Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China Author(S): Xueguang Zhou Source: American Sociological Review, Vol

Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China Author(s): Xueguang Zhou Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 54-73 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096218 Accessed: 19/05/2010 23:15

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http://www.jstor.org UNORGANIZED INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA*

XUEGUANGZHOU Cornell University

I explore how the institutional structure of state socialism systematically transforms indi- vidual behavior into collective action in China. State monopoly of the public spherefosters and reproduces large numbers of individual behaviors with similar claims, patterns, and targets. The state bureaucratic apparatus at the workplace also generates similar discon- tents and links them with national politics. The "large numbers"phenomenon provides the basis for theformation of collective action. The institutional arrangements also inducefre- quent state policy shifts and alternative modes of mobilization,providing the opportunityfor collective action. Finally, individual behaviors based on unorganized interests tend to con- verge in the same direction and assume a "collective" character - that is, they are often causally defined as "collective action" in this particular institutional structure. The phe- nomenon of "collective inaction" is discussed in the same vein.

T he popularuprisings in Chinaand Eastern Chinese state that eventuallywent beyond state Europein 1989 are recentexamples of the controland became a challengeto the state. "powerof the powerless"in state socialist soci- How can we explain collective action based eties. However, the currentliterature on collec- on the unorganizedinterests in the statesocialist tive action,which emphasizesorganizing capac- context?I examine the link between the institu- ity, resourcemobilization, and interestarticula- tional structureof state socialism and collective tion, is ill-preparedto account for such events action in China. My central theme is that the understate socialism. In typical socialist states, formationand outbreakof collective action are societyconsists of unorganizedinterests that con- rooted in the particularinstitutional structure of trastwith the organizational apparatus of the state. the state-societyrelationship. I arguethat collec- China,for example,evidenced minimal autono- tive actionin Chinais less a processof purposive mous organizingefforts prior to the outbreakof and rationalorganizing than an aggregationof the 1989 pro-democracymovement. The lack of largenumbers of spontaneousindividual behav- strategicmaneuvering and the prevalence of con- iorsproduced by the particularstate-society rela- flicts among studentleaders illustrate the unor- tionship.Although individuals are unorganized, ganized natureof the movement. Nonetheless, theiractions in pursuitof theirown self-interests withina shorttime, millionsof people acrossthe tend to convey similarclaims, sharesimilar pat- nation poured into the streets.The participants terns,and point to the state,i.e., they "converge" cut across the boundariesof work units, locali- into collective action. ties, andsocial groups. And the 1989pro-democ- racy movement,although the most spectacular, THE CHINESEPOLITY AND THE LOGIC was means an by no isolated event. Instances OF COLLECTIVEACTION abound of mass mobilizations initiatedby the Marx([1852] 1963) arguedthat the Frenchpeas- * ants of the nineteenthcentury sharedthe same Direct all correspondenceto Xueguang Zhou, economic situationand had the same political Departmentof Sociology, Uris Hall, CornellUniver- demands. But the lack of communicationand sity, Ithaca,NY 14853. Earlierversions of this paper organiclinks among the peasantsled to isolated were presentedat the RegionalConference of the As- and unorganizedinterests; peasants formed "a sociationof Asian Studies,Stanford University, 1990 and the Regional Conferenceof China Studies, UC class of itself' but not "a class for itself."More Berkeley, 1991. I am gratefulto ValerieBunce, James thana centurylater, Chinese citizens are far more March,John Meyer, Victor Nee, David Stark,Sidney organicallyintegrated into the national system and Tarrow,Andrew Walder, Robin Williams, the editor more interrelatedwith each otherthan were the and reviewersof ASRfor theirhelpful comments. French peasants.In terms of self-organization,

54 AmericanSociological Review, 1993, Vol. 58 (February:54-73) UNORGANIZEDINTERESTS AND COLLECTIVEACTION 55 however,the Chinese are no betterthan the French Of course, state penetrationof society is not peasants.Studies of theChinese polity have found complete or always successful. Indeed,in most the uniquedual institutional structure of the state- Communist societies, there are some private society relationship:strong organizationalcon- realms, such as "the second economy"in Hun- trol over society by the state and the systematic garyand the free marketin China.During the era positive incentivesfor complianceoffered by the of economicreform in China,state political con- socialisteconomic institutions. From the metropo- trolover societyhas weakenedconsiderably. The lis to ruralareas, social life in China has been emergenceof the privatesector has providedso- organizedby the statebureaucratic system (Par- cial space outside the realm of immediatestate ish and Whyte 1978; Whyte and Parish 1984). administrativecontrol. This intermediatecivil Accompanyingthe state organizationalappara- structurehas facilitatedlateral interaction among tus are political sanctionslike political labeling, individualsand social groups,but by and large, monitoring,and campaignsthat systematically these privaterealms are either closely monitored repressand deter oppositionto the state (White by the state or too narrowto escape state domi- 1989).Thus, the Communiststate has effectively nance. The emergingelements of a civil society monopolizedthe resourcesfor social mobiliza- are far from the organizedinterests commonly tion and denied the legitimacyof any organized perceivedin the collective actionliterature. interestsoutside its control. To studentsof collective action, particularly At the same time, "thepositive incentivesof- those who take a "resourcemobilization" ap- feredfor compliance"(Walder 1986, p. 6) in the proach,the Chinesepolity appearsto presentfor- so-called "unit-ownership system" (danwei midableobstacles to collective action opposing suoyouzhi)ties workersto theirworkplaces, peas- the state. If the success of collective action de- antsto theirvillages, and individuals to their"work pendson the strategyadopted, the extent to which units." Workunits function not only as the state interestsare organized(Gamson 1968) or on a apparatusof political control,but as redistribut- socialmovement "industry" (Zald and McCarthy ing agenciesin which rewardsand opportunities 1987), China is a puzzle. The absence of orga- are linked to individuals'political attitudesand nized interestsmakes it impossible to identify loyalty. One consequence of this institutional stableinterest groups or to find some systematic structureis the prevalenceof the clientelist sys- distributionof rewardsor sanctionsthat would tem "in which individualmembers of subordi- motivateindividuals to join in collective action. nate social groups pursue their interestsnot by The dualinstitutional structure - organizational banding togetherfor coordinatedgroup action, control and positive incentives for compliance but by cultivatingties based on the exchange of - has severelylimited, if not eliminated,collec- loyalty and advantagewith individualsof higher tive actionbased on organizedinterests. Collec- statusand power"(Walder 1987, p. 47). In con- tive action outside state control has invariably trast to "civil society," in which autonomous met with a state crackdown,and the state has groupsare formed and interests articulated through kept the cost of organizedresistance high. Fur- the politicalprocess, its counterpartin Chinacan thermore,positive incentives based on workunits best be labeled"subordinate society." The popu- have erodedthe basis for social mobilizationby lace constitutessociety, but does notconstitute an encouragingindividuals to pursue personal in- organizedpolitical force countervailing the state. I tereststhrough privileged access and particular- ism rather than through collective action. As 1 The recent finding of a pluralisticdecision-mak- Walder (1986, p. 19) argued,the Chinese state ing process - negotiation,bargaining, and compro- has an "extraordinaryability to preventorganized mise amongformal groups - is less relevantto soci- political activitieseven from reachingthe stage ety proper.Because these formalgroups are based on, of collective action." or arepart of, the statebureaucratic organization, they However,to understandmass mobilizationin are closer to the state system than to society. Recent China, the logic of collective action cannot be studies of groups in Chinese politics concurredthat uncriticallyaccepted from a literaturethat has social groups in China are not autonomous"interest been largely built on non-Communist(mainly groups" (Goodman 1984; Falkenheim 1987). Shue (1988) noted the cellularfeatures of Chinese society, Western)experience. Two assumptionsembed- which helpedlocals resistcentral authority. However, ded in varioustheories of collective action seem she focused on the withdrawalof isolated and local particularlyproblematic in this regard:(1) that interestsfrom the macropoliticalprocess ratherthan there is a separationbetween public realms and on collective action across local boundaries. privaterealms; and (2) that individualactivities 56 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW in the privaterealm involve market-liketrans- AN INSTITUTIONALAPPROACH TO actions. COLLECTIVEACTION Olson (1965) suggestedthat when individuals calculatethe costs and benefits of participating Organizedor unorganized,people everywhere in collective action, they comparethe option of pursue their interestsand resist what they per- participationwith the opportunitycost incurred ceive as injustices. To explore the causal link by deferringthe pursuitof individualinterests between individualbehavior and the collective without collective action. This assumption is outcome,researchers