Campaigning The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College
Featured Essays
Rain of Ruin: Operational Earthquake in Haiti: Design and the Pacific war, Application of GIS Mapping 1944 -1945 Technology to Coordinate Relief Efforts International Code of Conduct: A Cybersecurity Panacea or The Accidental Counter- Pandora’s Box? Guerrilla
“That All May Labor As One”
Fall 2015 Campaigning Fall 2015 https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69
Commandant, Joint Forces Staff College RDML Brad Williamson, USN
Dean, Joint Forces Staff College Dr. Patricia B. Strait
Director, Joint Advanced Director, Joint and Combined Warfighting School Warfighting School Col Peter E. Yeager, USMC CAPT John M. Maxwell, USN
Director, Joint Command, Director, Joint Continuing Control and Information and Distance Education Operations School School COL Maxwell Thibodeaux, USA Col Tricia L. York, USAFR
Editor
Dr. Daniel H. McCauley
Editorial Board: Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel Dr. Frederick R. Kienle Assistant Professor Stephen W. Dennis
Cover image: Students of JCWS Seminar 13, Class 15-03 apply design concepts during a seminar exercise at NSA Norfolk, VA on Oct 20, 2015. Photo by Daniel H. McCauley.
Campaigning Fall 2015 i In this issue of Campaigning:
Editor’s Corner……………………………………………………………………………..iii Dr. Daniel H. McCauley
Features Earthquake in Haiti: Application of GIS Mapping Technology to Coordinate Relief Efforts………………………………………………………….….….1 Mary S. Bell
The Accidental Counter Guerrilla………………………………………………………..10 Mike Bennett
Rain of Ruin: Operational Design and the Pacific War, 1944-1945……………………13 COL Gerard P. Tertychny
International Code of Conduct: A Cybersecurity Panacea or Pandora’s Box?…………………………………………………………………………….22 MAJ Amanda Current and Lt Col Bryan Redash
Commentary The Challenging Art of Modern Mission Command ……………………………………32 MAJ Johannes Castro, Maj Adam Knox, and Maj Scott Worth
The Falklands Campaign: A Failure in Modern Joint Common Operating Precepts ……………………………………………………….……42 LTC Phillip Borders, Maj Kelly Montier, and LtCol Michael Nakonieczny
The Foresight Factor Using Strategic Foresight and Systems Thinking Analyses to Craft a U.S. Strategy for the African Sahel and Maghreb………………….….…….50 Col Robert Pope, LTC Jeffrey Fair, and Maj Dale Fenton
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites, or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.
Campaigning Fall 2015 ii Editor’s Corner
Educating the Joint force is the sole mission hindsight. In her essay, “Earthquake in of the Joint Forces Staff College. A key Haiti: Application of GIS Mapping component of the College’s educational Technology to Coordinate Relief Efforts,” approach is to develop in our students the Professor Bell analyzes the lessons learned ability to understand the concepts, from the 2010 Haiti earthquake and principles, structures, and processes that advocates for the use of advanced mapping Joint professionals apply or operate within software in future humanitarian relief now and in the future. On the surface, efforts. Mr. Mike Bennett provides a developing an understanding of Joint historical essay titled, “The Accidental concepts appears a relatively simple Counter Guerrilla,” that draws lessons from educational task: read, discuss, and apply. In successful counterinsurgencies in El reality, developing an understanding of Salvador, Colombia, and the Philippines anything is far more difficult and time- from which he advocates for a template to consuming than many practitioners imagine. apply to future counterinsurgency To develop an understanding in the manner operations. In his essay, “Rain of Ruin: in which General Martin Dempsey has Operational Design and the Pacific War, described in his desired Leader Attributes 1944-1945,” Colonel Gerard Tertychny for Joint Force 2020, the student must applies the current Joint Publication 5-0, examine the past, leveraging hindsight to Joint Operation Planning, operational design comprehend how today’s environment concept to the U.S. Pacific Theater of War, developed and why; it requires the student to 1944-1945, providing insights into the analyze the current environment, leveraging evolving nature of planning processes and insight to gain a deeper appreciation for the concepts. Lieutenant Colonel Phillip elements, purpose(s), and interrelationships Borders, Major Kelly Montier, and of the present system; and, finally, it Lieutenant Colonel Michael Nakonieczny requires the student to analyze trends, collaborate on an essay titled, “The leveraging foresight to develop the ability to Falklands Campaign: A Failure in Modern recognize the possibilities, plausibilities, and Joint Common Operating Precepts.” The probabilities of a dynamic future. In short, to authors use the Falkland Islands campaign to operate successfully in today’s global study the application of Joint common security environment students need not only operating principles as described in the study the lessons learned, but the “lessons to current Joint Publication 3-0, Joint be learned” as well. Operations.
The Fall 2015 edition of Campaigning Two of this edition’s essays leverage the addresses these three components of second component of understanding, insight, understanding: hindsight, insight, and by focusing on contemporary issues. Major foresight. Assistant Professor Mary Bell Amanda Current and Lieutenant Colonel presents the first of four essays that leverage Bryan Redash examine the Shanghai
iii Campaigning Fall 2015 Cooperation Agreement and the proposed tools using a specific student-selected issue cyber Code of Conduct. They argue that as for context. Although the emphasis is on the the leader of the Western consensus, the use of the tools, the analysis and U.S. should refrain from endorsing it. Major assessments are noteworthy. Colonel Rob Johannes Castro, Major Adam Knox, and Pope, Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Fair, and Major Scott Worth examine another Major Dale Fenton provide the initial essay, contemporary issue, mission command, “Using Strategic Foresight and Systems discussing the implications of the concept Thinking Analyses to Craft a U.S. Strategy for senior military leaders. for the African Sahel and Maghreb,” as they apply selected foresight tools in the analysis Finally, this edition of Campaigning and assessment of U.S. policy, and develop introduces a new feature, “The Foresight a strategy for the African Sahel and Factor,” that focuses on the third component Maghreb. of understanding: foresight. The Foresight Factor is dedicated to increasing the Joint We hope you enjoy this edition of community’s awareness of strategic Campaigning. You can let me know what foresight and some of the tools available to you think by emailing me the Joint practitioner. These essays are the at [email protected]. products of one of the Joint and Combined Warfighting Schools electives that focuses Daniel H. McCauley primarily on the application of foresight Editor
Campaigning Fall 2015 iv Earthquake in Haiti: locate missing people or moving necessary Application of GIS Mapping supplies from a port of embarkation to a Technology to Coordinate Relief distribution center. The application of development and modernization theory is Efforts especially useful in helping understand the unique challenges underdeveloped nations By Assistant Professor Mary S. Bell such as Haiti face. Because the Haitian experience and view of the world is so Every American can tell you where different than most of the people helping they were when terrorists flew two airplanes them, these theories help those organizing into the World Trade Center in New York relief efforts in the future. In the midst of City on September 11, 2001. January 12, the crisis in Haiti, visionaries and 2010 holds the same significance for volunteers found new applications for Haitians and is a day that will not be mapping software that were critical to forgotten by the Haitian people. That day a providing timely information to relief magnitude 7.0 earthquake brought the small workers. It’s possible to understand a variety island nation to its knees. The epicenter of of challenges relief workers faced in Haiti the earthquake was approximately 10-15 after the earthquake through a brief miles from Port au Prince, the nation’s description of Haiti’s history, application of capital city, and photos and video of the development and modernization theory, and immediate aftermath made the world take a broad overview of the application of some notice. Most of the devastation was mapping technology used during earthquake concentrated in Port au Prince, with an recovery. estimated total population of 2.2 million people. Virtually everyone in the capital city The Violent and Difficult Haitian suffered directly from the earthquake with Experience more than an estimated 300,000 people Before the disastrous earthquake hit killed and 1.5 million people left homeless.1 in 2010, more than 70% of Haitians were One young teenager, Darlene Etienne, “was living on less than $2 a day and 86% of the entombed in crumbled concrete and twisted people in Port au Prince were living in slums steel. All around her, the sprawling city of which mostly consisted of poorly Port-au-Prince was in ruins.”2 However, constructed concrete buildings. Only half of some, like Etienne, were rescued from the the 2.2 million people in Port au Prince had rubble. Her family had given up hope until access to latrines and only one-third had after a staggering 15 days buried in the access to running water.4 The road network rubble, someone finally heard her cries for was poor, at best. The ports to the west of help. She recalled being coherent and awake the capital city were the main source of hearing people going by, but nobody heard transportation of goods to and from the her cries for two weeks because of the nation and they were virtually destroyed by “cacophony of rumbling equipment and the earthquake. Haiti is roughly the size of other noises in those desperate days.”3 Massachusetts, yet only a small percentage Etienne’s unique story of hope and survival of it has serviceable infrastructure. Most are uncommon although relief efforts from people travel by foot or bicycle making it around the world were enormous. The difficult to move goods to and from the rural improvements and creative use of areas. technologies and resources are critical for rescue workers whether they are trying to
Campaigning Fall 2015 1 In addition to poor infrastructure, relief workers were disappointed with over half of Haitians are illiterate.5 Print Haitian recovery following the earthquake. media is minimally produced and consumed Applying Development and because the people can’t read. Television is Modernization Theory minimally available due to poor Haiti’s only true form of mass infrastructure with sporadic access to communication is via radio programs of just electricity. The only form of mass media about every variety including sports, with a high penetration rate is radio. The politics, religion, music, and news. The people are able to power radios with current Haitian President, Michel Martelly, electricity, batteries and solar power. was widely popular as a radio music star in a Approximately 96% of Haitians listen to the local music style called Kompa. He had no radio every day making it the most common political experience when he ran for form of media. Nearly 42% of people in president in 2010, but his millions of Haiti have mobile phones and most of those dedicated followers voted him into office.8 are used for multiple purposes including The power of media is strong in Haiti, tuning in to radio stations. Illiteracy allowing Haitians to express themselves contributes to the low use of mobile phone through low-tech and low-cost means. SMS technology and only 8.4% use the Theorists Elihu Katz and George Wedell internet.6 explain that radio broadcasts are vitally All these conditions explain why important in giving Haitians a sense of recovery from the devastating 7.0 magnitude national identity and providing a forum for a earthquake has been so difficult. Most of the radio music star to be elected as president. land lacks the soil it needs to grow crops and Katz and Wedell wrote, “The most trees, governmental leaders have historically important use of radio in the promotion of terrorized their people, the infrastructure is national integration is its encouragement of very poor, and the people are illiterate. the national language.”9 They go on the Further hindering recovery was a lack of a stress the importance of radio in emerging centralized government to lead the effort. markets is due to its very low-cost access. The earthquake destroyed the Presidential Katz and Wedell’s theory on the need for the Palace and killed an estimated 16,000 civil proliferation of radio in a developing nation service employees. A report issued by an is applicable to Haiti, but it’s harder to internationally recognized non- evaluate how Haitians are able to utilize governmental organization (NGO), Oxfam other forms of technology. International “found that dysfunctional Due to high illiteracy rates and governance, legal hurdles and a lack of long- minimal use of technology, visualizing term strategic planning on the part of spatial data can be especially difficult in Haitian officials has hobbled the recovery nations such as Haiti. Yet, in the developed effort and delayed basic construction world, the creation of online mapping projects.”7 applications has become a major global Individuals, foreign governments, industry. These applications are commonly and charitable organizations either went to called Geospatial Information Systems Haiti or committed valuable resources to (GIS) and allow users to quickly import a Haiti to help with recovery efforts. variety of data formats such as geospatial Dissecting the Haitian experience and data into online maps and share this correctly applying developmental and information to assess real-world problems. modernization theory will help explain why Use of GIS technologies was important in
Campaigning Fall 2015 2 the Haiti earthquake recovery efforts through fund raising efforts, but the voice allowing relief workers to find and rescue they are given is one that is constructed to injured people, determine building damage emphasize their need. This was especially and track large population movements. evident in the fund raising models used by There were many new applications of GIS organizations in response to the Haiti during the disaster that are being further disaster. It was not a portrayal of the developed to help during relief efforts in subaltern as they feel about themselves and other parts of the world. how they see their place in the world, but a Understanding that different cultures constructed view by outsiders to enhance the have a different view of time and space is portrayal of a large community of subaltern one of the most difficult sociological Haitians as in dire need of help. concepts for humans to absorb. How most of Theorist Michel de Certeau wrote us see the world is related to how we view how the simplest things from giving to power in the world. The earliest maps directions to reading a tour map are displayed power by placing continents like indicative of how one sees the world.12 Europe at the center of the map and making Some people are used to orienting the depiction larger than other landmasses. themselves using cardinal directions and Use of GIS changes the way the world is others orient themselves using landmarks. portrayed discarding centuries of this subtle There are people who consider 10 miles a form of power. GIS allows individuals to far distance and others who would consider manipulate data and rotate the world anything within 100 miles as the local area. according to their perception. However, It’s important to understand how different theorist David Bodenhamer recognizes the populations have a different view of the biggest problem is that “Spatial technologies world and applying GIS to activities such as in general, and especially GIS, are tracking large population movements expensive, complex, and cumbersome, doesn’t explain why the populations moved despite recent advances that have driven from one place to another nor does it down costs and simplified the user provide insight into when they may move experience.”10 GIS inherently allows each again. GIS may be used to determine the user to display and manipulate data using level of building damage resulting from an their personal view of the world, but only earthquake, but it doesn’t help move people those with access to the technology have the out of or away from the building. The use of ability to reimagine spatial relationships. GIS provides information, but the analysis Intersecting spatial relationships of of how to use and apply that information is different cultures is more common as the the next important step in determining the world globalizes. Radhika Ganjalla theorizes effectiveness of GIS. that the globalization “discourse represents Developmental theorist Fabienne technologies as enabling the bringing Darling-Wolf emphasized several important together of the ‘good people’ in the concepts applicable to those trying to developing countries to help the poor and understand and help the Haitians. First she disadvantaged of the third world. This explained that when trying to frame how discourse does not tell the other side of someone else sees the world, you must have globalization.”11 Ganjalla emphasizes that a good understanding of your own biases. the subaltern - people who are socially, She also emphasized the importance of a politically and geographically outside of the deep understanding of other cultures that can power structure - are often given a voice only be obtained by first-hand experience.13
Campaigning Fall 2015 3 For relief workers to provide immediate small group. They reached out to The disaster relief they need a basic Fletcher School of Tufts and “By the end of understanding of what they will be facing. the week, [they] had trained over 100 To have more impact and a longer lasting graduate and undergraduate students on how effect, it is critical that those people wanting to monitor social and mainstream media for to provide aid understand the history and relevant, mappable content. Due to poor culture of Haiti. People who understand the imagery of Port au Prince, hundreds of Haitian culture are more equipped to use volunteers from around the world lent their technology to predict population movements expertise to create the most detailed even during a crisis. Darling-Wolf’s theory roadmap of Haiti ever produced.”14 Meier must be constantly revisited to achieve the called their volunteer relief efforts the best results. The more relief workers and Ushahidi Haiti Project (UHP). charitable organizations understand about Relief organizations heard about the culture, religion and language of the UHP and sponsored an international SMS people they are trying to help, the more number used by the Haitian Diaspora and successful they will be. other people with contacts in Haiti. Digicel, the largest mobile phone company in Haiti How Mapping Technology was Used to offered UHP a free SMS number and helped Support the Relief Effort promote the use of it for people within Haiti When developers and users of GIS to send updates on their location and level of technologies work to see the world through need. The word was spread using local radio different perspectives of space and time, stations. Another network of language they are able to create new angles of experts translated the SMS messages and viewing and incorporating information. Tweets posted in the native Haitian language Different types of GIS technologies and of Creole to English, enabling the volunteers mapping data illustrates this point. Two at UHP to map the actionable data. types of free online, GIS software that were Operators from the US Coast Guard (USCG) used to help relief efforts in Haiti were and Department of Defense (DoD) heard Ushahidi and Google Earth. about UHP and contacted The Fletcher Ushahidi, which means testimony or School. UHP volunteers quickly responded witness in Swahili, was initially developed and linked the USCG and DoD into their to map reports of violence and peace efforts network. Users from both the USCG and the resulting from protests over the Kenyan DoD wrote testimonials of the importance of elections in 2008. A PhD student at Tufts the information mapped on Ushahidi and University, Patrick Meier, had friends how they were able to use it to find and conducting research in Haiti when the attend to critically-injured Haitians.15 earthquake struck. In an attempt to track his Figures 2 and 3 depict the UHP crisis map. friends, he launched a live crisis map of UHP was hugely successfully in providing Haiti using Ushahidi. Meier heard from his disaster mapping that was used by NGOs, friends in Haiti via SMS by midnight and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and learned they had survived the tragedy, but he US governmental organizations to deliver continued mapping the emergency tweets relief aid and to launch search and rescue and SMSs being transmitted by other operations. survivors. He enlisted the help of his fellow Meier created a network providing students and they began to help map the data information to those on the ground who as it came in. Soon it was too much for the could act upon it. This system saved lives
Campaigning Fall 2015 4 and demonstrated a new way to apply GIS in a disaster. Application of GIS this way has led to the use of the Ushahidi in other parts of the world during disasters and even “led to the launch of the Standby Volunteer Task Force (SBTF), a global network of 850+ volunteers in more than 80 countries around the world who use their live mapping skills to support humanitarian, human rights, development and media organizations.”16
Figure 3 - Ushahidi Haiti Project Map at the End of Operations19
There were other applications of GIS supporting Haiti earthquake relief efforts. Google Inc. used GIS to help in the relief effort, but their approach was different from Meier’s use of UHP. Immediately after the earthquake, Google Inc. obtained aerial imagery produced by the Open Skies mission and other aerial imagery platforms. The Open Skies aerial imagery mission is one example of missions flown by the US Figure 1 - Earthquake Intensity17 Government as part of the relief efforts. The 27-person mission crew flew on the Open Skies aircraft (OC-135) producing thousands of unclassified images of Haiti that were digitized and offered at no-cost to organizations that were able to use imagery for mapping and analysis of the devastation.20 Figures 4-8 are from the Open Skies mission flown on January 16, 2010.
