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IRAQ Displacement in Southern Governorates Babylon, Kerbala, Najaf, Qadissiya & Wassit, January 2015 SITUATION OVERVIEW

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IRAQ Displacement in Southern Governorates Babylon, Kerbala, Najaf, Qadissiya & Wassit, January 2015 SITUATION OVERVIEW IRAQ Displacement in Southern Governorates Babylon, Kerbala, Najaf, Qadissiya & Wassit, January 2015 SITUATION OVERVIEW Summary The second wave saw IDPs arriving from Ninewa, following the spread of violence on Escalating insecurity in much of northern to the Ninewa plains. The last wave included and central Iraq since January 2014 a continued, but smaller stream of arrivals has caused the internal displacement of from Ninewa and an increase in IDPs from approximately 1.9 million persons across Anbar. the country. Iraq’s southern governorates, including Babylon, Kerbala, Najaf, Qadissiya The majority of IDPs in these governorates and Wassit, have for the most part not been live in public buildings and collective shelters, directly exposed to the conflict but have with the remainder mostly renting or hosted instead received a large influx of Internally by families. Although the assessed area is Displaced Persons (IDPs). A total of 38,350 largely accessible to humanitarian actors, displaced families now reside across all five relatively little assistance has been delivered assessed governorates, with the majority in to date compared to northern ares. Kerbala and Najaf. Host communities have thus far been largely IDPs in the five assessed governorates resilient to the added pressure of displaced predominantly originate from Anbar and populations, with little rise in unemployment Ninewa, and arrived in three distinct phases: and limited food shortages. However, the before June; between June and September; surge in populations has stretched and will and from September. The first wave was continue to stretch local services. CONTENTS characterised by an influx of IDPs from This report provides an overview of Methodology p2; Displacement Anbar where fighting has been ongoing displacement trends and the priority needs of Trends p2; Access to Basic Needs p4; between Armed Groups (AGs) and the communities hosting IDPs. It should be read Conclusion p7. Iraqi government since December 2013. alongside dashboards for each governorate. METHODOLOGY DISPLACEMENT TRENDS All IDP figures used in this report are from the The IOM DTM reports that a total of 38,350 IDP families have fled to Babylon, Kerbala, IOM DTM. The objective of this assessment Najaf, Qadissiya and Wassit. All five governorates have received an influx of IDPs was to gather information on the conditions in seeking refuge from the escalating conflict in northern and central Iraq. Najaf and Kerbala communities hosting IDPs as a result of the have the heaviest caseloads of 13,602 and 11,125 displaced families respectively. Only conflict, in Babylon, Kerbala, Najaf, Qadissiya Babylon has been subject to direct fighting in its northern territories, and therefore is and Wassit governorates, and to further qualify and confirm IOM DTM findings. the only governorate of the five assessed to have witnessed both internal and external displacement. The assessment was based on group discussions and key informant (KI) interviews with host communities. REACH selected Displacement Phases individual participants based on criteria relative PHASE 1: January-May 2014, displacement from Anbar. Throughout the to the research question, in order to gain reliable first half of 2014, fighting between armed groups and the Iraqi government in Anbar and relevant information. A total of 117 group discussions and interviews were held, 20–21 governorate spurred a steady stream of IDPs seeking refuge elsewhere in Iraq. interviews in Kerbala, Najaf and Wassit, and 33 Half the IDPs fleeing from Anbar in the assessed governorates settled in Kerbala because interviews in Qadissiya. 16 interviews and 14 it was closer and perceived safer than Babylon. Most of these families travelled in family group discussions were held in Babylon. and/or convoy units using private or rented vehicles. By the end of May the overwhelming LIMITATIONS majority of displaced families living in these governorates orginated from Anbar. Najaf also All interviews were with host community KIs. hosted a number of families from Ninewa, while Qadissiya hosted IDPs from Babylon, KIs were asked specific questions about the Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk. situation for IDPs and the host community, as well as on the overall situation. Throughout the PHASE 2: June-September 2014, displacement from Ninewa. During June report, findings refer either to IDPs, hosts, or to and July armed groupd rapidly expanded their presence in north eastern and central Iraq, both population groups. As data collected was including the takeover of Mosul City on 6 June and intense fighting in Tal Afar on 16 June. based on purposive sampling, findings cannot This threatened and marginalised non-Sunni ethno-religious groups living in Tal Afar and be statistically generalised to the governorate the Ninewa Plans, prompting an exodus towards the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and level, but provide a general overview. southern Iraq. In particular, towards