classify these behaviorsas spelled out by Hirschman(1982), who held that purposive action versus spontaneousresponse, the separationof the private and public realms organizedinterests versus unorganized interests, leads to cycles of involvementin collective ac- and everyday forms of resistance versus open tion. When individualsfind that their self-inter- protests. Collective outcomes are explained in ests can be satisfiedby engaging in activitiesin termsof theirpurposiveness, leadership, organi- the privatearena, they are unlikelyto participate zational resources, and the circumstancessur- in collective action. On the other hand, frustra- roundingthem. tions and dissatisfactionsover issues in the pub- At a deeperlevel, however,institutional struc- lic realm often lead to changes in individuals' turespecifies the stablepatterns of the state-soci- preferencesthat push them to collective action. ety relationship,the interconnectednessamong The privatesphere thus offers an exit from pub- social groups,and the channelsand directionsof lic life and hence from collective action. politicalinput. In this respect,recent research on Thepresence of a marketeconomy also reduces the formationof nation-statesand collective ac- theprobability of collectiveaction. The basic fea- tion provides importantinsights. An emerging tureof markettransactions is an equilibriumbe- theme from these studiesis the close association tween supply and demand among individuals betweenthe expansionof the nation-stateon the engagedin marketactivities. Individuals enterthe one hand and the increasingscale of interestar- privatearena with divergent demands and prefer- ticulation,organizing capacity, and social mobi- ences. Given individuals'rational calculations, lizationon the other.Tilly (1986) arguedthat the transactionstend to producea market-likesolu- rise of a capitalisteconomy andthe modernstate tion to their self-interests.In terms of political in the nineteenthcentury produced the "prole- analysis,this is a processthrough which individu- tarianization"of society,engendered widespread als' pursuitof theirself-interests will compensate discontent,and transformedlocal conflicts and each otherso thatcollective actionis impossible revoltsto the nationallevel. Skocpol (1979) em- or unnecessary.Thus, individual behavior in pri- phasizedthe link betweencrises and the dynam- vate realmsis commonly seen as being outside ics of social mobilization.She arguedthat social the scope of collective actionresearch. mobilizationoften occurs when the stateexperi- Both above assumptionsfail miserablyin the ences crises andcannot effectively control politi- Chinese context. The boundarybetween public cal resources.This createsnew opportunitiesfor and privatearenas, if it exists, does not prevent bottom-up mobilization. Birnbaum(1988) di- state interventioninto the individual'severyday rectlylinked the types of regimeswith variations life. "Thepenetration of the state into all realms in collectiveaction and empirically examined this of life did not extenda public sphereso much as causal model in differentpolities. Though his negate it, for withoutattachment to the partyor studies were confined to Western Europe and one of its subsidiaryorganizations no particular North America,his findings stronglysuggested individualcould make claims with any general thatcollective actioncannot be fully understood validity"(Stark and Nee 1989, p. 22). Moreover, withoutincorporating the state into the theoreti- studentsof comparativepolitics have noted "the cal models (Tarrow1986). The statesocialist re- importanceof the nonmarketeconomy in shap- distributivesystem producesa sharpdivision of ing a patternof social and politicalrelationships interests between the state bureaucracies as unlike those thathave been elucidatedfor capi- "redistributors"and other social groups as the taliststates" (Perry 1989, p. 581), andthe role of "immediateproducers" (Szelenyi 1978). Thus, the Communiststate in forging particularforms the institutionalstructure of state socialism pro- of mass mobilization(White 1989). These con- vides the startingpoint to approachcollective siderationspoint to a link between the institu- actionphenomena in China. tional structureof state socialism and collective Institutionalstructure circumscribes both the actionbased on unorganizedinterests. solution space and channels of political input. UNORGANIZEDINTERESTS AND COLLECTIVEACTION 57

Apparentlysimilar political and social phenom- tionship. One fundamentaldifference between ena may have quitedifferent implications in dif- the two is that,in the capitalistmarket economy, ferent institutional contexts. For example, organizedinterests outside the stateexist andare Birnbaum(1988) found that tradeunions in the legitimate.In the Chinese context, on the other United Kingdomand the United Statesprefer to hand,if interestsare organized, they arebased on reach agreementdirectly with employers in a the state organizationalapparatus and hence are contractualsetting because the institutionalstruc- not autonomous;if interestsare independentof ture does not provide for state intervention.In the state, they are often unorganized.State mo- France,on the otherhand, collective agreements nopoly of the public spherereduces the private do not exist, and recourse to the state and the space in which individualscan pursuetheir self- courts is often necessary (p. 78). In the same interestthrough market-like transactions. Conse- vein, it is importantto understandthe political quently,individual behaviors, even in pursuitof significanceof local grievancesin the workplace self-interest,are unlikelyto lead to a market-like andconflicts among social groupsby examining solution.That is, althoughunorganized, the de- how they are interconnectedand wherethey are mandsand behaviors of individualsare nonethe- channeledin the Chineseinstitutional setting. less structuredby the institutionalconstraints that The natureof collective action is defined by connectindividuals, social groups,and the state. theparticular institutional structure, which speci- fies the legitimacyof formsof politicalparticipa- INSTITUTIONALSTRUCTURE AND tion. The Communiststate claims a monopolyof COLLECTIVEACTION IN CHINA the public goods and denies the legitimacy of interests at the individual level. An important In studyingthe popularuprisings in Franceand consequence is that any behavioroutside state England during the transition to a capitalist control is seen as a challenge to the state. As economy between the eighteenthand the nine- Havel (1985) observed:"Anything which leads teenthcentury, Rude (1981) observed: people to overstep their predeterminedrules is This was still a periodwhen popular attachment and regardedby the system as an attackupon itself. antipathytended to focus not so much on causes And in this respectit is correct:every instanceof andinstitutions as on individualheroes and villains. such transgressionis a genuinedenial of the sys- As the crowd had its heroes, like Wilkes, Lord tem" (p. 30). When these behaviors appearin George Gordon, Marat,or the semi-mythicalRe- large numbers,they constitute collective defi- becca, so it had its clearlyidentifiable villains in the ance againstthe state. shape of the individualemployer, merchant,fore- Tilly (1986) emphasizedthe importanceof the staller, baker, landlord,or official; and such men existing repertoiresthat constrainthe types of became the naturaltargets of its vengeance when collective actionand the availabilityof opportu- wages werecut, prices were high, the harvestfailed, or traditionalrights were threatened.(pp. 240-41) nities. Changes in the repertoiresof collective action are often the resultof the evolving state- Piven and Cloward's (1977) account of the society relationship.As Dyson (1980) pointed "poorpeople's movement"in the United States out, the state "representsnot only a particular afterWorld War II revealeda similarpicture: mannerof arrangingpolitical and administrative affairs and regulatingrelationships of authority Peopleexperience deprivation and oppression within but also a culturalphenomenon that binds people a concrete setting, not as the end productof large togetherin terms of a common mode of inter- and abstractprocesses, and it is the concreteexpe- riencethat molds their discontent into specific griev- pretingthe world"(p. 19). An examinationof the ances againstspecific targets.Workers experience particularstate-society relationship can help us that factory, the speeding rhythmof the assembly understandhow the repertoiresof collective ac- line, theforeman, the spies and the guards, the owner tion are maintainedand sharedamong individu- andthe paycheck. They do notexperience monopoly als acrosslocal and organizationalboundaries. capitalism.(p. 20) I use the dichotomy between the market economy and state socialism as ideal types and Obviously, a marketeconomy presentsparticu- choose this comparativeframework for the pur- lar obstaclesto collective action because it pro- pose of theoreticalexposition. From an institu- ducesa complexstratification system and a struc- tionalperspective, the capitalistmarket economy ture of fragmentedgrievances and discontents. and the state socialist redistributivesystem rep- The presenceof privatespheres and market trans- resent two distinct modes of state-societyrela- actionsalso providesa wide rangeof alternatives 58 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW for pursuingself-interest without resorting to col- them to "act toghether"and converge into col- lective action. Within this marketcontext, the lective actionchallenging the state. collective action literaturehas emphasizedthe ways in which incentives,resources, and organi- The "LargeNumbers" Phenomenon zations affect individuals'choices between pri- vate spheres and public spheres and between By incorporatingall citizens into its webs of or- marketsolutions and political solutions. In recent ganizationalcontrol, the Communiststate can years, studentsof collective actionhave pointed effectively extract resources to fulfill the to theimportance of "thecritical mass" - a group leadership'sambitions of economicdevelopment of individualsthat takes the initiativein pursuit and political control. Two important conse- of public goods (Oliver 1980; Oliver, Marwell quencesfor the state-societyrelationship follow. and Teixeira 1985). The roles of leadership,cu- First, the