STlDPISTlDPI ORALORAL HISTORYHISTORY (02)(02) 1'.77f'.TI

Yale-UNYale-UN Oral History Project Diego ArriArriaa Jean Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr September 5, 19919977 New York, New YorkYork.. Yale-UN Oral History Project Diego ArriArriaa Jean Krasno. IntervieweInterviewerr September 5, 19919977 New York, New YorYorkk

Index: Central America

Atlatcal Battalion 20 Contadora Process 2-3 Caricom Conference 3I31 Cold War 8 ElEI Salvador Peace Process 2,4,8,13-14,16-17,19-22 European Union 4 Frente Farabundo MaliiMali! para la Liberacfon Nacional (FMLN) 5,5,11,19-20,23 11, 19-20,23 Governors' Island 32 Group of Friends ElEI SalvadorSalvador 2-3,5-9,2-3,5-9,11,13-14,17-19,21 II, 13-14, 17-19,21 HaitiHaiti 24-25,29-30,32-33,37 GuatemalaGuatemala 39-46 Haiti Sanctions against 32, 38-39 Organization of American States (OAS) 26, 30-32,34, 36-37 San Jose Agreement 23 Spain 3 Truth Commission 13,20,2213,20, 22 UN General Assembly 28 UN Observer Mission in ElEI Salvador (ONUSAL) 23 UN Security CouncilCoul1cil 1,13,21,27-34,37,39,43 Venezuela Role in ElEI SalvacloranSalvadoran peace processprocess 2, 7, ]0, 15, 19-22,24-25,]9-22,24-25, 38,42 Role in Haitian peace processprocess 2,4,8,22,25-30,33,38-39 Role in Guatemalan peace processprocess 2,4,38,42,44-45 • • ..• 11• .­

1 • Yale UN Oral History Interview with Dr. Diego AlTiAlTiaa • Interviewer: Jean KrasnKrasnoo • September 5, 19919977 • New York, New YorYorkk • Jean Krasno (JK): This isis an interviewinterview with Dr. Diego Arria ofVenezuela. This isis September 5, iI 1997. We are interviewinginterviewing inin New York City inin his residence and I am thethe interviewer,interviewer, Jean iI Krasno. iI Dr. Arria, for thethe record, could you explain when you first became associated with thethe United 11 Nations and when you became ambassador toto thethe UN?

.­ Dr. Diego Arria: I became Pennanent Representative inin January 1991 and I was therethere tUltiltUltil thethe end 11 of 1993. I served on thethe Security Council as Pennanent Representative ofVenezue1aofVenezuela for two years, iI from 1992 toto 1993. iI JK: Venezuela was on thethe Security COlU1cil during thisthis period.

• DA: Exactly, we took,took, along with thethe United States, thethe issueissue toto thethe Security Council.

• JK: When you say thethe issue,issue, you tooktook thethe issueissue oYElofEl Salvador toto thethe Security Council. Did • • 1 • • 2 it Venezuela serve as president during that period?

• DA: I served as president during the month of March in 1992. • IJ JK: Venezuela has played a very key role in the resolution of a munber of conflicts in this hemisphere and has been a member ofthe Groups ofFriends on several different issues: El ill Salvador, Haiti, and then most recently in Guatemala. I would like to talk to you about Venezuela's

role in these three groups. Perhaps we should take them one at a time and try to keep them distinct. • How did the Friends Group form on El Salvador and what was its relation to the Contadora • Process?

• DA: Well, its origin really comes from the Contadora process. Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and • Panama actually were involved and tried to be a supportive element to the resolution oftheofthe ill conflicts in the Central American area, fundamentally, in the case ofElofEl Salvador. Then Secretary­Secretary- 11 General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar, had the idea -- it was an innovation at the time -­ to pick Mexico, Colombia, Spain, and Venezuela to be the Friends ofthe Secretary-General on El ill Salvador, to help the Secretary-General in the process of negotiating the peace agreement. At the

end, at the last months of the process, the United States became what we called the "four friends ill- Ill! plus one," which was the inclusion ofthe United States which proved to be ofextraordinary importance in the resolution of the conflict. ill ill JK: In the selection ofthese original four countries, three were a pmt ofthe Contadora Process. But ...... r : 2 J I

3 ­ Panama had also been in the Contadora Group. Why were they not included as a member of the I Group of Friends?

- DA: The political landscape of Panama had changed. President Manuel Solis Palma was not there anymore. He had been killed in an accident, remember. So, there were players and new leaders in

- the region. So, that is why Panama was not included. But Colombia was a protpaIt of the process. The - inclusion of the United States in the process actually made more real the whole negotiating process. , The U.S. was velY much involved tlu'oughout the whole process during the conflict and the war , and then in the solution of the conflict But they were doing this through bilateral negotiations. When the Secretary-GeneralSecretaI'y-General involved the U.S. in the Friends, it became a velY constructive process

, because the player that had the weight was the U.S.U.S. This was a euphemism to call it the I'four"four , friends plus one" but the "plus one" became a fundamental contribution. At the time it was . , Ambassador Pickering who was anall extraordinary representative ofthe United States.

, JK: Why was Spain included in the group? , DA: Spain, because ofthe role that Filipe GonzalezGonzmez fundamentally played. It was a way to include ,11... a EuropeanEUrOpeaI1 cOlU1tlYCOlU1tlY instead of France.FraIlce. IfIfYOll you remember in the Contadora Group, France had a velY , conflicting relationship with the United States regarding the Contadora process, originally. Mitten-and,Mitte1TaI1d, at one time, even made a proposal from Europe. So, I think the Secretaly-General was

, wise to bring a European countly, in this case Spain, with a committed head of state like Felipe , Gonzalez, committed to the Latin American cultures. He enjoyed great tmst from the guelTilla

, 3 , • 4 - groups and fi'omft'om thethe govemment.

- JK: Was therethere some importanceimportance toto have a linklink toto thethe European Union throughthrough Spain? III

DA: Yes, II thinkthink it gave fom1allyfom1ally a balance. There was Mexico, a big country inin thethe area, Colombia • and Venezuela, not as big but also very active players inin thethe same region,region, and Spain, which hac! a • socialist govermnent, who could be trustedtrusted by thethe guerrilla movement and at thethe same timetime respectablerespectable enough toto be trustedtrusted by thethe goverru11ent inin El Salvador. ItIt had thisthis balance. II thinkthink thatthat

• was thethe reason.reason. • f JK: What were Venezuela's interestsinterests inin Central America or inin EIEl Salvador? f DA: You know, even today,today, inin Venezuela, and tln-oughtln-ough thethe process, public opinion never f understood why Venezuela would get involvedinvolved inin thethe Salvadorian process or inin thethe Guatemalan or III Haitian process when we had so many internalinternal problems. We had at thethe time,time, a president who was velY active inin hemispheric issues,issues, CarlosCat'los Andres Perez.perez. II think,think, thanksthanks toto his vision, thatthat Venezuela

III became a velY importantimportant player inin thethe process, fundamentallyfundamentally because of his initiatives.initiatives. InIn thethe case

~ ofEIofEl Salvador, he thoughtthought itit was a part ofthe region,region, thatthat thethe process should be solved by ~ olU'selves, thatthat we should not letlet thethe "big brother" ofthe hemisphere resolveresolve thethe problems of thethe region,region, the we, thethe Latin Americans themselves,themselves, should be a p81i ofthe process. That isis why he

, bec81ne so committed. We are inin thethe area, and inin thethe Caribbean; therethere isis a certain proximity, not , likelike thethe proximity of Colombia. There would be velY fewfew people inin thethe country thatthat would share f 4 - I

55 I with him that concem. That isis a reality.reality. He waswas swimmingswimming againstagainst thethe CUl1'entCUl1'ent becausebecause mostmost I people couldn't care whether we were active oror notnot activeactive inin thethe case.case. WeWe areare aa strongstrong economy,economy, anan I active country, and a democratic countly who hadhad experienceexperience withwith intemalintemal problemsproblems inin thethe 1960s1960s ofof guen-i11as that we had solved and thisthis gave us moralmoral authorityauthority andand politicalpolitical authorityauthority toto bebe partpart ofof ­ the Group.Group. • JK: Did Venezuela have thethe same kind of relationshiprelationship withwith bothboth partiesparties thatthat youyou hadhad talkedtalked aboutabout inin ,• relation to Spain, the confidence of both sides?sides? DA: The guelTilla leaders, thethe FMLN leaders,leaders, likelike ShafikShafile HandalHandal oror SamayoaSamayoa hadhad metmet withwith thethe

, president of Venezuela on many opportunities andand theythey leamedleamed toto trusttrust himhim enormously.enormously. YouYou

would see Perez in the process, personally influential because ofthe trust that he had developed and '/: would see Perez in the process, personally influential because ofthe trust that he had developed and •" , the effort that Venezuela had made. Venezuela hostedhosted manymany ofofthethe meetings,meetings, asas youyou know.know. WhenWhen the process would lose speed, thethe president would getget involvedinvolved andand movemove thethe playersplayers onon bothboth sides.sides. , He would speak to Cristiani. He would speakspeak toto thethe guerrillaguerrilla leadersleaders inin orderorder toto maintainmaintain thethe , momentum. As I will telltell you later,later, thatthat was velYvelY impOliantimpOliant duringduring thethe lastlast fewfew weeksweeks ofof thethe , process in 1991. J JK: I definitely want to talktalk toto you about that.that. InIn whatwhat wayway werewere youyou personallypersonally involvedinvolved inin thethe Group of Friends? J Group ofFriends? J DA: Well, as the Representative of Venezuela, II waswas automaticallyautomatically involved.involved. But,But, alsoalso asas thethe r 55 r ­ 6 I president's advisor and having been a member of the cabinet before, I had very open access to the I process. I was very well informed. The president had a chief of staff at the time; her name is Beatrice Rangel whom I suggest you interview, who was extremely active also through this process

I and who enjoyed great confidence on the part of the players, both the government and the guerrillas.