the end of July an increasing number of Shabak 2 Figure 1: Displacement phases between January and December 2014 Total number of IDPs in governorate Number of new IDP arrivals Governorate of origin of IDPs Phase 1: January-May 2014 Phase 2: June-September 2014 Phase 3: September-December 2014 and Turkmen Shia Minorities from Ninewa the Iran-Iraq border, and to relocate even government to travel to and settle in the arrived in Shia-majority governorates further south of the city. From 3 August south rather than the KRI. of southern and central Iraq, choosing 2013, violence spread further into the PHASE 3: September-December traditional pilgrimige routes and religious Ninewa Plains, towars Sinjar, Zummar, 2014, Displacement from Ninewa sites as their destination (see Map 3). and areas to the north and east of Mosul. and Anbar. The period from mid- This resulted in a third, largest and fastest, Most families would travel for several September to the start of December saw wave of displacement. The majority of days, renting cars or buses and driving a continued but reduced stream of IDP those who travelled towards southern in convoy. Many took routes through the arrivals from Ninewa in the assessed governorates were Shabak and Turkmen KRI, via Erbil or Sulaymaniyah (some via southern Iraqi governorates. Although Shia, using similar routes to those Kirkuk) and then through travelled through some fighting continues in northern and outlined in Phase 2. During this period Khanaquin district towards Baghdad central Iraq, most of the families able to many displaced families were promised or Basrah. Increased insecurity in and move appear to have done so at the start a monthly incentive from the central Iraqi around Baghdad forced more IDPs to use of the crisis. 3 The IDPs who fled Ninewa in August and ACCESS TO BASIC the lack of privacy and lighting, particularly Anbar in September and October are for women and children. For example, especially vulnerable. While wealthier NEEDS showers and latrines in informal shelters families were able to afford to leave earlier are rarely lockable, lighted or separated in the year, the relatively newly displaced Shelter by gender.2 These IDP families also face moved as a last resort and have few Host communities reported that only a the risk of eviction with the start of the resources left. minority of IDPs is living in open air in academic year (which was due to begin Moreover, as seen in Map 4, the Wassit, Babylon and Qadissiya. These in September but has in some cases been displacement during these two periods families are the most vulnerable and in postponed to December) or as landowners occurred immediately after respective need of immediate assistance. Exposure start to claim rent. This could force IDPs crises, indicating instant and spontaneous and lack of household facilities such as to resort to makeshift shelters or open air movement and rendering them particularly stoves for heating and cooking, will be sleeping arrangements if they lack the vulnerable. While these IDPs are generally exacerbated during the winter months (for resources or personal support network for more vulnerable than many families example an average daily minimum of private accommodation. displaced in July, who were able to around 8 degrees celcius and 24 mm of Many IDP families across the assessed prepare for their displacement and bring rainfall in February in Qadissiya). These governorates Iraq were reportedly more belongings, many of these IDPs who households unlikely to be able to afford renting or being hosted–especially in arrived in the south before August were sufficient food and medicines. Kerbala, Qadissiya and Wassit. IDPs also in critical need. The majority of IDPs in Najaf and Babylon, residing in rented accomodation or Months later, these IDPs are now facing and large proportions in the remaining staying with friends or relatives are in less protracted displacement. With initial three governorates were known to be immediate need of assistance, but as the savings becoming rapidly exhausted, many living in collective shelters (including arrival of IDPs increases competition for of these IDPs are resorting to prolonged schools and mosques). Collective shelters jobs in host communities, and damage to negative coping mechanisms, with little seldom provide adequate access to water, transport infrastructure harms businesses, access to humanitarian assistance. sanitation, electrical and heating facilities. the ability to pay rent is unsustainable and They also raise protection concerns due to could encourage IDPs to relocate to less formal shelter arrangements. 1 NRC Safety Audits, August 2014. 4 Both IDP and host community populations times per week, and the majority in Wassit 62% 9% 11% in all assessed governorates, apart from had limited access on a weekly basis. The O% 11% Babylon and Wassit, were reportedly remaining governorates typically faced 4% mostly able to access electricity for more fuel shortages on a monthly or sometimes 4% than ten hours a day via the main network. weekly basis. Fuel shortages will increase 6% 30% In Babylon many households had access the price of fuel and risk inhibiting the 13% 21% 65% between 6 and 10 hours only per day and ability to meet cooking and heating needs.
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