting with Habibie. According to Syafi’i Anwar (Muzani 1993, 140), Habibie agreed to the idea, and surprisingly, also asked to present his paper in the national Muslim conference. To Habibie’s mind, the conference should be framed in the theme of ‘The Contributions of Muslim Intellectuals to National Development’. Although stating his personal approval, Habibie underlined that as a cabinet member he needed to seek permission from Suharto to take part in that Muslim forum. It was agreed between Habibie and the students to support each other; Habibie was willing to approach the political elite for their endorsement of the idea of convening a national Muslim intellectual conference, while the students would provide him with a formal draft of a request to the government.

The decision to approach Habibie for support was an effective option. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie was known as a devout Muslim, indicated by his fasting on Mondays and Thursdays. Habibie’s personal relationship with Suharto was closer than anyone else outside the President’s immediate family. They were like father and son. The relationship went back to 1950 when Suharto was assigned to be in-charge of South Sulawesi Province and the general had befriended Habibie’s family. After Habibie’s real father passed away, not long after Suharto’s arrival, the 13-year-old Habibie had

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been under Suharto’s protection. In a political biography, the New Order leader admitted that Habibie regarded him as a parent, from whom he took notes on the philosophy of life, and sought guidance from (McCharty 1998, 1-2).

Habibie’s political and bureaucratic career had a bright beginning, starting with a technocratic job, prior to ascending to a ministerial position. Despite his personal brilliance, many argued that this was due to Habibie’s relationship with Suharto. Habibie a highly educated scientist, was a dedicated proponent of the power of technology in support of economic development. He studied aeronautical engineering in Germany before being called back by Suharto in 1974 to help develop the country’s industries. Habibie served as Minister of Research and Technology in Suharto’s cabinet for about 20 years (McCharty 1998, 2). By 1995, he had received no less than 50 medals of Honour from the Indonesian government for his contributions, which included building airplanes, steel mills, cars and shipping industries (Republika 10 December 1995). With his Islamic identity, Habibie was widely regarded as an icon of Indonesian Muslim progress and internationally recognized in the Islamic world (Amir 2007, 83). Through his position and access to the centre of the New Order power, Habibie was able to significantly contribute to the creation of the Islamic intellectual group.

Habibie played a crucial role by undertaking high level lobbying with Suharto to smooth the way for the establishment of the ICMI. Habibie gained the approval of his Muslim colleagues in the New Order cabinet, including six ministers; Ali Alatas, Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, Moerdiono, Harmoko, Emil Salim and Munawir Sjadzali. At the societal level, Habibie circulated the draft request for support - designed by the Muslim students - amongst academics, journalists, and businesspeople. As a result, the draft request obtained consent of 49 signatories, all prominent Muslim figures representing various Islamic groups, as well as professional associations. With this support in hand, Habibie spoke to Suharto about the idea of ICMI, and was able to secure the Indonesian leader’s endorsement. According to Habibie, Suharto told him ‘it

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is his duty to help, uplift, and guide the majority of Indonesians who are Muslims to progress…’ (Husaini 1995, 58).

The Muslim intellectual conference was held between 8 and 10 December 1990, during which President Suharto inaugurated the ICMI. He emphasised the importance of Islam as a force for national development to the 512 participants, who included scholars and activists from around the country. He identified Indonesian Muslims (Muslim intellectuals) as ‘an integral part of and reliable power of our nation’ and claimed ‘with the setting up of ICMI, they [would be] encouraged to contribute to the success of national development…’ (Pelita 9 December 1990). Habibie, on his first speech as ICMI leader, underscored that the organization would work hand-in-hand with the government to advance Indonesian social, economic, and cultural developments (Jawa Pos 11 December 1990). Even though both Suharto and Habibie did not affirm ICMI as a political group, the presence of the two leaders of the New Order had implied the high political profile of ICMI. Importantly, Suharto had for the first time openly recognized the significance of Islam and Muslims for the country’s development.

As it was established to accommodate all Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, ICMI membership embraced the elements of traditionalist and modernist Muslims. However, ICMI cleverly communicated its Islamic identity through themes that conformed to the New Order government’s policy lines. Firstly, the ICMI leadership adhered to the first principle of Pancasila, that is, belief in the one supreme God, representing what they term tauhid (the oneness of God). Secondly, the purpose of ICMI was to improve the quality of human resources in Indonesia, promoting technical and scientific education particularly at university level which had been the first priority of the ICMI affiliated Minister of Education and Culture Wardiman Djojonegoro and Habibie himself. Thirdly, ICMI committed to support the state - not the market - as the primary agent for economic development. This view was advanced mainly by ICMI’s secretary general Adi Sasono (Liddle 1996, 617-20).

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The ICMI moved towards a strategic position in the New Order governance. Habibie and the ICMI leadership utilized bureaucratic approaches to strengthen their political power. The patron-client system was applied to recruit supporters. More and more high- ranking officials of Suharto’s administration from both central and local governments were recruited to be ICMI cadres, and in return they received opportunities for promotion. There was a general assumption that in order to attain a better bureaucratic and political career, one should belong to ICMI, regardless of the degree of their Islamic religiosity. As such ICMI was viewed as the catalyst for political achievement (Hefner 1997, 76). By 1995, ICMI had been supported by 42,000 cadres encompassing various branches of government agencies and societal Islamic associations (Ummat 3 December 1995).

The ICMI held its second national congress in Jakarta in December 1995, and was attended by 1,200 delegates representing ICMI branches throughout the country. Habibie was re-elected as national chairperson for a second five-year term, and Suharto was appointed as the patron of ICMI. Several high-ranking officials, including 16 ministers in the cabinet, attended the meeting and were given important positions in ICMI leadership (Gatra 9 December 1995). This event demonstrated that with the support of Suharto’s bureaucracy the ICMI had grown as a powerful Islamic group9. The rise of ICMI’s political power bought with it the hope that more room would be made to accommodate the aspirations of Indonesian Muslims, and that the Islamic identity would be able to exert influence in the New Order governance, or at least Islamic voices would be less suppressed than before.

The rise of the ICMI was striking; they were ready and highly likely to drive Indonesia’s national and foreign policy in line with their worldview. In the foreign policy area, the task was given to Ali Alatas, an activist of ICMI with Arab Hadhrami descent, who was appointed as foreign minister in 1988. In an interview with The Jakarta Post (2 November 1999), Ali Alatas explained that his vision of Indonesia’s foreign policy was entirely faithful to the basic tenet of ‘independent activism’. He

9 The reason why Suharto supported the establishment of ICMI has been presented in Chapter One. 165

called it a principled foreign policy, and emphasized that it was ‘not an expeditious one, not a quality of expedience tending with the wind or just for the sake of short-term gain, sacrificing basic principles…’. Ali Alatas (2006) argued that Indonesian foreign policy in many respects referred to idealism, rather than realism. In pursuit of the national interest, the state’s foreign policy was guided by the notion of mutual cooperation instead of the struggle for power; compliance with international law instead of forceful domination; creation of order based on consensus instead of military alliance; and the notion of cooperation and goodwill among states rather than anarchy as underpinning international system.

In relation to the position of Islam as the marker of identity in Indonesian foreign policy, Ali Alatas (ANTARA 3 November 1999) was convinced that Islam always had something in common with the government’s policy. The fact that the majority of the Indonesian population professed to Islam was, and still is, an important factor in decision making. Ali Alatas referred to Jakarta’s policy on the Arab-Israel conflict to establish this claim: Indonesia did not reject the existence of the Jewish nation, nor was it against Israel, but decision to open diplomatic relations with Israel was more to do with the will of the majority of Indonesians who wanted Tel Aviv to first undo what it was doing to the Palestinians and the . This position was also part of Indonesian anti-colonial stipulation in the 1945 Constitution. This example, he argued, showed that Islamic identity and the non-Islamic reference to foreign policy were, and are, both important features in Indonesia’s relations to the Muslim world.

Indonesian Changing Policy in the OIC During the 1970s and 1980s, Indonesia did not play an important role, or occupy a prominent position within international Islamic organizations. This was the official position of the Suharto government. This was not simply because the Muslim world underestimated Indonesian capability and its large Muslim population. The New Order leaders did not want Indonesia to be seen as a state with an Islamic identity that could potentially distance its relationships with the secular Western economic donors (Azra

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2006, 107). Imron Rosyadi (1981, 28), a member of Indonesian parliament representing the Islamic-oriented Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP), favoured this position. For instance, he argued that Indonesian presence in the OIC was static, marginal, and full of formality over substance. The reason for this was that Indonesia had never shown political solidarity with the Islamic world, for instance, by attaching itself officially to the OIC as a full member.

Indonesia’s first attendance in the OIC was noticeable at the third Islamic foreign ministers conference convened at Jeddah Saudi Arabia in 1972. However, the Indonesian delegates, led by Foreign Minister Adam Malik, refused to sign the OIC Charter promulgated in 1969. This was on account of a disagreement with the condition for OIC membership stipulated in Article viii of the charter, stating that every Islamic state is eligible to be an OIC member upon submission of an application expressing willingness and preparedness to adopt the charter. In relation to the article, the phrase that pointed to membership being only for Islamic states hindered Indonesia’s full involvement. As Adam Malik argued: ‘Indonesia is a state based on Pancasila, and accordingly an attachment to the Islamic organization will be misleading because of obscuring its national identity…’. Nevertheless, the Indonesian foreign minister affirmed that Indonesia would continue to participate in the OIC activities (ANTARA 14 March 1972).

Jakarta was not averse to taking part in the OIC, but it was not going to seek formal membership. This status of partial membership in the Islamic organization should be understood as a reflection of the government’s foreign policy that could not simply ignore the reality that nearly 90 percent of the Indonesian population were Muslims. Thus, the Indonesian government maintained involvement in the OIC, while not over- playing the country’s Islamic identity. Indonesia continued to articulate its secular identity as a developing country, as well as promoting cooperation with members of the Islamic conference based on equal partnership and mutual benefits (Hein 1986, 141). As

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such Indonesia was able to participate in the OIC with a loose and non-binding commitment to solidarity with other Muslim states.

An official report issued by the Indonesian ministry of foreign affairs at the turn of the 1990s mentioned that ever since Indonesia’s first attendance in the 1972 Islamic conference, Indonesia had taken part actively in various OIC’s activities, with economic cooperation as the main motivation underpinning its participation. For example, in 1983 Indonesia signed the General Agreement on Economic, Technical, and Commercial Cooperation amongst members of the OIC, as well as hosting the Islamic conference of chamber of commerce. Indonesia was always represented in the Islamic countries meetings and contributed to the programs of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). In return, starting in 1974 Indonesia received loans worth no less than US$ 50 million from the IDB (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1991, 82).

Following the establishment of ICMI, discourse over strengthening Indonesia’s ties with the Muslim world began to increase in Jakarta. In February 1991, Habibie spoke to the press of the new direction of the government’s policy on international affairs; ‘Indonesia will take a greater and more prominent role in the Islamic world which previously it has neglected due mainly to over-focusing on domestic economic development…and the development of Islam in the country and internationally is ignored…’. Furthermore, according to Habibie, the time had come for Indonesia to play a greater role in the Muslim world. Other ICMI leaders, especially Amien Rais who was chairing the group’s council of expert, supported this view. Rais argued that Indonesia was historically and culturally closer to the Islamic world than the Far East. Therefore, relations with Muslim countries should be tightened. Habibie claimed that Suharto agreed with his idea (Berita Buana 4 February 1991). Given the fact that Indonesia’s foreign policy was centralized in the presidential institution, Suharto’s support made it possible for Habibie to influence the state’s international agenda.

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The first outcome of this change in direction was the New Order government’s enthusiasm for enhanced participation within the OIC, with a move from partial to full membership. However, this continued to be hindered by the condition of Islamic state identity for membership. The solution was to approach the Islamic conference and petition for a change in the conditions, removing the explicit requirement of an Islam- based state. For Indonesia, this demonstrated Foreign Minister Ali Alatas’ argument, (ANTARA 3 March 1991) that it was important to keep its principled foreign policy, continue to be consistent with the 1945 Constitution, and not to stray from the national identity of Pancasila, whilst at the same time enabling it to improve the standing in the Muslim world.

In 1991 Indonesia decided to seek full membership of the OIC. This decision was followed by intensive diplomacy led by Ali Alatas, during which Indonesia succeeded in stipulating a significant change to Article viii of the OIC Charter on the conditions for membership. The phrase ‘Islamic state’ was altered to ‘every state with Muslim population’. Under this circumstance, Indonesia was eligible to gain a full member status of the Islamic group without the need to identify itself as an Islamic state (Perwita 2003, 52). Subsequently Suharto attended the sixth OIC summit held on 9 to 12 December 1991 in Dakar, Senegal. This was the first time the New Order leader was present at the conference of heads of state/government (Kompas 10 December 1991), that indicated the more salient position that the Islamic organization was taking in the Suharto regime’s international policy.

Indonesia sought to voice its interests in issues related to Muslims, in particular those that related to economic cooperation and development. At the Dakar meeting, Suharto gave a speech underscoring the need to reduce dependence on Western economies. Suharto criticized Western economic powers; ‘it is concerning that the Developed countries have failed to accomplish their promises to take real actions to galvanize economic growth and development in the Developing countries…’. Suharto pronounced that the most important area of collaboration with the OIC should be within the

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economic field. Solidarity and friendship within the Muslim ummah (community) should be centred on how to advance its economy. To this end, Indonesia proposed to fortify the OIC’s joint projects in the sectors of agriculture, science, technology, family planning, and banking (Sihbudi & Hadi 1991, 18-20). Indonesian cabinet members soon followed up the president’s initiatives, especially Habibie, who then undertook diplomatic visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in April 1992, with the purpose of discussing collaboration in the establishment of the Islamic centre for culture and science as a think-tank institution for policy research (Republika 23 April 1992).

The report on Indonesia’s activities in the OIC between 1992 and 1995 indicated that it had contributed to the development of policies on the promotion of preferential trade systems, long-term financing schemes, and export and credit cooperation supported by the IDB (Bisnis Indonesia 11 December 1996). Indonesia joined the OIC but tried to reframe its agenda and approach to Muslim issues, called for solidarity through trade. For example, at the Islamic chamber of commerce, industry, and private sector group meeting in Bandung on 23 October 1996, Indonesia suggested that due to the nature of the OIC members’ economy, which varied from the rich to the poor as well as from the resource-based to the industrialized ones, it made sense for them to start to trade with each other more vigorously. Indonesia hoped that economic solidarity would inform meetings between the Muslim countries more regularly (The Jakarta Post 24 October 1996).

The height of Indonesian participation in the OIC came in 1996 when Jakarta hosted the 24th OIC foreign ministers meeting. As such, Indonesia automatically led the Islamic organization. Ali Alatas claimed that it was evidence of the Muslim world’s appreciation of Indonesia’s positive role in the OIC (The Jakarta Post 4 January 1996). Although Indonesia was moving closer towards the Muslim world and despite pledging to sustain efforts to progress economic cooperation amongst members of the Islamic grouping, there was no new commitment made by the Indonesian government at the December conference (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1996).

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Since economic interests became the priority in Suharto’s Muslim world policy, Indonesia’s links with Islamic states such as Pakistan also fell into line with this. Indonesia and Pakistan relations enjoyed improvement in economic terms in the mid 1990s. Pakistan had also started to see Indonesia as being more important than it had before. It was to some extent as part of the changing geostrategic atmosphere that required Islamabad to reorient its foreign relations, for example by adopting the ‘look east’ policy.

Pakistan: The ‘Look East’ Policy The death of Pakistani President Zia Ul-Haq on 17 August 1988 in an airplane crash marked the end of an eleven-year period of military-led government. Party-based democracy was restored. The elections held in November 1988 brought Benazir Bhutto to power as the first democratically elected prime minister, but she had to deal with the political reality inherited from the Zia regime. During the last three years of the Zia government, under an order called the Eight Amendment of the 1973 Constitution, the president enjoyed supreme power in politics. To be a prime minister one had to be elected by the national assembly. However, the president had the authority to nominate and sack the prime minister even for personal reason. General Zia had the power to appoint senior civil bureaucrats, including provincial governors and judges, as well as the chief of army staff. Most importantly, the President was authorized to dissolve the national assembly if he deemed the institution as not working properly. The establishment of democracy resulted in a slight change in the constellation of political power, from the supremacy of presidential system, to a troika comprising of a triangular relationship amongst the President, the Chief of Army Staff, and the Prime Minister. In fact, only the first two actors possessed real power, the prime minister had to survive in politics by carefully managing this fragile relationship (Yasmeen 1999, 177-8).

Political games within the troika affected the rise and fall of governments in Islamabad. The president dismissed Benazir Bhutto’s governance in 1990, and came

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to power in 1993. Three years later, Sharif was ousted and Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister for the second term. This political instability implicated the ignorance of the political elite about tackling the persistent and real problems plaguing the country, rampant corruption, and a vulnerable economy. Another important legacy of the Zia government was the increasingly significant role played by Islamist groups in Pakistan’s domestic public sphere, and foreign relations. With the approval of the Zia regime during the Afghan war, groups such as Jama’at-i-Islami founded transnational links to Afghan Mujahideen groups, and various Arab nongovernmental groups based in Peshawar. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, they changed the focus of the movement toward establishment of Islamic states in their countries of origin, including Pakistan. The inability of the government in Islamabad to curb the Islamist’s radicalism had, in many ways, led to international pressure on Pakistan (ICG 2009). In turn such domestic political features were reflected in the formulation of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

The changing geostrategic environment provided the context in which Pakistan had to reshape its international relations. As soon as the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan in 1989, it was clear that the country had begun to lose its centrality in the US global strategy, and Pakistan’s significant frontline role diminished accordingly. The nuclear issue started to dominate Washington-Islamabad links. The US asked Pakistan to discontinue all weapon research programs. When Pakistan refused, the Pressler Amendment, legislation passed by the Congress in 1985, was reactivated. It required the American President to render the senate with an annual certificate guaranteeing that Pakistan did not have a nuclear program for warfare purposes. Failure to meet the obligation would affect economic and military assistances to Pakistan. Given that Soviet forces occupied Afghanistan, President Ronald Reagan had issued the certificate without trouble, and his successor President George Bush did the same until 1989 (Sattar 2007, 225). However on 1 October 1990, after the withdrawal, President Bush stated that he was unable to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon

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program, and the US government suspended the US$ 564 million in military and economic assistance for Pakistan (Bray 1992, 65).

The suspension of the American aid severely impacted the Pakistani military. Apart from losing military assistance which comprised half of the total aid to Pakistan, an order of F-16 aircraft bound for Pakistan’s armed forces was also cancelled. Pakistani army also had relied on the US for vital spare parts which were now unavailable as part of the cessation of aid. The Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, General Aslam Beg, though disappointed at the US policy, claimed that without the American military support, Pakistan had the opportunity to expand a strategy reinforcing closer links with its Islamic neighbours. This was related to the long-term objective of the army leadership to develop a strategic alliance amongst Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey - without Washington’s backing - in order to counterbalance pressure from India. This plan would never come about (Bray 1992, 65).

Despite the loss of the US aid package Pakistan could still rely on help from other international donors who did not follow the American example. Japan was willing to continue to provide US$ 500 million annually in economic assistance to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the government in Islamabad failed to handle the economy well, suffering a big trauma due to mismanagement in budgetary policy, pervasive corruption, and a debt trap (Sattar 2007, 226). Pakistan’s economic predicament was complicated by numerous problems resulting from the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991. The American government stopped giving economic aid to Pakistan only two months before Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait in August 1990. The crisis that followed impacted on Pakistan. The remittances from Pakistani migrant workers based in the Gulf region sharply declined (from US$ 1.8 billion in 1989 and 1990 to US$ 700 million in 1990 and 1991) while the oil import bill increased in the tense international environment. This situation aggravated economic problems for the government that had been increasingly dependent on remittances. Additionally, there were about 100,000 Pakistani migrant workers who had fled to Jordan from Kuwait and Iraq. The

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government in Islamabad had to help settle and feed them. At the time, Pakistan had a domestic reserve less than US$ 100 million, which was just enough for two-weeks supplies. To manage the situation, Islamabad called for help from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), asking them to provide US$ 2.9 billion of emergency aid (Yasmeen 1994, 116).

However, there was still the hope amongst Pakistan’s military leaders that their country would remain significant for Saudi Arabia, and more importantly the US. This meant that Pakistan would retain its important role in the Gulf region. In August 1990, Pakistan promised to send 5,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. They were to serve under Saudi command, and as such did not formally belong to the American-led multinational forces. In November, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif increased the number of Pakistan’s military deployment to 11,000. This was partly aimed at persuading the Americans and the Saudis to support Pakistan in dealing with the economic toll of the Gulf crisis. This strategy backfired. Islamabad’s decision to send troops to Saudi was fiercely protested by the Islamists. The government of Nawaz Sharif was conspicuously unprepared to manage the domestic reactions in favour of Iraq after war broke out in January 1991. Schools, universities, and shops closed. Thousands of pro-Iraq demonstrators crowded on to the streets of every major city in Pakistan. This led to an apparent split between the prime minister and the military chief. On 28 January, shortly before Nawaz Sharif held a press conference announcing the results of a peace mission to the Gulf, General Aslam Beg made a public statement revealing his theory that Iraq had been deliberately incited to invade Kuwait in order to give the US an excuse to intervene in the region. To the general’s mind, Saddam Hussein was a distinct defender of the Islamic faith against American-led aggression. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan immediately tried to downplay the difference between Sharif and Beg by suggesting that the two differed in style rather than substance (Bray 1992, 65-6).

In fact, Islamabad was not able to make the presumption to approach both the Saudis and the Americans. Pakistani troops had not been deployed at the frontline of the war

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suggesting that they held only minimal importance to the Americans and the Saudis. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claimed that his policy to align Pakistan with Saudi Arabia had been vindicated by the outcome of the war. The post-war politics in the Gulf shattered this claim for good. Pakistan did not play an important role in the post-war Gulf security arrangements. Saudi Arabia continued to become an important economic partner for Pakistan, yet Washington-Islamabad relations could not be improved, as the American government had not been convinced by Pakistan’s half-hearted involvement in the Gulf war (Bray 1992, 66). Islamabad’s efforts to reinvigorate ties with Washington again did not go smoothly. Pakistan’s continuing refusal to permit to international inspections of its nuclear facilities became a primary concern for the US. Their relations dropped to their lowest level on 25 August 1993, when Washington imposed economic sanctions against Pakistan and China as a result of their sustained cooperation in developing their nuclear programs (Mashad 1996, 244-5).

The end of the Cold War was followed by strategic shifts in South, Southwest and Central Asia. Washington indicated a willingness to entertain an Indian request for transfer of superior technology, which included nuclear installations. On 6 to 9 November 1993 the Assistant to Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Robin Raphael, visited New Delhi to discuss ways of improving Indian-American relations. This suggested that Washington had started to employ equidistant policies toward India and Pakistan. India also improved its links with China. The demise of the Soviet Union had given rise to the independence of six of Pakistan’s neighbouring countries. The natural resource wealth of these countries could provide alternative economic opportunities for Pakistan on the one hand, but their internal instability could pose new problems on the other (Strategic Assessment 1997, 10-12). Pakistan was therefore forced to play it safe in these changing regional contexts.

Endeavours to attain economic revenue from trade with these newly independent Central Asian countries had created another problem for Pakistan. During the civil war in Afghanistan, Pakistan helped the Taliban ascend to power in Kabul by 1994.

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However Taliban’s antiquated practice of Islam prompted dismay from the international community, including the Muslim countries. Islamabad continued the support to retain its strategic influence in Afghanistan (Riedel 2008, 31), whilst at the same gaining vital access to trade with Central Asia (Sattar 2007, 227). The policy attracted a lot of international criticism and directly undermined Islamabad’s image in the eyes of the international community.

In response to these developments, and in an attempt to discover a relief mechanism, the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, during its second term in office (1993- 1996), initiated a reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Dependence on the Western industrialized countries, especially the US, was to be reduced by promoting efforts to look for alternative sources. One outcome was to expand links with the emerging economies of Southeast and East Asian regions. It was called the ‘look east’ policy (Mashad 1996, 246).

Benazir Bhutto outlined the new approach to East Asia saying ‘Pakistan has decided to pursue a look east policy to reduce the long continuing reliance on Western economic assistances and investments…after the end of the Cold War, the flow of Western aid has come to an end…it is, therefore, time to look towards the economically developed Asian countries…’ (Pakistan Horizon 1996, 6). Pakistan was aware of economic potential possessed by the booming Asian economies, such as Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea. It was predicted that Pakistan would be able to secure more economic, and probably political benefits, by forging closer ties with these countries.

Pakistan was to commence closer relations with ASEAN members. This move had come quite late from Islamabad in comparison to India, which had started to move towards Southeast Asia since the early 1990s, and had succeeded in promoting an Indian-ASEAN partnership in 1995 and an Indian-ASEAN summit dialogue status one year later (ASEAN Secretariat 1996). Previously under President Zia Ul-Haq’s

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administration, ties with Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and to an extent Thailand, where a Muslim minority lived in the Southern part of the country, were made possible in sustaining Islamic social and cultural activities.

On 23 July 1993 Pakistan and ASEAN committed to establish a sectoral dialogue cooperation to commence more intense economic collaboration. Practically, this scheme had only begun to work in 1995. Although total trade volume between the two sides had increased since the early 1990s to a worth of US$ 707 million in 1989/1990 to US$ 1.1 billion in 1993/1994, it was less than 1 percent of ASEAN’s total trade and less than 7 percent of Pakistan’s international trade volume. The investment value was about equal. Commenting on ASEAN-Pakistan economic ties, the Secretary General of ASEAN Dato’ Ajit Singh, who was visiting Karachi in March 1995, said that ‘…they were lagging behind social and cultural aspects of the relationships…’ (Straits Times 25 March 1995). The reorientation for economic benefit highlights the primary importance of Southeast Asia to Pakistan at this stage.