She kept me very much informed all through the initiative that my government was taking • unilaterally in the process. • JK: How and when was Venezuela first contacted by the Secretary-General to become a member of

• the Group? • • DA: In 1991. • JK: In 1991, okay. You talked about the role of the president in coptacting both the parties. Can • you just tell us, for the record, what were some ofthe other things that Venezuela did to assist the , process. You mentioned that they hosted various meetings. Could you describe some ofthat? , DA: Venezuela served as a meeting ground for many ofthe official meetings held. Even though , they were not meeting face-to-face, what we call pendular meetings, on several occasions, J Venezuela and Mexico acted as hosts for the process. New York at the end became the last meeting ground where the peace agreement was signed. Perez himself, the president of Venezuela,

, played also a very important role which is not very well known, spealcing to Castro, for example. , President Castro, as you know, was an infonnal but very important substantive political link

, 6 , 7 between Cuba and the rebels like the United States was for the government ofEIofEl Salvador. You

have to put this into context. You have to see EIEl Salvador as a part of the East/West confrontation,

even though Cuba is in the West. The Soviets at the time also had a stake in the issue. And I will

tell you later how the Soviets wanted to be part ofthe process. At the end when we were

negotiating in New York. I remember the Soviet Ambassador, Noronsov who is now the

Ambassador in Washington, and his deputy wanted very much to be kept infonned. Actually they

wanted to be part of the Friends. At the end, this is not very well known, they wanted to be part of

it. At the end, they were actively infonned, tln·oughout. Actually, the Friends met with the Soviets to keep them infonned. At the time of Perestroika, there was a clearer air between the pmiies.paIiies. You have to remember that the U.S. Ambassador, Thomas Pickering, had been the U.S. Ambassador in

El Salvador during the conflict when the United States was SUPPOliingSuppOliing and financing substantially the war. This was an extraordinary experience. I remember the first time that we met, it was at the

Mexican Mission. We met with the guenilla leaders and the United States came for the first time to be part ofour group, the so-called "plus oneilone" El11d Ambassador Pickering came in and said in perfect

Spanish, "Buenos Dias, comandantes." Good morning, commanders. I could not believe it. He had been in charge ofthe confrontation before. And now he was in charge ofthe peace process. I think Pickering made an extraordinary contribution because ofhis wisdom, his knowledge ofthe

situation, and the degree ofrespect that the guenillas had for him. Isn't that an amazing story?

JK: Itreally is. This is all very, very interesting. When the partiespaliies met in Cmacas, I believe that was in the spring of 1990. They had met in Geneva prior to that as a first attempt to negotiate something, working on even a agenda, what they would negotiate andal1d in what order. Then the

7 8 meeting in Caracas took place somewhat after that. What were some of the issues at that time?

DA: In 1990, I was noL involved. I suggest that you speak with Beatrice Rangel. She was very knowledgeable. She took notes of all the meetings that Perez had with all these people on the whole process, even in Haiti. She has extraordinary, good infonnation because she was taking notes herself or one ofher assistants. She took very good notes ofthe whole process that she saw and she saw a lot. For example, one of the fundamental issues at the time was how to put into perspective the demands ofthe guenillas on the almed forces; what did they want out ofthe process. The essence was that no one could win the war. That was when they came to realize that they had to come to al1 agreement. It was a standstill. The govell1l11ent could not defeat the guenillas and the guerrillas could not defeat the goven1l11ent. It was the end of the Cold Wal·.

I am jumping a bit ahead but I remember telling Shafik Handal and the guelTillas at the meeting that the Friends had with them at the United Nations building on the 36th floor, one morning around two o'clock in the moming -- sometimes we were there all night -- one morning I said, "Listen, in two days, Perez de CuellarCueIlar is going to leave the United Nations and there is going to be a new Secretary-General. There are going to be new priorities. You are going to be the least ofthe priorities, number 27 or 46, you don't lmow.Imow. Today, you are 11lU11ber one. There is a Latin

American as Secretary-General who wants to clinch this deal. No one is going to care very much for you." I got Perez to speak to Hal1dal and to tell him, "You have to seize the chance now, seriously, do it now." Because at one time we felt that the UN Secretariat was wavering and wal1ted them to get an even better agreement and maybe go beyond it.

Later, the Friends decided that we would play even a more active role, intervening into the

8 9 process, supporting the Secretary-General, but intervening in the process.

JK: Let's go into that right now, as long as you are talking about that. This was in the last couple of weeks?

DA: Let's say in the last two months because Cristiani came several times.

JK: Yes, Cristiani came at that period of time. So, now we are talking about the last months of

1991 when PerezP6rez de CuellarCu611ar was going to leave.

DA: Yes, we felt that sometimes the Secretariat -- they were very good people; de Soto is a very good negotiator, and Blanca -- but we felt that sometimes we had to take issue with some of the way they were negotiating. The information that we were getting from the government or the information that we were getting from the guelTillas. I remember one day, we were informed that there was not going to be an agreement. So, we inunediately presented ourselves to the Secretary­Secretary-

General's office, without notice.

JK: By we, you mean yourself and ...

DA: The four Friends: the Ambassador of Mexico, of Colombia, Spain, and myself. We wanted to see the Secretary-General urgently. And we said to him (this was in the last week), "Listen, this is the opportunity. It has to be done right now." I remember we had a discussion there. De Soto had

9 11

1100 11 some different points of view thanthan we did. But we had a very collective, unified position. Then we I decided toto go out of thethe system. Instead of only talkingtalking toto him, to thethe Secretary-General, we became a party toto thethe negotiating process. We went toto see Cristiani, tried toto convince Cristiani of

I certain positions and thenthen we would go toto thethe guelTillas and triedtried toto convince them.them. We became 11 extremely active inin this.this. And thenthen we would meet with thethe Secretmy-Genera1.

11 JK: When you say you met with them,them, I have thisthis need toto lmowlmow where people actually meet. 11 11 DA: Cristimli was staying at a 42nd Street hotel, thethe Helmsley on 42nd Street, not thethe Helmsley Palace, thethe other one. He was therethere inin his room with Santa Maria, General Vm"gas, and his wife

11 [Mrs. Cristimli]. His wife was thethe one who was takingtaking all thethe notes inin her computer. 11 JK: Mrs. Cristiani. 11 f DA: Yes, she was actually likelike thethe secretary of record of thethe process. Cristimu isis a very balanced , man. Thanks toto his balmlce, thethe deal was made. We came inin and triedtried toto push him when we thoughtthought he needed toto be pushed, practically, very objectively, very candidly. I had a very personal , relationship with Cristimli. And he had very good relationshiprelationship with my presence. There was a sort , of intimacyintimacy mld trust.trust. He knew thatthat we would not do anything thatthat would go counter toto EIEl Salvador. ,~ JK: ItIt isis impOlimltimpOlimlt toto have his trust.trust. ,• t f 10 f 11 ­ 11 III DA: Then we would go toto thethe apartments thatthat thethe FMLN had near thethe United Nations.

I JK:JK: So, thenthen thethe whole Group of Friends would go toto visit Cristiani inin his hotel. I' I' DA: We would all go together.together. ..•..' JK:JK: At thisthis point, you were not reallyreally meeting inin thethe UN or at any of thethe missions.missions. I' DA: No, no. You see,see, Cristiani only went toto thethe UN toto meet with thethe Secretary-General until thethe f end, only thethe Secretary-General. InIn thethe lastlast fewfew days, he would wait on thethe 36th Hoor11001' and we were f meeting with thethe guelTillas, let'slet's say,say, on thethe 37th Hoor,floor, and with thethe govemment on another floor,floor, tryingtrying forfor themthem not toto seesee each other. Some of thethe meetings lastedlasted all night until 5 o'clock inin thethe

I moming, 6 o'clock inin thethe morning. And then,then, we would hold meetings also inin our missions and I inviteinvite thethe guerrillas or thethe government toto meet. The meetings always tooktook place inin thethe Venezuelan mission or thethe Mexican mission; thosethose were thethe places. II don't rememberremember thatthat we ever had a

I meeting at thethe Colombian mission or thethe Spanish mission, and at thethe end at thethe U.S. mission. The I Friends would meet with Pickering, not with thethe guelTillas. With thethe guerrillas or thethe -government,-government, I we always would meet at thethe Venezuelan or thethe Mexican mission. That isis where thethe meetings were held. , But we were very disturbed by thethe realizationrealization thatthat de Soto and thethe others saidsaid thatthat an , agreement could not be reached,reached, before thethe 31st. f 11 f ­ I 12 IJJ JK: I1 did not realizerealize theythey had said that.that.

I DA: This was thethe day before. I1 rememberremember very clearly, and I1 must looklook forfor some of my notes forfor I you. I1 have all my notes because I1 kept themthem forfor my government. I1 had toto infOlIDinfOlID themthem what was going on. More thanthan thethe govenunent, itit was reallyreally thethe president who was thethe only one who was

I reallyreally concemed about thisthis issue.issue. I1 rememberremember Perez de Cuellar said, "I"1 am going toto imposeimpose on I them,"them," he said inin Spanish. "Voy a imponerimponer mis cabelos blancos." "I"1 am going toto imposeimpose on themthem I my white hairs." Perez de Cuellar had a suave way of negotiating which proved toto be very useful at thethe end. He was likelike a big fatherfather talkingtalking toto his children. He would say, "Listen." He treatedtreated themthem I inin a very familiarfamiliar way, inin opposition toto a very formalformal United Nations fashion,fashion, inin a way, tougher.tougher. I Perez de Cuellar would make themthem meditate. He has thisthis good image,image, likelike a fatherfather figure,figure, which proved toto be velY important.important. Hours before, we fearedfeared thatthat itit was not going toto be signed. That isis

I when we met with both sides. I1 thinkthink thatthat at thethe end, thethe contribution thatthat we had because of thethe I suppOli and trusttrust thatthat we had with thesethese parties, thatthat we were able toto move them.them. So, actually theythey I did sign, not at twelvetwelve o'clock, at twelve-twelve- fifteen.fifteen. f JK: Stop thethe clock! f DA: We decided toto stop thethe clock. My wife was waiting forfor me with my daughter thinkingthinking thatthat I1 , was going toto anive, and I1 never arrived before midnight. Actually, theythey signed at twelve-fifteen,twelve-fifteen, , twelve-twenty,twelve-twenty, fifteenfifteen minutes intointo thethe firstfirst ofJanuary 1992. Of course, thethe agreement lackedlacked a lotlot

