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China's Navy 2007 Organizational Structure Leadership Political System Doctrine Submarine Forces Surface Forces Naval Aviation Coastal Defense Forces Marine Corps Manpow- er Unit Training Quality of Life Foreign Relations Organizational Structure Leadership Political System Doctrine SubmarineChina’s Forces Surface Navy Forces Naval Avia- 2007 Office of Naval Intelligence China’s Navy 2007 Office of Naval Intelligence China’s Navy 2007—i ii—China’s Navy 2007 The PLA Navy is responsible for safeguarding China’s maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and interests. Preparation for the maritime battlefield has been intensified and improved while the integrated combat capabilities are being enhanced to conduct offshore campaigns. The capability of nuclear counter-attacks has also been enhanced. In accordance with the principle of smaller but more efficient troops, the PLA Navy has compressed the chain of command and reorganized the combat forces in a more scientific way while giving prominence to building maritime combat forces, especially amphibious combat forces. The PLA Navy has also sped up the process of updating its weaponry and equipment with priority given to the development of new combat ships as well as various kinds of special- purpose aircraft and relevant equipment. At the same time, the weaponry is increasingly informationalized and long-range precision strike capability raised. China’s 2004 Defense White Paper The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks. The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation weaponry and equipment. Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield capabilities, with emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new equipment and the development of combat support capabilities. The Navy is endeavoring to build mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support. Efforts are being made to improve and reform training programs and methods to intensify training in joint integrated maritime operations. China’s 2006 Defense White Paper China’s Navy 2007—iii iv—China’s Navy 2007 Contents Chapter 1 Chapter 11 Organizational Structure...1 Officer Corps...61 Chapter 2 Chapter 12 Leadership...11 Enlisted Force...73 Chapter 3 Chapter 13 Political System...17 Unit Training...87 Chapter 4 Chapter 14 Doctrine...23 Quality of Life...103 Chapter 5 Chapter 15 Submarine Forces...31 Foreign Relations...111 Chapter 6 Chapter 16 Surface Forces...39 Weapon Systems and Equipment...121 Chapter 7 Naval Aviation...45 Appendix A Chinese Terms...123 Chapter 8 Coastal Defense Forces...51 Appendix B Suggested Reading List...129 Chapter 9 Marine Corps...55 Chapter 10 Manpower...57 China’s Navy 2007—v vi—China’s Navy 2007 Preface Over the past decade, the Chinese Navy has embarked on a modernization program with the goal of being the preeminent regional power in East Asia. By acquiring some of the world’s most impressive naval technologies from abroad while simultaneously building advanced indigenous submarines, combatants, and naval aircraft, China is positioning itself to play a growing role in regional and trans-regional affairs. This enhanced naval power sought by Beijing is meant to answer global changes in the nature of warfare and domestic concerns about continued economic prosperity. Responding to global trends, this modernization program is meant to address what China terms “the generation gap in military technology” brought on by the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the RMA’s associ- ated application of information and technology to the means of warfare. As such, this moderniza- tion effort is driven by China’s strategic requirement to maintain the effectiveness of its military against a backdrop of global changes in military weaponry and doctrine. Domestically, this mod- ernization effort aims to ensure access to trade routes and economic resources throughout the region. This drive to build a military component to protect the means of economic development is one of the most prevalent historical reasons for building a blue water naval capability. China’s Navy is in a state of transition as it strives to fill these new goals and objectives. Just as China’s sailors are learning to operate this new equipment, China’s leaders are learning the means of employing a navy with modern capabilities to support national objectives. During this period of learning, many opportunities will be presented to China as well other parties in the region. In order to better understand the world’s fastest growing maritime power and its means of naval action and thereby foster a better understanding of China’s Navy, the Office of Naval Intelligence has prepared this study with the goal of educating and informing those who may be called upon to aid during this time of greater contact between the United States Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The first five chapters provide detailed background into the history, doctrine, leadership, struc- ture, and politics of the PLAN. The next five chapters provide information on the operating forces of the PLAN – submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, coastal defense forces, and marines. The following section deals with the people who make up the PLAN, with chapters on manpower, the officer corps, the enlisted force, training, and the quality of life of PLAN personnel. Finally, the last two chapters regarding the PLAN’s foreign relations and the development process for major weapon systems and equipment conclude the handbook. WILLIAM E. TARRY, Jr. Director, Naval Analysis Directorate Office of Naval Intelligence China’s Navy 2007—vii viii—China’s Navy 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations AAA Antiaircraft artillery MWR Morale, welfare, and recreation AAM Air-to-air missile NCO Noncommissioned officer ADM Admiral NDU National Defense University AFVAB Armed Forces Vocational nm Nautical miles Aptitude Battery NPC National People’s Congress AMS Academy of Military Science NRC Navy Equipment Proving ASCM Antiship cruise missile Research Center ASM Antiship missile NRI Naval Research Institute ASW Antisubmarine warfare NSF North Sea Fleet CAPT Captain OJT On-the-job training CCP Chinese Communist Party OMTE Outline of Military Training and CDR Commander Evaluation (Dagang) CMC Central Military Commission PAFD People’s Armed Forces CO Commanding officer Department COL Colonel PAP People’s Armed Police COSTIND Commission for Science PC Political commissar Technology and Industry for PLA People’s Liberation Army National Defense PLAAF PLA Air Force CPT Captain PLAN PLA Navy CPX Command post exercise PME Professional military education CSSC China State Shipbuilding Corp. PRC People’s Republic of China CYL Communist Youth League R&D Research and development EEZ Exclusive economic zone RADM Rear Admiral ELINT Electronic intelligence RMB Renminbi ENS Ensign ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps ESF East Sea Fleet SAM Surface-to-air missile FTX Field training exercise SCAPT Senior captain GAD General Armament Department SCOL Senior colonel GED General Equipment Department SLOC Sea lines of communication GLD General Logistics Department SSBN Ballistic missile submarine GPD General Political Department SSF South Sea Fleet GPS Global positioning system SSM Surface-to-surface missile GSD General Staff Department SSN Nuclear powered attack ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile submarine IFR Instrument flight rules TUD True unit designator IOC Initial Operational Capability UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle kg Kilograms US United States km Kilometers USD US dollar km/h Kilometers per hour USG US government kt Knots USN US Navy LCDR Lieutenant commander USSR Union of Soviet Socialist LT Lieutenant Republics LTC Lieutenant colonel VADM Vice Admiral LTJG Lieutenant junior grade VIP Very important person m Meters WPNS Western Pacific Naval MAJ Major Symposium MR Military Region XO Executive officer MRAF Military Region Air Force MUCD Military unit cover designator China’s Navy 2007—ix x—China’s Navy 2007 Chapter 1 Organizational Structure This chapter addresses the People’s Liberation Unit Designators Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) organizational structure, to include the use of unit designators, the PLA’s Every PLAN platoon and above unit has a true 部队番号 and PLAN’s grade and rank structure, and the unit designator or TUD ( ), such as the 62nd Submarine Zhidui or the Qingdao Support leadership, administrative, and operational or- Base. However, the PLAN rarely provides these ganizational structure. designators to the public in speeches or news- paper articles, on letterhead, or on Internet sites. Instead, the PLAN identifies them as a Brief History “certain” (某) unit, such as a “certain North Sea Fleet submarine zhidui.” In some cases, the The PLAN considers its founding day as 23 PLAN identifies regiment level and above units April 1949, when the East China Military with what it calls a “unit designator code” Region Navy was created. In January 1950, (部队代号). Outside China, this
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