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Organizational Structure Leadership Political System Doctrine Forces Surface Forces Naval Aviation Coastal Defense Forces Marine Corps Manpow- er Unit Training Quality of Life Foreign Relations Organizational Structure Leadership Political System Doctrine SubmarineChina’s Forces Surface Forces Naval Avia- 2007

Office of Naval Intelligence

China’s Navy 2007

Office of Naval Intelligence

China’s Navy 2007—i ii—China’s Navy 2007 The PLA Navy is responsible for safeguarding China’s maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and interests. Preparation for the maritime battlefield has been intensified and improved while the integrated combat capabilities are being enhanced to conduct offshore campaigns. The capability of nuclear counter-attacks has also been enhanced. In accordance with the principle of smaller but more efficient troops, the PLA Navy has compressed the chain of command and reorganized the combat forces in a more scientific way while giving prominence to building maritime combat forces, especially amphibious combat forces. The PLA Navy has also sped up the process of updating its weaponry and equipment with priority given to the development of new combat as well as various kinds of special- purpose aircraft and relevant equipment. At the same time, the weaponry is increasingly informationalized and long-range precision strike capability raised.

China’s 2004 Defense White Paper

The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks. The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation weaponry and equipment. Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield capabilities, with emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new equipment and the development of combat support capabilities. The Navy is endeavoring to build mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support. Efforts are being made to improve and reform training programs and methods to intensify training in joint integrated maritime operations. China’s 2006 Defense White Paper

China’s Navy 2007—iii iv—China’s Navy 2007 Contents

Chapter 1 Chapter 11 Organizational Structure...1 Officer Corps...61

Chapter 2 Chapter 12 Leadership...11 Enlisted Force...73

Chapter 3 Chapter 13 Political System...17 Unit Training...87

Chapter 4 Chapter 14 Doctrine...23 Quality of Life...103

Chapter 5 Chapter 15 Submarine Forces...31 Foreign Relations...111

Chapter 6 Chapter 16 Surface Forces...39 Weapon Systems and Equipment...121 Chapter 7 Naval Aviation...45 Appendix A Chinese Terms...123 Chapter 8 Coastal Defense Forces...51 Appendix B Suggested Reading List...129 Chapter 9 Marine Corps...55

Chapter 10 Manpower...57

China’s Navy 2007—v vi—China’s Navy 2007 Preface

Over the past decade, the Chinese Navy has embarked on a modernization program with the goal of being the preeminent regional power in East Asia. By acquiring some of the world’s most impressive naval technologies from abroad while simultaneously building advanced indigenous , combatants, and naval aircraft, China is positioning itself to play a growing role in regional and trans-regional affairs.

This enhanced naval power sought by is meant to answer global changes in the nature of warfare and domestic concerns about continued economic prosperity. Responding to global trends, this modernization program is meant to address what China terms “the generation gap in military technology” brought on by the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the RMA’s associ- ated application of information and technology to the means of warfare. As such, this moderniza- tion effort is driven by China’s strategic requirement to maintain the effectiveness of its military against a backdrop of global changes in military weaponry and doctrine. Domestically, this mod- ernization effort aims to ensure access to trade routes and economic resources throughout the region. This drive to build a military component to protect the means of economic development is one of the most prevalent historical reasons for building a blue water naval capability.

China’s Navy is in a state of transition as it strives to fill these new goals and objectives. Just as China’s sailors are learning to operate this new equipment, China’s leaders are learning the means of employing a navy with modern capabilities to support national objectives. During this period of learning, many opportunities will be presented to China as well other parties in the region. In order to better understand the world’s fastest growing maritime power and its means of naval action and thereby foster a better understanding of China’s Navy, the Office of Naval Intelligence has prepared this study with the goal of educating and informing those who may be called upon to aid during this time of greater contact between the and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

The first five chapters provide detailed background into the history, doctrine, leadership, struc- ture, and politics of the PLAN. The next five chapters provide information on the operating forces of the PLAN – submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, coastal defense forces, and marines. The following section deals with the people who make up the PLAN, with chapters on manpower, the officer corps, the enlisted force, training, and the quality of life of PLAN personnel. Finally, the last two chapters regarding the PLAN’s foreign relations and the development process for major weapon systems and equipment conclude the handbook.

WILLIAM E. TARRY, Jr. Director, Naval Analysis Directorate Office of Naval Intelligence

China’s Navy 2007—vii viii—China’s Navy 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA Antiaircraft artillery MWR Morale, welfare, and recreation AAM Air-to-air missile NCO Noncommissioned officer ADM NDU National Defense University AFVAB Armed Forces Vocational nm Nautical miles Aptitude Battery NPC National People’s Congress AMS Academy of Military Science NRC Navy Equipment Proving ASCM Antiship cruise missile Research Center ASM Antiship missile NRI Naval Research Institute ASW Antisubmarine warfare NSF CAPT OJT On-the-job training CCP OMTE Outline of Military Training and CDR Evaluation (Dagang) CMC Central Military Commission PAFD People’s Armed Forces CO Commanding officer Department COL Colonel PAP People’s Armed Police COSTIND Commission for Science PC Political commissar Technology and Industry for PLA People’s Liberation Army National Defense PLAAF PLA Air Force CPT Captain PLAN PLA Navy CPX Command post exercise PME Professional military education CSSC China State Shipbuilding Corp. PRC People’s Republic of China CYL Communist Youth League R&D Research and development EEZ Exclusive economic zone RADM Rear Admiral ELINT Electronic intelligence RMB Renminbi ENS ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps ESF SAM Surface-to-air missile FTX Field training exercise SCAPT Senior captain GAD General Armament Department SCOL Senior colonel GED General Equipment Department SLOC Sea lines of communication GLD General Logistics Department SSBN Ballistic missile submarine GPD General Political Department SSF GPS Global positioning system SSM Surface-to-surface missile GSD General Staff Department SSN Nuclear powered attack ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile submarine IFR Instrument flight rules TUD True unit designator IOC Initial Operational Capability UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle kg Kilograms US United States km Kilometers USD US dollar km/h Kilometers per hour USG US government kt Knots USN US Navy LCDR commander USSR Union of Soviet Socialist LT Lieutenant Republics LTC Lieutenant colonel VADM Vice Admiral LTJG Lieutenant junior grade VIP Very important person m Meters WPNS Western Pacific Naval MAJ Major Symposium MR Military Region XO Executive officer MRAF Military Region Air Force MUCD Military unit cover designator

China’s Navy 2007—ix x—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 1 Organizational Structure

This chapter addresses the People’s Liberation Unit Designators Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) organizational structure, to include the use of unit designators, the PLA’s Every PLAN platoon and above unit has a true 部队番号 and PLAN’s grade and rank structure, and the unit designator or TUD ( ), such as the 62nd Submarine Zhidui or the Support leadership, administrative, and operational or- Base. However, the PLAN rarely provides these ganizational structure. designators to the public in speeches or news- paper articles, on letterhead, or on Internet sites. Instead, the PLAN identifies them as a Brief History “certain” (某) unit, such as a “certain North Sea zhidui.” In some cases, the The PLAN considers its founding day as 23 PLAN identifies regiment level and above units April 1949, when the East China Military with what it calls a “unit designator code” Region Navy was created. In January 1950, (部队代号). Outside China, this is known as a the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Unit Cover Designator, or MUCD. Committee’s Military Commission, common- ly known as the Central Military Commission (CMC), appointed an Army general, The PLA’s Grade and Rank Jinguang, as the first PLAN commander. On 14 Structure April 1950, PLAN Headquarters was officially established in Beijing. The PLA is organized into an administrative structure and an operational structure. Both of Today, the PLAN is composed of five branch- these are based on the PLA’s officer personnel structure, which is composed of 15 grades and es—submarine, surface forces, naval aviation, 10 ranks. Therefore, a basic knowledge of the coastal defense, and marine corps. It also has PLA’s officer grade and rank structure is essential 10 subordinate academies and schools, as well to understanding the organizational structure. as various research institutes, specialized sup- port forces, and a political, logistics, and main- Since the Red Army was founded in 1927, the tenance structure. These forces are organized PLA has always had a grade system for its of- into three fleets—North Sea Fleet (NSF), East ficers, who are usually referred to as cadre. Sea Fleet (ESF), and South Sea Fleet (SSF). The first rank system was not introduced until 1955. Changes in the grade and rank system The PLAN’s primary missions are to guard are shown below: against enemy invasion from the sea, defend • 1927: A simple grade structure was intro- the state’s sovereignty over its territorial wa- duced ters, and safeguard the state’s maritime rights • 1952: A revised structure of 21 grades was and interests. implemented

China’s Navy 2007—1 • 1955: A system with 20 grades and 15 Today, all PLA officers and organizations are ranks was introduced assigned one of these 15 grades. Figure 1 shows • 1965: At the beginning of the Cultural the current system with 10 ranks and 15 grades Revolution, the rank system was abol- as it applies to the PLAN. ished and officers used the government’s National Administrative Cadre system of 27 grades Understanding the Two Systems • 1972: Four grades were abolished, leaving In the US military system, grades and ranks are 23 grades synonymous. US military officers are assigned • 1979: 23 grades were reduced to 15 one of 10 ranks and each rank has an equal • 1988: New rank system with 10 ranks was grade of O-1 to O-10 (i.e., a US Navy com- implemented mander is an O-5).

Figure 1—PLAN Officer Grades, Retirement Ages, and Ranks Each Grade has 2 Ranks (Primary and Secondary)

PLAN Rank Retirement Grade # Grade (USN Equivalent Grade) Age Primary Secondary CMC Chairman (军委主席) None 1 N/A None Vice Chairman (军委副主席) ADM (O-10) 2 CMC Member (军委委员) N/A ADM (O-10) None Military Region Leader 3 65 ADM (O-10) VADM (O-9) (大区正职) Military Region Deputy Leader 4 63 VADM (O-9) RADM (O-8) (大区副职) 5 Jun Leader (正军)* RADM (O-8) VADM (O-9) 55 6 Jun Deputy Leader (副军) RADM (O-8) SCAPT (O-7) 7 Division Leader (正师) SCAPT (O-7) RADM (O-8) Division Deputy Leader (副师) 50 8 CAPT (O-6) SCAPT (O-7) (Brigade Leader) 9 Regiment Leader (正团) CAPT (O-6) CDR (O-5) 45 10 Regiment Deputy Leader (副团) CDR (O-5) CAPT (O-6) 11 Battalion Leader (正营) LCDR (O-4) CDR (O-5) 40 12 Battalion Deputy Leader (副营) LT (O-3) LCDR (O-4) 13 Company Leader (正连) LT (O-3) LTJG (O-2) 35 14 Company Deputy Leader (副连) LTJG (O-2) ENS (O-1) 15 Platoon Leader (正排) 30 ENS (O-1) LTJG (O-2)

* The Chinese term jun is usually translated as “army” or “corps,” but the Handbook will use jun.

2—China’s Navy 2007 The PLA also has 10 officer ranks, but it has 15 the grade of regiment leader, regiment deputy officer grades, which are identified by the type leader, or battalion leader. of organization and whether it is a leader or deputy leader position (i.e., division leader or division deputy leader). Each named grade has Promotions an associated number. However, when refer- ring to officers or organizations, the PLA uses Within the PLA, the grade, not the rank, has the name, not the number. For example, a di- always reflected authority and responsibility vision leader is not called a Grade-7 officer. across service, branch, and organizational lines. Thus, although rank is a key indicator of posi- Each grade has both a primary rank and a sec- tion within the hierarchy of foreign militar- ondary rank. For example, a fleet commander ies, grade is the key indicator within the PLA. can have the primary rank of vice admiral or the secondary rank of rear admiral. Furthermore, One must make a clear distinction about what as shown in Figure 2, each rank can have from constitutes a “promotion” in the PLA. Within one to four grades associated with it. For exam- the PLA, promotions in grade are what count. ple, a PLA Navy commander can be assigned Moving forward from one grade to the next

Figure 2—PLA Ranks and Grade Relationship Each Rank Has 1-4 Grades Associated With It

Rank (Army/Navy) Grade Grade Grade Grade GEN/ADM CMC Vice Chairman CMC Member MR Leader MR Deputy LTG/VADM MR Leader Jun Leader Leader Jun Deputy Division MG/RADM MR Deputy Leader Jun Leader Leader Leader Division Deputy SCOL/SCAPT Jun Deputy Leader Division Leader Leader (Brigade Leader) Division Deputy Regiment COL/CAPT Leader Regiment Leader Deputy Leader (Brigade Leader) Regiment LTC/CDR Regiment Leader Battalion Leader Deputy Leader Battalion Deputy MAJ/LCDR Battalion Leader Leader Battalion Deputy Company CPT/LT Company Leader Leader Deputy Leader Company 1LT/LTJG Company Leader Platoon Leader Deputy Leader 2LT/ENS Platoon Leader

China’s Navy 2007—3 is a promotion. For example, from a regiment upon graduation. As shown in Figure 3, the leader to a division deputy leader is a grade promotion cycle for grades and ranks is not promotion. Moving from one position to an- a 1:1 ratio. other in the same grade is a lateral transfer. For example, moving from the chief of staff to be a deputy commander in PLAN Headquarters is Military Pay Criteria and Retirement not a grade promotion, because both of these positions are MR deputy leaders. Military pay is calculated on the basis of time in rank, time in grade, and time in service. Furthermore, one should not equate a promo- Unlike the US military, the PLA includes the tion in rank to a promotion in grade. For ex- three or four years served as an academy cadet ample, the commander and political officer at in their total time in service. Finally, regula- every level in the PLA’s chain of command hold tions regarding retirement ages are based on the same grade, but they often do not have the grade, not rank. same rank. The reason for this is that officers must serve in a particular grade for a set period of time before they are promoted in rank. Key Organizational

PLA regulations specify the time-in-rank and Terminology time-in-grade requirements for officers before For purposes of the Handbook, three specific they are promoted to the next rank and grade. terms relating to the PLAN’s organizational For all ranks except second lieutenant to first structure—zhidui, dadui, zhongdui—will be not- lieutenant, the time-in-rank requirement is ed in Chinese rather than English as follows: four years. However, the time-in-grade require- ment is three years. Furthermore, in the PLA, • Zhidui (支队): A PLAN zhidui is a division time in service begins the first day as a cadet leader-grade vessel headquarters organiza- in an academy, not the day of commissioning tion, which various dictionaries translate

Figure 3—Rank and Grade Promotion Cycle

Rank Time in Rank Grade Time in Grade Cadet 3-4 years Cadet 4 years Platoon Leader 3 years 2LT/ENS 2 years Company Deputy Leader 3 years 1LT/LTJG 4 years Company Leader 3 years CPT/LT 4 years Battalion Deputy Leader 3 years MAJ/LCDR 4 years Battalion Leader 3 years LTC/CDR 4 years Minimum of 3 years for promotion to each next higher COL/CAPT 4 years grade

4—China’s Navy 2007 as a “flotilla” or “division.” The PLAN has el. To avoid confusion, the Handbook uses the seven types of zhidui: generic term “vessels.” Within the PLAN, each — Submarine type of vessel is assigned one of the PLA’s 15 — grades. The vessel terms and their grades are — shown below: — Speedboat — Combat support vessel • Jianting (舰艇) and jianchuan (舰船) are ge- — Submarine chaser and frigate neric terms that refer to boats, ships, and — Landing vessels. • Chuan (船) is best translated as a “ship.” • Some zhidui are combined-vessel zhidui Within the PLAN, a chuan is a non-com- that are composed of several types of ves- bat support vessel that can be of any size sels. For example, the PLAN has destroyer and frigate zhidui, nuclear and conven- or type. Therefore, there is no set grade tional submarine zhidui, and speedboat level for a chuan. In fact, the commander zhidui that consist of missile boats, mine- for some chuan are noncommissioned of- sweeper boats, submarine chasers, and ficers (NCOs). torpedo boats. Vessel zhidui normally • Jian (舰) is best translated as a “ship.” have a set number of support vessels. Within the PLAN, a jian is a combat vessel • Dadui (大队): A PLAN dadui can be either a that is more than 400 tons. A jian is a regi- regiment-leader or battalion-leader grade ment leader-grade organization. organization, depending on which branch • Ting (艇) is best translated as a “boat.” and type of unit is being discussed. When Within the PLAN, a ting is a vessel that is applied to naval vessels, a dadui is a regi- less than 400 tons. Certain types of ting ment leader-grade vessel headquarters are now more than 400 tons, especially af- organization and is most often translated ter they have been upgraded with heavier as a “squadron.” Training dadui are also weapon systems, but the designation has regiment leader-grade organizations. For remained based on historical precedence. PLAN aviation, coastal defense, Marine The highest grade for a ting is battalion Corps, and maintenance troops, a dadui is a battalion leader-grade headquarters or- leader-grade, but some ting can be lower ganization, which is sometimes translated than battalion leader-grade. For example, as a “group.” a 125-ton escort boat (护卫艇) is a com- pany leader-grade organization; a guided- • Zhongdui (中队): This level of organiza- missile boat (导弹艇) is a company deputy tion for vessels is generally not discussed in English-language articles about the leader-grade or platoon leader-grade or- PLAN. For PLAN vessels and training orga- ganization; and a (登陆艇), nizations, this is a battalion leader-grade which has an NCO as the commander, organization. For PLAN aviation, coastal does not have a grade. defense, Marine Corps, and maintenance troops, this is a company leader-grade or- In the PLAN, a submarine (潜艇) is classified ganization. as a boat. However, nuclear submarines are considered a division deputy-grade organiza- The PLAN has the following five specific terms tion, and conventional-powered submarines for its vessels, ships, and boats, each with a are considered regiment deputy-leader grade specific meaning and organizational grade lev- organizations.

China’s Navy 2007—5 Figure 4 shows the grade structure for the three Tiered Structure types of vessel headquarters and vessel types that are subordinate to the headquarters. For The PLAN’s tiered structure consists of the example, , which are a regiment following five levels: leader-grade organization, are subordinate to a zhidui headquarters, and , which are a • PLAN Headquarters is an MR leader-grade regiment deputy leader-grade organization, are organization. Until 2004, both the PLAN commander and political commissar subordinate to a dadui headquarters. were grade-3 officers. This issue became somewhat blurred in mid-2004, when the PLAN commander was elevated as a mem- Overall Structure ber of the Military Commission, which is a grade-2 billet. Even though the com- The PLAN’s overall structure can be viewed mander was elevated to a grade-2 officer, from four perspectives: the PLAN as an organization remained a grade-3 organization. Furthermore, • Tiered structure the commander and political commissar • Administrative structure are still considered co-equals within the • Leadership and command structure PLAN, even though the political commis- • Logistics and technical support structure sar is still a grade-3 officer.

Figure 4—Grade Structure for Vessel Headquarters and Vessel Types

Grade Headquarters Vessel Types (3) MR Leader PLAN HQ (4) MR Deputy Fleet HQ Leader (6) Jun Deputy Support Bases Leader Zhidui (7) Division Leader Garrisons (8) Division Deputy Leader Nuclear-powered submarines (Brigade Leader) (9) Regiment Leader Dadui Destroyers, conventional-powered submarines (10) Regiment Frigates, service ships, conventional-powered submarines Deputy Leader Escort boats, submarine chasers, ships, (11) Battalion Leader Zhongdui service ships, landing ships (3-digit hull numbers) Escort boats, minesweeper boats, service ships, landing (13) Company craft, missile speedboats, missile boats Leader (4-digit hull numbers)

6—China’s Navy 2007 • The PLAN has three Fleet Headquarters — ESF: (North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea), each — SSF: , Beihai, and Xisha of which is an MR deputy leader-grade () organization. Therefore, since the late • Vessel zhidui, which are usually subordi- 1980s, each fleet commander has been nate to a support base, and dadui, which concurrently assigned as an MR deputy can be subordinate to a support base or commander. a zhidui. • Each fleet has several subordinate bases, which are jun deputy leader-grade organi- Administrative Structure zations, and can be categorized into three types: support bases, test bases, and train- The PLAN’s administrative structure at each lev- ing bases. Fleet aviation is at the same el throughout the chain-of-command consists level. of four first-level departments: Headquarters, — Of the total number of bases, the fol- Political, Logistics, and Equipment. lowing eight are considered major support bases: Each first-level department has several sec- — North Sea Fleet (NSF) ond-level departments that have adminis- — Qingdao trative and/or functional responsibilities for — Lushun subordinate organizations within the head- — East Sea Fleet (ESF) quarters and throughout the PLAN. It is not — — always clear what the differences between the — two responsibilities are, but some administra- — South Sea Fleet (SSF) tive responsibilities include housing, food, and — transportation support, while functional re- — Yulin sponsibilities include plans and budgeting. — — The PLAN also has other specialized bases as follows: PLAN Headquarters — is a missile test, research and development (R&D), and When the PLAN Headquarters was estab- training base lished in Beijing in 1949, it had three first- — Jianggezhuang is for the PLAN’s level departments—Headquarters, Political, nuclear powered submarines only — A third type of base, which may and Logistics. In April 1952, Naval Aviation or may not be co-located with a was added as a fourth first-level department. support base, is a training base or During the 1950s, the PLAN also formed vari- training center ous other first-level departments, but they were • Some support bases have subordinate eventually reorganized, abolished, or merged division leader-grade garrisons (水警区), with other departments. which are responsible primarily for coastal patrol, coastal defense, and protecting During the 1960s to 1990s, the PLAN estab- fishing boats. The PLAN has six subordi- lished different departments to manage vessel nate garrisons: equipment and technical issues. Following the — NSF: Dalian and Weihai establishment of the PLA’s General Equipment

China’s Navy 2007—7 Department (GED) in 1998, the PLAN merged • Propaganda these departments into the Equipment • Security Department.1 PLAN Logistics Department Since then, the PLAN’s administrative orga- nization has included four first-level depart- In 1985, the PLAN changed the existing ments—Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and four-tiered logistics supply structure—PLAN Equipment. The directors are the same grade as Headquarters, Fleet Headquarters, support the PLAN deputy and the three base, and units—to a three-tiered structure— fleet commanders. PLAN Headquarters, support base, and units. As such, the three fleet headquarters no longer have a logistics administrative structure. PLAN Headquarters Department The Logistics Department is the leading organi- The PLAN Headquarters Department is the zation responsible for managing logistics sup- military command organization for the Navy’s port. Because it is the largest component of the leaders. The director is the Chief of Staff. The PLAN, the Logistics Department is organized Headquarters Department consists of several more like a command than a department. As functional departments and military studies such, it has a director and a political commis- research organizations. The primary function- sar. The primary second-level functional de- al departments, listed in alphabetical order, are partments are as follows: as follows: • Audit • Communications • Engineering Design • Intelligence • Finance • Military Affairs • Health • Operations • Military Transportation • Training • Port, Airfield, and Barracks Management PLAN Political Department • Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel

The Political Department is the leading orga- The PLAN has some second-level departments nization responsible for political work. It con- within the logistics organizational structure sists of several functional departments, plus that are unique to the Navy. The first organiza- the military court and procuratorate (i.e., the tion is the Engineering Command Department, Inspector General). The primary functional de- and the second is the Vessel On-Shore Service partments are as follows: Department. The Engineering Command Department is responsible for construction of • Cadre (Officer) all naval facilities, including airfields, ports, air • Discipline Inspection defense, and buildings. The Vessel On-Shore • Organization Service Departments are responsible for lo-

1 The General Equipment Department is sometimes noted as the General Armament Department (GAD) and the services’ Equipment Department is sometimes referred to as the Armament Department.

8—China’s Navy 2007 gistics and technical support for naval vessel • Armament units while they are in port. • Comprehensive Plans • Defense Industry Regional Representative The logistics support system is primarily re- Bureaus sponsible for supporting personnel living • Electronics conditions, port and shore base facilities con- • Equipment struction, plus supply and technical support • Inspection and Management for all types of munitions (including vessel • Vessel Technology gun shells, missiles, torpedoes, and mines) and land-based common-use weapons and equip- ment. Although the PLAN supplies units with Leadership and Command special-use materials, the military regions sup- Structure ply them with common-use materials. The PLAN has a four-tiered on-shore vertical and lateral leadership and command structure. PLAN Equipment Department Within the PLAN’s vertical structure:

The Equipment Department is primarily re- • PLAN Headquarters is the highest tier, sponsible for technical support for all PLAN is the service’s supreme command staff, equipment and weapon systems from con- and is the CMC’s and Four General cept development to retirement. As such, the Departments’ functional department that Equipment Department is responsible for the implements leadership over PLAN units. PLAN’s special-use equipment throughout the • The three fleet headquarters make up the following seven steps: second tier. They are the campaign com- ponent and constitute the leadership and • Plans and theoretical evaluation command staff for a certain strategic di- rection. Furthermore, the three fleet head- • Technical design quarters receive leadership not only from • Construction design PLAN Headquarters but also from their • Inspection during construction respective military region headquarters. • Test and evaluation • Support bases make up the third tier and are primarily responsible for the compre- • Delivery of the vessel to the unit hensive support of all naval forces within • Lifetime repair support their area of responsibility. • Garrisons and zhidui make up the fourth The Equipment Department has subordinate tier. factories, repair facilities, depots, warehous- es, and purchasing stations. Because it is one When the fleets conduct mobile task-force op- of the largest components of the PLAN, the erations, the PLAN employs only a three-tiered Equipment Department is organized more like at-sea command structure: a command than a department. As such, it has a director and a political commissar. The • PLAN Headquarters primary second-level functional departments • Fleet Headquarters are as follows: • Zhidui

China’s Navy 2007—9

Within the PLAN’s lateral leadership and com- • Zhidui have three first-level departments— mand structure, all four tiers have fairly equiv- Headquarters, Political, and an On-Shore alent staffs and functional departments, even Service Department, which is equivalent though the names may be slightly different: to a Logistics Department

• PLAN Headquarters, support bases, and garrisons have four first-level depart- Logistics and Technical ments—Headquarters, Political, Logistics, Support Structure and Equipment Finally, the PLAN also has a three-tiered on- • The Fleet Headquarters have only two shore logistics and technical support structure first-level departments—Headquarters and Political. They do not have a Logistics or that skips the fleet headquarters: Equipment Department • PLAN Headquarters • Support bases and garrisons have four first-level departments—Headquarters, • Support bases Political, Logistics, and Equipment • Garrisons and zhidui

10—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 2 Leadership

Leadership is implemented at all levels in the General Political Department (GPD), General PLAN as a shared responsibility through the Logistics Department (GLD), and General CCP Party committee system. In general, every Equipment Department (GED), the PLAN as an headquarters organization in the PLAN down organization is not equal to the four General to the company level has a commander and a Departments and is still at the same grade as co-equal political officer. The commander and the seven Military Regions. political officer, along with the deputy com- manders, deputy political officers, and the di- rectors of the four departments (Headquarters, Commanders and Political Political, Logistics, and Equipment), compose Commissars the Party committee’s standing committee, where all major decisions are discussed and de- From 1949 to 2006, the PLAN has had a total cided upon for implementation. The political of 7 commanders and 11 political commissars, officer usually serves as the Party secretary and as shown in Figure 5 (below) and Figure 6 (top the commander as the deputy secretary. The of the next page). Party committee system is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Commanders In September 2004, the commander of the PLAN, Admiral Zhang Dingfa, became the first (2006-Present): Wu was born in PLAN commander ever to serve concurrently Wuqiao, Province, in August 1945. As as a member of the CCP Central Committee’s a senior officer, he served as chief of staff of Military Commission (CMC). His promotion the PLAN’s Fujian Base, commandant of the in grade and appointment to the CMC provid- Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, commander of ed a unique challenge for the PLAN within the Figure 5—PLAN Commanders PLA hierarchy. Commander Command Period As is discussed in Chapter 1, all organizations Wu Shengli (吴胜利) Aug 2006 – Present within the PLA are assigned one of 15 grades. Zhang Dingfa Jun 2003 – Aug 2006 In addition, the commander and political of- (张定发) ficer are assigned the same grade. However, (石云生) Nov 1996 – Jun 2003 when Zhang Dingfa was promoted one grade Zhang Lianzhong as a CMC member, neither the grade for the Jan 1988 – Nov 1996 (张连忠) PLAN as an organization nor the grade of the (刘华清) Aug 1982 – Jan 1988 PLAN political commissar was raised to the 叶飞 same level. Therefore, although Zhang and his Fei ( ) Jan 1980 – Aug 1982 successors will hold the same grade as the Chief Jan 1950 – Dec 1979 of the General Staff and the directors of the (萧劲光)

China’s Navy 2007—11 Figure 6—PLAN Political Commissars tion. Zhang became seriously ill in January 2006 and was replaced in August 2006. Political Commissar Command Period Hu Yanlin (胡彦林) Jun 2003–Present Shi Yunsheng (1996-2003): Shi was born in Yang Huaiqing (杨怀庆) Jul 1995–Jun 2003 Liaoning Province in January 1940 and joined Zhou Kunren (周坤仁) Dec 1993–Jul 1995 the PLA in 1956. In 1958, he graduated from Wei Jinshan (魏金山) Apr 1990–Dec 1993 an aviation preparatory school. He then at- tended the PLAAF’s 7th Aviation School in Li Yaowen (李耀文) Oct 1980–Apr 1990 , graduating in 1962. After grad- (叶飞) Feb 1979–Jan 1980 uating, he served as a Naval Aviation pilot, Du Yide (杜义德) Oct 1977–Dec 1978 zhongdui commander, dadui commander, and Zhenhua (苏振华) Sep 1971–Sep 1977 deputy regiment commander. In 1976, he was Li Zuopeng (李作鹏) Jun 1967–Sep 1971 appointed as the deputy commander of NSF Wang Hongkun (王宏坤) Mar 1966–Jun 1967 Naval Aviation. In 1981, he became a Naval (苏振华) Feb 1957–Mar 1966 Aviation division commander. In 1983, he was appointed as the SSF Naval Aviation command- the Fujian Base, deputy commander of the er. In 1990, he became a deputy commander of East Sea Fleet, and commander of the South Naval Aviation. In November 1992, he was as- Sea Fleet and concurrently deputy commander signed as a PLAN deputy commander and was of the Guangzhou Military Region. In 2004, he promoted to commander in November 1996. was appointed as one of the deputy chiefs of Shi served as the commander until he was re- the general staff. In August 2006, Wu replaced lieved of duty in June 2003 as a result of the Zhang Dingfa as the PLAN commander. death of the entire crew on a Ming submarine two months earlier. Zhang Dingfa (2003-2006): Zhang was born in December 1943 in Shanghai and joined Zhang Lianzhong (1988-1996): Zhang was the PLAN in 1960. From 1960-1964, he was born in June 1931 in Province and a cadet at a PLAN submarine academy. After joined the PLA in 1947. During 1948, he par- graduating, he served as a submarine CO, sub- ticipated in several campaigns against the marine zhidui deputy commander, assistant Nationalists. Beginning in 1949, he served in to the chief of staff of the NSF, and chief of several junior officer positions in the Third staff of the Qingdao Base. He then successively Field Army’s 273rd Regiment. After attending became the chief of staff, deputy command- an infantry school in 1956, he served in sev- er, and commander of the NSF. In November eral ground-force billets until he enrolled in a 2002, Zhang was assigned as the first naval of- PLAN submarine school in August 1960. After ficer to be the president of the PLA’s Academy graduating in 1965, he served in various billets, of Military Science (AMS). In June 2003, he re- including a submarine CO, deputy zhidui com- placed Shi Yunsheng as the PLAN commander. mander, zhidui commander, NSF deputy chief In September 2004, Zhang was selected as a of staff, Lushun Base commander, and PLAN concurrent member of the CMC, making him deputy commander. He succeeded Liu Huaqing the first PLAN commander to hold this posi- as commander of the PLAN in January 1988,

12—China’s Navy 2007 serving in that post until November 1996. As Xiaoping (who at the time was the PLA’s chief a submariner, Zhang was the first PLAN com- of the general staff), and then deputy chief of mander to have served at sea. the general staff. In August 1982, he was as- signed as the third PLA Navy commander. Liu Huaqing (1982-1988): Liu was born in This position also included being selected as a October 1916 in Province and joined member of the CCP’s 12th Central Committee. the Red Army at age 14 in 1930. He partici- pated in the , where he established In November 1987, Liu moved from the navy personal relations that would serve him well in to the final phase of his military career in the the future. For the next 15 years, he served in CMC, where he eventually became the senior political commissar positions with various Red vice chairman and one of the most powerful Army and PLA units. men in the PLA behind Deng, who was the CMC chairman. In 1992, he also became a member His naval career began when he was appoint- of the 10th CCP Central Committee’s Politburo ed as the deputy political commissar of the 1st and the Politburo Standing Committee, where Naval College in 1952. From 1954-1958, he he helped shape the future of the PLA as a whole. attended the Voroshilov Naval Academy in Leningrad, where he was influenced by the Ye Fei (1980-1982): Ye was born in the writings of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. After re- and his family returned to China turning to China in 1958, he served as first when he was four years old. He joined the deputy-commander, chief of staff, and com- Communist Youth League in 1928 and the mander of the PLAN’s Lushun base, and depu- CCP in 1932. During the 1930s and 1940s, Ye ty commander of the NSF. was involved in CCP activities in southeastern China and as a political commissar and com- The second phase of his naval career began mander of various Red Army units. In 1953, in 1961, when he was assigned as the presi- he held several concurrent positions, includ- dent of the Ministry of National Defense’s 7th ing the governor of Fujian Province, deputy Research Academy, which was established in commander of the Military Region, 1958 to manage development. In and commander and political commissar of 1965, Liu became a vice minister of the 6th the Fujian Military District. At age 40, Ye Fei Ministry of Machine Building (shipbuilding). received the rank of general when ranks were The following year, he became a vice minister first given to the PLA in 1955. In 1975, he be- of the Commission for Science, Technology, came the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) and Industry of National Defense (COSTIND), Minister of Transportation. In February 1979, which was responsible for guiding develop- appointed Ye, who had nev- ment of the military’s weapon systems. er served in the PLAN, as the Navy’s political commissar for one year. Deng then appoint- In 1970, he returned to the PLAN as a depu- ed him as the commander until August 1982. ty chief of staff. It was during this time that After leaving his position as PLAN commander, he also broadened his influence by becoming he served as the vice-chairman of the standing a member of the Party leading group of the committee of the 6th and 7th National People’s Chinese Academy of Sciences, assistant to Deng Congress (1983-1993).

