THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 74 16-31 May 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-7 In the CENTRAL RE- Kumri while night raids and effectively to repel attacks 8-15 Northern Region GION, a lone BBIED man- ‘reintegration's’ occur else- in Mano Gai. In NAN- Western Region 16-18 aged to penetrate a military where. In JAWZJAN, GAHAR, NGO staff are hospital in KABUL, killing 6, AOG target cell phone arrested by IMF and threat- Eastern Region 19-24 despite a generally improved towers and establish vehicle ened by AOG while a sub- Southern Region 25-28 level of ANSF capacity. In check posts on the Shiber- stantial SVBIED kills 15 in WARDAK, the migration of gan-Sar-i-Pul road. In SAR- an attack on the Regional 29 ANSO Info Page Kuchis caused tension in I-PUL itself, AOGs target Training Centre. In NURI- Daymirdad while in Nirkh ANP and militias in Sayyad. STAN, a major AOG forc- IEA and HIG came to In the WESTERN RE- es captures Do Ab district. YOU NEED TO KNOW blows. In LOGAR, local GION, on May 30th a Up to 150 persons– includ- AOGs stole equipment from combination of suicide ing ANSF and civilians– • General Daoud killed in deminers while in PARWAN are killed in IMF airstrikes explosion in Takhar bombers, IEDs and infan- ANSF operations in the try engaged the PRT in HE- to recapture it. ANSF Ops • Herat PRT comes under Ghorband valley succeeded RAT city for more than six in Waygal are ineffective at sustained attack in temporarily clearing hours in what was likely an restoring it to GOA con- AOGs out. trol. In KHOST up to 4 • Mass civilian casualties in attempt to discredit the In the NORTHERN RE- transition process. In AOGs target ANP QRF in IMF airstrike in Do Ab, a 5 hr battle. In PAKTYA, Nuristan GION, an explosive device GHOR, NGO staff were detonated at high level gov- intimidated. on two sepa- there is a mass murder of • Ghazni, Khost and Paktya ernment meeting in rate occasions, by AOGs 36 local construction work- deteriorate severely TAKHAR on the 28th, kill- on the roads in, and in to, ers in Wuzu Zadran while in Gardez district 30 NGO ing the Northern Region Po- Chaghcharan while in Pasa- lice Commander General band armed local hooligans deminers are abducted and ANSO is supported by Daoud and five others. The assault NGO clinic staff . released unharmed. death of General Daoud may AOGs in Pasaband and In the SOUTHERN RE- forebode political turmoil in Taiwara continue a low lev- GION, with the exception the region and beyond. Else- el campaign of ambush and of NIMROZ, all provinces where the killing of women IED against ANSF. In continue to experience a in an IMF night raid sparked FARAH and BADGHIS high volume and velocity violent demonstrations in civilians continue to be of incidents. Notable Taloqan city. In FARYAB, killed by IEDs. events include, in PAK- intense IMF-ANSF/ AOG In the EASTERN RE- TYA, the assassination, by clashes in Almar are resulting GION, a BBIED targets an silenced pistol, of the dis- in internal displacement. In irregular force commander trict NDS chief and the Chahar Dara, KUNDUZ, an in Alishing, LAGHMAN. break up of a suicide cell in IMF soldier is killed by an In KUNAR an NGO clinic Yaha Khiel district and in IED while AOGs target mili- sustains collateral damage in HELMAND the attempted tias in Gorteppa, killing a highly unusual SVBIED assassination of the Provin- three. In BAGHLAN an strike on the IMF while cial Governor. IED targets ANP in Pul-i- ANSF and IMF collaborate THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 Although AOGs conducted 40 several significant strikes in other regional centers recently, 30 Kabul this period—including a Herat City and Kandahar City 20 BBIED in Wazir Akbar Khan, in particular. A single BBIED 10 an RCIED against an ANP has proven both effective and 0 contractor in Musaye, a strike economical in Kabul, with the on the Surobi section of the full devastating potential of the highway to Jalalabad, and a less TTP appearing this cycle in KABUL AOG KABUL Crime significant night-time rocket Takhar. It is highly likely that nificant point of contention. NGOs should attack against Kabul Airport— AOG networks in Kabul City monitor eventual changes in AOG TTPs, the momentum remained with will continue to explore this noting IED deployment in particular. the ANSF. As in the previous tactical method in the future. cycle, ANSF-IMF authored The trends for 2011 comprise Observing the developments in other re- 80% of the security incidents in one suicide attack in Kabul gional centers, Kabul Province and the the province. City every three weeks. capital city constitute only a secondary area of interest for AOGs, with local considera- Around mid-day on the 21st of An additional number of recent May, a single BBIED attacker incidents require further assess- tions (such as the cost/benefit ratio) out- wearing an ANA uniform en- ment, in particular the two sep- weighed by AOG strategic and tactical fo- tered the Daud Khan Military arate cases of IED discoveries cus on other regions. AOG-instigated vio- Hospital (a MoD facility), in the Daud Khan Military lence also remains just one amongst many walked into the canteen where Hospital (days after the NGO risk factors in Central, the others the medical staff were having BBIED strike at the location), including the clashing ‘business’ interests lunch, and detonated his and inside the drug store in the of powerful warlords (Paghman, Deh charge. The blast left 6 fatalities Baba Shah Mina Hospital (a Sabz), the scope for public gatherings to and dozens injured. NDS fol- civilian GOA-operated facility turn violent (when grievances and frustra- lowed swiftly with a series of in PD 12). In the rural districts, tions of different kinds meet with the nec- arrests in Shakardara (all inside Surobi (Sari Tapa, Liwan), essary level of organization) and urban one qawm, or extended family). Shakardara (Boyazar), Pa- criminality due to the mere size of the pop- The strike, sanctioned by the ghman (Daraye Pashai), Deh ulation amassed in the capital. In addition, IEA, was executed with preci- Sabz (Tarakhel) and Bagrami political developments such as the killing sion along recently emerged (Alu Khel, Dashti Botak) wit- of general Daud in Takhar, the ‘northern’ TTPs elsewhere in the country: nessed a number of IMF- stream of legal opposition to the current the exploitation of soft-targets ANSF operations. Of note to establishment (centred around Panjshiri among the ANSF-IMF security NGOs, several sizeable discov- opposition figures), as well as the top-level personnel, the use of an ANA eries of stockpiled IED materi- negotiations among GOA representatives uniform (or even of a sleeping el and mines and arrests of and Kuchi & Hazara leaders in the after- agent), and the deployment of IED operatives have been per- math of Kuchi migration to Wardak were a solo suicide attacker. The use formed by ANSF and IMF in all factors debated by NGO security man- of a single operative stands out Surobi. The coming weeks may agers, although the impacts of any such in comparison with the simul- see the Surobi section of the developments on the NGO security para- taneous attacks recorded in Highway become a more sig- digm are yet to be seen. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 2 LOGAR This Report Period 1 50 In the early morning of the 28th of 40 orded during the previous report- May, five armed AOG members 30 ing period. Major IMF-ANSF entered a local NGO demining 20 site in Dehi Manaka (Zarghun operations continued in the popu- 10 Shahr Area), where sixty deminers lation centers of Baraki Barak, were getting ready for the morn- Puli Alam and Charkh. A night 0 ing shift. The gunmen confiscated raid in the Sheikhan Area of 16 VHF handsets, leaving the site Charkh sparked several demon- LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime shortly afterwards. Several IMF- strations (reaching up to the Charkh DAC), and resulted in a ANSF operations have targeted the school establishment. A correlation exists the area recently and reinforced series of additional arrests by security forces. AOG concentrated between this attack and the presence of a par- checkpoints have been imple- ticular AOG with a local agenda, responsible mented on the main access alleys. on sporadic close-range strikes against security forces in Baraki for the bombing of the girls’ school in the The robbery came weeks after the same area in October 2010. Besides these two AOG destruction of a telecom- Barak and Puli Alam, while docu- mented IED deployment dropped attacks, targeting of school establishments in munication mast in the area, and Logar has become rare since 2008, as opposed shortly followed a series of ANSF from 5 cases in the previous period (all neutralized) to 2 incidences to thirty cases recorded between 2006 and -IMF searches targeting IED cells. 2008. Also of note this cycle, Porak, the adja- rd (the mentioned RCIED blast in In the evening of the 23 of May, cent Niyazi, and Qalai Juma regularly wit- an effective RCIED strike left 1 Zarghun Shah, and an additional IED discovery on the district road nessed AOG elements moving with ease on IMF killed and 3 IMF injured on the highway in the late afternoon hours. the main road in Zarghun Shahr. in Ali Khel, Baraki Barak). More Unlike in the East (Paktya, Khost, significant than attacks against Further in contrast with rather low incident Nangarhar), where some of the security forces were the cases of volumes, AOG fighters continued to infiltrate recent incidents involving targeted killings and other form of the province. Literally all the districts contain demining organizations could intimidation, readily performed by mature AOG structures. The recent election of have stemmed from deliberate mobile AOG squads right in the a ‘HIG shadow provincial governor’ may rep- AOG efforts to expel the agencies population centers, as well as resent an additional development of signifi- from AOG areas of interest (for along major roads. In the most cance, and eventually cause a concern for the instance as a part of preparation prominent case, the head master IEA (or at least for the current IEA TPSG, for an intensive IED deployment), of Porak Boys’ School was who had spent several years in HIG captivity the Zarghun Shahr case seems gunned down on the highway in in the past). Yet, as pointed out in previous solely motivated by the seizure of Porak on the 23rd of May (during reports, Logar-based AOGs including IEA and the lucrative VHFs. The authors the attack, his young son, seated HIG are usually able to strike pragmatic alli- did not seem to have an issue with on the motorbike behind his fa- ances of convenience when facing concerted the NGO programming in the ther, also sustained injuries). Alt- action from the security forces; the implica- area. hough the motives remain un- tions of such ‘political’ truces need to be as- clear, local accounts reported that sessed over a longer period of time. Overall, the incident volume the head master had ignored sev- stayed on par with the levels rec- eral AOG grievances related to