, 1122 , - 1313 - of things. We did it at the end, afterwards. What startedstarted asas aa SUpp0l1iveSUpp0l1ive rolerole toto adviseadvise thethe I Secretary-General, with the Friends, became a negotiating role.role. WeWe thoughtthought thatthat itit waswas goinggoing toto unravel. We were velY concerned with thethe arrival of thethe newnew Secretary-General,Secretary-General, thethe SalvadorianSalvadorian • issue might not hold. Croatia was begilming toto be inHamed.inf1amed. WeWe thoughtthought thatthat othersothers issuesissues wouldwould enter the Security Council and we said thisthis isis thethe moment toto deliver.deliver. ItIt mustmust stopstop thisthis year,year, now.now. • All the pm1ies contributed at thethe end. There were many issuesissues stillstill hanginghanging inin thethe process,process, likelike thethe • distribution of Im1d, the economic supp0l1, toto make suresure thatthat allall thethe displaceddisplaced partiesparties inin ElEl SalvadorSalvador I would get an oPPOliunityoppOliunity toto get agricultural credit, toto get education.education. AA lotlot ofof thethe thingsthings werewere leftleft hanging and not very clear. But thethe fundamentalfundamental issues,issues, thethe cleaningcleaning upup ofof thethe armedarmed forces,forces, thethe • Truth Commission, were taken care of. The government wentwent throughthrough aa veryvery painfulpainful process.process. I would see Cristiani's face. ItIt was a velY painful process toto acceptaccept thatthat hishis armedarmed forcesforces hadhad I committed criminal acts. They had been under his command.command. HeHe hadhad toto gogo outout andand firefire andand I prosecute many of the officers inin thethe army. ItIt was very difficult.difficult. I JK: Yes, later on when the report of thethe Truth Commission camecame out.out.

I DA: I remember, in the last few weeks, he had with himhim thethe MinisterMinister ofof Defense,Defensc, andand GeneralGeneral I Vargas, and he had with him thethe mayor of San Salvador, whowho isis todaytoday thethe presidentpresident ofof ElEl Salvador,Salvador, , Calderon Sol. He had been wise toto involveinvolve thethe person hehe thoughtthought couldcould bebe aa presidentialpresidential contender.contender. And he brought the Minister of Defense who was velY receptive.receptive. ItIt waswas anan amazingamazing process.process. I Some of the issues that we had toto speak toto thethe president aboutabout werewere reallyreally veryvery painful.painful. HeHe hadhad aa I lot of demands on the guenillas, thethe delivelYdelively of arms. WeWc hadhad aa lotlot ofof quarrelsquarrels withwith thethe guerrillasguerrillas atat I 13 I 14 the end regarding thethe real truth about the amount of armaments. As you remember, they lied many times.

JK: Because they found that there had been weapons stored. Ijust want to go back to that period of time before the agreement was signed at the end of Decem her in '91. You said the Group of

Friends had played a muchmllch more active role at that point. My understanding is that the Group of

Friends actually did propose some initiatives which were able to overcome the impasse. I believe itit had something to do with the reforming oftheofthe military and the police. Do yOllyou have some recollection of that?

DA: Yes, thank you for refreshing my memory because thatthat isis a fact. The UN, for example, wanted to impose changes in the police which would have rendered El Salvador [for a period of time]time] a country without a police. Some ideas were extreme and we came with somesome ideasideas on thethe extent of the reforms of the atmedmmed forces and on thethe dates thatthat thesethese events shouldshould taketake place. For example,exanlple, battalion X should be demilitarized, thethe dates; itit was a lotlot of fine-tuning.fine-tuning. Of course, thethe fundamental negotiations were done by thethe United Nations. There isis no doubtdoubt aboutabout that.that. WhoWho clinched thethe deal? The United States. Who supp0l1edsupp0l1ed thethe deal politicallypolitically andand mademade itit possiblepossible toto clinch thethe deal? The Friends,Friends. And who created thethe groundworkgroundwork toto bebe ableable toto conductconduct forfor twotwo yearsyears

-- remember theythey startedstarted inin 1990 ---- a longlong process ofof negotiations,negotiations, thethe patience,patience, thethe perseverance?perseverance?

De Soto atldmld his team.team. That isis a major truth.truth. EachEach oneone playedplayed itsits role.role. WhatWhat happenedhappened atat thethe endend was thatthat each one had toto playplay veryvery activelyactively hishis ownown role.role. Otherwise,Otherwise, itit wouldwould notnot havehave comecome toto anan end. ItIt was fortunatefortunate thatthat itit waswas thethe lastlast yearyear ofof PerezPerez dede Cuellar.Cuellar. IfIf PerezPerez dede CuellarCucllar hadhad hadhad

1414 15 another year, we would probably have been negotiating throughthrough 1992.

JK: There would have been another year of negotiations.

DA: Yes.

JK: So, having a deadline was imp0l1ant.imp0l1ant. The situation was ripe enough but a deadline was needed.

DA: Perez de Cuellar said, "I am going toto imposeimpose on themthem my white hair." I don't know what he toldtold themthem at thethe end. But he must have toldtold themthem thethe same thing I am tellingtelling you. "This isis it;it; I'm leavingleaving at midnight. You are on your own after midnight. I have been caring for you for twotwo years.

YauYou can trusttrust me; I have supported you." But I thinkthink thatthat Perez de Cuellar did not know very well thethe details of thethe process. Of course, he had tootoo many other issuesissues at thethe United Nations. He relied fundamentally on de Soto. So, thatthat isis why we felt, inin thethe process, we had toto give him direct inputinput on what was thethe real situation, not seen throughthrough de Soto's eyes, but seen throughthrough Cristiani's and thethe guenillas' eyes. We felt at thethe timetime thatthat therethere was an imbalance;imbalance; thatthat theythey were tryingtrying toto get tootoo much out of thethe govemment. We felt thatthat pushing thethe govemment tootoo much could derail thethe process. We had toto cool themthem down on thethe pressure theythey were putting on thethe government. At one timetime we thoughtthought therethere was an exaggerated leaningleaning on thethe gove111l11ent and not tootoo much leaningleaning on thethe guelTilla side. That isis when we decided to intervene.intervene.

JK: Very interesting.interesting. You mentioned thethe role of thethe Soviet Union and of Cuba. I understand thatthat

1155 16 Perez de Cuellar, early on in the process, had written letters to Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the

United States, asking for their SUpp011. It came [the SUPP011] indirectly. But, from what you were

saying, later on there was more direct involvement. The president ofYenezucla, Perez,Pcrez, had been in

touch with Castro?

DA: The president of Mexico, the president of Colombia, and of Spain. They were meeting with

Castro on other issues outside El Salvador. Actually, we were meeting with Castro to see if we

could get him back into the main stream in a democratic fashion. Ofcourse, it proved to be a futile

effort. I was at one ofthe meetings in Brasilia in 1990 for the inaugural ofthe then President ColCollorlor

de Mello. We had a meeting with Castro at the time. There was the President of Spain, the Prime

Minister of Spain, and Garcia Marques, and Castro, and the president of the Parliament of Cuba,

who then became ambassador here. Later I became ambassador here. Castro proved to be a contributing factor to stabilize the process.

JK: In what way? What were you asking of Castro?

DA: First, no more supp0l1, and that happened, then to reinforce the conception that El Salvador was exhausted and that this was the right time for the guenillas to get a good settlement and that a peaceful resolution would be accomplished. I think it played a moderating role in that. The extent ofthat, I CaiIDotCaIIDot tell you, but this what I perceived in my conversations with the Cuban delegates here, all the time. They were very constructive and knew what was going on all the time. I am sure they were meeting discretely with the guenillas. I cannot prove it, but, well, I am sure they did.

16

------IJ 17 IJ Sometimes one of my colleagues (one ofthe Friends) would get lost and we would find out that he was meeting with the guenillas without telling us. We reprimanded him for that but he must have

I been receiving instructions from his goverrunent relevant to the issue, unilaterally. I On the issue of Castro, I think Castro played a minimal role but in the same direction as the United States. The U.S.D.S. had been very actively involved in the war. Cuba had been active but not ­ as active as the United States, first, because of a matter of size and importance and significance and , resources. They supp011ed the guerrillas in the country for many years. I happen to be very familiar f with El Salvador. Actually, Napoleon Duarte, who you remember was President in EIEl Salvador before, was my advisor when I was govemor of Caracas. He was in exile and he was my sanitation • expert. It was very fUID1Y. He was my advisor and sanitation expeli. He helped me to change the landfills in Caracas for soccer and baseball fields. That is what he was doing in Venezuela. He and • I go back a long time. .,;, ,,,)'~ , , JK: That is amazing. , DA: Now, the Soviet Union at the end was always there asking to be informed. They knew that the solution would come, and they wanted to be a part of the solution. We were not actively engaging

, them more than before, but they played an impOliant role. There was a complete cut in their f relationship with the guenillas at the time. They were very supportive and expressed publicly their support ofthe peace process. But we never included them. They wanted to be the "Friends plus f Two." They attended one meeting at the U.S. Mission with us. We had invited them. I don't f remember the content ofthe conversation, but it was in the context of the Friends. But, we did f 17 r I

18 I meet with them. I I JK: Why were they not accepted as "Four plus Two?" 11 DA: By that time, when they wanted to be included, it was at the end ofthe process. I don't think we ever discussed it fOlmally whether we should or should not, but as head ofthe mission here, we

11 never felt that there was a state interest in the problem. We did not approach the Secretary-General ,.~ on their account and I never heard Perez de Cuellar express to us anything ofthat sort.

