International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq

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International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq HCR/PC/ May 2019 HCR/PC/IRQ/2019/05_Rev.1. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO PEOPLE FLEEING THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ Table of Contents I. Executive Summary .......................................................................................... 6 1) Refugee Protection under the 1951 Convention Criteria and Main Categories of Claim .... 6 2) Broader UNHCR Mandate Criteria, Regional Instruments and Complementary Forms of Protection ............................................................................................................................. 7 3) Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative (IFA/IRA) .............................................................. 7 4) Exclusion Considerations .................................................................................................... 8 5) Position on Forced Returns ................................................................................................. 9 II. Main Developments in Iraq since 2017 ............................................................. 9 A. Political Developments ........................................................................................................... 9 1) May 2018 Parliamentary Elections ...................................................................................... 9 2) September 2018 Kurdistan Parliamentary Elections ......................................................... 10 3) October 2017 Independence Referendum ........................................................................ 11 B. Security Situation .................................................................................................................. 12 1) Overview ............................................................................................................................ 12 2) Security in Areas with Continued ISIS Presence or Influence ........................................... 16 3) Security in Baghdad ........................................................................................................... 19 4) Security in the Southern Governorates ............................................................................. 20 5) Security in the Kurdistan Region ....................................................................................... 22 C. Civilian Casualties................................................................................................................. 22 D. Forced Displacement and Returns ....................................................................................... 24 1) Internal Displacement ........................................................................................................ 24 2) External Displacement ....................................................................................................... 25 3) IDP Returns ....................................................................................................................... 25 4) Returns from Abroad ......................................................................................................... 29 E. Human Rights Situation ........................................................................................................ 29 1) State Actors ....................................................................................................................... 30 2) Non-State Actors ............................................................................................................... 39 3) The Ability and Willingness of the State to Protect Civilians from Human Rights Abuses 41 F. Humanitarian Situation ......................................................................................................... 46 1) Shelter ................................................................................................................................ 49 2) Livelihoods ......................................................................................................................... 50 3) Food Security ..................................................................................................................... 52 4) Health ................................................................................................................................. 53 5) Education ........................................................................................................................... 54 6) Water, Sanitation, and Electricity ....................................................................................... 56 III. Assessment of International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Iraq . 58 A. Refugee Protection under the 1951 Convention Criteria and Main Categories of Claims ... 58 2 UNHCR / May, 2019 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO PEOPLE FLEEING THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 1) Persons Wrongly Suspected of Supporting ISIS ............................................................... 59 2) Persons Associated with, or Perceived as Supportive of, the Government ...................... 66 3) Persons Opposing, or Perceived to Be Opposing, the Government or those Affiliated with the Government ................................................................................................................. 70 4) Persons Opposing, or Perceived to Be Opposing, the KRG or Those Affiliated with the KRG 73 5) Members of Religious and Minority Ethnic Groups, and Persons Contravening Strict Islamic Rules .................................................................................................................................. 74 6) Journalists and other Media Professionals who Engage in Critical Reporting on Political or other Sensitive Issues ........................................................................................................ 83 7) Humanitarian Workers ....................................................................................................... 85 8) Women and Girls with Certain Profiles or in Specific Circumstances ............................... 85 9) Children with Certain Profiles or in Specific Circumstances .............................................. 96 10) Persons of Diverse Sexual Orientations and/or Gender Identities ............................... 100 11) Individuals Targeted as Part of Tribal Conflict Resolution, Including Blood Feuds ...... 106 12) Palestinian Refugees .................................................................................................... 109 B. Refugee Status under UNHCR’s Broader Mandate Criteria or Regional Instruments, or Eligibility for Complementary Forms of Protection .............................................................. 112 1) Refugee Status under UNHCR’s Broader Mandate Criteria and Regional Instruments . 113 2) Eligibility for Subsidiary Protection under the EU Qualification Directive ........................ 114 C. Considerations Relating to the Application of an Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative (IFA/IRA) ............................................................................................................................. 116 1) Relevance Analysis ......................................................................................................... 117 2) Reasonableness Analysis ................................................................................................ 120 3) Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative in the KR-I ........................................................ 122 D. Exclusion Considerations ................................................................................................... 126 IV. Position on Forced Returns .......................................................................... 128 UNHCR / May, 2019 3 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO PEOPLE FLEEING THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ List of Abbreviations AFP Agence France-Presse AP Associated Press AQI Al-Qa’eda in Iraq BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CEIP Carnegie Endowment for International Peace CERAH Geneva Centre for Education and Research in Humanitarian Action CIVIC Center for Civilians in Conflict CJMB Crescent Journal of Medical and Biological Sciences CPJ Committee to Protect Journalists CRC Committee on the Rights of the Child CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies CTC Combating Terrorism Center at West Point DIS Danish Immigration Service DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix DRC Danish Refugee Council DW Deutsche Welle EASO European Asylum Support Office ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations EPIC Education for Peace in Iraq Center ERW Explosive Remnants of War FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FGM/C Female Genital Mutilation / Cutting GCC Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf GC4HR Gulf Centre for Human Rights GDCVAW General Directorate to Combat Violence Against Women GPPI Global Public Policy Institute HLP Housing, Land and Property HRW Human Rights Watch IBC Iraq Body Count ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICG International Crisis Group ICP Iraqi Communist Party ICSSI Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDP Internally Displaced Person IED Improvised Explosive Device IFA/IRA Internal Flight Alternative / Internal Relocation Alternative IFJ International Federation of Journalists IHL International
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