China’s Navy 2007—13 Xiao Jinguang (1950-1979): Xiao was born probably had the most significant impact on in January 1903 in Province. At age PLAN development, because, for all practical 16, Xiao became involved in political activi- purposes, he ran the Navy from 1962 until ties and joined the Communist Party at age 1971. He was born in 1914 in Province 17. He studied in Moscow from 1921-1924. In and joined the Red Army in 1930. In 1935, he 1925, he served as a political officer during the began working in the General Staff Department Northern Expedition and was given the rank of and participated in the Long March. From 1939 lieutenant general. He went back to Moscow in to the early 1950s, he served in various Army 1927 and studied there until 1930. From then staff, training, school, and command posi- until 1949, he served in various Red Army and tions, including the commander of the 4th Field PLA command and political commissar posi- Army’s 43rd Army. In 1962, he was assigned to tions. At the age of 46, Xiao Jinguang became his first Navy position as a PLAN deputy com- the Navy’s first commander. Technically, he mander. In 1967, he became the PLAN political held the position until December 1979. In commissar and was later assigned as a concur- 1962, however, Xiao came under attack from rent deputy chief of the general staff. Li was Defense Minister , and Lin relieved him the last PLAN flag officer to serve as a deputy of his PLAN duties in January 1967. When Lin’s chief of the general staff until the early 1990s. plane went down over Mongolia in September 1971, Xiao was reinstated but came under im- The PLA Navy’s encyclopedia states that, un- mediate attack from ’s wife, der Minister of Defense Lin Biao’s tutelage as Qing. For all practical purposes, the PLAN’s vice chairman of the CMC, Li Zuopeng essen- political commissar, Li Zuopeng, ran the Navy tially took over command of the navy, which from 1962 until he was arrested immediately negatively affected the PLAN’s direction of after Lin’s plane crash. development. After the was launched, this battle became more bit- ter, especially during the period from January Political Commissars 1967 to September 1971. During this time, Li advocated politics above all else, and he Of the PLAN’s 11 political commissars, the brutally persecuted officers who disagreed with first 8 spent most of their career in the Army him, thus destroying unit development. and moved into the PLAN political commis- sar position without much, if any, naval expe- From 1965-1971, Naval Aviation fighter and rience. Zhou Kunren, who was appointed to bomber pilots averaged 26 flying hours annual- the position in 1993, was the first PLAN politi- ly, with a low of 12.5 hours in 1968. In November cal commissar to spend most of his career in 1969, Li abolished Naval Aviation headquar- the Navy. His successor, Yang Huaiqing, spent ters and its entire command staff. It was not re- most of his career in PLAN political officer bil- established until May 1978. Therefore, aviation lets, but his replacement, Hu Yanlin, spent units within the fleets were left to themselves most of his career in PLAAF and Army political without guidance from PLAN Headquarters. officer positions. From 1969-1978, Naval Aviation had more than 70 aircraft accidents that resulted in total loss Li Zuopeng (1967-1971): Although the PLAN of the aircraft and 62 pilot deaths. The serious has had 11 political commissars, Li Zuopeng accident rate in Naval Aviation was quite high.

14—China’s Navy 2007 When Lin Biao’s plane crashed in September political commissars have been promoted as the 1971, Li was immediately arrested. Ten years PLAN political commissar. later, the PRC’s highest court tried and sen- tenced him to 17 years. Although he was arrested in 1971, his policies continued to neg- Chiefs of Staff atively affect PLAN development through the end of the decade. Since 1949, the PLAN has had at least 14 chiefs of staff, who serve as the director of the Headquarters Department within PLAN Deputy Commanders Headquarters. Of these, 7 have received lateral promotions in grade as a deputy commander. Since 1949, the PLAN has had about 40 dep- uty commanders, with an average of three serving at the same time. Each deputy has his Political Department own broad portfolio of responsibilities that cut Directors across the four major departments. Whereas many of the early deputies were transferred Since 1949, the PLAN has had at least 15 di- from Army positions, almost all the deputies rectors of the Political Department within from the 1970s on rose up through the PLAN. PLAN Headquarters. Of these, 5 have received lateral promotions in grade as a deputy Of the deputy commanders, 12 previous- political commissar. ly served as fleet commanders (2 NSF, 3 ESF, and 7 SSF) and 7 served as PLAN Headquarters chiefs of staff (i.e., director of the Headquarters Fleet Commanders and Department). The remaining 19 deputies came Political Commissars from a wide variety of positions in the four ma- jor departments within PLAN Headquarters. Each of the PLAN’s three fleets has a com- Of the deputies, three were later promoted mander and political commissar, who hold as the plan commander. the same grade as the deputy commanders, deputy political commissars, chief of staff and Political Department director at PLAN Deputy Political Commissars Headquarters. Since the late 1980s, the NSF, Since 1949, the PLAN has also had about 25 ESF, and SSF fleet commanders have also been deputy political commissars, with an average concurrently appointed as a deputy com- of two serving at the same time. Of the depu- mander of the , Nanjing, and Guangzhou ties, 10 previously served as fleet political com- Military Regions, respectively. missars (3 NSF, 2 ESF, and 5 SSF) and 5 served as the director of the Political Department Since the three fleets were established, the NSF in PLAN Headquarters. The remaining dep- has had 11 commanders and 11 political com- uties came from a wide variety of political missars, the ESF has had 11 commanders and positions within the PLAN, Army, and four 13 political commissars, and the SSF has had General Departments. Six of the deputy 14 commanders and 12 political commissars.

China’s Navy 2007—15 Of these, only the former commander of the commissar, Zhou Kunren, who served as the NSF, Zhang Dingfa, and the commander of the SSF political commissar, has become the PLAN SSF, Wu Shengli, have become the PLAN com- political commissar. mander. In addition, only one fleet political

16—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 3 Political System

According to PLA writings, the PLA’s political Each Party committee is responsible to a high- work system is the means through which the er-level committee and ultimately through the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) guarantees Central Military Commission (CMC) to the absolute control over the military. Every organi- CCP’s Central Committee. The five types of zation in the PLA, including headquarters, op- Party committees, which are discussed in more erational units, academies, research institutes, detail later, are shown below: and factories, has one or more components of the political work system, which consists of • Party Committee (党委) the following six main components: • Grassroots Party Committee (基层党委) • Party general branch (党总支) • Party committee system • Party branch (党支部) • Political administrative system • Party small group (党小组) • Discipline inspection system • Party congresses Every organization in the PLA is composed of • Political officer system two basic components: • Judicial system • A headquarters element • Administrative departments The PLAN’s political work system is identical to the larger PLA’s political work system. Every headquarters element has one of the three types of Party committees shown below:

Party Committee System • A Party committee established in every regiment-level and above organization The PLA has five types of Party committees headquarters that can be established in organizations at all • A grassroots Party committee established levels of the PLA. The type of Party committee in each battalion-level organization head- established depends on three factors: quarters • A Party branch established in each com- • The level at which the organization re- pany-level organization headquarters sides • The organization’s responsibilities, such as Every administrative department has one of the Operations Department having greater the four types of Party committees shown be- responsibilities than the Management low: Bureau, even though they are at the same level • Party committee • The number of Party members • Party general branch

China’s Navy 2007—17 Figure 7—PLAN Headquarters Party Committees

Organization Level Organization Party Committee Headquarters element PLAN Headquarters Party Committee First-level department Headquarters Department Party Committee Second-level department Operations Department Party General Branch Third-level department Operations Division Party Branch

• Party branch In addition to the headquarters element’s • Party small group Party committee, each of the four first-level administrative departments has its own Party

committee. In addition, some second-level de- Figure 7 provides an example of the dif- partments for regiment and above organiza- ferent types of Party committees within tions have their own Party committee if there PLAN Headquarters’ structure, including are enough Party members for one. the Operations Division of the Operations Department in the Headquarters Department. Grassroots Party Committees

Party Committees A grassroots Party committee is assigned to the headquarters element for all battalion-level or- A Party committee is established in each ganizations. Although these committees are headquarters element for all PLA regiment- formally identified as grassroots Party commit- level and above organizations. The PLAN tees, the PLA often omits the term “grassroots” has a Party committee for each regiment and and identifies them just as Party committees. above organization. At the regiment level, Grassroots Party committees are not assigned this includes vessel dadui, aviation regiments, to administrative departments. coastal defense regiments, and all regiment- equivalent organizations. Party General Branches Each of these Party committees has a stand- ing committee (党委常委) consisting of the Party general branches are established only with- commander, political commissar, deputy in administrative departments that are not large commanders, deputy political commissars, enough to have a Party committee but are too and directors of the four first-level adminis- large for a Party branch. Party general branches trative departments—Headquarters, Political, are not established in headquarters elements. Logistics, and Equipment. In most cases, the political commissar is the Party secretary and the commander is the deputy secretary. In Party Branches some situations, however, the commander is the secretary and the political officer is the Party branches are assigned to all company-lev- deputy secretary. el organization headquarters and to all second-

18—China’s Navy 2007 and third-level administrative departments. Party Congresses are composed of elected repre- For example, the second-level Operations sentatives from the Party committee at each level. Division subordinate to PLAN North Sea Fleet’s They are the top-level organizations responsible Headquarters Department has a Party branch. for supervising lower-level Party committees. Furthermore, each administrative branch on PLAN vessels, such as a destroyer’s radar and In addition, every administrative depart- sonar branch, has its own Party branch.2 ment that has a Party committee with more than 200 Party members holds its own Party Congress every five years. The Party Congress Party Small Groups reviews the department’s activities for the pre- vious five years and selects new members for All PLA Party members must belong to some the next Party committee. type of Party organization. Party small groups are established at the platoon level, where only Battalion- and company-level organizations a few officers are present, and at the squad level, and administrative departments that have few- which is composed solely of enlisted personnel. er than 200 Party members convene a Congress of Military Party Members (军队党员大会). In addition, when the PLA establishes ad hoc working groups, the members, regardless of All of these Party Congresses are responsible their grade or rank, are organized into a Party for approving the Party Committee’s report, small group or a Party branch. Which type of the report for that level’s discipline inspection Party committee is established, such as a Party commission, discussing key issues and making small group or Party branch, depends on the decisions based on those issues, and selecting number of Party members involved. and approving the members for the next Party committee and that organization’s discipline inspection commission. Party Congresses

By regulation, every regiment-level and above Political Officer System organization in the PLA holds a Party Congress (党代表大会) once every five years, but a Party Party committees are the decision-making and Congress can be held on an ad hoc basis if guidance bodies for all key issues, including necessary. For example, from 1956 to 2004, training, at each level in the chain of command. the PLAN held 10 Party Congresses. Although they were held sporadically through the 1960s, The political officer system consists of politi- they have been held every five years since. The cal officers at every level in the chain of com- PLAN holds plenary sessions for each congress mand from the company level up to the four about twice a year. General Departments. Platoons and squads do

2 PLAN vessels are organized into bumen (部门), which the PLA translates as “branch.” In the US Navy, they are called departments, each of which has subordinate divisions.

China’s Navy 2007—19 not have political officers. The three types of the deputy secretary. For example, Party com- political officers are: mittees oversee virtually all of a unit’s work: from operations and training issues, such as • Political commissars (政委) are assigned to logistics support and personnel completion of all regiment-level and above organizations training tasks; to officer evaluation, selection, • Political directors (教导员) are assigned to and staffing; to expenditure of unit funds for all battalion-level organizations goods and materials; to the implementation of • Political instructors (指导员) are assigned higher-level Party committee decisions. to all company-level organizations

Some of the key responsibilities for political of- Political Administrative ficers include: System

• Serving as either the secretary or deputy All regiment-level and above headquarters in secretary of the Party committee the PLA have a political administrative struc- • Implementing decisions made within the ture, which is responsible for implementing the Party committee system organization’s political work. Organizations at • Instilling Party discipline among Party the battalion level and below do not have any members administrative departments. • Providing political education to the The political administrative structure consists troops within their organization of departments (部), divisions (处), offices (科), • Working with other components of the or branches (股), which are responsible for man- political work system aging the establishment of Party organizations, officer personnel records, propaganda, securi- Political officers at the company and battal- ty, culture, mass work, and Party discipline.3 At ion levels are responsible for gathering infor- the regiment level, some of the administrative mation on all personnel for promotions. They branches are combined. For example, Figure 8 are also responsible for administering the Party (top of the next page) shows how the propa- member selection process. However, promo- ganda and security administrative structure is tions and Party membership decisions are de- organized from PLAN Headquarters down to cided by the appropriate Party committee. the regiment-level vessel dadui.

The PLA has a dual leadership system, where the commander and political officer are co- Discipline Inspection System equal in grade; however, almost all key deci- sions are made by the organization’s Party The PLA has a system of discipline inspection committee, where the political commissar is organizations that are responsible for moni- normally the secretary and the commander is toring the actions of PLA Party members and

3 Although the Political Department’s Cadre Department is responsible for officer personnel management, the General Staff Department’s Military Affairs Department is responsible for enlisted personnel management.

20—China’s Navy 2007 Figure 8—PLAN Propaganda and Security Administrative Structure

Organization Level Propaganda Security PLAN Headquarters Propaganda Department Security Department Fleet Headquarters Propaganda Division Security Division Support Base Propaganda Division Security Division Vessel Zhidui Propaganda Office Security Office Marine Brigade Propaganda Office Security Office Vessel Dadui Propaganda and Security Branch

Party organizations and ensuring that Party • At battalion- and company-level units, discipline is maintained. This system is mir- the Party committee or branch assigns rored after the CCP’s discipline inspection sys- Party members to undertake discipline in- tem on the civilian side. spection tasks

The components comprising the PLA’s disci- Members of the discipline inspection com- pline inspection system can be divided into mission at each level are selected by the Party three groups: Congress, which is held every five years.

• Party discipline inspection commissions (党纪律检查委员会) Judicial System — The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is the top-level military China’s armed forces have a military judicial organization that oversees the PLA’s system composed of the military courts (军 discipline inspection system 事法院), military procuratorates (军事检察院), — CCP discipline inspection commis- and security departments (保卫部门), which sions are established in all PLA units exercise the trial, procuratorial, and investigat- at the regiment-level and above ing powers, respectively, in accordance with • Discipline inspection departments (纪律检 the laws regarding criminal cases within the 查部), which include: armed forces. The military courts and mili- — The General Political Department’s tary procuratorates are established within the Discipline Inspection Department armed forces as part of the State judicial sys- — The PLAN’s Political Department’s tem, meaning that they adhere to State laws. Discipline Inspection Department — The political department in each jun- Within the PLAN, military courts and procura- level and above headquarters has a torates have been created in PLAN Headquarters subordinate Discipline Inspection and each of the three fleet headquarters. They Department are considered administratively subordinate — Below the jun level, the Organization units within PLAN Headquarters and the three Department within the Political fleet headquarters, but exercise independent Department is responsible for carrying judgment. Although neither organization is out discipline inspection tasks directly subordinate to the Party Committee

China’s Navy 2007—21 or Political Department in PLAN Headquarters • Directly accepting and investigating crim- or the fleet headquarters, the PLA incorporates inal cases involving crimes committed judicial system work as part of the political • Deciding whether to make an arrest or to work system. initiate a prosecution • Exercising supervision over the legality of The military courts accept criminal cases within the armed forces and may accept other cases with the investigatory and judicial activities of authorization from the Supreme People’s Court. the internal security organs and the mili- tary courts. The military procuratorates serve the role of an Inspector General and judge advocate organi- The security departments, which are estab- zation. Their responsibilities are as follows: lished in the political departments of PLA units at or above the regiment level, investi- • Examining criminal cases investigated by the internal security organs and deciding gate criminal cases within the armed forces in whether to approve an arrest or to initiate accordance with the provisions of the Criminal a prosecution Procedures Law.

22—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 4 Doctrine

Doctrine, Theory, and Practice “guidelines,” “concepts,” and “principles.” Whereas “basic military theory” articulates The PLA does not have one specific word for what will guide the PLA in the application of doctrine, and it does not use a word substitute military force at each level of warfare in broad for “doctrine” in referring to its own opera- conceptual terms, “applied military theory” tional theory or operational concepts. What addresses the specifics of how to do it. the PLA does write about is operational “the- ory” and operational “practice.” Therefore, understanding the linkage between opera- The PLA’s Three Levels of tional theory and operational practice in Conflict the PLA is an important tool for identifying operational concepts. The PLA writes that warfare consists of three levels of armed conflict and combat: war, cam- In the PLA, the field of “military science,” paigns, and battles. Wars can be either “local” which is the link between theory and practice, or “total.” Wars are fought to achieve a nation’s has two broad components: “basic military overall political objectives. Campaigns serve as theory” and “applied military theory.” the operational link between the conduct of battles, which are tactical engagements, and “Basic military theory” articulates the the achievement of the nation’s overall objec- fundamental “laws” that govern modern tives in a war. Each of the three levels of con- military operations for the PLA. The PLA flict is “informed” by a different level of “basic presents these fundamental “laws” in its pro- military theory” as shown in Figure 9. fessional institutions, textbooks, “doctrinal literature,” and training as strategic “guide- lines,” operational “concepts,” and tactical “Active Defense” Strategic “guiding principles.” Guidelines “Applied military theory” is the practical As a component of the “greater PLA,” much application of those fundamental “laws,” of the strategic and operational jargon of the Figure 9—The PLA’s Three Levels of PLAN, its constructs for the analysis of warfare Conflict and operations, and the basics of Chinese na- val military science reflect the universally ap- Level of Conflict Informed by plicable “PLA approach.” In other words, it is War (战争) Strategy (战略) couched in “Army” terminology. It is arguable Campaign Methods Campaigns (战役) that the PLAN’s theory does not start resem- (战役法) bling a distinctly naval organization until one Battles (战斗) Tactics (战术) goes down to the tactical level of warfare.

China’s Navy 2007—23 Therefore, all of the PLA’s major strategic and el operations or even specific contingencies. operational concepts apply equally to the They are always keyed to an assessment of the PLA Navy. The near equivalent in China of most likely type of conflict China will face in the US’s “National Military Strategy” is called the near term (total war or local war, nuclear “The National Military Strategic Guidelines for war or conventional war). the New Period.” These guidelines have two major components. The current operational component of the “National Military Strategic Guidelines for the The first is a reform and modernization com- New Period” is known as “Active Defense” (积 ponent, referred to as “Army Building.” It 极防御) as adjusted for the conduct of “Local provides direction to the totality of the PLA’s Wars Under Modern High-Tech Conditions.” modernization efforts: equipment develop- “Active Defense,” therefore, is the highest level ment and procurement, and institutional and of strategic guidance for all PLA military opera- organizational reforms. The current guidance tions during war and preparation for war dur- for “Army Building” for the entire PLA is the ing peacetime. It applies to all PLA services and “Two Transformations” program, which calls branches, including the PLAN. for the PLA to transform itself:

• “From an army preparing to fight local Offshore Defense wars under ordinary conditions to an army preparing to fight and win local In 1985, the CMC approved a PLAN compo- wars under modern, high-tech condi- nent of the “Active Defense” strategic guide- tions” lines known as “Offshore Defense” (近海防 • “From an army based on quantity to an 御). The PLAN also refers to this concept as the army based on quality.” “Offshore Defense Strategy.” Operationally, • A corollary that usually accompanies “Offshore Defense” adheres to the following these two imperatives in PLA literature basic tenets of “Active Defense”: is that the PLA must also transform itself from an army that is personnel intensive to • “Overall, our military strategy is defen- one that is science and technology intensive sive. We attack only after being attacked. But our operations are offensive.” Since the early 2000s, the PLA has also begun • “Space or time will not limit our counter- focusing on building a military based on infor- offensive.” mationalization and mechanization.4 • “We will not put boundaries on the limits of our offensives.” The second component is operational, which provides a broad and overarching set of fun- • “We will wait for the time and conditions damental approaches to the conduct of war. that favor our forces when we do initiate These national-level operational guidelines offensive operations.” are general. They are not intended to provide • “We will focus on the opposing force’s specific direction for campaign- or tactical-lev- weaknesses.”

4 The Chinese term xinxihua (信息化) is translated as either informationalization or informatization.

24—China’s Navy 2007 • “We will use our own forces to eliminate val warfare, especially the increasing reach of the enemy’s forces” modern naval weapons, led to requirements • “Offensive operations against the enemy for a naval service that could defend China by and defensive operations for our own operating credibly further out at sea. force protection will be conducted simul- taneously” The adoption of “Offshore Defense” also matched China’s changing priorities, specifi- “Offshore Defense” as a cally Deng’s focus on economic modernization and the realization that ocean resources—food Strategic Paradigm Shift and energy sources—would be of increasing importance to China’s future development. Adopting “Offshore Defense” represented a sig- Moreover, the need for greater strategic depth nificant strategic paradigm shift for both PLAN for the maritime defense of China’s coastline operations and naval modernization. It revised was clear given that the PRC’s economic cen- the strategic-level operational guidance to the ter of gravity was quickly shifting from deep in PLAN, directing it to shift from preparing for the interior to China’s eastern seaboard. operations close to Chinese shores to prepar- ing for maritime operations in the seas off the Finally, “Offshore Defense” and the PLAN’s Chinese littoral. move out to sea coincided with increased in- ternational focus on the growing importance The PLAN’s previous strategic concept of of ocean resources, issues associated with the “Coastal Defense” (进岸防御) focused planning sovereignty of territorial waters, and, equally and operations on a close-in defense of China’s important, competing maritime claims among coast in support of a major land war. Specifically, the nations of Asia. “Coastal Defense” addressed an anticipated Soviet land invasion from the north support- ed by operations against the Chinese coast by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Hence, the PLAN was “Offshore Defense” as a landward-focused and was expected to play a Broad Strategic Concept supporting role in China’s most likely assessed future contingency. According to PLAN writings, “Offshore Defense” is simply an overarching strategic As a result, with the promulgation of “Offshore concept that directs the PLAN to be prepared Defense” in 1985, the PLAN’s strategic orienta- to accomplish its three key missions “for the tion was redirected—out to sea. As is usually new period” by engaging in maritime opera- the case in China, this major shift in mari- tions out at sea and building a naval service time strategic reorientation was a response to that is capable of sustaining operations out at a changed assessment of the “international sea. Those three key missions are to: security environment” and changes in global • Keep the enemy within limits and resist military capabilities. invasion from the sea By 1985, Beijing no longer believed that a • Protect the nation’s territorial sovereignty Soviet land invasion was likely. Furthermore, • Safeguard the motherland’s unity and Chinese assessments of the changes in na- maritime rights

China’s Navy 2007—25 The Changing Definition of “Offshore” It is clear, however, that “Offshore Defense” has evolved beyond the question of geography Among many foreign specialists of the PLAN, or geographic reach. Research strongly suggests the meaning behind “Offshore Defense” as a that, today, the term “Offshore Defense” does broad strategic-level operational concept has not imply any geographic limits or boundar- often become enmeshed with the associated ies. It does not appear that there is today, in questions of “operational reach,” strategic in- fact, any official minimum or maximum dis- tentions, and PLAN modernization programs. tances out into the oceans associated with the An example is the idea of operating within the “Offshore Defense” concept. “two island chains” or out to the 200-nautical- mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). According to the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, “Prior to the 1980s, the PLAN consid- The first island chain is usually described as ered ‘offshore’ to mean 200 nm from China’s a line through the Kurile Islands, , the coast. Under Deng Xiaoping’s guidance in the Ryukyu Islands, , the Philippines, and 1980s, China’s ‘offshore’ included the Yellow Indonesia (Borneo to Natuna Besar). The sec- Sea, East China Sea, , the ond island chain runs from a north-south line Spratly Islands, the sea area inside and outside from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, and the sea the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia. area in the northern Pacific Ocean.” Together, they encompass maritime areas out to approximately 1,800 nm from China’s coast, In 1997, provided guidance to including most of the East China Sea and East the PLAN that it “should focus on raising its Asian SLOCs. offshore comprehensive combat capabilities within the first island chain, should increase Most commonly, the discussion about nuclear and conventional deterrence and “Offshore Defense” has used terms that link it counterattack capabilities, and should gradu- to geographic boundaries out at sea, future as- ally develop combat capabilities for distant pirations to control various zones of ocean, or ocean defense.” intentions to dominate island chains. When the “Offshore Defense” concept was first being So, how far “offshore” will “Offshore Defense” formulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, take the PLA Navy? According to PLAN offi- and for some time after its formal adoption cers, and implied in some PLAN publications, in 1985, the PLAN engaged in a good deal of the answer appears to be… debate and produced a good number of stud- ies on the issue of how far offshore “Offshore …as far as the PLA Navy’s capabilities Defense” should be. Many of the internal de- will allow it to operate task forces out at sea bates did in fact argue in terms of geography. with the requisite amount of support and security. Moreover, PLAN officers have often explained the “Offshore Defense” concept to foreign- ers in terms that are justified by the “right of For many PLAN officers, this is still a function China” to defend its claims of sovereignty over of the operational reach of the PLA’s land- its EEZ, thus confusing the issue by implying a based aircraft and the PLAN’s antisubmarine 200-nm limit on the concept. warfare capabilities.

26—China’s Navy 2007 PLAN Campaigns Three Attacks and Three Defenses The PLA has identified 22 types of campaigns it could conduct during a conflict. Of these, Within its 22 campaigns, the PLA conducts the PLAN has six key types of campaigns that training on specific types of combat methods it may be called upon to engage in, either as for what it calls the “Three Attacks and Three part of a larger joint campaign or as a single- Defenses.” Originally, the “Three Attacks” re- service affair. They include: ferred to attacks against tanks, aircraft, and • Sea Blockade Campaign: A campaign airborne forces, and the “Three Defenses” re- aimed at blocking or reducing the sea ferred to defense against chemical, biological, links between the enemy and the rest of and nuclear attack. In 1999, the PLA initiated the world. the concept of “New Three Attacks,” which • Anti-Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) refers to attacks against stealth aircraft, cruise Campaign: A campaign to damage and missiles, and armed helicopters, and the “New paralyze enemy sea lines of communica- tion. Three Defenses,” which refers to defense against • Sea-to-Land Attack Campaign: A cam- precision strikes, electronic jamming, and elec- paign aimed at “attacking enemy naval tronic reconnaissance and surveillance.5 The bases, ports, and other important land- PLAN is actively involved in developing and based targets.” These campaigns can training with its own combat methods for the involve either the use of conventional new “Three Attacks and Three Defenses.” weapons or sea-based nuclear weapons. • Antiship Campaign: A campaign to de- stroy or damage large surface . It is “the most typical of all naval cam- Key Guidance Documents paigns.” The PLAN disseminates its operational and • Sea Transportation Protection Campaign: training guidance via official documents, slo- A Navy campaign to defend the safety of sea transportation and sea lines of com- gans, and books. The highest-level campaign munication. guidance documents are known as gangyao (纲 • Naval Base Defense Campaign: A cam- 要).6 Other layers in the process include the paign to resist large-scale enemy attack, Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, blockade, or occupation of friendly naval military training guidance concepts, regula- bases. This includes defense against a vari- tions, and teaching materials. What is signifi- ety of attacks, including attacks with sub- cant is that the PLAN has published an entirely marines, surface warships, water mines, air and land attacks, and attacks with nu- new set of revised guidance documents since clear, biological, or chemical weapons. the end of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000).

5 The word “new” is usually dropped, so it is not always clear which “3 defenses” is being discussed, but in today’s context, it generally means the program initiated in 1999.

6 Gangyao can be translated as outline, essentials, or compendium, but is best left untranslated.

China’s Navy 2007—27 The Gangyao The OMTE stipulate the procedures for imple- menting training, the drafting of plans, the Campaign gangyao are an authoritative and of- topics and programs, the training organiza- ficial set of guidelines, often classified, which tion, and the examination and assessment have a relatively long shelf life (5 to 10 years) of training. Some examples of PLAN OMTE and from which other more granular guid- are as follows: ance, such as specific regulations, are derived. Comparable US Navy documents would be a • Units Equipped with Each Class of Naval Submarine and Surface Vessel classified Naval Doctrine Publication. • Units Equipped with Each Type of Naval In 1999, the PLAN reissued its Campaign Aviation Aircraft, AAA, and SAM Gangyao at the same time the PLA reissued re- • Naval Coastal Defense Artillery and vised campaign gangyao for the Army, Air Force, Missile Units and Second Artillery. At that time, the PLA also • Marine Corps issued its first ever Joint Campaign Gangyao and • Logistics Units Joint Logistics Campaign Gangyao. • Chemical Defense Units

Military Training Guidance Outline of Military Training Concepts and Evaluation Based on specific “military training guidance In June 2001, the General Staff Department is- concepts” (军事训练指导思想) established by sued a completely revised Outline of Military the four general departments, the PLA Navy Training and Evaluation or OMTE (军事训练与 has identified similar, if not the same, concepts 考核大纲) for the ground forces, which, as a set as the basic principles for its military training. of classified documents, is simply identified in They are merely a set of 16 characters orga- 大纲 PLA writings as dagang ( ). After three years nized into four sets of four characters. A review of research and writing, the PLAN published of the PLAN writings identified the following its own completely revised set of OMTE in PLAN military training guidance concepts: January 2002. In April 2002, the PLAAF reis- sued all of its OMTE. Of note, the word “eval- • Closely adhere to actual combat situations uation” was not included until the revised (贴近实战) OMTE were issued. • Stress training against opposition forces (突出对抗) According to PLAN writings, the OMTE con- • Implement strict discipline during train- sists of the standardized documents used by ing (从难从严) each branch and type of vessel unit to organize • Apply science and technology during and conduct military training. The OMTE are training (科技兴训) divided according to branch, vessel type, spe- cialized function, and specialized technology. PLAN Regulations Their content includes the guiding thought, training subjects, content, timing, and objec- The PLAN has a wide range of documents tives of training. with different names that can all be trans-

28—China’s Navy 2007 lated in English as rules and regulations. • Establish limited prototypes or conduct Different headquarters can issue different larger exercises to validate adjustments types of rules and regulations. Only the four • Promulgate regulations or directives to general departments and service headquarters codify changes can issue certain types of regulations. Units • Study the new procedures PLA- or service- as low as a regiment can issue various types wide of regulations. • Execute the new procedures • Inspect “from the center” for compliance • Declare “success” or identify “contradic- Teaching Materials tions”

The PLAN uses teaching materials based on the Merely getting to the point of a codification of documents and training guidance concepts, what the new changes should be on any major which are written by organizations such as issue requires a good deal of ad-hoc committee the PLAN Command Academy and the PLA’s work and consensus building within the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS). “community” responsible for the particular change, reform, or adjustment to practice.