,,' ,",'c'' JK: You mentioned something that I wanted to go back into; you mentioned in terms of

, maintaining the consensus among the Group of Friends, I wanted to ask you more about that. It , seems as though maintaining a conU110n front would be particularly important. But, you .. mentioned, that at times it seemed as though there might be one or another that might begin to do

f, ,lip··'···· some bilateral negotiations. I had heard, actually, that President Perez may have participated in , something like that, inviting the pmiies to Caracas to possibly negotiate something. Could you , explain something more about that? , DA: Yes, Perez personality could not resist being pmi ofthe process himself, always in good faith, but sometimes he did meet with them. But these were not secret meetings. People lmew they were f in Venezuela while I went to see him. He would take a lot oftime, personally, to cajole them, both f parties. When I speak about the consensus, once we had agreed, for example, that we should tell f the Secretary-General to ask x, y, andm1d z from the gove111l11ent was too much, we would go and do rf 18 19 this together. When we were negotiating with the patties, each one would have his own concems and would battle for those. The Spat1iards, for example were very institutional. They were interested in the preservation of the institutions. The Mexicans were involved in the whole political issue. The head ofthe Mission ofMexico was velY political. This, for Mexico, is a very political issue. The cOlmtly more affected was Mexico. 111eyTIley had been following this for a long time. He

[Ambassador Montana] had a velYvery good relationship, rapport, with the FMLN people, more than they had with the government. It is fLumy, the Mexicat1s did. We had a more balanced relationship; we had a very good rapport with the govenunent, and our president had a very good rapport with the FMLN. We were perceived as velY balat1ced by both sides. We never lost the confidence either of the goverml1entgovermllent or of the guenillas.

JK: That is very impOliat1t atld I think it is interesting that each countIycountly had something to contribute to the Group ofFriends to keep the whole group balanced.

DA: On the whole, these digressions of one member going directly to the guerrillas were rare. In general, the group behaved velY well. To the extent of sticking to a position at least on those issues offLmdan1ental value where we would approach the SecretaIy-General.Secretary-General. Remember, at that time we were not advising, we were telling him, "Listen, if you don't do this, these at'e the consequences.

We spoke to Cristiani and he told us this. People are telling you something differently." You see,

Cristiani took more beating at the end because he was the one who had to yield. While the guenillas had to yield, actually they did not yield to the extent that they should have, i.e., arms, hiding ofaIms,arms, demobilization ofpeople. They said they had, but we couldn't prove it. We didn't

19 I

20 • know how many there were. In the army, you know how many divisions, how many regiments, the famous Atlatcal Battalion, where it was located. We didn't know where the guelTillas were. We • knew they were in certain parts of the country, but we could not pinpoint the size. So, the UN was • leaning at the end on the govemment. The government was yielding and yielding and yielding. Of course, they had more to give. To answer your question, we had a unified front in pushing the J• Secretary-General away from some ofthe advice that he was getting. , JK: [We just had a little break,] You were talking about some of the anguish of some of the people involved.involved. I

. ,/iC"'/

' , DA: I remember, for example, very vividly the face of the president of EIEl Salvador every time I f would go and see him at his hotel. What we would do is, we would negotiate with his team, would listen to them, and then we would go and listen to the FMLN group, and then we would go to see

, Cristiani. Sometimes to appeal to some ofthe positions, to change some ofthe positions that his , people had been holding that we thought should not be held. You could see his anguish that he felt , that the UN was being very unfair with him. He felt that very clearly. His people made it much more obvious. Cristiani proved to be a man of outstanding qualities during this process. Had he , been a smaller man than he was, the peace would not have been possible. To begin with, he was , the opposite of arrogant, a very modest man. Because he had a very clear record personally, he knew that he was not being attacked himself. EvelY time, Ilmew he must have been thinking, r "Tomon-ow"T01110now I have to go to El Salvador and meet my al1ued forces." The UN had lost perspective r sometimes on the monumentality ofthe challenge for Cristiani. To create a Truth Conunission, it r 20 ff/; 21 had never been done, not even in South Africa, alat the time. It was the first.

JK: You were speaking about the fact that there was tremendous pressure on the government and on

Cristiani.

DA: Sometimes I felt that the UN negotiating team had lost perspective of the political landscape of

El Salvador and the role of the aI111cd forces and how fragile the govenunent was, how fragile it was going to become. But at the SaInesmne time, I realized that if they were not pushed enough, they would not bend the minimum that they had to bend. So, in hind site, I think it was wise to push.

Otherwise, they would not have reached the agreement that they reached.

JK: We have been talking primarily about the role that the Friends had played in the negotiation process. After the agreements were signed in January, in Chapultepec, Mexico, Mdand the implementation had to begin, what kind of role then did the Friends play and was there a chaI1ge?

DA: At that time we becmne members of the Security COlillcil. After the agreement, we had the

United Nations Mission in El Salvador. The fact that Spain and Venezuela were on the Security

Council, together with the United States, made us increase our authority on both p3.1ties to continue exercising certain pressures to comply. The Friends accompanied the process until its end. We did not have the SaIne intensity as before. As a matter offact, a few months ago de Soto had the idea, before Boutros-Ghali left, to ask the fannerf0l111er four Friends ofEIofEl Salvador to go on a mission to present an evaluation of the peace process. We had accepted but at the end there were some

21 22 intemalintemal conflicts and theythey decided toto postpone it.it. They wanted thethe same people who had negotiated thethe agreement toto come and give a SOli of post mortem11l0rtem evaluation. I thinkthink itit would have been very interesting.interesting. I never knew exactly what happened, but therethere were some opposing forces insideinside and at thethe same time,time, thethe president of El Salvador, now was a littlelittle bit fed up with thethe UN interveningintervening and giving thethe impressionimpression thatthat theythey were still under thethe tutelagetutelage ofthethe United Nations.

They wanted toto get rid of thethe United Nations as quickly as possible, which theythey have. So, that'sthat's why we never went back. I have been back and with Cristiani several times,times, but on other issues.issues.

JK: In termsterms of thethe implementation,implementation, therethere were timestimes when thethe patiies met with thethe Group of

Friends toto complain thatthat thingsthings were not moving along. Were you a part of thosethose meetings? What kinds of complaints did theythey have?

DA: The landland distribution became an impOliantimpOliant issueissue and thethe police refonn. And inin thethe beginning, thethe Truth Commission. That was a very touchytouchy one. The landland problems continued toto be thethe hmIDting problem. At thethe end, itit was an issueissue of poverty. The fundamental issue,issue, thethe clashes of El

Salvador were of an economic nature. And theythey could not be solved by a peace agreement. There were a lotlot of complaints about slow results. Many timestimes thethe rebels felt thethe govemment was not complying especially on thethe economic side. They did not have enough resources. The intemationalintemational community never gave thethe financial support theythey should have. You can change thethe police and downsize thethe anned forces, but you have toto have thethe financial SUppOli for thisthis toto happen. The

Salvadorian people are a laboriouslaborious people, but theythey never got thethe strong financial support thatthat thethe peace process would have required. This isis takingtaking place inin Haiti. We are replicating the same

22 23 experience in Haiti.

JK: Did Venezuela have resources that they would use as incentives throughout the implementation process?

DA: Yes, we had with Mexico what we call the San Jose Agreement. We would give them oil at preferential prices. That comes from Perez' first government since 1974. When oil prices became very expensive, we started a program for the Caribbean and Central American countries "Acuerdo do San Jose," the San Jose Agreement. We would give them preferential trade on oil. El Salvador was receiving that support. Plus, we were part ofthe United Nations Mission in El Salvador, too.

JK: You had perso1Ulel there.

DA: We had a number of officers. Some the people who attempted the coup in Venezuela had been in El Salvador as pmi of ONUSAL. Some of these commanders and captains had been in the

ONUSAL Mission in El Salvador. They were training for a coup there.

Yes, we would meet with the Salvadorians. The minister, Santa Maria, would come here.

You should speak to the Ambassador from El Salvador because he has been here throughout the whole process. He's been here since 1990 up to now, And he has served under both govenunents and he never lost the confidence of FMLN. It was a very difficult position. I greatly admire that he always represented his country in the midst of this situation. If there is anyone who could give you some useful infonnation, it is he, Ricmdo Castalera. He was Deputy Foreign Minister before

23 2244 coming here. He isis inin his seventhseventh or eighth year at thethe United Nations.

JK:JK: I'llI'll definitely get inin touchtouch with him.

DA: We would meet with him and with Boutros-Ghali and give our advice many times.times. We met with de Soto. Then itit became an exercise ofimplementation.

JK:JK: You mentioned thatthat at one point thatthat you had heard complaints on thethe rebelrebel side,side, thatthat thethe police were not being reformedreformed properly, and soso f01th.f01th. There was also thethe complaint on thethe government sideside thatthat weapons were being fOlU1dfOlU1d inin secretsecret hiding places. How did thatthat infonnationinfonnation come toto you? Was thatthat presented toto thethe Group of Friends?

DA: ItIt would go throughthrough thethe United Nations. The president ofElofEl Salvador would call thethe president of Venezuela and say,say, "Listen, looklook what isis happening here." Then thethe president would call me and

II would call thethe Secretary-General. So, both patiiespaIiies moved inin thatthat direction. Or thethe FMLN would get toto seesee Peres or thethe president of Mexico. II don't thinkthink thatthat thethe president of Mexico was involvedinvolved personally. The Mexicans are more formal.formal. So, any contact would have been throughthrough thethe foreignforeign minister. While Perez was thethe direct link,link, he did not have ally intermediaries.intermediaries. Also, theythey could call

Beatrice Rangel, who II have mentioned. He was very involvedinvolved personally. So thesethese people would complain toto him. For eXalnple, what isis happening with thethe police, somesome of thethe officers, people being persecuted. They would promise toto hand over all thethe a.t1llS,a.t1llS, andaIld thenthen we would findfind out itit wasn't thethe tmth.tmth. We would reprimalldreprimalld them,them, get velY angry with them.them. At timestimes we had very tensetense

2244 25 conversations with them.them. Remember thatthat thethe guenillas were very much divided amongst themselves.themselves. I'm sure theythey were lyinglying among themselves.themselves. That collectively, theythey agreed toto lielie toto us,

I don't believe that.that. Because thatthat was very serious.

