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February 21, 2015 Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas ANG Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo-Leninismo-Maoismo English Edition Vol XLVI No. 4 February 21, 2015 www.philippinerevolution.net Editorial Intensify people's struggles in the face of the US-Aquino regime's political crisis serious political crisis is currently shaking the ruling regime as funds to create diversions and a result of disclosures regarding the direct responsibility of prevent the people from casting ABenigno Aquino III and US military officials in the bloody Ma- blame on the US and Aquino for masapano operation on January 25. the deaths of more than 80 peo- ple, including 44 special police Aquino's persistent shirking The Aquino regime is now troopers, paramilitary forces, of his accountability and his scrambling to find a way out of Moro fighters and civilians. coverups of the truth have fur- the political crisis through a se- Indicating the depth of the ther enraged the Filipino people ries of measures designed to people's anger at the ruling re- and fired up their desire to oust prevent the truth from coming gime, a number of PNP Special the puppet, corruption-ridden, out and the use of government Action Force (SAF) elements brutal and deceptive regime. who joined the Mamasapano sortie have revealed the truth regarding US military offi- cers' direct hand in training for, planning Despite the tens of millions sibility in planning and under- and executing the operation. of pesos given by Malacañang to taking the operation. The broad These exposés reveal the Aqui- the relatives of the slain police masses refuse to accept Aquino no government's high treason as troopers, it has failed to stifle and his officials' statements it acted as the US military's er- their complaints and grievances and depictions of what hap- rand boy in undertaking the about the abandonment of the pened. This is reflected in the mission to liquidate Zulkifli bin troops who had been besieged in demands made by members of Hir who had a $6 million reward the operation. The families of the Catholic Church hierarchy on his head offered by the US the slain SAF troopers are like- for the Aquino government to State Department. wise in possession of a lot of in- come out with the whole truth. In an attempt to stop the formation that may further Aquino's suppression of the disclosure of classified informa- point to the accountability of truth about Mamasapano and tion that would pin the blame on Aquino, his closest people and his attempts at a coverup are Aquino and the US, the Filipino the US military. fuelling the Filipino people's people were banned from view- The Aquino government con- widespread anger at the ruling ing, and listening to, the ongo- tinues to distort the truth about regime and further stoking calls ing investigation at the Senate the US' role. Aquino's officials by broad sectors to oust Aquino dominated by pro-Aquino and claim that "there is nothing from power. pro-US politicians. Should such wrong" with US military "assist- Demands for Aquino's resig- information be made public, it ance," as if it were not the US nation go far and strong. His se- would certainly be "sanitized" that masterminded the whole vere isolation likewise embold- to avoid further stoking the operation. ens his reactionary political ri- people's anger. Congressional The Aquino government's vals and their cohorts among hearings, on the other hand, persistence in covering up and the military and police top brass have been indefinitely suspend- distorting the truth about the to join people's actions and turn ed out of fear that Aquino's offi- bloody Mamasapano operation their backs on the ruling re- cials would be put on the defen- merely enflames the Filipino gime. A number of religious sive by the questioning, espe- people's desire to go through all leaders have also expressed sol- cially by progressive legislators the pieces of information they idarity with calls to form a dem- who are determined to ferret have dug up and make sense of ocratic council that would take out the whole truth about the them in order to discover, above over once Aquino resigns. Mamasapano incident. all, Aquino and the US' respon- The Filipino people deeply desire to oust the Aquino re- gime because of its corruption ANG Contents and brutality, its puppetry to Editoryal: Intensify people's struggles in the the US and its deceptiveness. It face of the political crisis 1 has perpetrated myriad crimes Vol XLVI No. 4 February 21, 2015 Advance the Bangsamoro struggle 3 against the people. The bloody Mamasapano operation sparks anger 4 operation in Mamasapano was Ang Bayan is published in Pilipino, Bisaya, Hiligaynon, Waray and English US' leading role in Mamasapano 5 but the latest in a long list of editions. US' terrorist intervention in the Philippines 6 transgressions that have It is available for downloading at the Philippine Revolution Web Central Where is Meiring? 