Red Diamond Threats Newsletter

TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise ACE Threats Integration

Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 7, Issue 03 MAR 2016

INSIDE THIS ISSUE TRADOC G-2 WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE 2015 by John Cantin, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA CTR) Sustainable Readiness ...... 4 The 2015 version of the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) is released as of 16 Anti-ISIL Alliance ...... 11 March 2016, and will be posted soon to the Army Training Network. This year’s WEG has significant changes in format, information, and ease of use to allow users Threat 2025+ ...... 18 to more easily access information about weapons, platforms, and systems. Skylark UAV ...... 23 Combating Terrorism ...... 26

Threats-Antiterrorism ...... 27 VAB APC in G-2 WEG ...... 28 Modeling Threats ...... 34 Thermobaric Weapons ...... 38 Threats/OPFOR on ATN .... 42 Threats POCs ...... 43

OEE Red Diamond published Figure 1. Three-Volume TRADOC G-2 Worldwide Equipment Guide by TRADOC G-2 OEE Information, specifications, and tier tables have undergone a thorough review and ACE Threats Integration information has been updated where applicable. Individual chapters have been Send suggestions to: adjusted or combined where necessary to reflect changes for an operational ATTN: Red Diamond environment. The WEG will be posted to the Army Training Network (ATN) upon Jon H. Moilanen (IDSI Ctr), release. We encourage comments or suggestions to improve this product. Operations, G-2 ACE-TI and Laura Deatrick (CGI Ctr), WEG weapons and equipment tiers represent differing levels of system Editor, G-2 ACE-TI capabilities to be tailored as an opposing force (OPFOR) representative of a desired realistic, robust, and relevant threat in training, professional education, and leader development learning experiences. TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

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RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST by Jon H. Moilanen, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration, Operations, Red Diamond Newsletter (IDSI Ctr)

This issue of Red Diamond leads with an article on HQDA A concise article notes the antiterrorism awareness and EXORD 001-16 that directs the US Army use the Decisive protection cooperation of TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Action Training Environment (DATE) as the foundation to Integration and TRADOC G-34 Protection Division at the describe operational environment (OE) conditions in training 2016 US Army Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference, and education, as well as use of Annexes B and C of US Army hosted by the Army’s Provost Marshal General. The Training Circular (TC) 7-102, Operational Environment conference theme was “The Evolution of Terrorism: and Army Learning. DATE and the US Army TC 7-100 Staying Ahead of the Terrorist.” series provide these complex and dynamic operational conditions, and OPFOR organization, weapon systems During the December 2015 DATE 3.0 Working Group and equipment, doctrine, tactics, and techniques as a meeting, a requirement emerged for a threat model composite of real-world threats, adversaries, and similar to a violent extremist organization (VEO) such as enemies. the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). An article describes an approach of using the TC 7-100 series in Part one of a two-part article series addresses changes order to create desired threat capabilities and limitations that have occurred in the Syrian OE since the beginning of of a VEO for training and education purposes. the Syrian civil war, and the impact those changes have had on the US, Turkey, and the Anti-ISIL Alliance. The recent publication of the WEG includes the Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé (VAB), an armored personnel carrier, as Another article in a series describes the “Threat 2025+ one of several new entries. An article illustrates the many Project” to produce a series of threat blueprints for the roles of this carrier and its wide use among nation-states. purpose of capturing current and future threat tactics from a threat perspective for US Army training and Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) have been continually education. TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics is the basis improved within an expanding family of rocket propelled for representation of current and projected threats. An thermobaric, incendiary, and smoke grenade rocket intent is to validate hybrid threat (HT) requirements for launchers. An article focuses on the thermobaric RPG of the HT force structure at training centers and locations which there are two primary variants: the RPO-A and US Army-wide. RPO-M Shmel. Other smaller, lighter-weight versions such as the MRO-A and the MGK Bur are also discussed. The US Army Warrior Simulation (WARSIM) uses an assortment of different Skylark unmanned aerial vehicles To be added to the Red Diamond e-distribution list, (UAVs) in corps and division training exercises. The contact: manufacturer, Elbit Systems, uses a UAV numbering Dr. Jon H. Moilanen (IDSI Ctr) system that can be is confusing and may cause less than TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration, Operations optimum application in training and education. This [email protected] article clarifies the types of Skylark UAV as listed in the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) located on the Army Training Network (ATN).

Identify and Report SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR prior to ATTACK

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Director’s Corner Thoughts for Training Readiness

by Jon Cleaves, Director, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC) There is some confusion in the force over how to integrate current operational observations and insights into effective training for US Army readiness. One surging example of interest is the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in a contested border region. Numerous requests for information from commanders, Centers of Excellence, byexerciseJon S.designers, Cleaves curriculum, Director, developers, ACE-Threats trainers, Integration and educators appear to want data on the Warsaw Pact or Russia related to training and education that spans live, virtual, constructive, and gaming venues. First, a significant concern I see in many of these requests is a trend that presumes actions occurring between Ukraine and the Russian Federation are representative of how conflict will occur if the US Army in a coalition confronts the Russian Federation. Yes, similarities of this specific regional contest may exist in a future conflict. However, one thing of which we can be fairly certain is that potential adversaries will not fight us the way they fight their regional opponents. Dangerous opponents will adapt. And it is our charter to train our soldiers to resist dangers by subjecting them to those challenges in training before they face them for real. Many of the requests I receive completely miss the mark of this essential point. One cannot simply transpose today’s headlines into an exercise scenario and be likely to get it right. Second, another concern is a mantra that the opposing force (OPFOR) for training needs to be “more Russian.” The hybrid threat OPFOR already includes a substantial level of Russian representation in its composite model of actual worldwide forces and adaptable capabilities in doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment. In fact, Russian thinking and experience probably accounts for more of the hybrid threat OPFOR than any other single actor. That OPFOR, a composite model of worldwide threat best practice, can be tailored to replicate the tactics and operations of any highly capable threat, including that potentially posed by the Russian Federation. Third, some voices from the field obscure adaptive tactics and simple techniques in military operations as something new or a revelation, and attempt to skew what should be priorities in training and educational experiences. For example, massed multiple rocket launcher fire on an enemy concentration in canalized terrain is neither new nor adaptive in concept or application. It is a technique, not an achievement. An unbalanced focus on technique continues to hamper comprehensive tactical understanding. We must truly visualize future threats, and be prudent and decisive in how, where, and when we apply the Army’s limited resources to prepare for and be ready in a complex and dynamic world. Finally, the Chief of Staff of the US Army recently published Execution Order 001-16, Sustainable Readiness, in which he states that the Army’s training and education proponents will use the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) (current version is 2.2, dated April 2015) as the foundation to describe operational environment (OE) conditions. DATE and the US Army TC 7-100 series provide these complex and dynamic operational conditions, and OPFOR organization, weapon systems and equipment, doctrine, tactics, and techniques as a composite of real-world threats, adversaries, and enemies. The OE and OPFOR, as stated in Army Regulation 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program (2015), are integral to complex and dynamic training conditions as challenging operational variables, and an OPFOR must be realistic, robust, and relevant to assessing and evaluating US Army performance measures and collective and/or individual task proficiency. JON

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Sustainable TC 7-102 Readiness and the Decisive Action Training Environment by Jon H. Moilanen (IDSI Ctr) and Angela McClain-Wilkins (DAC), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Sustainable readiness is the Army’s new force generation process. The Army will use it to generate trained and ready units to meet known operational requirements, while simultaneously creating the adequate depth necessary to remain optimally postured to deploy rapidly to unforeseen contingencies. Army Directive 2016-05 (Building Training Readiness) (11 February 2016) Headquarters, Department of the Army recently published Execution Order (EXORD) 001-16 to detail requirements and direction on how the US Army will establish an enduring process for sustainable readiness. Annex B of the EXORD (2016) states two critical factors in order to provide consistency in Army unit training products, such as collective and individual tasks, Combined Arms Training Strategies, and associated learning methods. First, the Army directs that its training and education proponents use the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) as the foundation to describe operational environment (OE) conditions. Second, training and evaluation proponents are to refer to the task proficiency criteria in Annex B of EXORD 001-16 and Annexes B and C of US Army Training Circular (TC) 7-102, Operational Environment and Army Learning, in order to describe the complex and dynamic training conditions of collective and individual tasks. TC 7-102 also provides a methodology and techniques of using the Army Learning Model for improved readiness.

Operational Environment and Opposing Force An operational environment (OE) is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (Joint Publication (JP) 3–0). Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3–0 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–0 describe the OE in terms of eight operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical terrain, and time (PMESII-PT). Army forces use these operational variables to understand and analyze the broad environment in which they are conducting operations.

An opposing force (OPFOR) is a plausible, flexible, and free-thinking mixture of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces and capabilities (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment). The OPFOR is used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing U.S. forces. The OPFOR is tailored to replicate highly capable conventional threats and unconventional threats that combined can replicate hybrid threats and their strategies further described in the Training Circulars (TCs) 7–100, 7–100.2, 7–100.3, hereafter referred to as TC 7–100 series of manuals. AR 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program (2015)

The TRADOC G-2 is the Army’s lead for the operational environment and opposing force program in accordance with Army Regulation 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program, and is the US Army’s author of DATE and TC 7-102.

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Joint and Army doctrine describe an OE with a framework of eight operational variables. These interrelated variables are: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical terrain, and time. Operational Environment and Army Learning TC 7-102, published in November 2014, provides a concise practical guide on how to integrate the conditions of an operational environment (OE) into US Army training, professional education, and leader development experiences. Other applications of variables include concepts and capabilities development initiatives. TC 7-102 complements critical design principles in TC 7-101, Exercise Design, and presents an overarching “how to” in support of an adaptive learner-centric model—the Army Learning Model—in the operational and institutional domains of the US Army. In 2016, the tactical task list for the opposing force (OPFOR) in TC 7-101 is undergoing a major revision of tasks, conditions, standards, and measures of performance. As these revisions are approved for implementation, the products and processes are being integrated into the online resources of the TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise (G-2 OEE). The TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration Directorate (ACE-TI) serves as the lead for the TRADOC G-2 designing, documenting, and integrating threat, OPFOR, and OE conditions in Army doctrine, training, professional education, and leader development, as well as concepts and capabilities development for the US Army.1 ACE-TI collaborates closely with TRADOC G-27 to provide the resources that enable Army leader initiatives that embed robust, realistic, and rigorous conditions to train and educate to Army standards. A key e-link to training and education resources is the TRADOC G-27 OE Training Support Center. With common access card entry, the TRADOC G-2 Virtual OPFOR Academy provides an array of OE and OPFOR resources such as the Army TC 7-100 series; modules for training as an OPFOR; an instructor video presentation of OPFOR tasks, conditions, and standards; and a Virtual Battle Space 3 (VBS3) simulation of OPFOR tactical vignettes as a “realistic semi-immersive environment that allows units, usually company and below, to train at home station on…battle drills, platoon level collective tasks, combined maneuver tasks, and other collective tasks.”2 The G-2 OEE architecture-supported tools and enablers are expanding continually in resource capabilities and online accessibility. These learning venues include individual responsibility for professional self-development and institutional and operational responsibility and accountability to provide easily-accessible resources to a comprehensive range of mission requirements and experiences. TC 7-102 presents enduring doctrine-based guidance on how to integrate the variables of an operational environment in support of Army missions. The primary audience for TC 7-102 is the commander/leader and the training/curriculum developer responsible for developing and instituting an Army learning continuum of timely, credible, and relevant experiences. The training and education charter is to develop and implement the best possible operational and institutional experiences, with available resources, to improve and sustain the competence, confidence, and capabilities of soldiers, leaders, Department of the Army civilians, and Army units or organizations for decisive action in the 21st century. Army training and education must embed mission command principles and the effective conduct of mission command warfighting functions in its training, education, and leadership development. A leader uses these primary concepts, grounded in approved Army doctrine, to ensure the quality of adaptive and timely training and education to the Army. The aim of deliberate experiences is learning and achieving professional competence toward expertise ranging individual soldier skills to effective conduct of leadership at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The conditions of an experience must complement the desired learning level complexity in order to accomplish a designated task/action to Army standards. Leaders determine the conditions that address current OEs and threats, and also prepare for future contingencies of a globally-engaged Army. The philosophy and principles of mission command guide how to perceive, analyze, understand, and apply these OEs for sustainable readiness.