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 25th of May 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 In Kapisa, down-ward trends 30 and low incident volumes were security gains on the side of the noticed this period. AOGs IMF-ANSF, or whether the 20 staged three mostly ineffective current calm is rather a result 10 attacks against IMF-ANSF of an AOG ‘waiting out’ strate- 0 premises in Tagab (a close- gy. The presence of foreign range SAF assault and a failed fighters was highlighted in Ta- rocket attack against ANP tar Khel (Tagab) when an KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime checkpoints in Malaya and Ta- AOG unit attempted to target tar Khel, and an IDF against an ANP post with a rocket. Sanjan (Kohistan I), not far away from the the IMF outpost in Jalokhel), During manipulation, the main site of the IED strike recorded last period combined with two RCIEDs operator accidentally dropped (Tape Malik). The area is located just targeting security convoys in the projectile, which then deto- across the district border from Dizd Dara Afghaniya along the main ac- nated, killing himself and injur- (Koh Band), where a civilian motorcyclist cess road to Tagab (which was ing his two colleagues. Local died in an IED blast in January. So far this also the target of several ANA- ANP established that the killed year, the deployment of 8 road-side devices ANP-NDS operations). Simi- fighter was ‘a Chechen’ (a term (including 3 detonations) has been attribut- larly to the situation in Logar, often generically used for fight- ed to the local unsophisticated AOG. At the low number of incidents is ers from the post-Soviet coun- this stage, the activity does not constitute a in disparity with heavy AOG tries), while his wounded ac- substantial risk factor for NGO move- presence along the main dis- complices were local. ments in the area, although caution and trict roads and in population In the West, the string of make local awareness is advisable. In particular, centers. It is yet to be deter- -shift IEDs continued with the movements in vehicles which from a dis- mined to what extent the cur- discovery of another device on tance may resemble security convoys rent status quo reflects tangible the link road to Koh Band in should be avoided. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 A steady growth in incident vol- 80 umes characterized this cycle in point, several risk factors still re- 60 main in play - in particular the Wardak. The province hosted eve- 40 ry second AOG attack staged in presence of mobilized armed net- 20 Central Region. The yield of over works (offering also a more thirty AOG-authored escalations ‘politicized’ version of the issue) 0 also represents a 30% annual in- and the nomads’ outreach deep into the Helmand Valley in crease when compared to the WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime same period in 2010. Behsud, reminiscent of the situation preceding the violent clashes The perennial issue of Kuchi mi- in 2009. The next days will tell as contracted convoys (as demonstrated for in- grations has resurfaced in the to the scope for open conflict to stance by 6 IED blasts on the highway this north-west of the province erupt between the communities. cycle). The frequency of fighting on the road (Daymirdad, Behsud I & II, combined with steady traffic flows brings Another recurrent vector in Jalrez), threatening to destabilize about the certitude of collateral civilian casual- Wardak, the IEA units in Nirkh the current precarious balance ties. This cycle, one civilian was killed and an once again engaged local HIG between the nomads and the sed- additional two were wounded on separate oc- entary communities. The first re- networks, and failed again in casions, all of the victims impacted by SAF in evicting the rival party from the ports came from Daymirdad, with the proximity of convoys under attack. How- province. During a clash in Sad the Kuchis making their way ever, civilians associated with IMF-contractors Murda (28 May), the IEA lost its through the district towards the do constitute an explicit target, legitimized ear- Helmand Valley in Behsud and leading military commander, him- lier this year in the IEA announcement of the self the main champion of IEA clashing with ANP on two occa- Operation Badar. Noor and Salar Areas wit- aggressive stance towards HIG in sions. In anticipation of violence, nessed abductions of local drivers associated the district. Whereas such a set- a substantial part of Daymirdad’s with the supply convoys. In the former case, Hazara population vacated the back may prompt the IEA leader- two individuals were taken from their houses; ship to deploy more resources areas along the access corridors, in the latter, the driver was abducted when his into Nirkh in the short term, it is with a smaller group of residents truck was blocked and burned on the highway. rather expected that the IEA will retreating towards the DAC, and The abductions occasionally end up with the others leaving the district. At a dedicate its capabilities to the pur- payment of a large ransom from the victim’s suance of the main cause. later stage, an approximate 200 family, but direct execution of the abductee is nomad families set up camps in Otherwise, the Saydabad section a more typical outcome, serving the AOG in- Tehzak and Kajao, and an addi- of the Kabul – Ghazni Highway timidation campaign. Such was the fate of an- tional stream reached the site thru attracted a major portion of AOG other driver, whose body was recovered by Jalrez. Despite the altercations in activity, with a combined 21 close- ANP in the Puli Sukhta Area (Nirkh) this cy- Kajao, Dashte Qutub Khel and in range attacks & IED blasts rec- cle. To make the picture complete, reports this the eastern parts of Daymirdad, orded so far this period (as op- cycle also reiterated frequent AOG check- the on-going negotiations leave posed to only 5 such attacks dur- points on the highway, usually set up in the the scopes for peaceful resolution ing the equivalent cycle last year). late afternoon hours in Salar, Shash Gaw and open (similar to the agreements AOGs remain committed to at- Sheikhabad. reached last year). In counter- tacks against security and IMF- THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN 50 This Report Period 0 In the absence of criminality 40 for the second consecutive cy- cept, with the core of relevant 30 cle, external factors have domi- IEA effectives constituted of 20 nated the security paradigm in Baghlan-based fighters. In this 10 Bamyan, in particular the link- regards, the Tala wa Barfak – 0 ages to Baghlan-based AOGs Kahmard road represents the main vector of insecurity, alt- and the access via Parwan and BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime Wardak. hough security incidents along this route remain rare. On the night of May 22nd, two Occasional IED activity in the recorded three casualties resulting from the senior IEA commanders were RCIED strike in Ghorband on the 15th of killed by IMF-ANSF in Daka Ghorband Valley (Parwan) and kinetic attacks along the road in May. In counterpoint, Jalrez AOG struc- (between Puli Khumri and Du- tures comprise a much better developed shi) in Baghlan. It has been put Jalrez (Wardak) remain issues of concern for NGOs in network (whereas the district also hosts a forward after the operation plethora of local criminal networks, bring- that one of the commanders Bamyan in terms of collateral exposure (AOGs in both prov- ing an unpredictable element onto the was a member of the IEA mili- NGO security map). The Parwan Route is tary leadership in Bamyan. inces concentrate on targeting security forces, including the currently assessed as less risky for NGO Bamyan IEA structures are ac- travels than the Wardak alternative. tually rather a theoretical con- PSCs). Bamyan ANP indeed THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN This Report Period 50 AOG attacks in the Ghorband 40 warned by the AOG to refrain Valley have doubled since the 30 announcement of Operation from his frequent meetings with GOA authorities in the 20 Badar. This cycle, Ghorband 10 witnessed a number of IMF- DAC and in the provincial cap- ANP operations, with the IEA ital. 0 campaign running apace. Irreg- The second operation targeted

ular IED activity on the main the wider Quli Hir Area, and PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime road to Bamyan remains a ma- included an IMF element se- jor concern for NGOs, though conded to the ANP. On the hunting rifle to kill a local malek (who was th the deployments usually fall 28 of May, a convoy of five also a former commander and a member outside of the 0900 hrs – 1500 IMF and four ANP vehicles of Ittihade Islami). hrs and target the security forc- came under SAF and RPG at- A combined 5 IDF attacks targeted police es. Yet, the majority of AOG- tack during transit in Dara Kaf- and military facilities in Bagram, Chahari- authored incidents (5 out of 9) shan. The results of the opera- kar and Jabalussaraj. The Bagram Airfield were IDF attacks against secu- tion are yet to be corroborated, base witnessed an accurate strike, with a rity facilities in Chaharikar, Jab- though local sources confirmed single 107mm rocket causing numerous alussaraj and Bagram. that the core AOG force with- casualties among the personnel. Besides In Ghorband, two police oper- drew from the area as did the IMF-ANP force at a later stage. the IDF, increased IED activity is expected ations swept across the DACs throughout the summer months on the and northern side valleys of Such one-time police efforts remained futile in the past, as roads in the vicinity of the Base. In Chaha- Siyagerd and Shinwari. The rikar and Jabalussaraj, the Korean PRT first initiative was carried out the initiatives failed to leave any permanent police presence base is the usual recipient of IDF and RPG solely by ANP (13-16 May), attacks. This period two RPGs also im- largely in response to the ab- behind. On a positive note, local AOGs have so far re- pacted in the vicinity of the ANP check- duction and a killing of a Ja- point in the bazaar of Jabalussaraj, reminis- miati commander in Wazhgar. frained from interfering with NGOs, a behaviour largely decent of similar attacks in the past. Local The operation yielded only observers often point out criminal motiva- four arrests (in Wazhgar, Duzd termined by the acceptance levels of NGO programming tions behind such attacks, namely on-going Dara and Saydan). When the power struggles among local commanders. ANP retreated, an AOG ab- inside the communities. The opposite is true for the infra- In another show-case of local power- ducted a local elder, probably struggles, a local Jamiati commander was in retribution for the commu- structural projects implement- ed by private contractors, espe- gunned down in an execution style killing nity allowing the police force to in Guzare Payeen of Jabalussaraj. investigate the area (as in sever- cially when these are dominat- Lastly, the IMF and NDS reported a num- al other parts of Ghorband, ed by local commanders turned ber of AOG arrests, including a night raid ANP usually seek the clearance entrepreneurs. Other conflicts against an AOG cell in Chaharikar City, of village elders prior to enter- pertain to the usual disputes which yielded the seizure of two suicide ing the communities). Follow- over access to land and water. vests and the arrests of three AOG mem- ing an intervention of the local During this cycle, an unknown bers. shura, the elder was released attacker broke inside a private unharmed ten days later, re- residence further up the road in vealing that he had been Sheikh Ali District, and used a THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 Although security incident reporting has remained con- to these included an attack on a 30 sistent (and relatively high) in pro-government militia posi- 20 Kunduz Province over the last tion in Ghortepa area (May 28) 10 2 months, this trend is likely to —which resulted in the deaths 0 change in June, as widely circu- of 3 militia-men and injuries to lated reports have surfaced that 11 others—and the detonation KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime a new military operation of an IED on the vehicle of a (Operation “Omaid”) is being former Jihadi commander on In regards to the upcoming military opera- th launched with the mandate to the 18 in Khawaja Ghaltan tions: While it is impossible to accurately clear Kunduz Province of any area. predict the scope of military actions that AOG presence. This reporting Outside of Kunduz District, Operation Omaid