Given the fact that Indonesia was at the time the primus inter pares of ASEAN, it was reasonable that Islamabad devoted special attention to enhancing relations with Jakarta. On 6 February 1996 Benazir Bhutto’s Special Assistant for Economic Affairs, Shahid Khan Hussein, arrived in Jakarta to discuss preparations for the Pakistani Prime Minister’s visit to Indonesia, scheduled for the 7th to 9th of March that year (The Jakarta Post 7 February 1996). This period marked the commencement of reinvigorated Pakistan-Indonesia ties, especially in bilateral economic cooperation.

The Revitalization of Indonesian Relations with Pakistan Before 1996 ties between Indonesia and Pakistan had remained normal, although they were not close. Since the visit of President Zia Ul-Haq to Indonesia in November 1982 there were no high rank official exchange visits between the two governments. Indonesian Vice President had visited Pakistan on 28 August 1988 to attend the funeral of President Zia, and understandably did not discuss bilateral

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relations. Suharto did not visit Pakistan until he stepped down from power in May 1998. The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was present at the tenth Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit held at Jakarta in September 1992, but it was only for multilateral business within the organization; there was no account of bilateral talks between Islamabad and Jakarta.

Nonetheless, the two governments could still show goodwill towards each other in international diplomacy. Pakistan continued to endorse Indonesia’s assertive international diplomatic moves either within the NAM or the OIC. Pakistan supported Indonesia when it expected to lead the two organizations. Although the support of one country did not make Indonesian diplomacy effective, in terms of the two countries’ relations, Pakistan indicated that it was not averse to Indonesian leadership role in the two large groupings. In return, Indonesia stood by Pakistan’s proposal to take part in international fora in which Indonesia had become an important actor, such as Asia- Europe Meeting (ASEM), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization.

Even though Indonesia was moving closer towards the Muslim world, Pakistan still tended not to occupy an important position in Jakarta’s international outlook. It was for the most part because Indonesia, concerned with economic relations, had found ties with the Middle East to be more beneficial than those with Pakistan. Indonesia enjoyed a boost in exports to the Middle East from US$ 1.18 billion in 1991 to US$ 7.67 billion in 1995. Of these achievement figures, exports to Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt were the three largest. Exports to Pakistan and other non-Middle East Muslim countries in the corresponding years only amounted to an increase from US$ 23.3 million to US$ 90.4 million (Basyar 1999, 92). These figures indicated an extensive gap between Indonesian trade to the Middle East and trade with Pakistan, thus causing economic interests to become more focused on that region.

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Indonesia’s greater interests in the relationships with the Middle East, rather than Pakistan, could also be seen in the intense diplomatic efforts being made by the New Order government since the early 1990s. Visits to the Middle Eastern states by high- ranking Indonesian officials had become more common. For example, in June 1990 Indonesia’s Minister of Trade, Hartarto, travelled to Tehran to meet with Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. In return, in September of the same year, Iranian Vice President visited Jakarta; the Iranian President followed this one year later. In October 1991 Indonesia established diplomatic ties with the oil-rich Libya, ignoring Western concerns about such a decision. Between 1993 and 1997, Suharto made four visits to the Middle East including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates, all aimed at finding solutions to matters hindering trade between the two sides (Sihbudi 1997, 50-2).

The situation changed more favourably following a meeting of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and President Suharto in Jakarta. From the Indonesian side, Pakistan began to gain a more meaningful place in Jakarta’s international economic relations. This visit by the Pakistani prime minister was made as part of her East Asian tour; five ministers of her cabinet, and 80 business leaders accompanied her, highlighting the importance of such a diplomatic trip for Pakistan. An official of Pakistani embassy in Jakarta told the press that the three-day visit of Benazir Bhutto was taking place at a time when bilateral relations between the two Muslim countries were being weighed by the new wave of economic globalization. Pakistan’s relations with Indonesia were developed within the context of its approach towards ASEAN, in which Indonesia was the core member. At the time Pakistan was already a sectoral dialogue partner of the regional grouping, but was seeking to gain full dialogue partner status (The Jakarta Post 7 March 1996). This, accordingly, increased the significance of Indonesia to Pakistan.

Economic relations were high on the agenda of discussions between the Indonesian and Pakistani leaders. Initially, Benazir Bhutto emphasized historical and Islamic ties between the two countries. She reiterated that relations between Pakistan and Indonesia

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were steeped in history. The Pakistani government was proud that Pakistan’s soldiers had fought hand-in-hand with their Indonesian Muslim brethren in the war for Indonesian independence. In relation to such historical roots, Banazir Bhutto explicitly pointed out ‘Islamic solidarity proves to have built the deep-rooted relationships between Indonesians and Pakistanis…’. At this meeting the Pakistani Prime Minister also expressed a determination ‘to promote economic cooperation with Indonesia and other countries in Southeast Asia’. Benazir Bhutto personally expressed gratitude to President Suharto for the Indonesian endorsement for Pakistan’s admittance as an ASEAN sectoral dialogue partner (Kompas 8 March 1996).

In response, Suharto said ‘Indonesia and Pakistan shared many similarities in their efforts to create world peace and a new world order which is more equitable and humane…’ (Kompas 8 March 1996). Unlike Benazir Bhutto’s way of describing Indonesia and Pakistan relations, there was no mention from Suharto about Islam as the bond between the two sides. Suharto, while improving relations with the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular, preferred to focus on talking about issues related to the developing countries, and not to focus on Indonesian Islamic identity. As reported by ANTARA (8 March 1996), the Indonesian leader stressed ‘the most pressing challenge faced by the Developing countries like Indonesia in world politics today is the presence of asymmetric relations between the Developed and the Third World states…to meet this challenge, the Third World countries need to foster economic relations accorded on mutual cooperation not exploitation through dependency…’. This indicated that Islam was not the major consideration of Indonesia’s foreign policy with Pakistan.

On Indonesia-Pakistan relations, President Suharto suggested that several out-dated agreements should be revised with a view to adjust them to the present situations, pointing to the potential that had not yet been fully explored, especially in the fields of economics, the trade sector, technology, and agricultural cooperation (Pakistan Horizon 1996, 10). Indonesia appeared more interested in promoting economic interests than

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talking about Islamic ties with Pakistan. As a result, the two governments agreed to revive the Indonesia Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation (IPECC), an annual bilateral consultation that had lapsed since the end of 1980s. Under the IPECC, 12 memoranda of understanding were signed, covering a variety of sectors of trade, investments, and industry worth US$ 1.6 billion, of which US$ 400 million would be allocated for the construction of private and public sectors (Text of Agreement between Indonesia and Pakistan 1996). Also under these contracts, 12 large projects were identified, including the establishment of a palm oil refinery in port Qasim, sale of sugar plants, cement, and spare parts of submarines by Pakistan on a barter trade basis. In exchange, Pakistan was to get 15 N-250 passenger planes from Indonesia, with a percentage of the spare parts being co-produced in Pakistan (BBC News 11 March 1996).

This aeroplane project was significant for the advancement of Indonesia’s aviation industry, being led by the Minister of Research and Technology, Habibie. This newly developing industry, known as Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (the Nusantara Airplane Industry, IPTN), needed a market, and Muslim countries such as Iran, Libya, and Pakistan were considered as potential buyers of the IPTN product. The ICMI leaders, such as Amien Rais, were actively involved in the promotion of the IPTN product in the Middle East and Pakistan. An approach for the sale of the plane to Pakistan had been made since 1995. This meant that those active in fostering Islamic identity in Indonesia also paid attention to developing relations in the economic domain with Pakistan.

Having been encouraged by such business deals, economic interactions between the two sides increased in the later years. Indonesia’s total trade with Pakistan in 1998 indicated an increase of 10 percent amounting to US$ 338.86 million, of which Indonesia enjoyed a surplus of US$ 88.4 million. Palm oil was the largest export product from Indonesia to Pakistan at that time, valued at 14 percent of total export US$ 213.4 million. Pakistani exports to Indonesia climbed from US$ 99.87 million in 1997 to US$ 125.41 million in

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1998 (Indonesian Bureau of Statistics 1999). Concurrently, Pakistan’s total trade volume with ASEAN as a whole was up by 20 percent - between US$ 1.3 billion in 1997 and US$ 1.6 billion in 1998 (PPI News 22 February 2000). This, by all accounts, indicated the success of the economic diplomacy of Benazir Bhutto in ASEAN.

At the ASEAN meetings, the Pakistani leader requested support from Indonesia in their bit to join ASEM, APEC, and ARF. This was also successful. The Indonesian Foreign Minister announced to the press conference that Pakistan would soon be admitted as a full dialogue partner after the ASEAN ministerial meeting held at Jakarta in July 1996. Later in Jakarta, President Suharto and Minister of State Secretary Moerdiono reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to endorse Pakistan’s involvement within ASEM and APEC forum (Kompas 21 July 1996). This shows that more cordial diplomatic ties were achieved by Jakarta and Islamabad, in addition to the enhancement in trade interactions.

It can be seen that Indonesia, as part of its closer moves toward the Muslim world, was more comfortable to put relations with Pakistan in the context of promoting international economic cooperation. For example, when attending the OIC extraordinary meeting in March 1997 in Islamabad, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas asserted to his Pakistani counterpart Gohar Ayub: ‘the two countries focus of relationship within the OIC and bilaterally has to be directed at how to deal with economic globalization and liberalization facing Muslims around the world in entering the new millennium…’ (Kompas 23 March 1997). Indonesia had started bringing Islam into the relationship with Pakistan, in terms of the forum used to express this idea and the reference made to Muslim problems. Even so, Islam was not the primary determinant.

Though substantive Islamic identity was not totally in Indonesian foreign policy with Pakistan, its role did manifest into the pursuance of multilateral cooperation with Muslim countries. For example, Islam, and Muslim issues provided the space where Pakistan and Indonesia could be engaged in the creation of a new grouping with an

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Islamic nuance beyond the OIC, called Developing Eight (D-8). This new organization was founded for the purpose of encouraging a more prominent role for the Islamic world in the international political economic arena. In the space of D-8, Indonesia could cooperate with Pakistan and other Muslim states in order to expand trade, economic, and financial ties. Again, the Islamic identity appeared to be a feature of Suharto’s international policy, yet the focus remained on economic interests.

Established in Istanbul, Turkey, the D-8 is a group of eight developing countries with Muslim majority, namely Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. The idea of the D-8 organization was introduced by Necmettin Erbakan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, in a seminar entitled ‘Cooperation in Development’ held in Istanbul on 22 October 1996. At this gathering, Prime Minister Erbakan had suggested creating an institution that would be able to improve the Developing countries’ position in the world economy, to diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision making at the international level, and provide a better standard of living for Muslims (Asia Pulse 23 October 1996).

After some preparatory consultations, D-8 was officially promulgated through the Istanbul Declaration signed by eight heads of state/government on 15 June 1997. According to the signatories, D-8 cooperation is ‘a global arrangement rather than a regional one, which is reflected by its membership…the institution is founded on the ground of economic cooperation, and is a forum with no adverse impact on bilateral and multilateral commitments of its member countries, emanating from their membership within other international or regional organizations…’ (Istanbul Declaration 1997). D-8, therefore, embodies flexibility and inclusiveness in the nature of the institution as well as membership.

The formation of this new group raised controversy amongst Muslim states. This was because D-8 was advocated by stressing the assumption that the OIC had not been

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efficient and effective in assisting those countries to respond properly to global challenges and injustice commonly faced by Muslims (Muhibat 2006, 132). It is for this reason that several high-ranking members of the OIC such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did not welcome the existence of D-8, contending that the existing mechanisms rendered by the OIC met the needs of the Muslim world (Perwita 2007, 56). Indonesia however argued that the OIC was too large an organization to effectively lift the economic status of its members. Economic disparity amongst the OIC countries was also quite significant. Habibie was a strong proponent of this view. He argued that D-8 would be able to accomplish its members’ economic goals. Therefore, the Indonesian government was eager to form the D-8 as a model to others (Republika 18 June 1997). This position implied that Muslim issues were really at the heart of setting up the D-8, illuminating the role of Islam, despite limited expressions, in Indonesia’s foreign relations at the time.

Subsequently, Indonesia and the other seven Muslim countries emerged with a commitment to form a smaller network of intergovernmental cooperation. This was the application of ICMI’s notion on how Indonesia should deal with the economic challenges of the new millennium. Objectives of the D-8 grouping were defined as promoting regional economic cooperation amidst developing Muslim states from three continents, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and upholding solidarity for international peace and economic relations (Kompas 17 June 1997). The group is still global in nature, covering five streams of the world major Islamic cultures; Malay, Balkan, Persian Gulf, Arab, and African. This character of D-8 membership is a clear indication of the focus on Islam, yet the design of policy is couched in terms of economic cooperation.

The D-8 member’s avoidance of declaring Islam as their primary reference was perceptible in two points of contention that emerged between the founding states. Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan wished to identify Islamic principles for D- 8 economic cooperation, as well as wanting the original name for D-8 to be I-8 or M-8. Nevertheless, the initial I or M was not endorsed by other members, except for Iran,

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while the Islamic principles were rejected as well, and a more neutral identity was chosen. This followed the concern by some members that I and M could be interpreted by Westerns states as referring to Islamist and Muslim and could be counterproductive to the grouping (Haque 1997, 7).

The Istanbul Declaration, hence, pinpointed the main goals and principal areas, as well as principles on which D-8 cooperation was to be based as; first, the main objective of D-8 was to be socio-economic development in accordance with certain principles: ‘peace instead of conflict; cooperation instead of exploitation; justice instead of double standards; dialogue instead of confrontation; equality instead of discrimination; and democracy instead of oppression…’, second, was the desire to enhance the volume of trade amongst members and increase exports to the outside countries, and third, recognize the necessity to overcome trade barriers facing D-8 member countries (Istanbul Declaration 1997).

Amongst member countries, Indonesia and Pakistan preferred less focus on the Islamic identity of the new grouping. They shared the same view that open regionalism highlighting social and economic issues was to be the basis for the new organization. The reference to economic issues reflected both countries’ motives to get involved within D-8, and to attempt to discover a method of managing their domestic economic difficulties.

The New Order government carefully emphasized that the D-8 was not exclusionary in outlook, and was focused on economic issues. Jakarta assured that D-8 was not designed to constitute the centre of a future Islamic common market, or a wider alliance of Muslim nations. Rather, as articulated by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas’s (2001, 437) it was ‘…open to newcomers and [was] not intended to serve as an alternative to other multilateral organizations…and in addition, in some ways, D-8 resembles the group of non-aligned nations with its emphasis on equitable sharing of world resources, fair trade, economic collaboration, and rejection of domination by Western economic giants,

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as well as the stress on justice, peace, and democracy, instead of conflict, oppression, and exploitation…’. This concept of the D-8 organization suggests that Indonesia was not completely reluctant to place Muslim issues as a point of reference. However it was keen to establish an organization for economic development rather than an Islamic bloc.

In Jakarta, an enterprise like D-8 was considered to be a way for Indonesia to expand its economic power. In regard to Indonesia and Pakistan relations, the presence of D-8 could become an available arena in which relief strategies could be formed to help each other cope with domestic problems, especially in economic terms. Hence, the nature of interest behind Indonesian policy towards Pakistan in the D-8 schema was still the pursuance of economic profit.

When D-8 came into existence, Indonesia was in the midst of a financial crisis. Indonesian economic performance was not as good as its achievements during the first half of the 1990s. The Indonesian economy was being affected by the crisis spreading throughout Southeast Asia. An economist (1998, 272-5) explains what happened to the region’s economy; this regional characteristic had been discernible since its beginning. In mid 1997, speculators attacked Thai baht, this in turn caused Thailand’s central bank to react by inflating the value of the state’s currency. Unfortunately, this effort was unable to defend the currency. Subsequently, the exchange rate of the Thai baht weakened to 41 percent. This was then followed by the depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah by 55 percent, the Malaysian ringgit by 31 percent, the Philippines’ peso by 34 percent, and Singaporean dollar by 11 percent.

The resulting impact on Southeast Asian countries was the dramatic decline in confidence from short and medium term capital owners, and as such they withdrew from ASEAN markets. However, it is still debatable as to why the impact of the currency crisis spread from Bangkok to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and even Singapore. One explanation relates to the high convertibility of their currency, and open

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capital market, and the absence of good policies by the government watchdog relating to currency exchange rates.

Indonesia’s, and the rest of the region’s, predicament was exacerbated by the practice of, mostly Japanese, bankers of transferring huge amount of money overseas to benefit from low exchange rates of return domestically. They were lured to ASEAN, which had gained the reputation of very profitable large markets. They were over-confident. They overlooked the banking prudence in an atmosphere of euphoria. Local companies, mainly based in Indonesia, had used a great deal of loans for careless expansion of non- tradable sectors, such as shopping malls, real estate, housing projects, office buildings, hotels, and even golf courses. In the case of Indonesia, foreign debt had reached an amount of US$ 80 billion, of which US$ 60 billion was private debt and US$ 20 billion was the government. Once the Indonesian rupiah was depressed, the amount of debt climbed significantly, causing the debtors to be unable to pay them back. The current account deficit indicated that there was an alarming figure of 8 percent of gross domestic products (GDP). Indonesia was eventually plagued by a financial and debt crisis, causing international confidence in its economy to diminish.

Almost at the same time, the Pakistani government, under the second term of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (after taking over power from Benazir Bhutto at the end of 1996), emphasized heightening cooperation in regional economic groupings. The government in Islamabad had been trying to drive Pakistan to attach itself more tightly to the regional trade blocs, and economic forum, which had agendas that were less political rhetoric and more economic substance (Asia Times 17 June 1997). Such an economic-oriented policy, in a sense, could be related to Nawaz Sharif’s personal background as a businessman. More importantly Pakistan’s domestic economic problems were influential on Nawaz Sharif’s foreign policy.

Pakistan was beset by dire economic conditions during 1996/1997 and was heavily in debt, with national reserves of only US$ 430 million, and a debt of US$ 36 billion. The

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majority of its work force was uneducated, and unfortunately Pakistan had a reputation of being the second most corrupt country in the world. In February 1997 in Lahore, Nawaz Sharif acknowledged that under those unpleasant circumstances, governing Pakistan was an unenviable task. Moreover, ‘the company’ (Sharif’s analogy for Pakistan) was controlled by an interfering board of directors in the shape of the president and army chief of staff, who could have the prime minister sacked at the drop of a hat. ‘We’ve got absolutely no room for manoeuvre…’ the prime minister said, and that’s why it was his responsibility to look for some workable policy options, including new space for foreign relations (Lamb 1997, 2). The Pakistani army refused to reduce their budget despite the IMF and World Bank demanding stringent economic and financial measures to restrict public spending (Murphy 1997, 8).

Through D-8 cooperation, therefore, Indonesia and Pakistan could help each other fortify their strategies for finding alternative international economic relations. This policy was fruitful. At the end of the first two years of D-8 cooperation, following the holding of the second D-8 conference in 1999 at Dhaka Bangladesh, it was reported by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (2000) that there was a surge in Indonesia’s bilateral export volume to Pakistan between 1998 and 1999, from US$ 149.2 million to US$ 166.6 million, and that imports had climbed from US$ 150 million to US$ 153 million. This trend was in contrast to Indonesian exports with other parties in the corresponding years which signposted a decrease of US$ 200 million from US$ 48.9 billion to US$ 48.7 billion.

Critics of the D-8, however, argue that the summits of D-8 heads of state/government, which had been convened from Istanbul 1997, Dhaka 1999, Cairo 2001, to Tehran 2004, only registered the failure of previous efforts to achieve the goals of organizations, without being matched by radical strategies deliberated to lay down the foundation of a new economic, and then political bloc. The global economic, trade, and financial system had been subject to criticism in D-8 gatherings, claiming that the prevailing system continually failed to hear the needs of the developing countries.

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Nonetheless the D-8 itself did not produce solutions to repair this situation (Aral 2005, 100).

Western observers, particularly those with cynical opinions about D-8, concluded that the new economic grouping was virtually no different to the OIC, and that its initial D might refer to ‘disaster’ rather than ‘developing’. This was a result of supposition that D-8 countries will not be capable of resolving their own economic issues. In terms of the level of national income, D-8 countries’ economies varied sharply. Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan were low-income countries with US$ 400, US$ 320, US$ 470 gross-national-income per capita respectively. Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia belong to the lower middle-income group with US$ 2790, US$ 1390, US$ 2000, and US$ 810 gross-national-income per capita respectively. Malaysia is an exception with US$ 3780 gross-national-income per capita (Ahmad & Ahmed 2005, 200). These income figures, would suggest that D-8 members might hope for cooperation amongst them, which could be effective in reducing their economic gap. However, their low economic achievement is still indicative of domestic weakness rather than strength. In the Indonesian Muslim community, this cynicism was opposed, yet on the other hand D-8 was believed to be able to heighten the future of Muslim unity in a much more concrete manner. This was expressed, for example, in an editorial of the pro-Islamist newspaper Republika (20 June 1997) that showed an endorsement of the D-8. According to the daily, D-8 governments had to focus on moving forward persistently in order to further the goal of global Muslim unity in face of the West’s economic infiltration and exploitation.

The elite of the New Order also tended to socialize the idea of D-8 cooperation with optimism. In a press conference, following President Suharto’s visit to attend the Istanbul summit, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas reiterated the value tightening the ties of the newly founded grouping of Muslim countries ‘cooperation in economic field is expected to be able to materialize that goal…this is closely related to the fact that the primary problem faced by Muslim countries so far has been economic…’ (Berita Buana

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22 June 1997). Islam, nonetheless, in contrast to the Muslim community view, was not mentioned as the primary focus for D-8 cooperation. Rather, it was expressed modestly in terms of Muslim economic issues to be addressed as the organization’s main area of collaboration.

ICMI leaders, especially Habibie and Adi Sasono, favoured D-8 cooperation projects. According to them, D-8 would be working to achieve substantial prospects due to their limited and selective membership, in which the overall population of the eight participating countries was approximately 800 million, while their cumulative national product did not go beyond 2.4 percent or US$ 600 million of the world’s total product, which is about US$ 25,000 billion. They insist that it is quite promising for D-8 countries to advance internal trade volume to obtain higher productivity. The D-8 market also potentially supports their intra-group trade. Politically, economic independence is crucial for D-8 countries vis-à-vis stronger political economic blocs, particularly G-8 (Republika 8 July 1997). Their argument strongly reflects the ICMI’s view about the need for Indonesia’s economic independence, instead of the continuing reliance on affluent countries. All D-8 members commonly share confidence about the feasibility of D-8 cooperation.

On the one hand Indonesia’s more active participation in promoting and addressing issues associated with the Muslim world in the OIC, as well as D-8, can be understood as its gesture of greater interest in presenting Islamic identity as a feature of foreign policy. But on the other hand, the content of this course of action proves to be the same as its previous interests in non-Islamic agendas. The Indonesian government avoided overwhelmingly using the country’s Muslim identity, and focused on addressing issues linked to the economic field. Indonesian relations with Pakistan followed in this propensity. Indonesia committed to revitalize its economic cooperation with Pakistan, but Islamic identity was not articulated to be the primary bond that tied the two countries together. Within the D-8, Indonesia’s focus on economic relations with Pakistan has been more observable than the dedication to Islamism. Indonesia has not

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been disinclined to talk of Muslim issues, but it has been unwilling to markedly refer to the country’s Islamic identity.

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Chapter Six Muslim Solidarity In Indonesian Attitude Towards The Kashmir Conflict

By the end of the 1980s, a massive Kashmiri uprising occurred in the Indian-held Kashmir. Pakistan, which continues to endorse a plebiscite to determine the will of the Kashmiri peoples, started seeking international support, including support from Indonesia, for its Kashmir policy. India however, has always been opposed to Pakistan’s attempts to further its position on Kashmir in the international community. This chapter explores Indonesian approaches toward the conflict in Kashmir. This includes three important phases, the Kashmiri insurgency (1989-1999), Kargil crisis, and post 11 September 2001 developments, whilst outlining responses of the Indonesian government and the Muslim community to each of these events. The argument is that the government in Jakarta applied an impartial and passive policy towards Kashmir, aimed at maintaining balanced relationships with Islamabad and New Delhi. Geopolitical and economic interests, devoid of Islamic values, shaped this position. In contrast, Islamic solidarity continued to be articulated by Indonesian Muslims in favour of Kashmiri peoples, who are still struggling for self-determination, this in a way suggested a pro-Pakistan position.

The Rise of Kashmiri Insurgency An appreciation of the external and internal context of the Kashmiri insurrection helps in understanding why it occurred. Significant changes in Afghanistan, following the Soviet departure, resulted in a sense of Islamic victory over the communist superpower, which soon spread throughout the region. Muslim fighters were willing to bring the spirit of jihad to other regions, including Kashmir. Further, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of a number of new independent entities, particularly five Muslim countries of Central Asia. This increased the aspiration and hope of the ethno- nationalism elements in Kashmir (Varshney 1991, 997). The whole process was

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facilitated by the advancement of information technology, a communication revolution, and the spread of light arms (Giddens 1998, 31).