Communiststate eliminatesthe tradi- mulativeinvolvement, and the prospectsfor suc- tional intermediatestrata between the state and cess then alterthe incentivesof the latentgroup society - it directlylinks each citizen with the andattract more people to participate(Granovetter stateand thus reduces all social groupsto a simi- 1978; Chong 1991). larstructural position subordinate to the stateand In contrast,I contendthat the very institutional its bureaucraticorganizations. In state-owned structureof state socialism that preventsorga- enterprises,workers' wage grades, promotion nized interestsfacilitates collective actionbased opportunities,financing for housingconstruction, on unorganizedinterests. Central to my argu- healthinsurance, etc., are decidedby the minis- mentis theproposition that the institutionalstruc- tries in Beijing. Althoughlocal collective enter- tureof statesocialism reduces the barriersto col- prises, or privateenterprises in recentyears, are lective action by producing"large numbers" of not underthe administrativecontrol of the state, individualswith similarbehavioral patterns and they nonethelessare subjectto directstate inter- demandsthat cut acrossthe boundariesof organ- vention. For instance,in 1988, the centralgov- izations and social groups.The creationand re- ernment limited the organizationalpurchasing productionof these "largenumbers" of individu- power2of stateenterprises and government agen- als providethe basis for social mobilizationon a cies as well as collectives andrural organizations broadscale. with over 200 employees.For organizationsthat My secondproposition is thatthe institutional employed fewer than 200 workers,an "indirect structureof statesocialism also providesa direct controlmeasure" required their supervising agen- link between the workplace and the state and cies to set upquotas (Renmin Ribao 16 Oct. 1988). influences the direction of the local demands: In the countryside, as Oi (1989) noted, "after Once the opportunityis given, large numbersof eliminatinglandlords and collectivizingagricul- discontentedindividuals in workplacestend to ture, the state for the first time steppeddirectly converge in the same direction- toward the intothe strugglewith peasants over theirharvest" state. Even conflicts between social groupsand (p. 227). Even in the reformera, when statecon- workplacestend to be directedtoward the center trol reachedits lowest point in the last 40 years, for solutions.These instancesof discontentmay the peasants' well-being is still keenly affected not be based on common interests,nor are they by state policies on price control,material sup- necessarilyconsistent with each other;but they plies, and above all, the stabilityof reformpoli- often take a "collective"form because of their cies. similarpatterns and targets. Second, state policies tend to penetratethe Finally,the opportunityfor collective actionis boundariesof social groups and organizations embeddedin the state-societyrelationship. The and affect all individualssimultaneously. Mass use of political campaignsand mass mobiliza- mobilizationand resourcetransfers across sec- tions by the Communiststate to deal with its tors subjectdifferent social groups to the same bureaucraticand economic problems enables in- statepolicy vibration,i.e., individualsand groups dividualsto articulatetheir interests through their tendto be mobilizedsimultaneously through their responsesto statepolicies. State policy shiftshave vertical links with the state. For example, the thus induced spontaneousindividual behaviors acrossworkplaces and at localities the sametime, 2"Organizational purchasingpower" (shehui jituan leading to collective action. In brief, the institu- goumaili) is a Chinese term that refers to non- tionallinks impose structureand organization on production-relatedexpenditures (welfare, subsidies) these otherwiseunorganized interests, allowing in the work units. UNORGANIZEDINTERESTS AND COLLECTIVEACTION 59

Great-Leap-ForwardCampaign in 1958 was ini- ket. Interestgroups striveto establishtheir own tiated by the Communiststate to increase steel identitiesand boundaries and differentiatethem- production.To achieve its goals, the statemobi- selves from each other (Larson 1977; Freidson lized not only workersin the steel industry,but 1986). Consequently,the boundariesof social also intellectuals,workers in otherindustries, and groups, occupations,and organizationslead to even peasantsin the campaign.As a result, the differentpaces of change and differentrhythms ensuingdisaster spread over the countrysideand in absorbingexternal shocks. othersectors as well (Chang1976).3 In a central- The"large numbers" phenomenon is reinforced ized polity, state policies designatedfor a spe- by the stateorganizational apparatus in the work- cific areatend to affect individualsin otherareas place (danwei).4The recent literatureon China as well. The 1987 antibourgeoiscampaign was emphasizesthat the local bureaucracynot only launchedby the state to deal with liberalismin exerts political control against interestarticula- "ideologicaland political areas." However, peas- tions outside the state, but also generatesfrag- ants and workerswere also put underpolitical mentedand organization-based interests (Walder pressure and responded by withholding their 1986; Oi 1989; Shue 1988). Indeed,the bureau- marketactivities (RenminRibao 10 Oct. 1987). cratic apparatuseffectively preventsthe forma- As a result,even withouta consciousarticulation tion of autonomousorganized interests and per- of interests,individuals and social groupstend to haps also diffuses many potentialprotests at the exhibita spontaneousarticulation of behaviorin local level. However,the workplacedoes notpre- responseto statepolicies. vent the penetrationof the state into its bound- In the Chinese context, the similarityof the aries, nor does it lessen the tension between the links betweensocial groupsand the stateexerts a state and social groups.On the contrary,the bu- muchstronger effect on individualbehaviors than reaucraticapparatus in the workplacefacilitates do local within-groupconditions. The institutional the "largenumbers" phenomenon by (1) directly structureconstrains individuals' choice-sets and linkinglocal grievancesto nationalpolitics, and opportunitiesand thus narrows the directionsand (2) creating similar bureaucraticproblems and types of claims generatedin society. Moreover, breeding similar dissatisfactionsacross organi- this similarityin structuraldependency and vul- zations.This leads me to the institutionalarrange- nerabilityto the rhythmsof statepolicies implies ments in the workplace,especially the role of that social groups in China not only live in a local bureaucratsin linking local conflicts and similarpolitical and economic environmentbut the centralstate. also tend to share similar life experiences.It is In the Chinesesetting, bureaucrats at the local not surprising,then, that these macropolitical con- level acquiretheir authority and legitimation from ditions have producedsimilar behavior patterns the stateand they act as stateagents, interpreting amongindividuals across the boundaries of work- and implementingstate policies. In additionto places and localities. Chinese scholars use the its supervisingagencies, the governmentoften "swarmsof bees"metaphor to describethis phe- sends workteams directlyto local enterprisesor nomenon(Dong andZhang 1987). Like bees that villages to inspect and implementstate policies always swarm, similar individualbehaviors in (Burns 1988). In this context,the abilityof local Chinaare also presentin largenumbers. bureaucratsto solve localproblems is constrained This is in sharpcontrast to the formationof by the state. During a wave of reformin 1984, interest groups in other institutionalcontexts. managers in 55 factories in Fujian Province Studiesof therise of professionalismin theUnited cosignedan appealto the provincialgovernment States and Western Europe, for instance, have for authorityto appointtheir own managerialas- demonstratedthat the formation of interestgroups sistants and to decide on bonuses in the work- is often drivenby competitionin the labormar- place (RenminRibao 30 Mar. 1984). This well-

I The Great-Leap-Forwardcampaign, aimed at 4I use the concept of "workplace"in the sense of "rushedgrowth" of steel production,was the immedi- the Chineseconcept danwei, which includesnot only ate cause of the disasterof the 1959 to 1962 periodin factoriesfor the workers,but also universitiesfor stu- ruralChina. During this period,the rurallabor force dents and faculty,hospitals for doctorsand staff, and was sent to participatein steel production,leaving the villages for peasants,etc. Althoughthese danwei dif- autumnharvest untended. The advocacyof a "Great- fer in their social functions, they are the basic or- Leap-Forward"also led to a rushed adoptionof the ganizationsthat individualsbelong to and dependon People's Commune during the same period, which for resourcesand where the state exerts control over acceleratedthe disaster. individualson a daily basis. 60 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW publicized story shows the depth of the state's p. 51). Perry (1985) documentednumerous in- penetration into the workplace at the time: stancesof collective violence and feuds in rural Throughits bureaucraticapparatus, the central villages that clearly show that the state and its governmentcontrolled not only workers' wage local governmentstreated these local conflictsas levels, but also the internalmanagerial and in- a threatto the governabilityof the state (p. 190). centivestructures. Perhaps more important is that In one case of clan fighting in Hainanin 1981, the centralgovernment had the ultimateauthor- the local Party Committee"dispatched a work ity in meeting these demands- a few weeks team of more than600 statecadres, public secu- later,the centralgovernment instructed its local ritypolice, militiamen, and PLA soldiers"to solve agencies to allow managerialautonomy along conflicts among villages (Perry 1985, p. 180). thesedimensions. This is not an isolatedexample. The absenceof institutionalarrangements allow- As lateas 1988,the central government instructed ing different social groups to settle their own its local agenciesto intervenein agriculturalpro- disputesmeans that these competing interests can- duction in ruralareas (NongminRibao 28 July not be dealt with in a market-liketransaction. 