will entail, it is difficult period, Kunduz was again the the province maintained the to predict an end result different than what most volatile province in the usual high rate of insecurity in has occurred frequently with operations of region, with 30 security inci- common hot sports, with 7 this ilk. Established trends would point to dents. Following a series of security incidents recorded in this operation causing a notable short term high profile BBIED attacks Khanabad—including an illegal lull in insecurity inside the target areas, as that took place in the first checkpoint by ACGs in Nikpai AOGs hunker down to avoid direct con- quarter of 2011, Kunduz secu- Area on the 18th—and 5 in frontations, potentially creating a small rity has remained steady, show- Chahar Dara—including multi- window of perceived security. It would ing no significant escalation or ple IEDs detonation on IMF further seem likely that this window would deterioration over the last 3 vehicles in Zadran Village on diminish as Operation Omaid draws to a reporting periods. the 25th, 1 of which resulted in close, and eventually give way to a short Breaking down security report- the death of an IMF soldier spike in attacks as AOGs seek to re- ing further, Kunduz District and injuries to 2 others. In to- establish their ability to conduct opera- saw the most security incidents tal, Kunduz, Khanabad, and tions. However, this represents established in the Province, with the ma- Chahara Dara accounted for 23 regional trends, and further assessment is jority (8 of 11) consisting of of the 30 recorded security in- required to determine whether this opera- military operations and/or cidents. tion follows the same patterns. IED discoveries. Exceptions THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents BALKH BALKH Year to Date 4 50

This Report Period 0 40 Although there were 17 security incidents in Balkh Province, Bolak displayed increasingly 30 it was the death of General maturing AOG networks. Alt- 20 Daoud in Taloqan (see Takhar) hough it is widely assumed that 10 —the commander of all north- these are already acting at their 0 ern police forces—that left the full capacity, the eradication of greatest impression. General poppies from a few villages BALKH AOG BALKH Crime th Daoud—based out of Mazar-e across Chimtal on the 17 May Sharif—was considered by may have prompted an addi- ed insecurity—much of it AOG related— many the pre-eminent Jamiat tional series of attacks. Anec- with 4 incidents this period, including an leader in the North, and was dotal reports from the area AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint along known for his strong drive to suggest that AOGs had asked the main Sholgara-Mazar road. Sholgara combat AOGs rather than as a or ordered villagers to grow has seen an increase in activity this year, politician. The tangible effect these crops in order to finance with 18 security incidents recorded thus far that his death may have on the their operations, and that in (nearly twice as many as the 10 it witnessed security paradigm is debata- return, the AOGs bought the between January and June in 2010). ble—and will take time to ass- crops and promised to protect The deterioration of security in Sholgara es, as the north waits to see them. 5 incidents occurred in and eastern Jawzjan may be linked to the who surfaces as his replace- the district concomitantly to maturing of AOGs in Chimtal and Chahar ment (and from what political the eradication efforts, includ- Bolak, who seem to be increasing their in- party). Predictions about the ing an IED detonation on an fluence across various districts in Balkh th lasting consequences of his ANP vehicle on the 18 in and further. A new set of military opera- death range from outbreaks of Chimtal village, 2 incidents on tions has been planned to quell this, how- th political violence (as they the 20 in Arab Mazari village ever, it is questionable what sustained ef- scramble to assign blame and (an AOG ambushing the ANP, fect these will have, as it appears that year lobby to have their party fill the followed by an IED detonation to year, the infrastructure in these 2 dis- vacant position) to boosting on an ANP vehicle a few hours tricts has remained and matured, so that the morale of AOGs (who later), an IDF (7 mortar rounds when AOGs are temporarily forced from took responsibility for the at- fired at an ANP checkpoint their operating areas (after—for instance— st tack hours after it happened) to near Hotaki village on the 21 ), last December’s Operation Ebtekar) they th opening a wider door for and on the 24 , SAF attacks return after operations cease to a better GOA/AOG peace talks. How against an ANP near the gas prepared infrastructure, support base, and the government deals with— pipeline checkpoint around operations level, allowing them to make and fills—his loss will be a pro- Pashma Qala and Imam Sahib slowed but incremental gains. th cess that the entire region ob- villages. On the 24 in the Incidents within Mazar-e Sharif City in- serves. In the meantime, his neighbouring Chahar Bolak, an cluded multiple reports of military helicop- death is expected to play a AOG engaged an ANP patrol ters performing night ops between the 29th prominent short term role in along the main Mazar- and 31st, 2 reports of SAF—both the re- regional security, with expecta- Shibirghan road in a fire-fight sults of ACGs, and a UXO explosion tions that services—and per- that caused damages to a civil- which killed 4 children in PD#8. Finally, haps demonstrations—will sur- ian bus caught in the crossfire. Zari District was the site of yet another face as local communities and Elsewhere, AOG activity has road robbery, marking the 5th such inci- political parties consider the declined in Kishindih District dence this year. ramifications of his death. to the far south of Balkh, In terms of insecurity in the whereas Sholgara District has province, Chimtal and Chahar seen a steady pace of manifest- THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 2 FARYAB 50 This Report Period 0 Despite the launch of Opera- 40 tion “Wahdat 2”, a new effort maintain decent access amidst 30 to clear the Andkhoy – May- an increased presence of AOG 20 10 mana road in the north of Far- actors. How the conflict, re- 0 yab, it was deteriorating securi- sulting instability, and increased ty in the southern cradle of AOG presence in the southern FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime Faryab (Qaysar, Almar, Ko- districts is specifically effecting histan, Pahshtun Kot, and Maymana remains unclear. Civilian-military relations in the being noted in Kohistan and Pashtun Kot Bilchiragh) which remained the as well. It should be noted that the primary concern for NGOs city remain strained, as illustrat- ed by the recent firing of an IDPs—victims of the general instability working in the province. The throughout the south of Faryab—have pertinent question is whether RPG at the PRT in Maymana on the 12th, and perhaps due to reported fleeing the entire conflict, with increased insecurity in these anecdotal reports surfacing that many of districts is affecting NGO ac- incidents such as the accidental firing of a grenade by a return- them have specifically voiced concern over cess, and to what extent con- night raids and aerial bombardments. flict in the southern districts is ing IMF patrol near the ANP affecting security within May- HQ in Almar, which resulted in Kohistan to the south may also be coming mana City—a city that has seen at least 1 civilian death more under the influence of AOGs, and little demonstrated AOG activ- (constituting 1 of 5 security acting as a rally point for AOG forces, ity, and has anecdotally re- incidents in the district this re- with anecdotal reports suggesting that mained under strong GOA porting period). Just following AOGs are moving in and out of communi- control. the burning of the Koran, it ties, on occasions forcing families to feed was elders from Qaysar who and shelter them. Further sources suggest NGO reports from the prov- were reportedly most active in that Pashtun Kot may be in a similar situa- ince suggest that Maymana coming to Maymana, seeking tion, despite the overall low incident vol- continues to host an operable to start demonstrations. umes (1 security report this period). It environment, although some should be noted that NGOs do not all anecdotal reports hint that an However, it is southern Far- yab—and Almar in particu- agree on the extent to which this has (or undercurrent of mistrust of may in the future) affected their access. “foreigners” has arisen since lar—which was the focal point the demonstrations that oc- of insecurity this reporting pe- Notable amongst the 3 AOG incidents in curred after the burning of the riod. With GOA/IMF/AOG Almar this period was a clash that took Koran, and the violence— fighting going on, a large num- place in Kaftar Khan Uzbekia village be- mostly aimed at the PRT—that ber of IDPs have been forced tween villagers and an AOG. Qaysar saw a took place just following it. to move towards the district further 3 security incidents, including an However, conflicting reports centers of those districts bor- IED detonation on 2 civilians, the discov- st tell differing stories. dering Ghormach. AOGs ery of 6 IEDs, and on May 21 , the AOG from Ghormach may be creat- abduction of 2 alleged spies from Khwaja While the areas in Qaysar and ing a more controlled environ- Kinti area. Such accusations & abductions Almar directly bordering Ghor- ment within these districts— remain a tactic of AOG intimidation and mach were continuously re- with the potential to limit control, reported in increasing numbers ferred to for their heightened NGO access—while further throughout the region. insecurity, outside of these are- east, an increased presence is as, most NGOs claimed to THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 Approximately 2 months of 40 improved security in Takhar— well over 1,000. 30 which was translating to im- The demonstration occurred in 20 proved access for NGOs—was Taloqan City, and while the 10 0 violently disrupted when an vast majority of demonstrators IED detonated in Taloqan City remained in the centre of the at approximately 1640 hours city, a subdivision branched off TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime on May 28th. The blast killed at and marched to the Provincial Assistance Team (PAT). At which included top local government au- least 6 individuals including thorities stepping down (all of them Ja- General Daoud—the North the PAT the demonstrators threw rocks and make shift ex- miat) and the removal of the PAT from Regional Police Commander— Taloqan. Although the anger over the and the Takhar Provincial plosives into the compound, setting off a number of fires, as night raid was real, it appears likely that Chief of Police, and injured an Jumbesh party members—unhappy with additional 10-15 more, includ- PAT guards shot warning shots. It appears both sides their lack of political representation in the ing the Commander of RC- previously contested city—had also used North and the Provincial Gov- were armed, and at some point shots were fired by the PAT the incident to further a political agenda. ernor. This attack took place The deadline for the demands to be met just a week after 2 demonstra- guards, IMF, ANP, and the demonstrators, resulting in at was moved back a number of times as tions against an IMF night raid members of the Ministry of Interior from occurred on the 18th and 19th, least 7 demonstrators killed and over 80 injured (incl. at least 4 Kabul and General Daoud—based out of both of which resulted in sig- Mazar—got involved. Although political nificant violence. PAT guards and 2 IMF) in violence that did not cease until tensions subsequently ceased, the issue re- Reconstructing the chain of