JK: I wanted toto ask you some questions about Haiti. We have been talkingtalking primarily about El

Salvador. Venezuela thenthen became a member of thethe Group of Friends on Haiti. Aristide had been overthrown on September 30, 1991. So, thisthis was interwoveninterwoven with thethe whole issueissue on El Salvador.

How did Venezuela become a member of thethe Group of Friends on Haiti and what was Venezuela's involvementinvolvement inin thethe issueissue ofHaiti?

DA: ItIt would be interestinginteresting toto taketake a looklook at thethe book I gave you because inin thatthat I relate some of thethe things.things. One of thethe few presidents thatthat attending thethe inauguralinaugural of Aristide was thethe president of

Venezuela.

JK: This isis Perez?

DA: This isis Perez, thethe same. And Perez was very impressedimpressed by Aristide. I remember he toldtold me,

"This small man, when he starts speaking, he starts growing." When Perez, who isis a man with some alTogance about his own abilities, toldtold me that,that, I was greatly impressed.impressed. "Diego," he said,

"You lmow, thisthis guy grows up when he speaks." "Magnificent, he moves people inin a way I have seldom seen," he toldtold me. But, thenthen he was overtlu'own and I called thethe president. The president sent a plane, a private plane of a Venezuelan banker, a fJ:iendfi:iend of ours, Jose Alvarez Estele. He sent

25 26 a Gulf streamstream toto get Aristide. I1 will relaterelate something thatthat happened thatthat night. He aITived inin

Venezuela early thethe next morning.

JK: So, theythey sent thethe plane fromfrom Caracas toto POli-au-Prince. Who had contacted Aristide toto telltell him thatthat he could be picked up?

DA: Om ambassador, itit was a lady,lady, inin Haiti, was told.told. Perez had urged MittelTand before thisthis sayingsaying thatthat we shouldshould help thisthis new democracy. That isis why he was involved.involved. The next day, I1 called Perez and saidsaid toto him thatthat I1 knew thatthat Aristide was flyingflying toto Washington toto thethe OAS meeting, thisthis timetime inin a Venezuelan government plane. II saidsaid to to him thatthat he must come toto thethe

United Nations. I1 said toto him thatthat he isis going toto waste his timetime at thethe GAS. "I"1 understand thatthat isis a stopstop he must make, but you shouldshould telltell him thatthat he shouldshould come here. And when he comes here, he shouldshould come straightstraight toto me because I1 would likelike toto speakspeak toto him inin order thatthat he doesn't repeatrepeat thethe perfonnance he had at thethe General Assembly thethe firstfirst timetime here.here." 11 As you remember,remember, he spokespoke inin 17 languageslanguages and itit was quite a mess.

JK:JK: Let me justjust get thethe sequencesequence of events: he was overtlU"own on thethe 30th, and thenthen your anlbassador toto Haiti, thethe Venezuelan woman. Did sheshe organize Aristide's safesafe delivery out of

Haiti?

DA: She couldn't. This ladylady was also very close toto Aristide. Aristide trustedtrusted her. At thethe timetime

Aristide was a prisoner. When we sentsent thethe plane, we didn't know ifheifhe would be at thethe aillJOli.

26 27 Finally theythey tooktook him toto thethe airpOli. There was a lotlot of speculation on that.that.

JK: Were thethe military holding him?

DA: The militalymilitffiy were holding him. Actually, theythey had him a pl'isoner at thethe airport. Our plalleplffile

landedlanded and we sent a doctor, a physician, who got him onto thethe plane. Aristide thoughtthought he was

going toto be killed. He toldtold me. He thoughtthought he was going toto be killed before he got intointo thethe plane.

By thatthat time,time, thethe French French were on notice, thethe U.S. was on notice, we were on notice. So, he landedlanded

inin Venezuela and theythey tooktook him toto thethe presidential guesthouse and a couple of days afterwards he

I was inin Washington. Then sent him here inin our plane. Then I met with him and I triedtried toto negotiate

personally. The Colombian Ambassador, Fernando Sepera, thethe Mexican Ambassador, Gorge

• Montana, and myself went toto see thethe president of thethe Security Council, who was thethe Indian i ambassador, Chinmaya Ghareldlall,Ghareldlffil, who latelate became a paltpaIt ofthethe Secretariat. That month, he was IJ thethe president ofthethe Security Council. We went toto see GhareldlallGhareldl811 and said, "Listen, Chirunaya, therethere has been thisthis coup. Aristide isis thethe first elected president ofHaiti, thanksthanks toto thethe United

Nations contribution, you remember. This isis a United Nations issue.issue. You must receive Aristide."

I-IeI-le did not offer anything. This was around 6:00 inin thethe afternoon. There was an informalinformal

consultation about that.that. And we spoke also toto thethe EcuadoriallEcuadori811 ambassador who was on thethe Council

from Latin America along with Cuba, at thethe moment. Later, we found out thatthat thethe Ecuadorians, thethe

ambassador isis very fmmalfOlmal -- he isis now thethe foreign minister of Ecuador and a very distinguished

man ---- Jose Ayala Lasso. Pepe Ayala, very fonnal, was saying thisthis isis a regional issue;issue; why should

itit come toto thethe Security Council. The discussion was going on and Pickering came out and Alex

27 2828 Watson and said to me, "I don't understand whywhy PepePepe (Jose(Jose Ayalo)Ayalo) tooktook thisthis positionposition whenwhen wewe hadhad already approved together toto get Aristide intointo thethe meeting.meeting. VenezuelaVenezuela waswas alsoalso inin favorfavor ofof this.this.

But the position taken by Cuba, by China, andand byby Ecuador,Ecuador, thatthat II knowknow of,of, preventedprevented himhim fromfrom coming to a formal meeting of thethe meeting ofof thethe SecuritySecurity Council.Council. So,So, wewe gotgot thethe secondsecond best.best.

We kept pressing and we said we were going toto bringbring thethe wholewhole LatinLatin AmericanAmerican groupgroup andand therethere isis going to be a major confrontation. They accepted thatthat thethe CouncilCouncil wouldwould meetmeet inin thethe officialofficial room,room, he would speak, and thenthen he would leave.leave. TheyThey would givegive himhim hishis fifteenfifteen minutesminutes beforebefore court.court.

Then Aristide came toto thethe United Nations aroundaround 7:00pm7:00pm andand II metmet withwith himhim inin aa smallsmall roomroom nextnext to the Security Council. I explained toto him, "Mr."Mr. President,President, thethe SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil isis notnot thethe GeneralGeneral

Assembly. The Security Council isis a very seriousserious procedure;procedure; youyou can'tcan't speakspeak inin 1717 languages."languages."

Then, at that time I was not a member of thethe SecuritySecurity Council,Council, soso II satsat inin thethe gallerygallery overlookingoverlooking thethe fOlmal room. I remember, Aristide came in,in, thethe firstfirst timetime II hadhad seenseen AristicleAristicle inin thethe UnitedUnited Nations,Nations, the people stood up. This small-fi:amed man camecame andand thethe SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil membersmembers stoodstood up.up.

Then he sat at the table and began speaking veryvery softlysoftly onon thethe importanceimportance ofofdemocracy,democracy, peace,peace, notnot like a man fighting for his life,life, no, mild withwith velYvelY strongstrong concepts,concepts, veryvery wellwell delivered,delivered, withwith nono notes. He didn't mince one word thatthat he spoke.spoke. HeHe speaksspeaks immaculateiI1U11aculate French.French. HeHe speaksspeaks manymany other languages immaculately also, as we know.

JK: He spoke in French thisthis time?time?

DA: In French. I remember thethe silence. The wholewhole roomroom waswas packedpacked andand therethere waswas majormajor silence.silence.

The man cal1'ied great moral weight. Everyone expectedexpected himhim toto comecome likelike aa bomb.bomb. ItIt waswas thethe

2828 29 opposite. There startedstarted a longlong process of great conflicts inin our own region.region. Then a fewfew months

later,later, we entered thethe Security Council. That isis when we stal1edstal1ed pushing toto bring thethe issueissue of Haiti

toto thethe Security COlmcil.

JK:JK: When did thethe Group of Friends form?form? At thatthat time,time, you were already a member of thethe Group

of Friends on El Salvador and had seenseen thatthat process move very successfully.successfully. So, how did itit formform

on Haiti?

DA: There was a new Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali. Boutros-Ghali had great sympathysympathy forfor

Haiti. He played a very importantimportant role.role. Boutros, II will telltell you somesome confidential matter, thatthat

Boutros decided thatthat he shouldshould put togethertogether Fral1Ce, thethe United States, Canada, al1dal1d Venezuela as thethe Friends. Why? At thatthat time,time, Mittenal1d, Bush, Mulruney, and Perez had a very good rapportrapport

aJ.1daJ.1d with Boutros Ghali. II saysay inin thisthis book thatthat itit was Perez who proposed toto Mittenand thatthat theythey

shouldshould supportsupport thisthis process. Then Mittemmd visited Venezuela. ItIt isis Perez' recordsrecords thatthat he saidsaid toto

MitterraJ.1d we must suppOlisuppOli Haiti. And MittelTaJ.1cl saidsaid yes but he did not respondrespond quickly. So,

Perez called Mulruney and asked Mulruney toto speakspeak toto Mitten"and.

JK:JK: Mulruney of Canada.

DA: Right, al1dal1d asked him toto speakspeak toto Bush, too.too. And Mull'Uney became very involved,involved, engaged immediately.immediately. Mulruney was thethe one who called Mitten"and and called Bush and thatthat isis how thethe whole thingthing got stalied.stalied. InIn thethe Security COlmcil, therethere was France, thethe United States, al1dal1d

29 3030 Venezuela.Venezuela. ThreeThree ofof thethe fourfour Friends werewere inin thethe SecuritySecurity Council. Canada was not.not. We startedstarted lookinglooking forfor ways toto bringbring thisthis toto thethe Security Council immediately.immediately. There was a major resistance in thethe Latin American group, major resistance.resistance.

JK: Why was that?that?

DA: The Mexicans, the Brazilians, the Ecuadorians, the Uruguayans were very much opposed.