1988). Laba's (1986) observationof the Polish Rather,the statemust intervene to providepoliti- workplacefits the Chinesecontext as well: "The cal solutions.Thus, divergentlocal interestsand political controlsof the Leniniststate are so di- conflicts,at a higherlevel of analysis,share simi- rect, so unmasked,that they generatea critique lar behavioralpatterns that either directlymake of statepower withinthe workplace"(p. 66). politicaldemands or indirectlygenerate political Bureaucratsare not merely state agents, they pressureon the state. also have their own interests (Djilas 1966; Groupconflict duringthe CulturalRevolution Hirszowicz 1981). Bureaucratsas a "new class" providesan illuminatingexample. Although this tendto exhibitsimilar behavioral patterns across episode is complicated,it is clear that the con- differentworkplaces and localities, a tendency flicts amongsocial groups during this period were thatis reinforcedby an institutionalarrangement constructedby the Communistleaders (White thatgrants bureaucrats monopolistic power at the 1989). As a result,the disputeswere ultimately local level (Zhou1989). Thus, bureaucratic prob- referredto the centerfor solutionsand thus cre- lems, whichare pervasive, also exhibitthe "large ated political pressureson the top leaders.Dur- numbers"phenomenon and cut acrossorganiza- ing this period, all these groups demandedthat tion boundaries(Harding 1981; Lampton 1987). the Maoist leaders recognize their "seizure of The doubleidentity of localbureaucrats as state power" (Tsou 1986). Because the top leaders agentsand as a class suggestsa link betweenthe failedto reconcilethe conflictingdemands, these workplaceand the state. Although grievances and demandsrepresented a challenge to the leader- discontenttend to be engenderedin theworkplace, ship's authority.This was evidenced by the re- they are often attributedto constraintsimposed peated but unsuccessfulappeals for alliance by by thecentral government. Conflicts with bureau- the Maoist leaders. The political pressuresre- cratsin the workplaceare unlikely to be solved at sultingfrom groupconflicts changedthe course the local level, because local bureaucratshave a of the CulturalRevolution (Wang 1988). Mao monopoly on power and, normatively,they are Zedong originally estimated that the Cultural stateagents. Consequently, once the opportunity Revolution would last for three months. How- is presented,these instancesof discontenttend to ever, the accelerationof factionaland local con- go beyondthe boundaries of theworkplace and to flictscould not be containedeven by MaoZedong be directed toward the state. This argumentis himself and he was forced repeatedlyto post- consistentwith the 40 years of Chinesepolitical pone the deadline. history in which antibureaucratismhas been an effective weapon used by the state to mobilize Opportunityfor CollectiveAction peopleacross organizations and localities (Whyte 1980). The collective defiance duringthe Hun- Collectiveaction depends on opportunities.In the dredFlowers period and the 1986 studentdemon- contextof unorganizedinterests and statepoliti- strationswere triggeredby widespreadbureau- cal controlin China,why do "largenumbers" of craticproblems at local levels. discontentedindividuals emerge across localities Different, even conflicting, interests among and organizationalboundaries? localitiesor social groupsin Chinaare embodied The asymmetrybetween a strong state and a less in lateralcompetition than in their similar weak society understate socialism suggests that verticaldemands made on the state (Chen 1990, opportunitiesfor collective actionare more often UNORGANIZEDINTERESTS AND COLLECTIVEACTION 61 providedby the stateand statepolicy shifts than spond to crises in other areas (Zhou and Wang are createdby conscious organizingefforts on 1991). Mass mobilizationhas been adoptedto the part of society. Ironically,institutional ar- deal with economic shortages,to enhance eco- rangementsin Chinahave intermittently provided nomic development, and to support factional such opportunities.Collective action has often struggleswithin the leadership.In the economic grown out of political campaignsinitiated and arena, for example, the Great-Leap-Forward organizedby the stateor hasstemmed from cleav- Campaignof 1958 mobilized humanresources ages createdby the relaxationof state political from other sectors to increase steel production. control. In the politicalarena, the most dramaticexample The Chinesepolitical process is characterized is the CulturalRevolution in which Mao Zedong by frequentpolicy shifts that alternatebetween mobilizedmillions of students,workers, and peas- bureaucraticimplementation and political cam- antsto attackhis opponentsand the bureaucratic paigns.Focusing on the earlierperiod of the So- organizations.In part,this accountsfor the state's viet Union, Arendt (1958) first arguedthat the occasionalrelaxation of politicalcontrol, and tol- constantshifts of powercenters and offices were eranceand even supportfor individualinitiative. intrinsicto a totalitarianregime based on the ab- The responseof individualsand social groups solute power of the leadership and the to state policy shifts provides clues to the out- structurelessnessof the state. More recently, break of collective action in China. As Tilly Chinascholars attribute this phenomenonto the (1978) argued,"the general effect of sustained organizationalfailures of state socialism. State repressionis not to buildup tensionsto the point dominanceover society dependson a huge bu- of a great explosion, but to reduce the overall reaucraticapparatus. The state's monopoly of level of collective action"(p. 228). In fact, the power is duplicatedat the lower levels of the "positiveincentive for compliance"in Chinaen- bureaucraticsystem. Statepolicies are transmit- couragesand even forces individualsto takepart ted throughdocuments and only local bureau- in state-initiatedcampaigns and respond to shifts crats have access to these documents and the in statepolicy (Bums 1988). The politics of life authorityto interpretthem (Oksenberg 1974). chances are highly significantin state socialism Thus,local bureaucratscan manipulate state poli- (Whyte1985; Walder 1986). Shifts in statepolicy cies to serve their own interests.The emphasis either affect individuals'lives directly,or indi- on politicalloyalty rather than competence leads rectly signal the impendingdangers or opportu- to, as Harding(1981) observed,"a stifling con- nities, with severe consequencesfor those who formityamong officials, a reluctanceto take in- fail to adaptto these dramaticchanges. As a re- dependentinitiatives, a low level of technical sult, individualsmust be keenly aware of these and managerialskills, and disillusionmentand signalsand respond accordingly. However, indi- cynicismat the frequentshifts in official line"(p. viduals' responsesto shifts in statepolicy do not 375). Consequently,two types of organizational suggest adherenceto the politicalline set by the failuresemerge: (1) systematicbureaucratic de- state.Participating in state-initiatedpolitical cam- viations in implementing state policies; and paigns provides an opportunityfor individuals (2) an accumulationof incompetentbureaucrats, and groupsto pursuetheir own agendasand ex- whichreduces the statecapacity (Lampton 1987; ploit new opportunities(Harding 1981; Shirk Whyte 1980). Moreover,the bureaucraticsys- 1982).State-initiated political campaigns provide tem cannot adequatelydeal with these organ- opportunitiesfor unorganizedgroups and indi- izationalfailures because the structureof upward vidualsto act together. accountabilitycreates close ties and personal So far, my discussion has been confined to loyaltiesbetween local bureaucratsand their im- what I call institutionalized collective action - mediate supervisors.As a result,the state often the collective action was initiatedby the state adopts alternativemodes of mobilization,usu- and participantsfollowed the rules of the game ally politicalcampaigns, to remedybureaucratic and employed legitimateinstitutional channels. problems. Moreover, individualstook part in these cam- As Arendt(1958) argued,mass mobilizations paigns more as spontaneousand adaptive re- are a core characteristicof the totalitarianmove- sponses to state policies ratherthan as self-con- ment. In China, political campaigns serve the scious organizingefforts. The sourcesof shiftsin purposes of the leadership by mobilizing re- statepolicy may vary- factionalconflicts in the sourcesto achieve the state's ambitiouspolitical CulturalRevolution, bureaucratic problems in the and economic goals (Townsend 1967) or to re- HundredFlowers period, or mobilizationfor eco- 62 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW nomic developmentin the 1980s - but as long through1988 period.They showed that,despite as these opportunitiesare offered, individuals' the decentralizationefforts, the state played a behavior tends to go beyond state prescribed decisive role in promotingits policies. The dif- boundariesand take the form of collectiveaction. ference, as one delegate to the People's Con- Another type of collective action, un- gress put it, is thatbefore the reform,local gov- institutionalizedcollective action, refers to pro- ernmentsand representativesdemanded money tests and displays of open defiance that are not and resources from the central government, initiatedby the state - they bypass legitimate whereasnow theydemanded (special privileged) institutionalchannels to directly challenge the policies from the central government(Renmin state. This type of collective action was espe- Ribao, overseas ed., 4 Apr. 1992). Not surpris- cially salientduring the economicreforms of the ingly, althoughthe state monopoly has eroded last decade, e.g., the studentdemonstrations in considerably,the "largenumbers" phenomenon 1986 andthe pro-democracymovement in 1989. still prevailsand, more important,political pres- Unlike collective action in the pre-reformera, sures generatedby the reformprocess are still social protestsin the 1980s were not initiatedby directedtoward the state.Thus, uninstitutionalized the state.For instance,student demonstrations in collective actionresembles institutionalized col- 1986 and the pro-democracymovement of 1989 lective actionin many ways. both defied warningsand threatsof repressive measures by the top