No. 45 by Howard Handelman The Making of a Venezuelan South America [HH-4-'781 President: 1978

The grey Mercedes wound its way million-elect a president, both extremely high level of direct through the narrow streets of houses of Congress, and the contact between the candidate and urbanizacion Ruperto Lugo, a municipal councils.' Universal the electorate. Herrera in particular, deteriorating, working-class suffrage extends to everyone over a warm, gregarious man, favors neighborhood in northwestern the age of 18, and voting is small, face-to-face gatherings over Caracas. Occasionally, as the car technically obligatory.2 In mass rallies. In his efforts to meet as stopped for a light, a passing December 1978, shortly before this many voters as possible, he typically pedestrian or a driver in a nearby car Report appears in print, Venezuela works a 16-hour day, sleeps no more glanced in and reacted with will hold its fifth presidential election than 5 to 6 hours (the night before surprise. Some waved or shouted since the reintroduction of the housing project tour he had hello and the bulky, graying Senator democracy in 1958. Whatever the managed only 4), and catches in the front seat, already looking outcome, incumbent President 5-minute naps in his car or plane. tired at the start of yet another long Carlos Andres Perez will peacefully day, waved back. Finally, our car hand the reins of government to the "I guess you could sa y that I started reached its destination, a huge, victor as have his four predecessors efforts to reunite the party, and my low-income, public housing project in the country's recent democratic campaign for the presidency, two on the edge of the district. The era. Given the current domination of days after our disastrous 1973 candidate and his bodyguard military regimes, generally defeat," he told me. "Since getting jumped from the car and the waiting authoritarian in nature, throughout the nomination last August ( I6 crowd surged forward, shouting South America, Venezuela's months before the election), I "Luis Herrera, Luis Herrera." Social democratic electoral process merits generally have campaigned six days Christian (COPED militants, some further examination. No other per week and try to keep one day dressed in the party's green colors, country on the continent enjoys open for rest and quiet planning reached through the crowd to shake such intensely contested elections, with m y advisers. " their presidential candidate's hand. nor such a high level of popular As our group walked through involvement in the campaigm3 Herrera Campins' principal housing project high-rises, Senator opponent, Deputy Luis Pifierfia Herrera entered some of the The Selling of a Venezuelan Ordaz of the incumbent Acci6n buildings for prearranged visits to President: The Politics of Democritica (AD) Party also the apartments of COPEI activists. Exhaustion engages in frequent walking tours, Amid the second-hand Luis Herrera Campins' hectic trip to but more often stages mass furniture-the walls often adorned Ruperto Lugo was the second of meetings of the party faithful, the with religious paintings and a poster three walking tours he had general public, or specialized of the candidate- Herrera talked scheduled for Caracas that week interest groups. Given AD'S vastly earnestly with various family (mid-June 1978). During the walk, superior financial resources in this heads-a factory worker, nurse, and he also addressed a series of campaign, he also benefits from a transit policeman. As we left one meetings of functional interest huge mass media campaign. Yet, crowded dwelling, I asked "How groups (business, labor, a woman's Piherfia, too, has been intensely many live in this apartment?" organization) and gatherings of working for years toward this "There are 16 of us-3 families," a copeyano militants. Then Herrera moment. As AD Secretary of woman replied, "all 100 percent departed for the interior on his Organization during the 1973 copeyano. regular three-to-four-day weekend election, and later as Secretary tour of the country's smaller cities General of the party, he carefully Once every 5 years, Venezuelan and villages. Venezuelan cultivated grassroots support for his voters-now numbering some 5.5 presidential campaigns involve an candidacy. For the leading "third party" Christians supplement their TV experience. He has been joined by candidate, Jose Vicente Rangel, campaigns with radio, newspaper, Clifton White, a strategist for former standard-bearer of the Movement to magazine, and movie theater ads Senator James Buckley of New Socialism (MAS), this is the second (before the feature film). Nobody York. At first the Social Christians consecutive presidential race. In one seems to know (or admits to refrained from hiring foreign typical campaign day which I spent knowing) precisely how much is advisers and, indeed, pointed an with Rangel, he began his activities spent by the major parties, but accusing finger at AD for "letting with a 7:00 A.M. gathering of experts agree the figures are Americans run their campaign." sanitation workers in Caracas' Los staggering. Two noted American Later, when the COPEI media Caobos park. He then moved on to political scientists who covered the strategy floundered, they, too, an open air market to discuss food 1973 campaign estimated that AD succumbed to the lure of alleged prices with housewives doing their and COPEI each spent over $40 American expertise and brought in morning shopping. After meeting million in the 1973 election4 Other David Garth, author of Edward with workers at a cement factory at analysts place expenditures far Koch's upset mayoral victory in the edge of town, the candidate higher, and the 1973 figure will be New York City. Diego Arria, the paused briefly for lunch. The exceeded this year. The 1973 outlay former Minister of Information who afternoon was spent walking up and by each major party was is running as a well-financed down the hills of Gramoven, a vast approximately the same amount independent, has demonstrated his shantytown above the road to the spent by Richard Nixon in his ecumenical outlook by employing Caracas airport. Rangel's day winning U.S. campaign one year John Dierdorf, a campaign aide to concluded with an outdoor speech earlier. On a per capita basis, Gerald Ford, and Pat Cadell, pollster and rally (in front of a Catholic expenditure in the current for Jimmy Carter. Of course each Church) in the working-class district Venezuelan election will exceed the party accuses the other of of LTdice, some 15 hours after his outlay of the Carter-Ford race by a depending on foreigners, simul- first appearance. factor of more than five to one! taneously refusing to deny (or Moreover, these estimates do not confirm) their own use of outsiders. Rangel, a handsome and include large amounts of funds charismatic man, is probably the which the incumbent administration The various Venezuelan third parties most effective orator of the three (COPEI in 1973, AD today) spends (mostly on the left)-MAS, MIR, principal candidates. Moreover, he indirectly for its party's candidate. It MEP, FUN - have no such shares Herrera Campins' preference is likely, therefore, that Venezuela's resources. In 1973, for example, the for direct, face-to-face contacts two major parties expend more combined campaign expenditures of with small groups of voters. It is an money per voter in their campaigns all third party candidates was less activity in which both men excel, than do electoral contestants than one tenth the AD and COPEI intently grasping the shoulder or anywhere else in the world. outlays. MAS and MIR, the leading hand of the prospective supporter in Marxist parties, rely heavily on an attempt to establish personal Such expenditures have inevitably posters, handouts, and extensive rapport. Because of MAS' led to the Americanization of volunteer labor by student activists. extremely limited financial Venezuelan elections and the Only rarely does a paid Rangel ad resources, the party places introduction of Madison Avenue appear on television or in the movie particular emphasis on walking techniques. Foreign consultants theaters5 For the other three leftist tours through barrios (low income were introduced into Venezuelan candidates and the two rightists, the neighborhoods) such as Gramoven. campaigns in 1973 when AD purse strings are even tighter. It is 'I never really stopped campaigning candidate Carlos Andres Perez used rumored by inside campaign since the last election," Rangel told several Americans on a part-time observers that MAS has received me. "In the last four and one-half basis and COPEI employed West unpaid tactical advice from years I have visited virtually every German campaign technicians. In campaign technicians furnished by working class barrio in Venezuela." the current race, both major parties the Italian Communist ~arty.~The and the leading independent masistas strenuously deny this. Running for the Venezuelan candidate, Diego Arria, have turned presidency, then, is clearly hard to American media experts. Early in Background to the 1978 Campaign work. For the major political parties the campaign the adecos brought in In any Venezuelan national (AD and COPED, it is also very Joe Napolitan-a former consultant campaign, Acci6n Democritica expensive. Given television's to Hubert Humphrey and author of begins as the front-running party. Its prevalence in Venezuela today The Election Game and How to Play 900,000 registered members far (nearly every home seems to have It (1972)-to work on the Pifierua exceed the membership of any other one), it isn't surprising that campaign. Napolitan, who worked Venezuelan political party. Adecos ( increasing stress has been placed on for Perez in 1973, is the only have secured the largest media "blitzes" for "the selling of foreigner working in the current race congressional delegation in every the president." AD and the Social with previous Venezuelan democratic election held in the country and will undoubtedly lead in and such extensive economic The nation's cities, particularly this year's congressional race. resources, AD might have been Caracas, have suffered from a Finally, in presidential campaigns, expected to start the current combination of rapid urban only once (in 1968) has the AD presidential campaign with a migration-Venezuela is now 80 candidate lost, and then, only tremendous advantage. Yet, at the percent urban-and chaotic because of a party split that drew start of the 1978 campaign, economic expansion. Each month substantial support from the adeco journalists and politicians to whom I some 6-8,000 new vehicles are candidate? spoke described a national mood of added to Caracas' already-clogged disappointment and uneasiness. streets, intensifying the mammoth Five years ago, AD candidate Carlos Opinion polls conducted at that time traffic jams. Crime and pollution, the Andres Perez launched one of the indicated COPEI candidate Luis twin nemeses of modern urban life, most effective electoral campaigns Herrera had established a lead of have reached alarming proportions in recent Latin American history. some 6 percentage points over his in the nation's capital. Urban Skillfully using the mass media, he less dynamic adeco opponent. services, particularly water and projected himself as a man of great electricity, have failed to keep up strength and energy, and reversed a Several factors contributed to with demand and Caracas has been 15-year decline in AD'S vote total, Acci6n Democritica's inauspicious hit with periodic blackouts and achieving a victory of stunning start, some of them attributable to water shortages. A recent poll proportions over his COPEI administration policies and others revealed that during 1977, opponent. The 49 percent of the beyond the government's control. two-thirds of all Venezuelans vote attained by Perez nearly To begin with, President Perez had experienced some breakdown of equaled the highest total ever inadvertently raised popular water or electrical delivery. Not reached by a presidential candidate expectations beyond reasonable surprisingly, services have become a in Venezuela's modern democratic levels. Like his friend Jimmy Carter, major campaign issue. era (1958-1978)~Once in office, the the Venezuelan president had a new president set about broadening tendency to promise more than he his already substantial support base. could deliver. Oil wealth brought Finally, government efforts to During the first year of his great prosperity to a minority of the alleviate these problems have been administration, he used emergency population, slightly raised the plagued by inefficiency and economic powers granted him by economic level of many others, and corruption. Huge increases in the congress to raise the minimum accelerated sharply the rate of government oil revenues have wage and grant workers extensive inflation for all? In Caracas, the cost opened up new opportunities for indemnification protection against of middle income housing had plundering the public treasury. dismissal. He promised the country exploded, with new, two-bedroom INOS, the government agency more jobs, schools, and agricultural apartments costing more than charged with laying water and output and called for a more $140,000 to buy (the usual practice) sewage lines (and thereby reducing equitable tax system that would tap or upward of $650 per month to serious water shortages) is known the income of the nation's wealthy rent. as a cesspool of corruption. The for the first time. Moreover, President Perez inherited an incredible oil bonanza produced by the 1973 OPEC price increases. Government revenues during Perez's first year in office were triple the previous year's, and the current administration has been able to spend more money in 5 years than the total government budget during the previous 143 of the nation's history! Expenditures for agriculture, education, and industrial development were expanded correspondingly.