They felt that the Security Council was the place to bring issues of intemational peace and security.

Haiti did not tlu'eaten intemational peace and security. Their foreign ministers were being very formal about how to handle the decision.

JK: And there was the issue of GAS.

DA: The Secretary-General of thethe GAS waswas a Brazilian.

JK:JK: BaenaBaena Soares.Soares.

DA:DA: NowNow wewe areare inin 1993.1993. BrazilBrazil entersenters thethe SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil substitutingsubstituting Ecuador.Ecuador. InIn 1993,1993, wewe getget thethe HaitianHaitian issueissue beforebefore thethe SecuritySecurity Council.Council. ThereThere waswas aa majormajor resistanceresistance inin thethe LatinLatin AmericanAmerican

Community,COl1U1mnity, asas usualusual aa veryvery formalformal andand conventionalconventional handlinghandling ofintemationalofintemational issues,issues, sovereignty,sovereignty, youyou lmow,Imow, certaincertain icons,icons, notnot interveningintervening inin internalinternal situation,situation, moremore oror lessless thethe policypolicy thatthat ChinaChina takestakesonon manymany ofofthesetheseissues.issues. ThisThis isisinterveninginterveningintointothethesovereigntysovereignty ofofthethenation.nation. So,So,twotwosidessides

3030 31 were takentaken up. We tooktook one side and we became very active inin thethe Caricom conference, which were thirteenthirteen members. Then thethe Caricom countries and ourselves began lobbyinglobbying all over thethe

United Nations. Even inin my own govemment, I had toto keep away fi'om our ambassador toto thethe GAS what we were doing at thethe United Nations. Because he would call me everyday toto find out and toto telltell me thatthat we should not accept Haiti, thatthat thisthis was a regional issue.issue. ItIt was not an intemationalintemational issue.issue. At thethe same time,time, thethe Brazilian Secretary General was pushing his own ambassador.

Boutros would speak toto me and say, "You must find an excuse toto bring Haiti toto thethe Security

Council." I remember once he said toto me, "We must linklink thisthis toto a tln'eattln'eat toto thethe Dominican

Republic, which isis potentially a fact."fact." This would entail a threatthreat toto thethe peace and security. He really wanted us toto do something.

He had a very original solution toto thethe issue.issue. He appointed as his representative, Dante

Caputo. He said why don't we appoint togethertogether one representative, insteadinstead oftwo.two. Baena accepted.

JK: Dante being from Argentina.

DA: Dante was Argentine. So, thenthen we had thethe same position as thethe Brazilians. They thoughtthought thatthat would calm us until we were able toto bring lmderlmder thethe sponsorship of thethe United States, France, and

Venezuela, thethe resolution toto thethe Security Council. We became involvedinvolved inin thethe Govemors' Island

Agreement and thethe final retum of our friend Aristide. The day I tooktook thethe resolution toto thethe Security

Council, my ambassador toto thethe GAS called me and said, "Diego, what isis going on there?"there?" I said,

"Nothing, nothing special. Nothing very much isis going toto happen.'1happen." An hour later,later, I tooktook itit toto thethe

Security Council, made a speech, pushed it,it, and we got itit approved. He called me inin thethe aftemoon

31 3232 andand II hadhad toto telltell himhim thatthat II couldn'tcouldn't telltell himhim becausebecause hehe wouldwould have triedtried toto stopstop it.it. ButBut thethe president of VenezuelaVenezuela was inin totaltotal SUppOlisupPOti ofof whatwhat II was doing.doing. InIn thethe GAS, theythey kept itit a bay, and theythey would not do anything. But inin thethe internationalinternational fOlum,fomm, we would move ahead very fast. We did not offend thethe GAS, and we did not offend thethe international community.

JK: The resolution that you are refelTing to, is this the resolution to impose sanctions on Haiti?

DA: Yes.

JK: That was a key issue.

DA: That was a significant step. That is what created Governors' Island and Baena Soares one day would speak of it.it.

JK:JK: InIn thisthis case,case, toto orchestrateorchestrate thatthat tooktook quitequite aa whilewhile becausebecause thethe SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil hadhad 110tnot wantedwanted toto taketake upup thatthat issue.issue. AtAt thatthat point,point, diddid youyou meetmeet withwith thethe ot1lerother membersmembers ofofthethe FriendsFriends Group?Group?

YouYou hadhad thethe French,French, thethe Canadians,Canadians, andand thethe U.S.D.S. WasWas therethere aa consensusconsensus amongamong them?them?

DA:DA: Yes.Yes.

JK:JK: AtAt thisthis pointpoint thethe issueissue ofof sanctionssanctions waswas ready?ready?

3232 33 DA: Very ready. That group worked like a clock. The Group of Friends in the case of Haiti

worked like a clock. They were always very much attuned to each other. What we had to do was

always done collectively. There was very unified action. Of course, we had to lobby all the

members of the Security COlmcil. There was a role played by the Caricom countries. We

incorporated Africa into the whole thing, 54 members. We had a lot of people involved and we

started playing the racial card. I wrote an aIiicle in the New Yark Times about that called "Haiti,

the Black Bosnia." Latin Americans do not care for Haiti because they are Blacks andaI1d they don't

think they are Latins. Like the EuropeaI1S think that the BosniaI1s are Muslims.Muslims, Nobody cared very

much what was happening in Haiti.Haiti, This was a fact. The first victims of the Latin American lack of

interest were the HaitiaI1s. Latin America never gave much importance to Haiti.

JK: In that case, Venezuela's role in the process was very impOliant because you were the only

representative of Latin America in the Friends.

DA: More than Venezuela, it was the president of Venezuela. Let me tell you something tragically

ironic. When we brought Aristide to Venezuela, and many Haitians arrived in Venezuela, there

was a major scandal in public opinion. "We are going to be immdated by these Haitians." What

they meant was members of the Black community. And that is when I ran my article. "You

criticize, the United States aI1d they have thousands ofHaitians. You get 40 Haitians and you forget

our whole history when Petion was the president of Haiti and financed the two incursions of Simon

Bolivar to establish Venezuela's independence. Being one of the two Latin Americans in the

Security Council, I convened for a fmmalfOlmal meeting the Caricom countries and the Caribbean and the

33 I 34 Latin American group. II convened themthem inin a formalformal group toto openly discuss this.this. This isis beyond national considerations. Haiti isis thethe poorest country on thisthis continent. ItIt isis a bad country, impoverished,impoverished, marginal. II made a very strong political argument ratherrather thanthan toto continue on thethe internationalinternational lawlaw interpretation,interpretation, whether itit was a till'eattill'eat or not a tIu·eat.tlu·eat. They knew thatthat we had thethe support of thethe Africans and thethe United States. The Europeans were connected and involved.involved. There was more resistance,resistance, formally,formally, fromfrom thethe Latin American countries. There was China and Cuba thatthat didn't want thethe United Nations toto get involvedinvolved because theythey are scared thatthat one day we would bring a Cuban issueissue toto thethe Security Council. The China policy isis not toto intervene.intervene. InIn thisthis case, theythey abstained.

JK: They abstained, II see.

DA: InIn thethe rest,rest, we had 14 votes, but not Cuba.

JK: Let me ask you another question because II thinkthink itit isis velY interestinginteresting and complicated as toto why thethe Latin American countries were resistingresisting some of thethe issues.issues.

DA: Traditional attitudes, thatthat thethe United Nations not interveneintervene inin intemalintemal problems, and second thatthat thethe Security Council should not handle an issueissue inin which intemationalintemational security was not involved.involved.

JK: Because theythey wanted thethe OAS toto handle it,it, instead?instead?

34 35

DA: Well, I tell you that nobody cared for Haiti. The United States cared for Haiti for one reason;

Miami was being inundated by Haitians. That was very reasonable; that was more than enough. It was not that the United States loved Haiti more than we did, it was that the United States was more threatened. Actually, the greatest threat was in the United States because they were going to get one half a million Haitians ovemight. And that's what prompted it. I am not saying that was the only reason, but that accelerated the concem of the United States position. It was a natural one.

JK: The other question that I have had in my mind, was there resistance by some of the Latin

American countries or was there a fear that the United Nations, or the United States behind the

United Nations, might get involved, as it did in Haiti, and that that might set a precedence for getting involved in other Latin American countries if there were a military coup?

DA: Absolutely. Of course, that was not so openly said, but it was openly implied. In reality, actually the foundation of the concem was that. Today it's Haiti, tom01TOW it's us. They took the luxury of being very fonnal in the consideration of a COuntly like Haiti. I wonder ifthere would have been the same consideration taken if it had been Colombia, a more significant countly. They have been the victims of discrimination by their own colleagues in the region, Haiti, absolutely.

JK: Just in terms of bringing Venezuela into this issue, when was that attempted coup in

Venezuela?

35 , 36 , DA: The first one was inin February 1992 when we already had a coup. The coupcoup tooktook placeplace whenwhen II had only been in the Security Council forfor one month. II acted likelike nothingnothing had happened,happened, butbut itit hadhad " happened. So a year before. JK: I wonder ifif thatthat at all played a rolerole inin somesome ofofthe the activeactive qualityquality ofof PresidentPresident perez.Perez. BecauseBecause ifif

therethere had been a military coup inin Venezuela,Venezuela, wouldwould thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations takentaken aa standstand againstagainst thethe

military coup?

DA:DA: The OAS wouldwould have.have. TheThe GASGAS wouldwould havehave stoppedstopped inin aa minuteminute thisthis exercise.exercise. IfIfpoor poor HaitiHaiti

hadhad toto waitwait forfor thethe OAS,OAS, AristideAristide wouldwould stillstill bebe meetingmeeting inin aa churchchurch inin WashingtonWashington waitingwaiting forfor

somethingsomething toto happen.happen. EveryEvery timetime youyou taketake somethingsomething therethere itit isis thethe endend ofofthe the road.road. That'sThat's whywhy wewe

allall realizedrealized thatthat wewe hadhad toto bringbring itit toto thethe UN.UN. AndAnd II convincedconvinced perez.Perez. TheThe venuevenue isis notnot thethe OAS,OAS, atat

leastleast notnot thethe fOIDlalfOIDlal one.one. TheThe realreal issueissue isis inin thethe UnitedUnited Nations.Nations. So,So, II wentwent toto PerezPerez andand that'sthat's isis

whywhy wewe hadhad himhim herehere atat thethe Ul\JUl\J andand itit actuallyactually waswas resolved.resolved. ItIt laidlaid thethe groundworkgroundwork forfor somethingsomething

toto happen.happen. ItIt happenedhappened later.later.