mained unresolved when the above IED events, the violence started late ANSF reinforcements arrived to clear the streets at 1400. attack took place at the Provincial Gover- on the evening of the 17th with nor’s office during a high level meeting th an IMF night raid—allegedly The following day (May 19 ) a chaired by General Daoud, and including targeting an AOG weapons second demonstration— the provincial governor and the command- dealer—which ended in at least considerably smaller than the er of RC-North. first—took place (mostly 4 deaths and a number of ar- The death of General Daoud—a charis- around the ANP HQ). While rests. Amongst those killed matic leader of the Jamiat party—is sure to this one resulted in violence as were 2 women. Despite re- cause an increase in tensions not only be- well (ANP motorcycles set on ports released by IMF claiming tween the GOA and AOGs (who claimed fire, and at least 7 additional that the women had attacked responsibility for the attack mere hours casualties amongst the demon- them during the raid, the com- later), but also between the historically strators), fresh security rein- munity was furious—decrying tense Jamiat and Jumbesh parties in forcements made a number of that an inappropriate assault Taloqan as they seek to refill the position arrests and regained control had taken place on the women, and assign blame. In the immediate future, without the same level of vio- and that the victims had been this is likely to result in some amount of lence occurring as the day pri- innocent members of a family civil unrest throughout Takhar and the or. rather than legitimate targets. greater North, as General Daoud support- This was the initial impetus for The demonstrators—whom ers from all sides seek to make sense of the demonstration which took were mostly Jumbesh—put th this attack and what it means going for- place on the 18 that grew to forward a list of demands ward (see Balkh section). THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 The detonation of an IED on 40 an ANP vehicle in Puli Khumri incident reporting has done the 30 on the 31st—causing the death same. 20 of 1 ANP and injuries to 2 oth- In Dushi District—the quiet 10 ers—disrupted an otherwise district which saw an uncharac- 0 quiet reporting period in teristic spike in insecurity Baghlan Province. Other than around April this year—a night BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime raid in Kalagai Area (Daka Vil- the explosion—a rare occur- entry was an ANA operation. This repre- rence in Baghlan recently— lage) early on the 23rd resulted in the killing of 4 AOG mem- sents a significantly diminished amount of military operations and the sur- security reporting, with the final 2 inci- render of former combatants bers, including the District Shadow Governor of Dushi. dents consisting of AOG elements surren- made up the rest of the security dering to the GOA (both in Phuli Khum- reporting recorded, with 2 Night raids continue to be a point of contention throughout ri—where 14 former AOG members oper- night raids in Dushi District, ating in Baghlani Jadid surrendered on the and a night raid and an airstrike the country, and have drawn 21st—and in Dahana-I Ghuri, where 7 for- in Tala Wa Barfak. criticism from GOA politicians mer fighters surrendered on the 22nd). and inspired civil unrest (such The explosion—occurring on In light of the reduced incident reporting, the 31st at approximately 0945 as the demonstrations which occurred in Taloqan City—see IMF claims to be witnessing a tangible hours—marked the first AOG change in the security paradigm for the attributed incident since an Takhar section). IMF has th countered that night raids are province, and the numbers indeed appear April 27 clash in Dushi Dis- to support this. However, historically it trict between pro-government an integral part of their “counter insurgency” strategy. has been rare to see well entrenched AOG militia members and an AOG. strongholds give up their allegiances. In Puli Khumri, it was the first Without being able to find stronger political or civil sup- Baghlan is considered an AOG stronghold, AOG initiated incident since located just south of Kunduz—the most an attack on an IMF convoy port for these raids, IMF risks widening the divide that has consistently volatile province in the North took place along the main Puli- and the focal point of AOG operations in Khumri - Kabul road on Janu- formed in the wake of wide- th spread public allegations over the region—and it appears likely that the ary 19 . While Baghlan is lull in security reporting is more the direct known to have a strong AOG civilian casualties. In Baghlan, out of the 9 security incidents result of ongoing military actions than a presence, the province has seen sustained change in provincial dynamics a considerable lull in activity as that were recorded this reporting period - a mere 60% of the and/or loyalties. It remains early in the Operation Nowruz has focused process to determine whether this change military operations on the volumes (15) recorded over the same period in 2010 - 5 were will be sustained, or whether it is simply northern districts for 2 months the result of the present surge. straight, with operations creep- IMF operations (incl. the men- ing further south recently as tioned 3 night raids), while one THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Although Jawzjan witnessed 40 only 11 security incidents this are noteworthy, but should not 30 reporting period (a number be assessed as new trends. The 20 that is consistent with the last 2 abduction—occurring on May 10 th reporting periods), the security 17 —was of a successful busi- 0 paradigm for the province may nessman on his way home JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime be more in flux than the num- from the Mosque in the Bander Aqcha area, likely the work of bers suggest. Security report- ANP/AOG clash that occurred in Gorjak an ACG. It was reported on ing has made subtle moves and Shesha Khana villages in Feyzebad the 31st that the abductee had from the tri-provincial area District on May 23rd. This is noteworthy been freed. The illegal check- (Qush Tepa and Darzab Dis- for 2 reasons, firstly, it occurred on a well point, occurring along the main tricts) towards the north- travelled route later than these types of Shibirghan – Sar-e Pul road on eastern portion of the province clashes typically happen (they tend to oc- the 22nd, took place at 0720 hrs (bordering Chimtal and Chahar cur between 1700 at night and 0700 the in the Seshanba area, marking Bolak Districts in Balkh Prov- following morning) and secondly, as part the 8th such incidence along ince), and insecurity is being of a larger trend, it represents a continua- that road this year (not includ- reported in districts that have tion of eastern Faryab’s developing securi- ing 3 additional reports of not historically seen significant ty issues. Not only Fayzabad, but Aqcha, AOG members loitering conflict dynamics. These dis- and anecdotally Mardyan have seen issues around the main road with the tricts—most notably Fayza- with AOGs lately, likely the result of likely intent to set up check- bad—are gaining some mo- AOGs from Chimtal and Chahar Bolak points, which would bring the mentum concurrent to the sur- increasing their influence further west (See true number up to 11). It facing of reports that security is Balkh). While security reporting has re- should be noted that shortly deteriorating. While the vast mained sparse in Mardyan District, anec- afterwards, an additional majority of NGOs find the dotal reports from the district refer to inse- checkpoint was set up along eastern districts of Jawzjan still curity which is taking place but goes unre- the road, this time across the largely operable, it is a trend ported. border in Sar-e Pul Province worth monitoring. Other nota- Lastly, multiple attacks on telecommunica- ble developments include a (see Sar-e Pul section), bringing the number to 12. Shibirghan tion towers occurred throughout the prov- rash of AOG attacks on com- ince (but nowhere else throughout the munications towers in various was also home to a large demonstration on the 28th, held North) after a telephone company failed to districts, 3 incidents in Shibir- cave to AOG demands that they cease all ghan (including an abduction to commemorate the deaths of Jumbesh demonstrators 4 years operations at night (so that AOG activity and an illegal checkpoint), and and movement cannot be monitored). a clash in Fayzabad District a earlier. The demonstration remained peaceful. AOGs burnt down telecommunications mere 400 meters from the main towers in 4 districts in the Province includ- Jawzjan continued to witnessed Mazar-Shibirghan road on May ing Aqcha, Fayzabad, Darzab, and rd insecurity along the main 23 . Mardyan. The 3 incidents in Shibirghan Mazar-Shibirghan road, with an THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Samangan remains relatively 40 quiet, with the only incidents of communities throughout the 30 consequence to the security province—including those in 20 paradigm taking place in Dara-i Aybak—remain largely dis- 10 Suf Payin, where on the 22nd 4 trustful of any IMF presence, 0 armed thieves robbed a road and that IMF patrols are gener- construction worker of his mo- ally not receiving local ac- SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime ceptance—and are in fact treat- bile phone and cash in the When reports of an AOG presence in Ay- Dashtak area (along the Dara-i ed with suspicion—if not out- right hostility. Although re- bak surfaced, it was assessed as likely that Suf Payin – Dara-i Suf Bala AOGs from Northern Baghlan were mov- th ports suggest that the AOG road), and on the 27 a cache ing through the district in an effort to of weapons and ammunitions presence noticed in the district a few months prior (March) gather community support so that they was found in Lola Village. An- could use it as a safe haven when neces- ecdotal reporting maintains has subsided over the last month and a half, it remains sary, and as a transport hub between the that Dara-i Suf Payin remains AOG strongholds of the Northeast under the strong control of logical for the community— which played an active role in (Northern Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar) AOGs, and it is likely that any and those of the Northwest (parts of criminal acts taking place in the dislocating the small PRT out of Aybak—to stand firmly be- Balkh, the tri-provincial area, and the district are known to—or com- southern cradle of Faryab). With this in mitted by—AOG actors. hind their decision and actions. All the more so with the recent mind, it is possible that the military opera- While Aybak remains relatively violence that has occurred tions set to begin in Kunduz (Operation free of security incident report- around PRTs countrywide Omaid—see Kunduz) could initiate this ing, the potential for a change (Taloqan, Maymana, and Herat activity again, and cause AOGs to relocate in the dynamics there remains for instance). via Baghlan through Aybak. However, this relatively strong. Sources from is conjecture, and thus far, there have been the area continue to assert that THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 3 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 Sar-e Pul recorded only 2 secu- 40 rity incidents over the first militia’s family, and then lat- 30 week of the reporting period, er—in the same area on the 20 neither of them particularly same day—an AOG abducted 10 noteworthy. However, activi- 5 civilians whom they accused 0 ties began to increase in the of spying. second half of the cycle, with The abduction of civilians has SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime an illegal checkpoint along the become more common in Sar-e AOGs operating out of strongholds in main Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan Pul Province. In a twist on this Sayyad. While it is likely that the AOGs th Road on the 26 (Sayed Abad trend, an abduction in Gosfan- did not suffer damages that they cannot area) and 4 security incidents di District went awry for the mitigate, as witnessed by a number of high taking place in Sayyad District would-be abductors when, at profile attacks just following the opera- rd th on the 23 , the 25 , and 2 in 0300 hrs the morning of the tions, it is likely that they need time to re- th th, the 3 individuals abducted Ganda area on the 27 . The 20 group and rebuild. It should be noted launched a counter-attack on illegal checkpoint—where here that while Operation Wahdat 2 has their abductors (presumed to armed individuals stopped cars already begun, it will not target the Tri- be members of an AOG). This to search for GOA employ- Provincial area (which includes Sayyad in resulted in 6 AOG members ees—occurred at 1700 and Sar-e Pul), but rather the road between th and 2 of the abducted killed, marked the 9 checkpoint Andkhoy and Maymana. 