leaders. The participants TWO CASE STUDIES made explicit demandson the state and in both cases, therewere open confrontationswith gov- To illustratemy arguments,I examinetwo cases ernmentofficials, police, or the army. In many of collective actionin some detail. respects, the social protests of the 1980s re- sembled collective action in other social con- InstitutionalizedCollective Action. The texts. HundredFlowers Period The emergenceof open protestis rootedin the new opportunitystructure created by recenteco- In 1957, aftera periodof economic reconstruc- nomic reformsin China.In the economicreform tion, nationalization,and collectivizationcam- after 1978, the staterelaxed its policy of political paignsthat began in 1949, the ChineseCommu- control and introducedmarket mechanisms in nist state had consolidatedits territorialcontrol the allocationof resources(Nee 1989). The re- and had completedthe nation-buildingprocess. formfacilitated lateral communication across lo- At the same time, the bureaucraticsystem had calities and group boundaries,and some free- overexpanded and administrative problems dom of expressionwas tolerated.These reform loomed large(Harding 1981, pp. 87-115). In ad- measurescreated two conditionsthat facilitated dition, popularrevolts in Hungaryand Poland collective action:(1) The relaxationof political duringthis period challengedthe legitimacy of controllowered the fear of repressionand hence all Communiststates. Incidentsof conflict be- reducedthe expectedcost of participatingin col- tween the populaceand bureaucratsat the local lective action; and (2) political and economic level were also reported(Mao [1957] 1977a). resourceswere decentralized and, indirectly, were In this context, the CommunistParty adopted made availablefor the mobilizationof collective a "rectificationcampaign" to correctits bureau- action. craticproblems. Mao Zedong identifiedsubjec- However, the discontinuitybetween the Mao tivism,bureaucratism, and sectarianism as major era and the reformera shouldnot be overdrawn. problemswithin the Party.In February,Mao sig- The institutionalarrangements that created the naled the beginningof the HundredFlowers pe- "large numbers"phenomenon have not funda- riod in a speech in which he declared"let a hun- mentallychanged. The state remainsat the cen- dred flowers bloom and a hundredschools of ter,initiating reform through a top-downprocess thoughtcontend" and that "long-termco-exist- (Davis andVogel 1990).The basic characteristic ence and mutualinspection" were the long-term of the decentralizationprocess was that power state policy for handlingcontradictions among was "granted"to local authoritiesby the state, the people (Mao [1957] 1977a). He also advo- and thuscan be, at least normatively,withdrawn catedopen criticismof the problemsin the Com- by the state (Yan 1991). Hua, Zhang, and Luo munistParty. (1988) documentedthe majorreform decisions Intellectualsat first were reluctantto respond madeby the centralgovernment during the 1978 for fear of repression.On April 30, Mao invited UNORGANIZEDINTERESTS AND COLLECTIVEACTION 63 leadersof the democraticparties5 and intellectu- religiousgroups, responded with complaintsand als not affiliatedwith any politicalparties to dis- demands(MacFarquhar 1960). Official published cuss theCommunist Party's rectification and wel- materialsreveal non-Partymembers criticizing comed their criticisms.From May 6 to June 3, the CommunistParty's monopoly of power,doc- the CommunistParty's Ministry of UnitedFront tors complaining of bureaucraticcoverups of organized a series of meetings to gather criti- medical malpractice(Guangming Ribao 3 May cisms fromnon-Communist Party members, most 1957), studentsquestioning the proceduresfor of whom were intellectuals.Encouraged by the electing student representatives (Guangming leadership'sattitude, many individuals openly Ribao26 May 1957),and writers demanding cre- criticizedproblems within the CommunistParty. ative freedom (WenxueYanjiu (5) 1957). Open In a few weeks, criticismsfrom different sectors, criticismsfrom peasantsand workerswere less workplaces,and localitiespoured out.6 frequentand their expressions of discontenttook Severalcharacteristics of thisepisode are worth other forms. For instance,according to a report noting.First, the criticismswere clearly individu- by the official media, 13 workers' strikes or als' spontaneousresponses to state advocacy. "troublemaking"incidents occurred in one year Except for some gatheringsof senior members in GuangdongProvince alone. In the country- of the democraticparties in Beijing that were side, over 10,000 householdswithdrew from the encouragedby the CommunistParty, there is no cooperativesin GuangdongProvince during the evidence thatthe criticismswere coordinatedor same period (New China News Agency 14 May organizedby autonomousinterest groups. Nu- 1957 as quotedin MacFarquhar1960, p. 234). merousaccounts of this periodindicate that most The common characteristicof these incidents participantsacted on the basis of appealsfrom is thatcritics across different workplaces and lo- top leaders. For instance, some universitystu- calities raisedsimilar criticisms. The centralized dentswere later purged simply because they criti- politicalsystem produced large numbers of simi- cized headsof CommunistParty branches in their lar bureaucraticproblems across localities and departmentsor in the university.In an interview, largenumbers of individualswith similarexperi- a professorwho was purgedduring this period ences anddissatisfactions. These criticisms, while recalledthat, at the invitationof the Partysecre- differingin specifics,all demandedthat the Com- tary in his department,he wrote an article sup- munistParty correct local bureaucraticproblems portingthe CommunistParty's "Hundred Flow- and relax its political control over society. The ers" policy and warning that subjectivism, linkbetween local bureaucraticproblems and the bureaucratism,and sectarianism, if not corrected, centralstate was clearly perceived.As two stu- would lead to national disaster. As he put it: dents in a teachers'college in Shenyangput it: "Thosewere the same wordsthe top leadersused "Themain source of bureaucraticproblems lies whenthey advocatedthe rectification campaign." in the centralgovernment. If we don't eliminate Second,not only intellectualsbut social groups these problemsat their roots, they will emerge such as managers,doctors, civil servants,and again"(Shenyang Ribao 10 June 1957). The collectivenature of these spontaneousand large-scalecriticisms exceeded the state'sexpec- I In Chinese practice, all political parties outside tations.On May 15, less than the CommunistParty are labeled democraticDarties. 1957, threemonths 6My discussionrelies mainly on XinhuaBanyuekan after he declaredthe HundredFlowers policy, (Apr.- Aug. 1957), an official news-collectionseries Mao Zedongcharged that these criticismswere a that assembled informationon the background,par- concerted effort by counter-revolutionariesto ticipation,and stateresponses during this period.The overthrowthe CommunistParty (Mao [1957] best source available in English is MacFarquhar 1977b). On June 8, the Partylaunched its Anti- (1960), who collected a sample of criticisms during Rightist Campaign. Those who criticized the this period. In this collection and other official Chi- CommunistParty were labeled "rightists"and nese publications,criticisms by prominentintellectu- "conflicts"between rightistsand the state were als are disproportionatelyrepresented while circum- declared"contradictions between the people and stances at the local level are not adequatelyrepre- the enemies"rather than sented. In 1979, when the CommunistParty rehabili- "contradictionsamong tatedthose purgedduring this period,many individu- thepeople." In a few months,over 400,000 "right- als recountedtheir experiencesin workplaces.Some ists" were purgednationwide. of the cases citedbelow aredrawn from what I learned This episodeis an exampleof institutionalized when I was at a university in Shanghai during the collective action,i.e., the Communiststate mobi- rehabilitationperiod. lized the masses to deal with the state's bureau- 64 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW craticproblems. However, even thoughthe par- explosive natureof this event and on December ticipantsclearly were unorganizedand followed 8, 1986, an editorial in RenminRibao warned the stated rules of the game, their remarkably that political reformmust proceed accordingto similarcriticisms and demandsand the political the CommunistParty's blueprint. But it was too pressuresput on the statefollowed the patternof late. That same month, studentdemonstrations collective action. Consequently,they were seen tookplace in Shanghai,Beijing, Nanjing, Wuhan, as a challengeto the state and were severely re- Hongzhou, Shenzhen,and other large cities. In pressed. many places, studentsconfronted police and lo- cal officialsin defianceof thegovernment's chilly UninstitutionalizedCollective Action: Student warning. Demonstrationsin 1986 Eyewitnessaccounts and media reportsnoted the spontaneityof participationand the partici- Near the end of 1986, Chinawas full of frustra- pants' lack of organizationand clear goals. For tions, expectations,and excitement.The frustra- example,students at FudanUniversity mobilized tion stemmed from difficulties in carryingout after a group of studentsfrom a nearbyuniver- economic reforms. In 1986, China entered its sity marchedto Fudanand asked Fudan students eighthyear of economicreform. In theinitial three to join them. One studentorganizer at Fudanre- years,China experienced the most rapidagricul- called: "We [classmates]were all excited about tural growth in its history. Encouragedby this what was happening. Someone posted an an- economic miracle,the state extendedreform to nouncementthat there would be a demonstration the industrialsector in urbanareas in 1984.It soon the next day. We discussed it duringlunch and became clear that the political system was the decided we would preparebanners and join the biggest obstacle to urbanreform. Bureaucratic demonstration."In a few days, studentsfrom all interferenceand corruption led to economicstag- major universitiesin Shanghaiwere participat- nationand engenderedmass grievances. ing in the demonstrations.The unorganizedna- On the otherhand, expectations were high. In ture of the protests was also