Figure 2 - Close up of the Ushahidi Haiti map after 24 hours. Each number represents the individual number of reports within the area. Users could zoon in further to see the individual reports. Credit: UHP.18
Campaigning Fall 2015 5
Figure 4 - Projected Flight Path of the Open Skies Mission21
Figure 6 - Open Skies Team during the imagery collection mission over Haiti - Jan 16, 201023
Figure 5 - Flight Path of the Open Skies Mission While Collecting Imagery Near the Epicenter of the Earthquake22
Figure 7 – Open Skies Imagery: Port au Prince Port Image Depicts Both Damage and Masses of People Seeking Aide24
Campaigning Fall 2015 6 Another issue relief workers faced during relief efforts was large population movements out of Port au Prince following the earthquake. These movements made it difficult to deliver goods and services to people who needed them. Scientists were able to track these movements using mobile phone data. When the earthquake occurred, Haiti’s largest mobile phone company, Digicel, had 2.2 million users and approximately 90% coverage in the affected areas. Digicel provided the scientists anonymous data allowing them to track movements of users using geospatial- tracking systems. Since “mobile phone networks are relatively resilient to external shocks…”28 scientists were able to use this Figure 8 – Open Skies Imagery: Port au Prince Airport at Maximum Density of Airplanes Bringing method to track population movement, Relief Supplies and Relief Workers25 which peaked 19 days after the earthquake on January 31st. An estimated 630,000 The new images were added to the people who were present in Port au Prince free Google Earth online mapping software. on the day of the earthquake had not One use of these images was in conducting returned on the 19th day. This coincided with building damage assessments. Experts approximately 120,000 people moving into analyzed the before and after photos labeling the city who were not there the day of the buildings with a damage code that was earthquake leaving a total outflow of compared to ground survey data for 510,000 people on that day.29 accuracy. Accuracy of the analysts was assessed at 73%, which was as accurate as any other method of building damage evaluation and didn’t require travel to Haiti. Google Earth was simultaneously used to map geo-located crisis reports obtained through SMS. This data provided timely crowd-sourced damage patterns identifying the buildings with the most damage.26 It is estimated that 30,000 commercial and 250,000 private residences were either severely damaged or completely collapsed from the earthquake resulting in an estimated $14 billion total damage.27 These building damage assessments were important in establishing the priority of Figure 9 - Estimated Net Changes of the Port au Prince Population Following the Earthquake30 relief efforts. Google Inc. proved that by utilizing GIS, the assessment process could Large population movements were tracked be greatly streamlined in future disasters. for some time following the earthquake.
Campaigning Fall 2015 7 This data was compared to the data understanding of these features, relief efforts produced United Nations Population Fund using those technologies proved to be the (UNFPA), gathered mostly through most successful. The use of GIS household interviews, and the Haitian technologies such as Ushahidi and Google National Civil Protection Agency (NPCA), Earth to help create maps showing where primarily gathered by counting ship and bus relief efforts should take priority and mobile movements. The estimates were similar and phone tracking data to watch migration the technique using geospatial mobile phone patterns were vital in providing the right data was significantly less time consuming type of aid, at the right time and at the right and less expensive. The scientists were able place. It took creative thinking and creative to provide this timely data to relief application of advanced technologies organizations. This type of population applied to a nation with very little social, tracking was highly effective and could be economic and technological advancement. used in many parts of the world vulnerable These successes are good examples of the to large population migrations.31 possibility of future applications of GIS in both developing and developed nations. Conclusion When providing relief efforts to developing nations such as Haiti, Author Biography organizations must try to reach a basic Mary S. Bell is currently serving as an Assistant understanding of the environment in which Professor of the National Defense University’s Joint they are operating. Development and Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined modernization theories help inform the Warfighting School in Norfolk, Virginia. She has understanding of the environment by over 20 years of service in the US Army with explaining why Haitians see the world experience in Aviation and Intelligence. differently. By capitalizing on an
1 CNN World, “Haiti Earthquake Fast Facts,” 7, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to- February 28, 2014, know/the-daily-need/report-criticizes-haiti- http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/haiti- recovery-commission-led-by-bill-clinton/6187/ earthquake-fast-facts/ (accessed Oct 22, 2014). (accessed Oct 22, 2014). 2 Nicholas Garcia, “Darlene Etienne, Haiti 8 Paolo Woods, “In Haiti, ‘video has not killed the Earthquake Survivor ‘Miracle,’ Makes Full radio star’,” NBC News, Feb 2012, Recovery,” HuffingtonPost.com, Jan 11, 2011, http://photoblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/01/10 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/11/da 254366-in-haiti-video-has-not-killed-the-radio- rlene-etienne-haiti-earthquake- star?lite (accessed Aug 20, 2013). survivor_n_807403.html (accessed Dec 12, 2014). 9 Elihu Katz and George Wedell, Broadcasting in the 3 Ibid. Third World: Promise and Performance (Cambridge, 4 Disasters Emergency Committee, “Haiti Earthquake Mass: University Press, 1977) 171. Facts and Figures,” http://www.dec.org.uk/haiti- 10 David J. Bodenhamer, John Corrigan and Trevor earthquake-facts-and-figures (accessed Oct 22, M. Harris, eds, The Spatial Humanities: GIS and the 2014). Future of Humanities Scholarship (Bloomington, 5 Central Intelligence Agency, “Haiti.” Indiana University Press, 2010) 16. 6 InfoasAid, “Haiti: Media and Telecoms Landscape 11 Radhika Gajjala, ed. Cyberculture and the Guide October 2012,” Subaltern: Weavings of the Virtual and Real http://infoasaid.org/sites/infoasaid.org/files/haiti_med (Boulder: Lexington Books, 2013) 73. ia_guide_final_211012_0.pdf (accessed Aug 12, 12 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life 2013). (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 91- 7 Sal Gentile, “Report criticizes Haiti recovery 108. commission led by Bill Clinton,” PBS.org, January
Campaigning Fall 2015 8 Photo by Jamie McIntyre on Jan 12, 2010. (Released 13 Fabienne Darling-Wolf, “Negotiation and Position: on September 12, 2015). On the Need and Difficulty of Developing ‘Thicker 22 Ibid. Descriptions’,” Global Media Studies: Ethnographic 23 Ibid. Perspectives. Ed. Patrick Murphy and Marwan 24 Photo taken by OC-135 camera equipment on Kraidy, 2003, 109-124. January 12, 2010. LTC Mary Bell as Mission 14 Patrick Meier, “How Crisis Mapping Saved Lives Commander. (Released). 25 in Haiti,” National Geographic, Explorers Journal, Ibid. July 2, 2012, 26 C. Corbane, G. Lemoine, and M. Kauffman, http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/07/02 “Relationship between the spatial distribution of /crisis-mapping-haiti/ (accessed Oct 23, 2014). SMS messages reporting needs and building damage 15 Ibid. in 2010 Haiti disaster,” Natural Hazards & Earth 16 Ibid. System Sciences, 2012 Vol 12 Issue 2, 255-265. 17 USAID, “Earthquake Overview,” 27 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Study: Haiti’s earthquake http://www.usaid.gov/haiti/earthquake-overview damage estimated up to $14 billion,” The Washington (accessed Oct 22, 2014). Post, February 17, 2010, 18 Patrick Meier, “How Crisis Mapping Saved Lives http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02- in Haiti.” Screen captured by Patrick Meier 17/news/36856782_1_haiti-quake-haiti-funds-quake- (Released on September 14, 2015). damage (accessed Aug 8, 2013). 19 Ibid. 28 Linus Bengtsson, Xin Lu, Anna Thorson, Richard 20 Rebecca A. Garcia, “Air Force asset used to assess Garfield and Johan von Screeb, “Improved Response damage, needs,” 459th Air Refueling Wing, US Air to Disasters and Outbreaks by Tracking Population Force, January 20, 2010, Movements with Mobile Phone Network Data: A http://www.459arw.afrc.af.mil/news/ Post-Earthquake Geospatial Study in Haiti,” PLoS story.asp?id=123186328 (accessed Oct 22, 2014). Medicine, Aug 2011, Vol 8 Issue 8, 1-9. 21 Jamie McIntyre, “Haiti Overflight,” January 16, 29 Ibid. 2010, http://www.youtube.com/ 30 Ibid. watch?v=qrNiQf9FtKg (accessed Aug 12, 2013). 31 Ibid.
Campaigning Fall 2015 9 The Accidental Counter Guerrilla followed a plan consistent with US doctrine (The Other Side of the COIN: for COIN in El Salvador when it employed Counterinsurgency) an internal defense and development plan (IDAD) supported by US foreign internal defense (FID). It also employed persistent By Mr Mike Bennett engagement of ten-plus years with a small footprint of fifty-five trainers—a limit set by Dave Kilcullen, in his book The Accidental Congress. The 55-man limit restrained the Guerrilla, points out that not all guerillas U.S trainers from making it a U.S. lead arrive at the occupation on purpose. Some fight. The El Salvadoran Armed Forces guerilla’s do so for a particular cause, some (ESAF) had to do the fighting; trainers were for a number of different reasons, and some not allowed to go on combat operations. others entirely by accident. In some The limitation of 55 U.S trainers was historical cases, the United States derived from testimony before Congress. successfully responded to guerillas and This was the number of U.S. military that insurgencies, but in many cases it, too, had been in El Salvador prior to the responded by accident. An accidental cancelation of the security assistance guerilla would capitalize on successes, program. The program was canceled by accidental or otherwise, and so should the President Jimmy Carter due to the discovery United States. of massive human rights violations. As of late, the United States has not According to former US Military Group fared well fighting guerillas and insurgents. Commander, BG Joe Stringham, the original Current operational successes and failures strategy was to begin with the number of are largely the result of failure to follow trainers that were in country when the strategic guidance documents that foreswear program was canceled. The U.S Embassy “large-scale, prolonged stability and USMILGP never intended that number 6 operations.” 2 United States Special as a ceiling. However, Congress did not Operations Command (USSOCOM), as part relent. As one of the 55 trainers in country in 1983, I thought, and the consensus of their strategy for an international network amongst the trainers seemed to agree, that approach, now focuses on “small scale the parent organization, the 3rd battalion 7th stability operations,” and extolls the virtues Special Forces Group in Panama, should of indirect approach operations using small have been deployed. 3 footprint, persistent engagement. El Salvador ended its conflict when Researchers often cite El Salvador, the insurgent organization, Farabundi Marti Colombia, and the Philippines as examples Liberation National (FMLN) signed the of successful operations of that type, but a peace accords and agreed to become a part historical review focused on intent reveals of the political process. This assessment is in that a small footprint, persistent engagement accord with the RAND Study by Seth Jones approach was neither intended nor planned. and Martin Libicki that found most insurgencies end by becoming a part of the The US got to the right approach but by 5 accident. political process. In retrospect, the limitation on trainers worked to the US and El Salvador (1981-1992) El Salvador’s advantage because it forced us United States Southern Command to practice through, with and by the El (USSOUTHCOM) and the US Embassy Salvadoran forces. It was their skin in the
Campaigning Fall 2015 10 game. The 55-man limit, however, was not Philippines/JSOTF-P (2001-2015) planned; the small footprint was an accident. In 2001, the two terrorist groups, Abu Sayaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Colombia (1999-present) Islamiva took a group of hostages for In initial conversations, the US and ransom in the southern Philippines. Within Colombian Governments could not agree on the group of hostages were several the objective of the national campaign plan, American citizens. Shortly after the Plan Colombia (IDAD). Colombia wanted to kidnapping, the United States Pacific focus on the Forces Armed Revolution Command (USPACOM) responded with (FARC), but the US wanted to focus on the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines drug cartels. The US viewed the cartels as (OEF-P) and the deployment of the Joint the biggest threat to US National Security, Special Operations Task Force-Philippines and believed it could only support a conflict (JSOTF-P). USPACOM planned to advise against that threat. The US never intended to and assist Philippine security forces in involve itself in a Colombian civil war. counter-terrorist (CT) operations in the Although the Colombians disagreed southern sector of the Philippines where the with the US focus, the desire for US support local government had lost much of the local won out. Using a strategy of persistent control to the terrorist groups. The initial engagement combined with a small plan was to use the direct approach until the footprint, the partnership succeeded so well government of the Philippines objected for against the drug cartels that it created a constitutional reasons. Therefore, an vacuum. The FARC attempted to fill that indirect/FID approach also had to be void, which allowed the US and the developed.8 Colombian Governments to focus on them The expected Philippine government as narco-terrorists. The FARC’s expansion objections came to fruition and resulted in into narco-trafficking paved the way for the US and host-nation government efforts further US support to Columbia, not just for transitioning to an indirect approach through police and law enforcement, but for the Civil Military Operations (CMO) rather than Colombian military with security assistance exclusively on CT. This combined effort and training packages as well. assisted the Philippine government in The US government again used the reestablishing control in its southern islands. foundations of persistent engagement, small Once again, however, this was not the initial footprint (no more than 800 military and 600 plan of USPACOM. The initial plan in contractors--this was more than the 55 man response to the taking of US hostages was a limit in El Salvador but significantly less maritime joint task force that would conduct than the US has had in Operations Enduring US combat operations on the island. Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.) 7, and a Ultimately, the limitations set by the national campaign plan from Colombia, Plan Philippine government led to a successful, Colombia (IDAD). Plan Colombia is another though alternate, and accidental approach. example of a host-nation taking the lead in their country with successful long-term Conclusion results. Both the US and Columbian US guidance and strategy documents governments got what they wanted, but, directs the DoD to engage in persistent again, it was by accident and the result of an engagement, small footprint operations. Our indirect strategic approach. joint doctrine also directs FID in support of host nation IDAD programs. Our history
Campaigning Fall 2015 11 however, defaults to the direct approach continues to support Joint Special Operations favored by policy not the indirect approach University irregular warfare courses at the service components as well as the service component as directed by doctrine. schoolhouses. USSOCOM Special Operations Forces 2020 emphasizes building a network with our partners and establishing 1 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: relationships through persistent engagement University Press, 2009) in accordance with both the guidance and 2 Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global the doctrine. These three cases demonstrate Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense that although the results were not arrived at (Offices Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., initially by following that guidance, 2012) 12, 9 3 Special Operations Forces 2020, The Global SOF successful results were attained when the Network (USSOCOM, MacDill AFB Florida, 2013) principles were followed, even if by 4 happenstance. 4 ARSOF 2022, Special Warfare Magazine July- There are also more current September 2014, Volume 27 Issue 3 (USAJFKSWCS examples of where that guidance has not Ft Bragg, NC, 2014) 5 5 Seth Jones, Martin Libicki, How terrorist Groups been implemented and the efforts have not End (Rand Corporation Study, 2008) xiii had successful results to include our 6 BG Joe Stringham, former USMILGP Commander operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The El Salvador, interview held during El Salvador Panel Air War College Maxwell AFB Alabama June 2010 template of persistent engagement, small 7 footprint, FID, and IDAD program support Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, Wil R. Griego, Persistent Engagement in Colombia JSOU Report 14- has to be adjusted in each case to account 3 (JSOU: JSOU Press, 2014) 15, 18, 19 for the host nation participation and 8 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), considerations. But the principles of Partnered Counterterrorist Operations in the persistent engagement, small footprint and Philippines, A Case Study (JCOA, Suffolk VA, host nation lead don’t change. The US 2011) 3 should understand that it can achieve better results consistently if done deliberately rather than by accident.
