Bridgewater Review

Volume 4 | Issue 3 Article 11

Jan-1987 Historical Commentary: Vietnam and Revisionism David Culver Bridgewater State College

Recommended Citation Culver, David (1987). Historical Commentary: Vietnam and Revisionism. Bridgewater Review, 4(3), 24-26. Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/br_rev/vol4/iss3/11

This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts. Historical Commentary

Vietnam and Revisionism

David Culver

American Colonel Summers: "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield." North Vietnamese Colonel Tu: "That may be so but it is also irrelevant." Conversation in Hanoi, April 1975

st year General William West­ moreland told a Boston College U udience that politicians caused America's defeat in Vietnam. "The Vietnam War was not lost on the battlefield," the Commander of United States forces in Vietnam said, "but lost in the halls of Congress." Westmoreland's charge reflects re­ cent Vietnam War revisionism, the effort to rationalize America's defeat by claiming that United States forces were prevented from winning. Besides the politicians, who reduced military spending, the revisionists' cast of vil­ lains includes the media and antiwar dissenters, who turned the nation against the war, and various Presidents, who restricted military operations. If polls are to be believed, these interpretations are widely held by Americans, especially Vietnam veter­ perspective, a briefreview ofAmerican when it decided to extend containment ans. President Ronald Reagan sub­ involvement in Vietnam is in order. to Vietnam by openly supporting scribes to this view. Shortly after his As nearly everyone knows, Ameri­ France in its war in Indochina. election in 1980, he declared that ca's longest and most unpopular war The First (or French) Indochina American troops "were denied per­ had its origins in the Cold War and the War (1946-54) erupted when France mission to win." Revisionism is re­ containmentofcommunism that devel­ tried to reestablish its empire in Indo­ flected in our popular culture, reaching oped in the wake of World War II. As china (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) its most extreme form in the film the Soviet Union tightened its grip on after World War II. Meanwhile, how­ Rambo, which has its macho superhero Eastern Europe, an alarmed President ever, in 1945 Ho Chi Minh, a com­ ask his superior, "Do we get to win this Harry Truman in 1947 committed the munist and nationalist, had declared time?" American government to combating the independence ofVietnam and soon That such interpretations strike a Soviet expansion in Europe. The Cold war broke out between the French and responsive chord is understandable. War was official, and containment -­ the Vietminh, a coalition ofnationalist "The war that went wrong" has been a the effort to limit communism to the groups led by the communists. By late painful and traumatic episode for frontiers already under Soviet control 1949, however, with the war going Americans accustomed to military vic­ -- became America's principal Cold badly, France appealed for American tory. The cheering for Rambo reflects War strategy. aid. In the wake of China's fall, the need of many to resurrect a mea­ But by the end of the decade, the Washington, feeling bound to bolster sure of national honor lost in the war. United States seemed less secure, com­ an important ally whose support the Revisionism salves the national psyche munism more threatening. In 1949 the United States needed in Europe, ac­ and restores a self-image of power. communists triumphed in China and ceded to French demands, and in early However comforting, though, revision­ the Russians acquired the bomb. At 1950 took the first step toward a ism is simplistic and is narrowly fo­ home a Red Scare was under way, 25-year-war. cused. It ignores both the strength of distorting public debate and foreign This decision to extend containment Vietnamese nationalism and the weak­ policy. Soon led by Senator Joseph to Vietnam was part ofa new American ness ofour client state, South Vietnam, McCarthy, conservatives vilified the strategy to counter communist aggres­ historical factors which go far to ex­ Truman Administration for being soft sion anywhere in the world. "The plain the outcome of the war. But to on communism and for "losing" assault on free institutions is world­ understand better this lack ofhistorical China. Washington was in near-panic wide," a 1950 National Security Coun- 24 cil report noted ominously. The war in Vietnam pending elections scheduled to 16,500. But Washington could not Vietnam (and soon Korea) was seen as for 1956. provide political stability in Saigon or part of"the Kremlin's design for world While highly critical of the French transform Diem into "the Winston domination." Communism, Washing­ for any compromise with communism, Churchill of Southeast Asia," as Vice ton believed, was monolithic, and com­ the United States moved to establish President Lyndon Johnson publicly munists like Ho were merely pawns of South Vietnam as a barrier to further hailed him. (Privately, the crude Texan Moscow in a single conspiracy for communist advances in Southeast was more candid: "Shit, man, he's the world power. With China gone, Indo­ Asia. Containment would consist of only boy we got there.") By 