Introduction

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Introduction Introduction In 2011 I embarked upon a research journey that would irrevocably change my life – a journey with roots that stretched back several generations into my own family history. In 1907 my great grandfather, Yosef Nachmani1 set sail from the Ukraine towards Ottoman Palestine. Like many of his Zionist contemporaries, he envisioned a homeland for the Jewish people – a geographic sanctuary guarded from the violent pogroms and anti-Semitic policies that threatened his European, Jewish kin. For a Zionist leadership captured by the 19th century trend towards ethnocentric nationalism, Palestine was viewed as the ideal choice for the establishment of a Jewish state (White, 2014). In a world that continued to espouse Darwinian notions of racialized hierarchy and related practices of colonization, the presence of an indigenous Palestinian populace was viewed as a mere inconvenience that could be effectively dealt with through a series of geostrategic, legalistic and militaristic tactics (Qumsiyeh, 2011). My great grandfather became a loyal and somewhat prominent figure within the Zionist movement. In 1911, he joined Hashomer, a Jewish defense organization founded in 1909 to provide guard services for Jewish settlements. Later Nachmani became a high-ranking member of the Haganah, an underground militia that would amalgamate into the Israeli Defense Forces, founded in 1948. By 1935, Nachmani had joined the Jewish National Fund, becoming director of the JNF offices in Tiberias. In this role, he was responsible for acquiring land throughout the Galilee and Jezreel Valley regions. 1 Yosef Nachmani (1891-1965), was born Yoseg Agronovsky in Oleksandriia in the Ukraine. 4 Established in 1901, the JNF played a major role in the colonisation of Palestine. [The JNF’s] infamous history attests to its key role in the ethnic cleansing of Palestine and its subsequent settlement by incoming foreign Jews. Following the destruction by Zionist forces of over 500 Palestinian villages whose lands were then appropriated by the new Israeli state, a ‘Custodian of Absentee Property’ was appointed to oversee the fate of these lands. The JNF purchased over 1 million dunams of these lands for the exclusive use of ‘the Jewish nation’. The land could not be sold or leased to non-Jews, and it was developed into Jews-only settlements and new forests, all designed to prevent the return of the land to its original owners and to forestall their physical return. (Karmi, 2010:2) Nachmani’s activities in the Haganah and the JNF clearly indicated his support for the establishment of a settler-colonial and apartheid state that would award special privileges and entitlements to its Jewish citizens. Nonetheless, his diaries also communicate profound distress at the gross violations that characterized the nature of this enterprise. In the following paragraph, he speaks of the Israeli massacre of Palestinians in the villages of Safsaf and Salha They separated the men from the women, tied the hands of some 50 to 60 peasants and shot and killed them, burying them in a single hole. They also raped a number of the women from the village … In Salha, which raised a white flag, they carried out a real massacre, killing men and women, about 60 to 70 people. Where did they find such a degree of cruelty like that of the Nazis? They learned from them. (Morris, 2000) 5 Nachmani’s son, Shimon Nachmani also became a member of the Haganah (and later the IDF). In 1948, following the exodus of over 700,000 Palestinians, he ordered the destruction of Arab homes in Tiberias and in Lubyah, a tactic used to prevent the return of their inhabitants. Nachmani’s other son (my grandfather), Gabi Nahmani2, worked as a scientist for the IDF where he developed and invented military explosives. Against this backdrop, my father, Avner Nahmani, chose a radically different path. Coming of age during the late 1960’s he was deeply influenced by anti-war sentiments that characterized popular youth culture abroad. Military service is compulsory in Israel and failure to complete it can have severe consequences upon a person’s career and social standing. After one year of service though, my father presented himself as mentally unsound in order to gain a military discharge. He then left Israel with the intention of studying Chinese in Taiwan. On his way, he visited Samyeling, a Tibetan Buddhist centre based in Eskdalemuir, Scotland. It was there that he met my mother, Julie. Together they embarked upon a life as farmers, integrating themselves into the diverse community of Eskdalemuir. (My father’s dreams of studying in Taiwan were never to be realized!) I can’t say that I remember my father being overtly political. This was the purview of my mother. After moving to Australia in 1980, she became actively involved in civil rights, environmental issues, and the anti-nuclear movement. From an early age I was taken to seminars, meetings and protests. In this milieu, I developed a worldview that was critical of power and simultaneously committed to egalitarian values. 