reflected in their an effortto overcomethese difficulties, the Com- lack of sustainedmobilization and lack of coher- munist leadership,especially Deng Xiaoping, ent demands(Wasserstrom 1991). On December advocatedpolitical reform. On June28 and Sep- 18, just a few days after the first outbreak,stu- tember 13, 1986, Deng Xiaoping instructedthe dentsreturned to theirclassrooms in spiteof some Politburoto considerpolitical reform in orderto studentorganizers' calls for a boycott of classes enlist mass supportfor economic reformand to (Schell 1988, p. 230). overcome bureaucratism(Document Office of Althoughdemonstrations in differentareas were the PartyCentral Committee 1986). Inspiredby triggeredby differentlocal incidents,they all con- these signals,in the summerof 1986, heateddis- verged on the same issues. In Anhui Province, cussions occurred among intellectuals on the studentdemonstrations broke out to protestthe problemsof thecurrent political system and pros- violationof electionprocedures when a localParty pects for politicalreform. Articles, debates, and office tried to impose its candidateson the stu- proposalsappeared in newspapers,professional dents.In Shanghai,demonstrations were triggered journals,and publicforums.7 by theabuse of studentsby police in a publicplace While talk of political reformwas in the air, (Ninetith Feb. 1987, pp. 74-76). In Shenzhen, university students could wait no longer. The demonstrationsprotested high tuition (Schell apparentwillingness of the stateto considerpo- 1988).Even in Shanghai,different demands were litical reformreleased long-suppressed tensions madeduring the demonstrations. For instance, the in society. On December 5, 1986, students at initialdemands at Fudan University included com- China Science and Technology University in plaintsabout dormitory conditions and food qual- Anhui Provincetook to the streetsto protestin- ity, among others (Schell 1988; Wasserstrom valid election proceduresin a local election and 1991).Diverse as these complaintswere, student to demandpolitical reform and democraticpro- demonstrationsquickly converged on a demand cedures.The governmentrealized the potentially 8 My discussion here is based primarilyon pub- I Many publicationson political reformsappeared lished eyewitness accounts,news reportsin Chinese during this period. Interested readers can refer to journalsin Hong Kong, and interviewsin the summer RenminRibao, Guangming Ribao, Jiefang Ribao, and of 1987 with studentparticipants from Fudan Univer- Xinhua Yuebaofor mid-1986 for details. sity. UNORGANIZEDINTERESTS AND COLLECTIVEACTION 65 for the centralgovernment to speed up political that studentshad lost their enthusiasmand be- reformsand correctbureaucratic problems. come apathetic(Zhongguo Qingnianbao 4 Apr. The generalatmosphere of politicalreform cre- 1988). Althoughthere were a few informaldissi- atedby top leadershad provided the basis for the dentgroups among the studentsat Beijingon the mobilizationof students at differentcampuses eve of the 1989 events andthe membersof these andlocalities. These demonstrations actually sup- groupswere actively involved in the social pro- ported the top leaders' reform efforts. As one tests, thereis no evidencethat these groupsiniti- studentexplained: "We were respondingto the ated,or were capableof mobilizingand organiz- call last July by Deng Xiaoping for politicalre- ing such large-scaleopen confrontations.In fact, form. We are impatientthat in spite of all the the original studentrepresentatives of the Inde- newspaperarticles advocating mass participation, pendent Student Alliance of Beijing Universi- nothingconcrete has yet been done to allow us a ties, establishedduring the protest,included no say in governmentaffairs" (Schell 1988, p. 213). membersof these dissidentgroups (Shen 1990). Nonetheless,the Party leadership saw thedem- Nonetheless,the institutionalstructure created onstrationsas a challengeto Partyrule and inter- interconnectionsamong individualsand social pretedthem as "riots"(naoshi) inspired by "bad groups. Individualsfrom various social groups elements." In response, the government took andorganizations - victimsof the reforms,such strongpolitical measures to suppressthe student as workersand cadres in state-ownedenterprises, demonstrations.General Secretary Hu Yaobang as well as beneficiariesof the reforms,such as was forced to resign;three famous intellectuals privateentrepreneurs joined the demonstra- who advocatedpolitical reform were purged; the tions.Although participants may not have shared presidentand a vice presidentof China Science a common interest,they shareda common en- and Technology University, where the student emy. The central state and its policies engen- demonstrationsbegan, were replaced and the dered widespread discontent among students, university administrationreorganized. In the workers,cadres, and other social groups.Though meantime, a nationwide Anti-BourgeoisCam- demands varied across social groups (Strand paignwas launched.The CommunistParty orga- 1990), it was the centralposition of the state as nized mass criticisms of Western liberalism. the cause of, andthe solutionto, social problems, Withinone month,major Party newspapers pub- that was the basis for the articulationof behav- lished numerouseditorials and commentariesto iors amongthese participants. motivate this campaign (Xinhua Yuebao Jan. In most instancesof collective actionin China, 1987). studentsand intellectualswere the main partici- Althoughthey occurred30 years apart,these pants.In part,this can be attributedto the relative two instancesof collectiveaction share some simi- homogeneityof the intelligentsia,but it also re- larities. In both cases, participantswere moti- flects the sensitivityof intellectualsand students vatedby shiftsin statepolicy ratherthan by their to shiftsin statepolicy. The distancebetween the own organizingefforts. Political control at the intelligentsiaand othersocial groupswas not as workplaceand fragmented interests based on for- greatas it appeared.For instance,although only mal organizationsdid not preventcollective ac- studentsparticipated in the 1986 demonstrations, tion across these boundaries.On the contrary, citizens reportedlycheered the studentdemon- bureaucraticproblems at the local level were the stratorsand providedthem with food and cloth- immediatecause of collective action. But these ing (NinetithJan. 1987, pp. 17-20). These ac- criticismsand protests quickly moved fromlocal tions resembledcitizen supportfor studentsat issues to the centerand threatenedthe Commu- the beginning of the 1989 demonstrations,just nist state. before they joined studentsin demonstrations. The puzzlesof the 1989 pro-democracymove- This suggests that the promptstate crackdown mentcan be understoodin a similarmanner. Wide interruptedthe emerging mobilizationof these participationin the movement cannot be ac- nonstudentgroups in the 1986 episode. countedfor by eithercommon interestsor orga- In examiningthe patternsof collective action nizationalefforts. On the eve of the 1989 pro- in China,I have focused on its causal link with tests, Chinese society was highly differentiated; the institutionalstructure of statesocialism. How- inequalitygenerated tensions among social groups ever, microconditionsare also important re- (Davis and Vogel 1990). Even university stu- sources, organizingcapacity, leadership, incen- dents were divided(Chen 1991). Justa yearear- tives, personalnetworks, and existing repertoires lier,the Presidentof BeijingUniversity lamented of collective action also play importantroles. 66 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Thereis evidenceof mobilizationacross univer- In a marketeconomy, problems resulting from sities duringthe 1986 and 1989 studentdemon- noncomplianceand inefficiency at the workplace strations.Informal channels of communication do not assume a collective characterbeyond the were availablethrough personal networks, trav- local boundaryand a set of complicated eco- elers,hearsay and, in recentyears, foreign broad- nomic layersabsorbs their impacts. For instance, casts. The mobilizationof studentprotest was inefficiency in the Americanautomobile indus- also based on existing repertoiresof collective try has been suggested as a major source of its actionsuch as patrioticsymbols, the big charac- competitivedisadvantage. However, the cost of terposters (dazibao), and work units. These sym- inefficiency in the workplaceis sharedby com- bols and forms can be tracedto the May Fourth panyowners, consumers, and, indirectly, the state, movementof 1911 and the CulturalRevolution. throughdeclines in tax revenues. Furthermore, Furthermore,the 1989pro-democracy movement the adverseimpact of inefficiencyat the national clearlyreflected the profoundsocial changes that level may be partlyalleviated by the successesof had occurredduring the ten-yeareconomic re- otherindustries. Even when discontentspans so- form that underminedthe capacityof the Com- cial groups, it tends to be directed to multiple munist state. Whether the reform process can targetswith multipledemands. continueand whetherit will lead to fundamental State socialism is a directlyopposite case. In changes in the patternsof collective action re- the institutionalstructure of state socialism, the main to be seen. state's monopoly over the public spheremeans thatnoncompliance directly challenges state au- thority,affects the state'sextraction of resources, COLLECTIVEINACTION AS A FORMOF andthreatens its governancecapacity. Collective COLLECTIVEACTION inactionemerges when statepolicies shifttoward Thus far, I have consideredcollective action in political repressionand tightercontrol. During the formof open defiantbehavior. However, col- periodsof repression,open protestsare severely lective actionunder state socialism also includes punishedand individualsprotect themselves by noncompliance,apathy, and pessimism among resortingto invisible forms of resistancerather thepopulace (Townsend and Womack 1986; Ma- thanopen defiance.Collectively, these forms of son, Nelson,and Szklarski 1991). Certainly, these resistanceput enormouspolitical pressure on the formsof resistanceare not uniqueto Communist state,challenging its legitimacyand constraining society - they have been documentedin many its capacityto implementpolicies. In this light, othersocial contexts (Scott 1985;Colburn 1989). the "largenumbers" of