Despair Or Hope: Rural Livelihoods and Opium Poppy Dynamics in Afghanistan

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Despair Or Hope: Rural Livelihoods and Opium Poppy Dynamics in Afghanistan Despair or Hope: Rural Livelihoods and Opium Poppy Dynamics in Afghanistan Paul Fishstein August 2014 European Union Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Synthesis Paper Despair or Hope: Rural Livelihoods and Opium Poppy Dynamics in Afghanistan Paul Fishstein August 2014 This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of AREU and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union. 2014 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Editing: Ann Buxbaum Cover photo: Clockwise from top left: Vegetable fields, Chimtal District, Balkh Province, May 2013; opium poppy field, Jurm District, Badakhshan Province, May 2013; land prepared for cultivation, north of the Boghra Canal, Helmand Province, April 2012; widespread opium poppy cultivation in the Pirakhel Valley, Khogiani District, Nangarhar Province, April 2013. All photos by OSDR. Layout: Ahmad Sear Alamyar AREU Publication Code: 1421E © 2014 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of AREU. Some rights are reserved. This publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted only for non- commercial purposes and with written credit to AREU and the author. Where this publication is reproduced, stored or transmitted electronically, a link to AREU’s website (www.areu.org.af) should be provided. Any use of this publication falling outside of these permissions requires prior written permission of the publisher, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Permission can be sought by emailing [email protected] or by calling +93 (0) 799 608 548. ii AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2014 About the Author Paul Fishstein (MS, Agricultural and Resource Economics) is a former director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Since 1977, he has worked in the implementation of development and humanitarian programmes and in research in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is currently an independent consultant. About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research institute based in Kabul. AREU’s mission is to inform and influence policy and practice by conducting high-quality, policy-relevant research and actively disseminating the results, and by promoting a culture of research and learning. To achieve its mission AREU engages with policymakers, civil society, researchers and students to promote their use of AREU’s research and its library, to strengthen their research capacity, and to create opportunities for analysis, reflection and debate. AREU was established in 2002 by the assistance community in Afghanistan and has a Board of Directors comprised of representatives of donor organizations, the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, and non-governmental organizations. AREU currently receives core funds from the Embassy of Finland, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Specific projects in 2014 are currently being funded by the European Union (EU), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the University of Central Asia (UCA), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and the Embassy of Finland. Despair or Hope: Rural Livelihoods and Opium Poppy Dynamics in Afghanistan iii 2014 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank Sayed Mohammad Azam, William Byrd, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy and David Mansfield for their insightful reviews of a draft version of this paper. He extends special thanks and appreciation to David Mansfield, whose past and current work makes up such a significant part of the evidence base and analysis. He wishes also to thank the field and office staff at the Organisation for Sustainable Development and Research who conducted most of the fieldwork and provided valuable analysis and insights, Alcis Ltd., for production of the maps and Mudasir Nazar at World Food Programme/Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping for providing updated wage data. Finally, appreciation goes to Ann Buxbaum for her patience, interest and skilled editing. Paul Fishstein August 2014 iv AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2014 Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................1 1. Introduction .............................................................................................5 1.1 Background ......................................................................... 5 1.2 AREU research on the opium economy and rural livelihoods ............... 6 2. Methodology and caveats ............................................................................7 2.1 Methodology ........................................................................ 7 2.2 Caveats .............................................................................. 8 3. Opium poppy in Afghanistan ........................................................................ 10 3.1 History of cultivation and production in Afghanistan ........................10 3.2 Counternarcotics in Afghanistan since 2001 ...................................11 4. Main themes/findings: dynamics of opium poppy cultivation and rural livelihoods ....... 14 4.1 Not all geographical areas are equal: the need to differentiate areas and households ...................................................................................15 4.1.1 Geographical areas within one province .........................15 4.1.2 Households ............................................................19 4.2 The larger economic, political and governance context ...................21 4.2.1 Economic realities ...................................................21 4.2.2 Local multipliers: the effect of opium poppy ...................24 4.2.3 The political and governance context ...........................26 4.3 Where transition happens ........................................................33 4.3.1 The right economic conditions .....................................33 4.3.2 Non-farm and off-farm income .....................................37 4.3.3 The wrong conditions ................................................38 4.4 Coercive approaches .............................................................40 4.4.1 Short-term reductions through coercive approaches are possible with a strong and motivated leader and overwhelming force ...........40 4.4.2 Coercive approaches are susceptible to erosion and collapse 42 4.4.3 Coercive approaches have unintended consequences at the household and higher levels ...................................................44 5. Summary, policy implications and recommendations .......................................... 54 5.1 Summary ............................................................................54 5.1.1 Transition to licit cultivation is possible .........................54 5.1.2 Understanding the context .........................................55 5.1.3 The role and effects of coercive approaches ....................56 5.1.4 Policies and programmes ............................................57 5.2 Policy implications and recommendations .....................................58 Bibliography .................................................................................................. 61 Despair or Hope: Rural Livelihoods and Opium Poppy Dynamics in Afghanistan v 2014 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Tables Table 1: Summary characteristics of zones in Central Helmand ...................................... 16 Table 2: Gross returns to alternate cropping patterns, Nangarhar and Badakhshan .............. 23 Table 3: Hypothetical cash equivalent returns to sowing all land to wheat ....................... 39 Table 4: Returns to opium poppy per jerib in Helmand dasht under different yield and land tenure assumptions, US dollars .................................................................................... 47 Boxes Box 1: A thumbnail history of cultivation in the four provinces ...................................... 11 Box 2: Major developments and initiatives in counternarcotics ...................................... 13 Box 3: The roles of females ............................................................................... 21 Box 4: The Afghan Local Police and counternarcotics .................................................. 28 Box 5: Nangarhar land dispute ............................................................................. 30 Box 6: Managing eradication in Badakhshan ............................................................. 32 Box 7: Getting it right on prices ........................................................................... 36 Box 8: Development assistance in Helmand: priming the pump or stealing it? .................... 52 Figures Figure 1: Opium poppy cultivation, national level,1995-2013 (hectares) ........................... 10 Figure 2: Expansion of cultivated area north of Boghra Canal, Helmand, 1999-2010 ............. 18 Figure 3: Post-eradication fields in Jurm District, Badakhshan, 2013 ............................... 32 Figure 4: Wages for unskilled daily
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