2) AOG opera- and the final would-be abduc- along this stretch of road this tions have increased significantly in South- tee injured but alive. year (the situation along the ern Faryab and Eastern Jawzjan. As other road is further detailed in the A total of 7 security incidents locations throughout the North take prior- Jawzjan section). represents a low number for a ity or draw AOG attention, it is likely to In Sayyad District, all but the province which has seen a sig- cause lulls in previously kinetic areas from first of the 4 incidents (an IMF nificant deterioration in securi- where these AOG actors have relocated operation in Qiz Wala village ty over the past year and a half. from. More information continues to sur- the evening of the 23rd) were The low number is likely the face referencing region-wide networks and initiated by AOGs. On the result of 2 factors: 1) Opera- a flow of fighters between areas as far 25th an AOG attacked an ANP tion Wahdat, while not main- ranging as the Tri-Provincial area and checkpoint in Khoja Yagaan taining a strong hold or build Kunduz. This dynamic requires further village, and on the 27th in Gan- phase, likely had a significant assessment. da, an AOG attacked the resi- short term impact on the pre- dence of a pro-government sent strength and capacity of THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 6 GHOR This Report Period 3 50 Ghor Province saw three direct 40 NGO incidents, of which two On 18th of May, AOG estab- 30 were AOG initiated and indi- lished an illegal checkpoint in 20 cating a change in the security Khame Safed Area on the main 10 situation in Charsada District Charsada – Chaghcharan Road. 0 and Murghab Area of Chagh- Among other vehicles, the charan District as it was already armed men stopped a local GHOR AOG GHOR Crime became apparent at the end of transport vehicle rented by na- last year. tional INGO staff members, an NGO clinic in Talmastan Area and On 21st of May, two armed who were travelling low profile physically assaulted the head after clinic men on a motorbike stopped a and therefore were not recog- after he refused to visit a patient in a house civilian vehicle rented by an nized as such. This was the nearby, as other patients needed to be INGO in Durahee Band Area third recorded illegal check- treated in the clinic. The armed men were of Chaghcharan District on the point in three and a half weeks, reportedly not AOG members but influen- main road to Murghab Valley. which further confirms that tial neighbours of the clinic and their vio- The armed men explained to AOG are getting more influen- lent reaction a demonstration of power to the INGO staff verbally as well tial in the area. In addition, on ensure compliance with their medical sup- as in a signed letter that organi- 28th of May AOG set a com- port requests in future. zations that want to implement mercial truck in Chasma-E- In regard to AOG activity in the south, it projects in Murghab Area of Ghul Area on the Charsada – is becoming notable in Taywara and Pasa- Chaghcharan, as well as in Chaghcharan Main Road on band as expected. In Taywara AOG am- Dawlat Yar and Charsada dis- fire, which was parked at the bushed an ANP convoy in Farahrod Vil- tricts, should contact them di- side of the road due to a tech- lage on 28th of May, and Pasaband saw an rectly and pay a certain amount nical problem. The truck was abduction in Synai Area on 30th of May. Of of money to them. One of the part of a convoy carrying IO note, AOGs became active again in Kakuri armed men is reportedly a local food items. The main convoy Area of Pasaband, which became a kind of commander from Murghab did reach its destination with- ‘safe haven’ or base from where – especial- with links to AOGs as well as out problems and the truck, ly non-local – AOGs were operating in the to an influential commander in which was set on fire, seems to district in 2010. On 23 May, an armed Charsada. The incident shows have been rather a target of clash between AOG and armed locals in that the security situation in the opportunity. Nevertheless, Kakuri Area. This armed clash marks the area remains concerning and AOG activity has become first recorded incident in the area after an that an extension of this insta- more notable on the main road IMF airstrike last December. The recent bility to Charsada and northern between Charsada and Chagh- incident indicates that AOGs regrouped in Dawlat Yar, where armed charan lately. the abovementioned area despite the air- groups from Murghab Area The third NGO incident took strike. were also active in January this place in the south. On 23rd of year, cannot be excluded. May, two armed men entered THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 3 50

This Report Period 0 40 Herat saw the first attack including suicide attackers inside tacks needs to be seen in light 30 the city since 2009. On 30 May, of the announced handover of 20 there were reportedly two ex- primary/lead security responsi- 10 plosions between 1100 hrs and bility from ISAF to ANSF in 0 1130 hrs. One explosion – Herat City as part of the first most likely an RCIED attached tranche in Afghanistan, which HERAT AOG HERAT Crime to a motorbike or a bicycle – was likely to trigger a response took place in Chawke Cinama from AOGs to challenge the night and Karukh saw an attack against Area of District 2, causing a ANSF capabilities and under- an PSC convoy in Ab Khoban Area on the higher number of civilian casu- mine their credibility. In addi- main road to Qala-I-Naw in the morning alties. A second explosion at tion, the attack needs to be also of 25th of May. Ab Khoban was already the main gate of the PRT was seen as part of the spring of- known for AOG activity in 2010. As Ka- caused by a truck, damaging fensive announced at the be- rukh, Obe also saw the comeback of AOG the PRT gate and perimeter ginning of May creating a cer- activity in last year’s hotspot, which is close wall. Shortly afterwards, AOG tain pressure on AOGs also in to the border with Badghis District. started to attack the PRT with the Western Region to attract Chashmae-I-Shafa Area was already known SAF and RPGs from a building high media attention, which for a significant level of AOG presence opposite of the PRT main gate. especially the length of the last year and an airstrike last October un- ANSF engaged the attackers in fighting in the building close to derlined that the security situation in the the building and explosions the PRT ensured even though area was deteriorating. Although AOGs heard during the afternoon casualties and damages re- have concentrated their activity in Obe on were RPGs as well as suicide mained limited. Although fur- the western part of the Herat-Obe Main attackers, who detonated in the ther AOG related incidents in Road this year, they expected to re-emerge building during the fighting. and around Herat City need to in their old base during spring. Uncon- The fighting ended between be expected, the recent events firmed reports suggest that AOGs from 1700 hrs and 1800 hrs. alone do not directly change the north of Obe were responsible for a Despite frequent generic threat the overall security situation in direct fire attack against an ANP check- warnings in regard to suicide Herat City and such attacks are point and an RCIED strike against the ar- attacks against high profile lo- not likely to increase on a large riving ANP reinforcement in Turkabad cations, incidents involving sui- scale or be repeated in such a Area on the main Herat-Obe Road on 22nd cide attackers remain very rare dimension on a frequent bases. of May. Later on the same day, the second in Herat City. Of note, only Herat Province saw direct fire IED strike affecting civilians in Obe this two BBIED attacks – both in attacks particularly on main year was recorded in Payan Daman Area 2009 – were recorded since roads in the north-eastern and on the main road to Chashmae-I-Shafa. 2007. However, the surround- central eastern districts during Further IEDs on this road are not unlikely ings of the city especially the this reporting period. Kushki if AOGs continue to operate from there in Herat-Airport road saw a Kuhna saw a direct fire attack order to deter ANSF movement on the slightly higher number but against an ANSF/IMF patrol road. Of note, these were the first IEDs even there incidents including in the usual Darzak Area on affecting civilians, which were recorded in suicide attackers remain rare the main road to Kushk Dis- Obe District during the last three and a with three such attacks in 2010. trict. In Pashtun Zarghun, half years, reconfirming a change in the The last one occurred on 23 AOG attacked an ANP check- security situation in Obe due to increased October 2010 and targeted an point in Mar Abad Area on the AOG presence. IO compound. The recent at- Herat-Obe Main Road during THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 After ANSF/IMF reacted with 40 several operations on a recent increased risk for civilians on 30 shift in AOG activity towards the main road between Farah 20 the western districts of Farah City and Pusht Rod, which also 10 Province at the end of the last saw an IED detonation on the 0 reporting period, Anar Dara, side of Farah District. In addi- Shib Koh and Qala-I-Kah dis- tion, civilians in Pusht Rod FARAH AOG FARAH Crime tricts remained quiet during were affected by IEDs on sec- this reporting period apart ondary roads around Panjit Similar to Pusht Rod, again nearly all inci- from an ANP operation on 29 Gaw Village and Boldani Vil- dents were AOG initiated or IED detona- May in Pusht Koh Area of lage. A fourth IED was record- tions. This indicates a comeback of AOG Qala-I-Kah. Reports indicate ed on the main road between activity in these districts, which is com- that the ANSF/IMF opera- Pusht Rod and Khaki Safed bined with rumours of AOG movement tions during the last cycle District. from the south to Farah Province. In Bakwa and Bala Buluk the Herat-Kandahar pushed AOGs back to Pusht In addition, the historic Rod District, which saw an in- Main Road saw three direct fire attacks hotspots Bala Buluk and against PSCs and two IED detonations crease in incidents during the Bakwa districts, which were last two weeks. Of note, nearly against ANSF vehicles. Apart from that, relatively quiet in regard to in- Shiwan Village – already an area of con- all recorded incidents were cident numbers during the pre- AOG initiated and the majority cern last year – was again in the focus of vious cycles, accounted for AOGs with three direct fire attacks and were IED detonations. Most of nearly half of all incidents dur- them hit civilians, signalling an one IDF attack against ANSF, suggesting ing the last two weeks of May. that it will be again a hotspot this summer.