noncompliantbehaviors I would argue,however, that in the institutional resemblecollective action. structureof state socialism, noncomplianceand Althoughit is difficultto documentinstances apathyassume a collective characterand have a of collective inaction,several studies shed light specialpolitical significance. I labelthis phenom- on thisphenomenon. Skinner and Winkler (1969), enon collective inaction. in a studyof stateagricultural policies duringthe Collectiveinaction may takedifferent forms: a 1950s and 1960s, found that peasants'indiffer- lack of enthusiasmfor participatingin state-initi- ence toward state policies and their collective ated political campaigns,absenteeism or ineffi- resistanceinhibited the state'scapacity to imple- ciency in the workplace,evasion of public du- ment its policies and forced the stateto abandon ties, and the emergenceof subculturesopposing old policies andtake a differentdirection. Zweig the official ideology. Some of these behaviors (1989) examined the peasants' resistanceover are more visible than others and may well be collectiveland in the 1960sand 1970sand reached seen as "action"rather than "inaction,"such as similar conclusions. Townsend and Womack looting of crops and animal slaughter.But their (1986, pp. 265-69) also recognizedthis type of commoncharacteristic is thatthey areindividual- behavioras a distinctivetype of interestarticulation. based and take the form of escape from state Perhapsthe most spectacularexample is the controlrather than open confrontations. This type change in agriculturalproductivity that occurred of behaviorhas minimalsymbolic visibility: duringthe reform.The collectivizationof agri- Whenthey are practiced widely by membersof an culture before 1979 deprivedpeasants of their entireclass against elites or the state, they may have lands and the policy met with tacit resistantbe- aggregatedconsequences out of all proportionto haviors like free-riding,low productivity,eva- theirbanality when considered singly. (Scott 1989, sion of farm duties. The pervasivenessof the p.5) resistanceconstituted collective inactionand its UNORGANIZEDINTERESTS AND COLLECTIVEACTION 67 cost was clearlyreflected in a stagnationof agri- by then Acting GeneralSecretary Zhao Ziyang cultural production.During the 1971 through representsan effort to change the course of the 1978 period,when the peasantswere underthe politicalcampaign: communesystem, the annualgrowth rate in gross value of agriculturaloutput was 4.3 percent If the current[refonn] policy is interpretedas the result of bourgeois liberalism,it will create great (Perkins1988). During the reformera, when col- uncertaintyamong the people. If productionis un- lectivizationwas abandonedand privatehouse- attended,commercial activities disrupted, forest de- holds leased the land,the growthrate jumped to stroyedand pigs killed, who can shoulderall these 7.5 percentduring the 1980 through1982 period, responsibilities?(Renmin Ribao 10 Oct. 1987) and 13.0 percentfrom 1982 to 1986. As Perkins (1988) noted, "the growthof such key inputsas Clearly,collective action in the Chinese con- mechanicaland electric power and chemical fer- text manifestsitself not only throughopen resis- tilizerall increasedat ratesno higherand in most tanceand demonstrations, but also in moresubtle cases lower in the 1979-85 periodas contrasted formsof noncompliantbehavior that fall outside to the 1965-78 period"(p. 612). Clearly,these the conventionalscope of collective action.Un- high growthrates in agricultureare attributable like othersocial contexts, however, in Chinathese mainly to human factors, "particularlythe re- forms of resistanceshare the characteristicsof lease of energies connectedwith privatehouse- collective action. In a sense, collective inaction hold output"(p. 612). It is evidentthat collective is an invisible "sit-in"in the Chinese political inactionin agriculturebefore the reformera had context.Its message is loud andclear, even with- a devastatingeffect on the capacityof the stateto out symbolic actions. extractresources. In a capitalistmarket context, as Hirschman Even in the reformera, collective inactionfre- (1982) noted, the dichotomybetween the public quently occurred.For instance,in the springof andprivate arenas allows individualsto shift be- 1989, 150,000 workers in the coal industryin tween public and private realms and between Shanxi Provincerefused to returnto work after collective action and the pursuitof self-interest. the Chinese SpringFestival to protestthe short- In state socialism, on the other hand, shifts of age of grainsupplied by the state.This actionre- individualinvolvement are more likely to be be- duced coal productionby around400,000 tons tween collective action and collective inaction. per day and disruptedproduction in otherindus- Whetherindividuals strive for the publicgood or tries(Chen 1990, pp. 130-31). OnJanuary 4,1988, pursuetheir self-interests, their behaviors assume a reportappeared on the front page of Renmin a collective characterand challenge the state Ribao entitled "Workers' Enthusiasm in the monopoly. WorkplaceReached Its Bottom Low." The report presentedthe resultsof a social surveyconducted DISCUSSION by the NationalWorkers Union in whichonly 12 percentof the 210,000 workerssurveyed agreed I have examined collective action in China by thattheir work energies were fully utilized. contrastingstate-society relationships in the capi- In some instances,collective inactiondirectly talist marketeconomy and the state socialist re- affectedstate policy. Forexample, in 1987, when distributivesystem. These ideal types highlight the CommunistParty launched the anti-bourgeois how the uniquefeatures of statesocialism lead to campaignto repressstudent demonstrations, in- collective actionbased on unorganizedinterests. dividualssensed the impendingpolitical repres- The Chinese experienceis not an isolated case sion andpolicy shifts.Peasants cut the treesthey - collective actionsbased on unorganizedinter- were growing and slaughteredpigs they were ests have also occurredin the marketeconomy. raisingin fear thatthey would be confiscatedby The studentprotests in Francein the 1960s and the state. Enterpriseswithheld productionand 1986 emergedspontaneously rather than through investmentbecause of the possibilitythat the au- carefulorganization (McMillan 1992; Wilsford tonomygranted to themby the governmentmight 1988). Protestsby blacks in the early period of be revoked(Chengming Mar. 1987, pp. 19-21). the U. S. civil rightsmovement also were not a Althoughsimilar responses may occur in a mar- resultof consciousorganizing efforts. What con- ket economy, the differenceis that the Chinese ditionsfoster these similartypes of collective ac- were respondingto political uncertaintyrather tion in differentsocial contexts? thanmarket uncertainty and their behaviors were Accordingto Hirschman(1982), one cause of directlytranslated into political pressure. A speech this phenomenonis marketfailures that shrink 68 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW the privaterealm where individualscan pursue The absenceof a marketand the prevalenceof their self-interests and alter their preferences, the state in social life do not necessarilyentail therebypushing individuals into the publicarena. collective action in the Chinesecontext. The re- In a studyof the poorpeople's movementduring distributiveeconomic systemin Chinaplaces in- the GreatDepression, Piven andCloward (1977) dividualsunder the organizationalcontrol of the made similararguments. The politicaland social state. The lack of organizedinterests limits the bases of racialprejudice and discriminationren- effectiveness of leadership,personal networks, dered any market-likesolution impossible, set- communication,and mobilization.Furthermore, ting the stagefor the rise of the civil rightsmove- the track record of the state's repressivemea- ment. Underthese circumstances,collective ac- sures againstcollective actionmakes the cost of tion may occur with or withoutconscious orga- participationhigh. Why does collective action nizing efforts. The maintenanceand expansion occur underthese adverseconditions? of collective actions, however, depend heavily An institutionalperspective sheds lighton this on leadership,organizations, and the evolving puzzle. Althoughunorganized, collective action politicalprocess (McAdam 1982). in Chinais systematicallystructured by the par- Anothercontributing factor is the increasing ticular type of state-society relationship.The concentrationof powerthat accompanied the rise Communiststate and its institutionshave fos- of the nation-stateand redefinedthe boundaries teredinterconnections among otherwise unorga- of the public and privaterealms. "As capitalism nized interestsby generating"large numbers" of advanced,as nationalstates became more pow- discontentedpeople, by linking local discontent erful and centralized,local affairs and nearby withnational politics, and by a mobilizationpolicy patrons matteredless to the fates of ordinary thatperiodically incorporates social groupsin the people" (Tilly 1986, pp. 395-96). These evolv- political process. Thus, collective action is un- ing state-societyrelationships led to fundamen- wittingly"organized" by the Communiststate. tal changesin the formsand channels of political Considerthe role of formal organizations.It input from society. Wilsford (1988) attributed has been arguedthat factories,communes, and studentprotests in Franceto the dominanceof universitiesare part of the state organizational the state apparatusthere: "For the Frenchstate, apparatuswhereby the Communiststate exer- by dealing highhandedlywith its opponents,cut cises controlthrough political pressures and eco- them off from normalavenues of politicalnego- nomic incentives.In the studentdemonstrations tiation.In doing so, it forces its opponentsto exit in 1980s, universityauthorities discouraged stu- normal politics" (p. 152). The studentdemon- dents from participating.The governmentalso strationsof the 1960s in the United States were threatenedworkers through Party branches at the interconnectedin a similarmanner - they were workplace(Stavis 1988,p. 105). However,work- a collectiveresponse to the federalgovernment's places anduniversities are places wherepersonal foreignpolicy andits interventionin higheredu- ties and social networks are formed (Calhoun cation. 