Author Biography
Mr. Michael Bennett graduated from Loyola University in 1973 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science. He retired from the US Army in 2001 and worked at SOCJFCOM as the senior analyst/ trainer for 3 years, supporting OEF and OIF. Mr Bennett has been assigned to Joint Special Operations University since 2004, teaching at the Army, Naval, and Air War Colleges, Marine Corps University, and National Defense University as well as all of the Service component special operations schools. He arrived at JFSC in October 2010 where he teaches in the Joint Combined Warfare School, Joint Advanced Warfare School, Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Operations School, and the Joint and Combined Distance Education School. He also
Campaigning Fall 2015 12 Rain of Ruin: Operational Design the need to develop a coherent strategy to and the Pacific War, 1944-1945 address it. Senior leadership, therefore, called on the Combined Staff Planners to By Colonel Gerard P. Tertychny, USA develop an estimate of the situation and an outline for the defeat of Japan.2 “The trend in thinking in Confronted with British reluctance to Washington was toward two mutually emphasize operations in China or Burma, supporting advances across the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance to MacArthur’s and Nimitz’s, but with 1 the Joint War Plans Committee to develop a Nimitz’s taking priority.” Coming on the plan to defeat Japan as soon as possible after heels of the Japanese attack against the U.S. the surrender of Germany, preferably within Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in December twelve months. The result was the 1941, the U.S effort in the Pacific during the Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Second World War took place after senior Japan, which recommended operations in U.S. and Allied leadership had decided on a both the Pacific and China-Burma and “Germany first” strategy for confronting the culminated in an invasion of Japan, Axis powers. Forced to simultaneously plan operations that were estimated to continue for and execute operations against Japanese into 1948.3 At the heart of these long-range forces, senior U.S. commanders in the planning efforts was a debate over which Pacific and Joint Chiefs of Staff planners axis of advance against Japan to emphasize: were plagued by political realities, differing through the Central Pacific, from the south service perspectives on strategy, and the through New Guinea, or from the north seeming inability or unwillingness of the through the Aleutians. For a time, the Joint Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify a main Chiefs of Staff also considered attacks from effort. As Ronald Spector points out, the the Soviet Far East and Southeast Asia, U.S. strategy for the defeat of Japan during though both were eventually considered World War II took the form of compromise. geographically and politically unrealistic In reality, however, the senior U.S. civilian and were discarded. and military leadership, in deciding to The requirement that faced the Joint pursue a two-avenue approach in the war Chiefs of Staff in early 1944 was to “resolve against Japan, applied a methodology known Pacific strategy once and for all.”4 Specific today as operational design. issues to be addressed included the Background appointment of an overall commander in the By mid-1943, Allied efforts in Pacific, the identification of a main effort, Europe and North Africa were beginning to and the allocation of limited resources. In yield results. The Allies had driven German order to arrive at a strategy, the Joint Chiefs and Italian forces from North Africa, of Staff employed a methodology known captured Sicily, disrupted Nazi war making today as operational design in order to capabilities, and forced the collapse of the “identify and understand the political aims Mussolini government in Italy. As a result, of the war, determine the military objectives and following the Combined Chiefs of Staff and allocate resources in support of them, and establish a military strategy to deliver conferences in 1943, codenamed TRIDENT 5 and QUADRANT, the strategic issue that them.” faced the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the need to understand the role that the war in the Pacific played in the overall global war and
Campaigning Fall 2015 13 Operational Design The Chinese issue was fairly clear- While the term “operational design” cut: President Roosevelt’s policy towards has only been in use since 2002, the idea China had both short-term and long-term behind it goes back much further and the goals. The short-term need was to keep general concept was in use during World China in the war, thereby tying up Japanese War II. As defined in Joint Publication 5-0, forces that could have been used elsewhere operational design is “a process of iterative in the Pacific and also providing staging understanding and problem framing” that areas for future operations against the “supports a recursive and ongoing dialogue Japanese homeland. Long-term, and as a concerning the nature of the problem and an result of U.S. support during the war, the operational approach to achieve the desired U.S. looked to China as an ally in any end states.”6 disputes with the Soviets. The operational approach transforms Not as clear was Roosevelt’s and current conditions into desired conditions Churchill’s policy of unconditional and it is produced through understanding the surrender with regards to Germany and strategic direction, understanding the Japan, which called for “a postwar world in operational environment, and defining the which Germany and Japan would be unable problem.7 Critical to operational design, in to threaten the peace,” something planners addition to understanding the operational interpreted as “political guidance from environment and defining the problem to be which they were to shape strategy.”11 The solved, is its continual review, updating, and Joint Chiefs would see the details of this modification in response to changes in the policy as imprecise throughout the war, operational environment, desired end states, though it was clear enough to lead them to or the problem. the conclusion that they needed to devise a military strategy that resulted in “the utter Strategic Direction defeat of Japan’s military,” as Japan’s attack Joint Publication 5-0 defines on Pearl Harbor essentially ruled out the strategic direction as “guidance that option of a negotiated settlement.12 provides long-term as well as intermediate 8 or ancillary objectives.” What the Joint The Operational Environment Chiefs of Staff planners faced in early 1944 Another issue facing planners was was the need to consider several political the need to understand the operational issues that directly influenced the U.S. environment with regards to the war in the policy in the Pacific. As Brower points out, Pacific. Joint Publication 5-0 maintains that the Joint Chiefs’ “freedom of action to commanders and planners must address reconcile military strategy with national “friendly, adversary, and neutral actors that policy was meaningful only to the degree are relevant to a specific joint operation.”13 9 that they grasped national objectives.” One Key information in this effort includes, in issue was the role of China, both during the addition to the strategic guidance, the nature war and in the post-war world. In addition, of the conflict and any relevant history that planners had to appreciate the issue might aid in the understanding of any surrounding the mandate for the friendly, enemy, or neutral party actions. unconditional surrender of Japan. Planners Specifically, commanders and staffs must also had to take into consideration the will “analyze the operational environment and of the American people as the war dragged determine relevant and critical relationships 10 on and casualties mounted. between the various actors and aspects” that
Campaigning Fall 2015 14 exist.14 One framework that is currently in and existing war plans most likely use to analyze the operational environment influenced service thinking. addresses political, military, economic, Despite a policy that called for the social, information, and infrastructure defeat of Germany first, British and (PMESII) factors. In addition, and based on American leadership nevertheless supported the particular situation, factors such as a counteroffensive against Japan when they geography and meteorology can also be met at the Casablanca Conference in January considered. The requirement to understand 1943. U.S. leadership was generally in the operational environment was particularly agreement with a strategy that made use of evident in the planning effort for the Pacific limited counteroffensives in the Marshalls, war that took place in 1943-44 and planners the Carolines, the Solomons, the Aleutians, considered various relevant factors. and New Guinea, all leading to a full-scale General George Marshall expressed assault on Japan. Again, the debate centered a lingering concern that the American on determining where to place the main people would lose the will to continue the effort, command and control options, and fight if faced with mounting casualty figures the allocation of resources. The resulting and costs and the Joint Chiefs appreciated argument yielded two possible routes U.S. the need to consider the will of the forces could use to attack Japan, each with American people when addressing China’s its own advocates, advantages, and position and the unconditional surrender liabilities. mandate. In Roosevelt’s opinion, Americans One proposed route advanced from were not able to fully appreciate “the Hawaii, through the Marshalls, the sacrifice necessary to bring about total Carolines, the Marianas, and Palaus, to victory,” so any strategy the planners Japan and offered several advantages. First devised for the Pacific would have to take and foremost, an advance across the Central into account cost, casualties, and time, Pacific against Japan was, in the Navy’s issues that might influence American estimation, the most direct route. In tolerance for operations in support of China addition, such an advance would take and for unconditional surrender.15 advantage of U.S. naval and carrier air Though the leadership of both the power to reduce Japanese island positions, U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army looked upon destroy the Japanese advantage of interior the war in the Pacific as a “redemptive lines, cut off Japan from the Netherlands crusade” against Japan, the Navy, led by East Indies oil supplies, and place U.S. Admiral Ernest King and Admiral Chester forces within striking distance of Japan. Nimitz, saw the war as being waged against Last, such an advance would likely lure the the Japanese because of their attack on Pearl Japanese fleet into an open, decisive battle, Harbor and as one that would be where it would be destroyed by the U.S. characterized by naval dominance.16 fleet.18 General Douglas MacArthur, however, Not without disadvantages, the viewed the war as being waged against Central Pacific route would, in MacArthur’s Japan because of its occupation of the estimation, require multiple costly frontal Philippines, which resulted in MacArthur’s assaults against Japanese island fortresses. “humiliating departure from Corregidor,” In addition, because of the distances and because of a moral obligation to liberate involved, this axis would reduce momentum the islands.17 In addition, pre-war planning by requiring forces to return to Hawaii to resupply after each phase, and would take
Campaigning Fall 2015 15 U.S. forces out from under the protection of resistance before Allied exhaustion and war- land-based air support.19 weariness forced a compromise on Allied A second proposed route advanced war aims.”22 from Australia, through the Southwest Pacific to New Guinea, the Philippines, and A Solution Formosa, to Japan. Engaged in an ongoing The operational approach that results operation in New Guinea, MacArthur saw from analyzing the strategic direction and the effort in the Southwest Pacific as a great the operational environment and defining opportunity to deal the Japanese a decisive the problem describes the “commander’s blow and drive quickly to the Philippines, visualization of a broad approach for which he saw as the key to the war in the achieving the desired end state.”23 Pacific. His effort would also cut off Japan According to Joint Publication 5-0, it from the oil of the Netherlands East Indies, provides a foundation for planning guidance, provide a base in the Philippines for attacks it provides a model for execution of the against Japanese shipping and against Japan campaign, and it enables a better itself through the use of long-range understanding of the operational bombers, expose the Chinese coast to attack, environment. In addition, the operational possibly provoke the Japanese fleet into an approach addresses the strengths and open action, and take advantage of Australia weaknesses of various actors, identifies as a staging base.20 opportunities and threats, looks at the route In Admiral King’s opinion, however, from existing to desired conditions, and this axis was based on a New Guinea identifies likely consequences.24 operation that was originally intended to On 12 March 1944, the Joint Chiefs defend Australia, not to attack Japan directly of Staff met to decide on the Pacific strategy and bring about an end to the war. In and presented a compromise solution to both addition, the New Guinea operation was, at MacArthur and Nimitz. Both commanders the time, bogged down in a seemingly were instructed to initiate offensives “across endless jungle battle and was always the Pacific Ocean toward the China- threatened by Japanese air, naval, and land Formosa-Luzon area.”25 Nimitz was forces in the area. specifically instructed to move across the Central Pacific, capture the Marianas, and The Problem attack Palaus. MacArthur was to support Having absorbed the strategic Nimitz (though he always viewed his theater direction, and having considered the Navy as the main effort) by seizing New Guinea and Army perspectives on framing the and Mindanao in the Philippines in order to operational environment, the planners at the establish air bases to reduce Japanese forces Joint Chiefs of Staff then looked to defining there and in preparation for further the problem. Using Joint Publication 5-0 as operations against Formosa, possibly via a model, operational design calls for the Luzon. development of a problem statement that This strategy, while seemingly identifies “how to transform the current indecisive, actually played out well and conditions to the desired end state – before addressed the problem of ending Japanese adversaries begin to transform current resistance while taking into consideration 21 conditions to their desired end state.” The several characteristics of the operational problem facing the American forces in the environment. First, it allowed for both Pacific, therefore, “was how to end Japanese MacArthur’s and Nimitz’s ideas to be
Campaigning Fall 2015 16 employed and went a long way toward months earlier, Allied leadership in Europe alleviating the inter-service rivalry that had received the German leadership’s existed between the Army and the Navy, as unconditional surrender and an increasingly both senior Army and Navy leaders had no war-weary American population was problem with exercising command over looking for victory in the Pacific. In counterpart forces, but were not willing to addition, the monetary cost of the war was be commanded by the other.26 In addition, astronomical, the continued rationing of the two advances were mutually supporting: food, gasoline, and basic necessities was Nimitz’s offensive pulled Japanese naval taking its toll, and senior military leadership and air power from the Southwest Pacific feared a “great impatience” on the part of and MacArthur’s land campaigns pulled the American people.28 Last, the previous Japanese troops from the Central Pacific. six months had seen some of the most Also, the dual-offensive strategy forced the savage fighting in the Pacific, at Iwo Jima Japanese to spread their forces thin and kept and Okinawa, where U.S. servicemen had them guessing as to where the next faced suicidal opposition from the Japanese American move would come, while Nimitz and suffered staggering casualties on land and MacArthur could maintain the initiative and at sea. and concentrate forces against weaker Japanese positions.27 The New Problem and Alternatives Faced with the difficult decision A Changing Operational Environment concerning which course of action to choose and Iterative Understanding with regards to the continuation of the war Using the “Germany first” strategy, with Japan, President Truman, who had Allied forces had knocked Italy out of the risen to the Office of the President after war in 1943, had invaded France in 1944, Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, had to and had brought the European war against consider the political and military realities of Nazi Germany to an end in May of 1945. In the situation and the problem to be solved. the Pacific, the two-pronged strategy In the summer of 1945, he was presented decided upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in with a number of alternatives to bring about March 1944 had been successful in driving a Japanese surrender. Each of these options Japanese forces back across the Pacific. By carried risks to the three political issues that mid-1945, simultaneous offensives by faced President Truman and that influenced Nimitz and MacArthur had captured island U.S. policy in the Pacific: the role of China bases in the Central Pacific, pushed the during the war and afterwards, the mandate Japanese out of New Guinea and the for an unconditional surrender of Japan, and 29 Philippines, destroyed the Japanese surface the will of the American people. The fleet over the course of several problem to be solved now was how to bring engagements, and put U.S. land-based heavy about a Japanese surrender as soon as bombers over the Japanese mainland. possible, before China negotiated a separate This two-axis strategy was working peace with Japan or costs and casualties but took time, cost money, and resulted in resulted in the American people losing their considerable casualties. By August 1945, the will to continue the war. war in the Pacific had been going on for While keeping China in the war to almost four years since the attack on Pearl tie down Japanese troops was an important Harbor and for almost eighteen months since part of the U.S. strategy, by late 1944, China the decision to utilize this approach. Three under Chiang Kai-shek “had been
Campaigning Fall 2015 17 discounted as an effective ally.”30 With with a Japanese surrender brought about by China on the verge of collapse by the a naval blockade.33 summer of 1945, Chiang might possibly The bombardment of Japanese cities, negotiate a separate peace with Japan, while devastating, was showing no signs of freeing more Japanese troops for action driving the Japanese leadership towards against U.S. forces. In addition, the policy of unconditional surrender. This is incredible unconditional surrender, agreed upon by the when one considers that, on a single night, 9 allied powers and backed by the American March 1945, 279 B-29 heavy bombers population, was seen as necessary to the bombed Tokyo in a raid that delivered 2,000 complete defeat of Japan and her military.31 tons of incendiary bombs and resulted in This policy was directly linked to the will of firestorms that boiled water in canals, the American people. As the war dragged on melted glass windows, burned 16 square through its fourth year, American leaders miles of the city, killed over 83,000 began to question the ability of the civilians, injured 40,000 more, and left a American people to support operations in million homeless.34 A similar bombing the Pacific that might continue into 1946 campaign in Europe resulted in significant and beyond. Truman’s decision, therefore, Allied losses in manpower and material and had to take into account the monetary cost of still required a ground invasion of Germany continuing the war, the casualties that the to force an unconditional surrender. The U.S. and its allies would suffer, and the time blockade of Japan, also effective, would take required to execute the decision. far too much time to compel surrender and One option was to continue the might send the message to Japan that the bombardment of Japanese cities through the U.S. lacked the will to act decisively. Both use of heavy bombers. American long-range options would also prolong the war, bombers had been striking targets in Japan increasing the likelihood of Chinese since 1944, operating from bases in China leadership seeking a separate peace with and the Marianas, and these massive strikes Japan and further draining American against Japanese cities and industry were resources and will power. causing significant damage and casualties. Another option was a massive Many advocates of air power believed that amphibious invasion of the Japanese home these attacks would, if increased in intensity islands. Codenamed “DOWNFALL,” the through the occupation and use of a string of invasion of Japan was being planned for airbases around Japan, be sufficient to November 1945, when U.S. forces would compel a Japanese surrender.32 invade Kyushu, and March 1946, with an Another prospective strategy was for invasion of Honshu near Tokyo. This option, the U.S. to simply continue its blockade of according to General Douglas MacArthur, Japan. U.S. air, surface, and submarine stood the best chance of success, as it “was forces had all but isolated Japan from any the only one that would permit application importing of food or other materials and of the full power of our combined resources many believed that it would be simply a – ground, naval, and air – on the decisive matter of time before the Japanese objective.”35 leadership capitulated. Supporting this belief The planned amphibious operation was the experience gained from hypothetical against Japan was estimated to be extremely war games with Japan conducted at the costly in American, Allied, and Japanese Naval War College throughout the 1920’s lives, as evidenced by the recent fighting on and 1930’s, which almost always concluded Okinawa. Here, U.S. casualties leapt to 35
Campaigning Fall 2015 18 percent, higher than in any other Pacific Conclusion battle and across terrain that was “strikingly The Joint Chiefs of Staff planners, similar” to that of Kyushu.36 Japanese after what might be considered a slow start, military forces in the home islands employed the methodology of what is now numbered several million men. They, as known as operational design in their well as the civilian population, would be development of the two-axis strategy for the fighting on their home soil and would be Pacific War in World War II. In developing justifiably motivated, prompting Allied an operational approach, planners initially estimates of “200,000 casualties and 50,000 struggled to understand the strategic fatalities.”37 Such an invasion would guidance, as espoused by President prolong the war into 1946, at least, and Roosevelt. However, they and the Joint carried the risk of the Soviet Union Chiefs of Staff “worked hard to identify and intervening in the northern areas of the understand the political aims of the war, in Japanese home islands. However, the their view the first step in shaping a military planning and preparation for the invasion of strategy for Japan’s defeat.”39 Japan could continue regardless of which Planners took into consideration course of action Truman chose and, should service perspectives, the opinions and the chosen option prove ineffective; the personalities of the commanders in the invasion could still be launched. Pacific, logistical realities, and Japanese capabilities in understanding the operational Truman’s Decision environment. The “Army-Navy” and The successful detonation of an “MacArthur-Nimitz” debates resulted in no atomic weapon in July 1945 gave President assumptions going unchallenged and the Truman an additional option. He could use it development of better operational against civilian targets, military targets, or in approaches being devised than might a demonstration to the Japanese leadership otherwise have been the case. They used all of its destructive force, possibly giving them of this information to identify the problem to a legitimate reason for surrendering - the be solved, and then determined the military excuse that they were beaten by science and objectives, the resource requirements, and technology. the compromise two-axis strategy to be used Assessing the situation, Truman in solving that problem. The iterative decided to use an atomic weapon against a understanding and problem solving that is target on the Japanese mainland, characteristic of operational design led to determining that this was the best way to Truman’s decision to use atomic attacks on solve the problem that existed at that time Hiroshima and Nagasaki and brought about and end Japanese resistance. The dropping a conclusion to the war in eighteen months, of the first bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August several years shorter than original estimates 1945, and a second bomb on Nagasaki on 9 and only three months after the surrender of August 1945, resulted in a Japanese Germany, well inside the guideline of surrender on 14 August. Though the twelve months. unconditional surrender mandate was President Truman has come under modified, as Emperor Hirohito remained on some criticism for his decision to use atomic the throne, President Truman had brought weapons, with some citing how they were the war in the Pacific to a conclusion in a unnecessary as Japan was on the verge of week, and not with “an invasion of Japan collapse. However, he had to make a and 16 more months of war.”38 decision armed only with what he knew at
Campaigning Fall 2015 19 the time. The Japanese had put up a fanatical overall political, strategic, and military resistance at Okinawa and could only be situation, both globally and in the Pacific. expected to fight even harder on their home U.S. forces and leaders faced the prospect of ground, most likely resulting in untold continued casualties and the distinct American and Japanese casualties and the possibility of the war entering its fifth year utter destruction of Japan. Naval blockade without a surrender by the Japanese and massive aerial bombing operations government or with Japanese forces against Japanese cities had not brought the disregarding any surrender and continuing Japanese leadership any closer to surrender. the fight, both in the Home Islands and in Also, the costs of the war were already China and Southeast Asia. Based on the enormous, as were the casualties suffered by information he had at the time, President American and Allied forces. Truman would Truman made the decision to use atomic have had a very difficult time explaining to weapons in order to compel a Japanese the American people that he had atomic surrender in as short a time as possible, weapons but did not employ them if his thereby achieving the war’s political aims decision had resulted in countless more lives and bringing about its conclusion without lost. “another Okinawa” fought “from one end of As he stated in a press release after Japan to the other.”41 the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, President Truman revealed the reason for his decision to use such weapons, Author Biography that is, “to obliterate more rapidly and Colonel Gerard P. Tertychny, USA, is the Director, completely every productive enterprise the Special Operations Forces at the U.S. Army War Japanese have above ground in any city.”40 College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He is a He made his decision at a time of graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, holds master’s degrees from California State University considerable tension and disagreement and the Army War College, and earned his doctorate among senior U.S. civilian and military in education from The George Washington leaders and in response to a change in the University.