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 In Badghis Province AOG - 40 ANSF/IMF hostilities were Other main roads affected by 30 clearly concentrated on Murgh- hostilities were the main road 20 ab District, which saw 50% of between Muqur and Dara-E- 10 all recorded incidents and 57% Boom of Qadis District, which 0 of all AOG incidents including saw an IED detonation against IED discoveries. In addition, ANSF/IMF, and in Qadis the BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime 80% of ANSF/IMF operations main road from the DAC to took place in the district. Also Khirkhana Area in the east. Of joining the reconciliation process. On 23 worth noting is that more than note, ten out of 13 IED related May, around 115 AOG members among half of all incidents in Murghab incidents in Badghis Province others also from the Ghal Charkh Area, took place on main roads. The took place on main roads, indi- known for its notable AOG presence, Muqur – Murghab Main road cating an AOG focus on these joined the GoA. Apart from the relatively saw an IMF operation in Haji roads most likely due to fre- high number of AOGs reconciling, the Mohammad Khan Village, the quent ANSF/IMF movements. timing is surprising since AOGs are usually main road between the Murgh- Qadis District was also in the joining the GoA before the winter season ab DAC and Murichaq Area spotlight during this reporting and not during the spring offensive. Nev- saw four IED discoveries and period. Not only because of ertheless, it is too early to tell if this is al- the main road to Murghab several direct fire attacks and a ready an indicator that the APRP will be DAC saw a direct fire attack premature IED detonation, but more sustainable in Qadis District. against ANP as well as two also because of a significant IED related incidents. number of AOG members THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 0 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 Laghman continued to see 40 signs that AOGs operating in trict. 30 the province have a definite Second, there were also some 20 plan aimed at destabilising concerning signs of more con- 10 what has been a relatively fident AOG penetration in the 0 peaceful province as its capital provincial capital. An AOG CP undergoes transition to ANSF was established a short distance control. First, this is the second outside the city to search for LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime period in a row in which a GOA officials, in the Armul BBIED attack has struck in the pattern of IED emplacement supplement- area on the road to Alingar on ed by two significant IMF operations and province, in this case striking th the night of the 15 , without the abduction of an ANP policeman. The the vehicle of a former ANA any reports that they were suc- commander who was involved only IED detonation recorded occurred in cessful in their search. On the the Wati Jabarkhel area, which was home in managing the local national 22nd in the Sundalay area, early guard force for IMF facilities in to both of the IMF operations, which took morning, AOG fighters at- place on consecutive days shortly after the the province; 4 people includ- tacked a group of tribal elders ing the commander were killed IED; together, they led to the death of 2 with SAF and RPGs, leading to AOG fighters and the detention of 4 oth- in the incident in the Qala-ye the death of 2 and the injury of Nazir area of Alishing district. ers. Finally in that district, local community 3 others. Also in the capital members attacked an AOG unit in the Nu- Two nights previously in Alish- district, an IED struck an IMF ing, an IED accidentally deto- ralam valley for unknown reasons, killing 1 vehicle as it was moving and injuring 2 others. nated in the house of an AOG through the Chelgazi area, th commander in Golota, which while another IED was discov- In Qarghayi, on the 29 AOG fighters at- was being used as an informal ered and defused under a tele- tacked ANP and three fuel trucks at close IED factory; two of his family communications tower. In Bad range at 0400 hrs in the Surkhakan area, members were wounded when Pakh, two rockets were fired at with two trucks being destroyed. This area it detonated. To the north, in the new ANP HQ, and reports has emerged as in recent weeks as a more Dawlat Shah, IMF conducted of AOG attempts to co-opt the important site for attacks than Tangi an airstrike against a VBIED, community to its anti-GOA Abrisham, but the threat remains an early but other than that there were stance were also recorded. morning one, and ANSO’s daytime travel advisory stands. no reports from the heavily In Alingar, the conflict intensi- AOG-influenced northern dis- fied slightly, with the familiar THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 7 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 1 150 Incident volumes continued to Chapa Dara (4), Manogai (8), 100 decline in Kunar during this WataPur (8), with Nari and 50 period, from 90 to 63, in a con- Ghaziabad registering but at a tinuation of the trend from the lower number than usual. In 0 first half of May, likely con- Manogai, the registered attacks nected to the increased AOG demonstrated a level confi- focus on Nuristan in recent dence in the part of the AOG KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime weeks. With fewer AOG fight- forces in the area, with attacks ers present in the province, a on a number of significant mild damage. Asadabad remained quiet, consequent lower number of ANSF installations, with the with the IMF presence in WataPur thought direct AOG assaults on ANSF only response a short and ap- to be halting the advance on the provincial and IMF targets – the charac- parently ineffectual IMF opera- capital. The only recorded incident there teristic form of attack in the tion there on the 17th that led was the arrest of an ANP policeman trying provincial security landscape – to the deaths of two civilians to smuggle a small quantity of weaponry were the primary cause of the and no AOG fighters. Howev- into the prison, in an apparent attempt to overall drop; from 51 last peri- er, after an IDF attack on ANA aid prisoners inside. od, this period saw just 30. in the Nangalam area on May In northern Kunar, which recently featured However, NGO incidents to 29th, IMF air support called in a spate of particularly predatory AOG/ clinics continued to be record- by ANA helped repel the at- ACG actions and a heightened level of ed, with this period’s incident tack and in targeting AOG lo- general conflict, things were a little calmer taking the form of superficial cations killed 2 AOG fighters. during this period. In Dangam, the only damage to a clinic in the Sirka- This is the kind of effective significant incidents were two cross-border nay DAC area after an tactical collaboration that the IDF attacks from the PakMil, which were SVBIED attack against an IMF ‘transition’ to ANA field pres- apparently aimed at AOG fighters on their convoy visiting the DAC on ence that has occurred in the side of the border but came across into th the 28 . This was, in fact, the western corridor is supposed to Afghan territory. In Ghaziabad, just two first VBIED attack ever in generate, and is one positive direct attacks on ANA OPs were recorded, Kunar, and would be highly sign from an otherwise unopti- alongside an IED attack on an IMF vehicle significant even without the mistic part of the province. in the Chechen area. In Nari and Shegal, a fact that it occurred in a district small number of inconsequential direct where major IMF operations In WataPur, none of these direct attacks had any conse- attacks were recorded too, but in all, none finished in mid-April, which of the large abduction, killing or robbery led to nearly 100 AOG fighters quence, but one of the 5 IDF attacks against IMF facilities incidents recently seen there took place killed in joint ground and air during this fortnight. operations. In neighbouring that were launched in the dis- The security of the Jalalabad-Asadabad Marawara, where the afore- trict caused the death of 2 civil- Highway has improved after an AOG-IMF mentioned operation also took ians and the injury of 6 others firefight on the Nurgal-KuzKunar border place, a further air operation when one of the mortars land- ed in the Kharano bazaar. Fi- stretch on May 23rd, which led to the death was recorded early in the peri- of 6 AOG fighters and the injury of their od, which led to the killing of nally in that district, where AOGs are clearly concentrating commander, who was responsible for all 17 AOG fighters, including a the attacks on this stretch of the road. As commander. their forces, they also destroyed a newly-built ANP CP with such, with the commander recovering and Those places that remained explosives, which had yet to be his manpower significantly weakened, the characterised by a relatively occupied, while an IMF vehicle Highway is assessed to be slightly safer for high number of direct AOG also struck an IED causing the coming weeks and months. attacks were Sirkanay (4), THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NANGARHAR NGO Incidents Year to Date 6 NANGARHAR This Report Period 100 Two NGO incidents were rec- 80 plex attacks on ANSF and orded during this period, the 60 GOA in the city centre. Yet first of which in fact took place 40 attacks on the ANP are likely at the end of the first half of 20 to continue; in this vein, an the month, when a local NGO 0 employee was arrested by IMF IED detonated against an ANP th in Memla during the course of vehicle in Zone 2 on May 27 , a search for a high profile tar- injuring one policeman and 7 NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime get. The IMF confirmed the civilians. innocence of the employee and Beyond the provincial capital, fuel tanker. In Adwor, the IED seems to released him at the end of the Bati Kot, the Khogyani- have misfired, killing two passing civilians. period. The second incident Sherzad area, Shinwar and IMF operations were focused upon Mem- occurred to a local NGO Sorkh Rod remained the key la, where they continued to hunt high- demining agency in Pachir wa areas of contest. In Bati Kot, value targets; in three search operations Agam, which received a night- the profile of incidents was there, 10 suspected AOG members were letter warning the staff about slightly different from before, detained. The final incident of note in the ‘working with non-Muslims’, with just one IED discovery on area was an IDF attack on an IMF/ANSF similar to a number of Highway 7 and no direct at- recon team in Markikhel, which injured 3 demining-targeting incidents in tacks on tankers. However, policemen. key border areas in recent there was one attack on an In Shinwar and Achin, two incidents were months. ANBP vehicle in the Farmi directly attributable to the ongoing land This period also saw the first Char area. In Chardeh, a local dispute; a rocket was fired in the Deh significant attack on a major was shot and killed for what Sarak area by one of the feuding sub-tribes target in the Jalalabad City area appeared to be criminal mo- at the other, hitting a house and injuring 3 st after a considerable period of tives while on the 21 , ANSF women and a man, and a firefight broke quiet, with an SVBIED attack conducted an operation that out in the Pekha area for two hours, but hitting an ANP RTC vehicle led to the arrest of one AOG leading to no casualties. The remaining convoy near to the Customs fighter and the seizure of a conflict events were mostly IED discover- office. It is the third time this small weapons cache. ies, but there were also two detonations – year IEDs have targeted RTC In the Khogyani-Sherzad area, one in the Canal 25 area and one in the convoys. In the event, 15 peo- the urban area of Wazir was vicinity of the Goda Pump petrol station. ple were killed, with all but 2 of the site of 3 separate AOG am- Finally, AOG fighters ambushed IMF/ them employees at the RTC. bushes of IMF, with the most ANSF in the Qalah-ye Kundi area, which As the year has progressed, it serious, on the 16th, leading to led to 3 AOG deaths and the injury of has become increasingly appar- 3 civilians injured and 9 AOG their commander. ent that the prime target in the fighters detained. This fighting Chaparhar was quiet during the period, a greater Jalalabad area is the is indicative of the confidence consequence of recent IMF operations, ANP, likely because they are a of the AOGs operating there. while Lal Pur saw two direct attacks softer target than the alterna- Elsewhere in these districts, the against IMF and ANSF in the Fateh Mina tives – the ANA, the IMF and primary dynamics were of area, a locality NGOs are advised