JK:JK: InIn tennstenus ofofbringing bringing thethe issueissue toto thethe UNUN andand workingworking withwith thethe FriendsFriends andand gettinggetting thethe

resolutionsresolutions passedpassed inin thethe SecmitySecmity Council,Council, youyou playedplayed aa veryvery importantimportant role.role. WhatWhat aboutabout bringingbringing

alongalongthethemembersmembers ofofthethe OAS?OAS? WereWereyouyouableabletoto playplayaa kindkindofofrolerole inintennsten11Sofofconvincingconvincingthethe

OASOAS thatthat theirtheir cooperationcooperation inin thisthis waswas important?important?

DA:DA: ThatThat waswas anan impossibleimpossible exercise.exercise. II wentwent toto seesee mymy colleaguecolleague atat thethe OAS,OAS, whowho waswas aa veryvery goodgood

3636 37 friend ofmine, and tried to convince him. They had a culture, and that culture was regional and against a more universal view. We, the UN, had the sanctions; they did not have sanctions. We have the force of the Security Council, a force that they didn't have. I never received an instruction from my president to talk to talk to our people at the OAS,GAS, never. I did it on my own volition. I never got one note to coordinate or talk to them, no. We left them to do their own exercise, very political, very rhetorical. These negotiations we had, the resolutions, were very difficult. Baena was a very complicated man on this issue. We had the advantage that Boutros was very militant and wanted to bring Haiti to the Security Council. That was one reason, He was really genuinely convinced that the only way for Haiti was to go to the Security Council.

JK: I understand that the Group ofFriends on EIEl Salvador really wrote most ofthe drafts ofthe resolutions before they were presented to the Security Council. Was that the case with the Friends on Haiti?

DA: Yes, we were all very active. The four Friends were all very active. But the issue ofHaiti was only going to be resolved by the United States. There is no regional conflict where the president of the United States is not needed. In the end it proved a fundamental one. What could we do? Help

Mulroney,Mulruney, send some policemen and whatever. The Canadians were extremely useful. If!IfI had toto say who was more important it would be the United States and Canada, on thethe support of Haiti, later on. Inside, we were more useful because we were on thethe Security Council and Canada was not. They had just left the Security Council a couple years before. ItIt was a pity thatthat ifif itit had been the four ofus together [on the Security Council] it would have gone mllch faster.faster. But Canada isis a

37 38 respectable country, enjoys great respect. So, we were able to use thethe Canadians very effectively inin thethe region. But we all cooperated, cooperated likelike a clock. We were working with thethe Secretariat which was also on the same wavelength as we were. We were all working inin thethe same direction.

The four Friends and the UN Secretariat were very closely united. We did not have thethe differences that we had on the Salvadoran process with the UN Secretariat or with the Secretary-General. Here the Secretary-General and the Secretariat and the four Friends were totally united.

JK: You mentioned on EIEl Salvador that you had had a special alTangement for Central American countries on the purchase of oil. Did you have a similar a11'angement with Haiti?

DA: I think so, but I will have to check. Haiti was the poorest nation inin thethe hemisphere. The problem is that when Haiti had the dictatorship we were not giving themthem oil. At one time,time, theythey had this lady, Trouillot as president. During Perez time, Venezuela was very sUPPOliivesuppOliive ofI-Iaiti.ofl-Iaiti.

JK: When you were proposing sanctions, which included an oil embargo, thatthat really did involveinvolve

Venezuela because you would be involved in the oil embargo.

DA: At one point, we tlu'eatenedthreatened the Dominicans, because the Dominicans were sabotaging thethe embargo. They have a very uneasy relationship, as you know, with Haiti. The independence ofthe

Dominican Republic was the independence of the Haitians. There is a lot of bad blood between the two countries. And they were sabotaging, selling gas and oil.

38 39 JK: Across their border.

DA: I remember I had several meetings with the Dominican ambassador waming him that we were

going toto do something about it. Ifwe had to, we would propose sanctions against the Dominican

Republic. They were really sabotaging it.

JK:JK: Toward thethe end, wasn't therethere a Security Council resolution to close that border and put

observers on thatthat border?

DA: To put observers, but even thoughthough we had observers, theythey were wamed that we were taking a

closeclose look.look. There were a lotlot ofmilitary officers on thethe Dominican side thatthat were making a lot of

moneymoney sellingselling oil, likelike happens whenever therethere are sanctions. This isis not thethe only place.

JK:JK: WeWe havehave aa fewfew moremore minutesminutes and II wanted toto go onto thethe thirdthird Group of Friends which isis

Guatemala.Guatemala. ItIt isis amazingamazing thatthat VenezuelaVenezuela hashas been involvedinvolved inin all thesethese different groups. How was

thethe GroupGroup ofofFriends Friends ofofGuatemala Guatemala setset upup andand what was Venezuela'sVenezuela's rolerole inin thatthat case.

DA:DA: ThisThis isis different;different; oneone dayday thethe presidentpresident ofofMexico,Mexico, thethe presidentpresident of Venezuela, thethe president of

ColombiaColombia metmet forfor aa conferenceconference andand theythey agreedagreed toto formform aa GroupGroup ofof FriendsFriencls of thethe President of

Guatemala.Guatemala. TheThe oneone whowho triedtried toto dodo aa coupcoup d'etatd'etat himselfhimself alaala F~jimori.F~jimori. ThenThen II getget a call thatthat II

shouldshould gogo toto GuatemalaGuatemala fromfrom mymy president.president. II amam ambassadorambassador here.here. II getget aa callcall fromfrom mymy presidentpresident thatthat II shouldshould gogo toto GuatemalaGuatemala andand meetmeet withwith thethe presidentpresident togethertogether withwith thethe MexicanMexican ambassadorambassador

3939 ,

40 , who at thatthat timetime was Tello, thethe Colombian ambassador also. He wanted toto get thethe same Friends as , on El Salvador toto Guatemala.

, JK: So, therethere was a direct linlelink between thethe Friends on El Salvador and Guatemala. , , DA: Yes, so we alTived inin Guatemala. I had been a friend of thisthis man longlong before he was president l' of Guatemala. And we immediatelyimmediately realized thatthat therethere was a major mistake made by our , presidents. Because insteadinstead of calling ourselves Friends of thethe Process, ... ~ ; JK: You had been called Friends of thethe Secretmy-General. ',' DA: That was thethe same as Friends ofthethe Process, Friends ofthethe Secretmy-General.Secret31y-General. But we were ,,Ai!! I becoming Friends of thethe President of Guatemala.

··.

DA: I remember thethe reactions among ourselves. The Erst reaction was Tello. We had a very le"j··.tF, ...... I. , candid conversation with thethe president and311d thethe an11ed forces. We had a meeting at thethe palace thethe whole day. And I remember Tello saying, "We are Friends ofthethe Process." Process." The president of

Guatemala said, "Well, you are my friends." We did tlytly toto become on our own Friends of thethe I',>'..:.':. Process rather thm1th311 Friends ofthethe president. We lmewImew thatthat we would loselose thethe importanceimportance of itit ~;i~'i., ;::, Itii'i immediatelimmediately.

t;;'

40 1;,., i~;::::' ~iii!

is I~~~*i LJ41 1

JK: There isis a distinction between thethe Group ofFriends of thethe Secretary-General which was thethe titletitle

ofthe Salvadoran Group and thethe Guatemalan group which isis Friends of thethe Peace Process. But

originally, he had set itit up as Friends ofthe president.

DA: Yes, itit became laterlater on Friends of thethe Process. We knew thisthis on our own. II said toto thethe president, "We must go toto Mexico toto meet with the guenillas.guelTillas. Because ifif we leaveleave fromfrom here and

go back toto Washington or New York, we are going toto be one-sided." He lentlent us a small plane and

we got toto Mexico around 9:00 thatthat evening and went directly toto thethe foreignforeign ministly and theythey

brought thethe rebelrebel leadersleaders and we managed toto meet lU1tiI2:00lU1tiI2:00 inin thethe morning. We explained toto themthem thatthat therethere had had been a certain misunderstanding and thatthat we were Friends of thethe Peace Process, not

Friends of thethe president. That had been a mistake made by thethe presidents themselves.themselves.

JK: Who initiatedinitiated thethe meeting inin Guatemala with thethe president of Guatemala? Was itit thethe president of Guatemala's initiative?initiative? Or was itit fl.-omfi:om thethe group of presidents?

DA: They offered itit toto him. They said, "We are going toto send our ambassadors toto meet with you as soon as possible." II got a call and thatthat day II leftleft forfor Guatemala.

JK: The ideaidea came fromfrom thethe presidents of thethe countries ratherrather thanthan fl.-omfi:om Boutros-Ghali, [break[break inin thethe conversation] We were talkingtalking about thethe ambassadors going toto meet inin Guatemala and thenthen realizingrealizing thatthat you had toto meet with thethe guenillas, as well,

LJ41 1 42

DA: We realizedrealized thatthat itit was a major mistake done at thethe meetings inin Caracas by our presidents inin good faithfaith agreed toto thethe requestrequest ofthethe president of Guatemala, which isis one side toto suppOli him because he wanted toto sign a peace agreement. We knew, but we didn't call back our presidents and say itit was a mistake. What we did was toto act likelike itit were thethe Friends as inin thethe case of El Salvador.

Let's become Friends ofthe Process, not Friends of thethe president. At one point, inin thethe meeting, thethe president of Guatemala said toto thethe Mexican ambassador, "Well, you are my friends.friends." II And Tello

said, "Yes, well, we are Friends ofthethe Process.Process." II ItIt was a very difficult relationshiprelationship because he thoughtthought thatthat we were going toto serve him politically and we realizedrealized ifif we did that,that, itit would be bad.