1 Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, (New 13 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-8. York, NY: Vintage Books, 1985), 279. 14 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-9. 2 Charles F. Brower, Defeating Japan: The Joint 15 Brower, 9-10. Chiefs of Staff and Strategy in the Pacific War, 1943- 16 Taafe, 17. 1945 (New York, NY: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012), 17 Taafe, 16. 41. 18 Taafe, 15. 3 Brower, 43. 19 Taafe, 17. 4 Stephen R. Taafe, MacArthur’s Jungle War: The 20 Taafe, 18. 1944 New Guinea Campaign, (Lawrence, KS: 21 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-13. University Press of Kansas, 1998), 25. 22 Brower, 43. 5 Brower, 152. 23 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-13. 6 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0: 24 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-13-14. Joint Operation Planning, (Washington, DC: 25 Taafe, 27. Government Printing Office, 2011), III-1 – III-2. 26 Wayne A. Silkett, “Downfall: The Invasion that 7 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-7 Never Was,” Parameters (Autumn 1994): 112. 8 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-7. 27 Taafe, 30. 9 Brower, 5. 28 Thomas B. Allen and Polmar Norman, Code-Name 10 Brower, 5. Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why 11 Brower, 8. Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, NY: Simon 12 Brower, 9. and Schuster, 1995), 126.
Campaigning Fall 2015 20 35 Morton, 501. 29 Brower, 8-9. 36 Silkett, 118. 30 Allen and Norman, 119. 37 Michael D. Pearlman, Unconditional Surrender, 31 Theodore H. McNelly, “The Decision to Drop the Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb, (Fort Atomic Bomb” (presented at the Pearl to V-J Day: Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 1. World War II in the Pacific Symposium, Bethesda, 38 Allen and Norman, 216. MD, 1995), 133. 39 Brower, 150. 32 Louis B. Morton, “The Decision to Use the Atomic 40 Ayers Papers. Press Release by the White House, Bomb,” In Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts August 6, 1945. Greenfield (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 41 Silkett, 118. Military History, United States Army, 1960), 500. 33 Silkett, 111. 34 Daniel L. Haulman, Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan. The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II, (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999), 22.
Campaigning Fall 2015 21 International Code of Conduct: A The international “tug-of-norms” Cybersecurity Panacea or vis-à-vis cybersecurity can be traced back Pandora’s Box? almost two decades. In 1998—and every year since—Russia introduced a draft By Major Amanda Current, USA and Lieutenant resolution on “Developments in the field of Colonel Bryan Redash, USAF information and telecommunications in the context of security” in the First Committee The post-Cold War Era is often of the UN General Assembly.6 The described as the “information age” in which resolution called upon member states to the exponential advancement of technology consider the issues underlying cybersecurity, revolutionized the way nation states, non- define concepts such as unauthorized state actors and individuals interact in the interference or misuse of systems, and to global system.1 Information and strengthen global information systems. Two communication technologies (ICTs) have years after introducing the draft resolution, reshaped the international security Russia proposed the establishment of a environment, and dialogue concerning special Group of Governmental Experts cyberspace security has entailed a “return of (GGE) to address existing and potential the state” as sovereign nations grapple with threats to information security.7 When conflict and cooperation in a domain that Russia opened the resolution for co- transcends physical borders.2 At present, the sponsorship in 2005, China was the first of absence of a global cybersecurity treaty has 36 member states to endorse it.8 In created a vacuum that authoritarian states September 2014, Russia and China led the are exploiting to advance a revisionist resubmission of what is now termed the narrative for international Internet International Code of Conduct for governance. To that end, Russia and China information security to the UN General are leading a cohort of like-minded states— Assembly during the fourth GGE.9 As a to include members of the Shanghai leader among the Western Consensus, the Cooperation Organization (SCO)—that United States should not endorse the Code promote the concepts of Internet sovereignty of Conduct proposed by Russia, China, and and information security, which entitle states other members of the Shanghai Cooperation to set sovereign norms and manage content Organization (SCO). flow to protect their populations from the threat of hostile information.3 By contrast, Divergent Ideologies: Cyber-Realism, the United States is among a group of Cyber-Liberalism & the Role of Soft states—sometimes referred to as the Power “Western Consensus”—which advocates an Over the last 20 years, an open, interoperable medium for the free “intellectual evolution” has taken place flow of ideas and information that regarding the relationship between transcends national borders.4 Thus, both cyberspace and state power.10 The Internet United States and Russian governments are has transformed relationships among states, behaving as “norm-entrepreneurs” during challenging the Westphalian international the formative stages of a burgeoning system that has existed since 1648.11 The cybersecurity paradigm.5 viability of existential threats occurring in the cyber domain has emerged from a “fear of increased vulnerability and loss of control
Campaigning Fall 2015 22 that presumably is the result of moving from real world power.”18 Furthermore, this camp an industrial to an information society.”12 is driving what some researchers have called According to Assistant Professor Mary a “neo-Westphalian process in the digital McEvoy Manjikian of the Robertson School era” or a “Cybered Westphalian Age,” by of Government, two narratives have advocating virtual fences along physical emerged to describe cyberspace from an territorial borders.19 For both camps, these International Relations theory perspective: philosophical distinctions apply to states’ Cyber-Liberalism and Cyber-Realism.13 treatment of the cyber domain and do not Cyber-Liberalism is further subdivided into necessarily align with their International utopian and regulatory strands (See Figure Relations (IR) behaviors in the physical 1). “Utopians see cyberspace’s development realm. as an organic growth process, while Internet sovereignty and information regulators see the Internet evolving due to security serve as the ideological foundation focused international cooperation.”14 The of the proposed Code of Conduct. The latter strand of the Cyber-Liberalist regime Russian and Chinese governments “strongly describes what has been referred to as the support the idea of national control of all Western Consensus—a pragmatic view of internet resources that lie within a state’s international cooperation and cyber physical borders, and the associated regulation espoused by the United States and concepts of application of local most Western European countries.15 legislation.”20 Supporters of the Code of Conduct also espouse a concept of information security—codified in the Code of Conduct presented at the fourth GGE— which “promotes stability and elimination of threats to both information and communication infrastructure and the information itself [emphasis added].”21 Information security differs from the concept of cybersecurity—the term preferred by the Western Consensus— primarily in the characterization of a threat. Whereas cybersecurity recognizes the threat of hostile code, information security is based Figure 1: Competing Views of Cyberspace16 on hostile intent.22 Thus, under the Cyber-
Realist paradigm, any information seen as Conversely, the governments of harmful to a sovereign’s stability, culture, or China and Russia belong to the Cyber- social consciousness is considered a weapon Realist camp that stresses the importance of propagated through cyberspace. The idea ICT “as a technological change in the that information could be viewed as a existing international system.”17 Cyber- weapon appeals to authoritarian regimes Realists adhere to the core tenets of realism, while Cyber-Liberalists (i.e., the Western which observe states as rational actors Consensus camp) find this ideology competing for survival in an anarchical inherently undemocratic.23 Additionally, international system. This faction views the liberal democracies have opined that the cyber domain as an “extraterritorial site of concept of Internet sovereignty promotes
Campaigning Fall 2015 23 barriers to the flow of information along world—leads Cyber-Realists to extend their geographical borders, which is counter to reach to the governance and enforcement of the spirit upon which the Internet was built. norms within cyberspace as a whole.28 A Professor Joseph S. Nye, an skillful use of soft power will arguably drive accomplished IR scholar, has likened the the establishment of normative behavior in current status of cybersecurity policy to that the cyber domain. Because the effectiveness which governed the nascent nuclear program of soft power is directly proportionate to a in 1960.24 The tendency to draw parallels state’s credibility, the United States must between nuclear and cyber policy inevitably maintain a message of international leads to discussions about strategic cooperation to encourage a harmonized set deterrence and norms-seeking initiatives.25 of policies that are shared with like-minded Nye summarized the international partners. cybersecurity “tug-of-norms” concisely: For more than a decade, Russia has sought a Supporter Concerns – Russia / China treaty for broader international oversight of It is not inaccurate to characterize the Internet, banning deception or the Russia and China as cyber norm- embedding of malicious code or circuitry entrepreneurs in their own right. They have that could be activated in the event of consistently tabled cyber policy initiatives war.… The United States has resisted and actively sought additional international agreements that could legitimize validation through the UN for their authoritarian governments’ censorship of the proposals. Some of these same [I]nternet.… Even advocates for an recommendations have encountered strong international law for information operations international opposition because they do not are skeptical of a multilateral treaty akin to adequately address infrastructure and the Geneva Conventions that could contain network protection—tenets deemed precise and detailed rules given future critically important to the West. This would technological volatility, but they argue that appear to be a deliberate attempt by the like-minded states could announce self- Russians and Chinese not to become governing rules that could form norms for signatories to any policy that would the future [emphasis added].26 explicitly proscribe cyber-espionage, This characterization is noteworthy Distributive Denial of Service (DDoS) because the soft power advantage will go to attacks, and other infrastructure or network- those states whose “dominant culture and degrading actions. Similarly, the proposed ideas are closer to prevailing global norms Code of Conduct would empower … [with] access to multiple channels of signatories at the national level to filter, communications … [and whose] credibility block, or otherwise limit the free flow of is enhanced by their domestic and ideas across the cyber domain, as a counter international performance.”27 Moreover, the to what many Russian and Chinese leaders relative importance of soft power in the might consider to be corrupting influences information age has increased because soft from the West. power relies on credibility in an A second, more historical basis for information-rich environment. The ability of understanding current Russian and Chinese soft power to traverse real and virtual actions and predicting future behavior in the terrain—and the notion that the real world cyber realm emerges by examining each needs to be protected from the virtual state’s master narratives. The Master
Campaigning Fall 2015 24 Narratives platform—a collaborative project a unipolar world. Russian strategy is now of the Open Source Center, Monitor 360, focused on restoring their position as a and various partners across the U.S. credible international power by positioning government—focuses on “surfacing and themselves as essential partners for problem articulating master narratives across a range resolution and multilateral treaty of important geographies … [which] can be development.34 Their actions to promote the used to understand critical audience International Information Security segments and key influencers better, build Resolution and subsequent Code of Conduct analytic capabilities, and develop actionable reinforce that theme. messaging and counter-messaging The second master narrative strategies.”29 As defined by the Open Source informing Russia’s cyber strategy is more Center, master narratives are “historically conspiratorial in nature, centering on the grounded stories that reflect a community’s belief that few other countries are truly identity and experiences, or explain its Russia’s allies, and that Russia can only rely hopes, aspirations, and concerns.”30 The upon itself.35 This perception, coupled with master narratives help illuminate each a third master narrative—one reinforced by state’s respective motivations while also nationalism and a desire to preserve national offering possible insights into how best to culture—both link directly to Russia’s reconcile the disparity between Cyber- apparent reluctance to consider any Liberalist and Cyber-Realist positions. international cyber pact that would deprive In the Chinese case, their internal cyber them of the ability to control the content of strategy is driven by a mandate “to adopt the Internet within their sovereign borders.36 whatever is useful from more advanced countries … [to] reclaim its rightful place as Dissenter Concerns – U.S. / Western a world power.”31 This core master narrative Consensus legitimizes, if not encourages, cyber- In contrast to the Russian and espionage as a means to this strategic end. A Chinese cohorts’ focus on state actors and second narrative emphasizes re-attaining internal security measures, the Western their historical status as an East Asia Consensus response to the Code of Conduct hegemon after having been humiliated for suggests the existence of a loose agreement much of the last century.32 This master among the Cyber-Liberalist camp. In narrative contributed to the development of December 2013, the UN General Assembly national strategic guidance, which recently acknowledged the Code of Conduct included informatization and the proposed by SCO member states. As part of modernization of China’s information the resolution, the UN invited all members technology as a top priority.33 to provide comments back to the Secretary- Russians are similarly motivated by General regarding the recommendations three distinct master narratives, each with proposed in the resolution.37 Based on historical underpinnings critically important responses received in June and September of to their cyber strategy. The first of these 2014, the Western Consensus—or Cyber- highlights Russia’s post-Cold War Liberalist—point of view can be distilled transition. They quickly went from enjoying down to four key themes. superpower status in a bipolar world to The first theme indicates a belief that accepting the United States ascent to their existing international law is relevant and current role as the hegemonic superpower in malleable enough to address the actions of
Campaigning Fall 2015 25 states in the cyber domain. For example, the potential source of vulnerability requiring Australian government maintains that protection, except under conditions strictly “existing international law provides the established by law, in a proportionate and framework of State behavior [emphasis transparent way, in accordance with article added] in cyberspace and for appropriate 19 of the International Covenant on Civil responses to unlawful activity by States.”38 and Political Rights.”43 Austrians provide They go on to declare this includes, where additional support to the ideal of an open applicable, “international humanitarian law and free Internet at the international level. [IHL], law regarding the use of force, They advocate “the free exercise of all international human rights law and human rights must be guaranteed in virtual international law regarding State space; particularly, the right to freedom of responsibility.” 39 While the Australian expression and information must not be position supports the notion that existing restricted unduly in the internet.” The international law defines appropriate Korean position merges the idea of a free behavior and norms in the cyber domain, and open Internet with broad ideals and they also assert that “elaborating how values shared by western nations regarding international law applies to State behavior in economic liberalism; that is, in addition to cyberspace in both conflict and non-conflict providing greater economic prosperity, “an situations, while acknowledging the open and secure cyberspace is essential to complexity involved, is a priority task for increase human accomplishment and the international community.” 40 The promote democratic participation.”44 Canadian response expands on this position The principle of unimpeded flow of by deeming “international law in cyberspace information and ideas in the cyber domain as the cornerstone for norms and principles underscores the next theme: support for for responsible State behavior.”41 These democratic values. According to the Spanish sentiments echo the findings of the third respondents, these values include GGE, which concluded: democracy, human rights, and the rule of [I]nternational law and in particular the law.45 Additionally, Sweden advocated a United Nations Charter, is applicable and is European Union (EU) cyber policy essential to maintaining peace and stability specifically based on the EU’s “fundamental and promoting an open, secure, peaceful values and interests.”46 Sweden was among and accessible ICT environment [and that] a “core group of States that initiated Human State sovereignty and the international Rights Council resolution 20/8 (2012), in norms and principles that flow from it apply which the Council affirmed that the same to States’ conduct of ICT-related activities rights that individuals have offline must be and to their jurisdiction over ICT protected online.”47 Sweden also strongly infrastructure with their territory.42 supported the “Freedom Online Coalition, a The second theme that differentiates group committed to advancing Internet the Cyber-Liberalist camp from Cyber- freedom worldwide.”48 The Canadians Realists is the explicit support voiced by the further emphasized this point by stating a Western Consensus for a free, open, secure, balance must be struck between information and accessible Internet allowing for freedom security and respect for human rights and of expression online. The French position is fundamental freedoms. Specifically, the clear on this point: “France does not Canadian respondents identified individual consider information as such to be a freedoms, “including freedom of expression,