2 My grandfather adopted this new spelling of his surname. 6 My father’s childhood stories stimulated a particular desire to learn more about the Middle East. And later, as my own family history became clear, I developed a resolve to participate in the global civil society movement for peace and justice in Israel-Palestine. As a theatre practitioner and drama therapist I was especially drawn to related initiatives that employed arts-based methodologies. (In terms of my professional background, I specialize in the use of therapeutic and participatory theatre for community mobilization and collective trauma response. I have taught and practiced in Asia, Australia, Europe, the Middle East and North America, working extensively with communities impacted by structural oppression and political violence. I hold a Master of Arts in Counseling Psychology with a concentration in Drama Therapy from the California Institute of Integral Studies, USA. I’m a Registered Drama Therapist with the North American Drama Therapy Association, an Accredited Trainer at the Therapeutic Spiral Institute, Virginia, USA, and an Accredited Playback Theatre Trainer through the Centre for Playback Theatre, New York.) After deciding to pursue doctoral research in Peace Studies I reached out to The Freedom Theatre (TFT) in Jenin Refugee Camp to see whether they would be interested in hosting a participatory action research project focusing on the use of Playback Theatre and Drama Therapy as a response to the impact of political violence in Occupied Palestine. The response was positive. After an 18-month period of joint planning and fundraising3, I commenced a 2-year work contract with TFT starting in September 2011. During this 2-year period and in the year that followed I undertook the bulk of research that constitutes the body of my PhD thesis. 3 TFT sourced initial funding from the Swiss Consultate in Ramallah, Medico International and Unicef for the Playback Theatre Program and the Trauma Response Training Program that I subsequently led. 7 Presented in journal-article-format, my writings investigate the use of Playback Theatre within the Palestinian popular struggle movement. Two of my articles however, broaden this scope to investigate the use of Psychodrama and Playback Theatre within other movements and initiatives that aim to redress social injustice and collective trauma. My findings indicate that a process of sharing and enacting personal stories within a supportive, communal context, and against the broader backdrop of civil resistance, can hold various functional attributes at the psychological and sociopolitical levels. My research also identified certain limitations that Playback Theatre holds as a form of intervention in scenarios of conflict and oppression. It lacks robust mechanisms for the facilitation of in-depth, explicit dialogue. It also stops short of seeking solutions to the problems that appear during a process. In addition, Playback is unsuited to large-scale gatherings and other events that lack necessary intimacy and containment. In the following section, I provide a brief description of The Freedom Theatre - its history, operations, and the philosophy that guides its practice. I also speak about Playback Theatre and its evolution over the past 40 years. In the remainder of this introduction, I discuss my methodology and summarize my research findings and discussions as presented in the 7 articles I wrote. The Freedom Theatre During the 1980’s, the Israeli political and human rights activist, Arna Mer Khamis, established Care and Learning, a project based in Jenin Refugee Camp that aimed to address childhood trauma arising from the first intifada. In addition to Care and Learning, Arna Mer Khamis went on to establish The Stone Theatre, a small community theatre destroyed by an Israeli bulldozer during the 2002 Battle of Jenin. 8 Several years later, Zakaria Zubeidi, a former youth member of the Stone Theatre, and Jonathan Stanczak, a Swedish-Israeli activist, contacted Juliano Mer Khamis, Arna’s son, with the idea of establishing a new theater project for children and youth in Jenin Refugee Camp. In 2006, Mer Khamis, Zubeidi and Stanczak opened The Freedom Theatre as a venue to join the Palestinian people through a cultural means of resistance. “The Israelis succeeded to destroy our identity [and] our social structures, [both] political [and] economical. Our duty as artists is to rebuild or reconstruct this destruction […] We believe that the third intifada, the coming intifada, should be cultural” (Mer Khamis in Mee, 2012: 168). To this end, The Freedom Theatre established courses in acting, creative writing, film making and photography. The work of The Freedom Theatre has however garnered controversy. Conservative elements with Jenin Refugee Camp viewed the liberal values of Mer Khamis as a corrupting influence upon their youth. Some Israelis also took offence, accusing Mer Khamis of enabling Palestinian resistance.
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