Doctrine Development Not surprisingly, major reforms in the PLA also require a political imprimatur. Most directives, policies, and regulations are issued PLA Doctrinal Development under the authority of the CMC. However, when potentially significant (and potentially Because the PLA is a conservative organization, dislocating) change is required or a completely it takes time to enact major institutional, new direction is taken, the reforms are further systemic, or operational changes. This also justified by the invocation of the ideological includes the internal resistance such changes “correctness” of the policy. Ideological cor- often encounter. When the PLA does move rectness is a function of invoking a body of toward making major doctrinal, administra - military “theories,” “thinking,” or “thought” tive, or operational reforms, the evidence that is tied to the “original” military think- suggests it undertakes a methodical pro- ing of one of China’s past (or present) lead- cess. Based on an understanding of the ers. This invocation of such high-level organization, roles, and missions of the PLA in ideological justification is continually referred general, it is apparent that most major reforms to even after the fact of the change in order go through a thorough and sequential 10-step to reinforce the seriousness of the need within process as follows: the PLA to carry through with the intent of the change or reform. • Recognize there is a problem

• Conduct research and theoretical work to As such, each doctrinal reform can take a dif- look for solutions ferent amount of time, depending on the scope • Experiment with new concepts of the changes. In some cases, however, the • Make adjustments to theories and changes take place in conjunction with one of experiments based on results China’s Five-Year Plans. They are identified for

China’s Navy 2007—29 implementation either at the end of one plan for certain tactics and combat methods and to test the next plan, or at the beginning of the plan. new concepts. For example, the PLAN identi- fied several different units as test points for the new OMTE up to two years before it was finally PLAN Doctrine published. The eight steps are as follows:

The Navy Military Studies Research Institute is • Study the theory. This can be done by the single most important center in the PLAN bringing in specialists from PLAN and ci- for the development of national-level naval vilian institutions. In addition, the project participants at the unit usually visit PLAN strategy, the development of navy operation- academies and research institutes, as well al-level (campaign-level) warfighting concepts, as the civilian production facilities for the naval tactics, and research and studies that equipment being studied. look to the future of and the de- • Begin developing the concepts on paper velopment of foreign naval issues. Established and receive theoretical evaluation ap- in August 1985, the PLAN refers to it in English proval from higher headquarters for them. as the “Navy Research Institute” (NRI). • Begin using the specific equipment or weapon system to develop and revise the Tactics, Combat Methods, concepts. • Test the concepts at a PLAN test facility. and Training Concept • Receive a technical evaluation and ap- Development proval from higher headquarters. The PLAN follows a basic seven-step process in • PLAN Headquarters authorizes them for developing new tactics, combat methods, and use throughout the force. training concepts, which can take several years • Demonstrate the tactics, combat methods, to complete. Although the PLAN has a Naval or training concepts to VIPs and the rest Tactics Department in NRI, it often tasks spe- of the force. cific operational units as test points to develop • Units begin to implement the changes.

30—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 5 Submarine Forces

The PLA Navy’s submarine forces (潜艇部队) In January 1956, China began assembling the are generally listed as first in protocol order first type-03 submarine from parts provided among the PLAN’s five branches. This chapter by the at Shanghai’s provides a brief history of the submarine forc- Shipyard, which was then deployed to the es, followed by information on the branch’s PLAN in June 1957 and named New China 15. organizational structure and training. The Sino-Soviet rift that began in 1959 and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) marked Brief History major setbacks for the PLAN submarine forces, as both events resulted in the loss of essential The Soviet Union played a key role in the ear- technological expertise. During the Cultural ly development of China’s submarine forces. Revolution, the Naval Submarine School Although the PLAN was founded in April 1949, was closed in 1969 and not reopened until it was not until April 1951 that it organized December 1973. As a result of these setbacks, 275 personnel into a submarine study team though production was begun in 1959, the that studied at the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s subma- first submarine (type 33 Romeo class) produced rine unit stationed at Lushun. from domestic components was not commis- sioned in the PLAN until June 1969. The PLAN chose Qingdao on the Shandong Peninsula as its base for its submarine train- In the early 1970s, the PLAN began organiz- ing and operations. In May 1952, the PLAN set ing several division-grade submarine zhidui, up its first submarine base in Qingdao, and, in which, at that time, were subordinate to each June 1954, the PLAN established its first inde- fleet headquarters. In addition, the PLAN orga- pendent submarine dadui in Qingdao and pur- nized its first unit in 1975, chased four old submarines from the Soviet which, at that time, was directly subordinate Union. The two medium-class submarines to PLAN Headquarters. Today, each subma- were named New China (新中国) 11 and 12 and rine zhidui is administratively subordinate to a the two small-class submarines were designat- fleet support base. ed National Defense (国防) 21 and 22. In 1982, the PLAN successfully fired a subma- The PLAN also chose Qingdao as the site for its rine-launched ballistic missile, thus marking submarine school, which was created in August the emergence of China’s submarine forces 1953 as the 4th Naval School (第四海军学校). In into a new phase of modern development. September 1957, the PLAN changed the name to the Naval Submarine School (海军潜水艇学 Organizational Structure 校). In June 1983, the school again changed its name to the Naval Submarine Academy Today, the PLAN has one nuclear submarine (海军潜艇学院). base and six conventional submarine zhidui. It

China’s Navy 2007—31 is also building a nuclear submarine base on primary rank for the submarine CO and . As shown in Figures 10 & 11, each political commissar is commander. PLAN submarine is assigned a specific grade, • Some conventional-powered subma- which is lower than the higher-level headquar- rines (Kilo, Song, and Yuan) are regiment ters to which it is subordinate. For example: leader-grade organizations and are directly subordinate to a submarine zhidui. The primary rank for the submarine CO and • Some conventional-powered submarines political commissar is captain. (Golf, Ming, Romeo, and Wuhan) are regi- • Nuclear-powered submarines are division ment deputy leader-grade organizations deputy leader-grade organizations and are and are directly subordinate to a regiment subordinate to division leader-grade subma- leader-grade submarine dadui, which is rine zhidui. The primary rank for the subma- subordinate to a submarine zhidui. The rine CO and political commissar is captain.

Figure 10—Submarine Forces Headquarters, Vessel Grades, and Ranks

Grade # Grade PLAN Submarine Structure Primary Rank 3 Military Region Leader Navy HQ Admiral Military Region Deputy 4 Fleet HQ Vice Admiral Leader 5 Jun Leader Rear Admiral 6 Jun Deputy Leader Support Base Rear Admiral 7 Division Leader Zhidui Senior Captain 8 Division Deputy Leader Nuclear-powered submarines Captain Dadui; 9 Regiment Leader Conventional-powered Captain submarines Conventional-powered 10 Regiment Deputy Leader Commander submarines 11 Battalion Leader Zhongdui

Figure 11—PLA Navy Submarine Organizational Structure

32—China’s Navy 2007 • Each submarine zhidui is, in turn, subordi- then shifted to strengthening command staff nate to a jun deputy leader-grade support training. During the 1970s, submarines began base. The primary rank for the support organizing long-range navigation training, base commander and political commissar submarine group training, and campaign and is rear admiral. tactics combined-arms training. For example, • Each submarine zhidui may also have a in October 1975, submarine 295 conducted subordinate service ship zhongdui and an tests on self-sustained power. In January 1977, zhongdui. Each vessel has submarine 252 completed a 3,300-nm mission its own grade, depending on the size and function. through the Pacific Ocean. In July 1977, sub- marine 296 successfully conducted depth tests • Nuclear-powered submarines each have more than one crew, compared to one in the South China Sea. crew for each conventional-powered submarine. Today, the PLAN organizes submarine training into three types: common training subjects, technical specialty training, and tactics training. Submarine Force Hull Numbers Common Training Subjects The PLAN assigns 3-digit hull numbers to its All officers and enlisted crew members must submarines as follows: pass a specified set of common training sub- • Nuclear submarines have 4xx hull num- jects to meet their basic training requirements, bers which includes: • Conventional submarines have 2xx or 3xx hull numbers • Common military regulations • Damage control Submarine Force Training • Light weapons • Physical training and swimming The PLAN states that the objective of subma- • Regulations for routine support for sub- rine unit training is to increase the organiza- marines tional command capabilities of submarine • Seamanship command personnel at all levels, as well as increase the technical and tactics level of • Shallow diving and underwater escape submarine units. from danger • Submarine organization and deployment Training is conducted so submarine units can • Submarine structure carry out their combat responsibilities, either • Three defenses training (i.e., chemical, individually or in coordination with another biological, and nuclear) naval branch. • Vessel regulations

Types of Training In addition to the basic training subjects not- ed above, each type of organization and sub- During the 1950s, PLAN submarines began marine has its own individual and group conducting predominantly technical training, training subjects.

China’s Navy 2007—33 Technical Specialty Training Tactics Training Technical specialty training consists of the Tactics training consists of the principles and items individual officers and enlisted sail- methods for maritime combat and is given ors need to carry out their own duties. to command personnel of all levels, as well The different types of technical specialty as task-force headquarters and units. Combat training include: training includes:

• Chemical defense • Single-vessel tactics training • Command-and-control systems • Vessel group tactics training • Communications • Combined-arms tactics training during • Electro-mechanical coordinated operations with other PLAN branches • Electronic countermeasures

• Health The content for tactics training consists of the • Missiles following: • Navigation • Radar • Theory, principles, and combat methods • Sails and ropes7 • Mobility methods and weapons employ- • Sonar ment • Underwater weapons • Organization and command • Coordination activities and battle support The content for technical specialty training • Knowledge about all services and deals specifically with: branches

• Capabilities • Case studies of battles • Employment methods during combat • Maritime military geography • Maintenance and care • Naval organizational structure, equip- ment, and special combat characteristics • Management for naval opponents • Organization and command of specialties • Principles • Rules and regulations Training Procedures and Methods • Safety measures The PLAN divides its submarine training into • Specialized theoretical knowledge three phases: shore-based training for person- • Training methods nel, unit technical and tactics basic training, • Weapons and equipment structures and combined-arms training.

7 In US Navy parlance, this is the , conning tower, antenna, mast, and periscope storage.

34—China’s Navy 2007 Shore-Based Training arms training is organized according to tactics training subjects, including tactical group (战 Shore-based training for personnel refers to 术群) training, coordination and training with the basic training given to officers and enlisted other naval branches such as surface vessels sailors before they are assigned to their per- and naval aviation troops, and participation manent duty stations. This includes relevant in at-sea training exercises. To increase at-sea education at submarine academies or other combined-arms combat capabilities, com- naval specialized academies, as well as practi- bined-arms training is conducted under near- cal training at sea, observation, and qualifica- real-war conditions. tion examinations. Training on basic subjects continues after personnel are assigned to their permanent units. Unit Training

Unit Technical and Tactics Basic Training After officers and enlisted sailors of PLAN sub- marine units have completed their academy or Unit technical and tactics basic training re- specialized training, they are assigned to their fers to the training carried out in either train- permanent duty station on a vessel. Units rely ing centers and bases, or by task forces whose upon the PLAN’s Outline of Military Training primary responsibility is training. This usual- and Evaluation (OMTE) discussed in Chapter 4 ly entails implementing a certain number of to conduct different types and levels of train- training subjects that are identified specifically ing. For nuclear submarines, each vessel has for submarines, including: two sets of personnel who rotate on cruises, combat readiness and training, and resting. • Submarine organization Training is carried out according to the needs • Navigation preparations of real war and seeks to connect theory with re- • Single-vessel torpedo or missile attack ality. It is designed to improve the performance • Mine laying of all individual sailors, posts, branches, sub- marine compartments, the entire submarine, • Defense and submarine groups at each level. Training • Reconnaissance at an operational unit alternates between ba- sic training and practical training, and shore- These training subjects are completed in a spe- based training and at-sea training. cific order to enhance a logical organization and disposition, to correctly utilize weapons and equipment, to conduct proper coordina- Shore-Based Training tion, to establish a technical and tactics foun- The basic hands-on and crisis-management dation, and to organize all of the submarine’s training for strategic-missile submarines that components into a complete fighting force. cannot be conducted while the submarine is navigating underwater for long periods of time must be conducted on shore. Shore-based Combined-Arms Training training is conducted at base and harbor facili- Combined-arms training is usually conducted ties, using real situations, simulation training, after basic training is completed. Combined- and hands-on learning to control a vessel.

China’s Navy 2007—35 The training entails controlling a submarine • Training in maritime training areas while submerged and torpedo-attack instru- • Practice navigation ment training, as well as attack methods, tac- • Transiting sea areas tics principles, and coordination of activities • Long-range navigation aboard the submarine. Other examples of shore- based training include using a diving board and diving into a swimming pool, underwater Long-range navigation training is an important escape from danger, and self-rescue methods. overall type of training for submarines. Going through concealed navigation for long peri- ods of time increases the appropriate capabili- At-Sea Training ties for vessel personnel, and increases combat levels by testing a submarine and its weapons As soon as shore-based training is completed, and equipment. at-sea training begins and focuses on navi- gation and mission-based training subjects. Training for submarine tactical groups and Navigation training focuses on: combined-arms training are done only af- ter all of the training subjects in the OMTE • Controlling the submarine under special situations are completed. These types of training focus on the following: • Controlling the submarine while sub- merged • Subsurface movement methods for task • Submerging and surfacing forces • Crisis situation management • Identifying friendly and hostile subma- • Navigation during different watch periods rines while under water • Becoming familiar with maritime areas • Communications and fixing vessel posi- tions

Day and night surface and subsurface training • Submarine group communications and liaison with shore-based entities involves everyone, including the CO, XO, duty watch officers, technical officers, and enlisted • Combined-arms tactics with other PLAN sailors. The goal is to accomplish independent branches control of the submarine and obtain watch of- ficer certification. Mission-based training sub- COs first study the relevant theories. Next, jects focus on navigation training and the use they become familiar with how to coordinate of torpedoes, missiles, mines, and other weap- force with group and combined-arms tactics, ons. They follow the same pattern as other and with the characteristics of tactical situa- training—from theory to practice, from shore tions. They also research case studies of battles to sea, and from a little to substantive. At-sea and create scenarios. During each step along training includes: the way, they begin by conducting training for individual parts and then combining the parts. • Anchoring The final step is to conduct comprehensive at- • Assembled training for the crew while at sea training to put it all together, to include anchor live-fire exercises.

36—China’s Navy 2007 Submarine Force Training • The old concept of single submarines Reforms conducting independent training was re- placed with multiple submarines attack- Based on the revised OMTE issued in 2002, the ing as a task force. PLAN is developing and implementing new • The PLAN replaced the old basic training and more realistic tactics and combat methods method of simple and redundant training to enable its submarines to be able to attack, with mission-oriented training subjects. survive after an attack, and maintain the ca- • The old method of training on single sub- pability to attack again at a later time. This is marine tactics per sortie was replaced with a change from previous tactics, which focused training on several combined-arms tactics primarily on attacking and less on defense be- simultaneously in a combined-arms envi- fore and after an attack. ronment. • The revised OMTE calls for significant Under the new OMTE, submarine training now training advances in all three fleets for focuses on completing attacks and then break- “damaged” submarines and to rescue a ing safely through the enemy’s antisubmarine submerged submarine in distress. positions. This, it is hoped, will allow subma- • The submarine force has also increased its rines the opportunity to attack again later. use of simulator training. Based on the revised OMTE, PLAN submarine units have adopted the following reforms: Finally, the PLAN has begun extending both • The old concept of single submarines de- the range for some of its submarines and in- parting early in the morning and return- creasing the duration of some training events, ing late on the same day was replaced including training during poor weather condi- with the concept of multiple submarines tions. All of these training reforms have affect- conducting navigation training together ed how the submarine force provides logistics over multiple days throughout the day and maintenance support before, during, and and night. after each training event.

China’s Navy 2007—37 38—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 6 Surface Forces

The PLA Navy’s surface forces (水面舰艇部队) composite-supply ships, long-range salvage- are usually listed as second in protocol order and-rescue ships, and long-range tugboats. among the PLAN’s five branches. This chapter provides a brief history of the surface forces, followed by information on the branch’s orga- Organizational Structure nizational structure and training. The PLAN’s surface forces are organized into three levels of headquarters as follows: Brief History • Zhidui are division-leader organizations When the PLA Navy was founded in 1949, the • Dadui are regiment-leader organizations surface branch was the PLAN’s only maritime • Zhongdui are battalion-leader organizations force and was composed of combat vessels and service vessels. In November 1949, the PLAN Each individual vessel in the surface forces is established its first frigate dadui. Shortly there- also assigned a grade, which is the same grade after, the PLAN created landing vessel, mine- as the commanding officer (CO) and political sweeper, , submarine chaser, and officer. Because the PLA’s organizational struc destroyer forces. By the end of 1955, the surface - force expanded in size, types of vessels, and or- ture does not allow for an organization at one ganizational structure. During the 1950s, the level to be subordinate to another organiza- PLAN’s surface vessels helped occupy several tion at the same level, each PLAN vessel has Nationalist-held islands off the coast and sup- a lower grade than its headquarters. Figure 12 ported Chinese fishing rights. (top of the next page) shows the types of head- quarters and their assigned grade. In addition, During the early 1960s, China began designing the assigned grade for each type of the PLAN’s and researching its own missile boats, destroy- surface vessels is shown. ers, frigates, and landing vessels, which were then incorporated into the PLAN. During the 2000s, the PLAN has been restruc- turing its surface forces’ organizational struc- In the early 1970s, the PLAN created several ture to better meet its operational needs. guided-missile speedboat and guided-mis- For example, in 2004 the PLAN created a sile destroyer units. During the 1980s, the fo- new zhidui-level organization identified as a cal points for PLAN development were frigate Combat Support Vessel Zhidui (作战支援舰支 and destroyer combat-vessel units, while sig- 队) in each fleet. Several existing vessel dadui nificant progress also occurred for the mine- were re-subordinated to the zhidui to provide sweeper, mine-laying, and submarine-chaser better guidance for support for combat vessels forces. Furthermore, the PLAN expanded its at sea. In addition, the East Sea Fleet created service- and support-vessel force structure with a new submarine chaser and frigate zhidui.

China’s Navy 2007—39 Figure 12—Surface Force Headquarters and Vessel Grades

PLA Grades Naval Headquarters Levels Vessel Types and Grades (3) MR Leader Navy HQ None (4) MR Deputy Fleet HQ None (6) Jun Deputy Support Base None Garrison (7) Division Leader None Zhidui (9) Regiment Leader Dadui Destroyers (10) Regiment Deputy None Frigates and service ships Escort boats (3-digit hull numbers) Landing ships (3-digit hull numbers) (11) Battalion Leader Zhongdui Minesweeper ships (3-digit hull numbers) Service ships and submarine chasers Escort boats (4-digit hull numbers) Landing craft (4-digit hull numbers) Minesweeper boats (4-digit hull (13) Company Leader None numbers) Missile boats (4-digit hull numbers) Missile speedboats (4-digit hull numbers) Service ships

Figure 13 (top, page 41) provides a general over- shows the organizational relationship for de- view of the types of zhidui, dadui, and zhongdui stroyers and frigates within each fleet. subordinate to each fleet headquarters. When vessels from the same or different zhidui Each fleet has a destroyer zhidui that is com- and dadui are organized into task forces (编队), posed of subordinate destroyers and frigates. the task force is assigned the grade of the vessel with the highest grade, not that of the officer Whereas the destroyers are directly subordi- with the highest grade. For example, if a dep- nate to the zhidui, the frigates are subordinate uty fleet commander, who is a jun leader-grade to a dadui, which is subordinate to the zhidui. (grade 5) officer, is the task force commander The reason for this is that the PLAN’s destroy- and is aboard a destroyer, the grade of the task ers are considered regiment leader-grade orga- force is still that of the regiment leader-grade nizations, so they cannot be subordinate to a (grade 9) destroyer. dadui, which is also a regiment leader-grade organization. Therefore, they are directly sub- ordinate to the division leader-grade zhidui. PLAN Vessel Hull Number However, frigates, which are regiment deputy System leader-grade organizations, are subordinate to a dadui, which is, in turn, subordinate to the The PLAN assigns 3-digit hull numbers to its destroyer zhidui. Figure 14 (bottom, page 41) destroyers and frigates as follows:

40—China’s Navy 2007 Figure 13—Types of Surface Force Zhidui, Dadui, and Zhongdui by Fleet

Figure 14—PLAN Destroyer Zhidui Structure

China’s Navy 2007—41 • Destroyers have 1xx hull numbers Common Training Subjects • Frigates have 5xx hull numbers All officers and enlisted crew members must pass a specified set of common training sub- In addition, vessels above battalion leader- jects to meet their basic training requirements, grade have 3-digit hull numbers. These include which includes: submarine chasers, minesweeper ships, service ships, landing ships, and some escort boats. • Common military regulations • Vessel deployment Small combatants have a 4-digit pennant num- • Damage control ber, the first digit of which signifies area subor- • Seamanship dination. Furthermore, company leader-grade • Vessel repairs below the surface boats have 4-digit hull numbers. These in- clude minesweeper boats, service ships, land- • Camouflage and concealment ing craft, missile speedboats, missile boats, and • Light weapons some escort boats. • Physical training and swimming • At-sea practical training The system for hull numbers on auxilia- ries consists of a 3-digit number preceded by In addition to the basic training subjects noted two or more Chinese characters describing above, each surface vessel has its own individ- the ship’s fleet and function. For example, ual and group training subjects. “nanshui” (南水) is an SSF water tanker:

• The first character shows the fleet as fol- Technical Specialty Training lows: — “Bei” (北) for North Sea Fleet Technical specialty training consists of the — “Dong” (东) for East Sea Fleet subjects that individual officers and enlist- — “Nan” (南) for South Sea Fleet ed sailors need to carry out their own du- • The second character shows the function ties. The different types of training include: as follows: • Navigation — “Jiao” (交) for transport • Missiles and guns — “Jiu” (救) for salvage — “Jun” (浚) for dredge • Underwater weapons — “Kang” (康) for hospital • Communications — “Shui” (水) for water tanker • Radar — “Tuo” (拖) for tug • Sonar — “Xiu” (修) for repair • Electronic countermeasures 油 — “You” ( ) for oiler • Electro-mechanical • Sails and ropes Unit Training • Chemical defense Today, the PLAN organizes surface-force train- • Health ing into three types: common training subjects, • Command-and-control technical specialty training, and tactics training. • On-board aviation services

42—China’s Navy 2007 Technical specialty training for individ- As the annual training cycle progresses through ual classes of service ships also includes the calendar year, surface-force training shifts the following: from shore-based and shallow-water to deep- water training, from simple to complex train- • Ocean reconnaissance ing, and from separate training by individuals • Salvage and individual functional branches to com- • Medical care bined training for different functional branch- • Transport and supply es on the same vessel, and from single vessel to • Ocean surveillance and mapping multiple vessel training. • At-sea engineering

Tactics Training Current Training Reforms

Tactics training consists of the principles and Based on the revised OMTE issued in 2002, methods for maritime combat and is given to the PLAN has implemented several significant command personnel of all levels, as well as task- training reforms. force headquarters and units. Combat training is divided into the following two types:

• Tactics training by vessel class Task Force Reforms • Combined-arms tactics training with other PLAN branches Based on the new OMTE, the surface forces are moving away from task forces composed of a sin- gle class of vessel to employing what the PLAN Training Procedures and Methods calls composite task forces. Composite task forc- es are composed of multiple classes of vessels The PLAN divides its surface-force training or combine older and newer classes of vessels. into the following two phases in accordance with the OMTE: Although not every vessel has the same data- link systems and connectivity, the use of data- • Technical and tactics basic training links is helping to change the way task forces • Combined-arms training are organized and operate together. New com- bat methods have been devised to take advan- Technical and tactics basic training is conduct- tage of the data links. ed at one of the fleet vessel training centers or training bases, or during task-force train- Although different classes of surface vessels are ing, and includes vessel organization, man- working together more closely and the surface agement, navigation, defense, and combat forces occasionally conduct combined-arms training subjects. training with the submarine force, the surface forces do not train that often with naval avia- Combined-arms training usually begins after tion or the coastal defense forces. individual vessel technical and tactics training is completed and is organized between different The PLAN is also increasing the coordinated classes of vessels or different PLAN branches. employment of different types of task forces

China’s Navy 2007—43 for offensive purposes. For example, in 2003, under unknown conditions that allow the COs composite task forces used a new training sub- to adapt to changing conditions as the event ject involving firing their main guns together progresses. This includes training in unfamil- while at sea. Under the old OMTE, they had iar sea areas away from “one’s front door.” not done so due to an inability to coordinate different classes of vessels or establish the right command relationships. Logistics and Maintenance Reforms

The surface forces are beginning to include op- The PLAN’s surface forces have also made sev- position-force offensive and defensive training eral changes to their logistics and maintenance together during the same sortie. This includes training. For example, as individual vessels dealing with battle damage and the loss of per- spend more time at sea on longer missions, sonnel while conducting an attack. Under the they are adjusting the types and amount of old OMTE, they conducted offensive and de- food and water on board, as well as figuring fensive training separately. out how to receive supplies if their port facili- ties are destroyed. The PLAN is particularly concerned about the lack of adequate air defense capabilities Shore-based food supply stations are comput- and training. erizing their operations, to include inventory management, product selection by vessel sup- ply personnel, and online purchase of goods. Training Content In addition, some have begun supplying goods through civilian vendors on a contract basis— The surface forces are spending more time a process known as “socialization.” In some in- training on beyond-visual-range attacks against stances, these depots have switched methods. maritime and shore-based targets. Now, instead of storing items, they use pro- curement arrangements to acquire and supply They are also increasing their training at night, goods on short notice. from day into night, in poor weather conditions, near shoals and reefs, and in narrow passage- Previously, logistics and maintenance training ways. In some instances this means increasing was not necessarily incorporated into vessel the distances covered, the number of combat- training at sea. That situation is changing, so readiness patrols, the number of hours at sea, that the entire unit, including shore-based or- and the number of sea-area borders crossed. ganizations and vessels, are training together.

The surface forces are gradually moving away In an effort to train personnel for real-war situ- from training events being 100% scripted ations and to save money, the PLAN has em- where the “Blue Force” and “Red Force” know phasized repairing equipment instead of simply in advance what each side is doing, to training replacing it, as had been done in the past.

44—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 7 Naval Aviation

The PLA Navy’s aviation forces are known as Although the advent of the Korean War did Naval Aviation (海军航空兵 or 海航). Naval not allow the PLAN to fulfill its goals on Aviation is ranked third in protocol order schedule, the three-year plan laid the foun- among the PLAN’s five branches. Besides air- dation for creating an aviation arm. Based on craft and airfields, Naval Aviation has sub- this plan, Naval Aviation had its origins when ordinate antiaircraft artillery (AAA), radar, the CMC established the PLAN 1st Aviation communications, chemical defense, aircraft School on 1 October 1950 at Qingdao on the maintenance, and logistics units, as well as Shandong peninsula. various academies. During the 1980s, Naval Aviation had subordinate surface-to-air missile On 27 June 1952, the Naval Aviation 1st Division (SAM) units, but no longer has them. became operational at Shanghai Hongqiao air- field, followed by several Naval Aviation units, This chapter provides a brief history of na- schools, and fleet aviation troops. This air di- val aviation, followed by information on the vision was manned with the first graduates of branch’s organizational structure and training. the aviation school at Qingdao.

Naval Aviation celebrates 6 September 1952 as Brief History its founding, based on the following events:

• The Naval Aviation Department was es- tablished in Beijing as one of six separate The Early Years administrative departments within PLAN Headquarters Following its founding in April 1949, the PLAN issued its first three-year plan. The por- • A Naval Aviation Headquarters was estab- tions that pertained to creating an aviation lished at Liangxiang Airfield near Beijing branch included: • Naval Aviation was designated one of the PLAN’s five operational branches, along • Establishing three air divisions (one aerial with the submarine, surface, coastal de- mine-laying bomber division, one fighter fense, and Marine Corps branches division, and one division consisting of two ground-attack regiments and one fighter regiment) Operational and Administrative • Establishing three aviation schools, which Structure would train a total of 10,000 pilots and ground support personnel By the end of 1954, Naval Aviation had 5 air • Building two to three Naval Aviation air- divisions and 1 independent regiment. By fields in each strategic combat area 1960, the force comprised 500 aircraft, which • Purchasing 360 aircraft and necessary sup- were organized into 9 divisions and 3 inde- port equipment from the Soviet Union pendent regiments. Today, Naval Aviation has

China’s Navy 2007—45 7 air divisions assigned to 25 airbases located tion equivalent to a fleet headquarters, but throughout the three fleets. kept the Naval Aviation Department as a sec- ond-level department under the Headquarters After the Naval Aviation branch was estab- Department at PLAN Headquarters. lished, the structure changed several times. Through April 1960, the Naval Aviation As a result of the PLAN’s policies, Naval Aviation Department was responsible for implement- fighter and bomber pilots averaged less than 30 ing leadership over the aviation troops and hours annually from 1965-1971. During 1968 schools. From May 1960 to January 1964, alone, combat pilots averaged only 12.5 hours Naval Aviation units were placed under the per year. In addition, from 1969-1977, Naval three fleets, but simultaneously received lead- Aviation had more than 70 aircraft accidents ership and command from the Naval Aviation that resulted in total loss of the aircraft and Department. After January 1964, Naval Aviation 62 pilot deaths. By the end of 1977, however, units came under the leadership of the fleets, this trend began to turn around when Naval while the Naval Aviation Department was re- Aviation pilots flew more hours annually than sponsible for only Naval Aviation schools they had since 1959. For example, in 1978, and for naval aviation unit functional, not Naval Aviation pilots averaged just under operational, responsibilities. 90 hours, which was the highest number of hours ever flown.