In the domestic context, the environment in Kashmir had been tranquil for some time, due to the decrease in tensions between India and Pakistan after the 1972 Simla Agreement. Nonetheless, disturbances occurred as indigenous revolts exploded in the Kashmir valley in 1989 and early 1990. The Indian government’s unpopular policy stirred the Kashmiri Muslims to rebel. This had started in 1982 when the central government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi directly intervened in Kashmiri politics. In response, state leader Farooq Abdullah launched anti-Gandhi campaign. Consequently, Farooq was sacked, and replaced by a pro-New Delhi leader. Farooq’s supporters protested violently, leading to the imposition of Governor’s Rule in 1986 aimed to restore law and order (Roy & Wallace 2003, 409). A new party, the Muslim United Front (MUF), attracted the sympathy of Kashmiri peoples, including the Kashmiri nationalists and pro-Pakistan Islamists. They ran the 1987 assembly elections in the valley with the rhetoric of a conflict between Islam and secularism. The MUF were aiming for a majority endorsement, but were only successful in attracting 32 percent of the recorded votes, largely due to massive manipulation of the elections. Dissatisfied with the results, young MUF sympathizers joined a growing number of militant groups who had begun crossing into Pakistan for arms and training. By this time the Afghan jihad was occurring and Kashmiri Islamists had begun talking about repeating the experience in Indian-held Kashmir (Tremblay 2009, 934-5).

In 1989 the demand for a azadi (freedom) Kashmir was driven by two sets of forces. The first was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which sought an independent Kashmir with the restoration of the pre-1947 boundaries. The second were the Islamist movements such as Hizbul Mujahideen (Party of Holy Warriors), Jama’at-i- Islami, and Awami Action Party, who were all struggling for the unification of the state with Pakistan. Daily mass demonstrations were accompanied by violence against supporters of the pro-Indian government, members of the ruling regime, as well as

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alleged government’s informants (mostly the Kashmiri Hindus), and brought about complete social disarray and paralysis of the state governance (Tremblay 2009, 933). India immediately blamed the unrest in Kashmir on Pakistan, yet Pakistan’s role in fomenting the unrest was not evident. Kashmir was again drawn into a protracted ethnic and religiously motivated conflict (Schofield 2000, 133-88). India’s continued accusations that Pakistan was involved in the 1989 Kashmiri intifada eroded relations between the two countries.

The uprising surprised the elite in Islamabad. They concluded that India’s inability to manage the rebellion might provide an opportunity to reclaim the disputed territory. In parallel to the growing strength of the people’s revolt was Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri liberation movements. However this support did not include overt military offensives into the Indian-administered Kashmir, but was confined to political, diplomatic, and to some extent logistical aid. Pakistan did however discriminate between the pro-independence JKLF and the pro-Pakistan Islamist groups. The JKLF did not intend to become part of Pakistan, and as such Islamabad gave more support to groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen. Nonetheless, strategic decision makers in Islamabad were not comfortable with the increasing popularity and power of this Islamist movement, due to concerns that extremist Islamic interpretations would threaten other moderate segments of the Kashmiri population. Moreover, Islamabad’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) diverted its support from the smaller and less united Islamist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, which primarily consisted of ex-Afghan and Pakistani jihadists from the Afghanistan war, in order to conduct violence against the Indian security forces in Kashmir (Cornell 2006, 319-20).

India’s response to the Kashmiri freedom movement was to impose direct rule on the State of Jammu and Kashmir on 19 January 1990. The Indian campaign against the rebels was marked by human rights violations; including the shooting of demonstrators, massacres, and executions of detainees. In reprisal Anti-Indian groups murdered and threatened Hindu residents, and engaged in sabotage and bombings. With the

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encouragement and facilitation of the central government, some 100,000 Hindu inhabitants, known as pandits, left the valley. They were relocated to Jammu and the surrounding areas (Human Rights Watch Report 1994). At least 15,000 to 20,000 insurgents, police officers, paramilitary personnel, and civilians died due to the widespread violence (Brown, ed. 1996, 5). Meanwhile, Pakistan’s support for the uprising increased tensions between Pakistan and India and raised fears of another full- scale war between the two countries.

The revival of the issue attracted international concern, particularly from the United States (US). Before the Kashmiri intifada erupted, Washington had been in favour of a plebiscite to resolve the Indo-Pakistan territorial dispute. Washington had started to explore better relations with India. India, exasperated with Pakistan’s use of foreign jihadists in the Kashmir valley, appealed to the US to label Pakistan a terrorist state, yet the US did not fully support India (Schaffer 2009). The acting Secretary of State, Laurence Eagelburgar, announced that the American government needed to decide on listing Pakistan as a terrorist state within 120-160 days which suggested that Washington was taking the request seriously. However, in the end Washington adopted a cautious policy on the Kashmir dispute. Neither Pakistan nor India had gained a positive reaction from the US concerning their Kashmir policies. The Clinton government was attempting to refocus American foreign policy. Human rights issues emerged as an important element of the US international outlook in relation to Developing countries. Clinton made a reference to Kashmir, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 1993; ‘bloody civil wars, ethnic conflict and human rights violations ranged from Angola to the Caucasus and Kashmir, evoking public resentment…’. It was unprecedented that the US should refer to India as a human rights violator (Palit 2001, 790-1). Despite Washington’s support for a peaceful dialogue between India and Pakistan, it did not make serious endeavours to intervene in the conflict.

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Without international intervention, violence in Kashmir continued, although the intensity fluctuated. The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was established in 1993 as an alliance of 26 social, religious and political groups in Kashmir. The main objective of this organization was to promote self-rule for the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir and the formation of an Islamic state. This marked the transformation of a violent insurgency into a political struggle. Nevertheless, violence against the Indian security forces continued to be carried out by pro-Pakistan Islamists. The APHC’s role had been corrupted by internal frictions, despite claiming itself as the only legitimate party to representing Kashmiri aspirations (Tremblay 2009, 934). By the mid 1990s the Indian security agency had formed a local auxiliary force, called the Rastriya army. It consisted of surrendered and captured militants. Its main job was to assist in counterinsurgency operations. Such state-sponsored paramilitary groups also committed serious human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch Report 1996). Since then Pakistan and India have engaged in a low intensity war over Kashmir.

The Indonesian Government’s Response The Suharto government of Indonesia took an impartial and passive position in response to the Kashmiri insurgency. The pragmatic consideration underpinning Suharto’s foreign policy was to ignore the emotive references to Muslims being attacked by India; an idea promoted by Pakistan and suggested the need for solidarity with Pakistan and Kashmiri Muslims. Instead, a press release by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 March 1990 expressed Indonesia’s concerns about the development in Kashmir that had ignited tensions between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, Jakarta hoped that as members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) the two countries could overcome their differences using the Simla Agreement of 1972 (Kompas 16 March 1990). It was apparent that for Jakarta, it was an issue involving two states without a reference to the role of religious issues involved.

In response, India sent two special envoys to Jakarta, V. P. Singh and Arif M. Khan, to hold talks about Kashmir with President Suharto. The press was informed that India

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requested Indonesia to advise Pakistan not to intervene any further in the Kashmir conflict. The Pakistani embassy in Jakarta did not react strongly to the Indian move. There was only a short press release denying Pakistan having direct involvement in that period of the Kashmiri uprising (Kompas 29 May 1990).

Later, at the Non-Aligned foreign ministers conference held in Jakarta in May 1992, India and Pakistan quarrelled, bitterly accusing each other of human rights violations in Kashmir. The Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Siddique Khan Kanju charged the Indian administration in Kashmir with trying to conceal human rights violations in their attempts to suppress the secessionist movements that had flared in the valley since 1989. The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Eduardo Faleiro, deplored the raising of what he considered a bilateral problem in a multilateral forum, and reciprocated by accusing Pakistan of violating human rights in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. Pakistan wished to internationalize the Kashmir issue by linking it with human rights issues, which were becoming an increasingly important agenda in post-Cold War world politics. Yet India maintained that it was a bilateral matter, and argued that the request for human rights or charity had to begin first at home. India denied all of Pakistan’s accusations, and accused Islamabad of arming militants and terrorists in Kashmir to fight against the legitimate Indian government (Reuter News 15 May 1992).

Furthermore, the Indian external affairs minister urged the conference to support his government’s position against the notion of universal human rights. Arguing that they varied from country to country according to local cultural, social, economic, and political conditions, and as such they could not be externally imposed. As revealed by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas ‘there is no country legitimate to dictate its concept of human rights over the other…’ (Kompas 2 September 1992).

Such a position reflected the New Order government’s formal attitude towards human rights issues; that human rights could not be used as a foreign policy instrument. At that

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time Indonesia was facing tremendous international criticism of its handling of the violent mass demonstration at Santa Cruz, East Timor in November 1991. Since then human rights had become a sensitive issue in Jakarta’s foreign policy. Indonesia considered that all nations in the world deserved to develop their own economic and political system, in respect of the principle of national sovereignty, the rights of self- determination, and non-intervention (Dewanto & Bandore 1994, 259-60).

However, Indonesia’s and India’s stance in defiance of the universal nature of human rights did not prevent Pakistan pressing ahead in launching the Kashmir issue at the Non-Aligned summit in September 1992. India directly opposed this position. When speaking to the press in New Delhi on 26 August, External Affairs Minister Eduardo Faleiro, denounced Pakistan’s decision, describing it as an unfortunate and wrong move. He reiterated that the Non-Aligned summit was to discuss issues concerning the movement as a whole and not a forum for bilateral problems over Kashmir (AFP News 27 August 1992).

Ignoring this request Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spoke out on the Kashmir question at the Non-Aligned summit. In his speech, Sharif said he was convinced that Kashmir would continue to be a disturbance to India and Pakistan relations as well as South Asian stability. For this reason, Pakistan urged India to cooperate in attempts to materialize the Kashmiri’s aspiration for self-determination as stipulated in the 1948 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and in keeping with the spirit of Simla Agreement (Hamka 1994, 14).

To deal with this matter, Indonesian President Suharto proposed, what he called, a more effective mechanism, procedure, and guideline for internal conflict resolution within the Non-Aligned countries. It would be built around the NAM’s philosophy of overcoming differences through dialogue, and balanced approaches rather than partisan contention (Kompas 3 September 1992). In Suharto’s proposal, it was mentioned: ‘conflict amongst member states of the Non-Aligned Movement which may be detrimental to the

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interests of the organization or may endanger the interests of international peace and security shall be resolved through good offices, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice…’. Special to the role of good offices, Suharto proposed ‘any parties in dispute should seek consultation with the chairman of the NAM organization…’ (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992, 4-5).

The proposal, though not specifying any enforcement mechanism such as sanctions, the use of force, or peacekeeping operations in order to stop transgression by member states, won support of the summiteers, including Pakistan, whilst India’s position, on the other hand was silent (AFP News 2 September 1992). Suharto’s proposal can be interpreted as reflecting two main ideas. First is an emphasis on the relevance of the NAM, as a forum to discuss the economic and political issues facing the Third World after the end of the Cold War. Second was an anticipative policy to prevent its interests, in forging economic and political cooperation, from being hampered by conflict amongst its member states.

The tenth Non-Aligned summit did not produce any explicit statements in relation to Pakistan’s Kashmir cause. Nonetheless, the final draft of the joint declaration, issued on 6 September 1992, contained an article indirectly supporting Pakistan’s position stating, ‘freedom fighters are not terrorists…’ (The Jakarta Message 1992, 6). This was also a reflection of Indonesia’s official stand in dealing with problems related to secessionist movements in the Muslim world. In response to the statement, the Pakistani Secretary General of Foreign Affairs Office, Akram Zaki, said that it was satisfactory for his government, as it had communicated what Islamabad wanted (ANTARA 7 September 1992). President Suharto followed up the peace initiative, which was officially called The Jakarta message, by offering to use his position as the chairman of the NAM to mediate between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This offer was welcomed by Pakistan, although India continued to refuse international intervention into what it perceived to be

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its domestic affairs. In this situation, Jakarta affirmed that mediation would only be viable when it was approved by the two parties in dispute (Mashad 2004, 106). In other words, the Suharto’s initiative had done little more than provide a show of goodwill. The Indonesian government has never moved beyond this passive official stand.

Kashmir, the OIC and Indonesian Approach During the first half of 1990s, Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at several meetings of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). At the Cairo meeting held between 31 July and 5 August 1990, the OIC foreign ministers passed resolution no. 21/19-P, which affirmed that the United Nations resolutions on the settlement of the Kashmir issue had to be obeyed, and that a final settlement must be made in accordance with the Simla Agreement. This supported Pakistan’s policy on holding a plebiscite to determine the will of the Kashmiri people. The Islamic conference also reiterated its solidarity with the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims for their freedom, and expressed a deep concern at the violence and human rights violations against the people of Jammu and Kashmir. More importantly, the resolution indicated the willingness of the OIC to send a good offices mission to help ease tensions between India and Pakistan, and to determine and promote a peaceful conflict settlement (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1990). Directing international attention and support towards Kashmir was a significant achievement for Pakistani diplomacy.

Indonesia on the other hand was conspicuously silent on the issue of solidarity with Kashmiri Muslims. This was particularly evident in a diplomatic note from the Indonesian delegation, dated 5 August 1990, for example, that stated ‘Indonesia is in favour of a resolution that India and Pakistan have to redeploy their troops to peace- time locations…’ (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990).

The Muslim world’s support for Pakistan continued to flow. At the Dakar Islamic summit, the final declaration, concluded on 11 December 1991, made reference to state- sponsored violence against the predominantly Muslim population, and the Kashmiri

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peoples struggle for self-determination. The summiteers insisted that India should find a mechanism to resolve the trouble in Kashmir (The Islamic Summit 1991).

Indonesia remained impartial in the issue. It also eschewed making points that agreed with the terms ‘state-sponsored violence’ and/or ‘human rights violator’. The standard response was to express a wish for peace. When delivering his speech to the Islamic summit, President Suharto expressed ‘Indonesia observes with a deep concern at the prevailing tense environment in South Asia which is caused by the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir and the unrest that follows…We hope [that] the problem between Indonesia’s two friends – India and Pakistan – will be peacefully resolved through dialogue in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and the Simla Agreement…’ (Sihbudi & Hadi 1992, 16-7).

India rejected all outcomes of the Cairo conference and Dakar summit. New Delhi blocked international human rights organizations and the OIC fact-finding team from visiting its Kashmir territories. They also rejected the proposed good offices process. Instead, the OIC fact-finding team went to Pakistani Kashmir and collected information through interviews with Kashmiri refugees. The report was published in February 1993, confirming that the Indian security forces were undertaking indiscriminate massive violence against civilians in the disputed state. The Pakistani media, such as Dawn (29 April 1993) referred to this report, describing the acts of genocide that India had committed in Kashmir.

The secretary general of the OIC presented the fact-finding report in document no. ICFM/21-93/PIL/D.3 at the 21st Islamic conference of foreign ministers conducted in Karachi on 25 to 29 April 1993. In response, resolution no. 9/21-P was issued explicitly condemning the arbitrary use of force by the Indian military personnel against Muslim peoples in Kashmir. The OIC also regretted the Indian government’s lack of cooperation towards its offer of mediation, and the initiative of dialogue offered by Pakistan. The secretary general of the OIC was assigned to monitor the developments in

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Kashmir and to report them at the Islamic summit to be held in 1994 (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1993).

At this stage, Pakistan was able to exploit the Muslim world’s criticism of India. Nonetheless the OIC failed to take collective action to pressure India. Islamic solidarity with the Kashmiri Muslims’ struggle for freedom was more visible in moral rhetoric. For instance, Pakistan urged the Gulf oil-rich states to use their economic influence on India, including stopping imports of Indian goods, and the flow of Indian workers to the region, but this never happened (Baba 1994, 186-9).

At the seventh OIC summit in Casablanca Morocco on 13 December 1994 a special declaration on the Kashmir issue was announced. Essentially, this declaration strengthened the OIC’s support for Pakistan’s position in Kashmir, by reaffirming their ‘commitment to promote a peaceful political solution to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute on the basis of the United Nations resolutions…’, thus formally endorsing the referendum on Kashmir. Furthermore, the OIC declared its eagerness to see positive approaches applied by Pakistan and India to ease military strains, so that the people of Jammu and Kashmir could be free from sorrow and violence immediately (The Islamic Summit 1994). The ability to mobilise international attention and support for its Kashmir policy amidst the waves of violence occurring in the valley was probably the most striking achievement of Pakistani diplomacy. However Pakistani diplomacy may also have had an advantage given the worldwide rise of Islamism after the Cold War, paralleled with the second Gulf War, Palestinian intifada, and civil war in Bosnia- Herzegovina.

At the Casablanca Islamic summit, Indonesia did not follow this trend of negative sentiment flowing from the Muslim world towards India. Instead, Jakarta employed a conciliatory language, referencing the role of religions in making peace. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said ‘Indonesia considers [it] imperative for all religion believers and responsible governments to promote peace and tolerance through inter-religious

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dialogue and partnership…’ (Alatas 2001, 429). Indonesia was reluctant to articulate its favour for Pakistan’s position.

However, Pakistan continued to try to gain a firmer Indonesian policy on Kashmir. When holding bilateral talks with President Suharto in Jakarta early March 1996, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto again explained Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue. Benazir Bhutto said that the Kashmir issue significant to South Asia because of the threat it posed to stability of the region. Therefore, Pakistan called upon India to resolve the problem in a meaningful dialogue in accordance with the United Nations resolutions (Pakistan Horizon 1996, 9-10). By emphasizing the importance of Kashmir for regional stability and security, Benazir Bhutto hoped to prompt Indonesia to take a more active role in the issue.

Indonesia still remained impartial on the Kashmir issue. This was noticeable in Suharto’s response to Benazir Bhutto’s approach. According to the Indonesian president, Indonesia was concerned by prolonged armed conflicts and violence in several Muslim countries, including Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Kurdistan. Regarding the role Indonesia would play in Kashmir, Suharto repeated his erstwhile commitment to endorse a peaceful settlement between India and Pakistan, but would only involve in a mediation process if asked by both sides (Asia Times 11 March 1996).

The Kashmir problem was not discussed at the OIC’s foreign ministerial meeting held at Jakarta in December 1996 (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1996). It was reported that before the conference Jakarta had been willing to discuss sensitive issues such as Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, the Indian embassy in Jakarta released a statement saying that it would be unacceptable for India’s domestic problems to be raised at the Islamic forum that had no locus standi in Kashmir affairs. Jakarta subsequently declined the agenda, sparking an appeal from Pakistani diplomats in Jakarta, which resulted in the Kashmiri delegation being allowed to attend but not

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address the conference (Kompas 9 December 1996). This sent a message that Jakarta continued to balance foreign policy towards India and Pakistan.

Indonesia remained reluctant to actively participate in a resolution to the Kashmir conflict, despite its interest in promoting the countries Islamic identity in the early 1990’s, as demonstrated by its involvement in the OIC (see again Chapter Five). Undoubtedly the most convincing reason for this was the continued focus on geopolitical considerations in Suharto’s foreign policy, which focused only on those issues affecting Indonesia’s immediate regional stability and security. This did not include Kashmir. This position was further illustrated by Indonesia’s willing intervention in the Moro separatist problem in the Southern Philippines. In this case Jakarta had been willing to use the country’s Muslim identity to smooth the peace process, and promote regional stability.

In May 1974 Indonesia made a proposal to President Ferdinand Marcos to settle the Moro problem, but this did not result in a solution. Later, to the dismay of Jakarta, the Philippines government sought to resolve the issue by asking Middle East countries under the umbrella of the OIC for their assistance. Unhappy with this approach, Indonesia committed to continue observing developments in Moro, but declined to participate any further in the resolution (Sukma 2006, 72). However in 1993, Indonesia re-engaged in Moro when Suharto approached President Cory Aquino to recommence the peace process. Jakarta formed and chaired a task force consisting of ASEAN diplomats that was assigned to organize peace talks for Moro. Between 1993 and 1996, mediations were held in Jakarta, and in September 1996 a peace agreement was signed by the Philippines government and the secessionist movement, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (Perwita 2007, 125).

According to Wiryono, a senior Indonesian diplomat who had taken part in the Moro peace mediation, the key to Indonesia’s success as a mediator, was that despite Jakarta’s nonalignment policy with either party, Indonesia promoted its identity as a Muslim

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majority country in order to be easily accepted by MNLF, but ceased listening to what Muslims in Moro really wanted. Towards Manila, Jakarta displayed the goodwill of a fellow ASEAN member helping to solve its problem, this was important because instability of one country could possibly cause insecurity for the whole region (Republika 27 December 1996). It showed that Islamic identity was used pragmatically when it was considered to be a significant factor in accomplishing Indonesia’s geopolitical interests.

Indonesian Muslim Solidarity for Kashmir The response of Muslim societal groups was different to the government’s passive and impartial response towards India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The Indonesian Muslim community was more assertive about expressing its views, and extending actions, based on Islamic solidarity with Kashmiri Muslims’ struggle for self-rule. There was a history of pro-Pakistan feeling drawing on the Islamic identity, with groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama launching an anti-Indian campaign when the war over Kashmir initially broke out in September 1965. However, the anti-Indian actions did not appear in Indonesian public’s response to India’s violent police actions against indigenous intifada in Kashmir in early 1990. Suharto’s repressive crackdown on dissenting Islamic voices may have been responsible for this silence.

Nevertheless, this did not mean that there was no voice at all. For instance, Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World, KISDI)10 acknowledged that as well empathizing with the Muslim plight in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Moro, the Muslim struggle in Kashmir was also of deep concern. This view about the Kashmir problem was quite similar to Pakistan’s position; but Information about whether KISDI had links with Pakistan is not available. This pro-Pakistan outlook may have been shaped by attachment to the Muslim cause in Kashmir. The KISDI claimed that it represented the majority of Indonesian Muslim opinions about the Kashmir issue.

10 See again Chapter Four on the background and activities of KISDI. 205

The KISDI argued that the roots of conflict in Kashmir had begun with the partition in 1947. Essentially the problem of Kashmir was the legacy of the high-handed policy of India under the Hindu ultranationalist Congress Party during the August 1947 partition of the subcontinent. When the former states of British India were given the option of choosing India or Pakistan, the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir initially decided to be independent. Yet, in October 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir was coerced into acceding to India, later the king insisted that such an accession conditional on a plebiscite by the majority Muslim subjects (KISDI 1993, 2). This reflects the similar reading of the origin of the Kashmir dispute held by KISDI and Pakistan.

Soon after the undeclared war between India and Pakistan in 1948, the UNSC passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and a referendum for Kashmir. Initially, India agreed to a plebiscite, however later, in 1954, New Delhi renounced it unilaterally. The most ominous development in the Indian subcontinent in the early 1990s had been the rising tide of Hindu extremism in Indian politics, and its repercussions for Kashmir. This was obvious in the demolition of the historic 16th century Ayodhya Mosque of Uttar Pradesh in December 1992 by the Hindu militants, and in cases of Indian violations of human rights, including rapes, arson, and torture (KISDI 1993, 4-5). This information is quite similar to what many in Pakistan believe are the facts of the Kashmir conflict.

The KISDI (1993, 9) indicated its radical position in dealing with what was happening in Kashmir. According to KISDI, the sad story of Muslims in Kashmir was only one example of sorrow experienced by Muslim brothers and sisters in Kashmir. KISDI argued that the grief felt by Kashmiri Muslims was not heard by the international community, because it was dominated by Jewish economic and political norms and systems. For this reason, KISDI urged that the Muslim world, in particular the Indonesian government that represented the most populous Muslim society in the world, to take collective actions to liberate Kashmir, The use of the word liberation suggested

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that KISDI supported the radical sections of the Kashmiri insurgents and the Pakistani government.

KISDI’s idea is significant as an alternative reading of the origins and solutions to the Kashmir dispute. However, it did not change the Indonesian government’s attitude towards Kashmir. The KISDI’s position was not substantial enough to put enough pressure upon the Indonesian government in order to alter its response to the Kashmir issue. This is because, in spite of declaring itself as an Islamic pressure group (Sumargono 1998, v-vii) and having published its discourse of the Kashmir issue, KISDI did not make further attempts to mobilize Indonesian Muslims action to demonstrate their sympathy towards Kashmiri Muslims. Like KISDI, other Indonesian Muslim groups, such as the ICMI and Muhammadiyah, as well as critical individuals, seemed reluctant to strongly promote the Kashmir issue to the Indonesian public. Hence, the Kashmiri struggle went virtually unnoticed.

To some extent this reluctance of Indonesian Muslims, can be related to the fact that more attention was paid to other issues pertinent to Islam and Muslims, such as the civil war in Bosnia, which took place during the same time as the violence in Kashmir. In the eyes of Indonesian Muslims, the Bosnian conflict reflected their long-held conviction that the West, particularly the US, was perpetuating animosity towards Islam. The feeling of anti-Western and/or anti-American sentiment was one factor behind the Indonesian Muslims’ hard-hearted voices. Because this emotion was not reproduced in the case of Kashmir, the reactions to the issue were relatively weak.

For example, daily mass demonstrations were organized by various Indonesian Muslim groups during August 1992 to protest against the violence being committed by the Serbian military in Bosnia. The Muslim crowds spoke loudly of the West’s hypocrisy towards Muslim countries. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US eagerly pushed the United Nations to pass resolutions against Saddam. In the case of Bosnia however, it took no serious measures (Jawa Pos 19 August 1992). Muslim leaders urged the

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Indonesian government to take concrete action to respond to the concerning situation in Bosnia (Berita Buana 20 May 1992).

The increasing demand for action caught Suharto’s attention. It was noticeable in the president’s inaugural address to the nonalignment summit in Jakarta on 1 September 1992. Suharto said that a speedy and resolute action was needed to stop the Bosnian tragedy, and to uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and cultural heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Indonesian president further urged the UNSC to give the necessary authority and support for the Secretary General to restore peace in Bosnia. Suharto also advised the NAM members to play a more active role in resolving the Bosnian conflict (The Jakarta Post 2 September 1992). This response indicated that when the Muslim public articulated strong demands to the government, favourable responses to Islamic-related issues could result, even though Islamic solidarity was not expressed.