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The framework of OE analysis provides leaders with a holistic, scalable, and flexible method with which to generate an understanding of an operational environment. Each operational environment is complex and dynamic. The interactions among OE variables determine dangers and opportunities of a particular operational environment. This characteristic is primarily the result of the ever-changing nature of operational variables, their interactions, and the resulting implications for mission success.

Mission Command (Philosophy) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. Army Mission Command Strategy (2013)

Mission Command Warfighting Function The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. Army Mission Command Strategy (2013)

This framework provides coherence, flexibility, and continuity to the learning experience and levels of complexity. Army mission fundamentals are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The Army leader focuses readiness attention on assigned missions or prioritized contingency missions, and filters relevant information to critical mission variables. Decisive Action Training Environment TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration first developed the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) in February 2011 (DATE was originally titled the Full Spectrum Training Environment [FSTE]). The task to produce an unclassified operational environment for training came from the Chief of Staff of the Army and was based on feedback from all Combat Training Center (CTC) commanders. Its purpose was and still is to provide a common operational environment from which to develop exercises and training events across all learning venues. The current version, DATE 2.2 (April 2015), comprises the same elements as the original FSTE: OE variables for five countries in the Caucasus region whose conditions are based on a composite of real-world, worldwide conditions; orders of battle; an events list linked to Mission Essential Task Lists, equipment tables, and a Road to War option. There is enough information in DATE to allow exercise developers to produce multiple scenarios meeting a variety of training objectives with contemporary, complex, and realistic conditions. The OE in DATE serves to enable the creation of multiple scenarios using the five countries, their unique conditions, and the threat actors to replicate a hybrid threat opposing force to challenge the US Army to train against a realistic and relevant threat. Trainers and scenario developers have successfully used DATE conditions in scenario development for five years now. Some have used the idea for a scenario presented in the Road to War included with DATE, but others have applied different DATE-compliant scenarios to train to their objectives. Both methods are acceptable and encouraged. Analysts at ACE-TI continually review DATE to ensure it maintains its relevance. Analysts accomplish this by observing DATE training exercises at CTCs and home-station training locations to learn not only how effectively users implement DATE but also

Red Diamond Page 6 where there may be issues requiring revision to ensure these exercises remain valid. Analysts also stay informed about current threats actors and their tactics and techniques, and, if necessary, will revise DATE conditions to ensure these characteristics are present in the DATE OE. ACE-TI analysts always welcome feedback from DATE users, and consider all of these influences when revising DATE. Recently, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration hosted a working group for the next planned DATE revision, DATE 3.0. Ninety- six people from six countries attended, which included representatives from the United States, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (UK). This week of collaboration resulted in work completed by five subgroups: terrain, maritime, irregular forces, orders of battle, and timeline. The recommendations stemming from the subgroup work will be implemented into DATE 3.0. Maintaining DATE is an ongoing task as part of ACE-TI’s charter. To be compliant with AR 350-2, DATE country names are fictitious, and the fictitious names represent countries whose conditions are based on a composite of real-world variables and actors. Users can choose what elements of DATE to apply to their exercises, and can scale the conditions to meet the needs of the exercise and ensure the objectives are met. DATE conditions are substantial enough to train against any Army task. In addition to the US Army, the UK has employed DATE as an OE for training and Canada is the process of doing the same. Its versatility is useful for the US joint community and international partners. G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise The TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise (G-2 OEE) is an integrated training environment (ITE) resource that leverages technology-enabled presentations and other information in support of individual and collective learning experiences. This type of strategy describes the who, what, where, when, why, how, and projected cost of training to sustainable readiness. The development of a system training strategy includes knowing the capabilities of training site(s) and how to best train and evaluate selected critical tasks.3 The G-2 OEE enhances individual and collective learning experiences with identification of robust, realistic, and relevant OE conditions. This enterprise builds, validates, maintains, and delivers OE context and complexity to Army operational and institutional forces and other capability stakeholders. The reach of this enterprise and its resources support the Army in forums that can range—  Institutional learning,  Individual training,  Home station training (HST),  Combat training centers (CTC) rotation exercises,  Deployed units in training,  Emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE),  Operational force mission conduct, and  Professional self-development. In support of this readiness strategy, the G-2 OEE is TRADOC’s principal means to identify threat and other operational environment conditions in support of Army tasks and standards. The G-2 OEE resides in the institutional training domain and provides support to the Army’s institutional training and education systems, operational domain, and professional self-development of leaders and soldiers. As TRADOC improves its available live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (LVCG) collaboration of observations, lessons learned, and capabilities development and experimentation venues for Army readiness, the G-2 OEE continues to expand as a resource for OE conditions in support of the Army mission. The US Army Training Concept 2012-2020 and The US Army Learning Concept 2015 describe a continuum of learning focused on creating adaptive leaders across a career span that is learner-centric and enabled by technology. These concepts incorporate current Army training and education with requirement projections for future decades. In Appendix A of TC 7-102, a job aid of introductory statements and questions supports the training or curriculum developer within the analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate (ADDIE) process for effective and efficient use of the Army Learning Model and G-2 OEE. Appendix B of TC 7-102 is a summarized list of exercise design tasks and reference locations to information in TC 7-101, Exercise Design.

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These products, services, and support are just as integral to the institutional curriculum development process (ADDIE) and exercise design planning and execution. Army Method to Sustainable Readiness The Army Learning Model—analyze, design, develop, implement, evaluate—is a flexible instructional design model to enhance a system of continual learning development, conduct, and review for improved performance to Army standards. The ADDIE process takes the leader from initial determination of a requirement; through analysis, design, and development phases; to implementation of a learning experience; and carries on a learning continuum through constant review and assessment. These formative and summative evaluations are a progressive path to improved training, professional education, and leader development products, processes, and programs—sustainable readiness.

Formative Evaluation (In Progress)

Task or Analyze Design Develop Implement Evaluate Action

Summative Evaluation (Continuum)

Analysis Design Development Implementation Evaluation Identify Requirement Design Instruction Develop Ways-Means Conduct Instruction Evaluate Effectiveness Analyze: Write TLO/ELOs. Select: Confirm Ready Formative Evaluation Goal WHY Design: Method-Instruction Conduct Instruction In-progress review Scope-Outcomes Assessment plan Instructional media during ADDIE phases Identify: Assessment tools Develop: Administer: (e.g.) pre-TLOs Conduct Research Lessons materiel Student survey Summative Review pre- ELOs Design: Evaluation tools Faculty assessment Program evaluation Learning Hierarchy Course Plan Update: Focus groups post-conduct review: Target Audience:WHO Lesson Plan Resource analysis Review: Guidance Skills-Abilities Evaluation Plan Develop: Learning Outcome Design Profile proficiency Evaluation Tools Lesson Plans Student feedback Development Gap: WHAT Advance Sheets Faculty feedback Conduct of: Identify Learning HOW-WHEN-WHERE Instructor Notes Review-analyze to Learning Outcome Outcome need Assessment Criteria improve or revise. TLO/ELO mastery Resources: Update: Assessment Tools Process-Products― Constraints Resource Analysis Review TLO/ELOs Conduct: Efficiency Evaluation Plan Draft Milestone Plan. Learning Outcome Formative Evaluation Effectiveness MILESTONE PLAN: to be mastered throughout ADDIE WHAT & HOW to— Backplan-Suspense * Use-adult l earning * Collaborate in * Assess TLO/ELOs * Improve-Sustain * Apply ADDIE phases principles. lesson development. * Seek improvements * Innovate…Adapt

Task or Action: Leader & Self Development /Training/Professional Education Requirement RE: TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-series TLO: Terminal learning objective/ELO: Enabling learning objective

Figure 1. ADDIE considerations of the Army Learning Model in TC 7-102 Concise vignettes in TC 7-102 exemplify how a leader can assess learning objectives in each process phase. Each ADDIE phase illustration in TC 7-102 compares OE considerations and how to apply G-2 OEE capabilities in each phase. Each of the five phases in Figure 1 highlights key points for commander/leader and training/curriculum developer collaboration. The ways and means for learning are amplified by how leaders, trainers, and educators administer and evaluate the training, education, or leader development venues. Core competencies for soldier and leader proficiency are criteria to assess and evaluate particular learning experiences. Although comprehensive evaluation of competencies may not be appropriate in every learning experience, focusing on at least one competency is integral to planning any Army learning experience. Leader attributes are the inward characteristics of a soldier and leader that shape the motivations for actions

Red Diamond Page 8 and bearing, and how deliberate (and intuitive) thinking affects decisions and interactions with others. Attributes complement how competencies are visibly demonstrated in processes and outcomes. Core leader competency categories are as follows:  Lead. Leaders set goals and establish a vision; motivate or influence others to pursue the goals; build trust to improve relationships; communicate and come to a shared understanding; serve as a role model by displaying character, confidence, and competence; and influence outside the chain of command.  Develop. Leaders foster teamwork; express care for individuals; promote learning; maintain expertise, skills, and self-awareness; coach, counsel, and mentor others; foster job development; and steward the profession of arms.  Achieve. Leaders set priorities; organize tasks; manage resources; and execute plans to accomplish the mission and achieve goals. At the fundamental task echelon, the recently-published ADRP 1-03, The Army Universal Task List, provides the building- block requirements of individual and small unit actions to support the conduct of higher-echelon headquarters and units. In the ADDIE model, elements of analysis, design, and development overlap in a process to improve effectiveness and efficiencies in learning experiences. For example, information gathered during task and topic development in the analysis phase overlaps learning objective development in the design phase. Completed and approved elements from the design phase may proceed to aspects of development prior to all elements being formally approved for integration. Implementation is a dynamic action of conduct and concurrent review. The developer determines the combination of variables to focus particular conditions for a learning event. Selected sub-variables further describe the context of a learning environment and provide considerations for how conditions can be applied to a task or action. A TRADOC threat manager or OE subject matter expert can assist in the review and validation for credible and robust operational environment conditions. Evaluation is integral to every ADDIE phase. Formative evaluation must be conducted throughout the ADDIE process to ensure quality products, effective instruction, and credible use of available resources. The positive spiral development and improvement are an iterative continuum of updating and adjusting training and education experiences based on formative and summative evaluation data, the dynamic nature of an OE, and other guidance from the leadership levels accountable and responsible for the specific tasks and standards of Army readiness and task conditions. Implications for US Army Sustainable Readiness TC 7-102 is a US Army doctrinal guide for embedding realistic, robust, and relevant OE variables and threats into Army training, education, leader development, and professional self-development. Learning venue conditions affect the individual soldier, Department of the Army civilian, and Army leader responsible and accountable for Army readiness.

Army Readiness in Complex OE Successful future Army engagements will depend on resilient Soldiers and cohesive teams of conventional and special operations forces training and working interdependently. Organizations will need to be flexible and adaptable to support a wide variety of missions simultaneously. Complex operational environments will require Army forces to regionally align and organize capabilities to adapt to immediate and emerging requirements. Soldiers must use training methods that enhance understanding and ability to succeed in various operational environments. TP 525-8-1, U.S. Functional Concept for Engagement (2014)

The opposing force tactical task list in TC 7-101, currently under review and revision in 2016, presents tactical tasks that are specific to the OPFOR in portrayal of a threat or hybrid threat. OPFOR tactical organizations and individuals perform these tasks rather than the tasks and criteria for US Army units in other Army training literature. OPFOR organizations and individuals often display motivations and rationales that are different from US Army forces in leadership and soldier decisions and actions. For example, the OPFOR may be willing to accept significant casualties in order to accomplish a

Red Diamond Page 9 mission task that would be unacceptable casualties in US Army plans or execution of a similar mission. Another consideration of difference is an OPFOR willing to conduct operations with less than air parity with an enemy, and how an OPFOR would use an all-arms air defense tactic or selected capabilities of an integrated air defense system. The OPFOR will skillfully use friendly force affiliations, associations, and coalitions. Other deliberate planning and manipulation of a relevant population include use of—willing, coerced, or unknowing—noncombatants, government agencies, nongovernment organizations, and local and international media in an OPFOR area of responsibility. The OPFOR is not typically constrained by standardized rules of engagement and does not necessarily comply with international conventions or agreements on the conduct of warfare. TC 7-100, Hybrid Threat; TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics; and TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, are the baseline guidance in conduct of OPFOR operations as regular, irregular, and/or hybrid threat. DATE 2.2 and any future versions will contain all the conditions needed to replicate an OPFOR as defined above and in threat doctrine. TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration will continue to maintain the document’s relevance by reviewing real-world threats and coordinating regularly with DATE users to ensure DATE maintains its usefulness to the training community. An adaptive learner-centric model—the Army Learning Model—in operational and institutional domains of the US Army is the fundamental way the Army ensures challenging experiences that result in progressive functional expertise and leader excellence to achieve Army operational missions of a globally engaged force. Sustainable readiness is the Army mission to attain and maintain the highest possible Army unit and service-level readiness, manage risk within resource allowances, succeed in current operational requirements, and be rapidly responsive to unforeseen contingencies.