1963, china was the next communist target, restricting communism to North Viet­ when it was clear that Diem was losing and should this region fall, then the nam and treating South Vietnam as an the war, the Kennedy Administration surrounding countries (Malaya, Bur­ independent country and part of the approved ofa coup against Diem, who ma, Thailand) would fall like a row of "free" world. was subsequently murdered. dominoes. Despite the French failure and In three weeks Kennedy himself was In retrospect, historians question strong warnings of the difficulties of dead. The new President, Lyndon the American assumption that Ho was nation-building, the United States Johnson, inherited a deteriorating situa­ an agent of Moscow, that Vietnam was pushed the French aside and moved tion, despite Diem's elimination. Con­ a Soviet proxy. Ho was a dedicated quickly to prop up the regime of Ngo vinced that American honor, security, communist, but he was also a nation­ Dinh Diem. A nationalist and strong and prestige were at stake, Johnson alist, who resisted subservience to both anti-communist, Diem clearly illus­ moved to prevent a communist the Soviet Union and China. Ho's trated the enormous task in establish­ victory. drive for power was indigenous and ing South Vietnam as the "cornerstone Following his election in 1964, was not initiated by Moscow. Indeed, it of the Free world in Southeast Asia." Johnson began the fateful military was part ofa nationalist movement that He was a Catholic elitist in a Buddist involvement. Selective air strikes in was sweeping Asia, a powerful histor­ land, who had many enemies and little February 1965 were followed three ical phenomenon not fully appreciated popular support. He lacked Ho's repu­ weeks later by the massive bombing of by American policy makers, nor more tation, charisma, and vision for the North Vietnam and, soon after, by the recently by revisionists. As George future of Vietnam. The weakness of decision to use American soldiers in Herring, the author ofa major study of Diem (and of all South Vietnamese battle. By the summer of 1965, the the Vietnam War concludes, "Regard­ governments) was an intractable prob­ United States was fighting a major less of his ideology, Ho by 1950 had lem that would plague American policy undeclared war in Vietnam. captured the standard of Vietnamese to the end and, the revisionists not­ The Johnson Administration be­ nationalism, and by supporting France, withstanding, would have much to do lieved that a few Marines would be a ... the United States was attaching itself with the war's conclusions. quick fix, but the war now acquired a to a losing cause." With the colonial With American support, Diem con­ life ofits own. American escalation was era over, then, the United States chose solidated his rule and cancelled the matched by Hanoi with support from the wrong side of history. national elections called for by the China and the Soviet Union. What a The Vietnam policies developed by Geneva Accords. Soon, however, he frustrated President Johnson ex­ the Truman Administration were con­ faced a revolt. The Vietcong, Diem's claimed in 1965 applied to any year of tinued by President Dwight Eisen­ pejorative term for Vietnamese com­ the war: "I can't get out. I can't finish it hower (1953-61). American aid to munists, began a struggle to achieve with what I got. So what the hell can I France grew steadily (by 1954 America what they believed had been denied do?" The answer was more ofthe same, was paying for 78% of the cost of the them when Diem cancelled the elec­ hoping that a few more troops war), but it could not prevent a French tions. By the time Eisenhower left (550,000 by 1968) or a little more defeat. The climax came in early 1954 office in early 1961, the insurgency, bombing would break the commu­ when the Vietminh surrounded a large fed by Diem's unpopularity and in­ nists' will to fight. French force at Dienbienphu. Ameri­ creasing support from the North, had But despite government claims that can military intervention was seriously grown into a formidable movement. victory was "around the corner," the considered, but rejected by the Eisen­ Eisenhower's successor, John F. United States was losing the war. As if hower Administration, and the French Kennedy (1961-63), became the third to underscore this, the communists·in force surrendered. president to try to contain communism January 1968 launched the Tet Offen­ At a conference in Geneva, mean­ in Southeast Asia. Convinced that the sive, a massive attack throughout the while, the future of Indochina was struggle there was a test of American south. The communists suffered heavy being hammered out at the expense of resolve, Kennedy was determined not losses, but not before Americans France. The resulting Geneva Accords to "lose" Vietnam to communism (no watched in living color as the Vietcong of 1954 (which the United States never one could ever forget the pounding the attacked the American Embassy in signed) provided for a military cease­ Truman Administration took for Saigon. Tet's psychological effect was fire, French withdrawal from North "losing" China), and so increased the devastating and public opinion turned Vietnam, and a temporary partition of number of American military advisors sharply against the war. 25 Historical Commentary continued