8 caused the people's suffering, located at: oppression and repression. AFP's attacks against Moro civilians 8 We must gather the people's www.philippinerevolution.org. Civilian shot, wounded by soldiers 11 anger, forge their unity and un- Soldier killed in Samar 11 Ang Bayan welcomes contributions leash their power through wide- in the form of articles and news. Oil prices soar despite low internat’l prices 12 spread street protests. All sec- Readers are likewise enjoined to send US oil refinery workers strike 12 in their comments and suggestions for tors, groups and personalities the betterment of our publication. You 4 persons illegally detained 13 who are one in their demand for can reach us by email at: PCMC wins right to land 14 accountability from Aquino for [email protected] GMA 7's rights violations to be probed 14 his leading role in the Mamasa- Yolanda survivors stage protests 14 pano operation must be united. The patriotic forces must re- Ang Bayan is published fortnightly by the Central Committee lentlessly expose and assail the of the Communist Party of the Philippines US military for masterminding 2 ANG BAYAN February 21, 2015 the operation in violation of Advance the Bangsamoro Philippine national sovereignty. The workers and the toiling struggle—NDF-Mindanao masses must strengthen their mass actions to hold the US and he National Democratic Front (NDF)-Mindanao called on the Aquino accountable for the TMoro people to further consolidate their ranks and intensify bloody Mamasapano operation. their struggle for self-determination. The call was made by NDF- More important, this demand Mindanao spokesperson Ka Oris after the bloody clash in Mamasa- must be closely linked to the is- pano, Maguindanao on January 25. sues of raising the minimum wage, rollbacks in metrotrain The January 25 attack by samoro areas. fares, prices of oil and other armed troops of the Philippine Ka Oris stressed that the commodities and power and wa- National Police Special Action NDF has a commitment to the ter rates and higher budgets for Force (PNP-SAF) in Barangay Moro people to support their education, health and other so- Tukanalipao, Mamasapano, a struggle for self-determina- cial services. known Bangsamoro stronghold, tion. Thus, both forces can This way, they can unite the was a direct affront to the support each other against a broader ranks of the toiling right to self-determination of common enemy. masses for them to serve as a the Moro people. The NDF-Mindanao called major force in mass actions and The huge number of casual- on the BIFF to brace itself for measures to oust Aquino from ties inflicted by Moro fighters the definite intensification of power and further advance their on the SAF is being exploited military attacks on its ranks. It struggles under the post-Aquino by a number of groups and pol- must strengthen itself and rap- government. iticians to fan the flames of an- idly expand its area of maneu- The New People's Army ti-Moro chauvinism and cover ver to overcome the AFP-PNP's (NPA) must intensify armed up Aquino and the US' respon- encirclement campaign. The struggle and take advantage of sibility in the bloody operation. Bangsamoro areas and social the turmoil within the AFP and The passage of the Bangsa- terrain are fertile ground for PNP officer corps. The biggest moro Basic Law (BBL), developing expertise in guerril- blows must be meted on the offi- a bill resulting from la warfare and people's war. cers and units that have been the peace talks be- The NDF-Mindanao also most brutal and repressive on tween the GPH and called on the Filipino people to the people and in defending the the MILF is likewise unite with the Moro people in rotten Aquino regime. Let us en- in danger of being their struggle for genuine self- courage the disgruntled military blocked. determination and for na- and police officers and rank and Nonetheless, said tional freedom and de- file to turn their backs on the Ka Oris, even if the mocracy, in order for just Aquino regime and join the rev- BBL were enacted into and lasting peace to olutionary movement or cooper- law and implemented, prevail someday in ate with it. growing numbers Mindanao In the coming months, all of Moro people and the NPA commands must launch are expected to entire tactical offensives to contribute join the armed coun- to the people's struggle to end struggle being try. ~ Aquino's rule. This, in conso- launched by the nance with advancing agrarian Bangsamoro Islamic struggles and expanding and Freedom Fighters consolidating organs of demo- (BIFF) and the na- cratic people's government.
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