The Cultural Revolution Period Combat History By 1965, the PLAN had created 14 schools, in- cluding three aviation schools—1st Aviation On 18 March 1954, Naval Aviation engaged School in Qingdao, Shandong (1950), 2nd in its first air combat, and the last air combat Aviation School in Qingdao (1952), 4th Aviation took place on 10 February 1970 over Hainan. School in Langzhong, Sichuan (1961). During The PLAN states that its Naval Aviation pilots the Cultural Revolution, however, several have shot down or damaged 40 aircraft and schools were closed. Naval Aviation AAA have shot down 380 air- craft, some of which were unmanned drones. Besides schools closing, the Cultural Revolution had disastrous consequences across the board for Naval Aviation. For example, Naval Aviation Organizational Structure headquarters was abolished in November 1969 and was not reestablished until May 1978. Naval Aviation is composed of bomber, fight- Around 1986, the Naval Aviation Department er-bomber, attack, fighter, antisubmarine and was re-subordinated under the Headquarters reconnaissance units, as well as warning, elec- Department at PLAN Headquarters. As part of tronic countermeasure, transport, rescue, and its downsizing program in late 2003, the PLAN air refueling units. Together, these aircraft have again abolished Naval Aviation Headquarters reconnaissance, security, antiship, antisubma- at Liangxiang Airfield near Beijing, which was rine, and air defense capabilities. The organi- a first-level MR deputy leader-grade organiza- zational order moves from the Naval Aviation

46—China’s Navy 2007 Figure 15—Fleet Naval Aviation Force Structure

Department through fleet aviation to air divi- • South Sea Fleet sions and regiments. — Foluo, Guiping, , Jialaishi, Lingling, Lingshui, and Today, as shown in Figure 15, Naval Aviation has 7 air divisions, which are organized into air Aircraft Generations regiments and regiment-grade field stations, battalion-grade flight and maintenance groups When discussing generations of aircraft (i.e., 1st, (大队), and company-grade flight and mainte- 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th generation), the international nance squadrons (中队). Naval Aviation also community bases the generation on particular has several independent regiments, such as decades as follows: its shipborne helicopter regiments. Each fleet also has a radar brigade subordinate to Naval • 1st generation: circa 1945-1955 Aviation. In addition, the North Sea Fleet has a • 2nd generation: circa 1955-1960 Naval Aviation AAA regiment. • 3rd generation: circa 1960-1970 • 4th generation: circa 1970-1990 Naval Aviation’s air divisions and regiments • 5th generation: circa 1990-present are assigned to the following 25 airbases locat- ed throughout the three fleets: The PLA’s system, however, does not necessarily • North Sea Fleet match the international system. The PLAAF and Naval Aviation identify their aircraft — Anyang, Changzhi, Dalian, Jiaoxian, only as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation based on Jinxi, Jiyuan, Laishan, Laiyang, when they were first integrated into the force. Liangxiang, Qingdao, Shanhaiguan, Specifically, the PLA considers: and Xingtai • East Sea Fleet • 1st-generation aircraft: the J-5 and J-6, — Daishan, Danyang, , Luqiao, because they were first deployed in the Shanghai, and Shitangqiao 1950s and 1960s

China’s Navy 2007—47 • 2nd-generation aircraft: the J-7 and J-8, After completing their transition training, all because they were first deployed in the new Naval Aviation pilots are assigned to an 1970s and 1980s operational unit where they receive their initial • 3rd-generation aircraft: the Su-27/30, flight training in the unit’s aircraft. Following J-10, JH-7 and J-11, because they were first two to three years of technical training and ba- deployed in the 1990s and 2000s. The FC-1 sic tactics training, the pilots can be awarded rd is also considered a 3 -generation aircraft wings as a third-grade pilot. As their training continues, they have the opportunity to be- Pilot Recruitment and Training come a second-grade pilot by flying in day and night using instrument flight rules (IFR), Historically, Naval Aviation pilot cadets were se- maintaining flight safety, and reaching a cer- lected only from high school graduates, but that tain proficiency level. Next, if they have con- situation began to change in 2001, when Naval ducted combat and training missions under Aviation began selecting personnel who already day and night IFR conditions, flown a certain had a bachelor’s degree from a PLAN academy. number of hours, reached the level of instruc- tor pilot and flight controller, and maintained The high school graduate cadets receive flight safety, they can become a first-grade pi- their bachelor’s degree in one of two ways. lot. Finally, they can become a special-grade They either attend their first two years at pilot if they have made special achievements the PLAN’s Aviation Engineering College in in combat, training, and test flights, and main- Yantai, Shandong Province, or at the PLAAF tained flight safety. Aeronautics University in Changchun, Jilin Province. After they complete their basic stud- ies, they then spend two years in flight train- Unit Training ing at Naval Aviation’s only flying academy at Huludao, Liaoning Province, or one of the As noted above, Naval Aviation has three phas- PLAAF’s flight academies. es of pilot training: academy, transition, and unit training. After completing their bachelor’s degree, the new officer pilots attend about one year • Phase 1 consists of aviation basic theory of transition training at the Naval Aviation and technical flight training in a basic, intermediate, and advanced trainer at a base in Shanhaiguan, Hebei Province, in the flight academy. North Sea Fleet. • Phase 2 consists of transitioning into a In 2001, Naval Aviation began training its first combat aircraft and conducting basic pilots who have bachelor’s degrees from one of combat technical training at a transition training unit. several PLAN academies. After completing two years of basic flight training at a PLAAF flight • Phase 3 consists of tactics training in the pri- academy in 2003, they received a second bach- mary combat aircraft at an operational unit. elor’s degree and were assigned to the Naval Naval Aviation also conducts training for its Aviation transition training base. After com- AAA, radar, communications, chemical de- pleting their transition training, they entered fense, weather, aircraft maintenance, and the operational force in mid-2004. logistics troops.

48—China’s Navy 2007 Flying Hours and Content More Rigorous Training Scenarios

China does not provide public information As Naval Aviation adapts to more offensive about how many flying hours its Naval Aviation and defensive missions at further distances pilots receive each year. Each regiment has two and the possibility of having its home air- quotas it must meet during the year. The first fields destroyed or damaged by enemy mis- quota is a total number of hours. The second siles, it has changed the way its units and quota is the percentage of flight time dedicat- individuals train. ed to tactics training. Naval Aviation performs about 8.5% of each quota per month and usu- In 1996, the North Sea Fleet formed a Blue ally completes its quota in mid-December. Force aviation ground-attack unit that simu- lates enemy tactics. In addition, individual pi- Based on information available in PLAN writ- lot training on simulators in all three fleets was ings, it appears that Naval Aviation combat not emphasized as much until the new OMTE aircraft pilots average around 125 hours per was implemented in 2002. year. Most units normally fly only three days per week. Each training sortie for fighter and The new OMTE requires Naval Aviation pilots attack aircraft averages around 45 minutes. to conduct more rigorous training than before. Bomber sorties are longer. For example, pilots fly more long-distance, over-water, cross-border missions during the The PLAN divides the training day into three 8-hour flying periods, and most training day and night. Many of the flights are at mini- events occur within one of those periods. To mum altitude (i.e., below 100 meters) or low meet the goals of the new OMTE, however, altitude (above 100 meters) and in poor weath- Naval Aviation has experimented with cer- er conditions. Vessels with helicopters have tain adjustments with the length of the fly- focused on helicopter operations during day ing periods, time per sortie, and content per and night that are gradually moving further sortie. Specifically, some units have been fly- from the vessel. ing what the PLAN calls “large flying peri- ods” that cross from one flying period into The new OMTE also requires Naval Aviation another. Some units have also increased the pilots to take more responsibility for building time per sortie and incorporated more training their own flight plans, rather than merely im- subjects per sortie. plementing flight plans developed by higher headquarters or someone else in the regiment. As a result, the total number of hours per pilot has not necessarily increased, but the number To train in a real-war situation, Naval Aviation of sorties and flying periods has decreased to has increased its training at unfamiliar airfields, accomplish the same amount of training. in unfamiliar airspace, and under unknown conditions. Some training events include mo- bility transits to another airfield when an en- Current Training Reforms emy attack is imminent.

Based on the revised OMTE issued in 2002, Naval Aviation divides the day into three fly- the PLAN has implemented several significant ing periods and has increased its use of lon- Naval Aviation training reforms. ger flying periods that transition from day into

China’s Navy 2007—49 night, night into after midnight, and late night • Flight implementation into day. Naval Aviation is also now conduct- • Flight appraisal ing some “rolling-type” training events that include activity through all three flying peri - Under the new OMTE, Naval Aviation merged ods without rest. the advance-preparation and direct-prepara- tion phases to better manage flight activity. In addition, rather than conducting a sin- gle flight subject per sortie, Naval Aviation is now conducting two or more flight subjects per sortie. Attacks on surface vessels are now Logistics and Maintenance conducted from multiple altitudes and mul- To meet the needs of a more mobile force and tiple directions by increasingly large groups to deal with possible damage to airfields and of aircraft. aircraft during a conflict, Naval Aviation field To deal with the higher training tempo, Naval stations are moving from providing logistics Aviation has begun placing greater empha- and maintenance support for a single type of sis on psychological and fatigue training aircraft at home to supporting operations for for its pilots. multiple types of aircraft at home and during mobile operations. Naval Aviation is also prac- Under the old OMTE, the flying process con- ticing rapid repair of facilities, runways, and sisted of the following four phases: aircraft following an enemy attack.

• Advance preparation, which usually takes Naval Aviation airfields are also now able to sup- place the day before a flight port visiting PLAAF and Army Aviation aircraft • Direct preparation, which occurs the day and helicopters for short periods of time as they of the flight transit within and between military regions.

50—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 8 Coastal Defense Forces

The PLA Navy’s coastal defense forces (海军岸 In 1963, the PLAN began equipping its coastal 防兵) are composed primarily of shore-to-ship defense forces with fixed and mobile shore-to- missile units and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) ship missiles. By the end of the 1960s, these units. The PLAN usually lists the coastal de- missiles were organized into either regiments fense forces as fourth in protocol order among or battalions and were subordinate to either a its five branches. However, the PLAN provides fleet headquarters or a base. very little public coverage of the coastal de- fense forces compared to the other branches. The PLAN states that, since being created in the 1950s, the coastal defense forces have, ei- This chapter provides a brief history of the ther independently or in coordination with coastal defense forces, followed by informa- the ground forces or other PLAN branches, tion on the branch’s organizational structure participated in more than 400 combat op- and training. erations. During these operations, the coastal defense forces sank or damaged more than 70 vessels and shot down or damaged more Brief History than 40 aircraft.

The coastal defense forces were officially estab- lished in 1950 with the opening of the Coastal Organizational Structure Artillery School in August and the creation of the first coastal artillery battalion in October. Today, the coastal defense force’s shore-to-ship missiles are organized into either regiments or In 1952, PLAN Headquarters created a Coastal battalions, and AAA are organized into regi- Defense Department within the Headquarters ments. In some cases, shore-to-ship missiles Department. Today, PLAN Headquarters, each and AAA are combined into a single regiment. fleet headquarters, and each support base with Each regiment and battalion is subordinate to a subordinate coastal defense units has a coastal fleet headquarters or a support base. However, defense troop administrative organization in not every fleet has the same type of units. the Headquarters Department. Figure 16 (top of page 52) shows the current organizational structure for the three fleets. During 1951, the PLAN created several coastal artillery regiments, which were subordinate to either a base or a naval garrison. In 1955, Unit Training a mobile coastal artillery regiment was estab- lished along with several independent coastal The coastal defense forces conduct four types artillery battalions. of training organized into three phases.

China’s Navy 2007—51 Figure 16—PLAN Coastal Defense Force Structure by Fleet

Types of Unit Training Tactics Training Tactics training focuses on tactics theory, prin- The PLAN’s coastal defense forces conduct four ciples, and combat methods. This training types of training as follows: includes single-branch and combined-arms tactics training. • Technical specialty training

• Firing training Single-branch tactics training consists of ar- • Tactics training tillery and missile tactics, plus combat princi- ples, command, and support. It also includes • Common training subjects defending one’s firing or launch site and con- ducting mobile combat. Technical Specialty Training

Technical specialty training focuses on provid- Combined-arms tactics training consists of com- ing individuals with the knowledge and skills bined-arms principles, coordination between for their technical specialty. The different types artillery and missiles, and coordinated com- of technical specialty training include knowl- bat with the surface forces and Naval Aviation. edge of theory, as well as the capabilities, struc- ture, principles, operation, and management Common Training Subjects of weapons and equipment, technical equip- Common training subjects include common ment, and other relevant systems. naval education, as well as camouflage, conceal- ment, and defense against winds and floods. Firing Training

Firing training involves the combat use of Training Phases weapon systems either singly or by an entire company. This training includes the princi- The PLAN divides its coastal defense forces’ ples, operation, and command of firing guns or training into the following three phases in ac- launching missiles at moving maritime targets. cordance with the OMTE:

52—China’s Navy 2007 • Personnel training The training gradually moves from artillery • Technical and tactics basic training and missile battalions coordinating together, • Combined-arms training events to having several missile battalions coordi- nating together. From here, they begin con- Personnel Training ducting larger coordinated training events in a campaign- or tactical-level exercise with the Officers receive their basic training at a PLAN surface forces and Naval Aviation under the academy. Enlisted personnel receive their leadership of a support base. technical training at an academy or a train- ing base. Their training consists of studying basic knowledge, specialty theory, and the ba- sic control and command of weapon systems Current Training Reforms and equipment. Compared to the other branches, the PLAN has clearly lagged behind in implementing Technical and Tactics Basic Training training reforms involving the coastal defense forces. Specifically, although the submarine, Once the officers and enlisted personnel are surface, and aviation forces, and the Marine assigned to their permanent unit, they con- Corps are conducting increasingly more com- duct individual training, as well as unit train- ing at the company and battalion levels. This bined-arms training, the PLAN rarely conducts training includes deployment, management, combined-arms training between the coastal specialty skills, and firing or launching their defense forces and the surface and aviation weapon systems, as well as concealing, defend- forces. The primary reason is the cost in time, ing, and supporting everything at their launch money, and effort to the surface and aviation or firing site. forces to plan, coordinate, and conduct this type of training.

Combined-Arms Training Events At the same time, however, the coastal defense Once the companies and battalions have com- forces are beginning to coordinate more often pleted their basic technical and tactics train- with other components of the PLAN, such as ing phase, regiment and above organizations the observation and communications stations organize larger coordinated training events. located along the coast.

China’s Navy 2007—53 54—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 9 Marine Corps

The Marine Corps (海军陆战队) is the PLA zational structure changed several times. The Navy’s rapid-assault force for amphibious op- Marine Corps began forming brigades in the erations. The PLAN usually lists the Marine late 1970s, which became the primary opera- Corps as fifth in protocol order among tional organization. its five branches. The marines participated in the Yijiangshan This chapter provides a brief history of the Island campaign and contributed to oth- Marine Corps, followed by information on the er island campaigns along the coast during branch’s organizational structure and training. the late 1950s.

Prior to 1999, Marine Corps officers were Brief History trained in Army academies. In 1999, the PLAN’s Guangzhou Naval Vessel Academy established The Marine Corps had its origins in 1953, a Naval Marine Corps Tactics Command when the Marine Corps 1st Regiment was cre- Department, which is responsible for training all ated in the Huadong (East China) Military new and company-grade Marine Corps officers. Region. This regiment became the basis for the marines’ first division. After that, the organi- Organizational Structure

Figure 17—Marine Corps Organizational Today, as shown in Figure 17, the PLAN has two Structure Marine Corps brigades, which are designated the 1st and 164th. Both brigades are subordinate to the South Sea Fleet Headquarters and are located in Zhanjiang, Province. Each brigade has three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, and one amphibious armor regiment. The Marine Corps also con- sists of engineering, reconnaissance, chemical defense, and communications units, which are battalion- or company-level organizations.

Unit Training

Marine Corps personnel receive three types of training at one of three types of locations. Training is conducted during three phases.

China’s Navy 2007—55 Types of Training Psychological, Physical, and Field-Combat Survival Training The Marine Corps conducts three types of This training consists of adapting to different training as shown below: types of conditions, including crossing long • Technical training distances of water under difficult conditions and surviving under field combat conditions • Tactics training after landing on shore or on an island or reef. • Psychological, physical, and field-combat survival training

Technical Training Training Methods

Technical training consists of basic knowledge Officers receive their basic training at a PLAN for amphibious combat, swimming in full academy, but enlisted force members receive battle gear, reconnaissance, capturing enemy their training at an operational unit. Unit personnel, hand-to-hand combat, airborne training is normally conducted at one of landing and parachuting, using water and land three locations: loading and unloading equipment, driving combat vehicles, firing from shore-to-sea and • Training base sea-to-shore, and overcoming water and beach • Training center obstacles, as well as using survival equipment. • Special training site

Unit training normally occurs in the following Tactics Training three phases: Tactics training consists of knowledge of ser- • Shore-based training vices and branches, principles of tactics theory, • At-sea training individual and unit tactics, and combined- • Amphibious landing exercises arms tactics. It also includes the following:

• Theory and principles of amphibious op- Current Training Reforms erations • Boarding landing vessels, crossing bod- Based on the revised OMTE issued in 2002, the ies of water, and loading and unloading PLAN has implemented some training reforms equipment for the Marine Corps. For example, under the • Selecting loading sites and landing sites new OMTE, the Marine Corps is now paying • Assaulting beaches, establishing beach- more attention to simulator training for a wide heads, and breaking out from beachheads variety of specialties, such as driving and using • Organizing and commanding pre-inva- various types of equipment. sion night operations • Dealing with different terrain features The Marine Corps also conducts combined- • Planning, organizing, and commanding arms training with the South Sea Fleet’s land- amphibious operations ing vessel zhidui. This training is now taking • Coordinating with other services and place under more difficult sea and weather branches conditions than before.

56—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 10 Manpower

Understanding the size of the PLA in the past, People’s Liberation Army present, or future is not an easy task. The main reasons for this are because the PLA’s organi- The PLA currently has 2.3 million personnel, zational structure has changed significantly comprised of both active and reserve compo- over the past five decades and statistics were nents. The active components of the PLA are not always available or accurate. Furthermore, the country’s standing forces, consisting of the the statistics provided have not always differ- Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery. entiated among the different components of the armed forces. China’s reserve units were created in 1983 as an important component of the PLA’s orga- Although China has provided public informa- nizational structure. Over the past 20 years, tion about the total size of the PLA over the China has gone from having only ground- past decade, it has not broken down the num- force reserve units to developing PLA Navy, ber of personnel by service or branch, nor has Air Force, and Second Artillery reserve units. it provided specific figures for the number of Today, China has more than 500,000 reserve officers, technical officers, civilian cadre, non- personnel. During peacetime, the reserves commissioned officers, and conscripts. Figures come under the leadership of the provincial for the PLA Navy available in Western publica- military district or garrisons. After they are tions are not necessarily accurate, but they do mobilized during wartime, they come under provide a rough estimate. the command of active-duty units or they can carry out independent combat missions. This chapter first examines the three compo- During wartime, the reserves transition to nents of China’s armed forces and then briefly active-duty status. discusses the 10 PLA force reductions since 1950. The final section provides information about the estimated number of PLA Navy personnel. People’s Armed Police

The People’s Armed Police or PAP (中国人民 China’s Armed Forces 武装警察部队) was established in 1982. It be- longs within the organizational structure of When looking at China’s military, it is impor- the State Council and is under the dual lead- tant to make a distinction among the three ership of the State Council and the Chinese different components of the armed forces Communist Party Central Committee’s (武装力量): Military Commission (CMC).

• People’s Liberation Army The PAP has eight types of troops. Of these, • People’s Armed Police PAP Headquarters manages five (internal se- • curity, gold mines, forests, hydroelectric, and

China’s Navy 2007—57 transportation) with a combined total of more between 1997 and 2000 with a 500,000-man than 600,000 troops. The Ministry of Public reduction to 2.5 million. The 10th downsiz- Security manages the remaining three (border ing occurred between September 2003 and guards, fire fighters, and security guards) with December 2004, with a 200,000-man reduc- a total of more than 200,000 people. tion to the current PLA force of 2.3 million.

The 10 force reductions in the PLA have fo- Militia cused on the following areas:

China describes the militia (民兵) as the armed • Strengthening the PLAN, PLAAF, and organization drawn from the masses involved Second Artillery in production work, which serves as a reserve • Reducing the officer-to-enlisted-member force for the PLA. The General Staff Department ratio administers the building of the militia under the • Increasing the NCO-to-conscript ratio leadership of the State Council and the CMC. • Replacing officer billets with NCO billets

Currently, the total number of primary mili- • Reducing the number of headquarters tia stands at about 10 million, with about 100 • Reducing the number of administrative million people registered as ordinary militia. organizations within each headquarters • Streamlining the operational, logistics, and administrative chains of command Force Reductions • Abolishing or merging operational units • Transferring certain units to non-PLA or- Since 1950, the PLA has implemented 10 force ganizations, such as the railway troops in reductions. When the PRC was established in 1978 1949, the PLA had 5.5 million troops. At that • Strengthening the warfighting capability time, the enlisted force consisted primarily of for grassroots units in an informational- illiterate peasant volunteers and the officer-to- ized environment enlisted-member ratio was about 1:1. Today, the PLA has a 1:1:1 ratio for officers to non- • Reforming the professional military edu- commissioned officers (NCOs) to conscripts, cation system which equates to approximately 760,000 per- sonnel in each category. This 33% ratio for PLA PLA Navy Personnel officers contrasts to about a 15% ratio for offi- cers in the US Military. Although the PLAN does not provide specific data about the size and breakdown of its per- The first downsizing occurred in late 1950, sonnel force, available information suggests the but when the Korean War broke out, the force quickly grew to 6.3 million. The increase af- PLAN has approximately 290,000 personnel, fected almost all infantry forces. The next six which equates to 12.6% of the PLA’s 2.3 million. force reductions occurred in 1952, 1953, 1957, 1966, 1980, and 1982. Given a 1:1:1 ratio for officers, NCOs, and con- scripts for the PLA as a whole, and assuming The eighth downsizing occurred from 1985 to that the ratio holds for the PLAN, means the 1987, with a reduction from 4.238 million to PLAN has approximately 97,000 personnel in 3.235 million. The ninth downsizing occurred each category.

58—China’s Navy 2007 However, the ratio of officers to enlisted per- (16.0%) out of a crew of 250 personnel, while sonnel in the PLA Navy and US Navy can vary a USN Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has 23 of- depending on the type of unit. For example, ficers (7.1%) out of a crew of 323 personnel. a PLAN Luhai-class destroyer has 40 officers

China’s Navy 2007—59 60—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 11 Officer Corps

The PLA Navy’s officer (cadre) corps is part of the the types of PLA education institutions and de- overall People’s Liberation Army officer corps. grees, officer recruiting, and education reforms since the 1950s. The last two sections examine The PLA’s and PLAN’s officer corps are orga- the PLAN’s officer recruitment program, PLAN nized into officers (军官) and technical officers academies, and continuing education. (技术军官).

All PLA officers serve in one of five career tracks, each of which is broken into several Force Management specialties. With the exception of the political career track, officers are assigned to their career track and specialty when they enter an officer Personnel Management System academy as a cadet. The General Political Department’s Cadre The PLA’s education system has undergone Department (总政治部干部部) is the person- continuous reforms along an uneven path nel office for all PLA officer promotion, as- since the PRC was founded in 1949. The prima- signment, and retirement issues. The Political ry goal of these reforms has been to produce an Department in each military region and ser- educated officer corps capable of commanding, vice headquarters down to the regiment level using, supplying, and maintaining the PLA’s in the chain of command has its own cadre weapon systems and equipment during war- administrative organization. For example, time. The path began with an illiterate or semi- the Cadre Department in the PLAN’s Political literate force and is now producing operational Department is responsible for all PLAN officer and technical officers with graduate degrees. personnel issues. As noted in Chapter 10, although the PLAN does not provide specific data about the size The political officer at the battalion, company, and breakdown of its personnel force, avail- and platoon levels is responsible for managing able information suggests the PLAN has ap- officer personnel issues, but the personnel re- proximately 290,000 personnel. A 1:1:1 ratio cords are kept at the regiment level. for PLA officers, NCOs, and conscripts means the PLAN has approximately 97,000 officers. Officer Career Tracks This chapter begins by examining the force- management system for PLA officers, including PLA officers are assigned to one of five career career tracks, promotion and assignment pro- tracks: cedures, the promotion cycle, and mandatory retirement ages. That is followed by a brief his- • Military officer (军事军官), also identified tory of the PLA’s education system, including as the command (指挥) track

China’s Navy 2007—61 • Political officer (政治军官) are selected for the political career track, they • Logistics officer (后勤军官) receive training as a political officer. • Equipment officer (装备军官) Officers in the logistics, equipment, and tech- • Technical officer (技术军官) nical officer career track attend specialty acad- emies, such as the PLAN Logistics Academy or Officers in the military track normally attend the Aviation Engineering Academy. one of the PLA’s command academies or spe- cialized academies, such as the Dalian Naval Each career track has sub-specialties, which Vessel Academy. Upon graduation, these offi- equate to the appropriate department within cers are assigned as unit commanders through- the Four General Departments and the PLAN out the chain of command or as staff officers Logistics Department. For example, logistics in the Headquarters Department at regiment officers specialize in finance, quartermaster, and above organizations. transportation, materials, fuel, and so on, which equate to the administrative departments un- Officers in the political officer career track are der the General Logistics Department. usually chosen from officers who have already served as a platoon or company officer in the Figure 18 shows the rank insignia for the PLA military career track, but they can also come Navy’s officers. from the other three career tracks. Once they

Technical Officers Figure 18—Officer Rank Insignia The technical officer system was introduced in 1980. Since 1988, technical officers have been divided into three categories (senior, interme- diate, and junior), 14 grades (platoon leader to CMC member), and 10 ranks (second lieuten- ant/ensign to lieutenant general/vice admiral).

Technical officers wear the same rank insignia as regular officers, but they wear a special tech- nical officer insignia on their collar.

Promotion and Assignment Procedures

Officer promotions and assignments are man- aged through the political work system in a three-step process.

• The first step consists of the organization’s political office gathering information on the officer, including interviews with the

62—China’s Navy 2007 officer’s subordinates, co-workers, and • The general departments or military re- bosses. Each officer receives three evalu- gion leaders approve all promotions for ations, including an annual evaluation, officers at the division deputy-leader (bri- one every two to three years, and a pro- gade-leader) and regiment-leader grade. motion evaluation. The evaluations focus • The group army or jun-level leaders ap- on four items: political character, general military and billet knowledge, achieve- prove all promotions for officers at the ments, and physical fitness. regiment deputy-leader and battalion- leader grade. • During the second step, the political office makes a recommendation to the organiza- • The division or brigade leaders approve tion’s Party committee. Depending on the promotions for officers at the battalion level within the chain of command, the deputy-leader and below grades. Party committee can either authorize the promotion or assignment or send the rec- ommendation to the Party organization Promotion Cycle in the next higher command for approval. PLA regulations specify the time-in-rank and • Finally, the Party committee announces the promotion or assignment. time-in-grade requirements for officers before they are promoted to the next rank and grade.

For all ranks except second lieutenant to first Based on the officer’s grade, promotions and lieutenant, the time-in-rank requirement is assignments are approved at different levels four years. However, the time-in-grade require- as follows: ment is three years. Furthermore, in the PLA, • The chairman of the CMC approves all time in service begins the first day as a cadet promotions and assignments for officers in an academy, not the day of commissioning at the division-leader grade up to the chief upon graduation. As shown in Figure 19, the of the general staff and director of the promotion cycle for grades and ranks is not General Political Department. a 1:1 ratio.

Figure 19—Rank and Grade Promotion Cycle

Rank Time in Rank Grade Time in Grade Cadet 3-4 years Cadet 4 years Platoon Leader 3 years 2LT/ENS 2 years Company Deputy Leader 3 years 1LT/LTJG 4 years Company Leader 3 years CPT/LT 4 years Battalion Deputy Leader 3 years MAJ/LCDR 4 years Battalion Leader 3 years LTC/CDR 4 years Minimum of 3 years for promotion COL/CAPT 4 years to each higher grade

China’s Navy 2007—63 Figure 20—Mandatory Retirement Ages

Grade # Grade Retirement Age 1 CMC Chairman and Vice Chairmen N/A 2 CMC Member N/A 3 Military Region Leader 65 4 Military Region Deputy Leader 63 5 Jun Leader 55 6 Jun Deputy Leader 7 Division Leader 50 8 Division Deputy Leader (Brigade Leader) 9 Regiment Leader 45 10 Regiment Deputy Leader 11 Battalion Leader 40 12 Battalion Deputy Leader 13 Company Leader 35 14 Company Deputy Leader 15 Platoon Leader 30

Mandatory Retirement Ages • Schools (学校): Most of the PLA’s educa- tion institutions through the mid-1980s As shown in Figure 20, the mandatory retire- were schools. Around 1986, the PLA be- ment age for PLA officers is based on their gan upgrading all of its schools, except grade, not their rank or time in service. In 1994, the NCO Schools, to academies. retirement ages were added for military region deputy leader- and military region leader-grade 学院 8 officers. CMC vice chairmen and CMC mem- • Academies ( ): The majority of the bers do not have mandatory retirement ages. PLA’s education institutions today are academies. The mandatory retirement age for technical officers is slightly higher for each grade than • Universities (大学): In the PLA, a uni- for regular officers. versity can be a stand-alone institution,

such as the National Defense University Brief History: PLA’s Education (NDU), or have several subordinate acad- System emies, such as the PLA Navy’s Engineering University that has a subordinate PLA Education Institutions Engineering Academy and an Electronics Throughout its history, the PLA has had three Engineering Academy located in two levels of education institutions as follows: different cities.

8 The Chinese term xueyuan (学院) can be translated as either academy or college.

64—China’s Navy 2007 PLA Education Degrees ing a secondary technical degree at a PLA academy, to selecting high school graduates to As the PLA has gradually moved from an ed- receive a senior technical or bachelor’s degree ucation system based primarily on schools to at a PLA academy, to selecting civilian college one based on academies and a growing num- students and graduates as officers. ber of universities, the types of degrees offered have expanded as shown below: The education level for officers was primarily at the illiteracy level in the 1940s. As the PRC’s • Secondary technical degree (中专), which overall education system began improving, of- is a high school equivalency degree in ficers received middle school and high school China education in the 1950s and 1960s. For exam- • Senior technical degree (大专), which is ple, by the end of the 1970s, more than 70% of roughly equivalent to a vocational or the junior officers in the PLA had only a mid- associate’s degree offered by a community dle school education. During the 1980s, most college in the US officers received a two-year degree (i.e., a high • Bachelor’s degree (学士) school equivalency degree), three-year voca- 硕士 • Master’s degree ( ) tional school degree, or four-year bachelor’s de- • Doctorate (博士) gree. The PLA began offering master’s degrees in the 1980s and doctorate degrees in the 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, PLA schools offered pri- marily secondary and senior technical degrees to officers, along with some bachelor’s degrees. Officer Recruitment Today, academies offer senior technical degrees to both officers and enlisted personnel, as well The PLA states that, between 1927 and 1949, as bachelor’s degrees to officers. Some, but not many cadres were “extricated from illiteracy or all, academies offer master’s and doctorate de- were still illiterate.” Therefore, after the PRC grees to officers. Universities offer bachelor’s, was founded, this situation limited how the master’s, and doctorate degrees to officers. PLA recruited its officers.

One significant trend is that the PLA is gradu- One of the primary methods of filling the offi- ally moving from providing graduate degrees cer corps ranks was to provide a direct commis- to academy instructors and technical person- sion from within the enlisted force or to select nel only, to emphasizing graduate degrees enlisted members to attend a PLA academy for operations personnel, including vessel and receive a secondary technical degree. This commanding officers. method was prevalent through the late 1970s, but, in the early 1980s, the PLA virtually elimi- nated direct commissioning during peacetime From Illiteracy to Doctorate and has now eliminated secondary technical Degrees degrees for officers.