References US Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-7, Army Educational Processes. 9 January 2013. See also TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-series. US Department of the Army. Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1-03, The Army Universal Task List. 2 October 2015. US Department of the Army. Army Mission Command Strategy FY 13-19. 12 June 2013. US Department of the Army. Army Regulation 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program. 15 May 2015. US Department of the Army. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, The US Army Learning Concept 2015. 6 June 2011. Chapter 1. US Department of the Army. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-3, The US Army Training Concept 2012-2028. 7 January 2011. US Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100, Hybrid Threat. 26 November 2010. US Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-101, Exercise Design. 26 November 2010. US Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. 9 December 2011. US Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces. 17 January 2014. US Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.4, Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization Guide. 4 June 2015. US Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 October 2015.

Notes

1 Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Regulation 10-5-1, Organization and Functions. 20 July 2010. Para 8-18c(1)(a). Of note, the ACE Threats Integration Directorate was previously titled the Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID). TR 10-5-1 is in a 2016 revision process. 2 C. Todd Lopez. “Latest 'Virtual Battle Space' release adds realism to scenarios, avatars.” 3 April 2014. This site provides basic information on VBS3. 3 Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-13, System Training Integration. 27 October 2014. Para. 3-12a.

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by Jim Bird, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (IDSI CTR) This is the first increment of a two-part series that addresses changes that have occurred in the Syrian operational environment (OE) since the beginning of the Syrian civil war and the impact those changes have had on the US, Turkey, and the Anti-ISIL Alliance. Speaking at a Kansas State University-hosted lecture series in October 2012, General Martin Dempsey, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the frustrations inherent in trying to anticipate future operational environments. “The U.S. military,” said General Dempsey, “has a terrible record of predicting where conflicts will emerge and where [US units] will be deployed to fight.”1 In response to a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps cadet’s question about where he might be stationed over the next 5–10 years after coming on active duty, General Dempsey responded by comparing the military’s challenge in predicting future OEs to the comparable challenge of a hockey player trying to determine where a puck is going to land on the court before anyone has hit it with a hockey stick.2 If ever there was a figurative court where it has proven almost impossible to determine where the hockey puck is going to land next, the fast-moving and rapidly-evolving Syrian operational environment is it. Table 1: Kurdish groups active in the Syrian OE since 2012

Containing Iran’s Shiite Axis In the waning months of 2012, more than a year after the fateful events of the Arab Spring, the US and its allies in the Mediterranean region were focused almost exclusively on containing what one Turkish scholar dubbed “Iran’s Shiite Axis”—a sphere of influence that stretched from Tehran, ran through Iraq and Syria, and finally terminated in a Hezbollah-

Red Diamond Page 11 plagued Lebanon.3 At that point in time, when the potential fragmentation of Syria looked imminent, the role ethnic Kurds would play in shaping a final settlement was already under scrutiny. “Kurdish self-defense forces from Syria,” wrote Soner Cagaptay and Paray Khanna, “are now receiving training from Peshmerga forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.”4 Assuming that Turkey would carefully guard its sovereignty by keeping its own domestic Kurdish population under control, some analysts then believed that perhaps the time had arrived for a rapprochement between the Turkish government and the Syrian Party for Democratic Unity (PYD), a Kurdish group that Cagaptay and Khanna regarded as “the PKK’s Syrian franchise.”5 The acronym PKK stands for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a group formally designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union.6 Since 2012, a growing number of pro-Kurdish groups have emerged in the Syrian theater of operations. Table 1 should help readers distinguish among the Kurdish groups discussed in this article. Who at that time could have foreseen the collapse of the US-trained Iraqi army in the face of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) onslaught in June 2014, the crafting of a Russian-sanctioned “Iran Nuclear Deal,” and the eventual emergence of ISIL as an imminent and urgent threat to US security interests both at home and abroad? For their part, the Russians, backers of Syrian regimes dating back to the Cold War, continued to support the repressive government of Bashar al Assad. “The idea that all the problems will be resolved if Assad goes, is a utopia for us,” asserted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.7 A Stalwart NATO Ally and the Widening Syrian Sinkhole Amidst all the uncertainty and complexity that encumbered the Syrian OE, at least one factor in the equation remained constant. Turkey, a stalwart US ally and member of NATO since the days of the Cold War, was a major power in the Mediterranean region whose national interests would unquestionably have to be taken into account before any permanent settlement could be reached in the stalemated Syrian civil war. The day eventually came when that war began to encroach upon Turkey’s southern border with Syria. The United States Military Academy’s Combatting Terrorism Center analyst Stephen Starr, surveying the terrorist threat, perceived a need for Turkey to recalibrate its security focus in light of changed circumstances. “The threat to Turkey’s southern regions,” wrote Starr in 2013, “will increase the longer the war in Syria continues.”8 Starr also noted that “Syria’s slide into a widening sinkhole” would render Turkey vulnerable to groups that would “plot and plan long-term attacks on the Turkish state with impunity.”9 Since Starr penned those words, his predictions have proven uncannily accurate. The Syrian sinkhole has indeed continued to widen, albeit in ways that Starr could not have foreseen in 2013, with profound repercussions for Turkey and its regional allies. The Multi-Faceted Significance of Kobani After the Iraqi army debacle of June 2014, Kurdish forces operating in northern Syria demonstrated their prowess as the US coalition’s most effective partner for defeating ISIL in the Middle East. A January 2015 Red Diamond article, “Two Border Towns in Syria: A Description of Urban Operations,” explained how “the Kurdish defenders of Kobani have managed to withstand months of ISIL attacks and psychological warfare with the support of an international coalition. Using mostly small arms, rocket propelled grenades, and leveraging their intimate knowledge of the city, the Kurds and some FSA [Free Syrian Army] fighters have traded space for time as they waited for reinforcements from Kurdish regions in Iraq.”10 The same Red Diamond article also discussed Kobani’s strategic significance, noting that as of late 2015, the battle’s final outcome still remained in doubt. Kobani remains strategically important in more than one context. Different players interpreted what eventually turned out to be a victorious outcome (for the coalition) in different ways. Turkey, for example, discerned a threat to its sovereignty embedded in this victory. To be sure, airpower played an important role. US-led airstrikes that began on 27 September 2014 helped keep ISIL from closing in on districts east and southeast of town through early October. Meanwhile, almost 300 ISIL fighters died from a combination of coalition airstrikes and the dogged resistance put up by Kurdish YPG and Free Syrian Army allies fighting the enemy house-to-house in urban terrain. Shortly after the Kurds captured key terrain overlooking the town in mid-October, the US airdropped much-needed weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies in support of the beleaguered defenders.11

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The tables turned after the first of November, when militia from Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) arrived to reinforce their Kurdish (YPG) counterparts in Syria. By the end of January 2015, after a four-month stand-off, the Kurds had finally driven ISIL out of Kobani.12 Unfortunately, the coalition victory marked the end of only one chapter of the Kobani story; more would follow. On 25 June 2015, ISIL mounted a second attack, this time apparently aimed less at recapturing and occupying the town than to punish the local population for inflicting a defeat on the so-called caliphate. As a local journalist explained to a French news agency, “IS [ISIL] doesn’t want to take over the town. They just came to kill the highest number of civilians in the ugliest ways possible.”13 Dead bodies littered the streets in neighborhoods retaken by ISIL. At length, Kurdish fighters, again with the help of coalition airstrikes, ousted the group from Kobani for a second time.14

Figure 1. Smoke rising from Kobani, Syria, viewed from Syrian side of border, with Turkish troops in foreground About the time of this second liberation of Kobani, a confluence of factors came together to make June 2015 what may well be remembered as a key inflection point in not only the Syrian civil war, but also in the long-running struggle between the Turkish government and its domestic nemesis, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. One of these is that Kobani became a symbolic cause celebre among Kurds with aspirations to attain their own national identity. According to David Phillips, a US citizen of Kurdish heritage, “Kobani will take its place next to Halabja as a critical event in the construction of Kurdish identity.”15 Halabja was the city in Iraqi Kurdistan where, in 1988, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the country’s ethnic Kurdish population. Another reason why the Kobani operation assumed increased strategic significance during the June 2015 timeframe is that it occurred against the backdrop of an historic parliamentary election in Turkey. As a result of that election, a new, left-leaning pro-Kurdish political party—the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)—carried enough votes (meeting a 10% threshold) to secure its representation in the Turkish parliament. As far as Kurdish representation in parliament was concerned, this occasion marked an unprecedented event in the country’s political history. It also marked an historic milestone in the Kurds’ quest to gain acceptance as a legitimate player within the framework of Turkey’s domestic political system.16 The second battle for Kobani played out in the aftermath of this late spring election, even as Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) negotiated with other winning factions to form a new coalition government. The effort to construct a viable coalition government ultimately failed, triggering a second national election the following November.17 Throughout both phases of the Kobani operation, according to a Canadian Intelligence Service Report, the ruling AKP government in Ankara expressed extreme displeasure at the US’ use of airpower in support of the besieged Kurds, and let it be known that it did not wish success to the town’s defenders.18 On the evening of 5 June 2015—a couple of days prior to the parliamentary elections—two bombs exploded at a pro-Kurdish HDP rally in southeastern Turkey, just as the party’s chairman was beginning to make his remarks, killing four people and injuring as many as 400. A few days later, following the 7 June election, Figen Yuksedag, a co-leader of the HDP, accused the ruling AKP party of clandestinely supporting the

Red Diamond Page 13 second ISIL attack on Kobani.19 The 5 June pre-election bombing was the first in a series of three terrorist attacks linked to ISIL in 2015; the second would be mark a turning point that would poison the political waters inside Turkey.