Given the benefit of an incumbent administration, a dynamic president,

Presidents Carlos Andres Perez and Jimmy Carter in Caracas, March 29, 7978. Comptroller General's office of the Interior, Congressman, and, his party machinery. Party recently charged INOS with ultimately, Secretary General of AD. spokesmen were particularly consistently overpricing, He remains the consummate disturbed by the president's overbuying, overcharging, and product of the adeco machine- appointment of independents (some distributing contracts without steady, loyal, ready to do his work of them inimical to adeco leaders) to competitive bids. In 1976, the for the party and to wait his turn. the Cabinet and other high-ranking nation's Auditor General resigned in Pitierua Ordaz is respected by his positions. For example, they were protest, accusing the government of political allies and opponents alike furious when President Perez only investigating 2 percent of the for his organizational skill, feel for appointed Carmelo Lauria, a ranking 19,000 objectionable government the popular pulse, dedication, business leader with no ties to AD, payments to private firms his office honesty, and personal integrity. His to the powerful post of Secretary to had uncovered. Corruption has limitations are equally evident. He is the President. "That position is reached such alarming proportions neither a man of great intellectual critical in gaining access to the that R6mulo Betancourt and other creativity nor charisma; he is an president's ear," one high-ranking members of the president's own administrator rather than a leader. adeco told me. "Picking an party decry the low level of public My own first encounter with Pitierua independent to hold it did not sit morality. A recent Gallup poll illustrated this vividly. A short man, well with party activists." "Listen," indicated that 70 percent of all he stood unassumingly in front of he added vehemently, "he can respondents believed that his campaign headquarters on a choose independents for other government corruption is a serious major Caracas thoroughfare, positions, but that one is problem, while 36 percent felt the surrounded by his campaign ours."" Perez had also caused current administration is doing workers. Pedestrians walked by in some consternation among top nothing to alleviate it. large numbers and none noticed him adeco politicians by weakening the or said hello. Though a presidential party's prior links with In short, while most Venezuelans candidate, he was still "the average well-established big business groups are probably living better now than Venezuelan," lost in the crowd. (the Boultons, Eugenio Bondoza in ever before, improvements have favor of a more aggressive and modern "new capitalists" such as often failed to match expectations. Opposing Deputy Pifierua was The lower half of the population is Lauria himself and the Cianeros Jaime Lusinchi, leader of the AD family. well aware that their gains have delegation in the Chamber of been marginal compared with those Deputies. Lusinchi is widely admired Finally, the AD primary involved a of the upper-middle and upper in the Congress for his sense of personal conflict and a struggle for classes. And, for all citizens, the oil humor, pleasant personality, and party leadership between the boom has proved a mixed blessing, parliamentary skills. If Pifierua president and ex-president R6mulo bringing with it inflation, chaotic represented the traditional picture of Betancourt, the party's founder and urban growth, spiraling crime, Acci6n Democr6tica, Lusinchi most revered elder statesman. corruption, and insufficient urban projected the more modern image Ironically, Perez had begun his services. that some see as the AD of the political career as Betancourt's future. While Pitierua tended to personal secretary and had moved Accion Democriitica Nominates a appeal to the party's traditional through the adeco ranks toward the Candidate: Division and Conflict blue-collar and peasant voter base, presidency as the "old man's" At the start of the current campaign, Lusinchi, a pediatrician, represented Once in office, however, AD difficulties were compounded the nation's growing professional the new president had struck his by internal party divisions and and middle classes. own course and had abandoned leadership clashes. The most several policies dear to Betancourt's public arena for adeco conflict was Behind the Lusinchi-Pifierua heart. Most notable of these was the the party's 1977 presidential contest, however, also lay a more so-called "Betancourt Doctrine" in primary, the first of its kind in Latin fundamental conflict between foreign policy which stipulated ~merica.AD'S nearly one million President Perez and the AD party staunch opposition to (and members were offered the choice of machinery. Some degree of conflict diplomatic nonrecognition of) both two congressional leaders with between the president and his party Castro's Cuba and Latin America's strongly contrasting styles and has existed in most previous rightist military regimes. Seeking to images. Deputy Luis Pifierua Ordaz administrations as each chief establish Venezuela (and himself) as in many ways represented the executive has sought to a Third-World leader, Perez has traditional populist adeco self-image demonstrate that he is his own man. abandoned Betancourt's hard-line as the "party of the people." Born President Perez' flamboyant style, anticommunism, established of lower-middle-class origins and obvious desire for personal friendly diplomatic ties with Cuba, never having finished high school, popularity, and failure to be a "team and, at the same time, dealt more Pitierua worked his way up the party man," however, had put him at a openly with right-wing military ranks to become Governor, Minister greater distance than normal from dictatorships in Brazil and ~rgentina.1~In addition to his only chance of winning the election the copeyano youth movement at dissatisfaction with Perez's policies, lay in a strong defense of his own the time of the party's inception in Don R6mulo (as his admirers call administration's record. In the 1946, Herrera has served 15 years in him), a man of unquestioned weeks after the convention, AD the Chamber of Deputies and one integrity, was also upset over the wounds were slow to heal. At a term in the Senate. While the career high level of corruption and January 7,1978 party assembly, of this opponent, Luis Piiierua has "immorality" in the present Betancourt spoke openly of developed close to the country's administration. party-government differences and rural, grassroots, Herrera -a lawyer cited "public immorality," inflation, and journalist- has had As the primary developed, then, crime, and poor public services as considerable international each of the two presidents sought major campaign issues. experience as his party's delegate to to implant his own leadership, and Subsequently, several letters from the world conference of his own vision of Venezuela, on the Betancourt to party leaders (all parliamentarians and to various party and on the prospective AD leaked to the press) took President international Christian Democratic nominee. Betancourt, still a Perez to task for permitting Congresses. As a member of powerful figure in the party corruption and administering a weak COPEI's National Directorate since machinery, placed himself squarely foreign policy. Perez, in turn, was the 1950s and, more recently, leader behind the candidacy of his close rumored to be so incensed that he of the party's congressional friend Luis Pinerua. Officially, threatened to deny administration delegation, the Senator stands President Perez remained staunchly aid to the Pirterfia campaign, or even squarely within the copeyano neutral, but his preference for to back the independent candidacy centrist "official wing." Yet, he is Lusinchi was widely known. On July of his friend and Information generally considered more 17,1977, over 740,000 adeco Minister, Diego Arria, unless the progressive than long-time COPEI members cast their ballots and attacks ceased. standard-bearer Rafael Caldera. overwhelmingly selected Luis Indeed, he was favored by the PiiierCa. To be sure, Lusinchi had COPEI: Party Unity and the copeyano left for the nomination in never really stood a chance and Coronation of a Candidate both 1973 and the current both he and President Perez realized campaign. In 1973, then-President Like Acci6n Democrtitica (or any months before the primary that they Caldera apparently used his large political party), COPEI has also were beaten. Betancourt and the influence to block Herrera Campins' experienced internal debates and AD party machinery had geared up nomination, fearing Herrera's ties to divisions. To be sure, the Social for Pifierfia, and their network of the party's left would cost COPEI Christians are far more ideologically people who had been promised jobs critical middle-class and business heterogeneous today than are the in a new administration, people for support. whom the party had secured public adecos. Their viewpoints range from Opus Dei traditionalists and housing and other direct personal After the Social Christians stunning business-oriented fiscal contacts built up over the years defeat in 1973, Herrera Campins conservatives on the right, to were more than enough to insure began to tour the country seeking communitarian, quasi-socialists on victory. both to unite the party and to build the leftj3 But, unlike AD-which support for his own nomination. By suffered three debilitating schisms Three weeks later, at the AD 1977, the extremely popular Senator in the 1960s-COPEI has never convention formally endorsing had secured the backing of all the expelled nor lost a party faction. PifierCia's candidacy, party party's ideological wings. On Due in part to the dominant role of blood-letting continued. In his August 17,1977 the 4,552 delegates its founder, Rafael Caldera (the speech to the delegates, Betancourt to the COPEI national convention party's presidential candidate in pointedly criticized government nominated him by acclamation. every election from 1947 through corruption and implicitly Copeyano leaders, convinced that disassociated the new candidate 1968), internal differences have been kept within manageable the country was ready for a change from the record of the current and that they had fielded a far bounds. In 1977, the copeyanos administration. The party's grand stronger candidate than AD, looked old man showed his coolness moved toward the selection of their presidential candidate more toward to the race with scarcely toward Perez by speaking only of harmoniously united than ever. concealed confidence and "the president" and never enthusiasm. mentioning the chief executive by name. Similarly, in his acceptance Selection of the COPE! nominee MAS and the Venezuelan Left: speech, Pirterua suggested that his was carried out through a national The Search for Unity administration would be quite convention, rather than a primary. different from the current one. On Months before the Social Christian Following 20 years of Acci6n the other hand, Carlos Andres delegates convened, it was clear Democr5tica1spredominance in Perez, not surprisingly, insisted to their overwhelming choice would be Venezuelan electoral politics and the assembled delegates that AD's Luis Herrera Campins. A founder of COPEI's emergence as AD's major challenger, the role of the nation's elected to high-ranking positions in supporters, 16 percent identified "third parties" remains unclear. In several professionalorganizations with