Campaigning Fall 2015 26 association and assembly and respect for Cyber-Liberalist paradigm. This camp privacy,” must be protected in the virtual contends that a free, open, secure, and realm.49 accessible Internet should serve as a The final theme common to most common medium for the unrestricted flow Cyber-Liberalist responses is a clear of information and exchange of ideas on a emphasis on combating cyber-crime. global level. This perception of the role of Germany’s comments outlined a few the Internet is central to supporting and initiatives they believe will support this advancing fundamental human rights and endeavor. Over the next four years, democratic values in a globalized Germany intends to focus on efforts to international system. improve “consumer protection; amendments to the criminal law to better protect Legal Analysis individuals; the passing of an IT The absence of an international [information technology] security law with treaty on cyber policy is problematic for mandatory minimum IT security standards several significant reasons. Foremost among for critical infrastructure; and an obligation these is until there is concurrence on in respect of all federal authorities to invest regulatory policy, global actors will continue 10 percent of their IT budget to improve the to feel unconstrained in their actions. As security of their systems.” In response to technology advances, world processes concerns regarding potentially unlawful become more IT-dependent, and the surveillance or interceptions of ubiquity of the Internet grows, malign cyber communications, Germany is strongly activity will also grow proportionately, as encouraging Internet service providers to will the destructiveness of its effects. States, encrypt their telecommunications.50 individuals, and critical infrastructure will Increasing emphasis on encryption would become increasingly vulnerable. An also serve to increase the difficulty cyber international accord will not protect criminals encounter while exploiting their everyone, but it will go a long way towards targets. Furthermore, in an effort to combat defining and subsequently countering illicit cyber-crime and protect personal data and activity in cyberspace. privacy, Portugal instituted mandatory The Tallinn Manual is a superb first reporting of any personal data violations.51 step in this direction. Initiated by the North These international responses punctuate a Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative stark contrast between the Cyber-Realist and Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Cyber-Liberalist camps: while Russians (NATO CCD COE), the Tallinn Manual emphasize the potential danger posed by the serves as a comprehensive restatement of proliferation of information weapons, the international law governing cyberspace.53 “western block hardly touched upon the The manual provides 95 separate legal rules, issue of information warfare and weapons, each followed by a detailed analysis, to principally rejecting the need for include differing perspectives on possible disarmament and … emphasizing the applications. Although the document does criminal misuse of IT [emphasis added].”52 not constitute official cyber law, it could in The collective response from the future conceivably be used as a baseline Western Consensus states to the Code of for developing customary law within the Conduct proposed by the SCO states flowed framework of cyber cases held at either the from beliefs that are fundamental to the International Court of Justice (states) or the
Campaigning Fall 2015 27 International Criminal Court (individuals). While the Tallinn Manual has been Produced by 20 international law scholars, lauded by most Western scholars as a noble the Tallinn Manual addresses moral and attempt to clarify international law and legal concepts such as “sovereignty, preempt a cyber-catastrophe, several jurisdiction, and State responsibility insofar criticisms have been levied against the same, as they relate to operation of the jus ad namely from member states of the SCO and bellum and jus in bello.”54 For the time the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and being, much work remains to be done at the South Africa) grouping of emerging international level to codify norms and economies.58 develop more of an international consensus Despite the disparate priorities on the taxonomy of cyber offenses, between the Cyber-Realist and Cyber- including questions regarding the viability Liberalist states, however, there is reason for of applying the LOAC, definitions of an act optimism. Past precedent exists for broad of war in the cyber realm, and what might international collaboration on issues with constitute appropriate, and legitimate, global impact. The Intergovernmental Panel defensive responses in the wake of a cyber- on Climate Change (IPCC), the Nuclear attack. Content notwithstanding, a forceful Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the document—with legal authority and Vienna Convention for the Protection of the international legitimacy—is critical. Ozone Layer, are but three among many Rather than resolve some of the pacts that have scored some significant aforementioned legal challenges, the SCO- successes in reconciling a wide array of backed Code of Conduct actually clouds the interests and priorities. It is reasonable to international regulatory landscape. It also think the same is possible for cyber. may reflect more Machiavellian intentions on the part of its authors, or what Tallinn Conclusion and Recommendations Manual editor and cyber law expert Michael The concepts of sovereignty, Schmitt calls “peacetime lawfare.”55 The national security, and the role of political concept of peacetime lawfare involves the institutions are all changing in the age of the use of “law or other regulatory regimes Internet. The increasingly pervasive nature against one’s enemy.”56 The SCO are likely of information technology is driving a well aware that if the United States were to “relentless digitization across all facets of sign onto the Code of Conduct, it would human society.”59 According to some impose significant constraints on the Cyber- observers, states are reaching out to control Liberalist notion of the cyber domain. what they fear from the Internet: “the lack of Broader international acceptance of the sovereign control over what comes through Code of Conduct would enable the Russians, their borders.”60 International cyber Chinese, and others to object to U.S. behaviors and initiatives are clearly behavior at the slightest transgression while distinguishable between Cyber-Realists and denying any violations of their own. Mr. Cyber-Liberalists. For Cyber-Realists, states Schmitt avers that lawfare, rather than a translate their foreign relations practices to quest for best practices and open the cyber domain, “essentially reproducing compliance, at least partially explains the the security dilemma in the virtual world.”61 Cyber-Realist authoritarian regimes’ Russia, China, and other authoritarian states motivations behind their proposal.57 view unfettered information flow as an imminent threat to national stability and
Campaigning Fall 2015 28 state sovereignty. The Western Consensus, primarily utilize soft power to lead an on the other hand, extols the virtues of an international effort and develop a normative open, free, interoperable Internet blind to cybersecurity policy in order to cultivate a geographical borders. Both camps are acting multi-stakeholder framework for the cyber as international norm-entrepreneurs, and domain. they are not in alignment. Given that the international Team Biographies community is in the early stages of Major Amanda Current, USA, is currently serving cybersecurity norm emergence, now is the in the J25 at USCYBERCOM in Fort Meade, time for the United States to demonstrate Maryland. She was commissioned through ROTC at strong leadership and vision. The concepts Truman State University in 2002. MAJ Current of Internet sovereignty and information earned a BS in Psychology from Truman State security run counter to the democratic University in 2002 and an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University principles espoused by the United States and in 2014. Prior to her current assignment, MAJ other Cyber-Liberalist countries. Therefore, Current served as the Brigade Chief of Operations for the United States cannot endorse the the 159th Combat Aviation Brigade in Fort Campbell, proposed Code of Conduct for information Kentucky. security and remain credible as a leader of Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Redash, USAF, is the Western Consensus. Failure on the part currently assigned to the National Reconnaissance of the United States to counter revisionist Office (NRO). He was commissioned through narratives vis-à-vis norms governing ROTC at Boston University in 1997. Lt Col Redash international cybersecurity places it at a earned at BA in Economics from Boston University strategic disadvantage. A collaborative in 1997 and an MS in Management from Troy State University in 2002. He has previously served in a approach is essential to risk reduction and variety of assignments both in the United States and international cooperation in the virtual abroad. domain. Ultimately, the United States must
1 Rex Hughes, “A Treaty for Cyberspace,” Regarding Cyber-security?” Discussion Paper 2011- International Affairs (Royal Institute of International 11, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and Affairs 1944) 86, no. 2 (March 2010): 527, accessed International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 22, 2014, September 2011), 3. Maurer identifies “norm http://www.jstor.org/stable/40664079. entrepreneurs” as any entity with sufficient resources 2 Joseph S. Nye, “Cyber Power,” Paper, (Cambridge, to exert influence in an attempt to convince a critical MA: Belfer Center for Science and International mass of states to embrace new norms. In his research Affairs, Harvard University, May 2010), 15. for the Belfer Center, Maurer examined activities 3 Keir Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace among cybersecurity stakeholders at the United Issues” Paper, 2012 4th International Conference on Nations, and concluded that the international Cyber Conflict, (Tallinn, Estonia, 2012), 3. The community is presently in the first of three stages of nucleus of the revisionist camp is formed by member the norm life cycle: norm emergence. The second states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and third stages of the norm life cycle are “norm (SCO): China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, cascade” and “norm internalization”. These stages Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. are not linear, and the cyclic process is not 4 Ibid., 2. Giles coined the phrase “Western necessarily ever complete. Consensus” to describe a system of views which 6 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution forms an unstated but tangible concurrence among 53/70 – Developments in the field of information and the U.S., UK and other like-minded states. telecommunications in the context of international 5 Tim Maurer, “Cyber Norm Emergence at the United security. A/RES/53/70. (New York: United Nations, Nations – An Analysis of the UN’s Activities January 4, 1999). See also Eneken Tikk-Ringas,
Campaigning Fall 2015 29 agreed upon set of rules, institutions, and norms that Developments in the Field of Information and governed interactions in international society. 12 Telecommunication in the Context of International Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, “The Security: Work of the UN First Committee 1998- Information Revolution, Security, and International 2012, (Geneva: ICT4Peace Publishing, 2012), 4. Relations: (IR) Relevant Theory?” International Three of the General Assembly’s six committees Political Science Review 27, no. 3 (July 2006): 225, have met to negotiate draft resolutions pertaining to accessed October 22, 2014, cybersecurity: The First Committee (Disarmament http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445054? and International Security Committee), The Second origin=JSTOR-pdf. 13 Committee (Economic and Financial Committee), Manjikian, “From Global Village to Virtual and The Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Battlespace,” 382. 14 Cultural Committee). Ibid., 383. 15 7 Maurer, “Cyber Norm Emergence at the United Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Nations,” 22. The first Group consisted of Issues,” 2. 16 governmental experts from 15 states: Belarus, Brazil, Manjikian, “From Global Village to Virtual China, France, Germany, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Battlespace,” 387. 17 Mali, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Ibid., 385. 18 Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom of Manjikian, “From Global Village to Virtual Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United Battlespace,” 387. 19 States. Demchak and Dombrowski, “Rise of a Cybered 8 Eneken Tikk-Ringas, Developments in the Field of Westphalian Age,” 35. 20 Information and Telecommunication in the Context of Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace International Security: Work of the UN First Issues,” 3. 21 Committee 1998-2012, (Geneva: Ibid., 4. 22 ICT4PeacePublishing, 2012), 7. Ibid., 3. 23 9 United Nations, General Assembly, Group of Tom Gjelten, “SHADOW WARS: Debating Cyber Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field ‘Disarmament’” World Affairs 173, no. 4 (Nov, of Information and Telecommunications in the 2010): 3, accessed October 22, 2014, Context of International Security. 69th sess., item 92 http://search.proquest.com/docview/822629043? of the provisional agenda, A/69/112. (New York: accountid=10504. 24 United Nations, June 30, 2014). The concept of the Nye, “Cyber Power,” 15. 25 GGE was proposed by Russia in 2001. The first Tim Stevens, “A Cyber War of Ideas? Deterrence GGE convened in 2004; the second in 2010. The and Norms in Cyberspace,” Contemporary Security third GGE consisted of 15 states: Argentina Policy 33, no. 1 (April 2012): 148-170, accessed Australia, Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt, Estonia, October 22, 2014, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260. 2012.65957. 26 Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Nye, “Cyber Power,” 18. 27 Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of Joseph S. Nye, Power in the Global Information America. Age: From Realism to Globalization (New York: 10 Mary McEvoy Manjikian, “From Global Village to Routledge, 2004), 82. 28 Virtual Battlespace: The Colonizing of the Internet Manjikian, “From Global Village to Virtual and the Extension of Realpolitik,” International Battlespace,” 391. 29 Studies Quarterly, 54 (2010): 382. Open Source Center, Monitor 360, Master 11 Chris Demchak and Peter Dombrowski, “Rise of a Narratives Country Report: China. March 2012, 2, Cybered Westphalian Age,” Strategic Studies accessed October 22, 2014, Quarterly (Spring 2011): 32-61. Until the 1648 https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück (understood /ptargs_0_0_12162_1203_0_43/ together as the Peace of Westphalia), borders did not content/display/fbs20120403475741. 30 stabilize over many generations. The Peace of Ibid., 2. 31 Westphalia not only ended the Thirty Years’ War in Ibid., 3 32 Europe, but also heralded the emergence of the Open Source Center, Monitor 360, Master interstate system upon which modern International Narratives Country Report: China. March 2012, 2. 33 Relations theory was based. Leading states of the U.S. Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore period helped codify and enforce a collectively National Laboratory, More Than Meets the Eye:
Campaigning Fall 2015 30 53 Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the Clandestine Funding, Cutting-Edge Technology and International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare China’s Cyber Research & Development Program, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). The by Kit Conklin and Benjamin Bahney, October 23, NATO CCD COE is an international military 2012, 4. Informatization is a Chinese concept of organization based in Tallinn, Estonia and accredited information dominance as a means to ensure in 2008 by the NATO as a ‘Centre of Excellence.’ It sustained economic growth, compete globally in the is not part of the NATO’s command or force ICT realm, and ensure national security. structure, nor is it funded by the NATO. It is part of 34 Leon Aron, ‘Structure and Context in US-Russian a wider framework supporting the NATO Command Relations at the Outset of Barack Obama’s Second Arrangements. Its present sponsoring nations are Term,” Russian Outlook (Winter 2013): 4, accessed Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, October 27 2014, The Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and the http://www.aei.org/files/2013/03/08-structure-and- United States. Notably, the Tallinn Manual does not context-in-usrussian-relations-at-the-outset-of- carry the force of international law, nor does it have barack-obamas-second-term_172937861857.pdf. the authority of an international treaty or agreement. 54 35 Open Source Center, Monitor 360, Master Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 13. Just War theory has Narratives Country Report: Russia, 22. evolved through Roman and Catholic Church 36 Keir Giles, “Information Troops”—a Russian doctrine into several important bodies of international Cyber Command?” Paper, 2011 3rd International jurisprudence. Jus ad bellum refers to the morality Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia, (justice) in going to war, and jus in bello refers to 2011, 4. morality (justice) in war. Jus ad bellum has largely 37 United Nations, General Assembly, A/69/112, 2. been supplanted by the 1945 Charter of the United 38 Ibid. Nations and is sometimes known as the Law of 39 Ibid. Conflict Management. Jus in bello provides the 40 United Nations, General Assembly, A/69/112, 3. moral basis for the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 41 United Nations, General Assembly, Group of and the supporting Rules of Engagement (ROE). 55 Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field Michael N. Schmitt, email message to authors, of Information and Telecommunications in the October 30, 2014. Michael Schmitt is a Senior Context of International Security. 69th sess., item 92 Fellow at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence of the provisional agenda, A/69/112/Add.1, (New Centre of Excellence, and the editor of the Tallinn York: United Nations, September 18, 2014), 2. Manual. Mr. Schmitt is also the Director of the 42 United Nations, General Assembly, Group of Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field the U.S. Naval War College, a Professor of Public of Information and Telecommunications in the International Law at Exeter University (UK), and a Context of International Security. 68th sess., item 94 Fellow at the Harvard Law School Program on of the provisional agenda, A/68/98. (New York: International Law and Armed Conflict. 56 United Nations, June 24, 2013), 2. Ibid. 57 43 United Nations, General Assembly, Ibid. 58 A/69/112/Add.1, 3. Rain Liivoja and Time McCaromack, “Law in the 44 Ibid., 4. Virtual Battlespace: The Tallinn Manual and the Jus 45 Ibid. in Bello,” Yearbook of International Humanitarian 46 Ibid., 6. Law (2012): 49. 59 47 United Nations, General Assembly, Demchak and Dombrowski, “Rise of a Cybered A/69/112/Add.1, 6. Westphalian Age,” 56. 60 48 Ibid. Ibid., 34. 61 49 Ibid., 3. Manjikian, “From Global Village to Virtual 50 United Nations, General Assembly, A/69/112, 12. Battlespace,” 386. 51 United Nations, General Assembly, A/69/112, 13. 52 Tikk-Ringas, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunication in the Context of International Security, 5.