Figure 2. Damage to Kobani shown from the ground and from the air Suruc: A Suicide Bombing with Strategic Effects Up to this point in the Syrian civil war, another war was temporarily on hold: an ongoing internal fight between outlawed PKK separatists and the Turkish government that dated to 1984. Since early 2013 a relative calm had prevailed in Turkey as the two adversaries brought their claims to the negotiating table. For two and a half years—through June 2015—the ceasefire continued to hold, punctuated by only isolated and short-lived outbreaks of violence. Throughout the ceasefire period, however, mutual mistrust, bad feelings, and recrimination were the order of the day. The stakes were high for

Red Diamond Page 14 both parties. For the PKK, Kurdish independence and a national identity hung in the balance; for the Turkish nation-state, it was a life-and-death issue of preventing secession and preserving national sovereignty. Each side accused the other of bad faith in the negotiations. The breaking-point came on 20 July 2015, when a suicide bomber detonated a device in Suruc, Turkey, within sight of the Syrian border, and only a few kilometers from Kobani.20 The victims were a group of young left-wing activists, mostly college students who belonged to the Federation of Socialist Youth Associations. Now that ISIL had been permanently ousted from Kobani, they had planned to visit the town’s Kurdish neighborhoods to distribute toys, plant a memorial forest, and generally participate in humanitarian activities. The blast killed 34 activists and wounded over 100 more, some seriously. It was the deadliest terrorist attack on Turkish soil since 2013, when twin bombs killed 50 people in Reyhanli, another town on the Syrian border. Shortly after the attack, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated at a news conference that initial findings implicated ISIL, but that “we are not at a point to make a final judgement.”21 Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, condemned the attack and the perpetrators “who conducted this brutality,” also noting that “terror has no religion, no country, no race.”22 The Suruc-Kobani Nexus: One War Becomes Two There are conflicting reports as to whether ISIL was actually responsible for the Suruc bombing.23 As these things sometimes go, however, different versions of the truth emerge, and the real facts of the case take a backseat to how they are perceived by highly-sensitized populations who see themselves as victims. So it was in the hours and days that followed the Suruc episode. Despite President Erdogan’s condemnation of the attack, pro-Kurdish HDP leaders inside Turkey accused their (AKP) government of conspiring to “break international solidarity for Kobani.”24 The HDP had previously accused the Turkish government of privately sympathizing with ISIL, and now charged it with negligence and insensitivity in creating the political climate and conditions that culminated in the Suruc tragedy. A statement released by the HDP leadership amounted to a veiled condemnation of the Turkish government in declaring that “all countries . . . from which Isil [sic] has received support are partners in this barbarism. Those who keep silent and do not . . . raise their voice against Isil [sic], are accomplices to this barbarity.”25 Finally, in their frustration over the Turkish government’s perceived failure to protect Kurds along the trace of the country’s border with Syria, HDP leaders encouraged locals to protect themselves by taking security matters into their own hands. If the Turkish state would not protect them, they should fill the security vacuum by protecting themselves.26 To the authorities in Ankara, this strident rhetoric essentially equated to inciting treason. The intense popular reaction of Turkey’s Kurdish population to the Suruc suicide bombing effectively derailed the peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK that had endured for the past two-and-a-half years. Simply put, shortly after the terrorist attack the fragile ceasefire broke down. Just days after the incident, PKK elements in Turkey renewed their attacks against government security forces, and the Turkish government lost little time retaliating by launching airstrikes against known PKK positions in southeastern Turkey as well as selected areas administered by Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).27 Thus the Suruc suicide bombing attained strategic significance by reigniting the internal war waged by the Turkish government against rebellious Kurds who aspired to greater autonomy if not outright independence. By the end of July 2015, Turkey was threatened by two wars: one against Syria, its southern neighbor, and the other against a reinvigorated armed separatist movement in its southeastern region. The Root Cause of the Problem Despite the mutual recriminations lobbed back and forth between the warring factions since the ceasefire broke down, perhaps neither party is to blame for the fight. Instead, history seems to be the real culprit, in the form of national boundaries drawn by nineteenth-century European mapmakers who possessed scant knowledge of, and paid little heed to, local conditions and cultures. It is anything but a new issue. Writing in the mid-1990s, geopolitical analyst Robert D. Kaplan noted that “colonial borders of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Algeria, and other Arab states are often contrary to cultural and political reality.”28 Kaplan went on to observe that “Kurds are found everywhere in Turkey…But Turkey’s problem is that its…landmass is the home of two cultures and languages, Turkish and Kurdish.”29 As analyst Karen Kaya succinctly phrased it, “Kurdistan coheres in its geography and demography.”30 Kurds comprise the largest ethnic group of the twenty-first century—numbering approximately 32 million strong—that possesses no formally-recognized national identity. A

Red Diamond Page 15 particularly unsettling aspect of the problem for our own time is that their population overspreads several Middle Eastern countries, including Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. About 15 million Kurds reside within Turkey’s borders.

Figure 3. Demographic map of the Kurds, showing population distribution across national boundaries The Sykes-Picot agreement, the most recent (post-World War I) geopolitical reconfiguration to redraw international boundaries in the Middle East, left the Kurds without a homeland and countries hosting large Kurdish populations with an intractable problem that too often siphons off blood and treasure; in Turkey’s case, about 40,000 lives over the past 40 years.31 Setting the Stage for Escalation As already noted, Turkey’s AKP-led government was under considerable pressure to take a more proactive stance in waging the war against ISIL. This pressure originated with not only indigenous Kurds, but also partly from the United States, which was urging Turkey to assume a greater role in the anti-ISIL coalition. On Wednesday, 22 July 2015, Turkey’s President Erdogan and US President Barack Obama held a phone conversation. Coincidentally, the following afternoon, ISIL fighters from Syria staged a small-scale (5-man) cross-border rocket propelled grenade and small arms attack that claimed the life of a Turkish non-commissioned officer and wounded two others.32 By the end of the day, the international press was reporting that the United States had been given permission to stage operations out of Incirlik airbase, near the Turkish city of Adana. On 5 August 2015, Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusaglu made headline news by stating, “We have come a long way on the opening of the Incirlik Air Base. Turkey and the United States will soon launch a comprehensive war against the Islamic State [ISIL].”33 A few hours after the Prime Minister’s comments, a US Department of Defense spokesman announced that a “deadly attack” had been launched against ISIL targets “from the base in Southern Turkey.”34 Both the US use of Incirlik as well as Turkey’s more active participation in the Syrian theater of operations is symptomatic of how violent spillover from the Syrian civil war is spreading in the Middle East. Canadian intelligence experts contend that, in spite of the Turkish government’s strong rhetoric against ISIL, that same rhetoric is “often used opportunistically to equate ISIL with the PKK, often suggesting that the latter is the worse scourge.”35 Other sources suggest that an Office of Defense Cooperation cell operating out of the Turkish Armed Forces Sports School in Ankara is mainly coordinating “planning of Turkish air operations against the PKK in Iraq and US attacks against ISIL. The United States and Turkey…know all the details of each other’s operations in Iraq, but [do] not interfere with each other.”36 Despite divergent perspectives and differing priorities regarding exactly which group—ISIL or the PKK—pose the most dangerous threat in the Syrian OE, the Incirlik arrangement provided a workable solution for a month or two, except for one major glitch: other world powers were watching. Turkey, of course, is a NATO member, and Russia could hardly be expected to overlook a NATO presence in Syria that might prove strong enough to turn the tide of war against one of its client states: namely, the regime of Bashar al Assad.37 By the end of September 2015, Russia was refurbishing and enlarging

Red Diamond Page 16 an outmoded airbase in Syria’s Latakia province, making preparations for a major infusion of military advisors to Syria, and shipping advanced weaponry to the Syrian army. The few dozen jets deployed by Russia soon began to make their numbers felt. Staging out of Hemeimeem airbase, they flew more than 6,000 sorties over a period of four months. As reported in the New York Times, “the campaign [was] Russia’s first military operation outside the former Soviet Union since the 1991 Soviet collapse,” and it turned out to be a game-changer in the Syrian OE.38 General Dempsey’s hockey puck started to move again.

Notes

1 Micah Zenko. “100% Right 0% of the Time.” Foreign Policy. 16 October 2012. 2 Micah Zenko. “100% Right 0% of the Time.” Foreign Policy. 16 October 2012. 3 Soner Cagaptay and Parag Khanna. “Why Syria’s Fragmentation is Turkey’s Opportunity.” The Atlantic. 24 October 2012. 4 Soner Cagaptay and Parag Khanna. “Why Syria’s Fragmentation is Turkey’s Opportunity.” The Atlantic. 24 October 2012. 5 Soner Cagaptay and Parag Khanna. “Why Syria’s Fragmentation is Turkey’s Opportunity.” The Atlantic. 24 October 2012. 6 Greg Botelho and Gul Tuysuz. “Turkish Military Says 68 PKK Terrorists Killed in Kurdish Areas.” CNN. 19 December 2015. 7 Karen Kaya. “Russia’s Moves in Syria Complicate Turkey’s Position.” Operational Environment Watch. October 2015. 8 Stephen Starr. “The Renewed Threat of Terrorism to Turkey.” CTC Sentinel. 25 June 2013. 9 Stephen Starr. “The Renewed Threat of Terrorism to Turkey.” CTC Sentinel. 25 June 2013. 10 Jerry England. “Two Border Towns in Syria: A Description of Urban Operations.” Red Diamond Newsletter. January 2015. 11 BBC News. “Battle For Kobane: Key Events.” 25 June 2015; US Central Command. “Oct 6: U.S. Military, Partner Nations Conduct Airstrikes Against ISIL in Syria and Iraq.” US Central Command News Release Number 20141006. 6 October 2014. 12 BBC News. “Battle For Kobane: Key Events.” 25 June 2015. 13 Voice of America. “Kurdish Fighters Drive IS From Kobani.” 27 June 2015. 14 Voice of America. “Kurdish Fighters Drive IS From Kobani.” 27 June 2015. 15 Karen Kaya. “Kurds in Iraq and Syria: Aspirations and Realities in a Changing Middle East.” Operational Environment Watch. July 2015. 16 Karen Kaya. “The Turkish General Elections of June 7, 2015: Results, Significance, Implications.” Operational Environment Watch. August 2015. 17 Karen Kaya. “AKP Wins Decisive Victory in November 1 Elections.” Operational Environment Watch. December 2015. 18 Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Related Security Trends in the Middle East. January 2016. Pgs 123– 126. 19 Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Related Security Trends in the Middle East. January 2016. Pgs 123– 126; Dorian Jones. “Kurds Accuse Turkey of Allowing IS Attack on Kobani.” Voice of America. 25 June 2015; Josh Pettitt. “Turkey Attacks: A Timeline.” The Guardian. 17 February 2016. 20 Karen Kaya. “Is the Peace Process Over?” Operational Environment Watch. September 2015. 21 Kareem Shaheen and Constanze Letsch. “‘ISIS Suicide Bomber’ Strikes Turkish Border Town as Syrian War Spills Over.” The Guardian. 20 July 2015. 22 Kareem Shaheen and Constanze Letsch. “‘ISIS Suicide Bomber’ Strikes Turkish Border Town as Syrian War Spills Over.” The Guardian. 20 July 2015. 23 Agence France-Presse. “Turkey ‘Identifies Suruc Suicide Bombing Suspect.” Al Jazeera. 21 July 2015; Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Related Security Trends in the Middle East. January 2016. Pgs 123–126. 24 Agence France-Presse. “Turkey ‘Identifies Suruc Suicide Bombing Suspect.” Al Jazeera. 21 July 2015. 25 Kareem Shaheen and Constanze Letsch. “‘ISIS Suicide Bomber’ Strikes Turkish Border Town as Syrian War Spills Over.” The Guardian. 20 July 2015. 26 Agence France-Presse. “Turkey ‘Identifies Suruc Suicide Bombing Suspect.” Al Jazeera. 21 July 2015. 27 Karen Kaya. “Is the Peace Process Over?” Operational Environment Watch. September 2015. 28 Robert D. Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy.” The Atlantic. February 1994. 29 Robert D. Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy.” The Atlantic. February 1994. 30 Karen Kaya. “Kurds in Iraq and Syria: Aspirations and Realities in a Changing Middle East.” Operational Environment Watch. July 2015. 31 Karen Kaya. “Kurds in Iraq and Syria: Aspirations and Realities in a Changing Middle East.” Operational Environment Watch. July 2015; Egemen Bezi and Nicholas Borroz. “ISIS Helps Forge the Kurdish Nation.” The National Interest. 5 February 2016; Constanze Letisch and Agencies. “Turkey Says Kurds in Syria Responsible for Ankara Car Bomb.” The Guardian. 18 February 2016. 32 Kareem Shaheen and Constanze Letsch. “Turkey to Let Anti-ISIS Coalition Use Airbase After Soldier’s Death.” The Guardian. 23 July 2015. 33 Metan Gurcan. “What’s the US Really Doing at Turkey’s Incerlik Air Base?” Al Monitor. 7 August 2015. 34 Metan Gurcan. “What’s the US Really Doing at Turkey’s Incerlik Air Base?” Al Monitor. 7 August 2015. 35 Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Related Security Trends in the Middle East. January 2016. Pgs 123– 126. 36 Metan Gurcan. “What’s the US Really Doing at Turkey’s Incerlik Air Base?” Al Monitor. 7 August 2015. 37 Karen Kaya. “Russia’s Moves in Syria Complicate Turkey’s Position.” Operational Environment Watch. October 2015. 38 Vladimir Isachenkov. “Analysis: Russia Presses Air Blitz in Syria to Dictate Peace.” Yahoo! News. 16 February 2016; Karen Kaya. “Russia’s Moves in Syria Complicate Turkey’s Position.” Operational Environment Watch. October 2015.