to be central GOA facilities. Howev- IEDs and IMF operations; 8 particularly careful about for the time be- er, now that this targeting has IED detonations were record- ing. In all, Nangarhar and Jalalabad in par- become apparent, we may see ed, in Memla, Adwor, Has- ticular have not continued the early year AOG attempts against more kemkhel, Wazir and Grabawa, trends of significant deterioration, alt- difficult targets, including com- targeting IMF, ANSF and a hough major problems remain in the key THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 1 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 1 The major developments seen 40 in Nuristan this period were bloody, primarily because of 30 witnessed in the normally the absence of such IMF air 20 sleepy Do Ab, where AOG assets, with Waygal, for in- 10 fighters temporarily seized the stance, being seized without a 0 DAC on the 25th after sporadic single death. The consequences fighting starting in the early of these events are likely to be NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime hours of the 23rd, with 3 AOG far-reaching, although it re- fighters killed in the event. The mained too early to tell at the IMF and ANSF response was, end of the reporting period, ated his vest, killing himself, two Arabs in contrast to the seizure of with major medical assistance and two Pakistanis and injuring a dozen Waygal, decisive but bloody, efforts still underway; however, more. In addition, a larger operation was with the intense military force the high death toll from the conducted by ANP in the Ghosht-Chatras th, killing 4 AOG fighters that the IMF brought to bear ANP is likely to be an issue of area on the 29 and injuring 4 others, and reclaiming some on the AOG fighters occupy- particular tension. Some re- of the area for the government, including ing the DAC causing the larg- ports received at the end of the the roadway up to 25 km south of Parun. est single casualty figure seen in period, moreover, suggested At the time of writing, however, the road a day’s fighting in the eastern that AOGs were returning to remains blocked by AOGs at Gawardar. region in at least the past 18 the district to target the ANSF months; 150 people – AOG, and IMF currently occupying In Nurgaram, AOG members distributed ANP and civilians – were re- the DAC area. As such, the nightletters on the 16th warning locals to ported killed by F-16 aerial potential for further clashes in not cooperate with local authorities. How- bombardment of the DAC area Do Ab remains very real. ever, local community representatives re- and then the surrounding areas Elsewhere in the province, jected the AOG responsible and declared it as the AOG fighters beat a re- Waygal stood out with two sig- would oppose it, denouncing it as treat, with at least one bombing nificant developments. First, a ‘Pakistani’ and therefore not a legitimate run directly striking ANP rein- small ANSF clearing operation Afghan entity. This is an excellent insight forcements arriving from Lagh- was reported to have occurred into the difficulty that any political force man via Nurgaram, killing 35 in the Chatras area of the AOG will have in trying to bring the population and injuring two dozen more. -controlled district around the of Nuristan into line with an agenda not A further 170 from across the 18th-20th, as this was a key stag- seen as highly localised in nature – be they spectrum were injured, while ing point for the planning of GOA or AOG. an NGO clinic, schools, shops attacks on Parun. While some Towards the end of the period, finally, fur- and other such facilities in the fighting was reported, no casu- ther AOG fighters were reported to have DAC area were also damaged alties were registered, and the entered BargiMatal and Kamdesh as part to varying degrees of severity. operation was clearly all but of a renewed effort to target the BargiMa- This was the latest attempt by ineffective. As evinced by a tal DAC. As such, in spite of the heavy the IEA to take a Nuristan dis- dark incident that occurred in losses faced by AOG fighters in Do Ab, trict for themselves, after the the same village on May 20th; there are clear signs of both their persistent seizure of Waygal and more while a 12 year old boy was strength and their intention to continue to recent attempts to seize undergoing suicide attack in- pressure ANSF and seize further territory. BargiMatal and to harass Pa- struction by what was reported run. However, none of the pre- to be both Arab al Qaeda and vious fighting has been this Pakistani fighters, the boy initi- THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 2 KHOST This Report Period 0 150 The stand-out incident in Khost this period was the com- Bak, Sabari and TereZayi, for 100 much of the past year the key plex suicide attack on the joint 50 Traffic Police-ANP QRF com- battleground between AOGs pound in Khost City, in which and IMF. To illustrate, in Bak 0 4 AOG fighters including 2 the only evidence of AOG ac-

BBIED operatives penetrated tivity was a single IED discov- KHOST AOG KHOST Crime the facility at approximately ery, while it played host to 4 0400 hrs and engaged ANSF further IMF operations, detaining a total of 7 AOG members. motorcycle bazaar on the morning of the and IMF in an extended fire- th fight until roughly 0930 hrs. ANP also detained two AOG 30 . The 10 remaining IEDs were all dis- The presence of a VBIED out- members during a patrol in the covered and defused, although one did side the facility indicated that, district. In Sabari there were 5 detonate as ANP were trying to defuse it, as with previous complex sui- AOG attacks on various targets injuring two policemen, and in once in- cide attacks in the border re- – 3 ineffectual assaults on the stance, ANP detained an AOG operative gion, the AOG fighters were Spin Ghar ANP CP, one on as he was planting an IED in the currency well trained and equipped with the DAC and one in which exchange market, evincing a further en- multiple attack options – albeit they assassinated a former hanced ANSF effectiveness in tackling this in this case not succeeding en- ANP employee – but this small particular element of AOG activity. tirely in every element of their number of incidents, much Of the remaining events across the wider plan, as it was not detonated lower than in previous months, province, the majority of significant occur- before all operatives were was outweighed by 7 IMF op- rences were IMF operations, with 1 in killed, being subsequently de- erations that detained a total of Spera detaining 6; 2 in Musa Khel detain- fused by IMF. In total, all the 16 AOG members. And in Te- ing 3 and killing 10,including a command- attackers died, as did 3 police- reZayi, the only recorded inci- er; 3 in Mando Zayi detaining 7; and 1 in men, with a further 6 police dents were an inaccurate rocket Gurbuz with no detentions or killings. In and 1 civilian injured. attack on the IMF base in the Musa Khel, finally, there were two AOG However, beyond that spectac- Chargutee area and a single attacks on the DAC, without major conse- ular attack the key trend was IED discovery. quence. It remains true therefore that dur- again a 33% drop in the total Back again in Khost city, with ing the entirety of Mayin Khost the mo- reported number of conflict the exception of the complex mentum has been very much with the incidents, from last period’s attack described above the pri- IMF; whether or not they can maintain this 100 to 66, which was also low- mary risk comprised IEDs. momentum will be a matter of great inter- er than the equivalent period That being said, even in this est in coming weeks and months, but the last year. As with last period, a respect only two IEDs detonat- change is a remarkable one from trends large component of this drop ed during this fortnight, one seen over the past 6 months. was the almost total absence of against an ANP vehicle in AOG-initiated incidents in Matun village and one in the THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 1 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 1 This period’s absolute level of 80 conflict incidents fell on last nay and DandwaPatan ac- 60 period in Paktya, by 25%, but counting for most of the rest. 40 amongst those incidents there In the provincial capital, Ibra- 20 were both a highly violent mass him Khel was the site of two 0 killing and a mass abduction of direct assaults, one on ANP NGO staff. To take the latter CPs on the 28th and one on an PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime first, 30 demining staff from a IMF convoy on the 29th. There local demining NGO were ab- were also three IDF attacks on ducted en masse on the Kabul- key regional security force facil- DandwaPatan, a number of fatal engage- Gardez Highway, in the ities; rockets were fired at the ments were recorded, with two attacks on Tandan area of Gardez district, 203rd Corps HQ and the pro- ANBP CPs in the DAC on consecutive on May 21st; they were released vincial ANP HQ on the 21st, days leading to a policeman killed in each, within 6 hours after the inter- while the PRT came under and two further direct attacks, one on an vention of local community rocket attack on the 29th, alt- ANBP CP on the border and one on a representatives. This was the hough none of these caused joint IMF-ANP patrol in the Muqbal area, largest demining abduction in- any damage. In the Shaikhan where later in the period an IMF-ANBP cident of the spate of such inci- area, nightletters were distribut- operation also took place, in which one dents in the border region re- ed warning people against sup- policeman was killed after engaging AOG cently, and while the motives porting the government and fighters present in the area. The day after remain unclear, it may be con- security forces, while on May the second DAC attack, moreover, IMF nected to mostly criminal and/ 17th, AOG operatives attacked engaged in a clearing operation in the same or bargaining motivations. The and destroyed an IMF supply area, detaining 3. other outstanding incident was truck with RPGs in the The only incidents recorded in Zurmat, the violent assault on a road GhafoorKhel area. Attacks on after a particularly busy previous period, construction company site in a RCC and on a PSC CP in were an accidental IED detonation in Ko- Wuza Zadran on the 19th, separate incidents in the lalgo killing the AOG operative planting it, which left 36 workers killed Gardez environs on the 30th and an ineffectual attack on a joint convoy and 20 injured, all Afghans. led to 18 deaths on both sides, in Aba Pul, as well as an IMF operation Work crews are often a target while on the 31st an IED struck that detained 4. There was, moreover, one for such large scale attacks in an ANA vehicle near a UN other AOG attack, on an ANP CP in the the southeast, but it is unusual compound in the city. In sum Shoghla area that injured two policemen, that such a large number were these incidents paint a concern- and an IMF operation that detained a killed without the use of, for ing picture of AOG penetra- number of fighters and a HQN sub- example, a large truck VBIED, tion into Gardez, something commander. And of the rest of the inci- as occurred in Paktikaon that was evident but less conse- dents, the most noteworthy were an AOG March 27th, and indicates an quential in recent months. attack on a RCC PSC in Wuza Zadran, extremity of violence unusual Chamkanay and DandwaPatan which led to 3 PSC guards killed, and four for Paktya. represented a second area of direct attacks against DAC and ANSF tar- More broadly in the province, concentration, with a quarter of gets in Jaji, JaniKhel and LijaMangal, none Gardez accounted for half of incidents occurring here. In leading to fatalities. As such, Paktya saw an all recorded incidents, with the Chamkanay incident severity unusually high number of conflict fatalities usually restive Zurmat remain- was not high, with just 3 inef- during this period, and with drops in ing relatively quiet, and the fectual rocket attacks on the Khost and Nangarhar, stood out as of northern districts of Chamka- Chamkanay DAC. In above-average importance and insecurity in THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR‐2011 KANDAHAR Year to Date 1 200 This Report Period It would appear that Kandahar 150 standards well expected of this Province has reached ‘saturation’, 100 in that incident volumes have re- province, a recent IED incident in 50 mained relatively consistent in a Shorabak District (claimed by the yearly comparison leaving little IEA) is notable due to the ex- 0 room for significant increase or treme fatality rate that resulted decrease. This can be attributed from it. Up to 7 IMF soldiers to the state of equilibrium that has along with 2 ANP (engaged on a KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime developed between the two main foot patrol) were killed in an IED parties of the conflict, with each strike. While incidents are relatively rare in this district, 10 of the parties best interest to limit action, and there- side having reached their maxi- fore attention, to this strategic area, despite the mum capacities. While there have 11 recorded for 2010 were IED related. The low levels of incident recent efforts of the ANBP commanded out of been shifts at the tactical level, Spin Boldak with both sides implementing are likely related to a number of shifting focal areas (both geo- factors, including the limited pres- graphic and operational) and tac- ence of security forces and sparse tics, there is unlikely to be any population. However, it is also a major changes in the overall con- strategic cross border infiltration text through to the mid-term. route for AOG as well as for smugglers, with the latter attested While the majority of incidents to by the large seizure of drugs in reported this period fell into the February. It is remains in both