The PLA officer corps’ recruitment process has The second method was to select high school gradually transitioned from selecting enlisted graduates to attend a PLA academy to receive a members for direct commissioning or receiv- senior technical or bachelor’s degree and then

China’s Navy 2007—65 commission them as officers. This process was technical degree or three-year senior technical interrupted during the Cultural Revolution degree to a four-year bachelor’s degree. when most schools in China were closed. As a result of the political chaos in all of China Since the early 1980s, the PLA has tried dif- during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), ferent programs for recruiting civilian college most civilian and military schools were closed graduates as officers. The internal debate has or the courses were greatly curtailed. focused on whether these officers should as- sume command positions or be limited to During this period, two-thirds of all PLA technical officer billets. schools were closed, including almost all the command schools and half of the technical schools. PLA Academy Reforms In 1968, five of the PLAN’s 14 existing acad- The exact number of officer academies over emies were closed, entrance policies were re- time is difficult to determine with any preci- laxed, the academic period was shortened, and sion, due to the PLA’s changes in the nomen- teaching content was reduced. For example, clature for the types of academies. the academic period at command academies was reduced from four years to eight months Today, the PLA has about 65 academies, de- with a heavy emphasis on political training. pending on how they are counted (i.e., as one university with two subordinate academies or Military training for units more or less ceased as three separate institutions). to exist, resulting in serious consequences. To adhere to some of Defense Minister Lin Biao’s political education and military training regu- The Early Years lations, the PLAN had many surface ships that In its early post-1949 days, the PLA had cer- did not set sail for months on end, some sub- tain types of military academies that kept marine units did not train for half a year, and the initial number high but were eliminated flying units did not fly for many months, caus- over time. For example, during the first de- ing aircraft to rust. For example, Naval Aviation cade of the PRC, the PLA established “Cultural fighter and bomber pilots averaged less than Schools” as part of its professional military 30 hours annually from 1965-1971, which was education (PME) system. The mission of these a 50 percent drop from the early 1960s. During schools was to teach basic literacy (reading and 1968 alone, combat pilots averaged only 12.5 writing). These types of schools were gradually hours per year. From 1969-1978, there were eliminated as the PRC’s civilian education sys- more than 70 aircraft accidents that resulted tem became more highly developed. in total loss of the aircraft and 62 pilot deaths.

From the early 1950s until the beginning of In addition, from 1966 until the mid-1980s, the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the PLA had technical officers throughout the PLA were not about 125 academies, of which two-thirds were considered as important as command or politi- engineering and technical schools. Academy cal officers. In reaction to this, in January 1983, degrees ranged from a two-year secondary Zhang Tingfa, who was the PLAAF commander

66—China’s Navy 2007 and a member of the CCP Central Committee By the late 1990s, however, the PLA was still Political Bureau, stated, “It is an erroneous, faced with an undereducated officer corps. For muddled idea to look down on technical cad- example, in 1997, Xinhua reported that only res, and the practice of discriminating against 43% of the PLA’s low-ranking officers had acad- them is seriously wrong.” emy diplomas, of whom 20% earned through correspondence courses.

Reforms Begin in the 1980s As a result of this shortfall, a December 1997 Based on a decision made at the 12th Party Xinhua report stated that the PLA had revived Congress in September 1982, the PLA began the program of recruiting civilian college grad- placing greater emphasis on education for its uates on a limited trial basis to fill junior of- ficer command positions. For example, during officer corps. First, the number of PLA acade- that year, the PLA recruited 630 graduates, who mies expanded to around 100. Second, to help were to receive one year of military training make up for the shortfall of educated officers, before being assigned as platoon command- the PLA trained 2,000 civilian college gradu- ers. By 2000, the PLA had reduced the train- ates in 1983 for one year in military schools. ing from twelve months down to three. These Upon graduation, they were assigned as pla- civilian college graduates were offered several toon commanders. inducements to enlist, including larger subsi- As the number of military academies grew dur- dies, higher ranks, and priority employment opportunities after their enlistment period. ing the 1980s and more military cadets select- ed from high school students graduated from According to Liberation Army Daily and Xinhua them, fewer civilian college graduates were be- reports, since the 14th Party Congress in 1992 ing recruited and assigned to command posi- until 2000, the PLA had recruited 46,000 col- tions. Those who were recruited were assigned lege graduates, of whom 6,200 were assigned primarily as technical officers. However, the to the General Staff Department. PLA was still concerned the education level for its officer corps was not optimal. Although the trend today is for more civilian college graduates to assume command track positions, the majority are still filling techni- Jiang Zemin Implements New Reforms cal officer billets. During the early 1990s, CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin provided guidance to “strength- en the Army through science and technol- Restructuring the Academies ogy” by better integrating military academies In spite of the reforms and the fact that more and civilian colleges. As such, during the 14th than 700 college graduates with master’s or Party Congress in October 1992, the PLA re- doctorate degrees had become regiment and vived the program of recruiting civilian col- division commanders between 1985 and 1999, lege graduates as officers with an emphasis the PLA still faced the problem of what it con- on technical skills. sidered an undereducated officer corps.

China’s Navy 2007—67 To help solve this problem, in 1999, the CMC scholarships were offered at Beijing and approved the “Plan to Adjust and Reform the Qinghua universities in late 1999 for specialties Organizational Structure of Military Academies in electronics, computer science, automation, and Training Organizations,” which down- and foreign languages. sized the number of academies and restruc- tured their curricula to better meet the needs of the operational community. The 1999 re- Fostering Educated Officers forms constructed a new type of framework for In 2000, the State Council and CMC issued the system of academies. The old system fea- the “Decision on Establishing a Military Cadre tured the following types of academies: Cultivation System Relying on General High- Level Education” as part of Jiang Zemin’s • Three levels of command academies overall guidance to merge military education — Basic for platoon-level officers into the national education program and to — Intermediate for regiment-level officers “train officers by both military and civilian — Advanced for jun-level officers academies.” The “Decision” had two major • Two types of technical academies components: recruiting civilian college gradu- — Intermediate ates for the PLA, and training PLA officers in — Advanced civilian colleges.

Based on the reforms, the system now consists As noted in China’s National Defense in 2004, of just two main types: academies that provide the PLA has been realigning the organizational basic training and education for officer cadets, structure of its educational institutions. In re- and academies that provide intermediate and cent years, the PLA has utilized military edu- advanced professional military education for cational institutions as major platforms for officers. Furthermore, today, the academies training military personnel. However, a func- are divided into two types: single-discipline tional transformation of military educational specialized academies, and multi-disciplinary institutions is taking place with the emphasis comprehensive academies. In addition, some shifting from academic credentials education comprehensive academies have been restruc- to pre-assignment training. To accomplish this, tured as universities. more military personnel with specialties for both military and civilian use will be trained One of the obstacles the PLA ran into during by civilian institutions of higher learning. the late 1990s, however, was that, to compete with the growing private sector for good col- These educational reforms are aimed at meet- lege graduates, the PLA found it had to start ing the goals of the PLA’s Strategic Project for recruiting students during the first couple Talented People, which the CMC implement- of years in college. As a result, the PLA insti- ed in August 2003. The Project proposes that tuted a National Defense Scholarship (国防 in one to two decades, the PLA will possess: a 生) Program, which is similar to the US mil- contingent of command officers capable of di- itary’s Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) recting informationalized wars and of building program, and established reserve officer re- informationalized armed forces; a contingent cruitment and training offices in several ci- of staff officers proficient in planning armed vilian colleges. The first national defense forces building and military operations; a con-

68—China’s Navy 2007 tingent of scientists capable of planning and Civilian College Student Programs organizing the innovative development of weaponry and equipment and the exploration From 1994 to 2004, the PLAN accepted more of key technologies; a contingent of technical than 7,000 civilian college graduates as offi- specialists with thorough knowledge of new- cers, and, from 2000 to 2006, more than 1,800 and high-tech weaponry performance; and a students participated in the National Defense contingent of NCOs with expertise in using Scholarship Program. weapons and equipment at hand. As part of China’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2001- The Project will be implemented in two stages. 2005), the PLAN increased its recruitment of By the end of 2010, there will be a remarkable civilian college students as officers to supple- improvement in the quality of military per- ment the number of officers trained in PLAN th sonnel and a large increase in the number of academies. The goal for the 11 Five-Year Plan well-educated personnel in combat units. The (2006-2010) is to have officers trained through following decade will witness a big leap in the civilian colleges comprise 40% of new officers training of military personnel. each year. The two plans emphasize such spe- cialties as electronic information, communi- cations, radar, machinery, foreign languages, PLA Navy Officer Recruitment and construction.

Today, the PLAN has a program for commis- The PLAN has been testing different models for sioning enlisted sailors, plus two separate integrating the civilian college graduates into programs for recruiting and commission- the force. For example, the new civilian college graduate officers must first receive training for ing civilian college students. The first pro- up to one year at a PLAN academy before being gram for civilian college students involves assigned to an operational unit. The PLAN des- three months of military-political training ignated the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy as a following graduation from a civilian college. test point for this training work. It began train- The second program is the National Defense ing civilian college students who already had Scholarship Program. a bachelor’s degree as surface vessel technical and command officers and as grassroots politi- cal work and command officers. In 2002, the Enlisted Sailor Selection for Officer PLAN began testing the “2+2” program, where- Training by outstanding undergraduate students in ci- vilian colleges finish a two-year basic course at The number of enlisted sailors selected to at- selected universities and then enter one of the tend an officer academy and graduate as naval academies for the last two years. an officer has continued to decrease signifi- cantly over the past few years. The prima- The PLAN’s National Defense Student Program ry reason is that the PLAN has increased the was officially started in 2000. These students, number of civilian college graduates recruit- who are identified as reserve officers (后备军 ed as officers. The second reason is that the 官), receive a stipend and summer training PLAN would prefer to retain its best enlisted while they are attending college. Upon gradua- personnel as NCOs. tion, they join the PLAN as active-duty officers.

China’s Navy 2007—69 The PLAN has signed agreements with 12 ficers” to their operational unit, where they re- universities to support the National Defense ceive on-the-job training for one to three years. Scholarship Program and has set up selec- tion and training offices at each school. A continuing complaint within the PLAN for The schools include Nanchang University, some of the civilian college graduates is that, Huazhong Science and Technology “although their education level is high, their University, Harbin Engineering University, basic understanding of military technology is Northwestern Polytechnic University, China low, their ability to adapt to working in a mili- Ocean University, Huadong Ship Engineering tary environment is lacking, and their ability University, Ningbo University, Nanhua to manage troops is weak.” At the same time, University, the Nanchang Aviation Industry however, several civilian college graduates College, and Xian University. have now become key personnel on vessels and in operational unit headquarters. According to the agreements, students who will soon graduate from the program can ap- ply for graduate school in PLA academies, and PLAN Academies the PLAN can select officers to take postgradu- ate courses in the civilian institutions. As part of the PLA’s reforms discussed above, the PLAN implemented several changes to its Upon graduation from a civilian college, the education system by creating comprehensive new officers receive from one to three months academies and expanding the curriculum be- of military-political training. After completing yond a single branch. As shown in Figure 21, this training, they are assigned as “student of- the PLAN currently has 10 officer academies.

In April 1999, the PLAN integrated the Naval Engineering Academy in Wuhan and the Naval Electronic Engineering Academy in Nanjing to Figure 21—PLAN Officer Academies form the Naval Engineering University, which Academy City, Province is one of the PLA’s five comprehensive insti- Command Academy Nanjing, tutions. After it was formed, the university became the first PLAN institution to confer Dalian Vessel Academy Dalian, Liaoning master’s and doctoral degrees. Today, it offers Engineering University Wuhan, Hubei courses in technology, command, engineer- Engineering Academy Wuhan, Hubei ing, and management in several academic dis- Electronics ciplines on multiple levels. Nanjing, Jiangsu Engineering Academy Service Arms Command Guangzhou, In 2004, the PLAN renamed the Naval Academy Guangdong Guangzhou Vessel Academy as the Naval Service Submarine Academy Qingdao, Shandong Arms Command Academy. It is the only tacti- cal command specialty school for all five PLAN Logistics Academy Tianjin City branches and has primary responsibility for Flight Academy Huludao, Liaoning training surface force, Marine Corps, and coast- Aviation Engineering Yantai, Shandong al defense force intermediate-level command Academy personnel, and submarine force and naval avi-

70—China’s Navy 2007 ation tactical command personnel. Since the Since the early 2000s, this program has transi- academy was established in 1977, it has grad- tioned from technical personnel, researchers, uated more than 6,000 officers. At least 97% and academy instructors receiving post-grad- of the current surface vessel COs, 80% of the uate education to providing the same oppor- surface vessel dadui, Marine Corps, and coastal tunities to vessel commanding officers and defense battalion and regiment commanders, junior officers, as well as other key operations and 70% of the destroyer and frigate zhidui and headquarters personnel. commanders received their basic training at the academy. The academy has also hosted mil- PLAN officers are also receiving graduate de- itary delegations from more than 50 countries. grees from civilian universities. For exam- ple, about 1,000 PLA officers stationed in the Shanghai area have received master’s and doc- Teaching Reforms torate degrees from various Shanghai insti- tutions, such as Fudan University, Shanghai In addition to restructuring its academies, the Jiaotong University, and Tongji University. PLAN has attempted to address two major com- plaints about its education system. First, the In addition, PLAN officers are increasingly going students spend too much time studying theo- abroad to attend foreign war college programs. ry. Second, the students do not spend enough time on practical application. Part of this prob- lem is that much of the teaching material at Continuing Education the academies has not been updated for years and the equipment the students train on is not The PLAN has spent considerable sums of the same as in the PLAN’s operational units. money to provide the means and resources for its officers to continue their education af- To solve these problems, the academies have ter being assigned to their operational units. attempted to acquire advanced equipment for For example: training purposes and to update their written training materials. The academies are also ac- • Some units have signed agreements for quiring and making more use of simulators. local civilian universities to conduct night classes on certain technical specialties. Second, students in their final year spend a few • Certain civilian universities, such as weeks before graduation with an operational the Jiangsu Science and Technology unit to gain some practical experience. University, have provided training classes for PLAN officers for several decades. • The PLAN has also spent millions of Graduate Programs Renminbi on reading rooms, online sys- tems, computers, and stocking libraries Today, seven of the PLAN’s officer academies with thousands of books. offer master’s degrees and five offer doctor- • Some units have designated certain nights ate degrees. This is a one-third increase since as study periods, which can be used to 2000. As a result, an increasingly higher num- conduct individual or group study. ber of PLAN officers are invovled in some type of post-graduate work or receiving master’s or Several PLAN units have also created officer doctoral degrees in PLAN academies. training centers, which include the use of sim-

China’s Navy 2007—71 ulators and training on naval stratagem. In ad- in the Western Hills near Beijing, which serves dition, the PLAN has a Navy Cadre Training as a base for studying advanced naval and in- Center associated with the Central Party School termediate-level cadre theory.

72—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 12 Enlisted Force

The PLA’s enlisted force for all services and All conscripts report for induction screening branches consists of two components: on 1 November and begin their basic training during early December. Near the conclusion of • Conscripts (义务兵) their conscription period, they have the fol- • Noncommissioned officers or NCOs (士官) lowing three career options:

In the PLA, officers (军官) and cadre (干部) • Selection for officer training at a PLA academy are synonymous, and all enlisted personnel, regardless of service or branch, are identified • Selection as an NCO as soldiers (士兵 and 战士). Enlisted person- • Demobilization nel, not officers, in the PLAN are also called sailors (水兵). Unlike the US Navy, PLAN en- Concerning the enlisted force, conscripts and listed personnel use Army terminology for all junior NCOs who meet the age requirements ranks and grades. can take the examinations to attend an officer academy. All NCOs who are not selected for The enlisted force has changed profoundly this officer training or promoted to the next grade decade, particularly as a result of the revised are demobilized at the end of November. “Military Service Law of the People’s Republic of China” that became effective in January 1999. Prior to 1999, PLA Navy and Air Force Figure 22—NCO Service Periods and Ranks conscripts served for four years, and Army and Service Second Artillery conscripts served for three Period and Grade Level Rank years. Upon completion of their conscription Years per period, they could remain on active duty as Period a “volunteer” (志愿兵) for a total service time 1st Period of 16 years. Grade-1 NCO (3 years) Junior NCO 2nd Period The revised Service Law reformed the en- Grade-2 NCO tire enlisted force structure in the following (3 years) 3rd Period two ways: Grade-3 NCO Intermediate (4 years) • It reduced the mandatory service period NCO 4th Period Grade-4 NCO for conscripts in all PLA services and (4 years) branches to two years. 5th Period Grade-5 NCO • It established a formal NCO corps that is (5 years) divided into six service periods, as shown Senior NCO 6th Period in Figure 22, so that enlisted personnel can Grade-6 NCO now potentially serve for a total of 30 years. (9 years)

China’s Navy 2007—73 Because the new NCO program did not begin Force Management until 1999, at which time the service period for volunteers ended at the 16-year point, the The PLA has several organizations within the PLA has a small number of grade-5 NCOs and General Staff Department (GSD) and General only a few grade-6 NCOs today. The majority Political Department (GPD) that are respon- of NCOs are in grades 1 to 3, with a large turn- sible for different administrative aspects of over of grade-1 NCOs who are not promoted to the enlisted force. The organization with the grade-2 after they have completed their three- greatest amount of jurisdiction is the GSD’s year service period. Military Affairs Department (军务部), which is responsible for managing the size and com- Today, the PLA has 2.3 million personnel di- position of the enlisted force, as well as main- vided roughly into thirds (765,000) for offi- taining their personnel records. The GSD’s cers, NCOs, and conscripts. Although the PLA Mobilization Department (动员部) is respon- actually conscripts only about 4% of the males sible for the recruiting and induction process eligible each year, it is still having some prob- for conscripts, and the GSD’s Military Training lems meeting its quotas. and Service Arms Department (军训和兵种部) is responsible for training. As noted in Chapter 10, the PLAN has approxi- mately 290,000 personnel. As the ratio of offi- The GPD’s Organization Department (组织部) cers, NCOs, and conscripts in the PLAN likely is responsible for selecting enlisted-force per- mirrors the 1:1:1 ratio for the PLA as a whole, sonnel as Party members and managing all of the PLAN has about 194,000 enlisted person- their political-related issues. Although primar- nel, of whom one-half (97,000) are conscripts ily concerned with officer personnel manage- and one-half are NCOs. ment, the GPD Cadre Department (干部部) also defines the guidelines governing the selection Therefore, based on the two-year conscription of enlisted-force personnel as officers. cycle, the PLAN receives approximately 48,500 new conscripts each November and demo- bilizes a similar number of conscripts and an Conscripts unknown number of NCOs at the same time. This process is a primary factor that drives the PLAN’s one-year training cycle. Conscription Process

This chapter begins by examining the force The annual conscription process in the PLA management system for all members of the begins each August when the military holds PLAN enlisted force. It then addresses the con- a two-day conference to make arrangements scription and training process for PLAN con- for the upcoming winter conscription cycle. scripts. This chapter also illustrates the NCO In the PLAN, operational units determine how selection process in the PLAN and examines many new conscripts and NCOs are needed the wide array of opportunities for NCO pro- for the coming year. PLAN units then submit fessional military education. It then concludes these figures to each fleet, military region, and by addressing the issue of demobilization and PLAN Headquarters, where they are compiled its effect on the PLA, as well as Chinese society. and sent to the GSD.

74—China’s Navy 2007 Also in August, local People’s Armed Forces scripts. This process continues until the end of Departments or PAFDs (人民武装部), which are October when the State Council and the CMC military organizations that operate on behalf issue the order for the upcoming conscription of the local government, are required to con- period. This annual conscription order specifies tact all draft-age males who reach the age of the requirements for conscripted citizens and 18 before 31 December of the current calendar contains instructions for local PAFDs on how year. These individuals must register for mili- to carry out conscription work. On the basis of tary service by the end of September. this conscription order, PAFDs throughout the country then notify personnel of their selec- Each locality in China is assigned an annual tion as potential conscripts and instruct them recruitment quota, which is based on distribu- to report to a local induction center run by the tion of population. At present, the proportion PAFD for a series of examinations. of conscripts from urban areas accounts for just over 33% with the remaining 67% conscripted The induction process occurs throughout from rural areas. November, with potential conscripts being examined for a single day, after which they Although most individuals who register for con- return home and wait for their conscrip- scription are 18, theoretically any male between tion orders or rejection letter. The three types the ages of 18 and 22 may sign up. Females may of exams include: also register provided they are between the ages of 18 and 19 and have graduated from high • Physical exam school the previous spring. Although neither • Political exam (administered by the local the “Military Service Law” nor the “Regulations public security bureau) on PLA Conscription Work” stipulate offi- • Psychological exam cial education requirements for conscripted males, many of the recent annual conscrip- Unlike the US military, the PLA does not give tion orders state that incoming conscripts any pre-induction written examinations such should be graduates of intermediate school, as the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude which in China runs through the 9th grade. Battery (AFVAB) to determine each conscript’s Media reporting suggests that most intermedi- specific proficiencies for military specialties. As ate school graduates wait until they are 18 to a result, it is also unclear how the PLA deter- either join or be conscripted. Individuals spe- mines which conscripts go into the PLAN and cifically exempted from registration include what their specialty will be. those who have secured admission to college, are medically or physically exempt, have been Before 1999, conscripts had no control over imprisoned, or are under investigation at the which service or branch they would be as- time of conscription. Chinese media also indi- signed to. Today, they can voice a preference to cates that bribery is used both by people who enter a particular service or branch, although want to join but are not qualified and by those their choice is far from guaranteed, possibly who do not want to be conscripted. due to the educational or technical require- ments of certain services or branches. As PAFDs Once registration is complete, the PAFD be- are composed primarily of personnel from the gins the process of pre-selecting potential con- ground forces, recruitment teams from the

China’s Navy 2007—75 PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery are often work, as well as in its abilities to recruit high dispatched to selected regions to handpick school graduates in general. their own conscripts. A number of different reasons explain why in- dividuals may decide against joining the mili- Leaving Home and Reporting for Active tary. One is that many increasingly feel that, Duty in an era of rapid economic growth and greater opportunities, joining the PLA is simply not at- In most instances, conscripts in all of the PLA’s tractive. By comparison, although many young services and branches serve in a province oth- people were once attracted to the PLA due to er than their home of record. During the sec- the prospects for upward mobility, many now ond week of December, PLAN conscripts travel believe there is no future in joining the PLA, es- from across the country to one of several train- pecially when testing into a military academy ing and operational facilities concentrated or becoming an NCO is increasingly difficult. along the coast. Transportation arrangements are usually made in advance, and it is common Moreover, educational reforms have made at- for large numbers of conscripts to travel to- tending college in the PRC much easier than gether. Although the majority of travel is done it used to be, which has reduced the pool of by train, the PLAN has begun to charter civil- eligible conscripts. For example, the number of ian aircraft to transport the new conscripts. students attending college today is about 20% versus 1.4% in 1978. In addition, a college ed- ucation is widely viewed as a way to improve Conscription Difficulties and the Urban- one’s future prospects, including the opportu- Rural Divide nity to make money after graduation.

As noted earlier, PLA conscription quotas are Furthermore, although the PLA provides sti- based on the distribution of the population. pends for its conscripts and their families, these Inherent in these quotas are differing educa- minimal allowances have not kept pace with tional levels, technical abilities, and attitudes the rising cost of living and are far less attrac- towards military service. For example, those tive to individuals from more affluent areas of who grow up in the countryside are less likely the country. Thus, many people, particularly to be able to operate and maintain advanced in urban areas, think it simply does not pay weapons and equipment. to join the military. There appears to be little incentive to register and essentially waste two Conversely, although many potential urban re- years, especially as post-demobilization em- cruits are often better educated, they may also ployment prospects do not markedly improve. be blessed with greater economic opportuni- ties and thus have less desire to serve in the Therefore, despite the recent emphasis on PLA than their rural counterparts. Therefore, technology and education, the core of the en- although the PLA believes conscripts selected listed force continues to be made up of young from urban areas are more likely to possess the men from poor rural areas. Although four of educational and technical skills it desires, it is the last five annual conscription orders (2001- having difficulties in its urban conscription 2005) note that it is preferable that conscripts

76—China’s Navy 2007 recruited from rural areas be high school grad- immediately upon joining instead of wait- uates, in truth, most rural conscripts are inter- ing until after they complete basic training. mediate school graduates with low degrees of technical proficiency. The PLA has also begun recruiting civilian col- lege graduates and promoting them directly China has a system of compulsory education as NCOs. The specific grade they are given de- through intermediate school, but many fami- pends on their experience. lies are unable to cope with the high cost of school fees once their child enters high school. Such incentives are probably necessary as me- For these families, particularly those from the dia reporting suggests that many students countryside, the prospect of joining the PLA is voluntarily join the PLA for personal reasons viewed as one of the only means available to instead of idealistic motivations. Although potentially escape a life of poverty. Not surpris- many students join the military to learn new ingly, some resort to bribery in an attempt to skills or gain experience, others view enlisting pay their way into the military. As a result of as a way to improve their chances to join the all these factors, the proportion of new con- Communist Party, which is widely seen as a scripts who are high school graduates remains tool of social mobility in China, or as a way to in the minority. reduce the financial burden on one’s family.

Recruiting Civilian College Students and Conscript Training Graduates As shown in Figure 23, after completing the induction process, conscripts are assigned to One way the PLA has attempted to compensate for its inability to conscript some of China’s more educated youth is by recruiting them Figure 23—Conscript Training Phases and once they are in college or after they have grad- Locations uated. In 2001, the PLA began to recruit civil- ian college students in their first to third year of school as members of the enlisted force.

Most of these students who join as conscripts resume their studies once they complete their two-year conscription obligation, but the PLA’s unwritten goal appears to be to retain them on active duty and have them become NCOs.

The PLA has instituted several preferential policies, including monetary incentives and reduced tuition, to recruit college students as conscripts. In addition, depending on their college specialty, some students who join as conscripts are given the rank of private 1st class

China’s Navy 2007—77 either an operational unit or technical train- Conscripts who are sent directly to an opera- ing base where they receive basic training. tional unit are initially assigned to a training Regardless of where they are initially assigned, unit (教导队), which is an ad hoc organiza- the duration of basic training is about two tion in the PLA for group army-, division-, bri- months. Once basic training is complete, con- gade-, and regiment-level units. The PLAN has training units at each of these levels, scripts assigned to an operational unit are then as well those assigned to each of the PLAN’s reassigned within the same unit, where they support bases. receive individual and unit training. New con- scripts initially assigned to a technical training From December through February, these train- base remain there for technical training once ing units provide conscript basic training. their basic training is complete. After complet- Once basic training is over, they transition to ing their training, they are reassigned to an op- providing short-term training courses for NCO erational unit located elsewhere. squad leaders and officers. Some instructors are brought in on a temporary basis, while others are permanently assigned to the training unit. Basic Training Conscripts who are sent directly to a techni- All incoming PLAN conscripts arrive at their cal training base spend the first period receiv- operational or technical training unit in mid- ing basic training. Again, some instructors are brought in on a temporary basis, while others December for approximately two months of are permanently assigned to the training base. basic training. The actual length of time for ba- sic training varies depending on one’s branch and usually ends around Chinese New Year Taking the Oath and Receiving Rank (Spring Festival), which occurs sometime be- tween late January and mid-February. Once basic training is complete, the new con- scripts take the PLA service member’s oath The basic training instructors are mostly NCOs shown in Figure 24, receive their rank of pri- or junior officers assigned to the unit on a tem- porary basis from their operational unit. Upon Figure 24—Serviceman’s Oath completion of basic training, they return to their unit. “I am a member of the People’s Liberation Army. I promise that I will follow the Basic training in the PLAN includes subjects leadership of the Communist Party of common to all new PLA conscripts, such as China, serve the people wholeheartedly, marching and saluting, as well as some train- obey orders, strictly observe discipline, fight ing focusing on PLAN-wide or branch-specific heroically, fear no sacrifice, loyally discharge topics. During basic training, new conscripts my duties, work hard, practice hard to do not wear any rank insignia on their shoul- master combat skills, and resolutely fulfill ders, collars, or caps. During this period, they my missions. Under no circumstances will I are called “new soldiers” (新兵) and are as- betray the motherland or desert the army.” signed to “new soldier companies.”

78—China’s Navy 2007 Figure 25—Conscript Rank Insignia which conscripts are trained and used during their time in service. When PLAN conscripts served for four years, it was not a problem to devote three months to basic training followed by up to eight months of training unique to their military specialty, referred to as technical training (技术训练) within the PLA. However, now that conscripts serve for only two years, the PLAN elected to abolish technical training for the majority of its conscripts, starting with those who arrived in late 2002.

Today, once incoming PLAN conscripts com- vate 2nd class (列兵), and wear a shoulder plete their two months of basic training at epaulet with a single yellow stripe. At the con- a technical training base, they receive one clusion of their first year of service, they are month of training on vessel common training st promoted to private 1 class (上等兵) and wear subjects, which focus on seamanship, dam- a shoulder epaulet with two yellow stripes. The age control, life saving and rescue, navigation PLAN shoulder insignia for the two conscript knowledge, observation and identification, de- ranks are shown in Figure 25. ployment, and dinghies. During this period, they are called “students” (学兵).

Operational Unit Training Upon completing their training in late March, they are assigned directly to a vessel unit where Upon completing their basic training, con- they study their specialty and apply what they scripts are assigned to a company within their have learned in practical situations. permanent unit, where they learn how to function in squads and platoons. From this point forward, they are no longer called new soldiers, but are referred to as soldiers (士兵 or PLAN Technical Training Bases 战士). After being assigned to their billet, they receive on-the-job training (OJT), individual Following their second year, if conscripts show training, and unit training. This is where most good political and military qualities, want to PLAN conscripts learn their specialty. continue their military service, and are chosen as an NCO selectee, they are sent to a PLAN The PLA expects that, after six months into technical training base or a unit training orga- their two-year conscription period, conscripts nization for specialty training. will be integrated into their billets enough to take part in larger unit training. Each of the PLAN’s three fleets has a single di- vision-grade technical training base for con- scripts as follows: Technical Training • The North Sea Fleet Training Base is lo- The transition to a two-year conscription pe- cated on Liugong Island (刘公岛) off the riod has significantly affected the ways in Shandong Peninsula near Weihai.

China’s Navy 2007—79 • The East Sea Fleet Training Base is lo- technical training to its conscripts, the Navy cated in Wusong (吴松), which is part of has begun to turn over many of the leadership Shanghai Municipality. responsibilities previously held by conscripts • The South Sea Fleet Training Base is lo- in their third or fourth year to junior NCOs cated in Dongguan (东莞), Guangdong (NCO grades 1 and 2). Province, just east of Guangzhou. As a result, the scope of conscript responsibili- Prior to 2003, these bases were devoted to train- ties has diminished, with typical duties today ing conscripts, but their role has now changed. consisting of tasks that do not require signifi- To compensate for the lack of conscript techni- cant leadership skills or technical competency. cal training, the PLAN initiated a new program These include such tasks as performing physi- at each of its three fleet training bases in 2003. cal security and guard work, engaging in logis- The programs involve training second-year tical support, and operating motor vehicles and conscripts who have been selected to remain unsophisticated communications equipment. on active duty as grade-1 NCOs, and grade- 1 NCOs who are already in their fifth year of active duty prior to their selection as grade-2 Efficiency Reports NCOs. This type of training typically begins after the annual demobilization of NCOs near All members of the enlisted force receive an ef- the end of November. At the conclusion of ficiency report written by their immediate su- the training course, trainees are promoted to pervisor. In the PLAN, enlisted sailors receive grade-1 or grade-2 NCOs. an annual efficiency report. Company Party branches review each efficiency report and re- In addition to the three fleet training bases, ceive input from the person’s supervisor, co- the PLAN has some specialized training bases, workers, and subordinates. Their efficiency such as a Logistics Training Base and a Naval reports are included in their personnel records, Aviation Training Base. Each of the training which are managed through the GSD Military bases above train several thousand conscripts. Affairs Department system. In 2003, as part of its “transparency in grassroots affairs” cam- paign, the PLAN began to allow sailors to re- Conscript Duties and view and comment on their efficiency reports. Responsibilities

Conscript Party Membership Reduced Leadership Responsibilities Conscripts in the PLAN are eligible to become The shortening of the mandatory conscrip- members of the Chinese Communist Party tion period, coupled with the expansion of the (CCP). Applicants must be at least 18 years of NCO corps, has led to a gradual reduction in age and a member of the Communist Youth conscript leadership and some technical re- League or CYL (共青团). Conscripts have a sponsibilities throughout the PLA. With con- number of motivations for wanting to become scripts now serving only two years on active Party members. Many view membership in the duty and with the PLAN no longer providing CCP as a tool of upward mobility and an asset

80—China’s Navy 2007 that can help them attain their goal of becom- Figure 26—Conscript Options ing an officer or NCO. For the majority of PLA conscripts demobilized after the conclusion of their two-year conscription period, Party mem- bership can also be a valuable asset in finding employment or obtaining a better job upon returning home. demobilized. The possible career paths avail- The process to become a Party member is ar- able to conscripts are illustrated in Figure 26. duous and can take just about the entire two- year conscription period. Therefore, the Party The majority of conscripts who remain on ac- has basically given up recruiting conscripts. tive duty do so by becoming NCOs. Conscripts Predictably, the lengthy recruitment process, who choose to become NCOs can either be se- competitive selective procedures, and low lected on the basis of merit or pass an exam overall quota (about 3%) of conscripts eligible for entrance into an NCO program of study at to become Party members have caused many a PLA academy or school. In both situations, conscripts to be less than enthusiastic about however, the process is highly competitive and joining. As a result, it is common today for the results are by no means guaranteed. Also, many PLAN units to be without a single con- media reports indicate that corruption is wide- script Party member. spread in the selection process.