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by Jerry England, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC) The Threat 2025+ project is an ACE Threats Integration initiative to produce a series of blueprints for the purpose of capturing current and future threat tactics from a threat perspective for training. The blueprints are rooted in Training Circular (TC) 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics and are a representation of projected threat capabilities. The intent of the blueprints is to validate the current hybrid threat (HT) requirements for training and the current HT force structure at training centers Army-wide. This article is the first in a series that will discuss the threat blueprints and explain the conditions for their use in training. It will also highlight the elements of threat tactics that are most relevant when given a set of combat conditions. Threat Blueprint One: Regular Heavy Force Attack in Rural Terrain The conditions for blueprint one are designed to lay the foundation for exercising a heavy brigade combat team’s (HBCT) training objectives. The blueprint’s conditions contain an assaulting HT brigade tactical group (BTG) in mostly unrestricted rural terrain. The array of the enemy force (blue) is based on the forward defense diagram found in Field Manual 3-21.20, The Infantry Battalion, Figure 5.3, and was modified to include the enablers of an HBCT. The choice of conditions reflects the assumption that the HBCT represents the largest brigade-size force an opposing force at a live training center will face, and is therefore the largest type of exercise that can be supported given current levels. The opposing force is made up of a BTG that attacks from assembly areas across an international border. The BTG must invest in a combination of support and enabling actions to prepare for the integrated attack, which in this case is an assault on an enemy brigade support area. Actions in the disruption zone, such as information warfare (INFOWAR) and counterreconnaissance, will impede the enemy’s ability to observe and collect information on HT movements as well as gauge local support. Fixing and reconnaissance forces will isolate the enemy to prevent reinforcements from joining the battle and protect the assaulting force from a counterattack. These enabling and support operations assist the HT to disaggregate the enemy defenses and allow freedom of movement for the assault force.1 The conditions in this blueprint emphasize HT regular forces and the use of fire and maneuver as the ways and means to decisively defeat the defending force. The HT also uses irregular forces in a support and enabling role. The blueprint includes a population center, which provides a local population that can be critical to the success or failure of either side through the successful implementation of INFOWAR activities. The inclusion of the potentially-important civilian population provides the conditions to include local security forces, criminal elements, and other factors found in contemporary operations. Additionally, the BTG is supported by guerrillas and special purpose forces to further deny early warning and neutralize enemy overmatch. The inclusion of the irregular and special purpose forces will create windows of opportunity for the BTG to conduct its integrated attack at the time and place of its choosing. Additional regular forces fielding surface-to-surface missiles are included to facilitate fires on enemy command and control (C2) systems and logistics.

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Figure 1. OPFOR order of battle Functional Tactics: Disrupt 1. Set Conditions Condition-setting can be achieved by destroying or degrading a critical element or component of the enemy’s combat systems in order to enable the offensive action. Examples of combat systems at the tactical level are the enemy’s individual components (battalion and below formation), the synergy among the enemy’s components, and the boundaries separating the system components.2 Once the approach and method for the disruption action is decided, the HT will commit the necessary resources by allocating forces. INFOWAR activities are the action force during the initial preparation of the integrated attack. Perception management operations will foster support among the population and increase distrust of the extra-regional forces. Electronic warfare activities will provided intelligence on enemy and civilian communications, as well as deny or degrade coalition and host-nation C2 systems. Area-denial and anti-access techniques, such as local and national propaganda, disruption of military and security force C2 through electronic warfare, and computer warfare, are used to gain situational awareness and to limit US forces’ situational awareness on the threat and the population. US forces’ counteractions may include increased assistance to host-nation law-and-order efforts and a range of civil affairs tasks such as foreign-nation assistance. To mitigate these efforts, the HT will attempt to maintain its influence by infiltrating host-nation security forces and corrupting government officials through bribery and extortion, as well as engaging in assassination of potential rivals in the local community. The HT may use any combination of regular, special purpose, and irregular forces to accomplish this mission. Additionally, the HT will emphasize cultural and ethnic differences in an attempt to culturally distance the population from the US forces.

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The conditions are set when the HT has increased freedom of movement to conduct reconnaissance operations without the risk of interception by enemy early-warning systems or sabotage by the local population.

Figure 2. Hybrid threat disruption operations 2. Perform Border Counterreconnaissance Identifying the enemy components and the synergies among those components is accomplished through reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. By using the international border as a demarcation, HT forces and elements strive to locate enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and gauge the enemy’s ability to coordinate the defense. Additionally, understanding the objectives and the areas of responsibility for each of these components allows the HT to focus on the key subsystems’ limitations and vulnerabilities. Neutralizing enemy screens, reducing obstacles, and degrading forward fire controls are examples of counterreconnaissance objectives. The use of irregular and special purpose forces to probe base defenses, the initiation of indirect fires on forward enemy battle positions, and the disruption of C2 and logistics subsystems are attempts to disaggregate the enemy’s defense in depth. The impact of these operations may cause the enemy to begin a counterattack at a time and place not of his choosing and can affect adjacent missions. The border counterreconnaissance effort may come in the form of a reconnaissance attack, where the HT forces coordinate and synchronize to find, isolate, fix, and destroy the enemy in his battle positions to create windows of opportunity for offensive action forces. According to TC 7-100.2, “A reconnaissance attack is a tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed enemy elements and either fixes or destroys them. The purpose of the reconnaissance attack can be to find the enemy and to attack him (sometimes referred to as ‘search and attack’). However, the purpose can be to find the enemy but not attack him. Instead of attacking, the HT may use this opportunity to gain information that answers important questions about the enemy’s location, dispositions, military capabilities, and quite possibly his intentions.”3

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3. Neutralize Position Area of Artillery A key subsystem of the enemy’s ISR ability is the ground surveillance radar located in his support area. The HT conducts a raid as part of the disruption effort to destroy this critical element. According to TC 7-100.2, “A raid is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its capture or destruction that culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding force to safe territory. Raids can also be used to secure information and to confuse or deceive the enemy. The keys to the successful accomplishment of any raid are surprise, firepower, and violence. The raid ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.”4 The blueprint uses a combination of regular and special purpose forces with indirect fire (IDF) support from the surface- to-surface missile and harpy companies attached to the BTG. IDF used either in direct support or as a deception operation can either destroy the target or shift enemy reinforcements away from the objective to enable the action force conducting the raid. Mission success is accomplished when the enemy’s ability to conduct counterfire has been reduced to acceptable levels for HT freedom of movement. Functional Tactics: Enabling and Support 1. Fix Forward Battle Positions After successfully disrupting the enemy ISR capability, the HT will identify which enemy forces need to be fixed and the method by which they will be fixed. Using the systems warfare approach, the HT deploys fixing forces against the forward elements of the enemy defense in the form of two mechanized infantry battalions. The organic combat power of the battalions is capable of fixing the required enemy forces with the correct method. The large fixing forces contain constituent fire support capabilities to launch discrete attacks on logistics, C2, and enemy forward ammunition refueling points, in addition to engaging subsequent enemy battle positions. According to TC 7-100.2, “Battalions and below often serve as fixing forces for BTGs and are also often capable of performing this mission without significant task organization. This is particularly true in those cases where simple suppressive fires are sufficient to fix enemy forces.”5 For this reason, constituent artillery is the primary means for indirect fire support for fixing the enemy forward battle positions. 2. Isolate Enemy Reinforcements The isolating forces in the blueprint use a combination of fires and maneuver to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile actions against the key components of the assault force. They provide support by fire to protect the assault force as it maneuvers into position for the final assault. The isolation forces include an armor battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion, and move with the assault force to predesignated battle positions along the avenue of approach.6 In this case, constituent fire support capabilities suppress the enemy battle positions in order to allow the isolation forces and the assault force to continue along the avenue of approach and arrive at the final objective with the necessary combat power to accomplish the mission. Functional Tactics: Assault Force 1. Assault Objective The BTG commander employs an assault force consisting of a light tank battalion. The battalion assaults the objective using firepower and physical occupation to destroy the enemy defensive positions. In case of obstacles, a mine-clearing squad is attached as an enabling force. Subordinate detachments conduct assaults to destroy an enemy force or seize a

Red Diamond Page 21 position. However, the purpose of such an assault is to create or help create the opportunity for the action force to accomplish the BTG’s overall mission, which in this case is the integrated attack.7

Figure 3. Hybrid threat assault force combat power versus remaining blue forces Training Implications The threat blueprint described above illustrates a set of techniques that can be used by a hybrid threat when engaging a heavy enemy force. The blueprint, when utilized as a basis for OPFOR scheme of maneuver, can challenge many of the commander’s training objectives. Exercise designers can add variations to this blueprint by using additional techniques found in TC 7-100.2 and the Threat Force Structure. Notes 1 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 1-66. 2 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Paras 1-58, 1-68. 3 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 8-108. 4 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 3-174. 5 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 3-31. 6 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 3-33. 7 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 3-36. ______

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by Patrick Madden, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA Ctr) An assortment of different Skylark UAVs is used in the Army Warrior Simulation (WARSIM) for corps and division training exercises. The manufacturer, Elbit Systems, uses a numbering system for these UAVs that can be is confusing and may cause errors in application. This issue has been further complicated by another UAV company that initially used the same name for a completely different UAV. The purpose of this article is to help clarify this confusion since the Skylark UAVs are listed in the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) located on the Army Training Network (ATN). Background To begin with, Elbit Systems, located in Haifa, Israel, began promoting the initial Skylark I in 2003.1 The hand-launched Skylark I is a mini-UAV designed to be portable and used at the battalion tactical level for conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. In 2004 the Skylark I was purchased by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and used at the battalion level as designed.2

Figure 1. Skylark I/IV with size perspective to soldier and Figure 2. Skylark I/IV ready to launch At about the same time the Skylark I was developed, Elbit also began designing the Skylark II, which was initially flown in 2005.3 The tactical Skylark II is a derivative of the Skylark I, but is much larger and designed to be used at brigade and division echelons. The Skylark II has a mission radius of 60 kilometers as opposed to the Skylark I, which has a radius of 10 kilometers.4 The Skylark II, unlike the Skylark I, is not portable and is rail-launched from either a tactical vehicle launcher or a launch trailer that is towed. However, both Skylarks have relatively small fuselages and are powered by electrical brushless magnetic motors, making them hard to detect either audibly or visually. Their thermal signatures are also very low, making them difficult to engage with surface-to-air missiles, even with proximity or contact fuses. To help alleviate confusion about the different Skylarks there will now be separate pages dedicated to the Skylark I and the Skylark II in the 2015 WEG.