As for the charge that the military was handcuffed by civilian leaders, the United States could have bombed North Vietnam back to the Stone Age and invaded the North. But would the public have supported a costly inva­ sion against a dedicated foe that would have risked war with China and the Soviet Union (China had threatened to respond if the United States had moved north). In any case, what would have been left after "Victory?" As Sena­ Bob Englehart, Hartford Courant tor Stuart Symington asked of Secre­ Tet also claimed a political victim. which provided for a cease-fire and the tary of State Dean Rusk: "What do we Two months after Tet, President John­ withdrawal of American troops, did win if we win?" At the least, it would son told a national TV audience he not resolve the political future of have meant an indefinite American would not run for reelection. He had South Vietnam, the central issue ofthe occupation of Vietnam with all its tried to fight a limited war, quickly, war. The war soon resumed, and in costs and strains. cheaply, and seemed baffled by an April 1975 the communists marched Revisionism also underestimates the enemy that was willing to take such triumphantly into Saigon, drawing the power of Vietnamese nationalism, losses and continue to fight. "Just look painful war to a close. 58,000 Ameri­ whose banner had been captured by at the figures and you'll see that they cans had died. Twenty-five years of Ho and whose goal was to rid Vietnam have failed," Johnson said. "Ho's peo­ effort had ended in failure. offoreigners. Secretary Rusk said after ple are just not telling him about his Americans barely noticed South the war that he had made two mistakes: losses." In 1946 Ho had declared, "kill Vietnam's collapse, preferring to put underestimating the enemy and over­ ten of our men and we will kill one of the disaster out of their minds. The estimating the patience of the Ameri­ yours. In the end, you will lose and I nation was spared a bitter witch hunt in can people. Rusk's assessment of the will win." He was speaking to the search of those who "lost Vietnam." determiniation, even fanaticism, ofthe French, but the equation applied no No one seemed to want to know. But enemy, was correct, but he was wrong less to the Americans. North Vietnam, the war still haunts the American mem­ about the American public. Sentiment willing and able to fight longer, would ory and colors United States foreign turned against the war because the outlast the United States. policy. The so-called "Vietnam syn­ American government could not per­ If the war forced Johnson from the drome" has inhibited the United States suade its citizens that South Vietnam White House, it helped elect Richard abroad. "Will Nicaragua be another was vital to our survival and that the Nixon (1969-74), who was deter­ Vietnam?" is the subject ofdebate and war had any chance of success. In the mined to end the war but not lose it. cover stories. Thus the question re­ end the public recognized that the His goal was to preserve South Viet­ turns to why we lost and the "lessons" American goal of propping up South nam as a non-communist state, and his of the war. The question is not just Vietnam was unachievable. Our client strategy was "Vietnamization" -- turn academic; it bears on the issue of state, flabby and corrupt, could not the fighting over to the South Viet­ American power in the world and provide the cohesion or stability to namese, while withdrawing American under what circumstances the United become a viable anti-communist state. troops. To compel Hanoi to make States should again send troops to fight And no amount ofAmerican aid could concessions, Nixon intensified the abroad. change that. bombing of the North, declaring that Though questions persist and a con­ Colonel Summers was correct. "the bastards have never been bombed sensus on the war is still emerging, the American soldiers fought bravely and like they're going to be bombed this revisionists' claim that the defeat was won the battles. But as Colonel Tu time." As Henry Kissinger, Nixon's largely self-inflicted is a dubious prop­ said, it was irrelevant. Vietnam re­ National Security Adviser insisted, a osition. Congress, to return to West­ quired a political solution; America "fourth-rate power like North Viet­ moreland's charge, continued to vote tried to impose a military solution. nam" must have a "breaking point." funds well after the public had turned Despite all its might, the United States But no matter how much the United irreversibly against the war. The media, could not impose its will. While Ameri­ States pulverized the North, it could too, reflected, rather than shaped, pub­ cans discuss the lessons ofthe war, they not force the communists to quit. lic opinion. As George Herring has seem to recognize one chastening les­ Hanoi had sacrificed too much and was recently written, "Careful research has son: there are limits to American too close to victory. The war dragged shown that ... the media and the anti­ power in a highly complex world. on for four more years before the Paris war movement played no more than Accords were finally signed in January peripheral roles in turning the nation David Culver is a Professor of History at 1973. But the "peace agreements," against the war." Bridgewater State College. 26