1989). When opportunitiesopen up, they pro- The emergenceof new social movements in vide a channel for social mobilization,as evi- WesternEurope also illustratesthis point. In con- denced in the 1989 pro-democracymovement. trastto the traditionalorganizational base of so- In this light, the workplace is a social space cial movements,scholars have observed the emer- where individuals share similar interests and gence of social movementssince the 1970s that similarexperiences and interact.It is also a po- arisefrom a diffuse and fluid social base andcut litical space where discontentagainst the state acrossgroup boundaries and traditionalpolitical and local bureaucratsis bred and accumulated. arenas(Dalton and Kuechler1990). This pattern In time, it becomes an organizationalbasis for of social mobilizationis mainly the resultof the mobilizationof its membersin pursuitof their rise of welfare state in industrializedsocieties interests. which has blurredand widened the boundaries Moreover,in the instancesof collective action of the political (Maier 1987). The state's pen- I consider,participation was eithermobilized by etrationinto social life has linked diverse social the statedirectly or inducedby statepolicy. Dur- issues andpolitical arenas and prepared a broader ing the HundredFlowers period, for instance,the base for interestarticulation. Clearly, changes in state took greatpains to motivateindividuals to the repertoiresof collective action and forms of participatein the anti-bureaucratismcampaign. social mobilizationreflect an evolving state-so- Studentdemonstrations and studentattacks on ciety relationship. bureaucraticorganizations in 1986 were also UNORGANIZEDINTERESTS AND COLLECTIVEACTION 69 promptedby the call for politicalreform by the Obviously,the collective actions discussed here top leaders.In such an institutionalsetting, indi- differ in many aspectsfrom collective actionsin viduals may start with diverse targets and de- othersocial contexts.Because they areless "pur- mands,but they tend to converge in a common posive," they could be termed "aggregates"of directionowing to the centralizedpolity and op- individualbehavior or "crowdbehavior." How- portunitystructure. Regardless of participants' ever, the transformationof individualbehavior motivations,the large numberof criticisms di- into collective action discussed here is too sys- rectedtoward the stateand open protests are caus- tematic, structurallyembedded, and politically ally defined as collective action. Even tree-cut- significantto be treatedmerely as a circumstan- ting and pig-killingin ruralareas that are within tial outcome.The largenumber of individualre- the privaterealm take a "collective"form to chal- sponsesis rootedin the natureof the state-society lenge the stateand statepolicies. relationshipand reproducedin everydayactivi- Communistpractices in China also generate ties. These responsesare part of the politicalpro- andmaintain the repertoiresof collective action. cess, bothas productand as input.They shouldbe Severalscholars have notedsimilarities between treatedas "collective"because they are perceived the studentprotests of the 1980s andother social andresponded to as suchby the state,and because movements in Chinese history (Strand 1990; they affect the politicalprocess as collective ac- Wasserstrom1991). The studentprotests of the tions ratherthan as unorganizedinterests. 1980srepeatedly invoked the imageryof the May Fourthmovement of 1911, whose patrioticsym- RETHINKINGTHE STATE-SOCIETY bols legitimizedparticipation. Students also drew RELATIONSHIPUNDER STATE on of memories the CulturalRevolution, which SOCIALISM providedforms of organizationand mobilization. Forinstance, big characterposters were displayed In concluding,I assess the relevanceof my argu- on campuses;student organizers in Beijing sent ments to collective actionin otherstate socialist representativesto othercities to mobilize fellow societiesand reconsider the state-societyrelation- students;workers joined by holding bannersof ship in state socialismin light of my arguments. their work units - all these actions were re- AlthoughI have focused on China,the issues markablysimilar to actions adoptedduring the and mechanismsinvolved are more generaland CulturalRevolution. Interestingly, both sources are rooted in the patternsof state-societyrela- of the actions were created and maintainedby tionshipstypical of state socialism. In develop- the Communiststate: The Communiststate cel- ing these ideas, I have benefited greatly from ebratesthe May Fourthmovement annually as a studies of the Soviet Union and EasternEuro- symbol of patriotism,and the CulturalRevolu- pean politics where the "large numbers"phe- tion and othermass mobilizationswere also ini- nomenonhas also beenobserved. Griffiths (1971) tiatedand organized by the state.The centralized found a "parallelarticulation of behavior"cut- politicalsystem creates a culturalcontext in which ting across formal groups in the Soviet Union. the repertoiresof collectiveaction are maintained Morerecently, Bunce (forthcoming) used the con- and sharedby individualsacross organizations cept of "homogenization"to characterizethe ba- and social groups. sis for spontaneousinterest articulation in East- Outbreaksof collective actionare triggered by ern Europeancountries. The directlink between shifts in several importantparameters: Political the state and the workplacehas been most evi- controlsare relaxed,individuals are encouraged dent in the Soviet Union and in EasternEuro- to participatein thepolitical process, lateral com- pean contexts (Laba 1986). Political campaigns municationnetworks are activated, and cleav- andmass mobilizationshave occurredfrequently ages open owing to factionalconflicts at the top. in the Soviet Union (Viola 1987) and Eastern During such episodes, individualsare encour- Europe (Hankiss 1989). Studies of mass resis- aged by the stateto "speakout." Thus, the popu- tance - instances of "collective inaction" lace becomes aware of widespreaddiscontents, andits politicaleffects on statepolicies have also which in turn promotesfurther participation in emergedin recentyears (Scott 1989). thisprocess. More important, such a politicalpro- Hankiss(1989) examinedthe mobilization pro- cess mustpersist long enoughto affect individu- cess in Hungaryand found that shifts in state als' incentivesand perceptionsof risk. Because policy towardopenness createdthe opportunity the simultaneousemergence of these conditions for society to mobilize and challenge the state. is rare,collective actionin Chinais infrequent. Even in Polandbefore the birthof Solidarityin 70 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW the 1980s, workers'uprisings exemplified col- these demandsembodied in differentorganiza- lective actionbased on unorganizedinterests. For tions strivingto obtain state licensing for privi- instance, workers' strikes in 1976 occurredin leged access to resourcestypical of a corporatist morethan 100 factoriesthroughout the nationon system. However, collective action in a society theday the Polish government announced its price of unorganizedinterests plays a critical role in reform program.Bernhard (1987) showed that the political process. The impact of collective these strikeswere immediateresponses to state actionis revealedin its timing.Collective action policy ratherthan carefully organized efforts. based on unorganizedinterests is largely a re- Therewere noticeabledifferences in the partici- sponseto the stateand to statepolicies. It tendsto pants' demandsacross sectors and regions. The occur when the state shifts policy. This is when unorganizednature of the strikes is also indi- the state is "weak" - owing to leadership cated by their short duration:They lasted one changes, fragile coalitions, or a lack of confi- day and ended when the governmentwithdrew dence in its new orientation.This type of collec- its price reformpolicy. The basic featuresof the tive action resembles social mobilizations institutionalarrangements and state-society rela- promptedby the breakdownof the state(Skocpol tionshipsdiscussed here have directimplications 1979). for understandingcollective actionin otherstate Collective actionbased on unorganizedinter- socialist societies. ests has been crucialin the erosion of the Com- Of course,the argumentsdeveloped here can- munist state; it also underliesthe dynamics of not be applied in a wholesale mannerin other reformcycles in Communistregimes. Collective contexts.The state'scapacity to monopolizethe actionhas disruptedstate policies, weakenedthe publicarena, the rhythmsof shiftsin statepolicy, stateorganizational apparatus, limited the state's and the resources available to society vary in capacityto implementpolicies, and undermined differentcontexts, which may introducediffer- its ability to govern. Ultimately, the collective ent dynamics and forms of resistance.For in- resistanceof the populaceforced the Communist stance,the civil structuresoutside state socialism statesof Chinaand EasternEurope to undertake variedacross Eastern European societies, which the reformsof the 1980s that led to popularup- then led to differentpaths of transition(Stark risingsin 1989. 1992). These conditionshave substantialeffects on the state-societyrelationship. The patternsof XUEGUANGZHOU is Assistant Professor of Sociology strategic maneuveringin the Solidarity era in at Cornell University.His research centers on the Polandclearly show an alternativecollective ac- state-society relationshipunder state socialism. His tion based on organized interests (Staniszkis currentproject is a study of the distributionof life 1984). chances in China (with Phyllis Moen and Nancy Earlystudies of contemporaryCommunist poli- Tuma).He also conductsresearch on the role of the tics have focused on the state and its organiza- modernstate in occupationalstructure and practice in the UnitedStates. tionalapparatus. These studiesattributed changes in state policy to factional conflicts among the top leaders.This focus on organizationsand in- REFERENCES terestarticulations meant that workers,peasants, Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Origins of Totalitarian- and intellectuals were treated as categorical ism. Cleveland,OH: The World PublishingCom- groupsand ignored (Skilling 1971). Furthermore, pany. these studies often attributedcollective action Bernhard,Michael. 1987. 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