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Fall 2015 Campaigning Fall 2015 Campaigning The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College Featured Essays Rain of Ruin: Operational Earthquake in Haiti: Design and the Pacific war, Application of GIS Mapping 1944 -1945 Technology to Coordinate Relief Efforts International Code of Conduct: A Cybersecurity Panacea or The Accidental Counter- Pandora’s Box? Guerrilla “That All May Labor As One” Fall 2015 Campaigning Fall 2015 https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69 Commandant, Joint Forces Staff College RDML Brad Williamson, USN Dean, Joint Forces Staff College Dr. Patricia B. Strait Director, Joint Advanced Director, Joint and Combined Warfighting School Warfighting School Col Peter E. Yeager, USMC CAPT John M. Maxwell, USN Director, Joint Command, Director, Joint Continuing Control and Information and Distance Education Operations School School COL Maxwell Thibodeaux, USA Col Tricia L. York, USAFR Editor Dr. Daniel H. McCauley Editorial Board: Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel Dr. Frederick R. Kienle Assistant Professor Stephen W. Dennis Cover image: Students of JCWS Seminar 13, Class 15-03 apply design concepts during a seminar exercise at NSA Norfolk, VA on Oct 20, 2015. Photo by Daniel H. McCauley. Campaigning Fall 2015 i In this issue of Campaigning: Editor’s Corner……………………………………………………………………………..iii Dr. Daniel H. McCauley Features Earthquake in Haiti: Application of GIS Mapping Technology to Coordinate Relief Efforts………………………………………………………….….….1 Mary S. Bell The Accidental Counter Guerrilla………………………………………………………..10 Mike Bennett Rain of Ruin: Operational Design and the Pacific War, 1944-1945……………………13 COL Gerard P. Tertychny International Code of Conduct: A Cybersecurity Panacea or Pandora’s Box?…………………………………………………………………………….22 MAJ Amanda Current and Lt Col Bryan Redash Commentary The Challenging Art of Modern Mission Command ……………………………………32 MAJ Johannes Castro, Maj Adam Knox, and Maj Scott Worth The Falklands Campaign: A Failure in Modern Joint Common Operating Precepts ……………………………………………………….……42 LTC Phillip Borders, Maj Kelly Montier, and LtCol Michael Nakonieczny The Foresight Factor Using Strategic Foresight and Systems Thinking Analyses to Craft a U.S. Strategy for the African Sahel and Maghreb………………….….…….50 Col Robert Pope, LTC Jeffrey Fair, and Maj Dale Fenton Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites, or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations. Campaigning Fall 2015 ii Editor’s Corner Educating the Joint force is the sole mission hindsight. In her essay, “Earthquake in of the Joint Forces Staff College. A key Haiti: Application of GIS Mapping component of the College’s educational Technology to Coordinate Relief Efforts,” approach is to develop in our students the Professor Bell analyzes the lessons learned ability to understand the concepts, from the 2010 Haiti earthquake and principles, structures, and processes that advocates for the use of advanced mapping Joint professionals apply or operate within software in future humanitarian relief now and in the future. On the surface, efforts. Mr. Mike Bennett provides a developing an understanding of Joint historical essay titled, “The Accidental concepts appears a relatively simple Counter Guerrilla,” that draws lessons from educational task: read, discuss, and apply. In successful counterinsurgencies in El reality, developing an understanding of Salvador, Colombia, and the Philippines anything is far more difficult and time- from which he advocates for a template to consuming than many practitioners imagine. apply to future counterinsurgency To develop an understanding in the manner operations. In his essay, “Rain of Ruin: in which General Martin Dempsey has Operational Design and the Pacific War, described in his desired Leader Attributes 1944-1945,” Colonel Gerard Tertychny for Joint Force 2020, the student must applies the current Joint Publication 5-0, examine the past, leveraging hindsight to Joint Operation Planning, operational design comprehend how today’s environment concept to the U.S. Pacific Theater of War, developed and why; it requires the student to 1944-1945, providing insights into the analyze the current environment, leveraging evolving nature of planning processes and insight to gain a deeper appreciation for the concepts. Lieutenant Colonel Phillip elements, purpose(s), and interrelationships Borders, Major Kelly Montier, and of the present system; and, finally, it Lieutenant Colonel Michael Nakonieczny requires the student to analyze trends, collaborate on an essay titled, “The leveraging