The Kargil Crisis (1999) and Indonesian Response The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan added a new dimension to the strategic situation: India tested nuclear weapons on 11 and 13 May, Pakistan responded quickly with its own nuclear tests within the month. This ignited criticisms around the world, and triggered sanctions by both countries’ donors, and trading partners, especially the US and Japan (AFP News 28 May 1998). Also, the Kashmir problem took on a nuclear dimension. Large-scale international criticisms and pressure were directed at both Pakistan and India. Nonetheless, the US quietly continued urging Islamabad and New Delhi toward dialogue (The News 7 July 1998).

As a result, both sides had concluded the Lahore Declaration on 21 February 1999, in which India and Pakistan vowed, among other things, to intensify efforts for promoting talks on outstanding bilateral issues, including Kashmir, and to alert each other of

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further arm tests (Lahore Declaration 1999). The Lahore episode raised hope for better India and Pakistan relations in the wake of the violence in Kashmir.

To the consternation of the international community, the Lahore Declaration was soon violated. Again on 11 April 1999 India tested its long-range Agni missile, and on 14 and 15 April, Pakistan followed with its long-range Ghauri and medium-range Shaheen missiles. A day later, India conducted another ballistic missile test. This exchange reignited international concern about the prospects of an arms race on the subcontinent. Most importantly, the Kashmir conflict could now involve nuclear weapons. The peaceful talks of the Lahore summit had completely disintegrated (Press Trust of India 28 December 1999).

This show of force was followed by the outbreak of limited war over Kargil between India and Pakistan. Pakistan launched an operation to help support militant forces with artillery and logistics, probably involving Pakistani military personnel as well, to seize the mountainous areas on the de facto India-Pakistan border in Kargil (Lieven 2002, 115). The Pakistani military leadership was convinced at that time that an attack would not be responded by India. If India responded, Pakistan and its allies could neutralize the attack. Moreover, the Pakistani military had felt deeply aggrieved by the Indians who had exploited the internal crisis in East Pakistan, ignored the 1972 Simla Agreement by capturing the Siachen Glacier, planned pre-emptive attacks on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in the guise of the 1987 Brasstacks exercise, and oppressed the Kashmiri peoples for decades. All this was complicated by the fact that the international community had always allowed India to get away with such perceived injustices (Lavoy 2009, 66-7).

In the early week of May 1999 some herdsmen alerted the Indian security forces of the presence of the Pakistani military next to the village of Gharkun in the Kargil area of Kashmir. In spite of underestimating the accuracy of this information, the Indian military authorities sent out a patrol, and on 4 May they discovered possible intruders.

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Quickly, other infiltrators were detected in neighbouring sectors. To further confirm the existence of Pakistani forces, larger patrols were carried out to examine the extent and scope of the incursions. Nonetheless, in the last week of May the Indian military leaders realized the full extent of the activities of the Pakistani infiltrators, and their engagement of the Islamist forces of Lashkar-e-Toiba (Tellis 2001, 7-18). Thereafter, the Indian Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS) concluded that the intruders had to be militarily countered. The conflict that then broke out between May and July 1999 is known as the Kargil crisis. Although, there was no official declaration of war from either India or Pakistan, the armed clashes were costly in terms of victims and materials. India lost 1,174 military personnel and Pakistan lost 772 (Ganguly & Hagerty 2005, 143).

The ground war was accompanied by India launching a diplomatic offensive to mobilize international opinion against Pakistan, which it alleged to have once again endeavoured to alter the status quo by dispatching Mujahideens into Indian territories, therefore violating the ceasefire line in Kashmir. This diplomacy was noticeably successful. The G-8 countries held that Pakistan was responsible for the military confrontations in Kargil, and described Islamabad’s intrusion attempt as irresponsible. The European Union called for the immediate withdrawal of the Mujahideens. The US regarded Pakistan as the instigator and insisted that the status quo be unconditionally restored. Relinquishing to mounting international pressure for withdrawal, Prime Minister Sharif rushed to Washington and on 4 July 1999, signed a joint statement with President Clinton affirming the reestablishment of the ceasefire line in accordance with the 1972 Simla Agreement (Mallika 2001, 233-42).

Indonesia also paid attention to the nuclear proliferation issue involving India and Pakistan that had preceded the Kargil crisis. The continuation of regional stability and security became the parameter for Indonesian responses to international conflict; Jakarta reacted to the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India in May 1998. A diplomat in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that Pakistan and India had broken their

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own commitment to non-proliferation, and that the tests by the two rivals demonstrated that they were once again going head-to-head over Kashmir. Furthermore, the Indonesian diplomat commented that other parts of the region would also be drawn in (ANTARA 3 June 1998).

ASEAN, which is the major political and security forum of Southeast Asian countries, reacted harshly following the Kargil crisis by threatening to disassociate both Pakistan and India from the sectoral and dialogue partnership they were developing (India Today 9 August 1999). In the eyes of Indonesian foreign policy officials11 ASEAN’s reaction reflected the conclusion that this potential threat could expand into an interregional problem. The question arose in the minds of Indonesian and ASEAN diplomats of whether or not the Kashmir issue could be resolved, or mitigated, in a bilateral agenda away from the multilateral processes. Kashmir, at this point, had been held hostage in India-Pakistan relations, resulting in continuing tensions between the two countries.

Although reacting assertively to the development in the subcontinent between 1998 and 1999, Indonesia and ASEAN did not want to quit engagement with Pakistan and India. As such there was only a warning on the danger of nuclear proliferation. At the ASEAN meeting held at Singapore in August 1999, opportunities were provided for the Indian and Pakistani delegations to explain their respective positions on nuclear issues. In the declaration issued on 8 August, ASEAN noted that the two nuclear powers had pledged to ease their tensions and discuss their differences in a constructive manner (ASEAN Secretariat 1999). ASEAN became more accommodative after the talks and continued to promote dialogue rather than sanctions. Certainly, the Kargil episode had increased the strategic importance of both Pakistan and India to ASEAN. As an Indonesian diplomat for ASEAN emphasized ‘ignoring and excluding Pakistan and India from the regional security dialogue will bring more negative consequences than facilitating them to sit down and talk…’12.

11 From interviews with some Indonesian diplomats in charge of ASEAN Regional Forum affairs, carried out in January 2010. 12 This opinion was conveyed in an interview carried out in February 2010. 211

The Kashmir Issue after 11 September 2001 General Pervez Musharraf took over governance from Nawaz Sharif through a bloodless military coup in October 1999. The new leadership of Pakistan was inclined to negotiate with India on the Kashmir issue. Musharraf took an important step by meeting with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Agra on 4 July 2001. The talk did not produce a viable solution but there were signs of improvement in the relationship. The draft of the Agra Declaration being considered stated that the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir would pave the way to the normalization of relations between Pakistan and India (Effendi 2006, 106). However hostilities between the two countries continued during 2001, and no fruitful diplomatic efforts were made.

Peaceful dialogue with India became a more pressing option for Pakistan in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, which were also followed by suicide attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly in October, and the Indian parliament two months later. Angered by the terrorists’ attacks, the American government launched the global war on terrorism, intending to hunt down Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda networks for their alleged involvement in organizing terrorism against the US. Military operations were undertaken by the superpower, first in Afghanistan to destroy the Islamist government of the Taliban, believed to have provided shelter for al-Qaeda. In this campaign, Washington left the world with two choices, become friends or enemies. India, claiming to have long suffered from militants’ terrorism, and the victim of two terror attacks after 11 September 2001, was quick to declare its full backing of the US. New Delhi attempted to establish an informal alliance with Washington. Premier Vajpayee proposed that Washington expand its war against terrorism to include the Pakistani-sponsored militants’ terror in Kashmir (India Today 15 October 2001).

In this situation, ushering jihadist violence in the Indian-governed Kashmir was an indefensible option for Pakistan. The events in America and India changed the dynamics of the region, and led to the blurring of the moral distinction between freedom

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fighters and terrorists. Under the new rule, states were more responsible for terrorist groups operating within their borders, and Pakistan could no longer take the risk of involvement with jihadist troops. Moreover, between December 2001 and July 2002, India threatened to wage a limited conventional war on Pakistan unless Islamabad terminated its support for what New Delhi portrayed as cross-border terrorism. Leveraging its threat of war on Pakistan effectively, New Delhi forced Islamabad to crack down on jihadist groups inciting war against the Indian government in Kashmir (Hussain 2007, 103-4). Islamabad was aware of the political and physical costs of the continuing use of militant force in Kashmir, and promised to permanently end its backing for armed militancy in the valley (Lieven 2002, 116), providing that India agreed to find a negotiated solution to the Kashmir dispute.

Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime from Kabul, Islamabad was faced with the US’ long-term interests in Southwest Asia, making Pakistan conform through the moderation of enmity towards India. For America, long standing proposals for building a trans-Asian gas pipeline would only be feasible if Pakistan and India supported the creation of peaceful interaction between Afghanistan and its neighbours (Hussain 2007, 105). Washington’s policy on fostering reduced tensions between India and Pakistan was during the visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell to Islamabad and New Delhi in October 2001, to urge restraint by both sides following the bombing of the Kashmir state assembly. India and Pakistan were engaged in a military standoff triggered by the militant attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001. In order to help ease tensions the American Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, was sent to India and Pakistan, this was followed by a visit from Secretary Powell and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in June 2002, all with the same mission (Schaffer 2009).

These efforts of high-ranking American policy makers reflected Washington’s interest in the peace negotiations between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, with its weak economy, polarized society and polity, flailing support from the international Islamic bloc, and China’s support for the US’ policy in Afghanistan, had no choice but to facilitate a

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peaceful settlement in Kashmir. In fact, the follow-up to this position included financial relief and a more sympathetic view on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Musharraf indicated agreement for talks with India, however he insisted that Pakistan’s policy on protecting and promoting the Kashmir cause would not change (Mudiam 2003, 270). Perhaps, this means that Islamabad, despite readiness to reduce tensions with New Delhi, would never withdraw from the position it has gained in Kashmir; neither allowing the Kashmir valley to be an independent state nor an accession to India.

India and Pakistan restarted their peace efforts. Although a slow process, these diplomatic efforts moved steadily ahead. In early 2003, Musharraf attempted to convince India of his good intention. Prime Minister Vajpayee responded favourably. In March the Indian prime minister at the conference of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) information ministers held at New Delhi, called upon South Asian countries to promote economic cooperation, despite political differences (Daily Star 12 November 2003). Vajpayee went on with his positive response by giving a speech one month later in the Indian part of Kashmir, saying that he was willing to look forward after 18 months of hostilities (BBC News 2 January 2004). President Musharraf followed up by projecting a flexible approach towards Kashmir. In a radio interview with BBC, Musharraf assured India of patience, sincerity, and flexibility in Kashmir. The Pakistani leader offered to set aside all options unacceptable for India, including the implementation of referendum in Kashmir, and allowing the people of Kashmir to develop a consensual solution (BBC News 18 December 2003).

The willingness of both sides to talk increased confidence-building momentum between India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Vajpayee, in an interview broadcast by Pakistan’s state television, said that he was willing to discuss the dispute over Kashmir with President Musharraf. Reportedly Pakistan took serious note of this remark. At the SAARC summit held at Islamabad in January 2004, Pakistan did not raise the Kashmir issue; India reciprocated this gesture with prudence by not holding Pakistan directly responsible for sponsoring terrorism (BBC News 3 January 2004). President Musharraf

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and Premier Vajpayee signed a joint statement on 6 January at the informal session of the SAARC summit. This was similar to the Lahore meeting that had created a more optimistic atmosphere for the two sides to promote peace. The two leaders agreed on the resumption of a composite dialogue to discuss bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir (BBC News 6 January 2004). This promise would be implemented by some confidence-building measures, comprising of a ceasefire line along the demarcation in Kashmir, recommencement of diplomatic talks, and the opening of transportation links between the two sides (Xinhua News 18 March 2004).

Musharraf continued his pronouncement of peace with India. When talking to Indian journalists in New Delhi on 18 April 2005, Musharraf proposed a three-step mechanism to solve the Kashmir problem; 1) the governments of India and Pakistan had to achieve a consensus; 2) if it needs to include people’s voices, there should be public debate and support, and 3) to identify the final objective which could involve issues of independence, self-governance, autonomy, and joint control. These all have different connotations, and therefore should be analysed in a deeper context. Later in May, Musharraf emphasized that Pakistan, India, and the Kashmiri peoples should accept the final objective as enough effort had been made. In response, the new Indian Premier Manmohan Singh said that India would be willing to continue the peace talks as long as its position was respected. Musharraf went further with his proposals. On 5 December 2006 he declared an offer for demilitarization and autonomy in Kashmir. In February 2007, Musharraf with a persuasive tone said that Kashmir was ready for resolution and reconciliation. Until this stage, India had not made any breakthroughs in responding to Musharraf’s persuasion. New Delhi persistently felt dissatisfied with Musharraf’s commitment to prevent the crossing of militants into Indian territories. Indians called it a slowing down, rather than a turning off, of the jihadi tap (Behuria 2009, 438-40).

Domestic political turmoil, which plagued Musharraf’s leadership throughout 2007 eventually, forced him to resign in mid 2008. The decline of Musharraf’s popularity was coupled by the weakness in his peace discourse on Kashmir. However, his peace

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initiatives produced progressive outcomes, in particular with the holding of Pakistan and India composite dialogues. Until Musharraf resignation there had been four rounds of composite dialogue aimed at improving bilateral relations between Islamabad and New Delhi, which included the involvement of business and civil sectors. Nonetheless, the Congress government of India did not appear to be discussing issues beyond normalizing civil and business ties. The dispute over Kashmir became stagnant due to India’s unwillingness to move forward with a concrete settlement (Gul 2008, 11). Musharraf, however, had tried to show an open mind and constructive attitude towards Kashmir, but the settlement of the Kashmir dispute needed each party’s acceptance to enable negotiations to be productive.

The Indonesian Governmental Response The government in Jakarta continues to follow the developments in Kashmir. After the collapse of Suharto’s New Order, there was a hope for a change in Indonesian attitude towards issues-related to Muslims, including Kashmir. However, the successive governments under the presidency of B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tended to preserve the direction encouraged by the New Order government. In relation to the Kashmir issue, Jakarta still remains impartial. On some occasions, the Indonesian government has stated a willingness to play a mediating role between India and Pakistan, but only if requested by them. Since India has never wanted to allow a third party’s involvement in Kashmir, the Indonesian position has merely been a symbolic value of goodwill, in fact there is a sustaining trend to pursue a balanced position towards Pakistan and India.

In September 1999 Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue in the 54th session of the United Nations General Assembly meeting, with an agenda of promoting international intervention, as had been done in the Indonesian Province of East Timor less than one month before. Pakistani Foreign Minister launched a lengthy comparison between the crisis in East Timor and Indian-controlled Kashmir territory. Laying claim to the recently proposed concept of humanitarian intervention by Secretary General

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Kofi Annan, Pakistan tried to make the case that one was needed in Kashmir, a plan that has been in the United Nations for 50 years. In Sartaj Aziz’s words, ‘human rights must be upheld, not only in Kosovo and East Timor, but also in Kashmir…’ (IPS News 24 September 1999).

Indian officials had been quick to dismiss any parallels between the problems in East Timor and Kashmir. Indian Foreign Minister Jashwant Singh voiced concern about the recent humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and East Timor, arguing that the new theories and postulating about intervention needed to be debated fully, and not selectively applied. In his official address to the General Assembly, Jashwant Singh said that India along with other Developing countries, such as China and Algeria, were worried about military deployments in Kosovo as an example that could hurt national sovereignty. Furthermore, the era of the state is still not over, and the United Nations should not be perceived as a super body that provides a viable substitution to sovereign states, with their continuingly crucial roles (IPS News 24 September 1999).

At the time the Indonesian government under President Habibie did not take seriously the discourse of comparing the case in Kashmir and East Timor. This was because they were too busy handling the real political developments in East Timor; specifically issues surrounded the referendum for the East Timorese. To the great surprise of the Indonesians, East Timor decided to separate. The independence of East Timor became the impetus for other regions with long-running secessionist feelings to exercise their rights of self-rule, such as Aceh and West Papua. The ethno-secessionist group of Acehnese, called Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (the Free Aceh Movement, GAM), had long dreamed of making an Islamic state in Aceh Province, separated from Jakarta. The GAM’s struggle started in the early 1950s along with the Darul Islam insurgencies. Under Sukarno and Suharto, it was heavily suppressed through military actions. However, since democracy was installed under Habibie in 1998 GAM has obtained a new momentum to consolidate its power and demands. The Acehnese problem was internationalized through GAM’s links with separatist groups residing in neighbouring

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countries, such as in the Southern Philippines, Malaysia, Southern Thailand, and Sri Lanka (Wardhani 2006).

This tendency was an existential problem for the Indonesian government. Moreover, the fact that the loss of East Timor was made possible by foreign powers’ interference led to a more profound non-interference sentiment in Indonesia’s foreign policy. President Wahid was not interested in becoming involved in the Kashmir issue. When Musharraf visited Jakarta on 31 March 2000, he briefed Wahid on his plan to bring Pakistan back on the road of progress and development in the Kashmir situation. At a joint press statement with Wahid, the Pakistani leader emphasized Pakistan’s goodwill to talk with India in a bid to resolve the Kashmir problem. Pakistan needed support to force India to negotiate on Kashmir (BBC News 31 March 2000). In response, Wahid affirmed that Indonesia would not intervene in another state’s internal affairs. Indonesia was always consistent with its nonalignment policy. However, Wahid indicated that his government supported Pakistan’s goodwill in promoting dialogue with India (Kompas 31 March 2000).

Wahid made a visit to Islamabad two months later. While addressing a press conference with Musharraf, the Indonesian leader took the diplomatic path on the Kashmir issue. Wahid declared that Indonesia was taking the position of Pakistan in which everything should be discussed with India. In response to a question on what Indonesia’s official stance on Kashmir was, Wahid stated they were ‘on the side of Pakistanis without taking offence to the Indians…’. This position was affirmed by expressing Indonesian preparedness to mediate between India and Pakistan as long as the request came from both sides, and not only from Pakistan. This was because Indonesia maintained no policies of unilateral intervention in its foreign policy (The Hindu 17 June 2000). Wahid surely understood that this neutral position would neither be interpreted as ignorance by Pakistan, nor regarded as interventionist from the Indian side.

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Wahid’s disagreement with foreign intervention bought his policy in line with India to some extent. Speaking at a joint press conference with the visiting Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in Jakarta, January 2001, Wahid repeated his government’s reluctance to become engaged in the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, by saying that Indonesia was tied to the existing international laws and treaties abiding India and Pakistan. Indonesia and India were facing a comparable problems, the reference was made between the separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua. Thus, according to Wahid, on this basis the two countries understood each other. Implicitly, Wahid recognized that Kashmir was the domain of Indian domestic affairs. He was confident making this statement after the Indian prime minister openly pledged to support Indonesian national integration (ANTARA 15 January 2001). The Indian support was an important achievement for Wahid trying to counter the internationalization of secessionism in the country.

Wahid was unable to settle the problem in Aceh. Vice President Megawati, who replaced him in July 2001, faced the growing intensity of ethno-nationalist aspirations of the Acehnese. In mid 2001, information circulated in Jakarta that GAM made use of Indian territories, especially an isolated group of islands in Nicobar, for gunrunning into Aceh. This meant that the Aceh problem had an international dimension that concerned India. Additionally, Acehnese rebels had been involved in pirating commercial ships stopping in Aceh’s waters before going onward to the Malacca Strait. GAM’s actions were aimed attracting funding, as well as announcing its political existence (Brewster 2011, 232). The spokesman for GAM in East Aceh Ishak Daud admitted that all ships sailing the Malacca Strait had to ask permission from GAM otherwise they would be attacked (AFP News 3 September 2001).

The Megawati government expressed concern at the issue of arms smuggling into Aceh from Nicobar. In response, the Indian government claimed to have evidence of the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan helping the Islamic Acehnese insurgents to get weapons. Notwithstanding that such an assertion has never been proven, New Delhi

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offered to conduct a joint patrol in Sumatra, Andaman and Nicobar waters. This led Indonesia and India to reach an agreement to undertake coordinated naval patrols in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, as well as the northern entrance to the Malacca Strait (Brewster 2011, 233). The first coordinated naval patrols were undertaken in September 2002 to check for arms smuggling and drug trafficking (The Jakarta Post 5 September 2002). This security cooperation was practical, but also had strategic value for Megawati’s policy in countering the impact of the internationalization of the secessionist threat in Aceh.

The security cooperation with India implicated Indonesia’s Kashmir policy. With the separatist movement at home, Megawati was not likely to support Pakistan in Kashmir, as a way of keeping India collaborating in the handling of the internationalized Acehnese problem. The Megawati government chose to continue Wahid’s neutral approach to the lingering India-Pakistan problem in Kashmir. Indonesia, under Megawati, supported Pakistan’s initiative to talk with India over Kashmir without expressing Islamic solidarity with the latter. In June 2002 President Musharraf dispatched his special envoy Najmuddin Shaikh to Jakarta to meet with President Megawati, and handed over his letter seeking Indonesia’s support to defuse tensions with India. When speaking to the press in Jakarta on 6 June, the Pakistani emissary indicated that the essence of the letter called upon Indonesia to advise India to exercise restraint and to resume dialogue rather than to escalate an engagement with a show of force. Megawati reportedly promised to do whatever Indonesia could to assist with a reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan (ANTARA 7 June 2002). Furthermore, the Indonesian president reiterated the commitment of her predecessors, a willingness to mediate the Kashmir dispute at the request of both India and Pakistan (Kompas 10 June 2002).

When visiting South Asia in December 2003, Megawati had not yet fostered any efforts to mediate India and Pakistan over Kashmir. At a joint statement with President Musharraf, the Indonesian leader only mentioned the need for resolving all the disputed

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matters between India and Pakistan, especially over Kashmir, through a positive and constructive dialogue process (PPI News 15 December 2003). This was all that Indonesia could do to show its encouraging intention on the Kashmir issue. To mediate between India and Pakistan without Indian approval would offend India, and would violate the principle of non-interference that directed Indonesia’s foreign policy.

President Yudhoyono came to power in October 2004. Soon afterward, the secessionist movement in Aceh no longer posed a national problem. Following the devastating tsunami in December 2004, which destroyed the separatist military basis along the western coastal areas of Sumatra Island, there was no rise in international dimensions of the Aceh problem for the Yudhoyono government. A peace agreement was achieved in early 2005, though which the central government granted Aceh a special autonomy status, including the implementation of shari’a for the Acehnese. It was however apparent that Yudhoyono did not change Indonesia’s Kashmir policy; the Kashmir issue even disappeared from Jakarta-Islamabad talks. When visiting Pakistan in November 2005, Yudhoyono discussed with Musharraf the enhancement of economic and security cooperation between Indonesia and Pakistan (AP News 25 November 2005). Similarly, President Musharraf did not discuss the Kashmir problem on a visit to Jakarta in January 2007 (ANTARA 31 January 2007).

This inattentiveness can be explained by considering both sides’ policy. From Pakistan’s side, Islamabad had affirmed its commitment not to raise the Kashmir issue with ASEAN member countries. This was made by Pakistan in pursuance of its dialogue partner status within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At a meeting in Yogyakarta in May 2004, Foreign Minister, Kurshid Kasuri of Pakistan, approved a request by ASEAN that Pakistan not to speak of Kashmir in ARF discussions, because it would cause an unnecessary quarrel with India, which had been therein since 1996 (Kompas 12 May 2004). The ARF was important for Islamabad’s effort to counter the propagation of Indian influence and interests in Southeast Asia, especially in terms of disrupting the regional states’ good perception about Pakistan. Pakistan was accepted as

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a member of ARF in July 2004 (Yahya 2004, 365), since then the Kashmir situation has never been raised in Pakistan-ASEAN meetings. When addressing the Pakistani community in Jakarta, President Musharraf said again that the best forum to discuss and manage the Kashmir issue was the ongoing composite dialogue between Pakistan and India (BBC News 31 January 2007).

Indonesia, which has long held an impartial attitude towards Kashmir, and the willingness of Islamabad and New Delhi to overcome their differences through bilateral dialogue, was a positive development that had to be supported. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda said ‘the involvement of a third party unwanted by each side will only aggravate the situations in the subcontinent…’ (Kompas 13 May 2004). Indonesia, therefore, had no moral obligation to intervene in the two parties’ dispute.

Apart from this, the enhancement of Indian-Indonesian relations under President Yudhoyono was also an important factor in Indonesia’s hesitance to become involved in the Kashmir issue. In securing the prospects of strengthened ties with India, Jakarta needed to ensure it did not offend New Delhi’s position in Kashmir. Jakarta and New Delhi launched a strategic partnership scheme on 23 November 2005 covering cooperation in defence, economic, and technology sectors (The Jakarta Post 24 November 2005). The strategic partnership placed economic links as top priority. This was made a reality through the two-way trade between Indonesia and India. Joint commission meetings were set up annually to monitor the progress of this program. A report published after the third joint commission meeting held at Jakarta in June 2007 showed significant growth in both sides’ trade volume, from US$ 3.93 billion in 2005 to US$ 4.79 billion in 2006. The balance of trade was in favour of Indonesia in 2006 with the surplus of US$ 2.99 billion. With this achievement, optimism arose between Indonesia and India that they would be able to boost two-way trade volume above US$ 10 billion by 2015 (The Jakarta Post 19 June 2007). In the light of such a promising partnership with India, it is still highly unlikely that Indonesia will undertake policies that would upset India, such as supporting the Islamic cause in Kashmir.