Campaigning Fall 2015 31 The Challenging Art of Modern At the core of mission command is Mission Command the human element. Subordinates interpret and implement a commander’s intent while By Major Johannes Castro, USA, Major Adam Knox, providing timely information and USAF, and Major Scott Worth, USMC recommendations up the chain of command to inform the future decisions required for successful mission execution. The execution Throughout history the ability to of mission command relies on junior leaders command and control military forces has who must be professionally developed in been a critical component of success. In our order to attain the expertise and skills military today, this requirement is made required to fulfill this vital element of more difficult and complex by a myriad of mission command. Due in part to the high factors including evolving technology, demands of recent conflicts, the military diversity of forces, geographical separation, climate has changed and this professional and dynamic threats. development has eroded. In short, senior Our current joint doctrine states that leadership is failing to provide junior leaders mission command is the “preferred method with the professional development they of exercising command and control.”1 deserve. Inherent in this method are several key To implement the art of mission elements which constitute the “art” of the command effectively, today’s military subject as reflected in the following joint officers must return to the roots of military doctrinal definition of mission command service and explore the foundations of (Editor’s note: italics added for emphasis): effective leadership. The risk-averse nature of our military culture must change, Conduct of military operations through micromanagement at all levels must be decentralized execution based upon discouraged, and the professional mission-type orders. It empowers development of junior leaders must be individuals to exercise judgment in how enhanced beyond mere practical experience. they carry out their assigned tasks and it exploits the human Risk Aversion element…emphasizing trust, force of One of the largest detractors from the will, initiative, judgment, and creativity. mission command concept are the risk Successful mission command demands averse characteristics of many of today’s that…leaders at all echelons exercise leaders. Risk aversion is demonstrated in disciplined initiative and… delegate today’s military through a flawed decisions to subordinates wherever performance evaluation system and a culture possible, which minimizes detailed of zero-tolerance. One factor contributing to control and empowers subordinates’ this avoidance of risk is the speed at which initiative to make decisions. Essential to any missteps are brought to the attention of mission command is the thorough the public through the sensationalism of the understanding of the commander’s media. intent at every level of command and a Risk aversion is evident in today’s command climate of mutual trust and military leaders through the performance understanding.2 evaluation systems of the respective services in general, and more specifically, their over inflation. In “Failure to Lead,” Brian
Campaigning Fall 2015 32 McAllister Flinn comments on Thomas Top talent with ambition and vision is Ricks’ book, The Generals, and contends promoted to the executive level within 10 that “Army wartime command could be years. Also, other highly talented people are improved by addressing the systemic allowed to remain in jobs they enjoy and are problem of failing to identify — and require productive in.”5 One recommendation that is for promotion — those innate qualities seen throughout the research is the concept [George] Marshall esteemed [common of a 360-degree review. This non-attribution sense, professional knowledge, physical type feedback allows leaders to benefit from fitness and stamina, loyalty, determination, the comments of peers and subordinates optimism, and the ability to work within a through non-permanent constructive group].”3 criticism. The Army currently has a form of In her master’s thesis for the Naval 360 evaluation, however; many question its Postgraduate School, USAF Maj. Stephane effectiveness and its ability to not be Wolfgeher, describes the evaluation systems distorted by the officer that is being of all the services and takes a deeper look at evaluated. Without change, however, the process for inflammatory characteristics. “performance evaluations will continue to She concludes that all services, to one emphasize a zero-defect mentality.”6 degree or another, engage in inflation of Additionally, today’s military evaluations. The USMC system is most commanders hide behind a policy of zero- immune to undue influence due to many of tolerance. The effects of this zero-defect its objective criteria and the USAF culture are evident in the performance evaluation system has the highest levels of evaluation system, but it is degrading inflation due to its pure essay format.4 officers’ decision-making and leadership Despite how commanders communicate abilities. Flinn states, “both senior and junior their subordinates’ performance to central officers have learned to avoid risk, since promotion boards, the result is a zero-defect mediocre performance will probably not culture. Service members know that one hurt one’s career, but making a mistake may mistake has the very real potential to destroy it.”7 Improvement is impossible torpedo one’s career. Raters know this as without initiative and the associated risk. well and are less likely to document Without innovation, new discoveries are substandard performance. Many have non-existent, new efficiencies will never be suggested adopting an appraisal system from reached, and cost savings will not be the corporate world. achieved; it will be impossible to do more An article in the Armed Forces with less. Today’s military is stagnating Journal describes the positive attributes of because the price of failure—or even just General Electric’s leader development partial success—is just too great. Senior model and suggests two possible changes to leaders have forgotten the difference the current system. Young talent is between a failure of a well-intended action identified early and cultivated through “fast- and irresponsible behavior. “Success may track programs, and exposed to different not result from absolute perfection, but regions and opportunities, and senior leaders rather from experimentation, learning from determine if continued promotion and failure, and the implementation of logical reward is merited. People are evaluated measures to manage risk. Such techniques based on organizational performance and should be encouraged rather than peer group comparisons, and in particular, inadvertently constrained, as the [military] during temporary service at ‘the next level’. strives to find the right balance between the
Campaigning Fall 2015 33 instilment of accountability and the posture. “Their reluctance appears to be a encouragement of sensible risk taking.”8 by-product of the zero-defects mentality Another major contributing factor to plaguing today’s [military]. Real or rick aversion is the speed at which mistakes imagined, this perception exists among the rise to the attention and judgment of the [military’s] ranks and seriously inhibits general public. The potential consequences initiative and risk-taking. Engaging the of mistakes have been described above, but media no doubt involves both risk and if that was not bad enough, the alarming initiative,” but success means more popular speed at which senior leadership becomes support for the military and more freedom of aware of these incidents can be enough to maneuver to use innovation and ingenuity to paralyze commanders at all levels. “The deal with the limited resources of this explosion of media outlets and constrained fiscal environment.10 inexperienced journalists are major causes of negligent reporting. Mushrooming media Risk Averse Micromanagement competition has spawned lower The risk-averse nature of civilian and professionalism among reporters and news military leaders also leads to people…The Internet also presents micromanagement. Starting at the top, our expanding opportunities for novice media civilian leaders have distanced themselves personnel to reach mass audiences.”9 This from military values in the recent past, combination of increased media making them unlikely to be accepting of competition, novice reporting, and the military casualties.11 This thought process instant and irreversible nature of social has filtered its way down through the media can be fatal to innovation and military chain of command, manifesting creativity in military operations and itself in micromanagement. Commanders commanders’ careers. from the platoon to the battalion-level are It is often forgotten that there are now scrutinized to ensure that each of their substantial differences between the general plans or exercises have Operational Risk public and the military. The military is Management (ORM) worksheets down to trained to accept and mitigate risk, but still the level of a soldier or Marine getting a undertake operations that could result in the snakebite in the field and ways to mitigate loss of life. The general public is not trained that risk. While understanding that there are or prepared to take this risk and is thus more risks inherent to the military line of work, risk averse. The instant reporting and one must ask, “Do I need to ensure that my sensationalism of the media unfairly Colonel knows that there are snakes in the transfers the risk avoiding nature of the field that could bite me, and that I public onto an institution that is trained to understand that threat?” In fact, under the analyze, mitigate, and, more importantly, premise of mission command and deal with the consequences of failure. A decentralized operations, shouldn’t senior remedy for this would require an intensive leaders be more trusting of their subordinate public affairs campaign aimed at the leaders and their senior enlisted advisors; at American public. The military must engage least to the point of understanding that their the media in an effort to educate them to the experience may lead to them quickly role of the military as an instrument of mentioning general risks and threats to those national power. Senior leadership is often in their charge? Lastly, how much accused of having their ‘heads in the sand’ manpower is wasted on ORM worksheets and only engaging the media in a reactive and other risk-related documents that could
Campaigning Fall 2015 34 be spent on the important parts of planning, understand and only need to have their or even training junior military members? thinking reinforced by career military The micromanagement that manifests itself professionals using their positions to in ORM worksheets and extensive briefs on strategically communicate with the general hazards in an environment completely population. contradict the nature of the very people our services have recruited. By nature, military Technological Micromanagement services target and attract risk-taking people. Yet another way micromanagement It is not until they enter the military that they is threatening the institution of a mission- are targeted with such risk-averse command climate in our military is through micromanagement techniques as excessive technological innovation. Many of these paperwork or lengthy, monotonous, innovations are centered on command and common-sense briefs. control (C2) software applications in The requirement for “safety briefs” military networks and intelligence, are another form of micromanagement due surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to risk aversion. Instead of holding leaders assets such as unmanned aircraft systems accountable for the ability to lead and (UAS) or drones. The intended impact of mentor subordinates, senior leaders require a these systems are improved command and multitude of briefs aimed at everything from control, however, commanders today use motorcycle safety to sexually transmitted these systems to micromanage their diseases. Motorcycle safety has become the subordinates in a way that would be epitome of risk-averse micromanagement, unfathomable to military leaders of the past. specifically in the Marine Corps where From the beginning of warfare and every battalion must have a “motorcycle into the 20th century, military leaders, club,” which is permitted to go on a club specifically generals, were present with their motorcycle ride at least one Friday a month. troops on the front lines of battle. Many Not only are commanders micromanaged to times, these leaders would be fighting develop unit-level clubs for fear of a alongside their troops, literally leading the military member getting hurt, they must give charge, or, at the very least, swinging a them man-hours to conduct club events, sword next to their men. As militaries grew wasting even more time and money. The larger and increased the responsibility of answer to eliminating micromanagement generals to manage at a much higher level, from risk-aversion is in the hands of our technology also advanced and made it senior military leadership. Instead of possible for these leaders to step away from bringing the military closer to the civilian the front lines and into command posts cultural aversion to risk, our general and flag several miles away. In the 21st century, officers must effectively convey the inherent militaries are experiencing an even faster risks of military service to our civilian rate of technological advancement. Fourteen leadership and the general population. This years of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan is not to say that we do not want to protect alone has witnessed a startling advance in our military members from harm or educate C2 and ISR assets, along with weaponry. To them on certain dangers inherent in military compound matters, the growth of social life. The American public holds its military media and expansion of access to the in high regard because of the inherent risk to internet has given the U.S, and its life that is incurred by joining the ranks, adversaries, another front in which to wage ensuring that in some regard they already war. All of this has two effects: 1) increased
Campaigning Fall 2015 35 distance from which a senior leader can gain when to drop them in real time due to his understanding and command a battle, even view from the command post. The problem at the tactical level, and 2) rapid, unfiltered with this story is that his decisions skipped information sharing from the battlefield to multiple layers of commanders, action the rest of the world. In terms of officers, and troops, micromanaging them to micromanagement both of these effects are the point of rendering them useless in the detrimental to mission command. mission. With ground units, an even greater The use of systems such as Global problem occurs when senior leaders decide Command and Control System (GCCS), that they understand the battle better than Command Post of the Future (CPoF), the commander on the ground due to their Command and Control Personal Computer views of icons and videos on separate (C2PC), and Blue Force Tracker (BFT) have screens in their command post. What these given senior military leaders the ability to senior leaders do not take into account is track their subordinate units in near-real what they cannot see; the 3D world of a time across the battlefield from the relative soldier or Marine looks quite different from comfort of a much more distant command the one thousand foot view of a Predator post, possibly even continents away if the IT feed or the lagging blue icon on a C2 network permitted. Coupled with new ISR display. Another question comes into play assets, such as Predator and Scan Eagles here as well: if the senior leaders are focused drones transmitting live video feeds to the on the tactical view of a single portion of the same command posts, senior leaders can battle, who is focused on the operational and now start to develop what they believe is a strategic views? Micromanagement in this holistic view of the distant battlefield.12 The case truly impacts strategic thought. As premise behind mission command is that the subordinate commanders are becoming more mission-type orders given to the subordinate and more micromanaged on the battlefield commanders would give them a certain (and let us remember, those being amount of autonomy, latitude, and flexibility micromanaged can be O-5 and O-6-level on the battlefield in order to carry out their commanders with 18-26 years of military mission. If an obstacle was introduced or experience), the “mother-may-I syndrome” situations on the ground had changed, a becomes prevalent.13 This syndrome commander may opt to change his plan in develops due to the micromanagement of order to accomplish the original end-state. subordinates becoming so severe that they Mission command in the environment will not attempt to make a decision to act on explained above is almost impossible. The mission-type orders without asking distance that military leaders have strayed permission to higher headquarters first; i.e. from the battlefield in centuries past has those watching the battle from the monitors been eliminated through technology, in their command post. Lastly, the ensuring that generals and senior civilian development of the “mother-may-I officials can all become part of the battle syndrome” and severe micromanagement on without actually being on the ground. In the battlefield due to technology is breeding Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, a culture of micromanagement among our and the Perils, Peter Singer recounts a story junior officers. From being micromanaged, of a general officer who was quite proud of our junior leaders are learning through his involvement in a battle, believing he had experience and example a way to lead which a greater understanding of the situation and is completely contradictory to mission could direct which size bombs to drop and
Campaigning Fall 2015 36 command. These junior leaders will then now, and should be improved upon in the continue these practices in the future. future, but the actions of our senior leaders Social media and the rise of global must be consistent with the education we are internet access also encourages providing to our junior leaders. micromanagement. As Marine General Charles Krulak invoked the thought of the De-emphasized Professional Development “strategic corporal” when lamenting about Another area which presents a the ability of junior military members to significant challenge to the art of modern affect the battlefield due to technological mission command is the de-emphasis of advances, the application of the “strategic professional development specifically in the private” pertains to the age of global internet military officer corps. Officer development access and social media. In this instance, the is typically thought of only as professional reference is to the speed at which a video or military education (PME) but what’s often picture taken on the battlefield can be neglected is the more enduring, holistic, uploaded and shared around the world in a individual officer development. It’s the latter matter of seconds, changing the perception component that’s the focus of this of civilian populations and creating discussion. This individual development is perspective enemies. One can think of a few manifest in three areas: mentoring, examples, including the current videos of counseling, and collective training. This torture and beheadings taken by ISIS (on the discussion will describe these challenges side of our adversaries) and of Marines and offer some proposed solutions for future urinating on dead Taliban fighters. The improvement. prospect of the effect of these instances In 2013, “the Center for Army occurring again in the future puts into Leadership's annual assessment of attitudes motion the very fearful micromanagement and perceptions on leader development of our civilian leaders that enacts the entire (CASAL) identified "Develops Others" as process of micromanagement down the the lowest-rated leader competency for the chain of command. For if public opinion is fifth year in a row. Just over half of Army threatened, senior leaders seem intent on leaders (59 percent) were regarded as reacting to situations and proving they will effective at developing others by their change them rather than explaining the subordinates. The CASAL further revealed situation and telling the ‘why’ behind the that one fourth (22 to 26 percent) of those action. surveyed indicated their units placed a "low" Peter Singer invokes “enlightened or "very low" priority on leader control” as a way to combat development activities.”15 Though these micromanagement on today’s statistics are representative of a single technologically advanced battlefield.14 His service, it underscores the impact of the high explanation of this is the understanding by demand levied on the military by recent senior leaders of when they should inject conflicts and budget constraints. This themselves into a process and when they includes a heavy toll specifically on a should let their subordinates carry out the generation of officers who have come to mission assigned to them. This is definitely expect professional development from the true, and must be coupled with continued confines of a classroom or from self-derived education on the mission command culture on-the-job training through a multitude of at all levels. Professional development in duty assignments. Critical components such regards to mission command does occur
Campaigning Fall 2015 37 as mentoring have become casualties of this pursue better opportunities in the private new environment. sector. Improved officer retention rates Mentoring is important to the future would benefit the government by increasing of our military because it’s “the vehicle the return on investment for training, through which the next generation of leaders security clearances, and other required new and followers are molded.”16 Even though officer expenditures. Third, Frank C. Budd mentoring should ideally occur throughout notes that mentoring could help to ease the an officer’s career, it’s most vital to junior higher rates of “divorce…occupational… officers who often lack the experience, [and] posttraumatic stress disorder levels” skills, and resiliency required to manage the which continue to impact the military after professional and personal challenges years of conflict.22 associated with a career in the military. The Improving officer mentoring is vital mentoring of a junior officer is important in for the development of our future leaders but that it also “establishes trust and promotes requires several key changes to the status learning” between the mentor and mentee.17 quo. First, a renewed emphasis on the A myriad of reasons can be noted for the importance of mentoring by senior service decline in mentoring but insufficient time leaders is needed. This would help prioritize and a lack of priority by senior leaders have time and effort on developing our human been noted as primary reasons.1819 Some capital. Second, service doctrine for officers might be reluctant to serve as mentoring must be developed to standardize mentors if they lack the skills or confidence basic expectations and establish guidelines especially if they’ve never had one for mentoring. A joint definition of themselves. mentoring would also eliminate confusion in Revitalizing officer mentoring could evaluations. Finally, education and training remedy several problems which remain a programs for mentoring must be developed, challenge for each service. First, one cause which begin at the basic service school level of toxic leadership is the inadequate to better prepare new officers for their first development of junior leaders. According to assignment with the confidence necessary to Mueller, “toxic leaders are a product of a succeed.23 Another component of mission lack of training and mentoring from command that’s been in decline is superiors.”20 It would stand to reason that counseling. early mentoring could identify and stave off Counseling, or performance those traits in junior officers that could later feedback, is another component of officer manifest themselves as what we consider professional development which has eroded toxic leadership. Second, enhanced over the years. For the purpose of this mentoring could improve officer retention. discussion, a few important distinctions need According to a report by Lieutenant General to be made upfront. Counseling is typically William M. Steele (Commander, U.S. Army conducted by a supervisor, not a mentor. Combined Arms Center) to the U.S. Army Supervisors are focused on specific duty Chief of Staff, “mentoring and retention are performance and may frequently change out related…younger officers felt a lack of while a mentor considers long-term career commensurate commitment from the Army progression and is typically a more enduring to them.”21 This problem isn’t unique to any type of a relationship. A supervisor is one service and may be why many of our “typically more interested in training and best and brightest junior officers leave the perhaps coaching a subordinate.”24 A military after their initial term of service to supervisor and mentor may be one in the
Campaigning Fall 2015 38 same but that is certainly not the norm. Mentoring and counseling play vital Regardless, we need to consider why our parts in officer professional development but counseling is inadequate and how it can be they’re limited to the individual officer and improved to further enhance officer neglect the benefits that collective or group professional development. training has to offer. As such, collective When done correctly, regular methods should be considered to prepare counseling can be a valuable way to enhance leaders for increased future responsibilities officer professional development by and to refine critical skills. These additional communicating expectations, providing methods can be incorporated at any echelon performance assessment, training, and or organizational level and may be coaching. The reality is that, too often, customized by leaders to benefit their counseling is an afterthought, if it happens at officers as they strive to improve their all, due to the familiar constraints of limited organizational culture. For this discussion, time and conflicted priorities. Typically we’ll consider future leadership when it does occur, it doesn’t extend beyond preparedness, collective professional either the initial counseling or performance development, and the sharing of lessons feedback triggered by an evaluation report. learned. Though some services may place more In the military, we know that people emphasis than others on counseling, officers are promoted based on potential for future are typically not the priority and are simply responsibility not on past accomplishment. expected to figure things out. Joint Senior leaders should strive to constantly organizations experience the additional seek ways to prepare junior leaders for these complication of unfamiliar sister service future responsibilities. Typically we forms and expected protocols for consider this to be a one level up focus but completion. This places an additional time Feltey and Madden contend, “this requires requirement on the counselor to learn these an institutional and career-long norm of standards or risk embarrassment. The continuous leader development.”25 absence of effective counseling within an Commanders and senior leaders must organization creates confusion especially consider this much broader approach for the among junior officers who may be lacking development of their junior officers rather the experience and skills that previous duties than what they merely need for their next may afford others. In addition, junior assignment or subsequent rank. Especially in officers may lack the confidence to ask for the current fiscally constrained environment, clear direction and may be left to guess as to this must include a good understanding of their supervisor’s intent and expectations. the individual and collective strengths and Counseling must be a leadership weaknesses so that scarce resources can best priority in any organization striving for be optimized to meet these developmental sincere improvement. Much like with needs. Additional collective training should mentoring, the requisite time, resources, and also be considered. genuine effort must be dedicated by leaders Collective professional development in order to meaningfully convey that their should be leveraged to improve officer subordinates are valuable assets worthy of training and resource utilization. These professional development. Improved events not only provide valuable leadership retention and unit morale will be the skills and build confidence but also improve barometers of success. morale and cohesion. At the tactical level, junior officers may benefit from training on
Campaigning Fall 2015 39 command supply programs, UCMJ review, of “enlightened control,” and the admin reporting, or anything else pertinent understanding of how to use technology for to the service or unit. Other organizations command and control appropriately, must be may benefit from staff rides, planning off- further developed, taught, and fostered sites, or seminars to derive similar benefits. among senior leaders in order to dissuade Commanders and senior leaders may also micromanagement at all levels. Successful benefit from the group dialogue or officer development requires effective opportunity to lead these events. The sharing mentoring, counseling, and collective of lessons learned may be an additional way training in order to overcome the challenges of developing officers. of mission command. Finally, our senior Senior leaders can serve as a wealth military leaders must develop an of knowledge for junior officers. While war information campaign to inform and educate stories may be entertaining, a wealth of our civilian leadership, the media, and the information can be obtained from leaders American people, on some of the intricacies willing to share the lessons that they’ve and inherent risks of military culture. learned throughout their career. Discussing mistakes or past errors in judgment can be a humbling experience but can add a human Team Biographies element to leadership while yielding valuable insight into decision making and Major Johannes Castro, USA, is currently serving as the J51 Strategy and Policy Division Chief at the resilience, especially when discussing what Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated was learned from the mistake and how it Missile Defense (USSTRATCOM) in Colorado shaped them for future leadership success. Springs, Colorado. He was commissioned through the U.S. Army Officer Candidate School in 1999. Conclusion MAJ Castro earned a BS in Biology from the University of Utah in 2000 and an MS in Liberal Arts History remembers only our wars’ from Louisiana State University in 2013. Prior to his commanders. Their performance in the face current assignment, MAJ Castro served as the Deputy of adverse conditions, immense violence, Division Air and Missile Defense Chief with the 4th and danger follow them through the Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado. generations to come. Strategic military Major Adam Knox, USAF, is currently serving as leaders were once junior officers and Deputy Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation at the required proper development in order to US Embassy in Prague, Czech Republic. He was execute mission command effectively to commissioned through U.S. Air Force Officer protect the nation’s vital interests. The Training School at Maxwell AFB, Alabama in 2002. concept of mission command is nothing new Maj Knox has an AA in German from the Defense Language Institute, a BS in Business Administration to military operations. While the burden of from Appalachian State University, an MA in executing mission command falls on the Strategic Intelligence from American Military shoulders of the junior tactical level officers, University, and an MA in European Security Studies senior leadership must alter the environment from the Naval Postgraduate School. Prior to his in which they operate and give these officers current assignment, Maj Knox served as an Evaluator Pilot and Chief of Standardization and Evaluation in the tools they need to succeed. Senior the 517th Airlift Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. military leaders must change the risk-averse nature of the military culture by installing an Major Scott Wert, USMC, is currently serving as effective form of performance evaluation the J71 Cyber Exercise Planner at USSTRATCOM, and giving young leaders the latitude to try Offutt AFB, Bellevue, Nebraska. He was commissioned through the USMC Platoon Leaders new techniques and innovate. The concept Class program in 2001. Maj Wert earned a BS in
Campaigning Fall 2015 40 Criminal Justice Administration from Mansfield Communication Battalion at Camp Pendleton, University of Pennsylvania in 2001 and a BA in California. History from Mansfield University in 2011. Prior to his current assignment, Maj Wert served as the Battalion Operations Officer with 9th
Notes 16 Lackey, James, and Gene C. Kamena. 2010. "Mentoring: Finding our way to the future." Fires 1 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2013. "Doctrine for the (United States Army Field Artillery Association), p. Armed Forces of the United States." Joint 22 Publication 1. Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of 17 Ozier, Davis, Christopher Lareau, and Bret P. Van Staff, March 25, p. V-15. Poppel. 2006. "Agile Birds: Junior Officer 2 Ibid, p. V-15 Professional Development During Training Hold 3 Brian McAllister Flinn, “Failure to Lead,” Wilson Periods." Armor, p. 35. Quarterly, accessed February 11, 2015, 18 Ibid, p. 23 http://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/failure-to-lead/. 19 Mueller, Robert A. 2012. "Leadership in the U.S. 4 Stephane Wolfgeher, “Inflation of USAF Officer Army: A Qualitative Exploratory Case Study Of The Performance Reports: Analyzing the Organizational Effects Toxic Leadership Has On The Morale And Environment,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate Welfare Of Soldiers." Ph.D. Dissertation, School of School, 2009), p. 30-58. Business and Technology, Capella University, Ann 5 Arnold, Brig Mark C., “Don’t Promote Mediocrity,” Arbor, Minnesota, p. 268 Armed Forces Journal, last modified May 1, 2012, 20 Ibid, p. 224 http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/dont-promote- 21 Captain Kopser, G. Joseph, U.S. Army. 2002. mediocrity/. "Mentoring in the Military: Not Everybody Gets It." 6 James Joyner, “Why America’s Best Officers Are Military Review, p 40. Leaving,” Outside the Beltway, last modified January 22 Budd, Frank C. 2007. "Mentoring In The U.S. Air 6, 2011, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/why- Force: A Cornerstone For Success Through americas-best-officers-are-leaving/. Organizational Transformation." Performance 7 Flinn, “Failure to Lead.” Improvement, p. 16. 8 Brendan Gallagher, “Managing Risk in Today’s 23 Captain Anthes, Erik J. 2012. "Completing the Army,” Military Review, Jan-Feb 2014, p. 96. Chain: Mentorship Needed in Officer Basic Courses." 9 James Lovejoy, “Improving Media Relations,” Army Sustainment, p. 23 Military Review, Jan-Feb 2002, p. 50. 24 Lackey, James, and Gene C. Kamena. 2010. 10 Ibid, p. 51. "Mentoring: Finding our way to the future." Fires 11 Furedi, Frank. "Afghanistan: The Dangers of a (United States Army Field Artillery Association), p. Risk-Averse War." Afghanistan: The Dangers of a 23 Risk-averse War. September 7, 2009. Accessed 25 LTC Feltey, Thomas M, and CPT John F. Madden. February 18, 2015. http://www.spiked- 2014. "The Challenge of Mission Command." online.com/newsite/article/7349#.VOTljDaKDIV. Military Review, p.4.