Although conscripts may not be Party mem- One of the key changes instituted by the re- vised “Military Service Law” was the formal bers, most of them are involved in Party- creation of a professional NCO corps with a sponsored activities through the CYL system. 30-year career path, as shown in Figure 27. At For example, besides daily and weekly activi- the end of each period, NCOs may extend their ties administered through the CYL organiza- tion in each unit, PLAN Headquarters holds Figure 27—NCO Service Periods and Ranks CYL Congresses attended by members from throughout the PLAN. Service Period & Grade Level Rank Years per Period Grade-1 1st Period (3 years) NCO Corps NCO Junior NCO Grade-2 2nd Period (3 years) NCO NCO Selection, Retention, and Grade-3 3rd Period (4 years) Evaluation Process Intermediate NCO NCO Grade-4 At the conclusion of their second year of ser- 4th Period (4 years) NCO vice, conscripts have the option of applying Grade-5 to extend their stay in the PLA by becoming 5th Period (5 years) NCO NCOs or officers. Conscripts not selected as an Senior NCO Grade-6 NCO or for officer training conclude their con- 6th Period (9 years) scription period at the end of October and are NCO

China’s Navy 2007—81 Figure 28—NCO Rank Insignia emy NCO program. This is a direct result of the PLA’s increased emphasis on the importance of NCO training and education.

According to guidance issued in 2005 by the GSD Military Affairs Department, all NCOs who hope to be selected to a higher grade must undergo education at a PLA academy or school or receive training at a training organization. The guidance is as follows:

Junior NCOs (grades 1-2), intermediate NCOs (grades 3-4), and all technical and command stay in the PLA by being promoted to a higher NCOs must have at least a high school- rank; otherwise, they are demobilized. level education.

An NCO’s rank is based on his service period, Senior NCOs (grades 5-6) must have at least a as are his salary, promotion, and date of demo- senior technical-level education, as well as at bilization. Figure 28 shows the PLAN rank in- least 10 years of experience in their specialty. signias for each of the six NCO service periods.

Learning Multiple Specialties NCO Professional Military Education The PLAN is now focusing on its personnel NCOs in the PLAN have a number of op- learning more than one skill to fill in for oth- tions for receiving professional military edu- ers who take vacation or are killed or injured cation (PME). Figure 29 shows these options, during combat. Specifically, the PLAN has be- which range from receiving no training at gun developing NCOs who master one tech- all, to technical training at a training organi- zation, continuing education usually in the Figure 29—NCO PME Options form of correspondence or distance-learning courses done from within the unit, to training at a special NCO school or NCO program at an officer academy.

Although the number of noncommissioned officers who attend an NCO school or officer academy NCO program is presently small, the number attending academies and schools has doubled since the 1999 reforms to the NCO system. For example, between 2000 and 2003, more than 20,000 PLA NCOs received train- ing at either an NCO school or officer acad-

82—China’s Navy 2007 nical specialty but are competent in several • Logistics Academy others. For example, conscripts must master • Aviation Engineering Academy one technical specialty, while grade-4 NCOs must master two specialties and be competent Noncommissioned officers who attend an NCO in two others. program at an officer academy are assigned to their own student units and are not mixed with officer cadets. The duration of study is between Training by Skill Levels two to three years, after which they receive ei- ther a secondary or senior technical degree. Under the PLAN’s old Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE), all enlisted Until the early 2000s, the highest degree NCOs personnel on board a ship received the same could receive was a two-year secondary techni- type of training, regardless of their skill level. cal degree (中专), which in China is viewed as Under the new OMTE, the PLAN is provid- a high school equivalency degree. The three- ing different types of training for each grade year senior technical degree (大专), which is and skill level. equivalent to a US associate’s or vocational de- gree, is a relatively new phenomenon for PLA NCOs. The PLAN’s first class of NCO senior Refresher Training technical graduates completed their program at the PLAN NCO School in July 2003. As part of its “Talent Cultivation Project,” the PLAN has also begun to mandate short-term refresher training for NCOs prior to promotion PLAN NCO School to the next service period. NCOs receive in- struction on new events and concepts, as well The PLAN NCO School is a technical school as the latest developments in armament and that trains NCOs for two or three years to technology. A breakdown of the five training phases is shown in Figure 30. Figure 30—NCO Pre-Promotion Training Phases

College-Level Education Personnel Phase Training Location Trained NCOs in the PLAN have the option of get- Grade-1 Naval Academies and ting a college-level education at the PLAN 1 NCOs Fleet Training Bases NCO School (海军蚌埠士管学校) located in Grade-2 Bengbu, Anhui Province, or one of the fol- 2 Academy Instructors NCOs lowing six PLAN officer academies that offer and Experts Train Grade-3 NCO programs: 3 Personnel Within Units NCOs • Dalian Vessel Academy Grade-4 4 • Naval Engineering University NCOs Naval Academies and • Service Arms Command Academy Grade-5 Research Institutes 5 • Submarine Academy NCOs

China’s Navy 2007—83 work in maritime and ground-based services. • Serving as the commanding officer for Originally founded in 1977, the school has some smaller vessels in the PLAN 24 academic specialties divided into nine cat- • Serving as acting platoon leaders. egories, including chemical defense, commu- nications, navigation, logistics, machinery, As the NCO force grows and the officer corps mechanical and electrical, and weapons. The gets smaller, the PLAN has begun training non- school also publishes the journal NCO Training. commissioned officers at its NCO School and NCO programs in officer academies to take The school began its first short-term train- over several different types of officer billets. ing classes in March 2005, which consisted These billets include electronic countermea- of 17 technical specialties. The new courses sures, land-based radar, sonar technology, and last from one to three months. These train- signals communication. ing opportunities are the outgrowth of a PLA plan to increase the professional skills of its NCOs. According to PRC media reports, some NCO Party Membership units appear to be having trouble finding suit- able candidates to hold down certain billets Although only a small percentage of conscripts due to a lack of specialties in the current NCO are actively recruited for Party membership, the education system. proportion of NCOs who are Party members has increased greatly in recent years. With the The PLA as a whole, as well as the PLAN, has been large increase in NCO Party members, PRC me- trying to address complaints from operational dia reports suggest that the role of Party organi- units that the NCO schools focus on too much zations in grassroots units (i.e., battalion level theory and not enough practical application. and below) has been strengthened and that a number of NCO Party members are also mem- bers of company-level Party branches (党支部). Duties and Responsibilities According to the PLA Daily, following the 16th As the overall proportion of NCOs in the en- Party Congress in October 2002, the PLA tasked listed force has surged to about 50%, and over each company-level Party branch to incorpo- 60% in some technical units, the responsibili- rate one to two NCO Party members. Usually ties of noncommissioned officers have also these are more experienced NCOs who are increased, primarily at the expense of con- squad leaders and serve as the head of a Party scripts and junior officers. At present, NCOs small group (党小组), which is the smallest or- hold down many key technical billets in all ganization that makes up a Party branch. For types of units. Other recent examples of the example, one PLAN vessel unit, where NCOs expansion of the scope of NCO duties and consisted of 70% of all Party members, incorpo- responsibilities include: rated many of these NCO Party members into the Party branch to adapt to this new reality. • Inheriting billets once held exclusively by officers, such as mess officers The PLAN’s goals are to have NCOs actively • Handling much of the training for both participate in work decisions and to gain man- conscripts and junior NCOs agerial experience. That said, NCO involve-

84—China’s Navy 2007 ment in the Party decision-making process is the All-Army Uniform Academic Examination limited to the company level, as only the Party for admission to military schools. The exam is branch secretaries and deputies, which are po- held throughout the PLA once a year, usually in sitions staffed by officers, can participate in early June. The examination results and acade- Party committees above the company level. my enrollment decisions are usually posted in mid-July, and classes begin in the fall.

Officer Selection In addition to taking the Uniform Academic Examination, many enlisted applicants for mil- Although the direct commissioning of mem- itary academies and schools must take an exam bers of the enlisted force to the officer corps covering specific military training subjects, de- was prevalent during the Red Army days and pending on the academic specialty they elect to study. This test is usually given several months still existed after the PLA was formed in the ahead of the Uniform Academic Examination. mid-1940s, the practice was abolished shortly The duration of the exam is about two hours, after the Cultural Revolution. Since 1980, the and the scores on these specialty exams are PLA has gradually changed its system of di- combined with the applicant’s score on the rectly commissioning enlisted members as of- Uniform Academic Examination for an overall ficers, so that, during peacetime, all conscripts score. According to the All-Army Recruitment selected to become officers are now required Office, nearly 30,000 enlisted personnel na- to undergo three to four years of training in tionwide took the exam in 2005, with more a PLA academy. This is true for NCOs as well, than 5,000 individuals gaining admission to although a handful of more experienced, older military academies as officers, an overall na- NCOs may be selected to undergo only a few tional ratio of 1 to 6. months of short-term training before being commissioned. Upon graduating from a mili- Of note, the total number of enlisted personnel tary academy, the new officers incur a 7- to 8- in the PLAN recruited into officer academies year commitment to the PLA. during the 2003 recruitment cycle plunged by 58% from the previous year. Statistics from the In 2003, the four General Departments issued PLAN Political Department’s Cadre Department new age requirements for enlisted personnel show that about 650 enlisted sailors were ad- applying for officer training. Members of the mitted to naval academies in 2003 compared enlisted force who were conscripted after grad- to more than 1,500 in 2002. An examination uating from high school cannot be more than of admissions statistics from 2005 reveals a 23 years old when they applied. The age re- further reduction, with the number of enlisted quirement was further reduced since 2003 to sailors admitted dropping to about 450. 22 years old. This implies that the only mem- bers of the enlisted force permitted to apply to Although the high number of applicants who an officer academy are conscripts and grade-1 take the examination each year suggests there NCOs who have not exceeded the age limit. remains great interest in extending one’s ac- tive-duty service as an officer, it has become All conscripts and NCOs who apply to officer increasingly difficult for enlisted personnel to undergraduate and senior technical academic gain admission to military academies in recent specialties offered at military academies take years for the following three reasons:

China’s Navy 2007—85 • First, the PLA has been reducing its overall es, NCOs receive about a month of training size, with a major focus on shrinking the prior to demobilization to prepare them for a officer corps. civilian job. Typical types of training include • Second, the PLA began recruiting civilian computers, driving, cooking, photography, college graduates as officers in the early and vehicle repair. 1990s and instituted a National Defense Scholarship Program in civilian universi- The changeover of personnel can sometimes ties in the early 2000s. This program has cause difficulties for units to manage, particu- further reduced the number of officer slots larly when it leaves a gap in expertise. For ex- available to enlisted personnel. ample, the replacements for NCOs who serve • Third, the PLA has been trying to expand as squad leaders are sometimes not identified the size of its NCO corps with personnel until the NCOs are demobilized. The units who previously would have been qualified must then spend time training the new NCO as to become officers. a squad leader. In addition, because the PLAN takes the demobilization date seriously, ves- Retirement and Demobilization sels on patrol have returned to port just to dis- embark NCOs who are being demobilized the With the reduction of the mandatory conscrip- following day. The vessels are then left short- tion period to two years, half of the entire con- handed until replacements can be trained. scription force now turns over each November. Moreover, NCOs are also demobilized at this After demobilization, conscripts and NCOs time, provided they have completed a service can be placed in enlisted reserve service if they period and are not selected for promotion to the next higher grade. are evaluated as suitable. These forces are oc- casionally brought in to active-duty units for When a conscript or NCO is demobilized from training. In 2002, the PLAN decided to con- the PLA, he receives a retirement subsidy, as duct its first reservist mobilization training well as a medical subsidy if he suffers from a to keep reserve personnel updated with the chronic illness. Once the soldier is formally more technically sophisticated equipment cur- demobilized and returns to civilian life, all ex- rently in service. For example, one destroyer penses related to his demobilization and job unit called up 80 reservists who had previously placement are paid by the local government served in the unit as grade-2 or higher NCOs. where he resides. The reservists trained together for several The demobilization process for NCOs is some- days and then conducted at-sea training for times disruptive for unit training. In some cas- about a week.

86—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 13 Unit Training

This chapter examines the PLAN’s guidance The OMTE and objectives for unit training as well as the annual training cycle for vessels, Naval As discussed in Chapter 4, the PLAN pub- Aviation, and the Marine Corps. It then dis- lished a completely revised Outline of Military cusses the different types of naval exercises, Training and Evaluation in January 2002. The combined-arms training, and joint training. OMTE consists of multiple volumes, with each volume identified as the OMTE for a specific topic. According to PLAN writings, the OMTE Training Guidance consists of the standardized documents used The PLA Navy provides training guidance by each branch and type of vessel unit to or- to its forces in several ways, including con- ganize and conduct military training. The ferences, training documents, and training OMTE is divided according to branch, ves- guidance concepts. sel type, specialized function, and specialized technology. Its content includes the guiding The PLAN convenes a Party Congress every thought, training subjects, content, timing, five years and usually convenes two plenary and objectives of training. The OMTE is now sessions each year, which provide guidance for issued in binder format, rather than as a bound all PLAN activities. After each plenary session, volume, so that individual sections can be the PLAN then holds a conference to review all replaced as necessary. of its training for the previous period and to provide guidance for the next period. The OMTE stipulates the procedures for imple- menting training, the drafting of plans, the The PLAN’s training conference occasionally co- incides with an All-Army Training Conference. topics and programs, the training organiza- Following the PLAN Training Conference, par- tion, and the examination and assessment of ticipants return to their units and hold fleet- training. Some examples of individual OMTE and unit-level training meetings to discuss the volumes are as follows: implementation of the training guidance. • Units Equipped with Each Class of Naval As noted in Chapter 4, besides the train- Submarine and Surface Vessel ing guidance concepts, the PLAN also pro- • Units Equipped with Each Type of Naval vides long-term training guidance to its units Aviation Aircraft, AAA, and SAM through the following documents: • Naval Coastal Defense Coastal Artillery and Coastal Missile Units • The Gangyao • Marine Corps • The Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) • Logistics Units • Various types of regulations • Chemical Defense Units

China’s Navy 2007—87 Regulations ing readiness conditions, implementing defen- sive measures, moving munitions from storage Since the revised OMTE was issued, the PLAN facilities to aircraft and vessels, scrambling air- has published numerous revised and new reg- craft and vessels, quickly moving forces out ulations that provide guidance for units on of harm’s way, repairing damage after an at- how to implement the OMTE. For example, in tack, dealing with injured personnel, and sup- December 2002, the PLAN commander and po- plying forces at home and deployed locations. litical commissar formally issued the new PLAN Military Training Regulations. The new regula- The PLAN is also restructuring its forces based tions completely updated the previous ones, on the assumption it will experience con- which were issued in 1991. New regulations, siderable personnel losses during a conflict. such as joint training, were added, while oth- Specifically, officers and enlisted personnel ers, such as the standards for quantifying train- must now have more than one specialty, so ing types and training time, were removed. they can fill in for someone if that person is killed or injured.

Unit Training Objectives Although the PLAN, like the rest of the PLA, relies heavily on centralized control for all of The PLAN’s training objectives for all units to- its training and operations, it is slowly trying day consist of the following key components: to provide its pilots and vessel COs with some command autonomy to implement the war • Training under real-war situations plan if communications are disrupted or the • Employing mobile operations and support situation changes rapidly. • Operating in unfamiliar areas and under unknown conditions • Transitioning from day into night Mobile Operations and Support • Training in poor weather conditions • Conducting multiple training subjects si- Over the past two decades, a consistent PLAN multaneously objective has been to move from a force fo- • Employing increasingly larger formations cused on “coastal defense” to one focused on “offshore defense.” This force transformation • Using data links and radio silence requires the ability to conduct mobile opera- • Operating in an electromagnetic jamming tions in both offensive and defensive cam- and countermeasures environment. paigns further from its home bases for longer periods of time. To fulfill this objective, the Real-War Situations PLAN has acquired new weapon systems, but even more important have been the PLAN’s ef- To increase PLAN units’ ability to operate under forts to restructure its vessel and aircraft logis- real-war conditions, the PLAN is increasingly tics and maintenance support systems. using scenarios for its training events that fo- cus on reacting to an “enemy” attack that has As the PLAN restructures its operational ves- just occurred or is imminent against land- and sel forces, such as creating combined destroyer sea-based assets. The training consists of rais- and frigate zhidui, to be able to better conduct

88—China’s Navy 2007 more complex task force operations, it is also offensive and defensive purposes, including restructuring its on-shore and at-sea support avoiding imminent “enemy” attacks. forces. For example, in 2004, the PLAN created its first combat support vessel zhidui in each These deployments are taking place both fleet to be able to provide better at-sea support within and among the three fleets. Naval for the more demanding mobile operations Aviation airfields are also increasingly support- the PLAN aspires to execute. ing PLAAF aircraft and Army Aviation heli- copters during their deployments through the The PLAN is also implementing what it calls coastal provinces. “socialized support” of its on-shore logistics support by contracting with local vendors for food supplies that can be delivered within Unfamiliar Areas and Unknown hours after ordering them via the internet. Conditions

Poor pre-departure preventive maintenance As the PLAN implements its “offshore defense” and vessel maintenance problems at sea, how- strategic guidelines, it is now conducting train- ever, have affected the PLAN’s ability to con- ing further from “its own front door.” Vessels duct certain types of mobile operations. As a and aircraft are now training in what the PLAN result, vessels often must return to base shortly calls “unfamiliar” sea areas, airspace, and air- after departing because of insufficient techni- fields. To be better prepared for operating in cal training for crewmembers or the lack of these areas, the PLAN has undertaken a con- spare parts aboard the vessel. This remains a certed effort to map the ocean’s floor in the major concern for the PLAN. Bohai Gulf, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. Concerning aircraft mobility, until the late 1990s, Naval Aviation aircraft rarely deployed As part of its mobility training, Naval Aviation to another base equipped with a different type aircraft now routinely deploy to “unfamiliar” of aircraft because of the fixed maintenance airfields for short periods of time. and logistics support structure in existence. One of the PLAN’s limitations has been the re- This situation has now changed. Over the past liance on scripted training events. Under the few years, Naval Aviation has created small old OMTE, the “Red Force” and “Blue Force” mobile logistics and maintenance teams that commanders in a training event or exercise ex- can accompany deploying aircraft to units changed information about their movements equipped with a different type of aircraft. These and intentions before deploying to sea or con- units can be deployed mostly by rail or road, ducting air engagements. The PLA calls this but some are now using transport aircraft that training under “known conditions.” accompany the combat aircraft deployment. Other small teams are being trained to support Under the new OMTE, only a general area of other types of visiting aircraft for short periods operations is provided and neither side is pre- of time. As a result, Naval Aviation aircraft are briefed about the other’s activities. The PLA now conducting more deployments from their calls this training under “unknown condi- home base for longer periods of time for both tions.” The premise is that the “enemy” is not

China’s Navy 2007—89 going to pre-brief the PLAN on its intentions Typically, PLAN units previously conducted or operations before or during a conflict. only one training subject per sortie in a build- ing block approach. Under the new OMTE, Furthermore, PLAN vessels are beginning to however, vessels and aircraft now conduct conduct more training in narrow and shallow more than one training subject per sortie. For seas, and in areas with islands, shoals, and reefs. example, vessels now conduct both offensive and defensive training subjects at the same time, to include dealing with injured crew- Transitioning from Day into Night members and shipboard damage. during All Types of Weather This change now allows the vessel crewmem- Historically, due to various weapon system bers and pilots to conduct longer but fewer limitations, the PLAN did not often train dur- sorties to accomplish the same training re- ing non-daylight hours or during poor weath- quirements. Among other factors, the rising er conditions. Vessels often trained during the cost of fuel is driving this reform. day and anchored at night. While the PLAN divides the training day into three 8-hour peri- ods, most training events occured in only one Annual Training Cycle of those periods. The PLAN conducts what can best be described The situation is now changing as the PLAN ac- as a one-year training cycle. The five key fac- quires more weapon systems that can operate tors driving this cycle are as follows: in all types of weather conditions and the re- alization that future conflicts may very well be • The annual conscription and demobiliza- conducted mostly at night. tion for one-half of all conscripts during October and November Under the new OMTE, PLAN aircraft and • The demobilization during November for vessels now routinely conduct training that all PLAN NCOs who are not promoted to transitions from one period into the next. the next grade Training that covers all three periods is called • The inclusion of new officers into the op- “rolling-type” training. erational force after their graduation from a PLAN academy in June • Weather The Shift to Multiple Training Subjects • Holidays

As noted in the earlier chapters on each of the The annual conscription cycle does not affect PLAN’s branches, the annual training cycle every branch equally. For example, training for progresses from individuals, to small units, to surface vessels and the Marine Corps, where larger units, and from basic subjects to tech- conscripts constitute a higher proportion of niques to tactics and combat methods. These personnel involved in the day-to-day train- tactics and combat methods are then incor- ing and operations, is more dependent on new porated into larger air formations and vessel conscripts than for Naval Aviation training, task forces as campaign-level training subjects, where all of the pilots and a high percentage of such as antisubmarine warfare. maintenance personnel are officers. However,

90—China’s Navy 2007 the annual training cycle is slowly changing as several months later. If a vessel missed the cut- the size of the NCO corps grows in relation to off, it had to wait until the next year to begin. the conscript force. The new OMTE now allows vessels to en- ter training throughout the year and to by- Naval Vessel Training pass certain sequential training subjects if the vessel and crew pass the evaluation. Further- Training for PLAN surface and subsurface ves- more, commanding officers (COs) now have sels occurs at the three fleet vessel training more flexibility in determining their vessel’s centers, in port, and at sea. The PLAN has im- training schedule. plemented several officer corps and enlisted force reforms that are changing the way its Under the old OMTE, any 1st-class vessel (i.e., vessels are training. one that was on readiness alert or on patrol) that received a new CO who had not received his full training qualifications had to be down- nd Vessel Training Centers graded to a 2 -class vessel (i.e., one that could go on alert in a short period of time). These In 1982, the PLAN began creating a single ves- vessels had to return to a training center so sel training center in each its three fleets, where that the CO could receive his full training cer- all PLAN surface and subsurface vessels and tification. This regulation also applied to the crews receive what is called “full training” or training qualifications of the crew as a whole. “single-vessel full training.” Some crewmem- bers and vessels also receive refresher training The new OMTE now allows for more COs to when necessary. be fully qualified, so that new COs can assume their duties without the vessel having to return The training is organized around a set of com- to the training center. mon training subjects, followed by task-force basic tactics training subjects, each of which Furthermore, the new OMTE allows some old- must be completed in a specified sequence. er vessels to be assigned on a permanent basis When each training subject is completed, an to training centers. These vessels are used for evaluation for each crewmember and for the training new crewmembers and for refresher vessel as a whole must be passed before mov- training. These personnel are then rotated to st ing on to the next subject. the 1 -class vessels so the vessels do not have to return to the training center. As noted below, several significant changes took place in the training at the centers as a Under the old OMTE, opposition-force training result of the new OMTE. at the centers was not a high priority, due pri- marily to safety considerations. The evaluation Under the old OMTE, every newly commis- vessel served as the target vessel but did not sioned vessel and every vessel that had just pose a threat to the vessels being evaluated, so completed an overhaul or received new equip- there was no true opposition. The situation has ment had to go through the training center and changed under the new OMTE, so that opposi- complete every training subject in sequence. All tion-force training is now a key component of training started after Spring Festival and ended the training. The vessels undergoing training

China’s Navy 2007—91 now serve as the opponents. Today, opposi- ing basic training at a fleet training center tion-force training constitutes about one-third until early February. Furthermore, all NCOs of the overall evaluation. who are not promoted to the next grade are demobilized in late November, and their re- Under the new OMTE, the centers have built placements are not yet necessarily selected or simulation labs and now require a high percent- trained. Weather in some fleets is also a factor age of training to take place using simulators. during this phase.

Under the new OMTE, vessel COs have more During this phase, vessel crews conduct train- flexibility to independently conduct their ing on basic subjects in port and in nearby vessel’s training while in the training center. coastal waters. In December, the vessels can Each CO organizes his own vessel’s training begin sea training in coastal waters. Sometimes plan with the center’s assistance. As a result, the vessels just leave port and anchor near the training time for some vessels has been re- the coast. The reason for this is so the crew is duced by one-half. not distracted by wanting to go ashore. This portion consists primarily of single vessel train- As a result of these changes, the vessel training ing, but sometimes vessels informally form a centers have significantly increased the num- small group for advanced training, depending ber and types of vessels they train annually. on their status. During this period, the crew trains to see how everything fits together for an individual vessel. This phase also includes Naval Vessel Training Cycle live gunnery against land targets.

PLAN vessel training is divided into three Phase one also consists of lectures and orga- phases based on the annual conscription and nized study of regulations. Study begins with NCO demobilization cycle. the general regulations and then moves to spe- cific regulations for each job. Some officers also Altogether, PLAN vessels train about 150 days take this opportunity to go on leave or to have per year, much of which is for just one day in their families join them while the vessel is in port or anchored off shore. The three fleets port and during Spring Festival. The training rarely train with each other, especially during cycle during phase one is gradually changing, phase one, but a couple of times per year two however, as the number of conscripts decreas- or all three of the fleets conduct training to- es and the number of NCOs increases aboard gether. This training is not necessarily an ex- each vessel. Some vessels are conducting train- ercise, because PLAN exercises are based on ing in January and February that they previ- specific scenarios, as is discussed below. ously did not conduct until the spring.

Phase One Phase Two Phase one lasts from 1 November until Spring Phase two lasts from March through June. Festival in late January to early February. Some During this phase, the vessels begin formally vessels are not fully manned during this phase training together in groups. After they have because the new conscripts are still receiv- mastered this, they then form larger task forc-

92—China’s Navy 2007 es, but this is not a true “task force.” During This issue is somewhat controversial, however, this phase, the vessels shoot at drones and because the limited time at sea for many PLAN work with Naval Aviation fighters. The vessels vessels does not allow enough time for mul- are involved in various types of training, such tiple officers to train in the same position. as antiaircraft artillery, antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface warfare. Destroyers also begin The PLAN also believed that flexibility in terms to train with frigates during this phase. of fully training crews was hampered under the old OMTE. This was because PLAN NCOs possessed only one technical skill and were as- Phase Three signed to the same vessel their entire career. Phase three lasts from summer until the end Therefore, under the new OMTE, NCOs are re- of October, when a final exercise takes place. quired to learn more than one technical skill During this period, special task-force mobility on the same and, in some cases, on different training usually takes place. classes of vessels.

Vessel Officer and NCO Training Reforms Naval Aviation Training Cycle

Based on the new OMTE, one of the PLAN’s The enlisted force conscription and demobi- goals is to have more vessels on combat patrol lization cycles do not impact Naval Aviation or alert status in port (i.e., on 1st-class status). as much as they do the surface and submarine Prior to the new OMTE, the PLAN deemed the forces. However, the addition of new pilots number of certified COs as insufficient to meet from the transition training base during June, its current and future needs, especially in times along with weather and holidays, does affect of war. Naval Aviation’s annual training cycle.

One of the PLAN’s largest bureaucratic chal- Naval Aviation assigns monthly percentage st lenges was that a vessel was taken off 1 -class quotas to each unit for completion of training status if the CO was replaced or could not per- subjects and flight time. Each month averages form his duties for various reasons, such as be- about 8% of the annual quota, with most units ing sick. When this happened, the vessel was completing their quotas in early December. taken off 1st-class status, and, in some cases, Each unit reviews its quotas on a quarterly ba- the entire crew had to be re-certified along sis and adjusts the training accordingly. with the new CO.

Although flying takes place in late December, Under the old OMTE, political officers, execu- tive officers (XOs), and watch officers had only early January, and during Spring Festival, the limited command roles on the vessel. As a re- overall level is less than the rest of the year. sult, they could not step in to assume the CO’s Naval Aviation takes the opportunity during role if necessary. In response to these challeng- late December, Spring Festival, and at least es, the new OMTE allows XOs and some po- once in the summer to conduct intensive litical officers to train as COs and allows watch maintenance inspections on all of its aircraft officers to conduct additional duties at sea. before heavy flight activity resumes.

China’s Navy 2007—93 Under the old OMTE, most Naval Aviation The Marine Corps conducts two comprehensive units usually elected to fly only on days when training evaluations per year. The first one occurs the weather was good. Even then, they flew in early June and the second in late November. only easy training subjects during the first These evaluations include live maneuver on part of the year and gradually increased the shore and at sea, as well as live firing on shore, difficulty as weather got better and the train- defense at-sea, and landing assaults on beaches ing cycle progressed. However, under the new under different weather and sea conditions. OMTE, Naval Aviation has increased the in- tensity and difficulty of training through- out each quarter of the year regardless of the PLAN Exercises weather conditions. This section begins by noting the six types of In addition, the transition from technical train- training methods and then focuses on the dif- ing, which usually took place during the early ferent types of PLA Navy exercises. It also dis- part of the year, to more complicated tactics cusses how exercises are organized. training has been shortened by two to three months. Whereas the reluctance or technical inability to fly during bad weather conditions Naval Training Methods previously necessitated waiting for spring to begin the transition, Naval Aviation units are The PLA Navy uses three terms for training: increasingly training in all weather condi- • Xunlian (训练) refers to training that oc- tions and relying on simulators to overcome curs on a daily basis for individual train- this bottleneck. ing subjects • Yanxi (演习) refers to an exercise • Yanlian (演练) is a combination of the two Marine Corps Training Cycle terms above and usually refers to a train- ing event by a unit that takes place during The annual cycle for conscription and NCO one or more days and incorporates several demobilization is an important driving factor training subjects but is not at the scope of for the Marine Corps training cycle. Although an exercise. some unit training occurs from 1 November

through February, the majority of the train- The PLAN organizes and conducts military ing occurs during the summer and fall after training for naval personnel to gain naval the new conscripts have completed their basic knowledge, technical skills, and combat training and have been gradually integrated methods. Training is divided into theory and into the operational brigades. practical application. Theory training includes Once the new conscripts are assigned to their self-study, lectures, seminars, correspondence permanent units, the training cycle progresses courses, and reports. Practical applica- from individual training to small-unit training tion occurs in a work environment to im- to larger-unit training, and from technical to plement the theory. There are six types of tactics training events. training methods:

94—China’s Navy 2007 • Drills (操练) include the instruction, Exercise Timing and Duration demonstration, and use of live weapons and equipment in a simulated combat The duration of an exercise is determined by situation. the subject matter and scale as follows: • Practical application (实习) includes observation and hands-on use of • A division- or brigade-scale maneuver equipment. exercise usually lasts about five days and • Demonstrations (操演) occur after nights the officers and enlisted troops have • A regiment-scale maneuver exercise lasts a basic technical capability. These about three days and nights include deployment, battle, and support demonstrations by combining the individual skills learned up to that point. Exercise Ratings The goal is to become familiar with command and coordination functions, The General Staff Department assigns one raise the skill level for weapons and of four performance ratings for exercises equipment use, and train for combat as follows: support. Demonstrations can be divided into battle demonstrations and • Grade 1 is excellent demonstrations for routine support. • Grade 2 is good • Exercises (演习) are the basic method for • Grade 3 is pass units to conduct actual combat training and include single-force, opposition-force, • Grade 4 is fail command and staff, combined-arms, joint, and live-munitions exercises. Naval Exercise Goals • Live-weapons training (实际使用武器训 练 ) includes: firing artillery; launching Naval exercises use scenarios to conduct unified missiles, mines, and rockets; dropping training for campaigns and battles. The goals depth charges; laying mines; and mine are to: sweeping.