COPEI, and 10 percent the first three elections held during (including the national association of supported MAS.' National surveys the modern democratic era, journalists), and demonstrate conducted during the first 6 months third-party presidential candidates considerable strength within the of 1978 indicate that total third party secured a sizable percentage of the petroleum workers' union, among support-principally for MAS and vote, ranging from a total of 35 iron and steel workers, and in the the independent candidate, Diego percent in 1958 to 47 percent in industrial unions of Caracas, Ciudad Arria - is likely to reach 25 percent 1963. In the 1973 campaign, Guayana, Carabobo, Aragua, and of the vote in this December's however, support for challengers to Zulia. election, some 10 percent above the AD and COPEI collapsed. The 1973 total. reform-oriented URD (which had MIR, led by its co-founder (and only drawn between 19 and 33 percent of congressional representative), As MAS moved toward the the vote in the previous 3 Americo Martin, remains the most selection of its 1978 candidate, presidential elections) and the militant of the country's four leftist however, its prospects seemed left-of-center MEP (which drew parties. While rnirista strength in clouded by internal divisions and by nearly 20 percent during its first some strategic labor unions and on differences between the parties of campaign in 1968) both failed to the nation's campuses has been the left. As they have moderated exceed 5 percent of the vote in the growing, the party has so far failed their political image, rnasistas have last election. In addition, the to attract a substantial following found themselves outflanked on the far-rightist CCN (National Civic among the general electorate. left by the more militant rniristas. Crusade), which had secured a MAS -whose congressional The problem has been particularly substantial congressional vote in the delegation includes Teodoro serious on the nation's university 1968 election, virtually disappeared Petkoff, Eloy Torres, and other campuses, a critical source of party former leaders of the Communist from the political scene. In all, the 10 activists. In the 1977 elections at the Party's guerrilla effort- rejects presidential candidates ranged Venezuelan Central University MIR's strident Leninism, favoring a against AD and COPEI in 1973 (Caracas), MIR candidates ended more moderate Marxist stance akin attained a total of only 14.5 percent five years of MAS dominance in to Italian ~urocommunism?~ of the vote, less than one-half their student government. Mirista upsets Having left the Venezuelan lowest previous combined total. followed at the University of Communist Party in a protest Consequently, many political Carabobo and at Los Andes. against democratic centralism and analysts argued that the 1973 Similarly, in union elections at the election was the first step toward a Stalinism, rnasista leaders seem huge, government-owned SIDUR two party Venezuelan political firmly committed to free debate and steel plant (Ciudad Guayana), MAS system. electoral democracy. In 1973 the candidates lost ground to MIR and party purposely went outside the COPEI slates. In the wake of these ranks of its own membership to setbacks, MAS Deputy-Secretary- Development since the last national choose Jose Vicente Range1 as its General Teodoro Petkoff blamed election suggest that reports of the presidential candidate in a further party youth leaders (who were third parties' demise may be effort to moderate its image. identified with rnasista Secretary premature. During that period, the Rangel, a respected lawyer and General Pompeyo Mgrquez) for the Marxist left-particularly MAS and, journalist, had served as a losses on the university campuses. to a lesser extent, MIR (the Leftist Congressman for the URD (a Petkoff, in turn, came under sharp Revolutionary Movement- has non-Marxist, left-of-center party) attack by German Lairet, a leader of reorganized, recast its image, and during the period of guerrilla the party's most moderate wing emerged as the principal challenger insurrection and had never been and, with Petkoff, a co-founder of to AD-COPE1 dominance. associated with the rnasista MAS in 1971. Lairet and fellow Essentially, the two leading leftist leadership's insurgent activities. moderate Jose Urbina accused parties have attempted to extricate Petkoff of being a Stalinist in themselvesfrom the isolation caused Following a rather modest showing disguise, not truly committed to the by their unpopular and unsuccessful in its first electoral campaign in party's democratic principles. The gueklla effort in the 1960s l4 The 1973, MAS has emerged as the "Teodoristas" (followers of Petkoff) core of their current support is found leading party of the left and the dismissed the moderates as closet among students, sectors of the labor nation's principal third Social Democrats, little different movement (particularly younger, party?6 Masista support is from AD. skilled, industrial workers), and particularly strong in the Caracas professional elements of the middle metropolitan area, home of Amid these party squabbles, two class. Marxists currently lead the one-fourth of the Venezuelan candidates emerged to seek the student governments in 50 percent electorate. In a 1977 Gallup poll of MAS presidential nomination. The of the nation's high schools and greater Caracas, 21 percent of the first was Jose Vicente Rangel, a universities. They have also been voters were identified as AD member of the rnasista delegation to the Chamber of Deputies and the articulate member of the Chamber but had been rebuffed in its efforts party's standard-bearer in the of Deputies. In seeking the MAS to field a single, MAS-MIR previous election. The handsome, nomination, Petkoff argued that, congressional slate. With the advent impeccably-dressed, 47-year-old however great Rangel's of the current campaign, efforts lawyer-journalist, had developed a qualifications, masistas should not were launched to form a united high degree of voter recognition and again support a candidate who was front, and select a presidential respect during his 1973 campaign not a party member. Petkoff's candidate who could be endorsed and subsequent political activity. opponents argued that the fiery by all four parties of the left. In Indeed, in a 1976 national survey leader's guerrilla past would alienate addition to MAS and MIR, the conducted well before a clear AD or many potential MAS voters. proposed front would include the COPEI candidate emerged, Rangel Communist Party and MEP (the was named by more voters than was One month before the party's Popular Electoral Movement). While any other single politician as their December 1976 convention, Petkoff spokesmen for all these parties choice for president in 1978. His withdrew from the race after it expressed enthusiasm for highly respectable image offered became apparent that Rangel had unification, differences persisted MAS a clear break with its founders' enough votes to secure the over critical details. Should a leftist guerrilla past and an opportunity to nomination. Masistas had coalition involve only the attract voters among lower and apparently decided to leave the presidential candidate or should a middle class moderates. For this militantly left vote to MIR in hopes single congressional slate also be reason, he was backed by MAS of attracting a larger number of chosen? By what means would the Secretary General Pompeyo more moderate voters. While they presidential standard-bearer be MFirquez. had lost the presidential race, the selected? What role would each "Teodoristas" emerged from the party play in the proposed coalition? Rangel's principal opponent was convention with 19 of 35 seats on And, of course, who would be the Teodoro Petkoff, leader of the MAS the MAS national directory, thereby presidential candidate? congressional delegation, party assuming control of the party Deputy-Secretary-General, and organization. Strenuously denying In the absence of a quick resolution MAS' most widely known and rumors of a personal rift with Party to these problems, each party popular spokesman. Teodoro, as he Secretary MFirquez, Petkoff and his proceeded to name its own is known in party ranks, joined the allies rallied behind Rangel's candidate, while making clear its Venezuelan Communist Party at the candidacy. willingness to withdraw that age of 16 and was active during the nominee in the future should 1950s in underground opposition to The selection of the masista unification be achieved. The the Perez Jimenez dictatorship. candidate fully two years before the Communists, probably the left's During the 1960s he was a leader of December 1978 election posed a weakest party since the defection of the Communist Party's guerrilla problem for the other parties of the its best leaders to MAS, selected activities and engineered two Venezuelan left. During the previous Hector Mujica, president of the dramatic escapes from prison. Later national campaign, MIR had national association of journalists. in the decade, after the guerrilla's endorsed Range! for the presidency, While well-liked in Venezuelan effort's collapse, his two books attacking the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and calling for a non-Soviet form of Venezuelan Marxism featuring free debate and democracy made him the leading spokesman for the dissidents who quit the Communist Party in 1970 to form MAS!^ A man of immense personal charm and sweeping intellectual interests, Petkoff is possibly the most popular member of Congress among the nation's television and press corps. One leading congressional correspondent (and no supporter of MAS) indicated to me that Petkoff is the most well-prepared and

Luis Herrera Campins (COPED touring low-income housing project during his campaign. political and press circles, Mujica congressional slate. But the Wolfgang LarrAzabal, a leader of the has little national following. MEP, commission's efforts were doomed junta that had replaced Perez the left's least radical party (indeed, from the start. MAS, the dominant Jimenez. Larrdzabal, with no the only one that does not label party of the left, was intent on political party background or itself Marxist), turned to its controlling its own destiny, political experience beyond his brief co-founder Luis Beltran Prieto, who establishing an independent tenure on the junta, was extremely led MEP out of Acci6n Democrdtica position, and disassociating itself popular among the urban poor in 1968. The tall, aging educator is from the old left. Consequently, it because of his dynamism, honesty, known simply as "el maestro" (the rejected offers by MlR and the and commitment to social reform. teacher). The nation's only black Communists to back Rangel Running with URD and Communist presidential candidate, Prieto is because those offers were backing, he swept Caracas and widely loved for his warmth and conditioned by a demand for finished a strong second nationally, humanitarian concern. He has had co-direction of the Rangel behind R6mulo Betancourt (AD) an illustrious career as an author (25 campaign. Masista leaders saw no and well ahead of COPEI leader books), educator, Minister of great value in allying with the Rafael Caldera. In the next two Education, UNESCO official, and Communists-who have never national elections both J6vito founding father and former attracted more than 2-3 percent of Villalba (URD's 1963 candidate) and president of Acci6n Democratica. In the vote-or with MEP-a party in Luis Prieto (MEP-1968) seemed to 1968, as the MEP