That isis why we went toto speak toto thethe guelTillas, actually thethe same day. We flewflew toto Mexico inin thethe same day. Let's say we met fromfrom lO:OOamlO:OOam toto 4:00 inin thethe aftemoon, and at 4:00 we tooktook affforofffor

Mexico. And we ended thethe meeting at 4:00 inin thethe moming inin Mexico with thethe guelTillas. Then we came back toto New York.

lIZ:1K: What was thethe rolerole of Boutros-Ghali inin all ofthis7

DA: None, at thisthis stage, none. The Mexicans, therethere was Rosario Green, who was thethe Deputy

Foreign Minister. She presided and was likelike our hostess forfor thatthat night. We met with thethe guelTillas therethere and laterlater on, thethe UN feltfelt theythey wanted toto become pali ofthethe process and we became more institutional.institutional. InIn a de factofacto way, II don't thinkthink therethere was any fOffi1alfOffi1al invitation.invitation. They started calling us, includingincluding thethe Secretary-General, thethe Group on Guatemala, a de factofacto continuation of El

Salvador. El Salvador isis finished,finished, now let'slet's go talktalk about Guatemala.

42 43

JK: In terms of the Secretariat, then were you working again with Alvaro de Soto?

DA: No, it was more with a young French guy and not so much with de Soto. I can't remember his name now.

JK: Was it FranceseFrancesc Vendrell?

DA: No, Vendrell was in El Salvador. Vendrell was velY impOliant in El Salvador; he was very active. And Vendrell was active in Haiti.

JK: Yes, very much so.

DA: Vendrell is a very good guy.

JK: In Guatemala, it was somebody else then.

DA: It was this French guy; I will have to remember his name, a velY bright guy.

JK: Then you stmied to meet but it was not at the initiation of the Secretary-General, so it was not really Friends of the Secretary-General.

43 44 DA: De facto, it became. Nobody said now you are the Friends, no. It was taken for granted that we were already.

JK: Then did you begin to play the same kind of role, in tenllS writing resolutions for the Security

Council?

DA: Yes, but at that point I left the United Nations. That was 1993.

JK: And then Venezuela went offthe Security Council.

DA: Remember the role was different. The guerrillas in Guatemala didn't have the same weight that they had in El Salvador. It was a different issue. Then came the self-coup d'etat by the president of Guatemala. Many things have changed. From there on, I CaImotCaIIDot help you anymore because I becaIne all outside observer ofthe process because I was not in the United Nations. It began to take place more in 1994 aIld 1995.

JK: Then, let's just go back to those initial meetings where you met with the president of Guatemala and then with the Guerrillas in Mexico. My understaIlding is that the guenillas were living in

Mexico City.

DA: They were living in Mexico City. That's why we went there.

44 45 JK: That's why it was possible to meet with them immediately. What were some of the issues on

both sides? What did you discuss?

DA: First, we had to decide. They suspected us. In the meeting I had to speak very frankly, very

candidly, and very strongly because they thought why do we have to meet with these cOlUltriescountries who

have already taken a side and to suppOli as Friends of President of Guatemala. It took 90% of the

time to clear the air that we wanted to be Friends ofthe Process. We were not Friends ofthe

president of Guatemala. We were friends of both of them. We wanted to be an instnunent to

promote peace within the United Nations system. That meeting was only significant in the way that

we cleared the air, in a large extent. But these people almost didn't want to meet with us.

JK: Were they aware of the Friends Group on El Salvador?

DA: Yes, very much, being aware of that, they suspected in this case, that instead of being the

Friends of the Secretary-General, we were the Friends of the president of Guatemala.

JK: So, you really had to change that concept.

DA: We changed it by amour own performance, not by the original instructions that we had. I had

never gone back to Perez to find out. I think they were motivated and convinced by the president of

Guatemala's will to come to peace. And he convinced them [the presidents] but they made a

mistake.

45 46

JK: Do you thinkthink thatthat inin takingtaking thethe action thatthat you did, thatthat you overcame thatthat lacklack of impartialityimpartiality on thethe beginning?

DA: Yes, because otherwise itit would have been impossibleimpossible toto keep thatthat same group as Friends of thethe Secretary-General thatthat itit laterlater became. We had thisthis moral authority fromfrom El Salvador. That was our realreal importanceimportance thatthat we had inheritedinherited fromfrom EIEl Salvador a good imageimage of being objective and balanced, etc. We had almost lostlost itit by thethe introductionintroduction as Friends ofthethe president ofGuatemala.

JK: Did you get involvedinvolved inin talkingtalking about thethe specific issuesissues at thatthat point?

DA: No, II have toto speak toto Tello toto refreshrefresh my memOlY, but that night we were addressing fl.mdamentallyfl.mdamentally thethe rolerole thatthat we would likelike toto play and how we were going toto do this,this, and thethe need toto come toto an agreement, ratherrather thanthan on specific points.

JK: Norway also became a Friend. How did thatthat happen.

DA: The ambassador ofNorway attended thethe meeting thatthat we had inin Guatemala. The ambassador of Norway toto Guatemala.

JK: Why was Norway involved?involved? ItIt seems very strange.

46 47 DA: They did thethe same thingthing inin thethe Middle East; don't forget that.that. That had been very hospitable toto thethe guerrilla side. So theythey enjoyed great trusttrust from thethe guelTillas. They were very vigilant. They were inin a way very vigilant of thethe process thatthat we would not deviate from an objective process.

That isis thethe role theythey played. They were very active. Later on, we met with the church, thethe bishop.

That day we met with thethe bishop. I went toto see thethe head ofthethe Opus Dei, who was an old friend, a

Spanish priest, toto get thethe thinkingthinking of thethe Catholic Church of Spain. The bishop isis a very complex man. He was thethe negotiator for both sides. The church tooktook a role toto be thethe mediator. We were tryingtrying toto see how we could push them.them. He was very jealous.jealous. He did not want toto loselose thethe Catholic role or his own personal role inin thethe process, which was a very touchytouchy and delicate matter. He was a man ofgreat arrogance, thisthis bishop. He comes from one ofthethe most distinctive families of

Guatemala, an aristocratic family inin Guatemala. He was very concemed thatthat he was going toto loselose his primary role because ofthethe United Nations intervention.intervention.

JK: Let me ask you a question about thatthat because ifif thethe church had been able toto play thethe final role inin mediating thethe agreement, then itit wouldn't have been necessmy toto bring inin thethe Friends group. So, what was itit thatthat thethe Friends group had toto offer thatthat thethe church couldn't do? ItIt was similar inin £1El

Salvador, for example, because thethe chmch therethere had played thethe role oftheofthe intermediaryintermediary and had been working with thethe parties toto a certain extent. But thenthen theythey could no longerlonger really function.

DA: They played a useful role within their capabilities. The U1\rUN had thethe capacity toto push thethe govemments and always thethe tlu'eattlu'eat of sanctions loominglooming inin thethe background, which thethe church didn't have besides not giving absolution toto thethe seniors. ItIt made itit a more formidable process. They

47 , I 4848 , wantedwanted thethe churchchurch andand himselfhimselfto to bebe thethe saviorsavior ofofthis this andand hehe couldcould notnot be.be. He did notnot wantwant toto

1 acknowledgeacknowledge that.that. OurOur meetingmeeting waswas aa difficultdifficult one. HeHe was a very alTogant man and very much

.....,f( 1 fullfun ofof himselfhimself and thethe rolerole hehe was going toto play.

JK: When you moved the meeting toto Mexico City, who represented Norway there?

DA: The ambassador ofNorway to Mexico, because he didn't travel with us. I took the Venezuelan

ambassador to Guatemala with me in order to preserve the continuity of our conversations. The

Mexican also carnecame from Guatemala with the Mexican ambassador to the UN, who shortly

afterward became the foreign minister of Mexico.

JK: I think I am going to end it here. Thank you so much forfor your patiicipation inin thisthis interview.interview.

DA: My pleasure.

4848 Yale-UN Oral History Project Diego ArriArriaa Jean Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr September 5, 19919977 New York, New YorYorkk

Name Index: Central America Antonini, Blanca 9 Aristicle,AristicJe, Jean-BelirandJean-Bertrand 25-28,33 Ayala, Pepe 27 Baena Soares, Joao 30,32,37 Bolivar, Simon 33 Boutros-Ghali,Boutros-GhaJi, Boutros 2~29,312~29,31,, 37,41-43 Bush, George 29 Caputo, Dante 31 Castalera, RicardoRicarclo 23 Castro, Fidel 6, 15-17 Cristiani, Alfredo 5,9-11,13,15,19-22 \­\_/ de Mello, Collor 16 de Soto, Alvaro 9,11, 14-15,21,24,43 Duarte, Napoleon 17 Estele, Jose Alvarez 25 Gharekhalll,Gharekham, Chinmaya 27 Gonsalez, Filipe 3 Green, Rosario 42 Handal, Shafik 5, 8 Lasso, Jose Ayala 27 Marques, Garcia 16 Mitterrand, Francois 3,26,29 Montana, Gorge 19,27 Palma, Manuel SolisSol is 3 Perez, Carlos Andres 4-6, 8, jj 6, 18,23-26,29,36, 38,4538,45

Perez de Cuellar, Javier 2-3,8-12,14-16,18,20,2-3,,8-12 14-16",,/18 20·· Pickering, Thomas 7,27 ' Rangel, Beatrice 6,8,24 Samayoa, Salvador 5 Sepera, FernandoFernancJo 2727 Sol, Calderon 13 Tello, Manuel 40,42,4640,42,46 Vargas, Mauricio 10,10, 1313 VendrelendreJ 1,I, FranceseFrancesc 4343 Watson, Alex 27-28 UNITEDUNITED NATIONS,NATIONS, DAGDAG HAMMARSKJ~LHAMMARSKJ~LDD LIBRARYLIBRARY

11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111/1111/111/1/11111111111111/1111111111/11111111/1111111/111II/!/ __._- --- __.. J. J.1~4~90?Q..~06091~4~90?(l~0609__ _