INTO THE FOLD: EVALUATING DIFFERENT COUNTRIES’ PROGRAMS TO DE- RADICALIZE ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS AND ISLAMIST TERRORISTS by Michelle Feldstein A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies Baltimore, Maryland May 2015 © 2015 Michelle Feldstein All Rights Reserved Abstract Countries all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and others currently run or have run programs intended to de-radicalize Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists. Many countries, including Yemen, Singapore, and Denmark, initiated these programs following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Although all de- radicalization programs share the common goal of re-integrating former Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists back into society, each country’s efforts have emphasized different approaches more than others, and have had varying degrees of success. This paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as political stability, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state’s level of repression affects that country’s level of success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Thirdly, this paper evaluates how religious characteristics, including a state’s official religion, affect whether states focus their de-radicalization efforts more on religious re- education or on social re-integration. The first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country’s de- radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country’s level of state repression increases, the success ranking of de-radicalization programs increase, although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country’s de- ii radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state’s religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, all 3 relationships are not strong. Although de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists—as a practice and concept—is still in its infancy, this paper can guide policymakers considering such programs to determine a mix of approaches appropriate to their own country context. Thesis Advisors: Chapter 1 - Jennifer Bachner, PhD Chapter 2 - Mark Stout, PhD Chapter 3 - Leila Austin, PhD iii Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………...ii-iii Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….1 Chapter 1. A Recipe for Success? Examining Whether Political Stability, Developmental Strength, Civil Society Participation, and Other Factors That may Favor Successful De-radicalization Lead to Less Islamist Terrorism…………………………………………………………………………….......13 Chapter 2. Holding Down the Fort? Government Repression and the Success of De-radicalization Programs in Muslim-Majority States……………………………...44 Chapter 3. You can Have it Both Ways: How a State’s Religious Characteristics Affect Whether States Focus on Religious Re-education or Social Re-integration Approaches to De-Radicalize Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists…………………………………………………………………...62 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….94 Appendix A. Core Years of Country De-radicalization Programs………………………99 Appendix B. Islamist Terrorist Groups………………………………………………...100 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………101 Curriculum Vita………………………………………………………………………...118 iv List of Tables Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs…………………………………………………………….32 Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria…...32 Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success…………………………………………………………………………………33 Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-radicalization Success and State Repression……...53 Table 5. State Approaches to De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists………………………………………………………………………78 Table 6. Descriptive Statistics: State De-radicalization Approaches and State Religious Characteristics…………………………………………………………85 Table 7. Comparative Case Study………………………………………………………92 v List of Figures Figure 1. Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success……………….34 Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression…………………….......54 Figure 3. De-radicalization Approaches and Percent of Muslims per Total Population………………………………………………………………………….86 Figure 4. De-radicalization Approaches and Official Religion…………………………………………………………………………....88 Figure 5. De-radicalization Approaches and Restrictions on the Majority Religion……….........................................................................................................90 vi Introduction “Releasing prisoners without a comprehensive rehabilitation programme ‘is like releasing 30,000 political bombs.’”1 Countries pursue de-radicalization programs to combat Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism. With the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), countries around the world, including the United Kingdom (UK), have entertained de-radicalization schemes aimed at Islamist extremists returning from Iraq and Syria.2 Other countries, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway currently run or have run such programs. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Denmark, and various other countries initiated de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists after the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, as this event brought the reality of Islamist terrorism to the forefront of every country’s collective conscience.3 Although Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism have existed since before September 11th, de-radicalization has become increasingly relevant as foreign fighters return home equipped with the know-how to carry out terrorist attacks in their own backyard. 1 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “Group Deradicalization in Egypt: The Unfinished Agenda,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 98. 2 Tom Whitehead, The Telegraph, “British jihadists to be forced to attend deradicalisation programmes, says Cameron,” (published September 1, 2014) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the- uk/11068878/British-jihadists-to-be-forced-to-attend-deradicalisation-programmes-says-Cameron.html (accessed March 18, 2015). The article describes some programs that the UK already has to de-radicalize Islamist extremists, including Al Furqan, where imams attempt to moderate the beliefs of Islamist extremist prisoners “through religious teaching.” 3 Adam Lankford and Katherine Gillespie, “Rehabilitating Terrorists Through Counter-Indoctrination: Lessons Learned from the Saudi Arabian Program,” International Criminal Justice Review 21 (2011): 119. 1 To evaluate de-radicalization programs in different countries, the paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as a state’s developmental capacity, the strength of its political institutions, and a state’s ability to build national consensus around its de-radicalization efforts, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim-majority countries. I hypothesize that countries with more successful de-radicalization programs will experience fewer Islamist terrorist attacks. The dependent variable is the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in each country, and the independent variable is each country’s degree of success with de-radicalization. The study reveals that as the success ranking of each country’s de- radicalization efforts increases, the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in each country increases significantly. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state’s level of repression affects Muslim-majority countries’ success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. I hypothesize that more repressive states will have more successful de-radicalization programs. The dependent variable is the success of each country’s de-radicalization efforts, and the independent variable is each country’s level of state repression. As state repression increases, the success of de-radicalization programs increases, although not significantly. Thirdly, I examine the effect of religious characteristics on what de-radicalization approaches various Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority countries pursue. I explore whether the percentage of the country’s population that is Muslim; a state’s official religion; and constraints on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the religious interpretation that the state endorses affect