nominee, Prieto sharp decline. They do respect MIR attract votes more on the basis of drew an impressive 20 percent of and Am6rico Martin and hope to personalistic appeal than on party the vote. Today, at age 76, he is reach some accommodation with loyalties. That phenomenon was clearly past his prime. the miristas in future campaigns. even more apparent in the case of But such a coalition is unlikely ex-dictator Perez Jimenez who led Finally, in October 1977, unless MIR moderates its hard-line his ad hoc party, CCN, to a MIR-which had been most Leninist position. For the present, surprisingly strong congressional vociferously committed to a united however, only Rangel and MAS showing in 1968. front candidate- nominated the represent viable third party party's leading spokesman, Am6rico opposition, with the other 3 leftist The 1973 election produced no arti in. Seventeen years earlier, candidates unlikely to exceed a personalistic candidate and, indeed, Martin-then the 22-year-old combined total of 5-7 percent of the was dominated to an president of the Central University's December vote. unprecedented degree by AD and student government and leader of COPEI. Yet, Venezuelan voters the Accidn DemocrAtica youth The Non-Party Independents seem to still maintain a certain wing- had abandoned a highly ambivalence toward their political promising career in AD to found If the 1978 presidential election tests parties. In a 1973 survey of MIR and take up arms against the the viability of third party Venezuelan public opinion, political government. Today, his current alternatives, it also probes the scientists John Martz and Enrique campaign slogan -"Am6rico, continued strength of another Baloyra found that three-fourths of Manos Limpios" ("America: Clean Venezuelan political phenomenon, the electorate felt political parties Hands1')-expresses MIR's the independent populist candidate. were important to the nation, continued insistence on ideological A major achievement of Venezuela's although voters simultaneously "purity" and its refusal to accept political leaders during the past 20 expressed dissatisfaction with the MAS' more flexible position toward years has been the development of actual performance of existing the establishment parties. arti in, well-organized, stable, and parties. Three-fourths of the the still-young, strikingly handsome, responsible political parties that respondents believed Venezuelan ex-guerrilla, is probably the most transcend personal loyalties. Indeed, parties were controlled by small charismatic of all the current the emergence of a mature party oligarchical groups. A 1977 survey presidential candidates. Despite his system is a hallmark of political of the Caracas metropolitan area uncompromising, militant ideology, development in the modern world. showed that 51 percent ofall voters he is personally well-liked by most of As in most of the Third World, refused to endorse any party. his political foes (including his however, personalism (i.e., political Finally, in a nationwide Gallup poll erstwhile AD colleagues) and loyalty to charismatic personalities conducted in May 1978,20 percent greatly respected for his political rather than to parties, ideologies, or of the voters said existing political talents. programs) has remained a strong parties were useless, while an element of the Venezuelan political additional 26 percent felt they only Efforts at leftist unification system. had slight utility. Only 42 percent continued into the early months of indicated that parties were very 1978. In January, the four parties In 1958, following the overthrow of useful to the nationJ9 formed a commission charged with military dictator Marcos P6rez trying to select both a single Jimenez, the URD selected as its This ambivalent attitude is presidential nominee and a common presidential candidate, Admiral apparently coupled with a negative assessment of politicians. Martz' began to express private concern a giant office-housing complex; and Baloyra's study showed 80 that he might draw anti- began a well-publicized, low-income percent of the electorate believing administration, protest votes away housing project; cleared beggars that "politicians are predisposed to from them. The number of votes he and venders off Caracas' streets; lie at every turn." These critical might have drawn, and its effect on and closed parts of the downtown evaluations would seem to present his AD, COPEI, and MAS area to traffic. His admirers claimed opportunities to a presidential opponents, will never be known. On that as Governor, "he did more to aspirant claiming to be "above March 16, merely two weeks before make Caracas a livable city than any political parties" and "free of the official start of the national other person in the history of the corrupt political ties." campaign, Ottolina's private plane ~ountry."~'His detractors, crashed into a mountainside outside however, accused him of initiating During the current race, two such Caracas killing him and his projects that were poorly planned, independent candidates have companions.20 inadequately financed, and emerged to challenge the party designed primarily for Diego's system. The first was Renny The day after the crash (at that time self-aggrandizement. Ottolina, Venezuela's most popular the wreckage had not been found talk-show host and television and Ottolina was merely reported In 1977, AD politicians-who personality. His frequent missing), the President's office despised Arria's playboy, country appearance in television announced the resignation of club, social background and his advertisements and variety shows, Minister of Information Diego Arria, blatant disregard for party and his hard work as a fund-raiser thereby clearing the way for Arria's protocol - pressed President Perez for various charitable causes, had independent candidacy for the to remove him from the made Renny (as he is universally presidency. Actually, Diego (who, governorship. Consequently, the known) a household name with a like Ottolina, is usually referred to by President asks his good friend to tremendous personal following. In his first name) had made his head the newly created Ministry of July 1977 he launched his decision to seek the presidency four Information and Tourism. There independent candidacy for the months earlier, long before Renny's Arria became one of the Cabinet's presidency. Financial backing for his death. Arria's awkwardly timed most influential members, while campaign apparently came primarily "resignation" from the President's directing an enormous from conservative business interests Cabinet came before he had (publicly-financed) media campaign including associates of former intended it and was precipitated by to "highlight the accomplishments dictator Perez Jimenez. Yet, pressure from his many political of the Perez administration." The ironically, Renny's appeal among opponents in AD. On May 21, the flashy, smooth-talking Minister, the urban lower classes (particularly former Information Minister never a team man, remained among women) threatened to appeared on national television to anathema to adeco's stolid, encroach on MAS' hopes for announce his candidacy. middle-class leadership. With both increased support among the COPEI (which he had deserted in nation's slumdwellers. Despite his Diego- young, extremely 1973) and AD closed to him, Diego's fame, virtually nothing was known handsome, articulate, and vain to only possible channel for political of Ottolina's political orientation. the point of arrogance- had built advancement lay in an independent Repeatedly refusing to offer a his career as a political maverick. In candidacy. concrete program or to define his 1973, he resigned a technocratic ideology, he spoke in broad position in the COPEI administration Diego Arria's political orientation is platitudes, stressing Venezuelan to help direct the presidential generally liberal with a strong nationalism, honesty, the value of campaign of AD candidate, Carlos technocratic bent. His friends and hard work, and, most of all, rejection Andres Perez. He quickly earned a political allies have included slain of the political party system. reputation as a media whiz and Chilean leftist Orlando Letelier "People should be elected on the expert "image maker" while at the (whose body Arria had flown to basis of talent," he repeated, "not same time establishing a close bond Venezuela for burial), wealthy just because they are AD or COPEI. with the adeco candidate. Venezuelan industrialist Pedro Subsequently, Arria was rewarded Tinoco, and the Nuiiez Arismendi Initially, neither party leaders nor for his critical role in Perez's family, owners of the conservative Venezuelan political analysts took impressive electoral victory with an Caracas daily, El Universe. His Ottolina's candidacy seriously. Both appointment as Governor of the extensive media campaign suggests groups apparently underestimated Federal District of Caracas. In his that Diego has powerful financial his popularity and his political new post, Diego used his direct line backing that belies his populist acumen. By February 1977, opinion to the President, and his aggressive image. Like Renny Ottolina, he is polls indicated he was drawing the style, to by-pass the AD party basically runing on an antiparty support of 7 percent of the machinery in the city council and platform built around his campaign electorate, only a few less than push through an ambitious slogan, "For Diego, the People MAS. Copeyanos and rnasistas program. In short order: he initiated Come First." Also like Renny, he purposely avoids both concrete their denunciations of AD policies, own party's candidate, it permits a proposals and ideological definition. the Social Christians' campaign government to advertise its own real Indeed, he has refused to issue a slogan assured the nation that "Luis or alleged accomplishments. From political program, claiming "the Herrera will Straighten This the closing months of 1977 onward, country's problems are obvious." the nation's television, movie The Acci6n DemocrGtica campaign, theaters, and press were inundated Backed by his blonde, socialite wife by contrast, started off haltingly. with a flood of advertisements Tiki (whom some see as a would-be While their standard-bearer, Luis touting government social and Eva Peron), Diego has concentrated Pifierda, worked tirelessly, he lacked economic development projects. his campaign on the nation's Herrera's charm and was a The slickly produced ads, emanating younger voters (nearly 20 percent of singularly ineffective public speaker. from Information Minister Arria's the electorate is under 22 years of A February speech by Pifierua to office, featured fast-moving films of age) and on Caracas shantytowns 12,000 AD youth was so uninspiring President Perez briskly striding from where he enjoys great popularity that nearly half these strongly one project to another as his voice from his days as Governor. More committed supporters left after the was superimposed over dramatic than any other candidate, he relies first hour of their candidate's overly background music. Each ad finished on the media and on Madison long discourse. Posturing himself with the message, "Step by step, Avenue techniques. The most somewhat to the right of both the work of the government is being "Americanized" of the current Herrera and President Perez, completed." Throughout 1978, the nominees (he speaks fluent English Pifierua advocated a greater role for 'Paso a Paso" ("step by step") and has lived in the United States), the private sector in the economy, campaign, as