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During the same time period listed above, another Israeli aerospace company called BlueBird Aero Systems began developing its own mini-UAV. Its UAV was also initially called Skylark. The name was changed to SkyLite in 2005 under a partnership with Rafael in order to prevent confusion with Elbit’s Skylark, both of which were in the same class of mini-UAVs.5 The SkyLite’s name was changed to SpyLite after BlueBird’s partnership with Rafael ended in 2008. Capabilities of the SpyLite are also listed in the 2015 WEG. Figure 2. Skylark II model Skylark Variants Toward the end of 2005, Elbit announced that it had enhanced its Skylark I and renamed it Skylark IV.6 This slightly- improved variant included a 30-minute increase in endurance time, ruggedized components, and improved gyro- stabilization. Total system weight was reduced some time afterward, when the components of the Skylark IV were converted from analog to digital. However, it still remained a hand-launched UAV in support of battalion-level coverage. Within three years, another variant of the Skylark was developed. This time the enhancement was entitled Skylark I Long Endurance (LE). The significant change on this variant was a stronger engine and longer wing span, which increased its radius of operation to 15 kilometers and endurance to three hours.7 In 2008, the Israeli Defense Ministry selected the Skylark I Long Endurance (LE) to be fielded to all IDF battalions.8 The latest variant is the Skylark I LE Block II, which was based on a modified version the Skylark I LE. This particular model was largely designed for the US military market. In January 2016, Elbit announced that it had been one of five companies to be selected by the US Army to provide a large array of UAV products. The selection also includes an option for the Army to purchase the Skylark I LE Block II.9 In addition, the Air Force Research Laboratory is working with Elbit’s Skylark I LE Block II in order to develop a hydrogen fuel cell engine that will enable this UAV to have an endurance time of over seven hours.10 The final version of this mini-UAV is still in process and the results have yet to be seen. A variant of Skylark II is the Skylark III. Revealed for the first time at the Singapore Air Show in February 2016, the Skylark III is Figure 3. Skylite A and B expected to be operational sometime in 2017.11 However, the Skylark III is unlike the Skylark I variants, which were built on each other. The Skylark III is listed as a variant of Skylark II in the 2015 WEG because it has similar capabilities that enable it to function as a brigade- and division-level tactical UAV. For example, its size does not allow it to be man-packed and it must be catapult launched, like the Skylark II. It also makes numerical sense to follow the Skylark II. Nevertheless, the Skylark III has increased performance relative to the Skylark II. The Skylark III is shaped more like a plane with a rearward- mounted electric engine. It is somewhat smaller in size and weight than the Skylark II but can carry a heavier payload, operate 40 additional kilometers in range, achieve a service ceiling altitude of 4.5 kilometers, and remain aloft for six hours.12

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Figure 4. Skylark I LE

Figure 5. Skylark III Listed below are the Skylarks and their variants discussed above. They show the progression and correct numbering for each Skylark category. Further details on these UAVs can be found in the 2015 WEG. Table 1. Skylark I, SpyLite, and Skylark II with variants and sequential numbering

UAV Type Echelon Initial Name Variant Variant Variant Mini-UAV BN Skylark I Skylark IV Skylark 1 LE Skylark 1 LE Block II Mini-UAV BN/BDE Skylark SkyLite A SkyLite B SpyLite

Tactical UAV BDE/DIV Skylark II Skylark III

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Conclusion The confusion over the Skylarks and their variants is important to understand. They are part of the Army WARSIM database and are currently being used by the World Class Opposing Force (WCOPFOR) from the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) at battalion and brigade level. Training units that engage the WCOPFOR need to know all its capabilities, including the Skylarks and other associated UAVs that are listed in the WEG. This prevents training units from engaging WCOPFOR equipment with incorrect weapon systems, the results of which can either be ineffective or overkill with weapon systems that should be used for other, more appropriate targets. Only by familiarity with the UAVs can the training units use the appropriate weapon systems to successfully attack these WCOPFOR assets. Notes 1 Martin Streetly, editor. IHS Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft: Unmanned 2013-2014. IHS Global Limited. 2013. Pg 85. 2 Israeli Weapons. “Skylark 1.” Accessed 3 March 2016; SAT News Daily. “Skylark UAV Elevates To Top Spot For Israeli Army.” 23 December 2008; Martin Streetly, editor. IHS Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft: Unmanned 2013-2014. IHS Global Limited. 2013. Pg 88. 3 Martin Streetly, editor. IHS Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft: Unmanned 2013-2014. IHS Global Limited. 2013. Pg 88. 4 Ian Kemp, editor. Unmanned Vehicles Handbook 2010. The Shephard Press. December 2009. Pg 38. 5 Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. “Rafael Announces Name Change for Canister-Launched Mini UAV.” 28 April 2004. 6 Martin Streetly, editor. IHS Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft: Unmanned 2013-2014. IHS Global Limited. 2013. Pg 87. 7 Ian Kemp, editor. Unmanned Vehicles Handbook 2010. The Shephard Press. December 2009. Pg 36. 8 Deagel. “Israel Ministry of Defense Selects Skylark I LE as Battalion Level Mini-UAV.” 16 December 2008. 9 Deagel. “Elbit Systems Selected for Award to Provide the US Army with Skylark I-LE Block 2.” 16 January 2013. 10 Elbit Systems of America. “Skylark I-LE.” Accessed 25 February 2016. 11 Kelvin Wong. “Singapore Airshow 2016: Elbit unveils Skylark III tactical UAV.” IHS Jane’s 360. 18 February 2016. 12 Kelvin Wong. “Singapore Airshow 2016: Elbit unveils Skylark III tactical UAV.” IHS Jane’s 360. 18 February 2016; Tamir Eshel. “New Drone Extends Combat Brigade’s View Beyond 100 km.” 10 February 2016.

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Know the Threats Consider: Where you wear your uniform. What decals-- We are Combating TERRORISM are on your car. Be ALERT! Personal Protective Measures for Home and Travel

US Army TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Combating Terrorism (CbT) Poster 06-16

For more on Threats and Opposing Forces (OPFOR) for Training Go to https://atn.army.mil/ Click “Training for Operations”-“TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration” and (Photo: US Army) “DA Training Environment”- “TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration OPFOR & Hybrid Threat Doctrine”

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by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration, Operations The February 2016 Annual US Army Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference, hosted by the Army’s Provost Marshal General, centered on the theme of “The Evolution of Terrorism: Staying Ahead of the Terrorist.” The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2 Analysis and Control Element Threats Integration (ACE-TI) Directorate participated in the conference antiterrorism training, education, and situational understanding of current and future threats. Professional exchanges among subject matter experts included representatives from the Department of Defense, other US federal government agencies, civilian and military academia, and individuals with specific experiences and insights on the current threats of terrorism. The objectives of the conference were to discuss ways and means to anticipate and mitigate particular threats in forward theaters of operations and in the US Homeland, as well as discuss Army policy in support of improved antiterrorism initiatives and programs. General (Ret) Michael V. Hayden was the conference keynote speaker. Other senior US leaders included Mr. Mark R. Lewis, Deputy Chief Management Officer in the Office of the Secretary of the Army, and Major General Mark S. Inch, Army Provost Marshal General. Other senior leaders represented a wide array of functional area expertise in organizations such as Department of Homeland Security; Department of Justice; Headquarters, Department of the Army, G3/5/7; National Defense University; Threat Knowledge Group; and the Army Military Police School. Several workshop breakout sessions during the conference, which were coordinated by the Office of the Provost Marshal General Antiterrorism Branch, encouraged conduct of face-to-face coordination by decisionmakers and action officers on pressing or emerging issues in commands and other Army organizations for 2016 progress. The TRADOC G-34 Protection Directorate hosted a protection and antiterrorism workshop. This type of work session reinforced professional friendships and ongoing mutually supported projects with protection and antiterrorism TRADOC G-34 experts such as Mr. Bill Moisant, Mr. Jim Kirkland (operating off-site), and Mr. Bob Belair. One example was the promotion and distribution of US Army and TRADOC training literature on current threats, hybrid threat, Figure 1. TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats and G-34 Protection Directorates at the US Army Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference FEB 2016. and opposing force for training, professional Dr. Jon Moilanen (IDSI Ctr) and Mr. Bob Belair (ICE Inc. Ctr) Army education, and leader development. Participants in this annual antiterrorism conference shared the viewpoints and expertise in a US whole-of-government approach to antiterrorism awareness, force protection and readiness, and professional collaboration among the US Armed Forces, civilian academia, civilian law enforcement, private sector experts, and the Antiterrorism Branch of the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

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VAB Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé Armored Personnel Carrier by H. David Pendleton, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr) When the latest Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) is published, it will include some new equipment. One of the added vehicles is the Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé (VAB) that is used as an armored personnel carrier (APC) or a support vehicle in a number of roles. Recent reports after the completion of the WEG sheet demonstrate the further proliferation of the VAB to at least 17 countries, many of them in Africa or the Middle East. There may be other countries with VABs, especially in the Middle East. On a deployment, an American unit will likely see a VAB as part of its allies’ vehicle array, or possibly operated by the enemy. Countries that use at least one VAB variant include Brunei, Central African Republic, Chad, Cyprus, France, Gabon, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritius, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Romania, and the United Arab Emirates. Knowledge of the VAB, its various versions, and its capabilities will assist an American commander, whether the US unit is working with an ally or facing an enemy threat.

Figure 1. VAB in the 2013 Bastille Day Parade; the commander/gunner is positioned high behind the machine gun and the three soldiers in the back are standing up through the three available hatches VAB Base Variant The original VAB, first fielded in 1976, is a 4-wheeled vehicle with 4-wheel drive (4 X 4) APC, operated by a crew of two with space for ten dismountable soldiers. The original design plans called for an air-transportable amphibious vehicle. The VAB met the standards to ride on a C-130 Hercules, with a base weight of 13,000 kg and dimensions of 5.98 m in length, 2.50 m in width, and a height of 2.06 m. After the crew erects the VAB’s trim vane, two water jets make the APC fully amphibious. Top road speed for the VAB is 92 kph and 8 kph in the water. Some variants may not travel as fast. The range on roads for the VAB is 1,000 km.

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The VAB design places the crew in the front of the vehicle, the engine in the middle, and the dismountable soldiers in the rear. The driver is on the left front of the vehicle, with the commander/gunner on the right side in a turret. The engine compartment sits directly behind the driver, leaving a passageway between the gunner’s position and the troop compartment in the vehicle’s rear area. The ten fully combat-loaded soldiers sit on two benches, five passengers on each side of the vehicle. The benches can fold up to create a cargo space of 4.57 cubic meters (2.46 length x 1.375 width x 1.35 height) that can carry up to 2,000 kg of cargo. Both crew members enter and exit through their own doors, while the other soldiers enter and dismount through dual rear doors without a center support post. All four doors feature a window opening to the outside, covered by armored shutters, where soldiers can fire their personal weapons. There are an additional three hatches on top of the troop compartment. Minimum armored protection on all Figure 2. VAB unloading from a Royal Air Force (United sides is against a 7.62-mm round and shrapnel from Kingdom) C17 cargo airplane most artillery explosions at least 100 m away from the vehicle. Weapons Systems The VAB’s base weapons system is the AA-52 7.62-mm machine gun. This weapon features a maximum effective range of 3,000 m, and the normal basic load of ball and tracer ammunition is 1,250 rounds. The actual weapon system(s) depend on the variant and the vehicle’s purpose. The French Army by itself fields 35 different types of VABs, but Renault produced additional export versions as well. There are five variants for the Véhicule de Combat de I’Infanterie (VCI) alone. These include the TL 20S with a 20-mm cannon in a manually-operated turret; the T 20 with a 20-mm cannon and a coaxially- mounted 7.62-mm machine gun; the T 25 with a 25-mm cannon and a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun in an electronic turret; a variant with a Dragar turret with a 25-mm cannon and a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun; and a model with a Toucan 1 turret with a 20-mm cannon and a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun that is used by the French Air Force.

Figure 3. VAB Engineer Vehicle with machine gun in front and recovery equipment mounted on the side of the vehicle; photo by Ad Meskens.