• At-sea training (海上训练) is conducted on • Raise the capability for organizing and single or multiple training subjects. commanding during a real war • Coordinate closely among all services and Exercise Plan branches • Evaluate weapons and equipment The exercise plan is the basis for organizing teaching materials an exercise and guides its preparation and execution. The contents include the exercise • Discuss combat methods tasks, goals, problems, participating forces, organization and leadership, exercise area, After officers and enlisted sailors have an methods, start time and progression times, understanding of theory and have trained in exercise phases and times, materials support, basic technical and tactics skills, the PLAN uses and safety measures. exercises to simulate real and specific situations.

China’s Navy 2007—95 Naval Exercise Categories At-Sea Exercise (海上演习)

Naval exercises are divided into the following This type of exercise is conducted on the seven categories and subcategories: ocean or water areas near the coast using naval vessel units as the primary participants. It is • Scale conducted only after the basic technical and — Strategic and campaign exercises tactics training foundation has been laid and — Campaign exercises the proper plans have been completed. — Tactical exercises • The level targeted for training Normally, this type of exercise is organized and — Unit training led by higher-level commanders and staffs. It — Command and staff exercises is organized into three phases: preparation, • Organization form implementation, and conclusion. — Single-force exercise — Opposition-force exercise The objective is to raise the maritime • Organization level campaign and battle command level and — Single-level exercise real-war capabilities, become familiar with — Two-level exercise coordination work, inspect and evaluate — Multiple-level exercise weapons and equipment, evaluate orders and • The conditions teaching materials, and discuss new naval — Chart exercise warfare methods. It is a high form of naval — Live-maneuver exercise campaign and tactical training. Exercises at — Live-maneuver with live munitions sea are categorized and subdivided into three exercise types based on: • Location — Indoors exercise • Scope: This category is divided into — Field exercise tactical, campaign, and naval maneuver — In-port or on-shore exercise exercises. — At-sea exercise • Objective: This category is divided into • Objective inspection, evaluation, demonstration, — Inspection or evaluation exercise trial, and research types. — Demonstration exercise • Organization: This category is divided — Trial exercise into single force and opposition force; — Research exercise single branch, vessel, or aircraft type; combined-arms exercises; actual troop Types of PLAN Exercises without live munitions, and actual troop with live munitions. The PLAN conducts 14 different types of ex- ercises, which are briefly discussed below. The content for naval exercises at sea consists Although each exercise is a stand-alone event of multiple comprehensive subjects. The for planning and execution purposes, it can in- exercises often include actual use of weapons, corporate components of other exercises. For such as artillery firing, launching of missiles, example, a combined-arms exercise includes mines, and rockets, as well as dropping depth naval maneuvers and opposition-force training. charges, mine laying, mine sweeping, and

96—China’s Navy 2007 electronic countermeasures. Depending on the the special organizations needed at sea to task character and exercise scale, this type of implement them. This normally consists of exercise can be conducted in the same sea area uniting military scientific-research missions, or multiple sea areas. theory discussions, experience, and scientific testing at the same time. The research subject and training requirements determine the At-Sea Inspection or Evaluation Exercise content and methods of the exercise. (检验性海上演习)

This type of exercise is used to inspect and check At-Sea Opposition-Force Exercise naval units for completion of their training 对抗性海上演习 mission, their battle preparation procedures, ( ) and their technical and tactics levels. This type This type of exercise involves having the of exercise is organized and conducted by the supported commander and staff and is often participating units simulate combat for both conducted on a no-notice basis. sides in offensive and defensive maneuvers. Each side has its own tasks and implementation methods, which it must keep secret from the At-Sea Demonstration Exercise other side. This type of exercise is organized and (示范性海上演习) implemented under the unified exercise leader.

After a new combat method has been ap- proved and regulations have been issued, At-Sea Campaign Maneuver Exercise the navy uses this type of exercise to dem- (海上战役演习) onstrate the new methods to the rest of the force, so that everyone implements them in This type of exercise is organized and a uniform manner. implemented to employ naval campaign methods at sea based on a specific campaign scenario. The goal is to increase the At-Sea Trial Exercise (试验性海上演习) organizational and command capability of the commander and command staff, strengthen Trial exercises are used to conduct research and the ability to conduct maritime warfare, and testing for new weapon systems and combat train unit capabilities for campaign mobility, methods. They are organized and implemented according to the specific subjects being tested. coordinating operations, and campaign support. These exercises are conducted individually by PLAN Headquarters, fleet At-Sea Research Exercise headquarters, or base-level organizations. They (研究性海上演习) can also be conducted in a joint campaign with other services and branches. These exercises The goal of this type of exercise is to research use the PLA’s military strategic guidelines of naval combat and training methods and “active defense” as its basis.

China’s Navy 2007—97 At-Sea Tactical Exercise (海上战术演习) types, or units from different organizational systems, under a unified command in the This type of exercise uses naval vessel units same exercise scenario. The goal is to raise as the primary participants during a tactical the capability for commanders, staffs, and scenario and is organized and implemented units to conduct combined-arms campaigns based on naval tactical principles. The goal is and battles. Combined-arms exercises are to allow naval tactical commanders to: divided into naval combined-arms tactical exercises and naval combined-arms campaign • Grasp, organize, and command battles at exercises. Normally, a combined-arms exercise sea is organized and led by a unit’s higher- • Conduct tactical mobility and level commander. Before the exercise, a coordination methods coordination conference is held, where all of • Strengthen their modern naval-warfare tactics the participants decide on an exercise plan and • Raise the ability of vessel units to preparation work; the commander, staff, and conduct real-war offense and defense units complete advanced training, including independently or using combined arms theory study, chart work, and joint exercise leadership, which is divided into training A tactical exercise at sea is an important meth- and pre-exercise portions. After the exercise, a od for naval units to conduct comprehensive unified critique is held. training. This type of exercise can be divided into different categories based on three different criteria as follows, each of which is organized Naval Exercise with Live Troops and Live and implemented in the same basic manner: Munitions (海军实兵实弹演习)

• Based on how the fire power is organized, The goal is to train and inspect unit real-war tactical exercises at sea can be divided capabilities under near-real-war conditions. into single-branch and single-vessel type, Normally, the exercise has a combat scenario or multiple-branch and multiple-vessel type exercises. and uses fake surface, subsurface, aerial, and shore-based enemy targets. The units employ • Based on the battle character, tactical exercises at sea can be divided into firing missiles, rockets, and guns, dropping offensive and defensive exercises. depth charges, deep-water bombing, mine • Based on the implementation method, laying, mine sweeping, and electronic warfare. tactical exercises at sea can be divided This type of exercise requires careful planning into single-force and opposition-force and safety measures. Prior to the exercise, a exercises. chart exercise and pre-exercise preparations are conducted. Normally, notification of a restricted Naval Combined-Arms Exercise area is announced just before the exercise, and (海军合同演习) the navy dispatches patrols and security. The navy also organizes observation and recording A naval combined-arms exercise employs units of the exercise and conducts a post-exercise from two or more naval branches or vessel analysis and critique.

98—China’s Navy 2007 Naval Combat Readiness Exercise can also be used to synthesize naval military (海军战备演习) science research, evaluate naval combat concepts, plus examine the organizational and This type of exercise is based on requirements combat structure, military orders, weapons and for combat readiness. The goal is to inspect equipment, and all types of support. It can also and reform naval combat readiness work and research ocean combat areas and every combat to raise the level of unit combat readiness. It direction special point. It is the highest form of is conducted in accordance with the combat naval training. readiness plan or a special plan, and is organized and led by higher headquarters or This type of exercise includes: shifting to each level of combat readiness, developing the commander and staff of the unit being strategy and campaigns, and carrying out the exercised. The exercise scale, contents, and beginning strategic surprise attack phase of procedures are based on the grade level and war and countering strategic surprise attacks; mission of the unit, and is determined by the seizing and maintaining command of the sea exercise tasks. and ocean passage, and protecting sea lines of communication; engaging in combat with The exercise’s content includes transforming: missile-equipped nuclear submarines and from peacetime to a war preparation mode; aircraft-carrier task forces; protecting naval from local combat preparation and navigation bases and coastal key points; and dealing with preparation to dispersal and being under way; local attacks on the ocean. from establishing a command post to opening a wartime headquarters; and from completing combat deployments to managing battle situations. Usually, the exercise plan is kept Command and Staff Chart Exercise from the unit being exercised until just before (首长司令部图上演习) orders are issued, or until the warning or This type of exercise, which can also be called signal is given. a command post exercise (CPX), involves regiment and above unit commanders and their Headquarters Department staff personnel Joint At-Sea Exercise (海上联合演习) who conduct command and comprehensive work using a military chart. The commander This type of exercise involves the navy plus is located in the command post and uses other services and branches, or involves naval communications equipment to command forces from two or more countries. the exercise.

The Naval Command Academy in Nanjing Naval Maneuvers (海军大演习) conducts one CPX annually and sometimes moves this into a field training exercise This type of exercise is a large-scale strategic (FTX). This CPX is for command personnel and campaign exercise organized by PLAN from PLAN Headquarters and the three fleets Headquarters. It is conducted under near-real- only and does not include command acad- war conditions and is intended to inspect the emy students, who have their own CPXs PLAN’s real power capabilities. This exercise during their training.

China’s Navy 2007—99 Combined-Arms Training Figure 31.—PLAN Combined-Arms Training Levels Combined-arms training (合同训练) involves High Medium Low two or more of the PLAN’s five branches—sub- NA, CD, Submarine Surface marine, surface, aviation, coastal defense, and MC Marine Corps. However, not all of the branch- NA, CD, Surface Subs es conduct combined-arms training with oth- MC er branches. For the most part, the five PLAN Surface, branches conduct intra-branch training. Under Naval Aviation Subs, the new OMTE, intra-branch training has been CD, MC gradually expanding to dissimilar aircraft Surface, training and training with multiple classes of Coastal Subs, vessels in the same task force. Defense NA, MC Figure 31 provides a general idea of the level Subs, Marine Corps Surface of combined-arms training between branches NA, CD as being high, medium, or low. Note that the Subs = Submarine; Surface = Surface; NA = Naval only two branches that train with any regu- Aviation; CD = Coastal Defense; MC = Marine larity together are the surface and subsurface Corps forces, but even this training is at a medium to low level. The Marine Corps trains a lot with fleet boundaries at sea to conduct training, but the South Sea Fleet’s amphibious forces, but naval vessels have rarely conducted intra-fleet training with the Marine Corps for the surface training. One of the reasons vessels have not branch as a whole is still quite low. conducted intra-fleet training is administrative in nature. Until recently, each fleet managed One issue inhibiting combined-arms train- its funding in cash, including paying its per- ing is a lack of understanding by personnel in sonnel, so it was difficult to coordinate fund- one branch about the operations of another ing for intra-fleet training. Now, however, the branch. Therefore, under the new OMTE, the PLAN is working toward funding the fleets and PLAN has begun sending officers from one personnel through centralized and individual branch to another branch for six months to a bank accounts. year to gain some practical experience. For ex- ample, surface officers and aviation pilots are As a result, changes in intra-fleet training have now spending time with the submarine forces, now begun to take place under the new OMTE. and submarine officers are spending time on For example, during early 2003, five aircraft surface vessels. from the North Sea Fleet, consisting of patrol aircraft, warning aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft, flew to the South China Sea, where Intra-Fleet Training they conducted a mission to recover an “ene- my-held island” that included reconnaissance Historically, Naval Aviation aircraft have de- of their target, guiding fighters during inter- ployed to airfields in other fleets and crossed cepts, and providing jamming.

100—China’s Navy 2007 During 2005, destroyers and frigates from the are not involved in providing protection for North Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet deployed the surface vessels. to the East Sea Fleet for training with the ESF’s destroyer zhidui. The PLAN described this as The PLAN and PLAAF have identified specific “a new training model that explores crossing practical and administrative problems with organizational systems for joint mobile task- joint training, to include the following issues: force fire power.” • Lack of a Joint Training Department in the General Staff Department and the Joint Training seven military region headquarters • Lack of a joint training structure and pro- In the mid-1990s, the PLA began to focus on gram at the fleet and military region air joint training (联合训练), which usually means force headquarters levels training by two or more services. According to • Lack of understanding of each other’s sys- China’s National Defense in 2004, tems and tactics • Problems with poor weather conditions “To step up preparations for military that preclude aircraft from departing after struggle, the PLA takes as its objective to ships have already been at sea for some win local wars under the conditions of time informationalization and gives priority to • The short duration of time (measured in developing weaponry and equipment, to seconds) the ships really get to practice building joint operational capabilities, when an aircraft flies over and returns and to making full preparations home after a single pass in the battlefields.” • Lack of real combat tactics practiced by the aircraft Although the PLA has publicly cited high in- • When a joint training day is missed for terest in joint training, the actual amount of weather or other reasons, it is difficult to joint training has not been high. In some in- make up given the other requirements of stances, opposition-force training between dif- each unit ferent services has been cited as joint training. For example, PLAAF aircraft attacking PLAN The three services have begun to address some surface vessels is actually opposition-force, of these problems by sending a handful of offi- not joint, training. Furthermore, when this cers on temporary duty to another service for six type of training occurs, Naval Aviation aircraft months to a year to learn about their operations.

China’s Navy 2007—101 102—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 14 Quality of Life

This section provides information on quality- because they do not own a vehicle. Personnel of-life issues for the PLAN’s officers and enlist- usually ride a bicycle, take a bus, or walk to ed sailors. The PLAN claims that it continues work and have a driver from the motor pool to spend millions of dollars to upgrade the take them to other work-related locations. living and working conditions for its forces, including housing, entertainment, and work More PLAN personnel are trying to purchase facilities. The focus has been on grassroots-lev- vehicles for personal use and to acquire gov- el units that are not located near urban areas. ernment driver’s licenses to be able to drive The PLAN, along with local governments, also motor-pool vehicles for work-related travel. helps find jobs for family members. However, this has led to an increase in the number of vehicle accidents, because the driv- The PLAN has had to implement these expen- ers do not receive adequate training. sive reforms as a means of recruiting and re- taining the type of force that it needs for the present and future. Work Conditions

To help retain personnel, the PLAN claims Military Pay to have spent millions of dollars on upgrad- ing work facilities, especially for its grass- Neither the PLA nor the PLAN publish detailed roots units located in rural and coastal areas, statistics about their personnel or military pay. as well as on islands. The money is being As a result, it is difficult to ascertain the ex- spent on water, electricity, heating, bath- act pay scale and subsidies for each officer and ing, medical, and transportation facilities. enlisted person.

The majority of PLAN personnel still receive Morale, Welfare, and their monthly pay in cash from their unit’s Recreation finance office. However, the PLAN is gradu- ally transitioning to paying by direct deposit The PLAN has also focused on building and to savings accounts, especially in urban areas. renovating morale, welfare, and recreation Checking and credit card accounts are not (MWR) facilities throughout the force. These widely used within the PLAN, but the use of types of facilities include soccer fields, basket- debit cards is growing. ball courts, indoor recreation areas, NCO and officer clubs, cultural centers, computer labs, and theaters. The units are also stocking the Transportation libraries with thousands of books of all types.

The majority of PLAN personnel, including of- To help PLAN personnel communicate better ficers, do not have a driver’s license, primarily with their families, the PLAN and some local

China’s Navy 2007—103 telecommunication companies help arrange PLAN spouses must be citizens of the PRC re- for free telephones and video conferencing. siding on the mainland. Citizens of and Macao are not permitted to marry PLA servicemen. Although not technically ille- Marriage gal, the GPD regulations also state that when a Han Chinese serviceman seeks to marry some- Both the national Marriage Law and an addi- one from one of China’s many ethnic minority tional set of stipulations issued by the General groups, efforts should be made to persuade the Political Department in late 2001 entitled the couple to abandon their wedding plans. “Regulations on Certain Issues Concerning the Military’s Implementation of the ‘Marriage Generally speaking, NCOs are not permitted to Law of the People’s Republic of China’” gov- marry within their unit or find a spouse in the ern marriages in the PLAN. Although the legal vicinity of where they are stationed. This stip- age for marriage in China is 22 for males and ulation is probably rooted in the fact that once 20 for females, the PLA “advocates and encour- NCOs are demobilized, they must return home ages” its servicemen to marry later, at age 25 to their home of record where they are official- for males and 23 for females. ly registered to live from that point forward. One exception to this involves NCOs at the Because PLAN conscripts are all younger than level of grade-3 and above stationed in rural the legal marrying age, they are not permitted or remote areas. These individuals may marry to marry. Both officers and NCOs, however, locally, provided the marriage is approved by may marry provided they are older than the the political organization at the division level legal marrying age and have the permission or higher. Once demobilized, these NCOs are of the political organization at the regiment resettled locally with their spouse. level and above.

When a serviceman becomes engaged, he Housing must report the courtship to his unit’s Party organization at least one month before the The housing situation for the PLA Navy is more marriage occurs. A political organization at the complex than for the US Navy. In the USN, ac- regiment level or above then begins the back- tive duty personnel can live in base housing ground investigation on the intended spouse. if it is available, or they can purchase or rent During this investigation, special attention is off-base civilian housing and receive a hous- paid to the prospective spouses of PLAN per- ing allowance to help offset the cost. When sonnel stationed on naval vessels or who work USN officers or enlisted personnel retire, they with classified information. can no longer live in base housing. Regardless of their rank, they must find off-base civil- Although the PLAN has the restrictions above, ian housing, for which they do not receive it sometimes sets them aside for older offi- a housing allowance. cers and NCOs. Specifically, each year, various PLAN units, including PLAN Headquarters, ar- PLA regulations state that PLA officers must range matchmaking events with local females meet four criteria in order to have their fam- for single personnel who are over 30 years old. ily join them: the officer must have 15 years

104—China’s Navy 2007 in the service, must have the grade of battal- housing and employment opportunities of- ion leader or above, on-base housing must be ten creates additional complications for both available, and the unit must find a job for the the family and the PLAN. In other instanc- spouse. Available schooling for children is also es, however, some spouses have managed to a consideration. However, these criteria do not find work off base earning more than their apply to pilots, who can get married and have military partner. their family join them at any time. Today, all unmarried personnel, as well as mar- Within the PLAN, on-base housing for mar- ried officers and NCOs who are not accompa- ried personnel is limited, and PLAN personnel nied, live in the barracks. must meet certain grade criteria to be autho- rized to live in base housing. PLAN regulations To help alleviate the problems associated with either forbid or discourage families from join- the lack of permanent housing, the PLAN has ing their spouses and living in off-base hous- spent millions of dollars to build apartment ing when on-base housing is not available. As buildings to be used as temporary housing for a result, a high percentage of PLAN officers, visiting family members. To allow for a max- especially in non-urban areas, live in cities imum amount of visitors, the PLAN has cer- and towns other than that of their spouse and tain restrictions on how long they can remain child. The situation is even more restrictive for in the temporary housing. It also discourages married NCOs, who, prior to 1999, had only them from visiting during certain times of the limited base housing available. year, especially when exercises are taking place. For example, PLA regulations state that spous- If married PLAN personnel do choose to live es are allowed to visit once a year, staying in in off-base housing due to a lack of available temporary housing for no more than 45 days on-base housing, the PLAN does not provide under normal circumstances. a housing allowance. Therefore, the PLAN dis- courages them from doing this. As the number of married NCOs has increased, the shortage of temporary housing for both of- This situation is further complicated by China’s ficers and NCOs has received more attention residency system (户口制度) under which ev- from PLAN Headquarters. ery citizen of the PRC has an official place of residency. Designed to control the movements One reason on-base housing is in short sup- of the population, citizens who live in a place ply is because some senior PLAN officers are other than their official home of residency can allowed to retain their on-base housing after be denied employment opportunities, hous- they retire. The PLAN is attempting to allevi- ing, health care, and education. ate this problem by building subsidized pub- lic housing near the base for some active-duty As China has abolished many of the travel re- and retired officers, civilian cadre, and NCOs. strictions once imposed on its citizens, many spouses have begun to relocate to the vicinity The type of public housing is allocated based where the military member happens to be sta- on several criteria, including the person’s tioned to reduce the distance between them. grade. For example, division-grade officers That said, their subsequent inability to find are limited to apartments with 92 square me-

China’s Navy 2007—105 ters and battalion-grade officers are limited to • Officers who are not married and choose 54 square meters. to visit their parents are authorized 20 days of leave every two years. • Married officers who live with their Family Member Employment spouse are authorized 30 days of annual leave to visit their parents, if the parents Unlike US Navy bases that are fully integrated live in another location. into the surrounding community by having • If a married officer does not live with his personnel live in civilian housing and local ci- spouse, he is authorized 40 days of annual vilians working on base, PLAN bases and units leave to visit his family. remain somewhat isolated from the communi- ty. As noted above, only a few PLAN personnel live in off-base public housing. As for NCOs, grade-1 NCOs get two 20-day home visits per service period, while unac- Furthermore, a high percentage of civilian per- companied and unmarried NCOs at any of sonnel who work on the bases and other PLAN the higher grades are granted additional leave. support facilities are spouses of PLAN officers The duration of this visit varies depending on and enlisted personnel. Having spouses work whether the NCO is married (40 days) or un- on PLAN facilities helps justify providing on- married (30 days). Senior NCOs (grades 5-6) base housing for the married military members. who live with their spouse but away from their parents are granted one 20-day home visit ev- One way the PLA as a whole has tried to ery four years. This increases to 30 days once help alleviate the problem of family separa- the NCO exceeds 20 years of active-duty ser- tions for officers stationed in rural areas that vice. NCOs performing combat tasks are not have minimal employment opportunities for accorded vacation time or family visits. spouses is to directly commission them as of- ficers and then assign them to the same unit. Although PLAN personnel are authorized an- This also allows the unit to authorize on-base nual leave based on their grade and marital housing for them. status, a large percentage of personnel either do not take their leave or are not allowed to take it because of the unit’s daily workload Military Leave and training activities.

The rules covering leave for officers and NCOs The PLAN has identified this as a morale differ depending on their grade, marital status, problem and tried to solve it through vari- and where their parents live. Each year, officers ous means. For example, the PLAN is trying to have a choice of taking regular leave or leave to have its NCOs learn more than one technical visit their parents as noted below: skill, so they can fill in for someone who is on leave or is incapacitated during combat. • Officers who choose to take leave and have less than 20 years of active duty are In addition, some units arrange for family authorized 20 days of leave per year. members or parents to stay in temporary hous- • Officers with 20 or more years are autho- ing during Spring Festival if the military mem- rized 30 days. ber is not able to take leave to visit his family.

106—China’s Navy 2007 Food Figure 33—New Average Meal Expense Standards by Mess Hall Category Per Day The PLA’s regulations state that all division- Mess Hall leader grade officers (i.e., senior colonels) and New Expense Standards Category below and all enlisted personnel must eat in Category 1 RMB 10 (USD 1.24) the mess hall for breakfast, lunch, and din- ner from Monday through Friday. Although Category 2 RMB 12 (USD 1.49) the mess hall is open on the weekends, per- Category 3 RMB 22 (USD 2.72) sonnel can eat elsewhere at their own expense. Category 4 RMB 38 (USD 4.70) However, for individuals stationed in isolated areas that lack other meal options, most meals are eaten in the mess hall. Furthermore, as not- increased by an average of RMB 1.8 (USD 0.22) ed above, because a high percentage of officers per person per day, raising the minimum meal are not accompanied by their families, they eat expense per soldier to RMB 10 (USD 1.20) per in the mess hall. As shown in Figure 32, the day. The new adjustment of meal expense stan- PLA has four categories of mess halls. dards was the largest since the founding of the PRC. Figure 33 shows the new meal expense All PLAN officers in the grade of jun leader standards broken down by the four categories and below and all enlisted personnel receive of mess halls in the PLA. a monthly food subsidy. Officers above the grade of jun leader do not receive a monthly The increase in subsidies has allowed the PLA to food subsidy and must pay for their food out provide more nutritional dishes. For example, of their salary. the latest rise in food subsidies allows soldiers to drink 250 grams of milk at breakfast and eat PLA meal expenses have increased six times fruits at both lunch and dinner. Beef, lamb, since the early 1990s. At the beginning of fish, and other seafood are gradually being in- 2005, the PLA’s meal expense standards were tegrated into the diets of enlisted personnel, replacing the traditional reliance on pork. This constitutes a substantial change from years past when soldiers often complained about eating Figure 32—PLA Mess Hall Categories the “three same old things,” namely, potatoes, Mess Hall radishes, and cabbage. Along with greater va- PLA Personnel Category riety in the diet, new standards governing the Officers, civilian cadre, NCOs, amount of food have also been put in place. Category 1 and conscripts in battalion-level and below units In units where the technology exists, person- nel are given a debit card to use in the mess Tank, self-propelled artillery, Category 2 hall. Otherwise, the amount is deducted from a and repair units ration card. The mess hall receives a maximum Vessel personnel and Category 3 amount for each person per meal. However, reconnaissance units the amount deducted from the debit or ration Submarine crewmembers Category 4 card is not a set amount but is based on a sepa- and aircrew rate deduction for each item. Personnel who

China’s Navy 2007—107 travel for temporary duty may receive an ad- lack of drinking water on the reefs by build- ditional amount on their ration card. ing fresh-water storage ponds to ensure supply for several months. Members select the food and beverage they wish to consume and present their card to a Providing water for some naval vessels, especial- cashier who deducts this amount from the bal- ly smaller vessels such as speedboats, has also ance remaining on the debit card. These deb- been a challenge. Several methods have been it cards were first introduced in units in the employed, including boiling the water in the Beijing MR in 2003. Embedded in each card is same woks used to cook meals, using automat- a computer chip that contains basic informa- ed electromagnetic hot-water machines, and tion on the individual and can also be used by providing barrels of fresh water to each vessel. servicemen to receive their salary or allowance and obtain medical care and other services.

Much of the food consumed in the PLA is pro- Retirement and duced by the military itself. During the 9th Demobilization Issues Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), for example, the PLA produced a total of 3.4 billion kilograms of grain, 3.2 billion kilograms of fresh vegetables, Enlisted Force and 1.3 billion kilograms of meat, fish, and eggs. Moreover, in the majority of company- Prior to the revised service law in 1999, en- level units, at least 70% of the meat and veg- listed “volunteers” were demobilized and sent etables consumed were provided by the unit. back to their home of record, where all retire- ment expenses were borne by the local gov- Most of the PLA’s farms were created during ernment. Prior to 1999, enlisted members did the 1960s and 1970s and were consolidated not retire from the military; they were only into a single system in 1988. PLAN statistics demobilized at the end of their service. As a show that 50% of the Naval Aviation units result, the PLAN did not have to bear the same provide all of their own food, 60% of PLAN type of retirement costs and responsibilities it ground service units provide 72% of their own did for officers. food, and 28% of surface and subsurface forces provide 28% of their own food. Today, when a conscript or NCO is not pro- moted to the next rank and is demobilized Many PLAN coastal defense, radar, and obser- vation sites are isolated on islands or moun- from the PLA, he receives a subsidy, as well as a tains. Supplies such as fuel, food, water, and medical subsidy if he suffers from a chronic ill- blankets are difficult to receive on a routine ness. As in the past, once the soldier returns to basis, especially during winter. However, the civilian life, all expenses related to his demo- food situation is gradually improving in many bilization and job placement are paid by the of these hardship posts. For example, in the local government where he resides. remote Spratly Islands, units have installed new refrigerators, are raising livestock, and are Because no grade-6 NCOs have yet to retire shipping in soil from the mainland to grow from the PLAN with a full 30 years of service, it vegetables. Many units have combated the is not clear what the retirement benefits will be.

108—China’s Navy 2007 Officer Corps can fully retire from the PLA, not take a civil- ian job, receive a full military pension, and re- PLAN officers can either retire when they reach main in military housing. their mandatory retirement age or they can be demobilized if they are not promoted beyond Officers who are demobilized (复员) before a certain grade. In addition, they can transfer reaching their mandatory retirement age re- to a comparable state-controlled civilian job ceive a one-time compensation based on a after they have served for a specified period fixed amount for each year served. The amount but before they reach their mandatory retire- ranges from 1.5 months of their base salary for ment age. Each of these options entails differ- each year served under 10 years to 4.0 months ent post-military benefits. of their base salary for each year served over 20 years. Once this money is paid, the PLAN is no The PLAN has two types of retired officers. longer responsible for them. The first type (离休干部) joined the PLAN before 1949, and the second type (退休干 Officers who choose to retire before their man- 部) joined after 1949. Each type receives datory retirement age based on their grade and different benefits today. transfer to a comparable job in a government- run organization (转业) also receive a one-time PLAN officers who joined before 1949 are al- compensation to help relocate. The amount lowed to live in a PLAN retirement home with for division leader-grade and below officers their family. However, as the number of these consists of two categories: relocation and liv- officers dwindles, those retirement homes ing expenses. The total amount varies from are slowly disappearing. seven months of their base pay to more than two years of their base pay. Depending on their grade and eligibility sta- tus, officers who joined the PLAN after 1949

China’s Navy 2007—109 110—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 15 Foreign Relations

Over the past decade, most Asian nations have China’s Military Diplomacy taken advantage of naval diplomacy to further their foreign policy goals, and the region’s na- Since China began to open to the outside val activities have increasingly expanded from world in the early 1980s, the PLA’s foreign re- bilateral to multilateral in focus. The 17-mem- lations have evolved as a means to advance ber Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) China’s national defense policy in several has held 10 biennial meetings and multiple ways. According to the PRC’s 2004 defense preparatory workshops since it was established white paper, in 1988. WPNS has 21 member countries, in- cluding China, plus four observer countries. Adhering to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, China Beijing has taken full advantage of this trend persists in developing friendly relations in naval diplomacy by using the PLAN as a and strengthening cooperation with other valuable, but small component of its robust countries on the basis of the Five Principles worldwide, multilevel foreign relations pro- of Peaceful Co-existence, and devotes gram. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated a broad itself to promoting international security program of foreign military exchanges in the dialogues and cooperation of all forms. late 1970s, PLAN commanders have traveled abroad about 21 times to 34 different coun- tries, and have hosted more than 70 coun- Based on information from the PRC’s five de- terparts from about 30 countries. The PLAN’s fense white papers and other PLA writings, political commissars have traveled abroad only the five general goals of the PLA’s foreign ex- a few times. In addition, the PLAN has con- change program are listed below. For all practi- ducted 25 ship visits abroad to 60 countries cal purposes, the PLA has been fairly successful and territories. The PLAN conducted its first in meeting each of these goals. around-the-world voyage in 2002. • Shape the international security environ- Within the context of its overall naval for- ment to support key national security ob- jectives eign relations program, the PLAN has taken a high-profile, dual-purpose posture in the • Improve political and military relations South China Sea. On one hand, the PLAN has with foreign countries increased its physical presence in the South • Provide military assistance to developing China Sea and East China Sea, while on the countries other hand it has increased the number of port • Enhance China’s military and defense in- calls as a form of confidence-building measures. dustry modernization by acquiring tech-

China’s Navy 2007—111 nology and advancing key research and High-Level Naval Exchanges development programs through foreign assistance High-level naval exchanges by the PLAN and • Help China’s military leaders, younger of- foreign naval officers can be divided into the fol- ficers, and civilian cadre acquire modern lowing categories, some of which may overlap: military knowledge, especially from the developed world, in doctrine, operations, • International politics training, military medicine, administra- • Arms purchases and technology transfer tion, and a host of non-combat-related areas. • “Show the flag” and promote goodwill • Regional security discussions PLAN Foreign Relations As Figures 34, 35, and 36 show, travel by the As part of the PLA’s overall foreign affairs pro- PLAN commander has been somewhat uneven. gram, the PLAN’s interaction with foreign From 1991-2002, the PLAN commander aver- countries has four major components, includ- aged one trip abroad per year, involving one ing high-level exchanges, ship visits, function- to four countries. Since early 2002, the three al exchanges, and arms sales and purchases. PLAN commanders have continued to host

Figure 34—PLA Navy Commander Visits Abroad: 1982-2006

Date Country Commander Mar 1982 Thailand Ye Fei Nov 1983 Pakistan, Bangladesh Liu Huaqing Nov 1984 Britain, Yugoslavia, West Germany Liu Huaqing Nov 1985 , United States Liu Huaqing Dec 1989 Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan Zhang Lianzhong Oct 1991 North Korea Zhang Lianzhong Jun 1992 Turkey, Tunisia Zhang Lianzhong Apr 1993 Russia Zhang Lianzhong Jul 1995 Italy Zhang Lianzhong Jul 1996 Pakistan, Chile, Brazil, Argentina Zhang Lianzhong Nov 1997 Pakistan Shi Yunsheng Sep 1998 United States Shi Yunsheng Nov 1999 Russia Shi Yunsheng Apr 2000 United States, Britain, Portugal Shi Yunsheng Apr 2001 France Shi Yunsheng Mar 2002 Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Australia Shi Yunsheng 2003 -2006 None

112—China’s Navy 2007 Figure 35—PLA Navy Commander Visits Abroad by Region and Country: 1982-2006

Asia-Pacific North America South America Europe

Australia United States (3) Argentina (2) Britain (2) Tunisia Bangladesh (2) Brazil (2) France (2) North Korea Chile (2) Germany Pakistan (4) Italy Thailand (2) Portugal Russia (3) Turkey Yugoslavia several foreign naval counterparts each year, followed by South America and North America. but no PLAN commander has traveled abroad. A PLAN commander has only made one visit The last PLAN political commissar visit abroad to Africa and zero visits to the . The was in early 2003, when Vice Admiral Yang commander has visited only one Southeast Huaiqing visited Algeria and Mexico before he Asian country. and Shi Yunsheng were replaced as a result of the Ming submarine accident. Blending Diplomacy with Seamanship These visits are not concentrated in any one geographical region, but are split almost even- As shown in Figures 37, 38, and 39, (on the ly between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, following pages) China sent only 2 task groups abroad to 4 countries and hosted 23 port calls from 14 countries during the 1980s. During Figure 36—PLA Navy Commander Visits the 1990s, the PLAN dispatched 10 task groups Abroad by Region: 1982-2006 for port calls to 20 countries and hosted 30 port calls from 17 countries. Since January 2000, the PLAN has sent 13 task forces on 37 country visits and hosted about 25 foreign na- val ship visits. The PLAN has conducted all of its ship visits using 7 different destroyers, 7 frigates, 2 training ships, and 6 replenish- ment ships. As the program has progressed, the PLAN has used its port calls as an oppor- tunity to show off its newest ships as well as to train its crews in open-ocean operations.