it came to be known, he has received campaign advice called for a national police force to saturated the media, exceeding in from Jimmy Carter's pollster, Pat combat crime in the streets, and volume the combined Cadell, and image maker, Jerry accused COPEI of being soft on advertisements of all the presidential Rafshoon. While Arria has no communism. candidates. One political insider told chance of winning the presidency, me the government had spent $40 he hopes to attract the votes of the Through the first weeks of 1978, the million of the taxpayers' funds on many disaffected Venezuelans who adeco candidate seemed to carry the campaign. had leaned toward Renny Ottolina forward the scars of the party's or who might be considering MAS. primary and the divisions between Some aspects of the government's the nominee and the outgoing program of self-congratulation were The Campaign Takes Shape president. Thus, Pitiercia was nearly quite questionable. In January, for as critical as his COPEI opponent of Diego Arria's entry into the race example, as the country approached the Perez administration's record. completed the cast of major the twentieth anniversary of the He promised a "war against presidential candidates. By that overthrow of the Perez Jimenez corruption and delinquency," time, however, his opponents, Luis dictatorship (and of the birth of the criticized the administration for Pitierua, Luis Herrera, and Jose contemporary democratic regime), closing down several prisons, and Vicente Rangel, had completed posters and banners appeared promised to improve social more than six months of intense throughout the nation hailing "20 services. In short, both major campaigning, and the character of Years of Democratic Action." This candidates' early campaign rhetoric the electoral contest had taken blatant identification of the sounded strikingly similar. Each shape. democratic era with the incumbent seemed dissatisfied with the existing Acci6n Democriitica party was situation; neither offered solutions loudly protested by COPEI and COPEI, exulting in Herrera's early that differed substantially from the MAS. Shortly thereafter, the lead and sensing a mood of public other's nor from the incumbent national Electoral Council, a discontent, launched a vigorous administration's; both seemed multiparty organism charged with attack on the Perez administration's merely to be saying that they could regulating the election campaign, record. Luis Herrera implicitly do the job better. ruled that these banners violated accepted the thrust of President restrictions on political Perez's programs in agriculture, advertisement prior to the official industrialization, housing, Paso a Paso: The Administration opening of the campaign on April education, and social welfare, but Defends Itself 11 23 Still, the banners and posters insisted that those programs were If AD candidate Luis Pifierua was remained. not working. The copeyano Senator not ready to defend the incumbent denounced breakdowns in public administration's record at this stage AD Comes Together services, corruption, and of the race, President Perez and his maladministration, suggesting that Cabinet had no such compunction. By March 1978, as the nation the tremendous oil revenues While Venezuelan law prohibits approached the official opening of collected by the adeco government members of the executive branch the electoral campaign, a subtle had been squandered. Coupled with from campaigning on behalf of their change had taken place in the nature of the race. AD polls had better year than the previous one. The core of the Pefierua campaign indicated that the party's chances Indeed, Venezuelans were more was the media blitz. While data were for victory would be greatly optimistic in this area than were unavailable, my own observations impaired unless its own internal respondents in any of the other 17 suggested that during the first half splits were healed. Consequently, nations in which Gallup asked the of 1978, there were perhaps four Luis Pitierca and his associates, same question?5 times as many television including R6mulo Betancourt, commercials for Pitierua as for Luis abandoned their earlier criticisms of Having smoothed over their earlier Herrera. Following his entry into the the administration and began to differences, the adecos geared up race, Diego Arria almost matched defend the Perez record with their superbly organized machine to the quantity of COPEI growing vigor. It was even rumored do what AD does best, win advertisement, while no other that President Perez had agreed to elections. In a further move toward candidate was able to afford dismiss Diego Arria from the party harmony, Piiierua's primary appreciable paid television time. If Cabinet in March in return for opponent, Jaime Lusinchi, was one were to add together the Pitierda's promise to run on the placed on AD'S powerful National Pitierua spots with the "Paso a administration's record2 Piriert3afs Electoral Command. Adeco Paso" commercials, pro-adeco strategists were also well aware that strategists skillfully polished their media exposure would dwarf their by associating their candidate with candidates image, emphasizing his opponents' efforts. the Perez administration, they could most positive characteristics- benefit from the government's administrative experience (which COPEI: The Search for an Effective massive "Paso a Paso" advertising Herrera lacked), diligence, and Issue campaign. Finally, it had begun to honesty. Because of Pitierua's appear that the national mood of weakness as a public speaker, AD The Social Christians opened their discontent during fall 1977-spurred television spots during the first own, far more modest, media on by serious breakdowns in water months of 1978 rarely featured the campaign with an aggressive attack delivery and shortages of certain candidate and never showed him on the Perez administration. Herrera food items- had been less speaking. Instead, a wave of ads focused on the enormous amount of deep-seated than previously featured testimonials from students, money spent during the past four imagined. Several months without housewives, truck drivers, slum years and charged the adecos with disruptions in water or electrical dwellers, small farmers, a star maladministration and corruption. service, a record new year's harvest soccer player, and a professional Borrowing from a speech by their that promised to alleviate food pianist. Each "average Venezuelan" congressional leader, Eduardo shortages, and President Jimmy explaind how his or her life had been Fernandez, the copeyanos adopted Carter's impending visit to Caracas, improved by the current adeco a new campaign slogan: "Donde all seemed to boost the administration and why each estan 10s reales?" ("Where has the government's popularity. A Gallup believed that under Luis Pifiert3a1s money gone?"). Looking for a poll showed that 68 percent of all honest and capable management poignant example of public waste, Venezuelans expected 1978 to be a the country would do even better. they pointed to a large exhibition center that the government had started building years earlier in downtown Caracas. Despite the expenditure of $10 million, the unsightly structure-commonly called "King Kong's Cager'- had still not been completed. Thus, COPEI jingles offered an answer to their own question: "Where has the money gone?- Into King Kong's cage."

While waste and corruption are certainly rife in the current administration, the COPEI attacks failed to take hold. Despite documented evidence of maladministration, most voters were not convinced that a COPEI administration would do much Luis Herrera Campins (COPED campaigning in low-income housing project. better. Herrera's charges, moreover, tended to be far too broad and vaguely stated. To simply ask "where has the money gone?" was to invite a huge number of AD and government advertisements (including the "paso a paso" ads listing the current administration's many positive accomplishments- power plants, steel mills, irrigation projects, schools, and hospitals. Given the vast amount of money the Perez administration had spent, even after allowing for waste and corruption, many impressive programs had indeed been initiated.

Other serious weaknesses became apparent in the Herrera campaign. While criticism of the incumbent was a perfectly valid electoral technique (and, indeed, there was much room for both praise and criticism), Herrera was far too prone to overkill and gross misstatement. To call the Perez administration "the worst [in Venezuela] in this century," as Herrera did, or to claim that the country was falling apart "like a leper in advanced stages" was clearly absurd. Moreover, COPEI campaign propaganda was almost exclusively negative in tone. The administration's record was continually criticized, but never did Herrera indicate what positive changes he would implement. In short, ineffective campaign strategy and poor "packaging" of their Herrera's campaign manager, Rafael Political poster. Luis Pifierfia as candidate had cost the copeyanos. And& Montes de Oca, himself a presidential candidate for Accibn Luis Herrera, a man known by his potential party Secretary, had Dernocraca. associates for his warmth, sincerity, alienated many COPEI leaders and and concern for the nation's "have had failed to make use of some of slogans, television advertisements, nots," had come across to the the party's more prominent and even posters were called in as voting public as vague and personalities on the campaign trail. the copeyano strategists shifted pugnacious. As one party leader put Former President Rafael Caldera gears. On Garth's advice, Herrera it, "it looks like our media program took pot shots at Abddn Vivas abandoned the folksy, was written by an adeco." Tertin (spokesman for the COPEI down-to-earth image he had been left), while Caldera and Herrera trying to project for a more By April, various opinion polls followers tried to outmaneuver each statesman-like appearance. The indicated that Herrera had lost his other for greater control of the open-necked peasant shirt he had lead and that the COPEI campaign campaign. sported so frequently on the effort was stalled. The party campaign trail was generally harmony brought on by the In an effort to put the Herrera abandoned for jacket and tie. The euphoria of the previous fall began candidacy back on track, COPEI "King Kong Cage" campaign was to fade. Several leaders and factions turned to American campaign dropped, as was the aggressive tone seemed more interested in jockeying strategist David Garth. Insiders of copeyano speeches. "Leave the for position for next year's selection report that Garth was aghast at the low road to Piii&~a," Garth of party Secretary General than in weakness of COPEI strategy and suggested. It was determined that aiding the Herrera campaign. media propaganda. Old campaign Herrera should become more specific in his criticisms of the AD administration and devote more time to offering positive solutions. Finally, COPEI strategists determined to take greater advantage of Herrera's superiority over Pitierua as a public speaker. COPEI television ads would feature its candidate more prominently in an effort to highlight Pifier6a1s dependenceon packaged endorsements and the paucity of appearances by the adeco candidate. Herrera also challenged his opponent to a televised debate, a challenge which Pirierua quickly rejected. By June, further erosion of Herrera's position had apparently been halted. It remained to be seen whether COPEI's candidate could regain his earlier lead.