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Figure 4. VAB used as MO-12-RT-6A mortar towing vehicle during Desert Storm; photo taken after the fighting by TSGT H.H. Duffner The VAB is convertible for use as an infantry support vehicle or even for logistics purposes. VAB variants include those with antitank (AT) weapon systems such as the Mephisto or Euromissile; various command variants; air defense; combat engineer vehicle; mortar-carrier or mortar-towing vehicle; NBC reconnaissance; electronic warfare; maintenance repair; or ambulance. While an NBC protection system is standard on the VAB in the French Army, additional equipment is available for the customer. Options include an air-conditioning system, an armored grenade-thrower hood, gas dispensers, loudspeakers, infrared or passive night-vision equipment, or a 7,000 kg front- mounted winch. See the WEG sheet below for information on the most common available variants. Figure 5. VAB Sanitaire (Ambulance) with space for 4 litter patients, 10 sitting patients, or a combination of 2 litter patients and five seated patients

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KNOWN COUNTRIES FIELDING THE VAB COUNTRY NUMBER REMARKS Brunei 39 Central African Republic 10+ Chad 65 Cyprus 128 VAB VTT Variant & VAB with UTM 800 AT Launcher France (Army) 4,105 35 Variants France (Gendarmerie) 28 VBC-90 Variant Gabon UNK Indonesia 46 VAB VTT Variant Italy 14 NBC Reconnaissance Ivory Coast 13 Kuwait UNK Lebanon 80 VAB/VCI Mauritius UNK Morocco 365 Various types Oman 23 14 VAB with ESD & 9 VDAA Qatar 160 VPM 81 Variant & VAB with UTM 800 AT Launcher Romania UNK Retired United Arab Emirates 20 Other Variants While rejected by the French Army, Renault produced several 6 x 6 VAB variants for the export market. These VABs, however, are not fully amphibious. Renault can also stretch the VAB out to an 8 x 8 wheeled-drive vehicle, but there has been little interest shown by the international military community for the much-longer variants. During operations in Afghanistan, the French Army added two tons of add-on armor to the VAB for additional ballistic protection against 12.7- mm ammunition. This increased weight and, while it increased the crew’s protection, made the VAB unable to conduct fully-amphibious operations. In Afghanistan, the VAB showed surprisingly good protection for the crew and troops when hit by an improvised explosive device (IED). While unintentional in the design, the wheel placement Figure 6. VAB Mk 3; a 6 x 6 test model with seemed to deflect the IED’s explosive blast, increasing the survivability air defense turret centered on the vehicle rate of the soldiers inside. The VAB’s relatively light weight sometimes caused the vehicle to jump two meters in the air after the explosion, but this upward movement reduced the IED blast’s ability to penetrate the vehicle’s armor. Future Developments The VAB, while still effective due to upgrades over the many years since it first went into production, is lagging behind other wheeled APCs that use more-modern technology. France is one of the leading arms-sellers to Africa, where conflicts often occur. The French Army will probably soon replace its VAB fleet, possibly as early as 2020. Once the French field a new wheeled APC, they will likely sell their old VABs to other militaries—especially those in Africa—making the VAB a likely vehicle on the battlefield for years to come.

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FRENCH ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER VAB

VAB AZURE Urban Combat Vehicle VAB APC

VAB APC VAB Memphisto Anti-Tank APC

SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS AMMUNITION SPECIFICATIONS Alternative designations: Vehicule de l’Avant Blinde Name: AA-52 Date of introduction: 1976 Caliber/length: 7.62-mm Proliferation: 5012+/12 countries Type: Machine Gun Description: 4 X 4 wheeled APC with 2 rear Ammo: 1250 Rounds: exit doors & roof hatches for 10 Ball, Tracer; Other: INA soldiers; 3 firing ports on each side & a port in each rear door

Crew: 2 (driver, commander) Maximum Effective Range: 3000 m Combat weight (mt): 13.0 (higher for 6 X 6 & 8 X 8 Armor penetration: INA variants) Chassis length overall (m): 5.98 (longer for 6 X 6 & 8 X 8 Muzzle velocity (m/s): 830 variants) Height overall (m): 2.06 VARIANTS SPECIFICATIONS Width overall (m): 2.50 VAB RASIT Recon vehicle with radar Ground pressure (kg/cm2): INA VAB RATAC Artillery target acquisition Automotive performance: VI MIDS 06.20.45 (MAN C.2356 VAB Sanitaire Ambulance Carries 4 litter, 10 sitting, or 2 HM 72 also available) litter/5 seated patients Engine type: Renault water-cooled, turbo- VAB VDAA Santal SAM System 6 X 6 VAB with 2-man turret charged in-line, 6-cyclinder with 6 MATRA Mistral SAMs diesel with 6 extra rounds in vehicle Cruising range (km): 1000 VAB with ESD TA-20 turret mounted anti- aircraft system

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Speed (km/h): Max road: 92 VAB Echelon Repair Vehicle 4 X 4 or 6 X 6 variants for Max off-road: INA battlefield repairs with a 7.5- Average cross-country: INA mm or 7.62-mm machine gun Max Swim: 8 Fording depths (m): Amphibious VAB PC Command Vehicle Crew of 6 with additional radios & mapboards; FDC & FO versions also available Radio: INA VAB Bromure Electronic Crew of 3 operate Thomson- Warfare Vehicle CSF VHF tactical jammer Protection: VAB ATILA Artillery fire & command Armor, turret front (mm): INA (Against 7.62-mm rounds) VAB Recon NBC reconnaissance vehicle Applique armor (mm): INA VAB Genie Engineer Vehicle Crew of 9 with roof-mounted raft Explosive reactive armor(mm): INA VTM 120-mm Mortar Towing Tows Thompson Brandt 120- Vehicle mm Mortar with 70 rounds Active Protection System: INA VPM 81 81-mm mortar fires through roof opening Self-entrenching blade: Bulldozer blade available VAB TOW Basic VAB with TOW ATGM launcher with 16 reloads NBC protection system: Yes VAB TOW-ALT Thune-Eureka 2-tube TOW turret with 16 reload missiles Smoke equipment: 4 Smoke grenade launchers VAB with UTM 800 Anti-Tank 4 non-retractable HOT tube Launcher launchers with 8 reloads Survivability equipment: Vehicle chassis design helps VCAC HOT Mephisto Anti-Tank 4 retractable HOT tube protect vehicle from mines Vehicle launchers with SACLOS missiles & 8 additional rounds VARIANTS SPECIFICATIONS VMO Internal Security Vehicle VCAC Milan Trial 4 X 4 with 2 Milan ATGMs VMO with TOI Standard VMO with cupola, 7.62-mm MG & AGL VAB VDAA Albi SAM System Prototype 4 X 4 or 6 X 6 with VAB AZURE Urban warfare with bulldozer turret with 2 MATRA SAM blade & panoramic periscopes launchers & 6 extra missiles VAB New Generation/ 1996 Upgrade with most VAB Atlas Improved ATILA Artillery C2 Improved VAB variants available VCI More heavily armed than the VAB Mark III Latest upgrade from 2014; 6 X 6 basic VAB with many variants with advanced protection & mobility NOTES SOURCES: MILITARY PERISCOPE & GLOBAL SECURITY. ALTERNATE PRIMARY WEAPON IS A 12.7-MM MACHINE GUN WITH 1200 ROUNDS. VEHICLE COMES IN 6 X 6 OR 8 X 8 VARIANTS THAT INCREASE THE VEHICLE’S WEIGHT. VEHICLE CAN BE USED AS A PLATFORM FOR A VARIETY OF WEAPONS IS EVIDENT BY THE NUMBER AND VARIETY OF VARIANTS AVAILABLE.

References

Armée de Terre. “VAB – véhicule de l’avant blindé” 2013. Army Recognition. “VAB Renault Armoured vehicle personnel carrier.” Undated. Deagel. “VAB.” Undated. Global Security. “Lesson 2: Light Armored Vehicle Identification.” Undated. Merchet, Jean-Dominique. “la bonne surprise du VAB face aux IED; avoir été amphibie…” Libération Secret Défense. 28 July 2009. Military Factory. “Renault VAB (Vehicule de l Avant Blinde) 4x4 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) (1976).” 29 July 2015. Military Periscope. “VAB (4 x 4) armored personnel carrier.” 1 May 2013. Military Today. “VAB Armored Personnel Carrier.” Undated. Tank Nut Dave. “The French 6x6 VAB AKA Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé Family.” Undated.

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Modeling Violent Extremist Organizations in Doctrinal Threat Models by MAJ Jay Hunt and Jerry England (DAC), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration During one of the discussions in the December 2015 Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) 3.0 Working Group meeting, several of the attendees voiced a need for a threat model that mirrored the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Their main objection to the existing hybrid threat models depicted in the Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series was that they were either purely guerrilla forces or purely insurgent. The working group expressed a desire to create a doctrinal model for a new “thing like ISIL.” The Hybrid Threat (HT) Force Structure is a composite model of threat capabilities that can be used for training and developmental purposes. This collection of models is the foundation of the military forces in DATE and is used across the Army as a consistent and doctrinally-aligned training tool. The very nature of the HT presents unique challenges for commanders that want to train their forces against current and emerging threats. This is particularly evident as exercise designers grapple with integrating the characteristics of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) such as ISIL.

Hybrid Threat The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations (2012)

Initial Steps: ACE-TI Approaches to the Hybrid Threat The first order of business by ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) was to review the existing approved doctrine publications— primarily the TC 7-100 series. The desired organization required by users was similar to parts of both the guerrilla and insurgent models. These two organizations would serve as the base unit. To minimize the reinvention of the wheel, a modified guerrilla/insurgent model would streamline doctrinal approval and adoption. One of the explicitly-stated needs by the users was an organization that included improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as a primary weapon in its structure and tactics. The cells within the HT local insurgent organization do not include a specific IED cell, but there are direct action and multi-functional cells that could serve this purpose. Further reading in the description of these elements’ tactics explicitly includes their use of IEDs. What Questions Need to be Answered? As with most user requests, the requirement was intended to address specific unanswered questions. Agreements about the application of a newly-designed threat force structure for training should be clearly understood by both the user and ACE-TI to meet the requesting entity’s intent. Consensus among the working group participants revealed the following distinguishing characteristics that would best describe a VEO like ISIL:  The VEO functions like a local insurgency, but is managed and enabled like a franchise of a larger enterprise in respect to direction, identity, and specialized capabilities,  The VEO operates a military element that is capable of projecting significant, mostly-conventional elements; this armed force can appear to change from near-invisibility to juggernaut and back almost magically,  Combat losses cause little apparent effects, and  Local populace acceptance and/or participation levels creates few problems for the VEO. The DATE 3.0 Working Group initially appeared to be correct in its belief that the HT did not effectively portray a VEO similar to ISIL. The questions by the participants about the structure and behavior of this organization were similar to those expressed about ISIL by military and civilian analysts. Analysis of open sources provided ample material on its high-

Red Diamond Page 34 level leadership organization. Most of the writings included obligatory line and block charts and contained a high degree of certitude about their conclusions. The other bulk of writings leaned toward the tactical end of the spectrum, with a range of details and horror stories of invincibility.

Figure 1. Notional functional leadership of higher-affiliated violent extremist organization

Figure 2. Notional hierarchy of higher-affiliated violent extremist organization The key task was not to exactly replicate ISIL, but to create an organization that possessed similar organizational and capability characteristics that could be used within the DATE environment and other approved training mechanisms. Any insights ACE-TI gained through the development of this organization would be added-value.

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For the purposes of modeling the HT in a training environment, ACE-TI narrowed the questions it needed to answer to three: 1. How does this VEO function locally, regionally, and even nationally or trans-nationally? 2. How does the VEO convince the populace to tolerate or support it? 3. How does the VEO create armies from almost nothing, deploy them in large numbers, and then have the force disappear? Mapping HT Force Structures as a Method The main HT structures that were initially examined were the local insurgent organization and the guerrilla battalion. Detailed analysis concluded these organizations contained most of the capabilities inherent in ISIL organizations that were needed in the HT.

Figure 3. Relevant doctrinal OPFOR models These organizations portray many of the force projection and direct action capabilities needed at the local levels, but lack the necessary enabling capabilities found in VEOs like ISIL. The influence and specialized capabilities of the higher insurgent organization were needed in the new VEO model. This collection of existing threat models meets the requirement of an external leadership and enabling element that leverages ideological adoption and force capabilities of local elements for its own purposes. This is not actually a new organization, but a modular task organization of the structures described in TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, paragraph 2-21. The modularity allows for consistency and on-demand support for the local elements, while the allegiance and readiness of the local franchises supports the parent organization’s perception management and force projection needs. Below is an example of a possible VEO organization. It fields a variety of local forces aligned and enabled by the leadership, and features specialized capabilities of the higher insurgent organization to include:  Direct action cell, multifunction,  Direct action cell, assassin/sniper,  Direct action cell, information warfare,  Cell, shelter, and  Cell, finance.