12 Singer, Peter. "Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils." The Brookings Institution. July 7, 2009. Accessed February 18, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2009/07/s ummer-military-singer 13 Ibid 14 Ibid 15 Crissman, Douglas C. 2013. "Improving the Leader Development Experience in Army Units." Military Review, p. 6.
Campaigning Fall 2015 41 The Falklands Campaign: A was already a member.2 The newly formed Failure in Modern Joint Common Argentine government conducted the Operating Precepts invasion of the Falklands to stifle internal political unrest by uniting the nation in a 3 By Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Borders, USA, Major struggle designed to evoke national pride. Kelly Montier, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonel The Argentine invasion plan called for 150 Michael Nakonieczny, USMC Marine Commandos to conduct a raid at Mullet Creek, neutralize the 68 Royal The Falkland Islands campaign Marines there, arrest the Royal Governor, started on April 2, 1982 with the Argentine and set the conditions for the invasion fleet invasion and subsequent occupation of the to enter Port Stanley Harbor.4 Although Falkland Islands. The roots of the campaign unforeseen events dictated changes to the stemmed from the contested rightful original plans, Argentine Commandos ownership of the islands between Argentina adapted successfully and the Governor, Rex and the United Kingdom dating back to the Hunt, surrendered a short four hours after 17th Century. After decades of diplomatic the Argentines first landed.5 action aimed at a negotiated settlement, After their rapid success, the Argentina resorted to the use of force and Argentines rotated the initial, professionally invaded the islands. 1 The resulting battle for trained Marine Commandos back to the Falklands represents the largest Argentina to counter potential domestic integrated land, sea, and air campaign since unrest and to reinforce the border with World War II. Although U.S. military Chile, where a long-standing dispute schools often highlight the British ingenuity, existed. Three brigades of Argentine Army expeditionary capability, and physical conscripts replaced the professional and prowess of the British infantrymen as the well-trained Argentine Marines on the ultimate key to their victory, what is often ground. The majority of these troops had not overlooked are the mistakes and lost finished initial training and were opportunities of the Argentines. Despite the individually inserted into units to achieve success of the initial Argentine invasion of acceptable combat strength.6 The Argentine the Falklands, they were ultimately defeated occupation force now tasked with the due to their failure to apply the Joint defense the island consisted of 11,000 Common Operating Precepts outlined in ground troops, an aged, but well-balanced Joint Publication 3-0; in particular, they naval fleet, comprised of two separate task failed to exploit unity of effort, influence forces and three submarines, and a domestic and international audiences, or formidable air force of roughly 220 fighter manage transitions over time and space. planes.7 The task of the air force and navy was to intercept any British vessels sent to The Argentine Invasion and British reclaim the islands. Counter Attack Three days after the initial Argentine In December of 1981, the Argentine invasion, the British launched their largest government underwent its second regime naval task force since World Campaign II to change in less than a year when General retake the islands.8 The Task Force Leopoldo Galtieri assumed the role of consisted of more than 100 ships, six president. Although he occupied the submarines, 42 Harriers, approximately 175 position, the real power rested with the helicopters, and a landing forces comprised three-man military junta of which Galtieri of Royal Marine Commandos and
Campaigning Fall 2015 42 paratroopers.9 Despite being one of the best commanders and being at a tactical trained forces in the world, the British Task disadvantage compared to the Argentines, Force was largely unprepared for such an the British succeeded in taking the locations immediate deployment and the requirement in what turned out to be the last large-scale to operate on lines of communications more assault of the campaign.13 From then on, all than seven-thousand miles from their home tactical actions encountered by the Royal shores.10 Marines and paratroopers resembled the Once the British Task Force neared Battle of Goose Green: stiff initial Argentine the Falklands in late April, the Argentines resistance followed by a collapse of the launched several air attacks against the Argentine soldiers once they were decisively British, but were unable to penetrate the engaged. On the night of 11 June, British protective screen put up by the Harriers and forces launched a brigade-sized night attack lost four aircraft. On 2 May, the British against the heavily defended ring of high submarine HMS Conqueror sunk the ground surrounding Port Stanley. The Argentine warship ARA Belgrano and 368 surrender of the Argentine forces on 14 June Argentine sailors were lost. The sinking of marked the end of the conflict.14 The war the ship convinced the Argentines they lasted 74 days and resulted in the deaths of could not compete with the British Navy and 225 British and 649 Argentine soldiers, the entire Argentine Navy returned to port. sailors, and airmen. The Argentines However, the Argentine Air Force retaliated surrendered 9,800 troops, all of which were with a major air strike, subsequently sinking repatriated to Argentina.15 the HMS Sheffield and pushing the British Task Force and its local air superiority away from the islands. 11 On 19 May, the full British Task Force arrived at the Falklands and commenced their amphibious landing. The Argentines launched uncoordinated air strikes against the British Navy, hitting five different warships but causing marginal damage, while losing ten of their own fighters. During the ensuing British invasion, casualties were high on both sides. The landing at Port San Carlos took the Argentines by surprise as they thought it impossible to land there. The Argentines Figure 1. JP 3-0 Common Operating Precepts16 then launched major air strikes against the British Fleet, sinking three and damaging Common Operating Precepts four other ships, and eliminating the bulk of Although the Falklands campaign the British helicopters. The Argentines lost lasted only 74 days and, compared to other another 30 planes and would be unable to major campaigns, resulted in relatively few execute air operations on such a large scale casualties. The campaign provides a for the rest of the conflict.12 doctrinal lens through which common The British launched attacks on operating precepts can be examined. The ten Darwin and Goose Green in the early common operating precepts (see Figure 1) morning on 27 May. Despite losing two key form the foundation of successful joint
Campaigning Fall 2015 43 operations. Although the Argentine military external narrative as successfully as it did violated several of the common operating the internal narrative, it may have been able precepts throughout their planning and to change the international environment execution of the Falkland Islands campaign, sufficiently to handicap the British effort three of these significantly contributed to while gaining material support for their own their ultimate defeat. These are: cause. Argentina was somewhat competent • Inform domestic audiences and at ‘informing’ its own population. The influence the perceptions and government had been carefully crafting and attitudes of key foreign audiences as controlling the information flow to its an explicit and continuous populace for over a decade and used this to operational requirement. its advantage during the Falkland conflict.21 • Achieve and maintain unity of effort After invading the Falklands, the Argentines within the joint force and between extended their information practices there as the joint force and U.S. Government, well. They introduced televisions to the international, and other partners. islands for which only Argentine • Plan and manage operational programing was available and limited other transitions over time and space. 17 forms of media to those that were friendly to 22 the Argentine cause. In Argentina, papers Collectively, “these precepts flow logically such as La Nación frequently pressed the from the broad challenges in the strategic themes of “British colonialism” and “British environment to the specific conditions, nostalgia for the lost empire” as they framed 23 circumstances, and influences in a [Joint the conflict in their early reporting. During Force Commander’s] operational the conflict, reporting minimized Argentine environment.”18 losses while emphasizing British losses, at times reporting the sinking of the same ships Inform & Influence multiple times during the campaign. Post Although Joint publication 3-0 did conflict, La Nación talks about terminating not expound on this precept, it did address the battle, ceasefires, and the withdrawal the importance of communication from the Falkland Islands rather than strategies.19 The U.S. Army Command and expressing it as a surrender, downplaying 24 General Staff College’s 2012 Campaign the failure of the junta. Planning Handbook associated this precept The Argentines attempted to with inform and influence activities which it capitalize on British weaknesses with defines as “the integration of designated moderate success; the most notable being information-related capabilities in order to the sinking of the ARA Belgrano. Although synchronize, themes, messages and actions the ARA Belgrano was a light cruiser, likely with operations to inform [domestic] and headed to engage the British fleet, the global audiences, influence foreign Argentines made much of the fact that it was audiences, and affect adversary and enemy outside the stated exclusion zone when the decision making.”20 It further stresses that British sank it killing 360 “innocent” lives. this precept requires active engagement that The sinking of the ship was characterized as 25 can lead to operational advantage when done a treacherous act in the Argentine media. well. Although a less obvious aspect of the Despite being a military victory for the Falkland Campaign than the other precepts, British, the Argentine’s ability to exploit had Argentina been able to control the “the premium that the international
Campaigning Fall 2015 44 community put on the appearance of purpose in JP 3-0 is “to ensure unity of avoiding escalation” turned the event into a effort in the accomplishment of minor political defeat for the British, objectives.”30 Additionally, JP 3-0 expands particularly in Europe.26 on the importance of unity of effort, The Argentines made their most highlighting how it is used to accomplish a significant mistake in failing to aggressively specific mission by establishing an influence the international community even atmosphere of trust and cooperation.31 before the conflict turned violent. Although During the planning and execution of the Argentines drove the early timeline, they the Falklands campaign, the Argentine allowed the British message to reach the military failed to leverage and integrate their United Nations, European Economic joint force to achieve unity of effort. This Community (EEC) and even the failure was a result of service rivalry and Organization of American States before the institutional culture. At the time of the Argentine message. This failure allowed the campaign, any Argentine joint training and British to push a resolution condemning planning that did exist was purely theoretical Argentina through the UN within hours of and did not translate into execution. “The the invasion and shortly after convinced the [Argentine] armed forces were divided into EEC to place an arms embargo on watertight compartments, each service Argentina.27 The embargo severely jealously guarding its rights and privileges. degraded the Argentine defensive The services participation in the daily capabilities by limiting their ability to machinations of national politics merely procure a resupply of Exocet missiles. From aggravated the situation.”32 the view point of national-level strategic Although there were multiple effects, the Royal Navy’s most effective air incidents in which the Argentines violated defense system during the campaign were the precept of unity of effort, the most the successful sanctions and arms embargo catastrophic incident is highlighted in the imposed by Europe. The Argentines used naval and air engagements marking the Exocet missiles to sink the HMS Sheffield initiation of hostilities. Given the vast and HMS Atlantic Conveyor, but they had distance between the Falklands and United only five operational missiles. The Kingdom, the British initial strength was Argentine Air Force could have inflicted their fleet and their ability to project global considerably more damage on the British power. Within the fleet, the troop transports Fleet had the French not halted upgrades on which enabled the British to project power the Argentines’ remaining Exocets and from the sea served as a vulnerability. If the delivery of another pending shipment. The Argentines were able to destroy the potential destruction caused by those transports, or even deter them from additional Exocets might have impacted the approaching the Falklands, the chances for outcome of the conflict in favor of the Argentine victory would have been assured. Argentines.28 Once the British Task Force neared the Falklands, the Argentines launched Unity of Effort several air attacks against the British, none Unity of effort is defined as the of which were supported by naval forces. “coordination and cooperation toward Despite the bravery displayed by the common objectives, even if the participants Argentine pilots, their fighters were unable are not necessarily part of the same to penetrate the protective screen without the command or organization.”29 The stated supporting effects of the navy. Similarly, in
Campaigning Fall 2015 45 a pure naval engagement on 2 May, the further compounded by their failure to share British submarine, HMS Conqueror, sunk even the most basic information. Examples the Argentine warship ARA Belgrano, of lack of information sharing included the thereby breaking the resolve of the navy failing to provide the air force with the Argentine Navy and forcing them from the radar direction expected by their pilots. battle.33 In a post conflict interview, Without this direction, Argentine pilots Argentine Rear Admiral Jorge Allare searched for targets of opportunity and expressed how ill-prepared and wasted fuel in the process. Additionally, the uncoordinated the Argentine Navy was to air force failed to profit from the techniques fight the British and to support his air force developed by navy pilots of lobbing their counterpart. “None of our plans envisaged bombs to provide them with enough airtime an all-out engagement between the two task to fuse. 37 Without the proper fusing set, forces; the difference in strength made that multiple Argentine air delivered munitions impossible. . . my orders were to carry out struck British vessels and passed through limited operations, taking advantage of them, failing to detonate. These failures favorable opportunities.”34 The departure of violated principles outlined in JP 3-0 which the Argentine Navy from the field of state, “Each component’s mission should battle furthered the pre-existing divide also create a complementary synergy with between the services and doomed the that of others. This enables the action of Argentine Air Force to fight alone against each component to enhance the capabilities the British Fleet. and vulnerabilities of the other.” 38 Despite the lack of naval integration and forsaking the tenant of unity of effort, Transitions the Argentine Air Force was still able to Joint Publication 3-0 states, “A retaliate with major air strikes. Through the transition marks a change of focus between use of fighters equipped with French Exocet phases or between ongoing operations and missiles, the Argentine Air Force was execution of a branch or sequel.”39 The successful in sinking the HMS Sheffield. common operating precept the Argentines Pressing their attack, the Argentine Air failed to exploit is “plan for and manage Force flew more than 300 sorties against the operational transitions over time and British Fleet resulting in the sinking of four space.”40 Despite the Argentines early British warships while damaging eight other operational successes they repeatedly failed vessels.35 Intimidated by the power of the at subsequent transitions negating any Exocet, the British Fleet commander backed gained momentum. The Argentines failed to his carrier force away from the islands and exploit opportunities between phases or took any chance of British air superiority manage transitions in ongoing operations at with him. 36 Given the vulnerability of the three distinct points: during the British Fleet to Argentine air strikes, the redeployment of forces prior to the British Argentines again failed to synchronize the counter-attack, following successes in the naval and air effects against the British air-sea battle, and during the final battle at transports before the invasion began. Port Stanley on 14 June. 41 Without naval forces pursuing the British The taking of Port Stanley by Fleet, momentum was lost and the British Argentine Marine Commandos and the landed their troops 17 days later. subsequent surrender of the Royal Governor The lack of unity of effort between Rex Hunt resulted in overwhelming success. the Argentine Navy and Air Force was Subsequently, on 4 May, the Argentine
Campaigning Fall 2015 46 forces continued their success with the bring the necessary maritime power to sinking of the HMS Sheffield, thereby exploit the Argentine Air Force success. blunting the British initial response. 42 The The lack of Argentine maritime vessels in Argentines now held an opportunity to the attack demonstrated a failure to continue to exploit these successes as the effectively transition from air/ground to British Fleet would take three weeks to cross air/sea. The inability of the Argentines to the Atlantic. 43 Using the transition time foresee transitions resulted in a failure to between 2 April and 19 May, General achieve dominance across all three domains, Mendez recognized Port Stanley as key allowing time and space for the British terrain, placing an overwhelming forces to gain a foothold on the eastern concentration of his troops around Port beach of the West Falkland Island. Stanley, positioning observation post Another example of the Argentine throughout the island along likely avenues failure to transition was their failure to of approach. However, the Argentines commit the reserve during the British attack created a weakness in their plan by rotating on at Port Stanley 11-14 June. General the Argentine Commandos from Port Mendez’s defensive plan hinged on Stanley, back to Argentina to reinforce the mobilizing his formidable helicopter reserve Chilean border. The commandos were to launch a counter-attack. The plan heavily replaced with a larger but untrained relied on the accurate reporting, the resolve conscript force exposing an Argentine of the defensive positions to hold in the face vulnerability.44 “In Argentina, the of British attacks, and the initiative of the Argentine military were still so obsessed Argentine counter-attack commander.47 with the Chile factor that they turned Chile During the British attack, the main effort into a hypothetical enemy out of all stalled subjecting the British infantry to proportion with reality.”45 Assuming direct and indirect concentrated fires. success in the Falklands, the Argentine Despite the tactical advantage and the leadership prematurely transitioned to a commitment of their helicopter reserve as threat on their border with Chile that did not planned, the Argentine forces never exist. effectively transitioned to their branch plan Although the initial sea and naval to blunt the British counter-attack. Nor did campaign was discussed previously to the Argentine air and naval forces intercept highlight the lack of Argentine unity of any British forces attempting to relieve the effort, it also demonstrates the Argentine beleaguered British. Once again, the struggle with transition. This weakness was Argentine branch plan was never executed, illustrated in the British counter attack displaying a lack of ability to manage this commencing on 19 May. Once again, the critical transition point within the Argentine forces exposed the ineffectiveness campaign48 of the British Fleet’s anti-aircraft defense by successfully sinking the four British ships Conclusion HMS Antelope, MV Atlantic Conveyor, MV Militarily, the Falkland Islands Atlantic Coventry, and HMS Ardent. 46 campaign remains the largest-naval battle However, Argentine national command between modern forces since the Second authority failed to see the focus of the battle World War. As such, the conflict offers was transitioning from British land forces at many lessons learned to the Joint Officer. Port Stanley to its maritime forces, the For example, the United States Marine British Fleet, in mid-May and they did not Corps currently uses the Falklands