MAS Looks to the Future During the first months of the campaign, the Venezuelan press focused most of its attention, not surprisingly, on the two major party candidates. Once it was clear that the left had failed to unite behind a single presidential standard-bearer, media interest in MAS (and, even more so, the other leftist parties) declined. Due perhaps to its earlier internal conflicts, MAS' campaign efforts were slow in getting off the ground. The public turnout was disappointing for an 18-kilometer march through Caracas (featuring Rangel, Petkoff, Msrquez, and other party luminaries) officially kicking off the campaign on April 1. long-term challenge to the Political poster. Luis Herrera Carnpins, Gradually, however, the party began establishment parties. Rangel's COPE1 candidate. to rebound. An impressive mass campaign differed in both quality rally in late May held in downtown and quantity from Pirieru6's or economic resources were modest. Caracas attracted 60,000 to 90,000 Herrera's efforts. As one of the 4 Rangel's television exposure was and convinced many doubters that parties to attain 5 percent of the limited almost exclusively to unpaid Rangel's candidacy would have to vote in the last election, MAS was appearances on interview programs be taken seriously. Opinion polls entitled, under Venezuelan law, to a and, of course, the news. confirmed masista expectations that modest government campaign they would emerge in this election subsidy of about Bs. 3,300,000 Neighborhood walks by Range! as as the major party of the left. ($750,000). Additional funds were well as other MAS leaders were a Barring a surprisingly fast finish by raised in many inventive ways, critical element of the party's Diego Arria, Rangel and the masista including the sale of paintings by strategy for reaching the electorate. ticket appeared sure to far prominent Venezuelan artists Lack of funds also put a premium on outdistance any other third party sympathetic to MAS. The party unpaid volunteers, most drawn from candidates. obviously could not draw on the high schools and universities. In one large contributions from big Rangel march that I attended, Unlike AD and COPEI, however, business that go to AD, COPEI and, hundreds of orange-shirted students MAS viewed their progress as to a lesser extent, the independent (orange is the official party color) merely a stepping stone toward a Arria campaign. Consequently, their accompanied their candidate through a low-income barrio of members of the middle and lower MAS political propaganda insisted Porlamar, a small provincial capital. classes were keenly aware of the that AD and COPEI were essentially Barcelona, Maracay, Valencia, and maldistribution of the nation's indistinguishable in their policies other Venezuelan cities were wealth; but, at the same time, MAS' because both were beholden to big covered with MAS posters and wall potential constituency among the business interests. The reformist drawings put up by young urban poor and industrial working measures implemented since 1958 volunteers. Masista wall art was class generally rejected the socialist by the two establishment parties, generally considered the best of any alternative as a solution to these maintained the masistas, had failed party's and, as two observers of the problems. Consequently, Rangel, fundamentally to solve the problems 1973 campaign noted, it was least Petkoff, and other party leaders saw of the lower classes and had, in fact, often defaced.26 the electoral campaign as an permitted a widening gap between opportunity to "raise the political rich and poor. Consequently, MAS It was not merely resources and consciousness [i.e., class called for the expropriation of the technique that distinguished consciousness1 of the working class nation's largest, private industrial Rangel's campaign from Herrera's and middle class." and commercial firms (but favored or Piiierua's, but its objectives as well. Most immediately, MAS wished to establish itself as the major third party challenger to AD-COPEI. Campaign slogans were designed to project MAS as a party on the verge of victory. "One step from victory," declared MAS posters, while young militants at party rallies chanted "we can do it, we are MAS" ("mas" is the Spanish word for "more" or "a majority"). Independent surveys, as well as spokesmen for all 3 major parties, indicated Rangel would attract over 10 percent of the vote in December (twice his 1973 showing) and might possibly win close to 15 percent. Despite their public insistence that they were in the race to win, both Rangel and his campaign manager, Freddy Mufioz, indicated to me that they would be pleased with a respectable third-place finish and anything over 10 percent of the vote. Such a showing, they said, would create a base for future growth.

Looking beyond the present election, MAS spokesmen saw their campaign effort as part of a long-term educational process. The party's strategists (including many of the nation's leading social scientists) perceived three critical aspects of Venezuelan public opinion: first, there was widespread disaffection with the specific performances of Venezuelan politicians and of the two establishment parties;27 second,

MAS supporters, many wearing orange hardhats, carry their party banner through the streets of Caracas. leaving smaller businesses in private As he went into the shantytowns when Luis Herrera led his adeco hands). The party also wished to and low-income barrios, Rangel opponent by a healthy margin in reduce (but not eliminate) spoke, not of a "new socialist January of this year, the majority of Venezuela's economic linkages to society," but of better water and Venezuelan voters expected Piiierfia the United ~tates?~ electrical service, improved to win? Of course, such ingrained transportation, and better housing. expectations can well become self-fulfilling prophecies. While Rangel and his colleagues Conclusions: The Campaign in effectively articulated the injustices Perspective The viability of COPEI (or any other and inequities still existent in party) as a challenger to AD is a In a close election such as Venezuelan society, they failed to matter of concern for many Venezuela's 1978 presidential race, show the average voter how observers of Venezuelan politics. candidates often experience surges socialization of major economic Hermogenes Lopez, a respected and declines in popularity. In sectors or reduced "dependency" independent Senator, has warned on the capitalist world would solve January 1978, many political that another AD victory might lead the problems of most immediate analysts were conceding the the country toward a concern to the lower classes- election to Luis Herrera. Acci6n "Mexican-type" political system in inadequate housing, poor public Democritica was too badly split, which opposition parties exist, but services, and high crime rates. MAS they said, and Luis PifieruA could one party always wind2 Senator spokesmen reportedly stressed not inspire the electorate. Some Lopez' warning and fears seem Venezuela's extreme inequalities of three months later, the common greatly exaggerated to this observer. wealth and income, and MAS wisdom was that Piiierua was a There may be legitimate cause for intellectuals undoubtedly perceived stronger candidate than expected concern, however, over the problem a clear linkage between socialism and that Herrera, plagued by of infusing new blood and ideas into and improvements in the quality of indecisiveness and bad campaign the Venezuelan political system if daily life. Yet, surveys indicated that strategists, had blown the election. AD continues its winning tradition. the voters the party most wished to AD would win as usual. By July, reach-the poor and the working "political experts" were shying Looking further down the list of classes-were more concerned with away from any predictions. Gallup candidates, Jose Vicente Rangel is crime and garbage collection than polls issued that month indicated likely to lead MAS to a third place with economic distribution? This that Pihert'ia had moved ahead of finish ahead of Diego Arria's may explain why support for MAS Herrera by 3.2 percent, while the independent candidacy. A critical was positively correlated with the highly respected Datos poll showed question for MAS' future, however, voter's educational level. MAS had Herrera still maintaining a 2 is what proportion of the vote they its highest level of support among percentage point edge. In will draw. If Rangel attracts a mere people with high school or September, at the time that this 6-7 percent of the vote (as Datos university educations, and was Report was written, the presidential suggested in July)-that is, a gain of weakest among voters who had race appeared to be a toss-up. Given only 1-2 percent over his 1973 failed to complete their elementary Acci6n DemocrZticafstremendous showing -party morale will suffer education. organizational capacity and its badly. Renewed internal bickering two-to-one advantage in party and in-fighting may develop. If membership, however, Luis Pirierua Range! can live up to earlier survey Ultimately, then, the long-term would have to be considered a slight predictions and surpass 10 percent, growth MAS seeks depends on the favorite. then MAS will have achieved its party's ability to expand beyond its intended growth rate. After Rangel present constituency of university Should the adecos win once again, and Arria, no other candidate, save students, Caracas professionals, the psychological effects on COPEI possibly MIR's Am6rico Martin, is middle class intellectuals, and skilled are likely to be devastating. The likely to garner more than 2-3 industrial workers. As the MAS Social Christians began the year percent of the vote. campaign director for Caracas with a healthy six-point lead. AD indicated to me, a major goal of this appeared to be badly split and Luis Whatever the outcome, some year's campaign was to build Piiierlia was generally considered salient features of the Venezuelan strength among the urban the least dynamic of the major electoral process merit further poor-i.e., unskilled and candidates. If the personable comment. Venezuelan voters' unorganized worker, maids, the copeyano Luis Herrera is unable to attitudes toward their elections are unemployed, and other win under these circumstances, it somewhat contradictory. Voter "sub-working-class" elements.But will raise doubts as to whether turnout is high, some 80 percent of ironically, to reach these voters, COPEI can ever defeat AD in a the eligible electorate. However, Rangel had to talk in immediate, presidential race.30 With each voting is technically obligatory pragmatic terms that differed little successive victory, AD appears (though enforcement procedures from PiherGa's or Herrera's rhetoric. more and more invincible. Even are very lax) and in one survey many voters indicated they wouldn't undistinguished. For his part, Diego less than half the voters committed bother to vote if they weren't Arria merely told the voters that he to AD or COPEI believed their own required to do The same study opposed existing political parties party's ads. The increasing use of found that the majority of voters felt and that for him "the people come American campaign advisers-most it made little difference who won the first." of whom fly in for periodic Venezuelan national elections. Yet, consultations, speak no Spanish, at the same time, respondents Up to a point, the homogeneity of and know little about Venezuelan overwhelmingly stated that having campaign rhetoric, the lack of sharp socioeconomic conditions- elections was very important. issues, is a healthy sign reflecting contributes further to an emphasis the broad area of political consensus on style over substance. My own feeling is that voters so critical in maintaining accurately perceive that there is little Venezuela's stable