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Figure 4. Example modular structure mapping of doctrinal OPFOR models Aligned and Enabled. One of the major differences between ISIL and al-Qaeda is ISIL’s ability to maintain control of invaded areas. Conquering is easier than ruling. ISIL’s ability to seize and then hold terrain has been, so far, essential to its staying power. The combination of propaganda, influence maneuvering, and normalizing its presence keeps the populace just under its reaction threshold and facilitates positive control of the civilians. The higher organization, through its apparatus of internal intelligence and control, is able to identify and supply where it needs additional controls. This enabling function is key. Some locales may need technical assistance. Others may need additional forces to motivate a local militia. Still others may need assistance for civil control and management. Fighting as an insurgency while operating as an enterprise has been a key differentiator for ISIL. Local Insinuation. ISIL appears to have a significant and long-term internal-control and loyalty-assurance process. Over a period of months—sometimes years—ISIL infiltrates, insinuates, and integrates itself into local life through intentional low-reaction activities such as marriages and participation in community groups, mosques, and local armed groups. ISIL operatives normalize their presence and identify potential allies and enemies. The VEO can then effectively maneuver, groom, corrupt, motivate, or kill its way into actionable positions of influence. By the time the local population starts realizing ISIL is in its midst, it is too late for the civilian populace or local government to resist. Ghost Army. One of the most difficult issues was how could this VEO deploy a combat force in the thousands, take casualties, and then disappear. If the VEO masses in significant numbers for very long, the group becomes a target for conventional forces on the other side. The ACE-TI solution was to make the parent organization use the local affiliates as expeditionary forces. Militias and other local armed groups would receive orders to temporarily deploy alongside similar elements from other locales. Consistent uniforms, flags, and symbols give the impression of a singular force. As with the ancient Persian Immortals, these forces could take significant casualties with little noticeable degradation.1 When the mission objectives are sufficiently achieved, the elements return to their home locales. Armed elements deployed for a common purpose and directed from the parent organization may fight alongside each other, but may be unlikely to integrate with each other. Equipment and tactics may be unique to a particular formation or area. This might facilitate identification of individual groups and possible vulnerable divisions between the various groups for tactical exploitation by the VEO’s opponents. A sophisticated propaganda campaign enables ISIL to multiply the effects of its brutality. Beheadings, mass executions, and parades of armored vehicles in action gives the impression of tactical progress to ISIL fighters on the ground, potential recruits, and donors. The images in social media do not necessarily reflect events throughout the groups’ territory, but support the narrative of a comprehensive system that is in control and ready to deal with dissent.

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Figure 5. Example local structure of higher-affiliated violent extremist organization End State The end state of this process was an organization that roughly mirrors a real-world threat and leverages the existing HT force structures. This model answers the original questions posed by the DATE 3.0 Working Group without creating a completely new structure. This model is a work in progress, but it does illustrate the idea that exercise designers can modify existing HT force structures to model specific real-world threat actors. The doctrinal threat models are only a toolbox. Trainers and developers possess some flexibility, but should always try to use organizations that already exist in the HT force structure. The use of standard force structures improves consistency between training exercises, maintains alignment with DATE, and simplifies integration with the simulations community. A more refined and detailed version of this VEO will likely be incorporated into the next version of DATE and related exercise mechanisms. In DATE-speak, it may become the foundation of an “Atropian Caliphate.”

References

Barrett, Richard. “The Islamic State.” The Soufan Group. November 2014. Engel, Pamela and Michael B Kelly. “ISIS Commander Reveals How The 'Caliph' Radicalized Under American Detention In Iraq.” Business Insider. 11 December 2014. Glenn, Cameron. “Al Qaeda v ISIS: Leaders & Structure.” The Wilson Center. 28 September 2015. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols. 2 February 2015. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 24 January 2014. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.4, HT Force Structure Organization Guide. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 4 June 2015. Ingram, Haroro, “Why we keep getting snared in Islamic State’s propaganda trap.” The Conversation. 21 January 2016. Raqqawi, Abu Ibrahim. “How Can ISIS Continue Achieving its Slogan ‘Stay and Expand’.” Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently. 30 June 2015. Thompson, Nick and Atika Shubert. “The anatomy of ISIS: How the 'Islamic State' is run, from oil to beheadings.” CNN. 14 January 2015.

Notes 1 M.R. Reese. “The Immortals: An elite army of the Persian Empire that never grew weak.” Ancient Origins. 13 November 2014.

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The Rocket Propelled Thermobaric Grenades RPO and MRO: The Modern Flame Weapon by Mike Spight, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr) Over the years, during both the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, the Russian military and arms industry has focused on continual development and improvement of its existing, and extensive, family of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) for use against armored and unarmored targets. The industry has also continually developed and improved its family of rocket propelled thermobaric, incendiary, and smoke grenade rocket launchers. For the purposes of this article, the focus will be on what are unquestionably the most effective and popular of these variants—the thermobaric RPG—of which there are two primary variants, the RPO-A and RPO-M Shmel. There are also smaller, lighter-weight versions, such as the MRO-A and the MGK Bur, which will be discussed as well. All of these weapons have great utility for infantry engaged in an urban fight where clearing buildings, bunkers, or other structures is required to achieve the commander’s tactical objectives. They are effective and extremely deadly weapons that are very simple to place in operation and fire with a modicum of training for the Russian infantryman. The RPO-A Shmel has been in the Soviet/Russian weapons inventory since its introduction in the late 1980s. It is also offered for export and has been purchased and is in use by approximately ten foreign militaries as well. Although there is no specific data on the number of countries that have purchased the RPO-M, MRO-A, and MGK Bur, it would be safe to assume that they will be made available for sale to any nation that can provide the hard currency to purchase them in quantity. Technical data for the RPO-A is as follows:  Weight: 11 kg  Sights: Iron  Length: 920 mm (launcher)  Caliber: 93 mm, with a 2.1 kg thermobaric warhead  Muzzle velocity: ~125 m/s  Effective range: 20–200 m  Max range: 1,000 m The RPO-A features a disposable launcher tube and is issued in a two-rocket container that can be carried on the soldier’s back, like a ruck sack. Besides the thermobaric variant (RPO-A), the weapon is also issued as the RPO-Z (incendiary) and the RPO-D (smoke).

Figure 1: RPO-A Shmel The RPO-M or Shmel M or RPO-PDM-A is the newest variant of the RPO (December 2003). The most significant physical difference is the addition of a removable, reusable firing/sighting unit that, once the rocket is fired, is detached from the

Red Diamond Page 39 disposable rocket tube and then attached to the next tube and made ready to fire. Like the RPO-A, the RPO-M is issued in two-round packs that are carried on the soldier’s back. Technical data for the RPO-M or RPO-PDM-A is as follows:  Weight: 8.8 kg  Sights: Optical  Length: 920 mm (launcher)  Caliber: 90 mm, with a 3 kg thermobaric warhead  Muzzle velocity: not available  Effective range: 20–300 m  Max range: 1,700 m Described as being more significantly more lethal than the RPO-A and with considerably greater maximum and effective ranges, it would appear to be a superior weapon in all regards. The MRO-A is another more-recent follow-on to the RPO-A, but in a smaller, lighter package than the RPO-A or RPO-M. Obviously, lighter weight often comes at a price and, in this case, significantly-reduced maximum and effective ranges. It is a disposable tube system and is also available in smoke and incendiary versions (MRO-D and MRO-Z). Brought into service in 2003, technical data for the MRO-A is as follows:  Weight: 4.7 kg  Sights: Iron  Length: 900 mm (launcher)  Caliber: 72.5 mm, with a 2.9 kg thermobaric warhead Figure 2: RPO-M Shmel or RPO PDM-A  Muzzle velocity: not available

 Effective range: 20–90 m  Max range: 450 m Clearly less effective in terms of range capabilities, it does not sacrifice much in the weight of the explosive mixture contained in the rocket. In terms of terminal effect on a target, the MRO-A should still be extremely destructive.

Figure 3: MRO-A The last thermobaric RPG to be discussed is the latest one to be developed and accepted for service by the Russian Ministry of Defense (October 2014). It is the MGK Bur, a smaller, lighter system than even the MRO-A. It does share a sighting/trigger system similar to the one on the RPO-M Shmel that, after firing the rocket, is then mounted on the next rocket launcher that will be fired. And like the RPO and MRO systems, once fired, the launch tube is then disposed of. Technical data for the MGK Bur is as follows:

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 Weight: 4.5–5 kg  Sights: Optical  Length: 742 mm (launcher)  Caliber: 62 mm, with a 2.9 kg thermobaric warhead  Muzzle velocity: not available  Effective range: 25–650 m  Max range: 950 m The MGK Bur is also available in a version that fires a high explosive/fragmentary rocket for use against troops in the open. It is not at this time known to be available in smoke and incendiary versions. The sighting/trigger system is also capable of mounting night-sighting systems (IR/thermal) as well. Of note is the fact that the MGK Bur can be fired from enclosed structures with dimensions of at least 30 square meters with no danger to the operator from the rocket motor back blast and overpressure. Like other thermobaric RPGs, the rocket is issued in a pack that is designed to be carried on a soldier’s back. Due to the lighter weight and size, it is issued in a pack containing three rockets vice two. Unfortunately, there is no image available for the Bur at this time. It does look very similar to the RPO-M Shmel, except that it is smaller and lighter. As noted above, the firing and sighting units for both of these weapons are virtually identical. All four of these weapons are very effective for their intended use and, as shown, all fill various requirements as to effective or maximum range, effects on target, weight, and ease of use for the individual soldier. They are formidable weapons in trained hands, particularly so in an urban, block-by-block, infantry fight.

References

Crane, David. “New RPO Shmel-M Rocket Flamethrower Man-Packable Thermobaric Weapon.” Defense Review. 19 July 2006. Smallwood, Michael. “Russian MRO-A Rocket Launchers in Ukraine.” Armament Research Services. 1 June 2014. Tendas, Pierangelo. “KBP MGK ‘Bur’.” All 4 Shooters. 7 July 2014. World Guns. “RPO-M/RPO PDM-A.” Accessed 29 February 2016. (Link is not accessible from a US government computer.)

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US Army TC 7-100 Series and Threats

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What ACE Threats Integration ACE Threats Integration POCs Supports for YOUR Readiness

Determine Operational Environment (OE) DIR, ACE Threats Integration Jon Cleaves conditions for Army training, education, [email protected] 913.684.7975 and leader development. Dep Director DSN:552 DAC Jennifer Dunn [email protected] 684.7962 Design, document, and integrate hybrid threat opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrine Military Analyst/Operations Dr. Jon Moilanen for near-term/midterm OEs. [email protected] IDSI 684.7928 Intelligence Specialist DAC Jerry England Develop and update threat methods, [email protected] 684.7934 tactics, and techniques in HQDA Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series. Senior Threats Officer MAJ Jay Hunt [email protected] 684.7960

Design and update Army exercise design Intel Specialist-NTC LNO DAC Kris Lechowicz methods-learning model in TC 7-101/7-102. [email protected] 684.7922

(UK) LNO Warrant Officer Matt Tucker Develop and update the US Army Decisive [email protected] 684-7994 Action Training Environment (DATE). Intelligence Specialist-DATE DAC Angela Wilkins Develop and update the US Army [email protected] 684.7929 Regionally Aligned Forces Training Intelligence Specialist DAC Walt Williams Environment (RAFTE) products. [email protected] 684.7923

Conduct Threat Tactics Course resident at Threat Tactics CPT Nikolas Zappone Fort Leavenworth, KS. [email protected] 684.7939 Military Analyst Dr. Jim Bird Conduct Threat Tactics mobile training [email protected] IDSI 684.7919 team (MTT) at units and activities. Military Analyst Rick Burns Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness [email protected] BMA 684.7897 in threat models and OEs. Military Analyst & WEG John Cantin [email protected] BMA 684.7952 Research, author, and publish OE and threat related classified/unclassified Military Analyst-Editing Laura Deatrick documents for Army operational and [email protected] CGI 684.7925 institutional domains. Mil Analyst-MCTP LNO BMA Pat Madden [email protected] 684.7997 Support Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Home Station Training (HST) and OE Military Analyst H. David Pendleton Master Plan reviews and updates. [email protected] CGI 684.7946 Mil Analyst-JMRC LNO Mike Spight Support TRADOC G-2 threat and OE [email protected] CGI 684.7974 accreditation program for Army Centers of Excellence (CoEs), schools, and collective Mil Analyst-JRTC LNO Threat Tec Marc Williams training at sites for Army/USAR/ARNG. [email protected] 684-7943 Military Analyst CTR (TBD) Respond to requests for information (RFIs) (Vacant) on threat and OE issues. Intel Specialist-Analyst DAC (TBD) (Vacant)

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