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Indonesian Muslim Solidarity for Kashmir Unlike the government that was passive on the Kashmir issue, some elements of the Indonesian Muslim public maintain endorsement for Kashmiri Muslim’s struggle, and indicate support for Pakistan. This is visible in the expressions of Muslim activists affiliated with Dewan Dakwah13 and its Kashmir Solidarity Forum (KSF) of Indonesia. While they did not organize mass rallies to demonstrate their views and feelings about the Kashmir issue, they were involved in activities such as seminars, at which the Kashmir problem was discussed, and carrying out fundraising for humanitarian purposes.

The KSF was introduced to the public in 1999. Upon its establishment, KSF which was then led by a Dewan Dakwah figure Mohammad Zahir Khan, was a social network of Indonesian Muslims who cared about Kashmir. The membership included people with a similar vision of advocating for the rights of Kashmiris to self-determination, there is no compulsion for sympathizers of the forum’s mission to contribute financially or join the gatherings. The nature of the sponsorship is free and voluntary. This forum is a purely moral movement of Indonesians in support of the Kashmiri struggle (ANTARA 7 February 2001). Zahir Khan the leader of KSF was noticeably the most outspoken Indonesian Muslim activist articulating the Kashmir issue in the country. He was born on 31 January 1947 in Asembagus Situbondo East Java. After completing basic education in Situbondo and Jember, Zahir undertook double degrees in English and Law at Gadjah Mada University Yogyakarta (graduated in 1967 and 1968 respectively). As an English scholar and lawyer he developed an academic and professional career at several institutions, such as the Islamic University of Mohammad Natsir Jakarta and STIAMI. Zahir has been a Muslim activist since he was at Yogyakarta, as highlighted by his involvement with the establishment of Muhammadiyah Student Association. In addition, Zahir’s Islamic credentials are clear, as demonstrated by the important positions he still holds, for instance, leader of the Iqbal Academy Jakarta since 1988,

13 On the origin and development of Dewan Dakwah, see again Chapter Four. 223

chair of ICMI branch (1997-1998) of the Netherlands, foreign relations director of the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood Movement (2000-2005), and secretary general of Dewan Dakwah since 2005 (Khan 2006, 84-6).

Zahir Khan published a book in 2004, titled Kashmir under Indian Occupation, which reveals his notions on the Kashmir issue. The book makes obvious that Zahir has a strong anti-Indian position. For instance, he describes what the Indian security forces have done to Kashmiri Muslims as systematic state-backed violence and terrorism. Like the KISDI, which showed a pro-Pakistan attitude, Zahir also refers to the ways of thinking commonly encountered in many Pakistanis regarding the background against which the Kashmir conflict emerged. India is presented as the invader of Jammu and Kashmir as well as an arrogant power that refuses a peaceful and just settlement of the dispute. Nonetheless, Zahir believes that negotiation and diplomacy are the best solution to the ongoing Kashmiri problem, not violence (Khan 2004, 32; 43-6). This differentiates him from the radical section of the Indonesian Muslim advocates for Kashmir.

It was reported that KSF held a one-day seminar titled ‘The Future of Kashmiri Struggle’ in Jakarta at the end of August 2001 (Editor 22 August 2001). Participants, which numbered around 200, included the representatives of the Pakistani government, scholars, journalists, and Muslim activists. The presence of Pakistan’s officials in the event fortified its symbolic significance. Pro-Pakistan views were predominant in the discussions. Nonetheless, the conveners denied that the Pakistani mission in Jakarta had sponsored the seminar. They stressed that the seminar was genuinely the manifestation of Indonesian Muslims’ solidarity with their Kashmiri brethren, despite shared opinion between the Pakistani attendants and the Indonesian Muslims.

On this occasion, Pakistani Ambassador to Indonesia Major General Mustafa Anwer Hussain, who was invited to be the keynote speaker at the seminar, thanked the Indonesian Muslims who had continued to support the government and people of

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Pakistan in seeking solutions to the Kashmir dispute. According to the ambassador, 13 million people in Kashmir had demonstrated their desire to join Pakistan since 1947. In dealing with the issue, a solution could not be separated from the 1948 United Nations resolution, the content of which still remains valid. Moreover, the ambassador added that India had declined the resolution in 1954 and rejected giving the Kashmiri people the right to self-determination (ANTARA 22 August 2001)

Mazni Yunus of Dewan Dakwah insisted the Indonesian government support Pakistan’s efforts to conduct a direct vote in Kashmir. Indonesia needed to give tangible political backing to the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims, as a part of Indonesian Muslims’ solidarity to their Muslim brothers and sisters in Kashmir. Political support for Indonesia, according to Yunus, was not entirely in terms of deployment of troops, but endorsement in international forum for Pakistan and Kashmir. More importantly, Yunus avowed that the feeling of Islamic brotherhood connected him and many other Indonesian Muslims to Kashmiri Muslims. The secular political institution called the nation-state, authorized to govern them, could not sever this kind of bond. Islam is in the hearts and minds of Muslims and would unite them everywhere. The only law that could rule Muslims is shari’a, which the secular government of Indonesia had long been denying. This is why the government did not care about Islamic solidarity with the Kashmiri Muslims’ struggle for freedom (www.dewandakwah.org).

Another seminar was convened by KSF with the theme ‘Kashmiri Struggle for Independence’. It was held in the city of Bandung West Java on 11 February 2003. No representatives from the Pakistani government were reported to have taken part. The attendants were mainly Indonesian Muslim activists of Dewan Dakwah, and some journalists. Zahir Khan presented his view on how the Indonesian government should respond to the Kashmir conflict. It was essentially the same as Yunus’s view at the previous seminar, that ‘the Indonesian government today needs to uphold tangible political support as well as the spirit of solidarity performed by President Sukarno to Pakistan and Kashmir…’. Khan emphasized that support should not be in terms of

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military aid, but rather more genuine endorsements in the international forum. He further claimed that most Muslims in Indonesia have called on the Indian government to stop terrorizing their Muslim brethren in Kashmir (OANA News 12 February 2003).

Beyond the conference room, Zahir Khan and KSF were active in gathering humanitarian aid for Kashmiri refugees. In 2005 it was reported that Zahir was able to collect donations amounting to Rp 15 million for Kashmir. This was given to the representative of the Kashmiri community at the Pakistani embassy in Jakarta on 5 February 2006 in celebration of Kashmir solidarity day. In appreciation of Zahir’s advocacy, on 23 March 2006, the Pakistani government bestowed the Tamqhai Quaid-i- Azam award on him (www.islamonline.net). This was an important episode, in which Zahir and KSF had demonstrated that the feeling of Islamic solidarity were within the Muslim ummah, regardless of the restricted scope of their movement.

Kashmir sympathizers within the Indonesian Muslim community also use information technology. This can be found in jihadist and jihad propaganda webpage appearing as arrahmah.com. This internet site, launched in 2006, claimed itself to be obliged to disseminate news and values of jihad against the enemies of the Muslim ummah through journalism. It claims that the publications in arrahmah.com are based on objective investigations into a wide range of jihad causes, promoting verifiable arguments against theories and views discrediting Islam and Muslims. Whilst also as providing an all-encompassing space for persons, whatever their identities, who love to express support for jihad. The founder and chair of this link, Mohammad Jibril Abdul Rahman, was prosecuted by the Indonesian government for his involvement in funding the July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta. The Ministry of Communication and Information had categorized arrahmah.com as a radical jihad mouthpiece. Indeed, articles available on the webpage indicate voices admiring jihadist figures such as Osama bin Laden, and communicating ideas spearheading antagonism towards the West (Jews and Christians), secular governments, and institutions that are regarded as

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infidels. Authors in the webpage promote jihad, in the form of violent fighting, as the proper way to liberate Muslims from the infidel suppression.

Nearly all articles accessible throughout arrahmah.com covering the Kashmir conflict are translations of media reports, mainly from the Kashmir Media Centre and Pakistani press. They tell stories about violence occurring in Kashmir with the majority being accounted to Indian military personnel. India is a subject of resentment, criticism, and even condemnation. On the other hand, tales of foreign jihadists in Kashmir, including Pakistani and Afghan Mujahideens, are hailed as heroic. Consequently the site does not present objectivity and neutrality in journalism.

Of the 50 to 60 writings on the Kashmir issue, there are only four opinions written by the arrahmah.com team, these are mainly from the chief editor Mohammad Fachry, and reflect its collective position towards Kashmir. It is not surprising that a pro-Pakistan view is excessively displayed. In the article titled ‘Kashmir: A Forgotten Place of Jihad’ posted on 12 March 2008, Fachry points out that the origin of the Kashmir conflict is entirely related to the Indian occupation of the Muslim land of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. In denying the rights of Kashmiri Muslims to self-rule, India has used brutal forces against civilians in the valley, including women and children, and has committed human rights crimes against the peoples of Kashmir. As the voice of the radicals, the only observable solution to the Kashmir problem in Fachry’s writing is total jihad, to punish and then expel the infidel Indians from the Muslim territories.

As a result of the limited scope of this activism, this kind of Indonesian advocacy for the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims may not affect the making and implementation of the government’s policy. Forums such as seminar, or online publications cannot be expected to obtain a lot of attention. Moreover, the chosen agenda is not very popular to the Indonesian Muslim public. It is also important to note that radical views and activities do not receive the support of the, mostly moderate, Indonesian Muslims. Hence, the Kashmiri sympathizers in Indonesia do not have enough power to influence

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the government’s decision making. There is a continuing distance between the aspiration of some elements of the Indonesian Muslim community and the government’s position on the Kashmir issue; a foreign policy that is substantially guided by the elite’s interest in material geopolitical and economic achievements.

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Chapter Seven Indonesia-Pakistan Relations And The Global War On Terrorism

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (US) brought counterterrorism into the centre-stage of world politics. Americans claimed that al- Qaeda networks led by Osama bin Laden were responsible for this act of terrorism. At that time, bin Laden was under the protection of Taliban in Afghanistan. President George W. Bush initiated a war on terrorism, intending to punish the Taliban regime for its unwillingness to hand bin Laden over to Washington. Support for Bush’s war on terrorism came from around the world. France, Japan, and NATO allies deployed their troops in the battlefield. Regional powers, such as China and India, committed to fully back the campaign. From the Muslim world, Central Asian countries – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan – provided their air bases and intelligence for the American military operation into Afghanistan. Iran also rendered intelligence assistance to Washington (Buzan 2006, 1014; Wanandi 2002, 185-6).

The government of Pakistan, having created and supported the Taliban since the 1990s, shifted its policy, and joined Washington’s alliance. Initially Pakistan approached Taliban leaders to hand bin Laden over to the US security authorities. Following this, Islamabad offered logistical and intelligence assistance for the American military operation in Afghanistan, without allowing the presence of American troops in Pakistan’s territories. Finally, the Pakistani government withdrew recognition of the Taliban following overwhelming defeat and departure from Kabul in November 2001 (Sayyid 2002, 182).

President Pervez Musharraf explained the decision in terms of the inherent dangers of not cooperating with the US. Musharraf (2006, 201-2) thought that Pakistan, with its

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weak economic and underwhelmed military power, was unable to survive an armed conflict with the US. Meanwhile, India had endeavoured to step in by offering the Americans its full assistance. Had Pakistan rejected to side with the Americans, India could have attained a strategic advantage in the situation by putting pressure on Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. Therefore, the government’s policy was to safeguard its vital interests.

In contrast to the government’s position, Islamists in Pakistan bitterly questioned and opposed the American-led war on terrorism. For example, through local media they voiced anxiety about the Bush government associating bin Laden and al-Qaeda networks with the tragedy of 11 September 2001. These were arguments based on a conspiracy theory. The Islamists were convinced that the assault on the US was designed by highly experienced and organized anti-Muslim Jewish intelligence. Bin Laden and the true Islamic Taliban were the innocent scapegoats for the anti-Islam collaborators. The primary interest behind war on terrorism was to damage the reputation of the Islamic religion (Yasmeen 2003, 193-4). The urge for jihad in defence of the Muslim ummah (community) was sounded everywhere in Pakistan. Reportedly, following the American military offensive that began on 7 October, thousands of Pakistani madrasah students crossed the border into Afghanistan to fight jihad with the Taliban (The News 10 October 2001).

However, those Islamist protests did not affect the government’s policy. Musharraf wished to improve Pakistan’s international image as a moderate Islamic state by cracking down on militant groups operating inside the country. On 12 January 2002 the Pakistani government announced the banning of six major jihadist organizations based in Pakistan, namely Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Ja’maat- al-Furqan, Sipah-i-Sahaba-i-Pakistan, and Tahrik-i-Jafariyya. Musharraf’s commitment to become an important strategic ally in Washington’s war against al-Qaeda was strengthened by controlling the activities of madrasahs in Pakistan. This was done in several ways: by asking them to conform the Islamic curricula to the government’s

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standard under the program of madrasah reform; watching their links with radical Islamist groups, especially those with external financial support; and issuing stringent regulations for student movements between local madrasahs and overseas students wanting to attend Islamic education in Pakistan (Noor 2008, 141-4).

Indonesia also responded to the war on terrorism. It responds to both the American military actions, and also the involvement of Pakistan in that campaign. After 11 September 2001 counterterrorism became an important agenda in Jakarta-Islamabad relations. This chapter intends to look in more detail at the Indonesian response to the global war on terrorism as well as examine the impact of the terrorism issue on Indonesia’s ties with Pakistan.

The argument is that the Indonesian governmental response was constrained by the rise of Islamist groups in the country. They focused on both turning the country into an Islamic state, and influencing foreign policy. The Islamists reacted strongly to the American invasion of Afghanistan. The reaction was not limited to radical groups it also included moderates who challenged the validity of the US approach. The Islamists in Indonesia also questioned the Pakistani government’s policy of aligning itself with the Americans against the Taliban. Jakarta’s response was muted and was not as forthcoming as Pakistan in joining the global war on terrorism. However after the Bali bombings the government of Indonesia began to realize the impact of radicalism on the country’s security. The realization of the impacts of transnational networks between Islamic militants in Pakistan and Indonesia led Jakarta to promote anti-terrorism cooperation with Islamabad. The increasing strategic importance of Pakistan relationship with Indonesia was, primarily underpinned by security needs, however Islam also remained an important consideration.

In this case, significant developments nationally and internationally meant that the state no longer dominated the substance of bilateral relations. Often governments must contemplate and cope with the political and security implications of connections at the

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societal level. The expanding Islamist solidarity connecting the militant groups in Pakistan and Indonesia concerned Jakarta. Democratization of Indonesia, provided more political space for radical Islamists, this took place at the same time as the rise of international terrorist networks signified by the 11 September attacks. Pursuit of common political goals between Indonesian and international militant Islamist groups, which remained dormant during the New Order governance, has become a salient issue for Jakarta.

Indonesian Changing Response to the War on Terrorism Several days after the 11 September tragedy, President Megawati Sukarnoputri visited the US. Commentators speculated if the government of the world’s most populous Muslim country would immediately participate in the war on terrorism. However, after the meeting with President Bush in the White House on 20 September 2001, Megawati made no mention of any action her government would take to support the Americans. Instead, she stated ‘…the people of Indonesia shared Americans’ and the world’s grief and outrage, and condemned terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations…’ (The Jakarta Post 21 September 2001). Thus the Indonesian governmental response at that time was not very loud.

In contrast, the Indonesian Muslim community reacted assertively against the Americans. Islamist groups, such as Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defender Front, FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin, MMI), and Laskar Jihad, reacted strongly and protested against the events evolving in Afghanistan. They fostered ideas such as jihad and daulah Islamiyya (Islamic state) coupled with paramilitary activities. The groups’ involvement in various kinds of violence led to them be labelled as radicals.

The FPI, led by Habib Rizieq Shihab, had been established by a group of Arab- Indonesian ulamas in Jakarta in August 1998. The FPI represented Indonesian Islamist’s vision that there was an urgent need for the reinforcement of shari’a on all

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Muslims in the country. Rizieq believed shari’a was the best solution to all social, economic, and political problems faced by Indonesians. Rizieq persuaded FPI’s members that the main obligation of Muslims was to uphold jihad, and combat the enemies of Islam - the repressive ruling regime and dominant foreign powers. He declared that the group’s objective was to defend Muslims everywhere from oppression (Jahroni 2004, 197-253). In reality, FPI’s activities were more ideologically oriented rather than religiously. They frequently engaged in violent mass actions against the existence of the Pancasila state, capitalism, and Westernization.

The challenges to the Pancasila state establishment were also posed by MMI. This Islamist movement was formed on 7 August 2000 in Yogyakarta. Its leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who had been figure in the Darul Islam organization, had previously fled to Malaysia in 1986 to avoid Suharto’s harsh repression. Ba’asyir spoke of the goal of MMI to unite all Muslim movements in Indonesia who shared the same ideal - to create an Islamic state (Kedaulatan Rakyat 8 August 2000). Members of MMI were mostly veterans of the Afghan war and Darul Islam supporters. Therefore, MMI was called the reincarnation of Darul Islam. Ba’asyir mentioned that da’wa (Islamic preaching) would be the main instrument to achieve his organizational goal. To expand MMI’s activism, Ba’asyir relied on the networks of madrasah alumni, especially those from Ngruki Sukoharjo Central Java. Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar uplifted the madrasah upon their return from Malaysia in early 1999. Following the death of Sungkar in September that year Ba’asyir became the director of the Islamic school.

Laskar Jihad, the movement inspired by Jafar Umar Thalib’s experience fighting jihad in Afghanistan, was another pillar of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia. Upon arrival from Afghanistan in 1989, Jafar was active in expanding the teaching of Salafi Wahhabi in Indonesia. He announced the founding of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (the Communication Forum for the Sunni, FKAWJ) on 14 February 1999 in Solo (Jawa Pos 15 February 1999). This aimed to respond to social and political changes happening in Indonesian Muslim society after the fall of President Suharto. Soon however, Jafar was reengaged in violent jihad projects, especially when

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ethnic conflict involving Christians and Muslims broke out in Ambon Maluku Province. On 30 January 2000 Laskar Jihad was named as the paramilitary wing of FKAWJ in Yogyakarta. The Laskar opened recruiting centres for jihadists in cities such as Bogor, Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta. In a mass rally of Laskar Jihad that took place in Jakarta in April 2000, Jafar claimed that there were 3,000 jihadists ready to fight against Christians who had killed Muslims in Ambon (Gatra 25 March 2002, 66-8). Although Jafar was not obsessed with overthrowing the legitimate government, his militant pursuit of jihad meant fighting against non-Muslims that oppressed Muslims (Umam 2006, 23).

When American forces entered Afghanistan during the Ramadan holy month, members of FPI, MMI, and Laskar Jihad gathered on major streets of cities like Bandung, Bogor, Jakarta, , Medan, Solo, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta to express their anger at the US. They shouted anti-American, anti-Bush, anti-Christian and anti-Jewish sentiments. The angry crowds claimed that the US was staging a war on Islam. Demonstrators displayed photographs of bin Laden and brought a slogan condemning the US as the ‘Great Satan’. They praised bin Laden for what he had done to the US, calling it a holy war resisting the evil plan to destroy the Muslim world. For the protesters, bin Laden was a guiltless victim of American and Jewish conspiracies to direct the war on terror at Muslims, thus positioning themselves as the greatest enemy of Islam. The masses burned photographs of President Bush and the American flag, as well as destroying McDonald and Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise logos. There was also a threat to purge foreigners, particularly Americans from Solo and Surakarta, which caused anxiety amongst expatriates (Hasan 2006, 20-1).

FPI, MMI, and Laskar Jihad demanded that the government of President Megawati freeze diplomatic relations with the US and its allies, specifically the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia (Republika 8 October 2001). Jafar Umar Thalib even went a step further by calling for volunteers to go to Afghanistan to fight jihad. Laskar set up jihad bases in Yogyakarta to serve as recruitment and training centres for the jihadist

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candidates. Laskar’s publications claimed that several hundred volunteers had registered for the Afghan jihad, and 300 of them had arrived in Peshawar Pakistan ready to cross over the borders toward Afghanistan (Bulletin Laskar Jihad 10 October 2001, 6). The FPI did the same. Its operation commander Siradj Alwi claimed that 1,000 jihadists had been prepared for the holy war in Afghanistan (ANTARA 8 October 2001).

The support for jihad also came from elements of the conservative Muslim group Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Ulama, MUI). The council issued a fatwa insisting that there was an obligation for all Muslims to fight jihad against the Americans who were invading the Muslim country of Afghanistan for their own justification of interests (Sebastian 2003, 432-3). When the US began to bombard Afghanistan, MUI denounced it as an act of the superpower’s arrogance and oppression of Muslims. The council renewed its call for jihad. Din Syamsuddin, the secretary general of MUI, conveyed that his organization would not prevent Muslims (in Indonesia) who wanted to volunteer in the jihad fii sabilillah (fight for the faith of Allah) against American forces in Afghanistan, as had been done by Mujahideens against the Soviets in the 1980s (Panji Masyarakat 8 October 2001).

As mentioned earlier, Islamists in Indonesia also expressed their feelings about Pakistan’s role in the American-led war on terrorism. Like Islamist voices in Pakistan, an opinion column published by the Indonesian Islamic bulletin Darul Islam (19 September 2001) praised the Taliban as the only true Islamic state in the world that had correctly translates the teachings of Qur’an into actions. The Taliban was demonstrating total jihad through non-cooperative acts towards the world system created and dominated by Judeo-Christian norms and interests. Therefore, it became an obligation for all Muslims to support the Taliban’s fighting against the infidel’s conspiracy. The Pakistani government’s decision to align with the Americans was regarded as un- Islamic, and thus did not deserve Muslim respect.

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In its editorial on the 3 October 2001 Media Dakwah, a media outlet for the old- fashioned ulama gathered in Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, warned Muslims in Pakistan and other countries against providing support for American troops in Afghanistan because of the Bush administration’s white non-Muslim egotism and spirit of colonialism. As such the Muslim government in Pakistan should be vigilant concerning international designs to divide the Islamic world. It quoted Qur’an to justify the claim; verse 120 of the Sura al-Bakarah which mentions ‘never will the Jews or Christians be satisfied with yours unless you follow their form of religion…’ and verse 109 of the Sura that says ‘quite a number of People of the Book wish they could turn you back to infidelity after you have believed…’. In addition, the verse 32 of the Sura al-Tawbah was referred as noting, ‘the Almighty God makes it clear that they want to extinguish His religion with their mouths…’. By quoting these Qur’anic verses, the Islamist agent sent a message to Muslims in Pakistan that one of the possible reasons for the US existence in Afghanistan was as Judeo-Christian missionaries.

Jafar of Laskar Jihad also challenged the Musharraf government’s alliance with the American military. In a televised interview with SCTV Indonesia (7 October 2001) he sent a message to Musharraf calling on him to stop collaborating with the Americans who wanted to annihilate the Muslim state of Afghanistan. Furthermore, Jafar wished to remind Pakistanis of their heroic history fighting with Mujahideens against the Soviets, and this time calling on them to combat another Godless people, the Americans. According to the Laskar Jihad leader, it was not right for Muslims to stand by a force performing hate towards Islam. This kind of position, to Jafar’s mind, was a betrayal of Muslim aqidah (conviction). It was reported as well that a number of Laskar Jihad members had marched toward the area around the Pakistani embassy in Mega Kuningan Jakarta to express their demand that the government in Islamabad to withdraw from the US alliance. However, before reaching the embassy yard they were blocked by police guards (Forum Kota 9 October 2001).

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Replying to Jafar’s claim, the Pakistani representative in Jakarta argued that Pakistan was in favour of the war on terror based on its national interests, and the shared commitment of the international community to exterminate terrorist threats. The decision was not taken on the grounds of animosity towards the Taliban regime, but the political and strategic requirement of safeguarding Pakistan’s vital national interests14. Even though the consideration behind the decision was not explicitly explained, it is in accordance with the policy line taken by President Musharraf.

In dealing with the Muslim public’s reactions to the US’ policy, the Megawati government issued a six-point-statement on 8 October, outlining its response to the American military campaign in Afghanistan. The statement affirmed that: 1) the Indonesian government expressed a deep concern that a military action was finally carried out; 2) Indonesia noted the statement by the American government that military operation would only be launched against terrorist training camps and military installations, and that the operation would not imply an act against Islam; 3) Indonesia hoped that the operation would be confined in terms of targets and duration so that minimized civilian casualties; 4) Indonesia called on the United Nations (UN) to undertake collective response to restore the situation; 5) the Indonesian government warned that reactions from the Indonesian society should not be expressed in ways violating the law, and 6) Indonesia would provide humanitarian aid to ease the impact of war felt by the people of Afghanistan (Indonesian Office of State Secretariat 8 October 2001).

The Indonesian governmental stand took a middle-of-the-road approach, indicating an unpreparedness to take a decisive option. Megawati was aware of the consequences of forming policy that confronted the American-led global campaign against al-Qaeda. At the same time, domestic Muslim groups’ pressure could not simply be ignored. As a result, the ensuing policy needed to conform to these circumstances, thus prompting Indonesia to take a weak response to the war on terrorism. In relation to Pakistan’s support for the American invasion of Afghanistan, Jakarta chose not to make any

14 This statement was conveyed during an interview done in March 2011. 237

remarks or to intervene. An Indonesian foreign affairs official later conveyed this15; ‘the principle of independent activism in our foreign politics knows no actions of interfering on other countries’ international affairs as long as they do not affect to Indonesia…’.