democracy. For The tremendous barrage of difference between AD and COPEI example, all major parties support campaign propaganda is linked, of policies. This same understanding extensive government-sponsored course, to great expenditures. may well account for their limited social welfare activity in areas such Venezuelan journalists estimate that commitment to voting3 My as public housing. All endorse the total cost of the 1978 campaign observations indicate that compared government ownership of the will reach $175 million-over $30 for to other Latin American nations, petroleum, steel, aluminum every vote cast. This figure dwarfs indeed compared to the United industries, and other critical sectors American electoral outlays and States, popular involvement in the of the economy. The lack of sharp threatens to turn Venezuelan Venezuelan electoral process, debate also reflects the absence of elections into a contest for buying through party marches, rallies, and the intense polarization and class (or votes through the media. Third the like, is very high. Moreover, ethnic) conflict that divide so many party candidates, particularly those large numbers of citizens experience developing nations. on the left who cannot attract direct personal contact with one or contributions from big business, are more of the candidates. What is not healthy, however, was obviously put at a disadvantage. Venezuelans can scarcely avoid the lack of meaningful interchange Moreover, as campaign expenses seeing their candidates on television between the candidates, their continue to grow, there is the or hearing them on radio. Watching tendency to talk past each other, danger that AD and COPEI will the animated reaction of most their use of vague slogans and become increasingly beholden to onlookers as AD, COPEI, or MAS cliches, and their failure to offer contributions from vested economic auto caravans wound their way concrete programs for addressing interests. through the streets of Venezuela's Venezuela's many remaining cities, I was struck by their obvious socioeconomic problems. Earlier in In the current campaign, sense of involvement in the electoral this Report (and in the preceding expenditures were heavily skewed, process. In short, the electoral study of Venezuelan parties) I noted with Acci6n Democratica spending process seems to serve the critical Venezuela's seriously inequitable more than twice as much as COPEI function of reinforcing popular distribution of wealth and the and at least 25 times as much as commitment to democratic problems of chaotic urban growth MAS. While AD'S superior institutions. and economic expansion. Beyond economic resources alone cannot vague promises, the candidates win the election, the tremendous Other critical functions, however, offered the country little in the way amount spend on Pifierua's media were not carried out by the current of concrete solutions to those blitz probably helped overcome the campaign. Throughout the problems. early Herrera lead. The figures just hundreds of hours of media ads and cited do not take into account the the hundreds of rallies and The Venezuelan presidential race is government's own extensive speeches, there was a notable also far too long and overwhelming. self-advertisement campaign which absence of issues. Adeco publicity By June, six months before the clearly worked to Piiierua's featured smiling voters who testified election, both the principal advantage. that life has been good under AD candidates and the voters were and "therefore, I intend to vote for exhausted. The candidates The government's indirect PifierGa-Correct." COPEI ads, continued talking, but it wasn't clear involvement in the Venezuelan on the other hand, offered a somber how many of the voters were still electoral campaign was perhaps the Luis Herrera who explained how listening. The country was most ominous aspect of the 1978 badly Venezuela was doing and inundated with political election. Despite laws prohibiting promised that he would "straighten propaganda, which few citizens members of the executive branch this out" in some unexplained way. seemed to take seriously. A July from participating in the campaign, Despite his distinctly different Gallup poll showed that a startlingly the urge to use government ideology, Jose Vicente Rangel's low 11 percent of the electorate resources on behalf of the efforts to reach the nonideological, believed that the propaganda of the incumbent administration's party lower-class voter were various parties was credible. Indeed, appears to be irresistible. Both Rafael Caldera's copeyano extended to campaign ads by the American consulting firms they government (in 1973) and Cirlos parties and candidates and that it thought were best. It wasn't the Andres Perez's adeco government had no power to regulate government's fault if AD picked the (1978) succumbed to that urge. advertisements by the government. same firm. However, the magnitude of the A legal confrontation was averted government's involvement in the when the government "voluntarily" Venezuelan electoral practices, last election was unprecedented. withdrew the six ads. then, seem sorely in need both of Ads promoting the Perez new direction and further administration's record were not At approximately the same time in regulation. Several party spokesmen only omnipresent but frequently the campaign, it was revealed that acknowledged to me that some appeared on television back-to-back the Venezuelan government had regulation and limitation of with PifierCia spots, which pledged paid "Public Affairs Analysts," a campaign spending would be to continue the good work of the U.S. firm, $1.5 million for the desirable. Clearer, more far-reaching government. When spokesmen for purposes of monitoring restrictions on government COPEI and MAS complained about Congressional attitudes and U.S. campaign involvement also seem in this practice, Information Minister public opinion regarding Venezuela; order. However, no reform Celestino Armas replied that it analyzing the American press for the legislation appears likely to be wasn't the government's role to tell Venezuelan government; and introduced in the near future. television stations in what order lobbying for Venezuela in the U.S. they should present their Congress. Since this same company In spite of these problems, one commercials. was headed by Joe Napolitan and critical fact remains clear. This Clifton White, both of whom were December 3 the Venezuelan people In July 1978, the Supreme Electoral advising the PiherCia campaign, the will freely choose between the Commission (the government body government's contract with "Public candidates of several capable and in charge of regulating campaign Affairs" was highly questionable. It responsible parties. They will vote practices) ruled that 6 of these 26 was obviously impossible to know with the assurance that whoever government television whether that contract was not they elect will take office early in the advertisements so blatantly invoked actually an indirect payment to following year. That in itself is far the name of Acci6n Democritica Napolitan and White for work done more than the citizens of most Latin that they constituted government- on the adeco campaign. Once again, American nations can currently sponsored support for PifierCia and Information Minister Armas' expect. should, therefore, be pulled from the response to this revelation was not air. Initially, Information Minister very satisfactory. Surely, he said, Armas insisted that the Electoral the government and AD each had Commission's authority only the right to employ whichever (September 1978)

NOTES

1. This Report is the second of a 2. The president is elected by direct, candidate of one party and the entire two-part series on Venezuelan political popular vote with victory going to the congressional and municipal slates of a parties and the presidential election of candidate who receives a plurality. In second party. The vote cannot be 1978. Readers unfamiliar with other Latin American nations (e.g., Chile further split and these are the only two Venezuelan politics are referred to the before the 1973 coup), if no presidential votes (president and legislative slates) first article, "Venezuela's Political Party candidate receives an absolute majority, the Venezuelan electorate casts System on the Eve of National Elections, the election goes to the Congress for (governors are appointed by the AUFS Reports, No. 44, 1978. This resolution. Since 1958, no candidate for president). Given the length and Report is based on interviews and the Venezuelan presidency has received intensity of Venezuela's national campaign excursions with two a majority and one candidate, COPEI's campaigns, this is probably merciful. For Venezuelan presidential Rafael Caldera, won the 1968 election a comprehensive discussion of the candidates- Luis Herrera Campins of with 29 percent of the vote. Members of proportional representation system used COPEI and Jose Vicente Rangel of both houses of Congress (the Senate to select national and municipal MAS-as well as interviews with and, the more important branch, the legislatures, see John Martz and Enrique various party spokesmen whose names Chamber of Deputies) as well as the Baloyra, Electoral Mobilization and are listed in footnote 11 of the first municipal councils are elected through a Public Opinion: The Venezuelan Election Report. I am also greatly indebted to complicated system of proportional of 7973 (University of North Carolina journalists Joseph Mann, Kim Fuad, representation. The voter is given two Press, 1976). Alan Yale, Luis Esteban Ray, and to "cards," choosing a presidential Gene Bigler for increasing my candidate on one, a party slate on the 3. In February 1978,l visited Bogota, understanding of Venezuelan elections. other. The party vote expresses a single Colombia during the last two weeks of Of course, none bears any responsibility preference for both houses of Congress the national congressional elections and for the information and opinions in this and for the local municipal council. A the presidential primary. Colombia is article. voter may choose the presidential currently the only Latin nation in South America besides Venezuela with a supporters left AD and founded MEP, a 12. COPEI President Caldera had first democratically elected, civilian new left-of-center party. Prieto attracted initiated contacts with Cuba and government, but the contrast to nearly 20 percent of the votes cast, abandoned other aspects of the Venezuela was marked. On the weekend drawing overwhelmingly from AD. He Betancourt Doctrine. Betancourt had of the election thousands of troops filled thereby enabled COPEI candidate expected his former protege to return to the streets of Bogota to maintain order. Caldera to beat the AD nominee by less the doctrine and was undoubtedly Men were routinely frisked for arms and than one percent. disappointed when he didn't. President documents. In the February election and Perez has not abandoned Venezuela's in June's presidential vote, fewer than 8. During Venezuela's brief attempt at long-standing hostility to right-wing 25 percent of the eligible voters democracy from 1945-1948, AD military dictatorships. Indeed, his participated. Public apathy toward the presidential candidate R6mulo Gallegos administration has broken diplomatic Colombian voting process has been won nearly 75 percent of the vote in the ties with Uruguay (in a dispute over a growing in recent years. I observed even 1947 election. Since the restoration of political prisoner who was seized by greater apathy several months later in democracy in 1958, winning Uruguayan police in the garden of the Ecuador as the country prepared to percentages have ranged from 29 Venezuelan Embassy while trying to return to civilian government after six percent (Caldera in 1968) to 49 percent gain asylum) and, more recently, has years of military rule. On July 16, a (Betancourt in 1958 and Perez in 1973). exerted pressure against the Somoza presidential run-off was held to narrow a regime in Nicaragua and in behalf of the large field of candidates to two. During 9. Inflation rates in Venezuela have democratically elected government in the next two months an electoral always been low by Latin American the Dominican Republic. But, Perez has tribunal disqualified thousands of votes. standards and still remain well below the been more pragmatic (and less Two of the candidates alternated in the continental average. Before 1973, moralistic) than Betancourt and has second place spot as the recount official inflation rates rarely surpassed 3 received the presidents of Argentina and percent, but the rate since then has continued. Yet, the public seemed Brazil in Caracas. This angered generally hovered around 10 percent. totally uninterested and only wall Betancourt, as did the current Official government figures, which tend posters gave evidence that a second administration's cordial relations with to understate price increases, indicated round was set for late 1978. Cuba. that the cost of living rose slightly less than 10 percent in 1977. However, the 4. Martz and Baloyra, pp. 201-203. actual figure was closer to 15 percent. 