foresight to develop the ability to Falklands Campaign: A Failure in Modern recognize the possibilities, plausibilities, and Joint Common Operating Precepts.” The probabilities of a dynamic future. In short, to authors use the Falkland Islands campaign to operate successfully in today’s global study the application of Joint common security environment students need not only operating principles as described in the study the lessons learned, but the “lessons to current Joint Publication 3-0, Joint be learned” as well. Operations. The Fall 2015 edition of Campaigning Two of this edition’s essays leverage the addresses these three components of second component of understanding, insight, understanding: hindsight, insight, and by focusing on contemporary issues. Major foresight. Assistant Professor Mary Bell Amanda Current and Lieutenant Colonel presents the first of four essays that leverage Bryan Redash examine the Shanghai iii Campaigning Fall 2015 Cooperation Agreement and the proposed tools using a specific student-selected issue cyber Code of Conduct. They argue that as for context. Although the emphasis is on the the leader of the Western consensus, the use of the tools, the analysis and U.S. should refrain from endorsing it. Major assessments are noteworthy. Colonel Rob Johannes Castro, Major Adam Knox, and Pope, Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Fair, and Major Scott Worth examine another Major Dale Fenton provide the initial essay, contemporary issue, mission command, “Using Strategic Foresight and Systems discussing the implications of the concept Thinking Analyses to Craft a U.S. Strategy for senior military leaders. for the African Sahel and Maghreb,” as they apply selected foresight tools in the analysis Finally, this edition of Campaigning and assessment of U.S. policy, and develop introduces a new feature, “The Foresight a strategy for the African Sahel and Factor,” that focuses on the third component Maghreb. of understanding: foresight. The Foresight Factor is dedicated to increasing the Joint We hope you enjoy this edition of community’s awareness of strategic Campaigning. You can let me know what foresight and some of the tools available to you think by emailing me the Joint practitioner. These essays are the at [email protected]. products of one of the Joint and Combined Warfighting Schools electives that focuses Daniel H. McCauley primarily on the application of foresight Editor Campaigning Fall 2015 iv Earthquake in Haiti: locate missing people or moving necessary Application of GIS Mapping supplies from a port of embarkation to a Technology to Coordinate Relief distribution center. The application of development and modernization theory is Efforts especially useful in helping understand the unique challenges underdeveloped nations By Assistant Professor Mary S. Bell such as Haiti face. Because the Haitian experience and view of the world is so Every American can tell you where different than most of the people helping they were when terrorists flew two airplanes them, these theories help those organizing into the World Trade Center in New York relief efforts in the future. In the midst of City on September 11, 2001. January 12, the crisis in Haiti, visionaries and 2010 holds the same significance for volunteers found new applications for Haitians and is a day that will not be mapping software that were critical to forgotten by the Haitian people. That day a providing timely information to relief magnitude 7.0 earthquake brought the small workers. It’s possible to understand a variety island nation to its knees. The epicenter of of challenges relief workers faced in Haiti the earthquake was approximately 10-15 after the earthquake through a brief miles from Port au Prince, the nation’s description of Haiti’s history, application of capital city, and photos and video of the development and modernization theory, and immediate aftermath made the world take a broad overview of the application of some notice. Most of the devastation was mapping technology used during earthquake concentrated in Port au Prince, with an recovery. estimated total population of 2.2 million people. Virtually everyone in the capital city The Violent and Difficult Haitian suffered directly from the earthquake with Experience more than an estimated 300,000 people Before the disastrous earthquake hit killed and 1.5 million people left homeless.1 in 2010, more than 70% of Haitians were One young teenager, Darlene Etienne, “was living on less than $2 a day and 86% of the entombed in crumbled concrete and twisted people in Port au Prince were living
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