The government’s position upset radical Muslim groups who thought that Megawati had failed to condemn the American aggression in Afghanistan. For instance, Habib Rizieq of FPI, in a radio interview, alleged that the government had indirectly supported Washington’s military campaign by pronouncing its hope that the operation should be limited in terms of targets and duration. Indonesia had agreed with military action even though America could not prove its accusation against al-Qaeda. Quoting from the Taliban regime’s statement after the 11 September attacks that it would have handed bin Laden over to America had the latter been able to support its claim with evidence, Rizieq argued that the Taliban had not tried to protect Osama bin Laden. Thus, the American invasion was merely a show of force by the arrogant power, and was why the ‘government that is Muslim ha[d] to stay quiet in seeing such injustice…’ (ANTARA 10 October 2001).

Muslim pressure increased especially when moderate elements from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah who formed the majority also expressed disapproval of the American approach to terrorism. The leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama doubted the truth fostered by the US government regarding the involvement of Osama bin Laden and al- Qaeda in the 11 September attacks. In a column published by the national non-Islamic- oriented newspaper Kompas (9 October 2001) the Head of Nahdlatul Ulama branch of East Java argued that firstly it a clear definition of terrorism should be established and then a decision could be made about whether or not the attacks on 11 September 2001 could be categorized as terrorism. The chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, Hasyim Muzadi, added that Washington had to provide solid evidence linking bin Laden and the terrorists’ attacks on the US (Kay 2005, 14).

15 This statement was made during an interview conducted in February 2010. 238

Voices from Muhammadiyah said that the US’ definition of terrorism was highly discriminatory. There was little disagreement over the categorisation of the 11 September attacks, and other attacks against embassies and warships that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda had admitted to carrying out, as terrorism. However the categorisation of people struggling against a foreign occupation as was questionable. This meant that Palestinians fighting for their freedom against Israeli rule could be also written off as terrorism acts. Therefore, Muhammadiyah suggested that the government in Washington had to fully understand that international law legitimized people’s rights to self-defence, while Terrorism was politically motivated violence (Suara Muhammadiyah 10 October 2001).

Muslim leaders, including those of the two largest Islamic organizations, made a collective statement signed on 12 October 2001 in Jakarta to request to the government to make a firmer stand against the American-led campaign in Afghanistan (Jawa Pos 13 January 2001). Responding to increasing Muslim pressure, Megawati modified her policy and criticized the US’ invasion of Afghanistan. At the Istiqlal Grand Mosque of Jakarta on the celebration of Isra Mi’raj 14 October 2001, Megawati gave a speech noting ‘it [was] unacceptable if someone, a group, or even a state – arguing for their cause to hunt down the perpetrators of terror – attacks people of other country…’. The Indonesian president went to make her government’s perspective clear; ‘in international law, there are rules that must be observed, and without obeying them, a strike that at the beginning has meant to combat violence will itself at the end become terror…’. Moreover, President Megawati expressed her concern at events in Afghanistan with assertive words; ‘blood could not be washed out with blood…’ (liputan6.com). With the choice of place and content of the Megawati’s statement, it was obvious that the government’s policy was more accommodative towards the Muslim peoples’ feeling.

This signal of change given by the president soon received favourable follow up from key members of the cabinet, who agreed with the argument that the way that the American government handled global terrorism was inappropriate both for long-term

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security prospects, and diplomatic legitimacy. The Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono argued that the American military action in Afghanistan could expand internal conflict into regional and global conflagrations. More importantly, it could further radicalize Muslims around the world, with the possibility of sparking a clash of civilizations (Gatra Online 17 October 2001).

Criticism of the American policy was followed by Jakarta’s reluctance to support unilateral action in the war on terror. At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in mid October 2001 held in Shanghai China, Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda delivered a speech emphasizing that international efforts to respond to global terror must be under the umbrella of the UN. The UN should initiate collective action to combat terrorism (ANTARA 20 October 2001). After a meeting with Bush’s Secretary of State Colin Powell, Foreign Minister Wirayuda reaffirmed that Jakarta preferred an international coalition to American unilateral military operations (Kompas 20 October 2001). This implied that Indonesia was not convinced of the correctness and political legitimacy of the American war on terrorism.

The Megawati government’s position was difficult to negotiate. There was the need to take into account domestic Muslim pressure on the one hand, and the notion of the state’s security and diplomatic considerations on the other. Megawati wanted to secure her governance amidst domestic and external difficulties. In terms of the government and Muslim community relations, Muslim leaders welcomed the change of Megawati’s policy towards the US. For instance, Abdillah Taha of Muhammadiyah and Dyn Syamsuddin of MUI conveyed that the government had listened to the aspirations of the Muslim people. They could understand, however, that the Indonesian government did not want to condemn America directly, and the position taken was already proportional (Tempo Interaktif 22 October 2001). Thus, Megawati was able to manage the widespread anxiety in the country’s Muslim people about the war on terrorism occurring in Afghanistan.

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However, Megawati’s accommodative policy on domestic Muslim concern gradually resulted in apprehension between Jakarta and its Southeast Asian neighbours. This was visible following the arrests and uncovering of suspected terrorist networks by Malaysian and Singaporean security authorities in December 2001 and January 2002. The suspects were planning to bomb the American embassy and other targets in Singapore. Later, in March 2002, the Philippines government unveiled activities of some Indonesian militant Muslims in Mindanao, and put them under police custody. They included Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, Abu Jibril Abdurrahman, Taufik , Faiz Abu Bakr Bafana, Agus Dwikarna, Tamsil Linrung and Abdul Jamal Balfas (The Jakarta Post 22 March 2002). Pressure was put upon Megawati to carry out more significant measures to crack down on militant networks in the country. These ASEAN members argued that evidence was uncovered about the operation of transnational networks of terrorists under the Jemaah Islamiyah organization approved and led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir of MMI. Indonesia was asked to hand Ba’asyir over to the US investigators for his suspected links with the incarcerated militants as part of the global networks of al-Qaeda. However, Jakarta was reluctant to do so, causing frustration amongst the pro-American ASEAN governments. They warned Indonesia that its protection of terrorists might have security implications for the region (Sukma 2005, 58- 60).

A polemic also arose between Indonesia and the global coalition of anti-terrorism. The American and Australian governments rejected the alteration of Megawati’s policy. The White House spokesman Ari Fleischer pointed out that Indonesia had weakened its commitment to oppose terrorism. The Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer even came out with a strong statement asking the Indonesian government to resist domestic Muslim pressure (Tempo Interaktif 22 October 2001). Foreign media directed a firestorm of criticisms at Indonesia. They bluntly accused the government and Muslim community in the country of having provided the fertile soil for the growth of extremism leading to Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, and of protecting terrorists escaping from the American-led global coalition wrath (National Review 8 April 2002;

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The Age 22 March 2002). Jakarta denied all allegations. Vice President , who was a Muslim figure and head of the Islamic-oriented Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP), earnestly gave his counterpoint ‘there is no terrorist in Indonesia…and there is no organization called as Jemaah Islamiyah linked to al-Qaeda in the country…it is merely a baseless accusation…’ (www.old.hidayatullah.com).

External critical voices did not affect Jakarta. Instead, domestic situations proved to be the stronger determinant to the government’s policy on the terrorism issue. This was evident when the devastating Bali bombings occurred on 12 October 2002 and took 202 lives of mostly foreign tourists (88 were Australians), and injured hundreds of others as well as destroying dozens of buildings. Megawati’s government changed its position on the war on terrorism. It began by realizing and acknowledging that terrorists were physically present in the country. This was followed by promoting a counterterrorism policy, with the removal of radicalism as its essential component. The Indonesian government formulated regulations, built institutional capacity, and allocated resources to back up its counterterrorism measures. The bulk of these efforts lay in the authority of the Indonesian Police (POLRI) and law enforcement apparatus (Widjojo 2005, 198- 201).

Suspicion of the involvement of the Jemaah Islamiyah networks strengthened in the months following the arrests of Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, Ali Imron, Imam Samudera, Abdul Rauf and Hambali, in relation to the Bali bombings. Hambali, or Riduan Isammudin, was suspected of being the principal operator of the Jemaah Islamiyah group. He had provided accommodation in Malaysia for Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi - the two hijackers of the American Airline that crashed into the Pentagon. They were all believed to be associated with the Ngruki madrasah led by Ba’asyir, and underwent jihad training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mindanao Southern Philippines. This supported the claim that Ba’asyir’s madrasah was at the centre of terrorists acting as al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian associates (Hasan 2006, 22-3).

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The Islamists opposed the change of the government’s policy. Arguments arouse to relate it to the American and/or foreign powers’ agitation and intervention. Analysis was based on conspiracy theories. According to a journalist affiliated with the Islamic- oriented newspaper Republika Dedi Junaedi (2003), the Bali bombings were used by the government to justify policies on cracking down on Islamic activists in the country, and had been planned and executed by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Americans and Jewish state of Israel. This claim was supported by a pro-Islamist Indonesian intelligence expert Z. A. Maulani (BBC News 13 October 2002) argued that the bomb explosions in Bali, which had caused such an extraordinary scale of destruction, could only have been carried out by highly organized and trained secret services or special commando units equipped with micro-nuclear devices. Therefore, the Islamists were convinced that no Indonesian Muslims were able to carry out these attacks, and no terrorists were operating from within their country. The Islamists in addition believed that the Indonesian government had been persuaded by promises of financial benefits for collaborating with the Americans and Jews in destroying Islamic movements.

The government countered this view. It argued that policies issued to deal with terrorism in the country were accorded on hard facts and the consideration of maintaining the security of Indonesians. The Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs General Yudhoyono urged the Indonesian people to stop debating conspiracy theories behind the Bali tragedy, because these analyses emerged from sheer speculation. He rejected the statement of the Islamists connecting the government’s counterterrorism efforts with interests of other countries. Rather, Yudhoyono stressed; ‘We now have solid evidence that terrorists exist in our country, and their actions are threatening the tranquillity and security of Indonesians…’. In addition to Yudhoyono’s point, the Indonesian Police Chief General Da’i Bachtiar acknowledged; ‘the security authorities encountered that [the] terrorists bombing Bali were Indonesians but linked to global networks…’ (Media Indonesia 11 August 2003).

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The Indonesian government realized that terrorism was a real danger to the country’s security. The actors behind the terror were not limited to local networking but connected to groups or individuals in other countries. Expert analysis and documents obtained from interrogation of the captured terrorist suspects resulted in the realization that Jemaah Islamiyah was operationally a transnational militant Islamic group of Southeast Asians with links to Islamists in South Asia, particularly Pakistan. They formed connections through militant group networks, Indonesian students in Pakistan, and probably moderate Islamic and non-political-oriented movement of Tablighi Jamaat.

Indonesia-Pakistan Militant Networks The evolution of radical Islamic thinking and activism in Indonesia cannot be separated from the events taking place in Afghanistan. During the 1980s when the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan, thousands of Indonesian Muslim volunteers along with Muslim counterparts from other countries went to that country to undertake jihad and expel the Soviets. There in Afghanistan, the jihadists were attracted by the prospects of obtaining military skills that could then be applicable for jihad in Indonesia. This was illustrated by the continuing visits of Indonesians to Afghanistan for jihad-related purposes even after the Soviets had gone. In Afghanistan, the most extreme members of the Jemaah Islamiyah became familiar with ideas and leaders of al-Qaeda. It was not surprising that the militant group accepted the 1998’s call from al-Qaeda to fight jihad against ‘Christians and crusades’ - the idea that inspired the Bali bombings of 2002. To reach Afghanistan, jihadists from Indonesia had to go through Pakistan. However, Pakistan was not only a transit point. After the Soviet departed, Pakistan became an important place for Indonesian jihadists wishing to take part in military training in local, and al- Qaeda militant camps in the country (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 15). With this position, Islamist groups in Pakistan had to some degree played an important role in facilitating the creation of the group Jemaah Islamiyah and its militant connections.

The making of Jemaah Islamiyah and its Indonesia-Pakistan militant connections evolved in two phases. The first phase was the introduction of organizational doctrine

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that occurred in the early 1990s, and the second phase was the shaping of operational paramilitaries taking place since the mid 1990s. In the first phase, militant figures especially Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar played the seminal role in determining the ideals and strategies of Jemaah Islamiyah struggle. Later on in the second phase, Ba’asyir and Sungkar assigned Hambali to form the military faction of Jemaah Islamiyah by recruiting Afghan veterans from Southeast Asia. Hambali arranged for the new recruits to join military training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan and as well mobilizing funding for their jihad projects.

Since 1986, Ba’asyir and Sungkar had been in exile in Malaysia. They were engaged in the Islamic study community known as the Jamaah Sunnah al-Islam based in Kuala Pilah where Ustad Hashim Ghani offered them hospitality. In 1993 the two clerics established a religious group called al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah which meant ‘the community of Muslims’, later becoming the infamous Jemaah Islamiyah. Initially, the group was set up to continue the ideas and teachings of the Darul Islam organization, to found an Islamic state of Indonesia. Nonetheless, this changed when the Afghan jihad against the Soviets neared an end in the early 1990s. Ba’asyir and Sungkar made active communications with al-Gama’at al-Islamiyah, a splinter radical group of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood that was then linked to al-Qaeda. Ba’asyir and Sungkar were inspired by this group to move beyond the ideology of Darul Islam into the more militant Pan-Islamism line of building an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia (Barton 2004, 50).

The feature of the Jemaah Islamiyah organization was presented in a 44-page handbook consisting of five parts known as the Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jama’ah al- Islamiyyah, or the General Guidance for the Struggle of al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah, PUPJI. It was written in 1993 by a collective of Jemaah Islamiyah leadership under the guidance of their ideologue Ba’asyir and Sungkar (Oak 2010, 989-990). The PUPJI defined the ultimate goal of Jemaah Islamiyah’s movement to be the restoration of the Islamic caliphate. To this end, the Islamization of Indonesia can be deemed as a

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fundamental component of a broader ideological vision that viewed daulah Islamiyya as the necessary catalyst for the shaping of Islamic governance covering the region of Southeast Asia. Such an outcome can be reached through a two-step process. The first step was to develop a puritanical movement with its members having religious social, political, and military identity. To accelerate this process, it needed to establish a base of cadres who were steadfast in their obedience and fully committed to the organization’s long-term objectives. The second step indicated that the group of individuals with their personal strengths of faith, brotherhood, and fortitude would be tasked to undertake armed jihad against the polytheists, apostates, atheists, and immoral peoples. The militant character of Jemaah Islamiyah is clearly described here. However, PUPJI still places a substantial emphasis on da’wa with the purpose of preserving the righteousness of Islamic principles. In a sense, the Islamist group combines violent and peaceful struggles of jihad.

Information revealed by POLRI’s investigation team from interrogations of the arrested Jemaah Islamiyah’s leaders, especially Abu Rusdan in 2003 and Ustadz Adung in 2004, showed the Islamist group’s projection in regional armed jihad. This is informed in the geographical scope and functions of its sections called mantiqi. Mantiqi 1 covered Malaysia (except for Sabah), Singapore and Southern Thailand. This section functioned to ensure economic support of Jemaah Islamiyah. Mantiqi 2 included the Indonesian archipelago, excluding Sulawesi and Kalimantan Islands. This section was directed to be the recruitment and chairmanship base for Jemaah Islamiyah cadres. Mantiqi 1 and 2 were established in 1993, followed by the building of mantiqi 3 in 1997. Mantiqi 3 encompassed Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Southern Philippines and were designated as training facilities and for weapon procurement. And lastly, mantiqi 4 touched Australia and Papua New Guinea, as fundraising areas. There is no information when mantiqi 4 was founded or started to operate. Hambali chaired the establishment of these regional elements (POLRI 2003; 2004).

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There is no exact number known and agreed on by experts and investigators about the Jemaah Islamiyah cadres. Nevertheless, it is estimated that during the heights of this organization’s terrorism between 2002 and 2003, there were about 2,000 activists with no less than 500 armed jihadists with the support of about 5,000 passive sympathizers at madrasahs established by Jemaah Islamiyah’s figures in Southeast Asia, the majority of which were located in Indonesia. They were mostly alumni of the al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah uplifted by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir16.

Between 1998 and 2001 Hambali organized for his mantiqi 1’s members to visit Taliban-controlled Afghanistan areas to observe what a real Islamic state looked like, and to receive short-term military training under the al-Qaeda commanders. One of the trainees was Azhari Husin, a Malaysian national, who along with Abdul Matin from Indonesia, were responsible as the bomb-makers behind the bombings in Kuta Bali October 2002 (ICG 2003). An important Jemaah Islamiyah’s commander Muhammad Rais – who was in charge as a military instructor at al-Qaeda’s Camp al-Farouk in Afghanistan where Indonesians received training – claimed that the trainees also went to the training camps run by Pakistan’s extremist group Lashkar-e-Toiba in Pakistan- held Kashmir. Such military education received by the Jemaah Islamiyah members was consistent with Lashkar’s track record of rendering jihad preparation exercises for foreign jihadists. An acknowledgement by a member of an Indonesian extremist community indicated that the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s affiliated Jama’at ud Da’wa Party (JuD) carried on rendering training and education for the Indonesian extremists who had to go to Pakistan to attend them (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 24-5). This indicates that connections between Indonesian and Pakistani militants had taken shape before the 2002 Bali bombings. Lashkar-e-Toiba contributed in at least some extent to the development of Jemaah Islamiyah’s paramilitary capability that enabled them to launch their terrorist acts.

Before 2000, Lashkar-e-Toiba was not known to extend activities and links with militant groups in Southeast Asia. Only when ethnic and religious conflicts broke out in

16 This information was obtained through an interview with an Indonesian investigator in December 2010. 247

the Indonesian Province of Maluku and Central Sulawesi, did indications of Lashkar-e- Toiba cadres’ involvement in the violent events become detected. It is mentioned in Indonesia’s Coordinating Ministry of Political and Security Affairs’ investigative report that between April and July 2000, at the height of deadly conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Ambon Maluku and Poso Central Sulawesi, a group of 30 to 40 foreign jihadists –Pakistanis – arrived in the battlefields to join the jihad struggle with local al-Qaeda’s cells, Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin. Hambali again played a significant role in the events. He organized funding from al-Qaeda for jihad in Ambon and Poso, and with the help of Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin was able to arrange for the arrival of Lashkar-e-Toiba’s militias in these two conflict areas (Tim Pencari Fakta Konflik Ambon Dan Poso 2002, 13-5).

Lashkar-e-Toiba (literally the army of the pure) was founded in Kunar Province of Afghanistan by a group of salafis who were undertaking Afghan jihad. Lashkar was set up as a paramilitary wing of Markaz ud-Da’wa wal-Irshad (MDI), a fundamentalist group linked to the Ahl-e Hadith sect led by Hafeez Saeed. The MDI’s basis is still located in Muridke near Lahore Pakistan. Lashkar’s first recorded presence was in 1993 in Jammu and Kashmir when 12 Pakistani and Afghan infiltrators crossed over the line of control into the Indian part of the state. This group had changed the focus of its struggle into liberating Kashmir from the Indian rule. Since its inception, Lashkar-e- Toiba has been promoted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) for its intrusion projects into Indian-held Kashmir (Swami 2005, 61-2).

This Islamist group defines its goals in national and regional terms. It attempted to promote twin ideological and operational agendas. Specifically, Lashkar-e-Toiba seeks to Islamize Pakistan’s social and political system towards the creation of a truthfully theocratic state of Pakistan. To a large extent, Lashkar wants to exploit the ethno- nationalism-based conflict in Kashmir, which in turn would incite the wider Islamic religious revolt in India and the neighbouring South Asian countries (Rabasa 2007, 81- 2). Initially, from the base in Pakistani Punjab, Lashkar-e-Toiba focused on ground

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activities in the Srinagar Valley. They then expanded to encompass Delhi, especially the Red Port shown in the 2008 Mumbai bombings (Tankel 2009). In the aftermath of the militant crackdowns by the Musharraf government, the organization of Lashkar-e-Toiba was reshuffled. It was restructured into two exclusively independent wings. One is Jama’at-ud-Da’wa, which concentrates on Islamic preaching with Hafeez Saeed as its chief, and the other is the Lashker-e-Toiba operating in Kashmir, led by a Kashmiri scholar Maulana Abdul Wahid (Rana 2004, 340-1).

Laskar Jundullah was founded in 2000 as a militia of Komite Penegakan Hukum Sharia Indonesia (the Committee for Enforcing the Shari’a Law in Indonesia), led by Agus Dwikarna, a Jemaah Islamiyah figure under arrest of the Philippines authority in March 2002. Laskar Jundullah was involved in destructive action against symbols of Western decadence and commercialism, including fast-food outlets, karaoke bars, gambling halls, and drinking establishments located in Central Sulawesi Province. Its most spectacular violence was a series of bomb attacks that struck Jakarta and Manila in December 2000, for which Agus Dwikarna was sentenced to 18 years in jail (ICG 2004).

Laskar Mujahidin also emerged in 2000 under the chairmanship of Abu Jibril, and was affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah. Singaporean police arrested him in 2001. This organization initially functioned as a conduit for recruiting jihadists to fight against Christians in Ambon and Poso. Laskar Mujahidin was backed up by an Islamic charity known as Komite Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (the Committee for Mitigating the Impact of Crisis, KOMPAK) under the aegis of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia. The mission of this aid organization was to assist Muslims affected by natural disasters, conflict, and poverty. However, in common with Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Mujahidin’s real focus has been on the total implementation of shari’a in Indonesia, while the anti- Christian struggle in Central Sulawesi acted as a training ground for the larger objective; the complete Islamization of the Indonesian state as the precondition for the founding of Southeast Asian caliphate (ICG 2002b).

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Hambali of Jemaah Islamiyah, Lashkar-e-Toiba of Pakistan, Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin were linked by their experience in undertaking jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Hambali, Agus Dwikarna and Abu Jibril were all veterans of Afghan jihad. The interaction they have made with other jihadists, including Pakistanis, may have developed into transnational Islamic solidarity. The victory of jihad to expel a communist superpower like the Soviet Union from Afghanistan inspired the Indonesian jihadists to rebuild the struggle in their country. Moreover, they expressed Islamic views in the same way, that is, that the Islamization of the state was the requisite for the establishment of regional caliphate. Having such commonalities in faith and strategic objectives, they were highly likely to help each other in their struggles.

It is, however, unclear whether Lashkar-e-Toiba interposes its religious doctrine onto Indonesian jihadists, or to what extent the Lashkar influences the Indonesian jihadists during their military training. Yet ex-paramilitary of Laskar Jundullah revealed that when the Pakistani jihadists arrived to assist him and others with warfare skills at the jihad base in Poso, he was introduced to the rigorous instruction of Ahl-e-Hadith tradition with the particular physical discipline of offering prayers. However, this tradition is not popular with Indonesians (Fajar 22 March 2002). The literature published by Lashkar-e-Toiba from 2000 onwards suggests that it was interested in observing developments of Muslim-related issues in Indonesia, and as such some cooperation with militants in the country may have occurred. Lashkar believed Christians who received the backing of the US, and the neighbouring countries such as Australia and New Zealand, were massacring Indonesian Muslims. The Indonesian government was described as a collaborator in this process on account of its silence and failure to pay attention to the plight of Muslims in its country17.

Activities of jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan prior to the Bali bombings of 2002 were also noticed in their involvement with Laskar Jihad’s paramilitary actions in the Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon. Laskar Jihad was, therefore, suspected of having

17 The resource of this statement is unpublished information by Samina Yasmeen, January 2011. 250

connections with al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. It was reported that on 7 July 2000 seven Afghans arrived in Ambon, and were spirited away by Laskar Jihad forces. Those Afghans joined some 200 other Afghans, Pakistanis, and Malays who had already arrived. This included both individuals and financial support. Laskar Jihad had received money for jihad from Osama bin Laden and his international Mujahideen networks. Bin Laden provided money for weapons, and other tools needed, as well as mobilized fighters to go to jihad hotspots. He continued to do so wherever jihad manifested into armed struggles, including Ambon. In addition, bin Laden’s trusted assistant Abu Abdul Aziz was sent to Ambon during the height of Laskar Jihad’s holy war (Abuza 2003, 150).

Jafar Umar Thalib denied such an accusation. He insisted that Laskar Jihad had no ties with Osama bin Laden or any other organizations related to al-Qaeda or other forms of movements associated with international networks that Westerners claimed were terrorists. Rather, Laskar Jihad was a purely home-grown and locally funded religious group. Jafar even mentioned that when he was fighting jihad in Afghanistan in late 1980s, he had met with bin Laden, but soon realized that the latter was a man empty of knowledge of Islam (Tempo Interaktif 24 September 2001). However, one could argue that whatever the nature of the links were, their connections became significant as Jafar, through Laskar Jihad, opposed the war on terrorism – expressions supported by other Pakistani and Indonesian Islamists. The leaders and members of the Islamist groups built upon these relations and both questioned and challenged their governments. Laskar Jihad did not just criticize the Indonesian governmental position, but also the Pakistani government participation in the American alliance, and lack of support for the Taliban. In addition Jafar’s claim of the successful dispatching of Indonesian Muslim fighters to Peshawar was a strong indication that he had the tendency to be associated with jihadist groups from Pakistan and Taliban in combating the American military.