13. For a more detailed discussion of COPEI ideological factions as well as the 5. From April 1, the date on which 10. In fact, the AD primary may have AD schisms of the 1960s, see my first Venezuela's current election laws allow been the first in the world in which all Report in this series. The COPEI extensive mass media advertising, card-carrying party members voted in a communitarians vigorously insist that through late August, the latest period single constituency, on a single day, in a they are non-Marxist and would covered by this Report, the vast majority binding primary. In February 1978 the probably object to my description of of television and other mass media Liberal Party of Colombia had an them as "quasi-socialist," but I consider advertisements were for AD candidate indirect presidential primary in which the the title appropriate. Luis Pifierua. COPEI advertisement, two leading presidential aspirants sparse through the early months of the agreed that the nomination would go to campaign, began to pick up somewhat the candidate whose followers won the 14. In 1962, two years after they had in June, though not to AD's level. largest vote in the congressional been expelled from Acci6n Nonparty candidate Diego Arria's entry election. Democratica, MIR leaders attempted to into the race in late May was supported emulate the Cuban revolutionary by an impressive television commercial 11. Aside from Laurfa's appointment, experience by initiating guerrilla action campaign that nearly equaled COPEI's adeco politicians objected strongly to against Rhulo Betancourt's in quantity. Through August, neither two other presidential aides: Perez's government. They were soon joined by Rangel nor any other third-party Minister of Development and economic Douglas Bravo, Teodoro Petkoff, and candidate had paid television exposure adviser, Gumersindo Rodriguez, had left other young Communist Party activists worth mentioning and Rangel AD in 1961 with the Marxist- who formed the Armed Forces for particularly depended heavily on the revolutionary MlR. He subsequently National Liberation (FALN). The optimum use of unpaid appearances on "returned to the fold," but retained the revolutionaries greatly miscalculated the interview shows. Of course, the more enmity of Betancourt and other adeco public mood, failing to realize that, poorly financed candidates tend to save hard-line anticommunists. The Perez despite extensive unemployment in the their media funds for the closing months aide most unpopular in adeco circles early 1960s and widespread political of the campaign and their television was Information Minister Diego Arria. disaffection among the urban lower exposure may have increased since Arria had left Caldera's COPEI classes, there was little support for August. administration in 1973 to help engineer violence and armed insurrection. A later Perez's election victory. After a short survey of Venezuelan public opinion by 6. See Aut6ntic0, June 5, 1978. period as governor of the Federal Enrique Baloyra and John Martz reveals District of Caracas (a presidential the basis for the guerrilla's failure. While 7. See "Venezuela's Political Party appointment), where he totally alienated many Venezuelans expressed System.. ." (footnote 1) for a discussion the AD municipal council members, he considerable skepticism and cynicism of the 1968 AD split. When the party assumed the newly created position of about their political parties' and machine denied the nomination to Luis Minister of Information and Tourism. politicians' performance, they Prieto, a party founder and the clear Always his own man, Arria remained maintained a strong commitment to the choice of adeco rank-and-file, his aloof from AD's leaders. country's democratic institutions. See Baloyra's "Public Attitudes Toward the dissident Marxist underground in Britain-53 percent; Chile-48 percent; Democratic Regime" in John Martz and eastern Europe and were roundly United States-45 percent; Canada-29 David Myers (eds.), Venezuela: The denounced by Pravda and by Soviet percent; Sweden-26 percent; Democratic Experience (Praeger, 1977). Communist Party Secretary Leonid Japan-18 percent; West Germany-13 Brezhnev. Petkoff, the son of a percent. These figures suggest that in 15. Petkoff, Torres, and Martin were all Bulgarian Jewish immigrant, is some of the countries with high levels of imprisoned during the 1960s for their reportedly a hero among disaffected positive response (Mexico, Chile), guerrilla activities. While both MIR and Bulgarian Marxist intellectuals. optimism may simply have reflected the MAS are now committed to working feeling that 1977 was so bad that 1978 within Venezuela's democratic 19. See Baloyra; CIDAL; AutSntico would have to be better. While most institutions, mast'stas are much more (Caracas); June 12, 1978. It is useful to Venezuelans expected 1978 to be a forthright in labeling their earlier guerrilla keep in mind, though, that allegiance to better year than 1977,35 percent felt activities as an error. MIR leader Martin political parties and belief in their utility they were worse off in 1977 than they succinctly summarized the difference is undoubtedly far higher in Venezuela had been 5 years earlier (before the oil between the two Marxist parties when than in most Latin American countries. boom) and only 39 percent felt they he was asked to comment on a MAS were better off in 1977. See, Autentico campaign poster showing Jose Vicente 20. The crash took place in an (Caracas): June 5,1978. Rangel waving to a crowd. "If that were inaccessible, heavily wooded area and, a MIR poster," Martin mused, "he despite an intense military search 26. See Martz and Baloyra. would have his fist clenched." For an ordered by President Perez, the extended and fascinating discussion of wreckage was not found for several 27. For further confirmation of this, see the Communist Party guerrilla efforts of days. Confirmation of Ottolina's death Baloyra. the 1960s and of the MAS exodus from set off a wave of national grief. the Communist Party, see Norman Gall, Regardless of how Venezuelans viewed 28. For a more detailed discussion of the "Teodoro Petkoff: Crisis of the Penny's political ambitions, they MAS program, see Handelman. Professional Revolutionary, Part I" admired his talents as a broadcaster, his LNG-1-'721, AUFS Reports, East Coast dedication to charitable causes, and 29. Ironically, the study showed that South America Series, Vol. XVI, No. 1, high standards of professionalism. middle class Venezuelans often cited 1972 and Part II [NG-3-'731, idem, Vol. maldistribution of income as a major XVII, No. 9, 1973. 21. See Resumen (Caracas): January 29, national problem, while low income 1978. people were far less concerned with that 16. MAS had only been formed two issue. See, CIDAL New Summary years before the 1973 election. Rangel 22. Herrera's campaign strategists were (January 1977). received 4.2 percent of the vote and determined to depict Venezuela in the finished fourth behind the leftist MEP grimmest of terms. They cancelled a 30. COPEI's only presidential victory candidate Paz Galarraga. The masista tentative contract to perform campaign during the current democratic era congressional slate finished a distant tunes for Herrera with noted Venezuelan occurred in 1968 as the result of an AD third (behind AD and COPED with musician Carlos Moredn because they party schism. Acci6n Democr6tica1s slightly over 5 percent of the vote, felt music would not be appropriate to Secretary General, Jesus Angel Paz electing nine Deputies and two the somber tone their candidate was Galarraga, and its most popular Senators. See Martz and Baloyra. presenting to the country. presidential aspirant, Luis Prieto, pulled their many followers out of the party. In 17. All other parties received the 23. Under regulations administered by the ensuing election, Prieto, running on combined support of only 2 percent of the Electoral Council, the national the MEP ticket, drew more than enough the respondents. Of course, these campaign does not officially begin till votes from AD to throw the election by figures are only for Caracas, describe April 1 and the parties are restricted in a paper thin margin to copeyano leader the situation prior to the selection of their volume of advertising prior to that Rafael Caldera. In 1973, Carlos And& AD's or COPEI's presidential date. On April 1, all the parties "kicked Perez led AD back into power with a candidates, and reflect party allegiance off their campaign" with giant rallies or stunning presidential triumph. rather than voting intention. MAS has marches. In actuality, of course, the race yet to establish that it can contend with had already been under way for months. 31. Autentico (Caracas): January 17, AD or COPEI for the more than 50 1978. percent of the electorate that consider 24. The adecos entertained a paranoid themselves independents. In other fear that Arria was using the Information 32. PRI, Mexico's dominant political words, they have failed to enlarge Ministry to further his own presidential party, faces opposition in each election, greatly on their base of strongly- intentions at AD's expense. In fact, but it has never come close to losing a committed support which they enjoy Diego's "Paso a Paso" campaign and national election since its foundation before the electoral race begins. Survey his bolstering of the Perez more than 35 years ago. data are drawn from the CIDAL News administration's image was more beneficial to Pitiercia's cause than to any Summary (June-September 1977). 33. Baloyra. other candidate including Arria himself. 18. Petkofi's works, Czechoslovakia: 34. That many citizens lack a strong Socialism as a Problem (1969) and 25. The proportion of respondents in commitment to voting may mean they Socialism for Venezuela (1970) are some of the other countries who reject the utility of their electoral process discussed in Gall (see note 15 above). expected 1978 to be a better year than (the apparent situation in Colombia, for His works were read avidly by the 1977 was: Mexico-57 percent; example) or they are passively satisfied with the system (probably more Venezuelan citizens who said they only of legitimacy even if most eligible common in the United States). Given vote because it is required fall in the citizens don't bother to vote. Witness their professed belief in the importance latter category. In any event a political the United States where only about of having elections, I suspect that most system can maintain a fairly high degree one-third of those eligible actually register and vote.