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 100 There is a typically limited number 80 of incidents reported from this jections of AOG force included province, with this period being an attack against IMF (which 60 no exception, with the distribu- maintain a limited presence in this 40 tion and type also remaining con- province), an IED discovery by 20 sistent. There are an average 13 the same, as well as the establish- 0 incidents reported per month, ment of illegal checkpoint in with over 60% of the total report- which 2 civilians were abducted. NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime ed from Khash Rod alone. This is In a more rare event, an IED in to be expected due to its proximi- Chahar Burjak (in the far south of dents, though the nature of these are more ty to Helmand as well as the pres- the province) resulted in the death related to border issues, including smuggling, ence of key provincial access of 3 ANP and the wounding of illegal immigration, and clashes between op- routes that transect the district, another. posing border police forces. and thusly hosts the most active Second to Khash Rod, Zaranj AOG presence. This periods pro- reports 27% of the provinces inci- THE ANSO REPORT Page 26

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 150 This Report Period 0 After an intense 6 weeks, Pakti- 100 ka recorded a slight drop in tive defected from the AOG conflict incidents this period, side and turned himself in to 50 the district ANP HQ, which although in absolute terms, it 0 remained the most violent led to a search operation in the province in the southeast, a Shamulzayi area that detained mantel recently poached from the facilitator of this particular PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime neighbouring Khost. The big- network of BBIEDs. gest drop by incident type was Other direct attacks took place in the first, 2 AOG fighters were arrested, in direct attacks by AOGs, in small numbers across the while in the latter, 4 AOG members were which fell about a quarter to province, none of which led to killed in a gun battle. The intensity of oper- 16; IDF attacks and IED inci- conflict party fatalities, and on- ations has not dropped during this period, dents remained at identical lev- ly one, in Mata Khan, leading although the numbers killed have fallen els, although there was a to the death of a child in the slightly; but it is likely that the cumulative marked increase in the propor- crossfire. Apart from Barmal, effect of these operations is one important tion of IED detonations rela- IDF attacks concentrated on reason for the slight decrease in AOG- tive to discoveries. Dila, Gayan and Omna, as per initiated attacks across the province in this With Barmal incidents again usual, with none recorded be- period. ing of significant consequence. revolving around IDF attacks Finally, with regard to the IED campaign on IMF bases, Yahya Khel was In regard to IMF operations, all in the province, there were 4 IED strikes a particular focus for direct but 2 of the 8 recorded opera- against IMF vehicles, although no reports AOG assaults, with 6 recorded, tions took place in Urgun, of casualties, while there were 8 instances the most significant of which where a total of 18 AOG fight- of successful IED disposals by the security was the assassination of the ers were detained, including forces. The most noteworthy of these was district NDS Chief with a si- one commander, and where in the discovery and subsequent defusing of th lenced weapon on May 20 . one joint ground and air opera- two IEDs attached to a donkey in the main Remaining attacks comprised 2 tion the forces killed 12 AOG Barmal bazaar, in what appears to be a on the DAC, 2 on ANP con- fighters and wounded an un- thwarted DBIED attack. voys, and 1 on an NDS vehicle known further number. The in the Ghaibi Khel area. Also remaining operations took in YahyaKhel, a BBIED opera- place in Gayan and Mata Khan; THE ANSO REPORT Page 27

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI‐2011 This Report Period 250 Incident volumes within Ghazni 200 continued to surge this period, in securing the main artery, AOG sharp counterpoint to the steady can also express their dominance 150 downwards trend identified in in the distant, more rural, districts 100 Helmand, bringing to the fore as seen in the extreme eastern and 50 once again the clearly contested western districts such as Nawa 0 nature of this province This year and Ajristan. This dominance is is following a very similar growth expressed in a variety of ways, GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime pattern to last and indicates that including the closure of mobile these high volumes are likely to networks, which remains ongoing province is one of the areas in Ghazni where persist through the summer in Qarabagh. AOG hold sway, these are warnings that will months. Not unlike Zabul to the south, likely be taken seriously, though how this de- This is likely due to a variety of AOG efforts to affect stability velops into action remains to be seen. factors, including geography and along the highway remains ongo- strategic importance. This prov- ing, with PSC escorts of logistical inces relative proximity to cross- convoys typically bearing the border infiltration and supply brunt of attacks. routes, as well as the large stretch While the majority of the inci- of Highway 1 that bisects it, de- dents continue to be a blend of notes its strategic importance the standard tactics and types, within the regional context. As intimidation efforts on the part of well, it also hosts a lower level of AOG were noted in this period. IMF & ANSF elements, indicating The visitation (of a warning na- that opposition groups can enjoy ture) to the relations of serving a higher level of freedom of ANP by AOG in Arghistan is but movement and action. As most of one example of this. As this these elements are focused on

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL‐2011 100 This Report Period Zabul incident volumes have con- 80 tinued to surge this period, mark- Jaldak, at the extreme south of the 60 province and bordering Kandahar. ing their highest yet recorded for 40

2011 as well as a two year high. It Incidents recorded this period 20 being early in the year, this is sug- represent the typical expressions gestive of a highly volatile sum- of AOG presence, include indict- 0 mer season to come. ed fire attacks against static securi- Beyond the local AOG forces, ty force installations, direct attack ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime elements from southern Ghazni against convoys (both logistical (primarily Nawa District) are and security), as well as the more of movement is also continuously impacted by known to project their influence rare IED event. Of note, a tactic this activity. On the reverse, security forces into Zabul, with both having a used commonly in this province, continue to pursue a program of interdiction specific focus on Highway 1 Dis- unlike most other parts of the and arrest, with much of this activity focused tricts bisected by this primary ar- South, is the use of explosive de- in Qalat City. tery the remain the most affected vices to destroy culverts and While the incident volume has increased, the by the conflict. These districts bridges, likely in an attempt to distribution and tactic type (described above) include Shahjoy, Qalat (the pro- impede patrol access. As a result has experienced little change over the years vincial capital), and Tarnak Wa of this, however, civilian freedom with this year unlikely to disrupt this pattern. THE ANSO REPORT Page 28

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND‐2011 This Report Period 300 The overall incident rate within 250 Helmand continues it downwards there the Helmand Provincial 200 trend, though the sharp drop not- Governors convoy was ambushed 150 ed during the last period is start- while enroute to Lashkar Gah 100 ing to level off, likely as the result following a visit to Sangin. While 50 of the closing of the poppy har- this ambush proved mostly inef- 0 vest season. Nonetheless, even fective, the concentration of key with the drop, the significant vol- governance and security officials HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime umes noted in the opening within the convoy likely proved to months of the year indicate a sig- rich an opportunity and resulted HELMAND‐2010 in a hastily planned attack. In- nificant increase over last (as pro- 200 vided graphs illustrate). The drop cluded in the convoy, beyond the may also be partially attributed to governor, were the Provincial 150 Chief of the NDS and the ANP. the reorientation of men and ma- 100 terials to Ghazni, which has noted If effective, the attack would have a dramatic increase of late (see effectively decapitated provincial 50 governance. Ghazni) It would appear that the 0 approaching summer months will In Lashkar Gah, the provincial bring with them volumes in line, if capital, AOG continue to express HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime not above, those recorded last their presence and while generally year. ineffective, these efforts are likely ard 2 man motorcycle borne ‘hit teams’. The While this period brought with it to continue, if not increase, in light of the planned upcoming various types of attacks have occurred both the standard incident type (IEDs, within the city and the surrounding environs direct attacks) and distribution transition of the city. Recent tactics have included indirect fire and primarily reflect opportunities to present (districts flanking the Helmand the impression of insecurity (for limited tactical River valley) there were a few attacks (RPG and rockets), IEDs, and direct attacks against ANP, as investment), and serve as part of the counter- noteworthy occurrences that fell narrative to the language of transition. outside these trends. In the first, well as the use of the now stand-

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THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Daykondi Panjshir NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Badakshan Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 contact: This is because we [email protected] do not know enough EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) about the area to Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 comment on the sig- Naseer - [email protected] - 077 2546 242 nificance of the inci- ANSO is managed by an NGO dents occurring Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) there. feedback, good or bad, let Vacant - [email protected] 0796 688 416 them know on: Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 [email protected] If you can help us understand the prov- ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) ince better, please Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 contact us. ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / ANCOP-Afghan Nation- al Civil Order Police / AOG- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Armed Opposition Group / Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghani- stan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Ex- plosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / PSC-Private Security Company ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device / PDO- Private Development Organisa- tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- District Shadow Governor (IEA) / APRP-Afghan Peace and Re- integration Program