Indonesian Students in Pakistan

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Southeast Asian students, particularly from Indonesia, attending Islamic educational institutions in Pakistan were discovered to be engaged in the development of Jemaah Islamiyah transnational networks. Information leading to the uncovering of this nexus was the arrest of Hambali in Thailand on 11 August 2003 (Asia Times 12 March 2003). In 1999, Hambali asked his younger brother Rusman Gunawan (Gun Gun) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son Abdul Rahim to gather students from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore attending Islamic studies at Abu Bakr Islamic University and University of Islamic Studies in Karachi. They were grouped clandestinely in a cell known as al- Ghuraba. The cell was reported to have between 20 to 40 members. Nonetheless, its exact purpose was blurred. It may have been formed upon the model of al-Qaeda leader Abdullah Azzam’s Maktab al-Khidamat (office of services) that facilitated foreign jihadists during the anti-Soviet resistance. Hence, there was a possibility that al- Ghuraba intended to be the transit point for foreign jihadists before continuing on to jihad in Taliban-held Afghanistan. Importantly, many of the Indonesian students belonging to al-Ghuraba cell were alumni of Ba’asyir’s al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 23-4). This sends a message that they had ideological, and to some degree, religious connections to Jemaah Islamiyah.

The existence and activities of the al-Ghuraba cell were unveiled in September 2003 in the aftermath of the Pakistani security services detection and apprehension of its members in Karachi (AFP News 22 September 2003). The detainees consisted of 16 Malays, 12 Thais, and 6 Indonesians including Gun Gun. Hambali’s causin Dhani in Indonesia who was sent a picture of him confirmed the presence of Gun Gun. The other students were Muhammad Saifuddin, David Pintarto, Muhammad Anwar Siddiqi, Ilham Sopandi and Furqon Abdullah. Gun Gun was seized on 1 September 2001, Saifuddin on 20 September 2001, while the other four were held two days later. Both Gun Gun and Saifuddin were captured at a private hostel owned by the Abu Bakr Islamic University Karachi. Because his father had called him to go home to get married Abdul Rahim was not part of those incarcerated (ANTARA 1 October 2003).

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Shaykh Muhammad Safarullah established the Abu Bakr Islamic University in 1978. The Imam and Khatib of Haram Muhammad bin Abdullah As-Subail laid the foundation stone. The university entirely followed in Islamic curriculum of the Medina Islamic University, Jamia Islamiyya, and Jamia Imam Muhammad bin Saud Riyadh, which was committed to teaching the aqidah of Salaf us Salih. The Abu Bakr Islamic University was the only educational institution in Pakistan that was affiliated to the Rabitat ul Alam al Islam (the World Muslim Council) organization, its funding is supported by Saudi Arabians. Teaching staff have been recruited from around the Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and graduates of local Pakistani Jamia. For teaching and learning process, students at the university are not allowed to use languages other than Arabic for medium in classrooms (www.siratemustaqeem.com). Owing to salafis connections, Abu Bakr Islamic University has close links to Jama’at-e-Mujahideen - which was founded by Syed Ahmed Shahid and Maulana Mohammad Islmail Dehlvi Shahid, which was a jihadist organization fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Thus, Jamia Abu Bakr turned into an extension of ideology of the Jama’at and became engaged in jihad activism18. Considering this Islamic characteristic of the Abu Bakr Islamic University, it was very likely that Indonesian students were espoused to the militancy of Salafi Wahhabi teachings, particularly on the doctrine and practice of jihad against whom they considered as kafir (infidel).

Days after the arrests of the six Indonesian students, according to the spokesman of Pakistan Ministry of Home Affairs Iftiqar Ahmed, no charges had been laid and an investigation into their cases was underway. However, Ahmed was sure that they had violated Pakistan’s immigration law (AFP News 22 September 2003). As mentioned earlier, the Musharraf government was employing closer regulation and control over the entry and circulation of foreign students within Pakistan’s Islamic educational institutions. This policy, which had started in early 2002, included charges and further deportation of foreign students overstaying in the country (PPI News 13 January 2002).

18 This is unpublished information by Samina Yasmeen - January 2011. 253

The spokesman of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, the then foreign minister, in response to the news from Pakistan, said that they – specifically the Indonesian students – might be charged of immigration-related issues unless they registered at any Indonesian representative offices in Pakistan (ANTARA 24 September 2003). Nevertheless, Marty did not comment on the possibility of terrorism charges on the students.

It turned out that the four Indonesian students arrested on 22 September were staying at the Jami’at al-Dirasat madrasah on the day the guest of honour at the school was Hafeez Saeed, the leader of Jama’at ud-Da’wa that was associated with the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba (PPI News 24 September 2003). This raised speculation that the Indonesian students and other Southeast Asians were too engaged in the militant activities promoted by Lashkar-e-Toiba.

The government in Jakarta responded this to. After a week of detention of the Karachi students the Indonesian government dispatched a joint team of investigators, comprising of two officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one each from POLRI and the National Intelligence Office (BIN). Given the composition of the Indonesian joint team, it would suggest that the arrested students were going to be interrogated and charged with militant activism, and maybe even terrorism. If the case were merely an immigration-related issue, the Indonesian foreign affairs representative in Pakistan would have handled it. Senior Commissioner Zainuri Lubis a spokesman for the Indonesian police later confirmed that the Indonesian students in custody in Pakistan may have been involved in activities sponsoring terrorism (ANTARA 30 September 2003).

After nearly six weeks undergoing joint investigations into the charges of terrorism, all six Indonesian students were eventually deported from Pakistan. A Pakistani security official announced that they were discovered to be a sleeper cell of the Southeast Asian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (AFP News 12 December 2003). Upon arrival in

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Jakarta on 12 December, the suspected terrorists were immediately put in a police detention centre in Jakarta. An official of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sahwin Adenan, who had corroborated in their deportation, pointed out that the Pakistani government, at the request of Jakarta, had approved to hand the students over to Indonesian authorities for further investigations into the terrorism-related charges (ANTARA 13 December 2003).

Analysis and interrogation resulted in verification that al-Ghuraba cell was really part of the Jemaah Islamiyah network, having undergone training in Pakistan. Details of the students were (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 26-7):

1. David Pintarto. Born in Sei Liput Aceh Province in 1981; studied at al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah in 1997; then moved to Darussyahada madrasah in Boyolali. When in Pakistan, David attended Abu Bakr Islamic University. After two months under police arrest in Indonesia, he was freed without being tried. 2. Muhammad Anwar Siddiqi. Born in Magelang Central Java in 1982; studied at al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah in 1996 and moved to Darussyahada madrasah in 2001; while in Pakistan enrolled at Abu Bakr Islamic University. Following two months of police custody in Indonesia, Siddiqi was released without being prosecuted. 3. Furqon Abdullah. This Indonesian student was born in Purworejo Central Java in 1976; attended al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah from 1986 to 1994; then moved to Ulul Albab madrasah in Solo; while in Pakistan studied Islam at Abu Bakr Islamic University. He was sentenced to 14 months on document fraud following police interrogation in Indonesia and being put on trial. 4. Muhammad Saifuddin. Born in Seleman Yogyakarta in 1980; became a student at al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah between 1992 and 1995; then moved to Darussyahada madrasah and joined the terrorist training camp known as Camp Hudaibiyah of Mindanao Southern Philippines from 1998 to March 2000, and graduated 5th of 22 students. Saifuddin continued to study at Abu Bakr Islamic

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University Karachi Pakistan before being detained by Pakistan’s security services. After deportation to Indonesia, he was sentenced to two years on the charge of involvement in the bomb attacks in August 2003 on J. W. Marriott Hotel Jakarta. 5. Ilham Sopandi. Also called Husni Rizal; born in 1977; attended 1995 class at al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah; arrived in Pakistan in July 2003; and then brought to court in Indonesia and sentenced to 15 months for immigration violation. 6. Rusman Gunawan. Familiarly known as Gun Gun; was born in Cianjur in 1977; attended Madrasah Ibridaiyah, Tsanawiyah Manurulhuda Madrasah and state madrasah. Initially, Gun Gun wanted to go to International Islamic University Islamabad but did not have enough funds, and instead attended Abu Bakr Islamic University between 1997 and 2001. After being arrested and prosecuted in Indonesia, Gun Gun was sentenced to four years in jail due to his role in collecting money for the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombings.

Under the leadership of Abdul Rahim, students in the al-Ghuraba study group discussed the need to undertake armed jihad against the US and Christians-Jewish conspirators. They watched videos featuring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s jihad operations (POLRI 2004). The links between al-Ghuraba cell and Lashkar-e-Toiba were confirmed. Muhammad Rais said that all members of the Jemaah Islamiyah’s cell studying at Jamia Abu Bakr and University of Islamic Studies Karachi went to the Lashkar’s military training base in Pakistan’s Kashmir. Their travel was organized on holidays by the school’s staff, but each student needed to pay their own way. Gun Gun’s police testimony gave information about the training he and others received including; 20 days of introduction to theory and practice of using a variety of light arms; 10 days military skills; as well as additional 10 days for explosives usage (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 24-5).

Although the members of al-Ghuraba cell had not yet applied their knowledge and skills in real terrorist actions, the emergence of this younger generation of jihadists belonging

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to Jemaah Islamiyah had alerted security authorities, particularly in Indonesia, that the terrorist group was prepared for regeneration, extending its ideological vision and long- term objectives beyond the destruction of the older structures. As affirmed by a former investigator of POLRI, Jemaah Islamiyah was training and consolidating its future leadership to the Ghuraba cell – mainly Abdul Rahim and Gun Gun – following the crack down on many terrorists in Indonesia19. Importantly, the experience of the Indonesian students also demonstrates that terrorists in Indonesia did not work alone but received significant technical and resource support from Pakistani extremists.

Potential Involvement of Tablighi Jamaat There was circumstantial suspicion that a non-political moderate Islamic group like Tablighi Jamaat could have been used by militants to spread the radical ideology of terror especially during the Jamaat’s ijtima (gatherings) and the Tablighis travel from Pakistan to Indonesia. Thus far, there has been no solid evidence linking Tablighi Jamaat with terrorists’ activities, yet to some extent it makes sense to think about the possibility that individuals inside or outside the group would use it to disseminate radical jihadism.

Several days after the bombs exploded in Legian Kuta Bali, the activities of Tablighi Jamaat attracted attention. Local media (Bali Post 20 October 2002) reported that four foreigners with salafis appearance had been discovered and apprehended by Bali Police whilst trying to leave the island quietly through Padang Bai coastal areas in the Karangasem eastern part of Bali. Amidst the island people’s sensitivity to the presence of outsiders, the report caused speculation that the Bali bombers had been captured. Bali Police Head Inspector General Budi Setyawan confirmed the arrests and announced that they were recognized as Pakistani activists of Tablighi Jamaat, but their identities were not published for investigation purposes. Furthermore, their presence and motives in visiting Bali were not yet known. Two weeks later, the police spokesman (Nusa 2 November 2002) informed the public that the result of investigations showed no evidence of connections between the Tablighis and the terrorist attacks. However, a

19 This statement was conveyed in an interview in March 2010. 257

terrorism expert from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, Sidney Jones (2008, 76) continuously insisted on the need to put Tablighi Jamaat activities under serious scrutiny, given the possibility of extremists using the group.

Shaykh Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, at Mewat Northern India, established Tablighi Jamaat in 1926. The Jamaat was intended to educate Muslims about their religion, and ultimately to avert Muslims converting to other religions. Da’wa was the main task of the Jamaat, to ensure that Muslims understood and obeyed their duties in light of the Qur’an and sunnah (habits exemplified by Prophet Muhammad). The focus on the group’s perceptibly correct religious way of life distanced Tablighis from advocating political-related issues, including condemning the government. Politics, according to them, is haram (impermissible). The same applied to talking about khilafiyyat (minor differences) between Muslims, and undertaking Islamic charitable activities (Azra 2006, 190).

Tablghi Jammat expanded to Indonesia through the medium of marriage when Pakistanis and Bangladeshis travelled to the country and married local women. Although Tablighis activities have been observable since 1952, they gained significance in 1974 following the construction of their Mosque in Kebon Jeruk Jakarta, which became their central office (Azra 2006, 190). So far there is no exact number of Indonesia’s Tablighis. However, it is believed that they have increased and are present in all provinces of the country from Aceh to West Papua (Noor 2010).

The risk of extremist involvement within Tablighi Jamaat lays in its nature of membership and preaching process. One can easily be admitted as Tablighi after committing to undertake khuruj (go out preaching), even if they are never active again afterward. Annually, the central office in Jakarta organizes Indonesian Tablighis who have the financial ability to travel to Pakistan for attending ijtima. Despite stricter regulations for obtaining Pakistan’s visa for religious educational purposes (applied since 2002), Tablighis from Indonesia have been able to enter Pakistan as tourists. With

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this in mind, if militants wished to utilize the Jamaat’s activities to cover up and expand their ideas and movements, they could pretend to pledge to undertake khuruj in order to be able to convert Tablighis to radical thinking, and then peacefully leave the Jamaat (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 21). Should this happen, terrorists operating between Indonesia and Pakistan could indeed safely build another channel of networking.

Indonesia-Pakistan Counterterrorism Cooperation For the Indonesian government, the complexity in the developments of Jemaah Islamiyah organization means, specifically in its dealings with terrorism issues, that there is an objective necessity to promote cooperation with Pakistan in countering terrorism. For instance, this was revealed by Siswo Pramono, the Deputy Director of Global Organization of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who believed that radicalization, was an important security issue for both Islamabad and Jakarta. In the aftermath of the cooperative success of the two countries security authorities in breaking the nebulous of terrorist networks working from Pakistan to Indonesia, it was time for Indonesia to work more closely with Pakistan in dealing with terrorist threats (The Jakarta Post 20 February 2004).

Bantarto Bandoro, a security and intelligence analyst affiliated with the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, agreed with Pramono. According to Bandoro (ANTARA 22 February 2004), Indonesia’s strengthened counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan, especially in terms of intelligence sharing, would enhance Jakarta’s regional security policies which thus far had focused on three pillars, the Southeast Asia Centre for Counter-Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, the Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, and the Indonesian Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation. In retrospect, Bandoro emphasized the need for pro-active security measures between Jakarta and Islamabad for the future, as terrorist threats had the continued potential to harm both sides.

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Indonesia needed to consider that Pakistan has had a growing significance for its regional security policy. Policy makers in Jakarta accepted this suggestion. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda expressed it, for instance, after the 11th ASEAN summit in Jakarta on 2 July 2004. In Wirayuda’s words, ‘now Pakistan is an important partner of Indonesia and ASEAN in countering transnational terrorism…’ (Kompas 4 July 2004). At the ASEAN meeting, Pakistan was admitted to be one of the dialogue partners of the grouping. Regional security issues, including counterterrorism efforts, dominated the discussions. Later in 2005, Pakistan concluded the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, as a foundation for the two sides’ practices of stronger and peaceful relationships.

In elaborating the foreign minister’s statement, spokesman for the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, said that Jakarta saw Pakistan as having a great deal of importance in the regional counterterrorism efforts for two reasons. Firstly, Pakistan had placed itself as the frontline state to combat terrorists of al-Qaeda working from its country borders with Afghanistan, and secondly, the government of President Pervez Musharraf had initiated reform to madrasahs in the country in order to restrain militancy. According to the Indonesian official, this was something that Indonesia viewed as a crucial step in counterterrorism (ANTARA 4 July 2004).

By the time Indonesia saw the increasing importance of security cooperation with Pakistan, the central government in Islamabad had launched five measures to promote reform of the madrasah educational system across Pakistan, which was assumed to provide the fertile ground of radicalism. These measures included: 1) the establishment of a national list for all madrasah in Pakistan under the guidance of the National Board of Religious Education; 2) the central government was authorized to assess the development and competence of every madrasah in order to ensure allocation of funding to the most needy institutions, as such the trustees, organizers, and administrators of madrasah were required to register their assets to the government on their part; 3) undertaking close scrutiny and ensuring further necessary actions would be

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taken upon donors and NGOs that were suspected of having affiliations with and support from radical foreign Islamist groups; 4) the government asked all madrasah to provide the identities of their trustees, administrators, and academic staff in order to enable observation of their political links with a wide range of parties in the country; and 5) the reform of madrasah curricula to suit the standard learning content, as formally offered at Pakistan’s general schools (Noor 2008, 144-5).

In fact, the Megawati government did not conclude the formal counterterrorism cooperation between Indonesia and Pakistan immediately. This was achieved only after President Yudhoyono came to power in 2004, when he visited Islamabad in late November 2005 (The Jakarta Post 25 November 2005). This had been more than two years since the discovery and annihilation of the Jemaah Islamiyah’s networks in Karachi Pakistan. It can be assumed that even though acknowledging the importance of and requirement for such cooperation, the Indonesian government was still inclined to consider it as a non-urgent matter.

Meanwhile, other ASEAN members have preceded Indonesia in making counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan a reality. For example, the Malaysian government - following the break out of Jemaah Islamiyah’s cell in Singapore and Malaysia in early 2002 and the Bali bombings in October 2002 - approached Pakistan for joint anti-terror measures. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad announced the plan when meeting with President Musharraf in October 2002 (PPI News 18 October 2002). Malaysia promoted bilateral cooperation against transnational crime and terrorism with Pakistan in the sidelines of the Islamic heads of state/government conference held in Kuala Lumpur, October 2003 (OANA News 15 October 2003). The agreement was made one month after the Pakistani security services arrested Malay students belonging to the Jemaah Islamiyah’s al-Ghuraba cell in Karachi. This meant that the Malaysian government considered the need for implementing such collaboration as urgent.

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The Indonesian government’s lack of urgency concerning its counterterrorism commitment with Pakistan was perhaps related to the fact that the focus of the government’s counterterrorism efforts (following the August 2003 bomb blasts in the J. W. Marriott Hotel and September 2004 bombings in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta) was on a new group led by Noordin Top, that was suspected of being responsible for the attacks, and was on the run in the country. The government in Jakarta had focused counterterrorism efforts on domestic areas, while the international dimension of the terrorism issue had not been given very much attention. Just when the second Bali attacks occurred on 1 October 2005, the Indonesian police detected the involvement of Umar Patek20, one of Jemaah Islamiyah’s contacts to Osama bin Laden, who was at that time was believed to be at large in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area (DetikNews 3 November 2005). This, eventually, became a stronger imperative for Jakarta to carry out more concrete counterterrorism cooperation with Islamabad.

In the Accords of Terrorism signed by both President Yudhoyono and President Musharraf on 24 November 2005 in Islamabad, there was an agreement that established a joint working group to fight terrorism. The group consisted of police and intelligence officers of the two states collaborating to coordinate counterterrorism measures, mainly information sharing and joint law enforcement. The joint working group operated on an ad hoc basis (Text of Accords on Terrorism between Indonesia and Pakistan 2005). Despite the lack of details about how this plan should have been applied, the initiative was not accompanied by sufficient infrastructure - primarily an extradition treaty between the two governments. Thus, this arrangement was beholden to the goodwill of each government.

Such a weak framework of counterterrorism cooperation became subject to criticism. The real condition inside Pakistan did not support it in being effective. This was mainly related to the fact that the central government in Islamabad was unable to watch, reform and control activities of the many madrasahs active across the country that had fallen

20 Umar Patek was also accused of masterminding and organizing terrorists’ attacks on 12 October 2002 in Kuta Bali, and he was listed of one of the most wanted terrorists by the Indonesian police. 262

under the influence of various militant groups. As suggested by International Crisis Group, the reform program of Pakistani madrasahs did not go to plan, and worryingly extremism continues to grow there. Under this circumstance, one can argue that to expect Pakistan to become a reliable partner of Indonesia to fight against extremism and terrorism was perhaps unrealistic. Indeed, Pakistan should be able to control extremist activities inside the country first, before helping others (ICG 2007).

The criticism became louder, especially after the bombing of the J. W. Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels Jakarta on 17 July 2009. Critics said that the ongoing Indonesia-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation was inadequate and did not have an impact on eradicating acts of terrorism. For instance, Sidney Jones (Tempo Indonesia 9 August 2009) claimed that funding for the bombing was suspected of being provided by an unseen Jemaah Islamiyah cell that was still operating from Pakistan. The cell transferred money from Pakistan through Thailand and then carried it into Indonesia in cash via a Malaysian carrier. Depending on where the funding came from, it could be argued that to some extent connections with Pakistani militants - severed following the arrest of Hambali in August 2003 and the demolition of al-Ghuraba cell in Karachi the next month - had probably been re-established, and security authorities from both Indonesia and Pakistan were unable to anticipate it.

While dealing with the second Marriott bombing, the head of the Indonesian government’s agency for counterterrorism Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai replied to the critics of the Indonesia-Pakistan anti-terror collaboration. He argued that the joint work on combating terrorism, including radical or extremist movements, remained underway between Indonesian and Pakistan’s security authorities. If terrorist bombings happened again, it could not simply be concluded that the intergovernmental measures had failed, but rather because ‘we are in Indonesia working out the issue from here…and our colleagues in Pakistan help us from Pakistan…’. Special to the matter of radicalization, Ansyaad said that another scheme was being prepared with Pakistan to organize the visit of Pakistan’s moderate Islamic figures to madrasahs in Indonesia and

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give the teachings of true Islam. This was part of the government’s de-radicalization program (www.dephan.go.id).

More important than the discourse of de-radicalization was a concrete achievement from the Indonesia-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation, specifically in terms of creating a channel to hand over terrorist suspects without formal extradition mechanisms. This has been visible in the recent capture of one of the most wanted Jemaah Islamiyah military figures, Umar Patek, by Pakistani police on 25 January 2011. This was then linked to information about the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad Southwest Pakistan. Reportedly, Patek was making his way to meet with bin Laden. When the news of Patek’s apprehension made headlines in Indonesian media in March 2011, the Chief Detective of POLRI Commissioner General Ito Sumardi gave a press release noting that his institution had liaised with Pakistan in the arrest, and that he was preparing a team to go to Pakistan to investigate it (DetikNews 30 March 2011). Several countries’ investigators wanted Patek, including the US, the Philippines, Australia, and Singapore. The Indonesian government staged a diplomatic approach with Pakistan to get Patek handed over to Jakarta, arguing that the suspected terrorist was its citizen and the terror bombings he had designed and executed had occurred in Indonesia. This led to the transfer of Patek to Jakarta in August 2011. Upon Patek’s arrival, Ansyaad Mbai stressed the importance of this effort, as Patek is believed to be able to render more significant information of Jemaah Islamiyah’s developments and activities (Kompas Cybermedia 11 August 2011). The terrorist suspect is currently facing court trial in Denpasar Bali.

This has by all means been a crucial achievement for Indonesia. Considering the important position held by Patek within Jemaah Islamiyah structures, coupled with his high proficiency in terrorism, his incarceration will hopefully lead to two things. Firstly, a more comprehensive assessment of the underground operations of the Jemaah Islamiyah networks, future projection of the hidden terrorist group, as well as information on the possibility that some aboveground radical Islamic movements

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surfacing in Indonesia recently - such as Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid, another creation of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir after MMI - have something to do with the clandestine nexus of Jemaah Islamiyah, and secondly, the paralysis of the major military wing of the suspected Indonesia-Pakistan connections of Jemaah Islamiyah, which in turn will prevent them from carrying out large-scale terror attacks in the future. This is despite the fact that terrorist groups have transformed themselves into smaller and less organized cells like those detected in the Aceh Province in 2010.

The global counterterrorism agenda has rendered the space for Indonesia and Pakistan to collaborate against Islamic extremism. Even though the Indonesian governmental response did not come straight after the 11 September tragedy - like that of Pakistan’s enlistment in the American war on terrorism - it illustrated the similar serious actions of moderate Muslims against radical Muslims. For its part, Indonesia has not expressed responses in formal Islamic terms, but in the language of security. However, the influence of the Islamic component is noticeable. The Indonesian government does not support the concept of terrorism pervasively promoted by the Americans, nor does it easily relate the terrorism issue to Islam, despite being committed to fight against radicalism, instead it cautiously takes action only when there is enough evidence to support the involvement of individuals or groups in the act of terrorism.

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Conclusion

This study concludes that Islam, to a limited degree, is used by the Indonesian government to relate with Pakistan, but it has not become the major consideration and real reference in shaping Jakarta’s foreign policy towards Islamabad. The role of Islam is marginal. The relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan is dominated by secular economic and political agendas. The Indonesian government’s policies have differed in many respects from the views of its people. Indonesian Muslims consistently articulate Islamic identity to describe their relationships with Pakistan, especially in dealing with issues pertinent to Islam and Muslims. This divergence has surfaced because Islam has been consistently prevented from influencing the making and implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The state’s non-Islamic identity, elite material interests, as well as conditions of external environments have established these constraints.

The politics of state formation in Indonesia was characterized by disputation on the suitability of referring Islam to be the basis of the state and national identity. Islamist groups claimed that because Indonesia had a majority Muslim population, Islam should become the basic philosophy of the polity governing the country. This entitlement was founded on the conviction that Islam was the best guidance to Muslim social and political life; Islam directives were clear, firm and solid as an ideology for the state. In opposition to this argument, secularist groups regarded Indonesia as a nation composed of a plurality of ethnicities and faiths, and therefore the pre-eminence of a particular religion to be the ideological fundament of the state was not appropriate or even unacceptable. Indonesia had to be founded on the ground upon which all faiths and identities were treated as equal. Pancasila, has emerged as the state’s philosophy and national identity in pursuit of this goal. Following extensive consultations and negotiations between leaders of the Islamists and secularists, Pancasila was accepted as a compromise solution, and has been further enshrined as the state identity.

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Pancasila, which consists of five principles; belief in one supreme God, humanity, national unity, people’s democracy, and social justice, denotes universality in values as well as dual approaches; acknowledging the attendance of God, but not indicating submission to a certain religious belief, including Islam. In other words, Pancasila is principally devoid of explicit mention of Islamic teachings. State identity informs foreign policy, by virtue of the absence of Islamic allusions in Indonesian identity affects the manifestation of Islam in the state’s foreign policy. Pancasila stands to be the formal constraint on Islam’s influence in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Practically, none of the successive governments act beyond this official limit.