A typical PLAN port call abroad lasts 2-4 days in each country. The task force commander is usually one of the three fleet commanders. The

China’s Navy 2007—113 Figure 37—PLA Navy Ship Visits Abroad: 1985-2006

Dates Countries Visited Ships Luda destroyer Hefei 132 and replenishment ship Fengcang Nov 1985 Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 615 Mar 1989 United States (Hawaii) Zhenghe Mar 1990 Thailand Zhenghe training ship Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Oct 1993 Zhenghe training ship Thailand Dajiang Sub Tender Changxingdao 121, Luda-II destroyer May 1994 Russia (Vladivostok) Zhuhai 166, and Jiangwei frigate Huainan 540 Aug 1995 Russia (Vladivostok) Jiangwei frigate Huaibei 541 Luda-II destroyer Zhuhai 166, Jiangwei frigate Huainan 540, Aug 1995 Indonesia and one replenishment ship Jul 1996 North Korea Luhu destroyer Harbin 112 and Luda destroyer Xining 108. Jul 1996 Russia (Vladivostok) Luhu destroyer Harbin 112 United States (Hawaii, San Diego); Luhu destroyer Harbin 112, Luda-II destroyer Zhuhai 166, Feb 1997 Mexico, Peru, Chile Replenishment ship Nancang 953 Feb 1997 Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines Luhu destroyer Qingdao 113, Jiangwei frigate Tongqing 542 New Zealand, Australia, Luhu destroyer Qingdao 113, Training Ship Shichang 82, Apr 1998 Philippines Replenishment ship Nancang 953 (PI - Qingdao only) Luhai destroyer Shenzhen 167, Replenishment ship Nancang Jul 2000 Malaysia, Tanzania, South Africa 953 United States (Hawaii, Seattle); Aug 2000 Luhu destroyer Qingdao 113, replenishment ship Taicang 575 Canada May 2001 India, Pakistan Luhu destroyer Harbin 112, replenishment ship Taicang 575 France, Italy, Germany, Britain, Luhai destroyer Shenzhen 167, replenishment ship Fengcang Aug 2001 Hong Kong 615 Sep 2001 Australia, New Zealand Jiangwei frigate Yichang 564, replenishment ship Taicang 575 Nov 2001 Jiangwei frigate Yulin 565 May 2002 South Korea Jiangwei frigate Jiaxing 521, Jiangwei frigate Lianyungang 522 Singapore, , Turkey, Ukraine, May 2002 Greece, Portugal, Brazil, Ecuador, Luhu destroyer Qingdao 113, replenishment ship Taicang 575 Peru Luhai destroyer Shenzhen 167, replenishment ship Qinghaihu Oct 2003 Brunei, Singapore, Guam 885 Nov 2003 New Zealand Jiangwei frigate Yichang 564, replenishment ship Taicang 575 May 2004 Hong Kong 8 vessels Luhai destroyer Shenzhen 167, replenishment ship Weishanhu Nov 2005 Pakistan, India, Thailand 887 Luhu destroyer Qingdao 113, replenishment ship Hongzehu Aug 2006 United States, Canada, Philippines 881

114—China’s Navy 2007 Figure 38—PLA Navy Ship Visits by Region and Country: 1985-2006

Asia-Pacific North America South America Europe Africa

Australia (2) Canada (2) Brazil Britain Egypt Bangladesh (2) Mexico Chile France Tanzania Brunei United States (4) Ecuador Italy South Africa Guam Peru (2) Germany Hong Kong (2) Greece India (3) Portugal Indonesia Turkey Malaysia (2) Ukraine New Zealand (3) North Korea Pakistan (4) Philippines (3) Russia (3)* Singapore (2) South Korea Sri Lanka Thailand (4) Vietnam

*Vladivostok

shortest voyage was to North Korea and the Figure 39—PLA Navy Ship Visits by longest voyage covered more than 30,000 nau- Region: 1985-2006 tical miles and four months to circumnavigate the globe in 2002. Some of the visits have been arranged so that the PLAN could participate in various anniversaries, such as Indonesia’s 50th anniversary, the 35th anniversary of the Sino-DPRK friendship treaty, the 30th anniver- sary of Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations, the 50th anniversary of Sino-Pakistan rela- tions, the 100th anniversary of the Philippine Navy, and Russia’s 50th anniversary of the end of World War II and 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy.

China’s Navy 2007—115 Foreign ships have visited Shanghai, Qingdao, country visits is still relatively low, there has Zhanjiang, and Guangzhou. Of these, been a significant increase in the quantity of Shanghai has received the most visitors. For PLAN ship visits abroad since 1997. The first example, as of August 2006, Shanghai had year China dispatched two task forces in a hosted more than 60,000 people in 912 del- single year was 1997. It was also the first time egations and 87 port calls by foreign vessels a PLAN vessel visited South America. Indeed, from 120 countries. this was the first time a PLAN vessel visited anywhere outside the Asia-Pacific region. The In 2003, the PLAN conducted its first joint growing quantity and scope of PLAN voyages maritime search-and-rescue exercises during beginning in 1997 illustrates the increased for- separate visits by vessels from Pakistan and eign-policy role China assigns to its naval fleet. India. Since then, it has conducted similar exercises with French, British, and Australian During those 1997 voyages, the PLAN as- vessels. The PLAN also conducted search-and- signed precedence to showing the Chinese rescue exercises during its ship visits to the flag abroad at the expense of Chinese military United States, Canada, and the Philippines readiness. The overriding goal was to illus- in late 2006. trate to the people of those countries, includ- ing overseas Chinese who visited the ships in For comparison purposes, the US Navy Seventh huge numbers during port calls, that China Fleet’s official website states, “Seventh Fleet and the PLAN were both open to the outside units conduct more than 100 exercises per world and no longer just a backward coastal year with nations throughout Asia. These exer- navy. Significantly, China simultaneously de- cises are an essential part of our overall engage- ployed its only two relatively capable, reason- ment program, and are imperative to building ably modern warships, the two new Luhu-class friendships and maintaining interoperability.” guided-missile destroyers, away from Chinese The PLAN identifies the following three broad waters. The readiness of these ships to partic- objectives for its ship visits: ipate in some potential crisis, such as in the Taiwan Strait, was effectively subordinated to • Improving political and military relations the value of sending these ships to North and between China and the PLAN host coun- South America and to three ASEAN countries. try at the state-to-state level • Learning lessons from foreign militaries Second, the government and the PLAN ex- that may prove useful in the PLAN’s mod- pended the effort and resources to plan and ernization efforts conduct these extensive cruises, accepting the • Improving relations between China and risk that its untested ships might break down the PLAN host country at the person-to- or that other embarrassing circumstances person level might be encountered.

State-to-State Diplomacy Finally, of the 60 country visits made by PLAN The primary objective of PLAN ship visits is ships since 1985, 77% of those visits have to improve political and military relations be- taken place since 1997. Prior to 1997, PLAN tween China and the PLAN host nation. While vessels had conducted 14 country visits in the total number of dispatched task forces and the Asia-Pacific region, including the United

116—China’s Navy 2007 States (Hawaii). Since January 1997, PLAN ves- tary officials of the host country and paid visits sels have conducted 46 country and territory to naval schools and facilities. The PLAN dele- visits, including 24 in the Asia-Pacific region, gation also opens their ships for visits by naval 6 in North America, 5 in South America, 8 in officials and the public. During the 1997 visit Europe and 3 in Africa. to the United States, Mexico, Peru, and Chile, more than 64,000 people visited the ships.

Modernization Lessons The Navy has also drawn the attention of local Chinese, such as during their visit to Seattle The next objective of PLAN ship visits is to in 2000 where hundreds of overseas Chinese provide the PLAN with an opportunity for ob- adults and students, as well as 100 children serving foreign and gathering examples from a local Chinese-language school, partic- that may prove useful in its own moderniza- ipated in the open house. PLAN sailors have tion efforts. During such visits, they attempt to engaged in soccer and basketball competition understand the profound differences between with the host country’s sailors. Meanwhile, the PLAN’s posture, doctrine, and attitudes as the host country usually provides some type contrasted with other navies, especially the of honor ceremony and provides local enter- USN, which it sees as a world standard. The tainment for the crew, such as when Malaysian PLAN takes every advantage to learn as much native tribes performed traditional singing and as possible from foreign ship visits to China. dance. During the training ship Zhenghe’s visit to Hawaii in 1989, the local Chinese-American In an unprecedented move, Beijing accepted community in Honolulu held several special an invitation from Washington to send PLAN events for and in honor of the crew. officers to observe RimPac 98, the major mul- tinational Pacific Ocean naval exercise. Similar previous invitations had been rejected, due Functional and Educational Exchanges to China’s general aversion to activities that might contribute towards the appearance or Functional and educational exchanges are reality of an Asia-Pacific regional security ar- conducted primarily to benefit naval modern- chitecture. Two Chinese representatives, the ization efforts, but they also meet some crite- commanding officer of a PLAN destroyer and ria for supporting China’s foreign policy. The an associate professor at the Naval Command PLAN’s relations with other navies provide Academy, were sent to observe. ideas for the badly needed PLAN reforms in ar- eas such as personnel management, training, logistics, and equipment maintenance. Person-to-Person Diplomacy The final goal of PLAN ship visits is to improve The PLAN has also adopted other concepts relations between China and the private citi- from foreign navies. Specifically, the PLAN is zens of PLAN host nations. During the port emulating programs for training students at- calls abroad, the PLAN has engaged in several tending civilian universities to become Navy activities. Like the other PLA and PLAAF officers officers. China will increasingly look to its who have traveled abroad, the task force lead- version of a Naval Reserve Officer Training ers have met with senior government and mili- program to supplement its naval academies

China’s Navy 2007—117 in supplying officers, especially officers with will most likely continue at the same pace for technical degrees who can function better in a the rest of this decade. Although China’s com- navy adopting advanced technologies. mander and ship visits abroad have received attention over the past few years, they are re- The PLAN has used various educational ex- markable primarily because they have occurred changes to support the broader goals of the within the context of Chinese naval moderniza- Chinese Communist Party and the PLA. This is tion. While both total numbers of commander reflected in its small-scale undertakings involv- and ship visits are small, they are noteworthy ing other countries with which the Chinese given the fact that the PLAN is an organization government has pursued closer ties. The PLAN in flux; it is currently seeking a new doctrine provided training for students from Cambodia and the capabilities to implement this as-yet and several African countries in PLAN facilities undefined doctrine. in Qingdao and Shanghai, but this apparently ended in the early 1980s. On the other hand, these exchanges are also noteworthy given the fact that they have in- The PLAN provided training for the Thai Navy creased at such a small pace and scale relative in the early 1990s in connection with Thailand’s to high-level Chinese military visits from the purchase from China State Shipbuilding PLA ground forces and Air Force. Corporation (CSSC) of four Jianghu frigates— two of which visited Shanghai in September Between now and 2010, the PLAN can be ex- 2002. Similar training has been provided to pected to average one annual voyage consist- the . The training for Thailand ing of two to three port calls abroad and to and Egypt was conducted by the PLAN but host five to ten foreign ships per year. There funded by CSSC. are no discernible PLAN preferences for which months to conduct port calls, but none have Between 1985 and 1993, the PLAN had only taken place during January or February. Foreign about 100 naval personnel take part in aca- ship port calls will take place equally through- demic exchanges and/or study abroad. By the out the year and will be an even mix between late-1990s, the PLAN had stopped, at least tem- Shanghai and Qingdao, with an occasional vis- porarily, sending officers abroad for training in it to Guangzhou. military schools. This is in contrast to the oth- er services that stepped up their student activi- The PLAN commander has not traveled abroad ties abroad. One possible reason is that former since 2002. Initially, the reason was due to the PLAN Commander Zhang Lianzhong’s nega- fallout from the Ming submarine accident in tive attitude toward foreign travel affected this early 2003 and commander Shi Yunsheng’s aspect of the PLAN’s foreign relations, but it subsequent replacement that summer. It is not may also be that the PLAN spends the majority clear why Zhang Dingfa did not travel dur- of its foreign relations budget on ship visits. ing 2004 and 2005, but may have to do with health reasons that led to his removal from office in August 2006. Looking to the Future Now that Wu Shengli has become the com- The PLAN has become fairly predictable in its mander, he and his successor will most likely foreign relations cycle since the mid-1990s and continue to take one trip overseas to one to

118—China’s Navy 2007 four countries and to host an average of three ther the year before or the year after hosting to six counterparts per year. PLAN political his counterpart. He will most likely travel dur- commissars have led only four delegations ing April, July, or November, and will probably abroad since 1990, so they are not expected to not travel between December and March. travel much over the next decade. Overall, the total number of PLAN flag officers who travel Most of the PLAN’s senior officer and ship vis- abroad is comparatively less than the Army or its with particular countries have taken place Air Force. This most likely reflects the Army’s along with increased exchanges among se- dominance of the program and that the PLAN nior political and military officials. These of- spends most of its foreign relations budget ficials include the president, premier, foreign hosting foreign ships and conducting its own minister, Central Military Commission vice- ship visits abroad. chairmen, defense minister, and chief of the general staff. There is no discernible pattern as There are certain predictors for PLAN com- to whether the PLAN visits take place before mander and ship visits abroad. One predictor or after any other official. This trend will most for ship visits abroad is upcoming anniversa- likely continue throughout the decade. ries, including five-year increments of diplo- matic ties with the PRC or major host-country There are political and economic limitations, naval anniversaries. In addition, the PLAN dis- however, to the number of exchanges China patched its two Luhu destroyers (Harbin and and the region can handle in the future. Most Qingdao), its first Luhai destroyer (Shenzhen), countries in Asia, including China, limit them- and all of its Jiangwei frigates on port calls selves to the total number of military exchang- 18-48 months after they were commissioned. es they can hold annually, and specific limits The question is whether the PLAN will follow are placed on the number and types of relations the same pattern and use its new Sovremenny they hold with individual countries. Besides destroyers for port visits at some point in political issues, there are limited funds for these the near future. exchanges. It is expensive, and getting more ex- pensive every year, to send delegations abroad Concerning visits by the PLAN commander, and to host foreign delegations in-country. In at least one trip to Pakistan and Thailand will addition, the rising cost of fuel will limit what most likely occur. Regionally, an equal number some navies can accomplish in the future. of trips to Asia and Europe will take place, with at least one to two visits including countries Finally, the PLAN has military attachés as- in South America. About one-half of the com- signed in only a couple of countries, including mander’s visits will be reciprocal exchanges ei- the United States and Britain.

China’s Navy 2007—119 120—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 16 Weapon Systems and Equipment

This chapter provides information on the PLA responsibilities to all organizations involved Navy’s weapon system and equipment devel- in the project. The three main tasks in the pro- opment procedures and a short overview of gram definition phase are as follows: the number of vessels in the inventory. • Conduct a theoretical evaluation of the development program Weapons and Equipment • Conduct testing that focuses on key tech- Development Procedures nologies and new parts • Conduct subsystem trial manufacturing PLAN Headquarters is responsible for oversee- and experimentation ing all naval weapon system and equipment development. The PLAN’s development cycle A Design Finalization Committee is responsi- for all of its weapon systems and equipment, ble for approving each milestone throughout regardless of how large or small, consists of the this phase of the project and then reporting following five phases: the findings to PLAN Headquarters.

• Theoretical evaluation (论证) During the engineering development phase, • Program definition (方案) which can take several years, the factory and • Engineering development (工程研制) associated research institutes are responsible for designing the weapon and producing and • Design finalization (设计定型) testing a prototype. • Production finalization (生产定型). The design finalization phase involves a com- The main responsibilities during the theoreti- prehensive review and inspection of the new cal evaluation phase are to begin examining weapon system or equipment throughout the the proposed technology to meet operational process, including systematic testing of each requirements, which includes the entire tech- component of the prototype or prototypes. nology program, development cost, conditions The PLAN Military Production Finalization to support the technology, and development Committee is responsible for reviewing and time frame forecast. The final step is to report approving each step of the process. the requirements for the new project to higher authorities for approval. During the production finalization phase, the new system is produced for delivery to the op- Once the theoretical evaluation phase is com- erational force. The PLAN also begins training pleted, the program definition phase begins. personnel to use, support, and maintain the In this phase, the comprehensive development new system or equipment. Once the new sys- project is implemented by assigning specific tem or equipment enters the operational force,

China’s Navy 2007—121 it can still take a lengthy period of time, pos- According to the US Department of Defense’s sibly years, before the system and its personnel Annual Report to Congress on The Military are considered combat capable. Power of the People’s Republic of China for 2006,

“The PLA Navy has 70 principal PLAN Vessel Inventory combatants (25 destroyers and 45 frigates), 55 submarines (50 diesel and 5 nuclear), The PLAN does not openly publish informa- some 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift tion on the types and numbers of weapon sys- ships (an increase of over 14% since 2005), tems and equipment in its inventory. and about 45 coastal missile patrol craft.”

122—China’s Navy 2007 Appendix A Chinese Terms

Pinyin Chinese English Ban 班 Squad Banzhang 班长 Squad leader Baowei bumen 保卫部门 Security departments Bei 北 North Beihai jiandui 北海舰队 North Sea Fleet (NSF) Biandui 编队 Task force; flight formation Boshi 博士 Doctorate degree Bu 部 Department Budui daihao 部队代号 Military unit cover designator (MUCD) Budui fanhao 部队番号 True unit designator Bumen 部门 Branch (on a vessel) Caolian 操练 Drills Caoyan 操演 Demonstration Chu 处 Division (administrative) Chuan 船 Ship Congnan congyan 从难从严 Implement strict discipline during training Squadron (vessel); group (aviation, training, Dadui 大队 and ground-based) Outline of Military Training and Evaluation Dagang 大纲 (OMTE) Dang daibiao dahui 党代表大会 Party Congress Dang jilü jiancha 当纪律检查委员会 Party Discipline Inspection Commission weiyuanhui Dangwei 党委 Party committee Dangwei changwei 党委常委 Party committee standing committee Dangxiaozu 党小组 Party small group Dangzhibu 党支部 Party branch Dangzongzhi 党总支 Party general branch Daodanting 导弹艇 Guided-missile boat Daqu fuzhi 大区副职 Military region deputy leader grade Daqu zhengzhi 大区正职 Military region leader grade Daxue 大学 University

China’s Navy 2007—123 Dazhuan 大专 Senior technical degree Dengluting 登陆艇 Landing craft Dong 东 East Donghai jiandui 东海舰队 East Sea Fleet (ESF) Dongyuan bu 动员部 Mobilization Department Duikang 对抗 Opposition force Fang’an 方案 Program definition; plans Fujun 副军 Jun deputy leader grade Fulian 副连 Company deputy leader grade Fushi 副师 Division deputy leader grade Futuan 副团 Regiment deputy leader grade Fuyuan 复员 Demobilized cadre Fuying 副营 Battalion deputy leader grade Ganbu 干部 Cadre (officer) Ganbu bu 干部部 Cadre Department Gangyao 纲要 Gangyao Gongcheng yanzhi 工程研制 Engineering development Gongqingtuan 共青团 Communist Youth League (CYL) Gu 股 Branch (administrative) Guofang 国防 National defense Guofangsheng 国防生 National Defense Scholarship Program Haihang 海航 Naval aviation Haijun 海军 Navy; PLA Navy Headquarters Haijun anfangbing 海军岸防兵 PLA Navy coastal defense forces Haijun hangkongbing 海军航空兵 Naval aviation Haijun luzhandui 海军陆战队 PLA Navy Marine Corps Haishang 海上 At sea; maritime Hetong 合同 Combined arms Reserve officer (National Defense Scholarship Houbei junguan 后备军官 students) Houqin 后勤 Logistics Houqin junguan 后勤军官 Logistics officer (career track) Hukou zhidu 户口制度 Residency system Huweiting 护卫艇 Escort boat Jian 舰 Ship Jianchuan 舰船 Generic term for boats, ships, and vessels Jianting 舰艇 Generic term for boats, ships, and vessels

124—China’s Navy 2007 Jianyan 检验 Inspection; evaluation Jiao 交 Transport (character on PLAN transport vessels) Jiaodao dui 教导队 Training unit Jiaodaoyuan 教导员 Political director Jiceng dangwei 基层党委 Grassroots Party committee Jiefangjun 解放军 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Jiefangjun Haijun 解放军海军 PLA Navy (PLAN) Jiji fangyu 积极防御 Active defense Jilü jiancha bu 纪律检查部 Discipline Inspection Department Jin’an fangyu 近岸防御 Coastal defense Jinhai fangyu 近海防御 Offshore defense Jishu 技术 Technical; technology Jishu junguan 技术军官 Technical officer (career track) Jiu 救 Salvage (character on PLAN transport vessels) Jishu xunlian 技术训练 Technical training Jun 军 Army; corps Jun 浚 Dredge (character on PLAN transport vessels) Jundui dangyuan dahui 军队党员大会 Congress of military Party members Junguan 军官 Officer Junshi 军事 Military Junshi fayuan 军事法院 Military court Junshi jiancha yuan 军事检察院 Military procuratorate Junshi junguan 军事军官 Military officer (career track) Junshi xunlian yu kaohe Outline of Military Training and Evaluation 军事训练与考核大纲 dagang (OMTE) Junshi xunlian zhidao 军事训练指导思想 Military training guidance concepts sixiang Junwei fuzhuxi 军委副主席 Vice chairman, Central Military Commission Junwei weiyuan 军委委员 Central Military Commission member Junwei zhuxi 军委主席 Chairman, Central Military Commission Junwu bu 军务部 Military Affairs Department Junxun he bingzhong bu 军训和兵种部 Military Training and Service Arms Department Kang 康 Hospital (character on PLAN transport vessels) Kaohe 考核 Evaluation; examination Ke 科 Office Keji xingxun 科技兴训 Apply science and technology during training Lian 连 Company

China’s Navy 2007—125 Lianhe 联合 Joint Liebing 列兵 Private 2nd class Lixiu ganbu 离休干部 Retired cadre (joined PLA prior to 1949) Lü 旅 Brigade Lunzheng 论证 Theoretical evaluation Minbing 民兵 Militia Mou 某 Certain (as in a certain unit) Nan 南 South Nanhai jiandui 南海舰队 South Sea Fleet (SSF) Pai 排 Platoon Qianting 潜艇 Submarine Qianting budui 潜艇部队 Submarine forces Renmin wuzhuang bu 人民武装部 People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD) Renmin wuzhuang jingcha 人民武装警察部队 People’s Armed Police (PAP) budui Shangdengbing 上等兵 Private 1st class Shengchan dingxing 生产定型 Production finalization Sheji dingxing 设计定型 Design finalization Shi 师 Division Shibing 士兵 Enlisted soldier Shibing shidan 实兵实弹 Live troops with live munitions Shiguan 士官 Noncommissioned officer (NCO) Shiji shiyong wuqi 实际使用武器 Live weapons Shixi 实习 Practical application Shiyan 示范 Demonstrate; demonstration Shiyan 试验 Trial; test; evaluation Water; water tanker (character on PLAN Shui 水 transport vessels) Shuibing 水兵 Enlisted sailor Shuijingqu 水警区 Naval garrison Shuimian jianting budui 水面舰艇部队 Surface forces Shuoshi 硕士 Master’s degree Tiejin shizhan 贴近实战 Closely adhere to actual combat situations Ting 艇 Boat Tuan 团 Regiment Tuchu duikang 突出对抗 Stress training against opposition forces Tuixiu ganbu 退休干部 Retired cadre (joined PLA after 1949)

126—China’s Navy 2007 Tuo 拖 Tug (character on PLAN transport vessels) Wuzhuang liliang 武装力量 Armed forces Xinbing 新兵 New soldier (conscript) Xinxihua 信息化 Informationalization; informatization Xiu 修 Repair (character on PLAN transport vessels) Xuebing 学兵 Student Xueshi 学士 Bachelor’s degree Xuexiao 学校 School Xueyuan 学院 Academy; college Xueyuan 学员 Cadet; student Xunlian 训练 Training Yanjiu 研究 Research Yanlian 演练 Training event Yanxi 演习 Exercise Ying 营 Battalion Yiwubing 义务兵 Conscript Oil; fuel; oiler (character on PLAN transport You 油 vessels) Yubei junguan 预备军官 Reserve officer Zhanbei 战备 Combat readiness; alert Zhandou 战斗 Battles Zhanfa 战法 Combat methods Zhanlue 战略 Strategy; strategic Zhanshi 战士 Enlisted soldier Zhanshu 战术 Tactics; tactical Zhanshu qun 战术群 Tactical group Zhanyi 战役 Campaign; operational Zhanyifa 战役法 Campaign methods Zhanzheng 战争 War Zhengjun 正军 Jun leader grade Zhenglian 正连 Company leader grade Zhengpai 正排 Platoon leader grade Zhengshi 正师 Division leader grade Zhengtuan 正团 Regiment leader grade Zhengwei 政委 Political commissar Zhengying 正营 Battalion leader grade Zhengzhi 政治 Political

China’s Navy 2007—127 Zhengzhi junguan 政治军官 Political officer (career track) Zhidaoyuan 指导员 Political instructor Zhidui 支队 Flotilla Zhihui 指挥 Command Zhihui junguan 指挥军官 Command officer (career track) Zhiyuanbing 志愿兵 Volunteer (former NCO program) Zhongdui 中队 Squadron (aviation) Zhongguo renmin 中国人民武装警察 People’s Armed Police (PAP) wuzhuang jingcha budui 部队 Zhongzhuan 中专 Secondary technical degree Zhuangbei 装备 Equipment Zhuangbei junguan 装备军官 Equipment officer (career track) Officer transferred to comparable civilian Zhuanye 转业 government job Zong canmou bu 总参谋部 General Staff Department (GSD) Zong houqin bu 总后勤部 General Logistics Department (GLD) Zong zhengzhi bu 总政治部 General Political Department (GPD) General Equipment Department (GED) or Zong zhuangbei bu 总装被部 General Armament Department (GAD) Zuzhi bu 组织部 Organization Department Zuozhan 作战 Combat; operations Zuozhan zhiyuanjian zhidui 作战支援舰支队 Combat support vessel zhidui Zuzhi xulie 组织序列 Protocol order

128—China’s Navy 2007 Appendix B Suggested Reading List

Cole, Bernard D. “China’s Maritime Strategy,” Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai. China’s in Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Army After Next. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford: Institute, August 2000. Stanford University Press, 1994.

Cole, Bernard D. “The Organization of the Muller, David G. China’s Emergence as a Maritime People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),” in Power. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, ed., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization. Shambaugh, David. Modernizing China’s Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002. Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects. University of California Press, 2002. Cole, Bernard D. “The People’s Liberation Army Navy After Half a Century: Lessons Learned in Shi Yunsheng, ed. China Navy Encyclopedia Beijing,” in The Lessons of History: The Chinese (Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu; 中国海军百 People’s Liberation Army at 75. Carlisle: Strategic 科全书). Beijing: Haichao Publishing House, Studies Institute, July 2003, pp. 157-192. December 1998.

Cole, Bernard D. The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Swanson, Bruce. The Eighth Voyage of the Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century. Annapolis: Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Seapower. Naval Institute Press, 2001. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Ge Dongsheng, ed., National Security Strategy Yao Jun, ed. A History of China’s Aviation (Guojia Anquan Zhanlue Lun; 国家安全战略论). (Zhongguo Hangkong Shi; 中国航空史). Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science Zhengzhou: Dajia Publishers, September 1998. Press, July 2006. You Ji. The Armed Forces of China. Australia: Huang, Alexander. “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Allen & Unwin, 1999. Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications.” Naval War College Review Zhang Xusan, ed. Navy Dictionary (Haijun 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994):16ff. Da Cidian; 海军大词典). Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, October 1993. Huang, Alexander. “The PLA Navy at War, 1949-1999: From Coastal Defense to Distant Zhang Yongyi, ed., Science of Naval Military Operations,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Training (Haijun Junshi Xunlian Xue; 海军军事 Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., 训练学). Beijing, China: Academy of Military Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since Science Press, April 2006. 1949. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. Zhou Keyu, ed. China Today: Navy, (Dangdai Kondapalli, Srikanth. China’s Naval Power. Zhongguo Haijun; 当代中国海军). Beijing: China New Delhi: The Institute for Defence Studies Social Sciences Publishing House, 1987. and Analyses, January 2001.

China’s Navy 2007—129 Notes:

130—China’s Navy 2007

Organizational Structure Leadership Political System Doctrine Submarine Forces Surface Forces Naval Aviation Coastal Defense Forces Marine Corps Manpow- er Unit Training Quality of Life Foreign Relations Organizational Structure Leadership Political System Doctrine Submarine Forces Surface Forces Naval Avia-

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