Beside the constraint of Pancasila, the domestic structure of Indonesia also disallows Islam from significantly influencing the political process and foreign policy. Soon after its independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945, Indonesia introduced a multiparty system characterized by a variety of ideological streams, secular-nationalism, Islam, and Marxism/Leninism. However, Islamic political parties did not gain a powerful enough position in the government to enable them to orient policies. This was initially because acute ideological differences existed within the Islamist movements, which manifested into fragmentation and disunity amongst them. Consequently, this corrupted their political power from within.

Following the institutionalization of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, politics was conspicuously directed by the interest of the ruling elite. Although the process of Islamization did not stop, the secularist leadership did not indicate interest of pursuing Islamic agendas. The main interest of Sukarno was to retain his political power. Islam was politically subjugated into odd accommodative relationships with the nationalists and the communists. There was not enough space for Islamic opposition to the secularist governance.

The position of Islam in politics was even more marginalized under Suharto’s New Order. Stemming from the 1950s and early 1960s when Darul Islam movement,

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aspiring for the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia, carried out insurgencies in some regions, forcing the central government to undertake repressive crackdowns to curtail the separatists. This adversely affected Islamic political groups, as the military establishment began to view Islam as a potential threat to national unity. Islamic political groups were suppressed and marginalized from politics. There was, however, a period when Islam was engaged by Suharto especially in the early 1990s, since the New Order leader felt that the military loyalty to his government had diminished. Suharto gave the impression of creating greater space for Islamic expressions of people’s socio- economic and cultural life. While trying to appear more Islamic, Suharto sought to cultivate Muslim backing and co-opted Islam to buttress his power base fronting the military challenge.

Islamic political groups suffered from the lack of capability to play politics and to govern. It is evident during the democratic era post-Suharto that despite the resurgence of Islamic parties and Islamist groups, in the three consecutive general elections held since 1999, the non-Islamic-oriented parties continuously overwhelmed the Islamists’ achievement. This has perhaps been influenced by the prolonged fragmentation and disunity amongst the Islamic political groups, their lack of skill in communicating Islam as an attractive political agenda, and an external factor - that is, the strength of the non- Islamic political groups. Islam still remains only a rhetorical, normative, and symbolic agenda in Indonesian politics, and by extension in foreign policy.

International situations have also contributed to the deficiency of Islamic credentials in the Indonesian government’s foreign relations. Foreign policy is essentially a response made by the Indonesian government to the trends in its external environments. When Indonesia started to launch its diplomacy, the international political system was dominated by the Cold War. In response, Indonesia chose to adopt a noncommittal position towards the ideological rivalry between the capitalist and socialist blocs. Indonesian foreign policy was steered by the principles of ‘independent activism’ that promoted the ideal of anti-foreign intervention and pragmatism in the campaign for

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national interests. The independent activism policy befits the unchallengeable doctrine of Indonesian international relations. Under Sukarno, foreign policy was directed by the discourse of anti-colonialism solidarity and the struggle for Third World freedom. Suharto, however, focused on fostering good neighbourly policy with regional stability as the main priority of national economic development. The establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967 implemented this policy. Islam, therefore, has not occupied an important place in foreign policy agendas. This condition has been sustained under the successive post Suharto governments. In recent years, Islam has started to be a consideration in foreign policy, but still does not shape it.

In the context of Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan, Pancasila is an important factor limiting Islam in influencing Jakarta’s foreign policy. It, in many respects, is at odds with the Muslim community’s aspiration for Islamic identity. This is evident in the cases such as Indonesia’s responses to the Afghanistan war and the Kashmir conflict. However, it does not necessarily mean that Islam has no roles at all in Jakarta’s relations with Islamabad. Islam became an important element of the Indonesian nationalists’ diplomacy for international recognition from the Muslim world. In the case of Indonesia’s support for Pakistan in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Islam was also expressed by Sukarno to strengthen the value of his anti-India campaign.

Elite interest becomes a determining factor to Islam’s role in Indonesia’s foreign policy, and relationship with Pakistan. When Islam is considered as relevant to supporting the ruling elite’s interest, it is used as a feature in foreign policy. In the case of Sukarno’s support for Pakistan in the 1965 war, the Indonesian leader’s interest to contain India brought Islam to the area of the state’s foreign conduct. In the 1990s, Indonesia under Suharto was active promoting ties with the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular, underpinned by the interest in economic cooperation. In the democratic era, Islam becomes a more significant factor in Jakarta’s foreign policy, particularly in the case of the muted response to the global terrorism issue; the policy aimed at avoiding

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domestic Muslim repercussion. However, in the Islamic-related issues like the East Pakistan crisis, the Afghan war, and the Kashmir conflict, Islam was absent in the Indonesian governmental responses, because the elite in Jakarta did not see the relevance of Islamic solidarity for their material interests.

International and regional situations too shape Jakarta’s policy towards Pakistan, and determine the position of Islam in the two sides’ relationships. The lack of sympathy of the great powers for Indonesian independence had driven Jakarta to look for support from Muslims in the Middle East and South Asia by emphasizing the country’s Islamic identity. In the 1950s Islam had no roles in Indonesia’s nonaligned policy and closer relations with India. However, following the 1962 Indo-China war the geostrategic environment directed Jakarta to lean towards Pakistan, and open up the space for the use of Islamic rhetoric in Sukarno’s policy during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Under the New Order regime (1966-1998), external settings had always been perceived as having no room for Islam to appear in Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan. The post-Cold War world order, for instance, the global war on terrorism, has contributed to the rise of radical Islamists’ activism in Indonesia, but the state’s foreign policy remains devoid of any Islamic references.

The following is the summary of the important findings of the chapters discussing the role of Islam in Jakarta-Islamabad relations, which highlight the foreign policy impact of the three factors mentioned above.

Observation of Indonesia-Pakistan relations under Sukarno generates three conclusions. Firstly, Islam has been useful as a tool for Indonesia’s diplomacy and struggle for independence. Since gaining independence in 1945, Jakarta had faced external threats, especially coming from the Dutch. Western powers were hesitant to recognize and support Indonesia’s independence. Therefore, the nationalist leadership under Sukarno turned to Muslim countries for recognition. The Islamists played an important role, through the use of their Islamic card, in securing recognition from the Muslim world.

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Indonesian diplomacy was also directed at South Asia, in order to access the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. The secular and Islamist nationalists in Indonesia conducted different methods of appealing for the support of South Asians. Sukarno persisted in the use of anti-colonial language, while the Islamists expressed the need for support in terms of Muslim solidarity. In fact, the focus on the nationalist objectives drove Jakarta to balance communications and interactions with both the Congress and the Muslim League. Beside international diplomacy, the nationalist struggle involved physical revolution. Indonesians and Pakistanis, in the spirit of Islamic solidarity, fought together against Dutch aggressions in Indonesia. The process of diplomacy and revolution ended with the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands government to Indonesian nationalists in December 1949. In this part of the evolution of Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan, Islam and anti-colonialism were combined to become important features.

Secondly, following the achievement of sovereignty, Indonesia began to enter into world politics. Despite the fact that Jakarta and Islamabad had indicated similar anti- colonial orientations in their international relations, and Pakistan’s valuable backing for Indonesia’s independence, their relationship continued on unsatisfactorily. Identity and elite interests did matter at this stage. The secular nationalist government of Sukarno was not interested in Pakistan’s project of Pan-Islamism for the Muslim world. The focus of Sukarno’s foreign policy in promoting an anti-colonialism and non- commitment position in the Cold War resulted in the enhancement of ties between Jakarta and New Delhi. The height of Indo-Indonesian political cooperation was the monumental holding of the 1955 Asian African conference at Bandung. Nevertheless, the difference between Sukarno and Nehru began to arise when the latter felt that Indonesia had attained too much international prestige through the Asian African forum. Afterward, India opposed the Indonesian plan for the second Bandung-like meeting, thus causing Sukarno to become frustrated with Nehru’s position. As disagreements on the ideas and leadership of the Third World between Sukarno and Nehru escalated into tensions between the two countries, the space is opened up for Pakistan and Indonesia to

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improve their links. By the early 1960s, Sukarno abandoned the discourse of independent activism policy, and radicalized Indonesian foreign policy in line with the New Emerging Force (NEFOS) worldview, as opposed to the Old Established Force (OLDEFOS) worldview. Confrontational policy toward India derived from this.

Thirdly, in spite of Sukarno and Nehru’s bitter personal conflict, the shift in geostrategic atmospheres, especially in the wake of the 1962 India-China border clash, had also provided room for the strengthening of ties between Jakarta and Islamabad. The fact that Indonesia and Pakistan were leaning towards China helped to establish further commonality in their views and policies. At first this resulted in limited improvement in the relationships. However this intensified with Pakistan’s support for Indonesia’s proposal for a second Bandung-type conference, and Indonesia’s reciprocal anti- imperial support for Pakistan on Kashmir. During the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965 over Kashmir, these heightened relations shaped the strategic engagement of Jakarta, Beijing, and Islamabad, vis-à-vis India. Indonesia explicitly used Islamic identity to align itself with Pakistan. Islam emerged as the key factor in describing the strength and preponderance of Indonesia’s support for Pakistan. Even though the Indonesian government followed the secular political interest, it did not oppose domestic Muslims reacting sternly to India in the name of Islam. Islamic ideas and secular interest became the context for Jakarta’s support for Islamabad.

Indonesian foreign policy changed following the rise of the New Order government under Suharto in 1966. The new leadership committed to reinstate Pancasila as the state’s national identity, as well as the independent activism principle to guide Indonesian foreign policy. In effect, the use of Islamic language reduced, if not disappeared, in the state’s international relations. This was paralleled by a focus on the creation of regional political stability to support national economic development. Hence, the New Order government developed good neighbour politics. In this general context, Jakarta’s policy in South Asia was modified as well. It encompassed Indonesia’s links with Pakistan and India. Jakarta remained cordial with Islamabad, but

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not closely tied, as was the case under Sukarno in the 1960s. The Suharto government also avoided using Islamic language to describe Indonesia-Pakistan links. The main agenda promoted by Indonesia with Pakistan was the achievement of mutual economic cooperation. In parallel, the impaired ties with India were restored with the similar objective. Suharto tried to balance Indonesia’s position between Pakistan and India.

Indonesia’s fostering of a non-Islamic coreligionist stance was noticeable during the crisis in East Pakistan that led to the emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971. Jakarta’s response went through some changes. Firstly, it recognized the legitimacy of Islamabad to respond to the trouble in its eastern territory, and refused foreign intervention, especially by India, in the crisis. Indonesia showed anxiety towards the involvement of the superpower – the Soviet Union – in the East Pakistan problem with the supposition that such an act could potentially spur instability that could expand into Southeast Asia. Secondly, in order not to offend Pakistan Jakarta did not rush to recognize Bangladesh. Finally, after discerning the post-crisis prospect, the Indonesian government recognized Bangladesh and opened formal diplomatic ties with Dhaka. This policy was communicated on the grounds of neutral language, that is, the willingness to build up friendship and cooperation with neighbouring countries.

After the crisis in East Pakistan, Indonesia and Pakistan were still keen to sustain relations in the economic and cultural field. During the 1970s, the two countries’ economic ties developed, although not satisfactorily, under the institution called Indonesia-Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation (IPECC). Cultural relations continued through channels of the state’s agencies and societal groups. In this area of interaction, the Indonesian government indicated an acknowledgement of the role and importance of Islam, but did not extend substantial support. As a result, Islamic inter- societal activities only took place between 1973 and 1977.

Suharto’s non-Islamic feature in foreign policy was more obvious in Indonesia’s response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, beginning in 1979, which

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prompted a decade-long Muslim resistance in that country. For Pakistan, the presence of Soviet troops along its borders with Afghanistan was the most serious security problem at the time. The Zia Ul-Haq government of Pakistan became the frontline opposition to the Soviets. With the support of the United States (US), Islamabad became involved in the global strategy to roll the Soviets back. The Muslim world stood by Pakistan and extended support for the Afghan resistance movement. This event showed the world the emergence of international Muslim solidarity. The trend was also present in Indonesian Muslims. However, the ways the Indonesian leaders dealt with the Afghanistan issue indicated dissimilarity between government policy and the Muslim community’s attitude.

Jakarta provided only a limited commitment in support for Pakistan’s policy on the Afghan war. Islamic solidarity was not the heart of the Indonesian governmental response. The New Order government’s opinion was anti-Soviet. The policy pronouncement referenced universal values like the respect of every nation’s rights of self-determination, and anti-imperialism. This, to an extent, implied an approval of Pakistan’s resistance of the Soviets. Nonetheless, Jakarta did not follow up with resolute and concrete support for Islamabad; rather it merely performed moral support. Suharto and the foreign policy elite in Jakarta did not consider the Soviet Union’s aggression in Afghanistan as an urgent problem for Indonesia, because of its geostrategic distance. The possible fall of Indochina to a communist regime, and subsequent expansion of communism into Southeast Asia was more threatening than the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The focus was on Indonesian national security and the stability of the immediate Southeast Asian region. As a result, when Jakarta and Islamabad became focused on their respective regional issues, political relations between them diminished.

At the societal level, however, Indonesian Muslim groups were more assertive about expressing feelings of Islamic solidarity with Afghan Mujahideen, including the call for jihad. In response, the New Order government took repressive actions in order to maintain national resilience. Critical Muslim voices were subjected to domestication.

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Paradoxically, the government’s suppression sparked clandestine Islamist movements in reaction, which assisted Indonesian Muslims seeking to join the jihad in Pakistan, and Afghanistan. As part of the strategy to bleed the Soviets, Pakistan’s security agency provided the jihadists with sanctuaries and guerrilla trainings. Interactions amongst Mujahideens in the jihad for Afghanistan sowed the seeds for the later emergence of transnational militant networks between Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims. This episode demonstrated that Islamism in Indonesia, to some extent, arouse as a response to the inattention, if not complete ignorance, of the government to the role of Islam in the country’s foreign relations.

After two decades of coolness in the relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan, a sign of progress came to surface in the 1990s. During these final years of the Suharto’s regime, Indonesian foreign policy shifted from subservience to assertiveness in the way that relations with the Muslim world were conceived and implemented. The driving force of this move was Muslim intellectuals assembled in the government-favoured group called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI). Stemming from the will of Muslim activists to obtain recognition of the country’s Islamic identity, the establishment of the ICMI was monumental. In this association for the first time the intellectual element of the Indonesian Muslim community received the blessing of Suharto. The ICMI, henceforth, grew to be an influential social and political nexus. Interestingly, notwithstanding their obvious Islamic identity, the ICMI launched more vigorous non-Islamic economic and political issues. This Muslim association upheld the notion of Pancasila as the Indonesian national identity. In other words, it did not come out with the dream of founding an Islamic state. The rise of the ICMI was striking, and the ICMI’s worldviews – through the role of its cadres in governance - influenced Indonesian links with the Muslim world.

The change engineered by ICMI was clearly envisaged in Indonesia upgrading its partial status to full formal membership within the Organization of the Islamic

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Conference (OIC). Muslim issues gained more attention in Indonesian policy within the OIC. Despite Jakarta referring to the country’s Islamic identity in its international relations, the distinction between feature and content in Indonesia’s foreign policy stayed unaltered regarding the position of Islam. The appearance indicated an acknowledgement of the Islamic identity, but the substance carried on being determined by secular agendas, particularly in the economic field. For Indonesia, in consonance with the ICMI’s vision, interrelations in the Muslim world had to above all focus on lifting the economic power of Muslims.

Indonesia-Pakistan relations tagged along with this trend. Jakarta was inclined to commence more quality relationships with Islamabad. Despite the fact that an alteration was taking place in the Indonesian international outlook on the Muslim world, Pakistan also experienced a new domestic and external landscape of foreign policy. Pakistan’s most urgent need was set to be the fulfilment of economic survival of the deterioration of Islamabad-Washington ties after the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. It led the government in Islamabad to look eastwards in search for alternative resources. In this context, Indonesia’s and Pakistan’s enthusiasm to reinvigorate bilateral links with economic cooperation came to be the focus and content. Indonesia did not use its Islamic identity to relate with Pakistan. This propensity extended in the Muslim grouping shaped in 1997 named Developing Eight (D-8). Muslim issues were at the heart of Indonesian participation in D-8; nonetheless the enterprise was not accompanied by the substantive reference of Islamic identity. At this stage, Islam was an attribute of but not the real component in Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan.

The enduring constraint on the role of Islam in foreign policy formed by the primacy of material interests and external situations can clearly be seen in how the Indonesian government responds to the Kashmir issue. Indonesian Kashmir policy has been neutral with balanced approaches toward Pakistan and India. This impartiality has been influenced by geopolitical considerations, setting aside Islamic solidarity with Kashmir.

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This is observable in the ways the New Order government dealt with the Kashmiri insurgency. Indigenous uprisings have shaken the Indian-ruled Kashmir since 1989. In dealing with this development, Pakistan had staged international diplomacy to obtain the world community’s support for the Kashmiri rights of self-determination. India has invariably opposed all efforts made by Pakistan to internationalize the Kashmir problem.

At the Non-Aligned Movement forum, Indonesia showed the goodwill to participate in an initiative to settle the Kashmir conflict, however it was not accompanied by real actions. Jakarta argued that a third party’s involvement had to be approved by both Islamabad and New Delhi. The persistent disagreement by the Indian government to the role of a foreign mediator in Kashmir caused Indonesia’s position to be meaningless. At other times Indonesia has not demonstrated Islamic solidarity for Pakistan similar to that performed by the members of the OIC. The passive attitude of Jakarta towards Pakistan’s plea for support in Kashmir was not a rejection of the Islamic nature of the issue. Instead, this foreign policy was substantially determined by geopolitical considerations, in particular the need to create regional stability. Once an Islamic- related issue was deemed to have a direct consequence on Indonesia’s regional security, Jakarta has not been reluctant to actively engage in an effort to find the resolution. This is illustrated by Indonesia’s initiative and involvement in resolution of the Moro conflict in Southern Philippines. In this case the Islamic identity of Indonesians was used to approach the Moro separatist movement, while still maintaining impartiality. Jakarta did this because the Moro problem was thought of as having the potential to influence the stability of the Southeast Asian region.

In addition the case of Kashmir shows once again how the Indonesian government and Muslim community differed when reacting to an Islamic-related issue. Some elements of the Indonesian Muslim population consistently spoke of Islamic solidarity with Kashmiri Muslims, to the point of declaring a pro-Pakistan position. Nonetheless, their expressions were limited in scope. The feeling of solidarity with Kashmiri Muslim

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fellows did not manifest into strong political pressure on the government. This appeared to be primarily moral support unlike events, in Bosnia where Indonesian Muslims put forward enormous demand for the government’s more resolute stand. Kashmir lies outside of their radar that is selective to issues immediately linked to antagonism between Islam and the West. Violence in Kashmir was prolonged during the 1990s, and the situation was complicated by India and Pakistan embarking on a nuclear rivalry. International opinions have been focused on the possible danger of an arms race in the Indian subcontinent. More importantly, the Kargil crisis that occurred in mid 1999 increased international awareness of the possible escalation of the sporadic armed clashes between Pakistan and India into a nuclear war. Indonesia responded to the Kargil episode with wariness. Jakarta did not expand policy beyond the regional dialogue mechanism provided by ASEAN. To an extent, the Kashmir issue has reached greater significance in Indonesia’s regional strategic view.

Nevertheless, the changes in geostrategic milieus of Pakistan – in the wake of 11 September 2001 and American subsequent invasion of Afghanistan – have forced it to modify policy on Kashmir towards promoting dialogue as an option for peaceful settlement. In this development, Islamabad continued trying to get Indonesian support for its Kashmir policy. In response, however, the successive Indonesian governments after Suharto remained impartial and passive. One explanation of this tendency has been the enhancement of the relationship between Jakarta and New Delhi, especially in the security and economic fields. The prospect of cooperation with India has prevented Indonesia from pursuing a proactive attitude towards Kashmir; the policy was formulated in a way that did not cause offence to the Indians, while retaining goodwill towards Pakistan. At the societal level, however, the spirit of Islamic solidarity continued to be alive. Indonesian Muslim advocacy for Kashmir was undertaken through seminars, fund raising, and publications. The scope of the activism was limited, and could not become a meaningful pressure upon the government. With the absence of

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strong public pressure, the Indonesian Muslim activists supporting Kashmir could not influence the government’s position on the issue.

After 11 September 2001, the global war on terrorism becomes an important component of security relations between Indonesia and Pakistan. The Pakistani government under President Pervez Musharraf shortly decided to enlist the American-led campaign to hunt down Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda networks in Afghanistan, thus staging a war against the Taliban government. The policy was built upon the consideration of keeping Pakistan’s vital national interest secure, and securing the survival of the nation-state from the danger of being recalcitrant towards the US policy. This caused strong reactions from the Islamists in the country. Anti-Americanism and jihad in defence of the Muslim ummah was noticeable everywhere in Pakistan. Musharraf’s decision was regarded being un-Islamic. Nonetheless, Musharraf was steadfastly in support of Washington. As such his government applied domestic policies, including the crackdown on militants and militancy. Islamist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, were banned. Madrasahs throughout the country were under close scrutiny, and the circulation of foreign students in Pakistani educational institutions was strictly controlled.

Indonesia also responded to the global war on terror. The Indonesian governmental response was muted however. It neither promptly joined with the American-led coalition nor directly opposed Washington. On the other hand, Indonesian Muslims demonstrated more assertive attitudes; such as articulating protests, with some even preparing for a jihad fii sabilillah (fight in the faith of Allah) against American and alliance troops in Afghanistan. The Islamists also questioned the involvement of the Pakistani government in the US military campaign. Pressure was directed by the Islamists at the Megawati government to take a firmer stand in dealing with the war occurring in Afghanistan. As domestic Muslim pressure mounted, Megawati took a position criticizing the US military action, but not condemning it. To the Islamists, this

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attitude was understandable. This episode clearly indicates that Islam had become an important factor in influencing the government’s policy.

However, in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, and subsequent chain of attacks the Indonesian governmental response to terrorism changed. It started to take resolute counterterrorism measures to safeguard against national security being threatened by extremism and terrorism. The effort resulted in the destruction of terrorist networks in the country, and equally important the unveiling of international connections between terrorist suspects in Indonesia and militants in Pakistan. The connections took shape before 11 September 2001 and the Bali bombings. They lay in the special relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah’s operatives and the banned Pakistani militant group of Lashkar-e-Toiba. A cell called al Ghuraba which consisted of Indonesian (and other Southeast Asian) students attending Islamic education at Islamic universities in Karachi, were found to have connections with Jemaah Islamiyah activists and military training from Lashkar-e-Toiba. There was circumstantial suspicion that the moderate non- political movement of Tablighi Jamaat has potentially been used for expanding extremist activism and thinking.

These findings led the Indonesian government to promote counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan. Indonesia, realizing the danger that terrorism posed to its national security envisaged the importance of Pakistan on two counts; one was a Pakistani government commitment to curb radicalization within the country, and two was the provision of exchange information and resources to handle the terrorist networks stretching between the two countries. This case illuminates that the Indonesian response to global terrorism and counterterrorism was framed in a mixed context, carefulness in managing domestic Muslim anxiety whilst at the same time pursuing the need to maintain the security of the country.

With regard to the ongoing debate on the role and position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, this study has demonstrated; firstly, that investigation through case study

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of bilateral ties between Indonesia and a particular Islamic state can provide a more comprehensive understanding about the presence of Islamic ideas in foreign policy, including the dynamics of Jakarta’s attitude toward Islamic-related issues, and its implication to the Muslim community. Secondly, Islamic features have not been entirely absent in Jakarta’s participation in international affairs of the Muslim world. Islam has proven to be an important consideration of the governmental policy when there has been a congruent interest between the ruling elite and Islamic groups in response to a specific issue. To step higher the study claims that despite the fact of the lack of academic consensus on theoretical approach through which to analyse the roles and limits of Islam in foreign policies of Muslim countries, a solid framework of analysis could be built by employing dimensional factors such as the state’s identity, the ruling regime’s interest, and external settings.

The ability to discuss all aspects of Indonesia-Pakistan relations in the wider context of Islam’s role in Indonesia’s external relations is outside the scope of this study. There are some aspects that may be worthwhile developing in further research. Firstly, if they had some ideological and personal connections there would be some similarities in the views of Islamists in Pakistan and Indonesia regarding Islam and the West interaction. There are perhaps other Islamic groups – despite Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jemaah Islamiyah or Tablighi Jamaat – which have built their transnational networks from Indonesia to Pakistan. This is an interesting and important area of study to look at in more depth - the Indonesia-Pakistan inter-Islamic fundamentalist groups’ links.

Secondly, research on people-to-people ties does not necessarily mean an excessive focus on militant activism. The history of Indonesia-Pakistan relations demonstrates that moderate Islamic movements, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and the ICMI, have paid attention to issues pertinent to economic, cultural, and political affairs occurring between both countries. Therefore, there is a question as to whether these Indonesian Muslim organizations have links to Pakistani moderate Islamic groups and to what extent they come about, this is also a fascinating avenue of investigation.

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Finally, owing to the increasingly significance of societal and cultural factors to foreign policy analysis, this study would suggest a more extensive examination of the roles played by Islamic intellectuals or think-tank groups in the making and application of Indonesian international relations. This is supported by the fact that more and more Islamic centres are nowadays present in the country, and active in articulating their notions on world politics. How the Islamic intelligentsia formulates aspirations for Islam in foreign policy, and how the Indonesian government deals with these voices - accommodating, resisting, or ignoring them and why, would be relevant to further research.

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