Campaigning Fall 2015 47 Campaign as a case study at the Expeditionary Warfare School and at their Commanders’ Course to educate attendees Team Biographies
on “amphibious lessons relearned.” Among Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Borders, USA, is other lessons learned, the Marine Corps uses currently serving as CENTCOM Engineer Chief of the Falklands campaign to illustrate the Plans, in Tampa, FL. He was commissioned through importance of amphibious / expeditionary ROTC at the University of Kansas in 1996. LTC readiness, adaptability, and the decisive Borders earned a Bachelor of Architecture from the University of Kansas in 1996 and an MS in Engineer advantage provided by fit, hardened men, Management from the University of Missouri at prepared to close with and destroy the Rolla in 2001. He also holds credentialing as a enemy.49 Although these lessons are Project Management Professional (PMP) since 2012. undoubtedly true, they only tell one side of Prior to his current assignment, LTC Borders served the story and fail to account for the as commander, 326th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) at Argentines’ actions. Fort Campbell, KY. The Argentines were successful in their capture of and subsequent planning for Major Kelly Montier, USAF, is currently serving as the defense of the Falklands but they failed the Iraq Security Forces Team Chief in the Joint to hold the islands due to their inability to Intelligence Center, USCENTCOM, Tampa, FL. She was commissioned through ROTC at Texas A&M adhere to the common operating precepts University in 2001. Maj Montier earned her BA in outlined in JP 3-0. Specifically, the International Studies and Russian; in 2009 she Argentines failed to influence the completed an MA in International Relations through international community, achieve unity of the University of Oklahoma. Prior to her current effort, and manage transitions. As recently assignment, Maj Montier served as Deputy Division Chief, East Asia Strategic Analysis and Integration, stated by General Dempsey, “…the strength NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center, National of [the] Joint Force has always been its Security Agency at Fort Meade, MD ability to combine unique Service capabilities to project decisive military Lieutenant Colonel Michael Nakonieczny, USMC, force.” 50 The Argentines failed to apply currently serves as the Chief of Staff, J3 Afghanistan Division, USSOCOM. LtCol Nakonieczny earned a these strengths and therefore failed to BA in Psychology from the University of California, achieve victory. Davis in 1996 and was subsequently commissioned through the Platoon Leaders Class program. Prior to his current assignment, LtCol Nakonieczny served as the Executive Officer of First Battalion, First Marines at Camp Pendleton, CA.
1 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer/Fall Falklands (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000): 85. Inc., 1984), 5. 6 Alejandro L. Corbacho, “Argentine Command 2 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, Structure” and its Impact on Land Operations during 43. the Falklands / Malvinas Campaign (1982),” 3 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (Manuscript, Universidad del CEMA, September 65. 2004). 4 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 7 Laucirica, “Lessons from Failure,” 85; Hastings and 73. Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 343. 5 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 8 EconomicExpert.com, 73-74; Jorge O. Laucirica, “Lessons from Failure: http://www.economicexpert.com/4a/Falklands:Camp The Malvinas Conflict” (Seton Hall Journal of aign.html
Campaigning Fall 2015 48 http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vo 9 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, l4no1Hew.pdf. 29 347-354. Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces 10 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, of the United States, (25 March 2013), GL-13, 83. http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_capstone. 11 Joseph Allen McCullough, “The Falklands htm. 30 Campaign, The Air and Sea Campaigns,” JP 3-0, i. 31 Suite101.com, http://modern-british- JP 3-0, V-18. 32 history.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_falklands_camp Juan Carlos Murguizur, “The South Atlantic aign#ixzz0XoYq3IRp; Hastings and Jenkins, The Conflict: An Argentine Point of View,” International Battle for the Falklands, 155. Defence Review, vol. 16, no. 2 (February 1983): 135- 12 McCullough, “The Falklands Campaign”; Hastings 36. 33 and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 155, 200, McCullough, “The Falklands Campaign”; Hastings 216, 231. and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 155. 34 13 McCullough, “The Falklands Campaign.” Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas 14 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (New York: Viking 1989), 103. 35 243, 296, 318, 310. Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 15 EconomicExpert.com, 316. 36 http://www.economicexpert.com/4a/Falklands:War.ht Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, ml. 155. 37 16 Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, (11 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, August 2011), I-3, FIG I-2, 323. 38 http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operation JP 3-0, II-3. 39 s.htm. JP 3-0, V-7. 40 17 JP 3-0, I-2. JP 3-0, V-7. 41 18 JP 3-0, I-2. Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 19 JP 3-0, I-6, I-7. 15. 42 20 Jack Kem, Planning for Action: Campaign Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, Concepts and Tools (U.S. Army Command and 155. 43 General Staff College, 2012), 103, McCullough, “The Falklands Campaign.” 44 http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/Planning- Paolo Tripodo, “General Matthei’s refelation and for-Action-Kem-August-2012.pdf. Chilie’s role during the Falklands Campaign: A new 21 Marina Walker, "Framing the Falklands/Malvinas perspective on the conflict in the South Atlantic”, War: National Interest in the Coverage of The Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 4 (2003): 118, London Times, La Nación (Argentina) and El doi: 10.1080/0141-2390312331279708. 45 Mercurio (Chile)," Universum (Talca) Universum 1, Tripodo, “General Matthei’s refelation”, 118. 46 no. 19 (2004): The media scenario, Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, doi:10.4067/S0718-23762004000100011. 216. 47 22 Luscombe, "British Empire”, Occupation. Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 23 Walker, "Framing the Falklands, April 4. 178. 48 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 24 Walker, "Framing the Falklands, June 15-16. 25 243. Walker, "Framing the Falklands, May 3-4; Herbert 49 “Operation Corporate, Falklands War, 1982” Friedman, "Psyop of the Falkland Islands War," (Marine Corps Commanders’ Program, Day 5, PSYWAR.ORG. October 1, 2005: FALKLAND February 2015). ISLANDS WAR PSYOP, 50 “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint http://www.psywar.org/falklands.php. Force 2020” (10 September 2012): 4, 26 Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland http://dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/concepts.htm. Islands, 1982," Foreign Affairs 61, no. 1 (1982): 203, doi:10.2307/20041358. 27 Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands,” 210.
28 Patrick Hew, “National Effects-Based Operations: The Example of Fleet Air Defence,” Security Challenges 4, no. 1 (Autumn 2008): 89, 94-95,
Campaigning Fall 2015 49 Using Strategic Foresight and Systems homeland. The Maghreb and Sahel thus Thinking Analyses to Craft a U.S. represent a region at risk, but also a group of Strategy for the African Sahel and nations that have great potential to influence wider continent of Africa and the world. Maghreb The study team recommends continued U.S. support of French CT and COIN efforts in By Colonel Robert Pope, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Fair, USA, and Major Dale Fenton, USMC the region, as well as direct U.S. security, governance, and economic assistance to the France is conducting counterterrorist governments of Niger, Mali, Chad and Libya. (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) activities These U.S. and French actions should be more in the Maghreb and Sahel regions of Africa— fully coordinated, eliminating duplicative specifically in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Libya— measures and reinforcing areas of shared which align with U.S. interests. The U.S. concern. If both nations use their diverse military has supported these French activities instruments of national power in a with inter/intra-theater airlift and aerial synchronized, deliberate manner, both can refueling. However, authorities and funding for achieve their national interests in the region, and that support expire early in 2015. France desires can do so in a cost-effective manner in this time continued U.S. support and reimbursement, but of fiscal constraints. the White House reportedly wants to end this The team arrived at this recommendation assistance. The question is whether the United by employing several strategic foresight and States should continue to support French CT systems-thinking methods, including modeling and COIN activities in the Maghreb and Sahel. the system to understand system behavior and This issue is important to the United identify key outcome and leverage variables, States not only because of terrorism concerns, forecasting global trends and their impact on the but also because of the importance of supporting problem, exploring alternative futures, social a key ally (France) who is taking the lead in this change theory, and anticipatory management. region. The emergence of groups such as the Islamic State, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb I. System Model. We begin the analysis of (AQIM), and the continued threat of Boko the problem by modeling the system Haram in Nigeria have established terrorism which includes key elements and threats both in and around the region. AQIM interactions between U.S. national has expanded operations from Algeria to Niger security, French national security, the key and Chad, Boko Haram has expanded attributes and goals of the Maghreb and operations from Nigeria into Niger and Chad, Sahel governments, and the key attributes and the Islamic State has moved into Libya, and goals of the regional VEOs. The recently conducting highly publicized combined system model is shown in beheadings. These and other Islamist violent Figure 1. extremists organizations (VEOs) pose a destabilizing threat, seeking ungoverned spaces to build forces and launch terror attacks on the region, U.S. allies, and potentially in the U.S.
Campaigning Fall 2015 50 similarities to the U.S. model, and intersects at key points of shared national interests. Although the French White Paper does not use the term “Global Security,” it does use the similar term “International Security.” The interests of both governments merge in the desire for stability, security, and global prosperity. This is realized through cooperation through a strong alliance (namely NATO), military interoperability, and an open international economic system. When applied to the Maghreb and Sahel, the security situation threatens not only economic prosperity, but also stability within and on the periphery of the region. French economic interests are greater in the region than those of the United States, tying French interests
Figure 1. Causal Loop Diagram of the Combined United States / more closely to the local governments. The France / Sahel-Maghreb Governments / VEOs System French White Paper also emphasizes shared language and culture across the Francophone The portion of the system describing the world, linking France to its former colonies and United States, shown in the lower left portion of regional partners around the globe. The paper Figure 1, is a model of the 2010 United States describes French interests and argues for National Security Strategy1 produced by continued action to support friendly Professor Dan McCauley at the U.S. Joint governments, highlighting French long-term Forces Staff College.2 The left side of the U.S. commitment to its allies in the region. subsystem represents the domestic portion of the The portion of the system describing the U.S. national security strategy, while the right Maghreb and Sahel governments, shown in the side represents the international portion. There upper left of Figure 1, is a model produced by are many positive, reinforcing loops in this the study team based on several sources, subsystem, such as American strength and including reports from intergovernmental 5 influence abroad driving global security and organizations, U.S. State Department 6 7 vice versa. The dominant loop in the subsystem assessments, scholarly journals and books, and 8 runs from American security, to global security, media reporting, since the governments of to international order, to American strength and Mali, Niger, Chad, and Libya have not influence abroad, and back to American published and made publicly available security.3 comprehensive security strategy documents The portion of the system describing comparable to the U.S. National Security France, shown in the lower right of Figure 1, is Strategy or the French White Paper. While a model produced by the study team based on these Maghreb and Sahel governments state that the 2013 French White Paper: Defence and they value human capital development and food Security.4 The French system model has several security, the behavior of these governments
Campaigning Fall 2015 51 indicates that what they value most is the power among these four subsystems; each is described and legitimacy of their regime. The key leverage briefly below. variable in this subsystem is the economy, • Sahel-Maghreb governments and VEOs: which feeds positively into every other element One key linkage between the Sahel- in this subsystem. The outcome element in this Maghreb governments and VEOs is the subsystem of most interest to the United States relationship among security of these is security, which is positively influenced by the states, successful VEO attacks, and VEO economy, government legitimacy and power, freedom of movement, while the second and infrastructure. In addition to security, key linkage is the relationship from the France has a greater interest than the United local economies to unemployment and States in improving the local economies and the youth bulge. This indicates that governments, since the French economy is more improving security and reducing strongly linked to these countries. unemployment will reduce VEO impacts The portion of the system describing the and VEO power. VEOs, shown in the upper right of Figure 1, is a • Sahel-Maghreb governments and the model produced by the study team based on the United States: The key linkage between Terrorism Threat Model found in JP 3-26 and the Sahel-Maghreb governments and the Country Reports on Terrorism 2013.9 Global United States connects security of these network links with VEOs in the region states to global security, which negatively affect international security. French influences American security. This activities that improve the regional economy, indicates that the primary U.S. national governance, and security within the region, interest in these countries is improving negatively affect VEO operations. VEOs have their security. This linkage of interests is less freedom to raise funds through extortion, highlighted in the blue oval in Figure 1. kidnapping, and other criminal acts, which • Sahel-Maghreb governments and supports training and equipping of extremists France: There are two key linkages for more successful attacks. Improving between France and these countries— economic conditions within the region counters between security in the African countries the negative effects of unemployment, reducing and international security in the French the underlying conditions that create pools of subsystem, and between the African candidates for VEOs to recruit and indoctrinate economies and the French economy. with their radical ideology. With greater • VEOs and France: VEOs in this part of security restricting VEO freedom of movement, Africa primarily relate to France through VEOs find fewer safe havens to train and their impact on the Sahel-Maghreb indoctrinate, increase membership, and pursue countries’ security and economy. their objectives. However, there is a direct negative Assembling these four systems linkage between VEO radical Islamist facilitates an understanding of how they interact ideology and French language and as one large system and facilitates identification culture, insofar as these non-French of key output variables and leverage variables in extremist ideologies take root in the system. There are six bilateral relationships immigrant communities in France,
Campaigning Fall 2015 52 leading to lone-wolf or local cell VEOs Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to within France. 2045 as a source document, we identified the • VEOs and the United States: There is following global or regional trends, drivers, and currently not a direct linkage between endogenous variables which help us to analyze the VEOs in this region and the United the United States/France/Maghreb and Sahel States, since their attacks are directed at Governments/VEO system to determine whether local and regional actors rather than is a sensible U.S. policy to provide financial or directly on the United States. However, other support to French counterterror actions in that could change if these VEOs gain Mali, Niger, Chad, and Libya. The global, sub- sufficient power and resources, or if they Saharan (which includes Mali, Niger, and perceive a direct threat from the United Chad), and North African (which includes States. Libya) of most relevance to the problem are • The United States and France: There are summarized in Table 1, while relevant two key sets of relationships between the endogenous variables, based on the causal loop United States and France; both are diagram analysis of the system, are listed in highlighted in the tan ovals in Figure 1. Table 2. The first links American security and global security through NATO and Table 1. Trends and Drivers in the Future Environment in the interoperability with allies and partners Maghreb and Sahel to the French interest in Strong alliance Trends Drivers partners and the European Union. The Increased instability11 Demographics: Sub-Saharan African second links American interests in an population is likely to double by 2045.12 “Rapid population growth is likely to open international economic system, jeopardize social and economic global prosperity, and international order development, particularly in the most vulnerable countries. With the to the French interest in international proportion of those in the 15-25 age- security. These linkages demonstrate group higher in sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world, young that the United States and France have people are likely to be under- or several interests in common and that it is unemployed and hence disaffected, driving instability.”13 Additionally, the in the United States’ interest to maintain large number of ethnic, religious, and a strong relationship with France. linguistic groups across the region does not align with national boundaries (a Nation – State misalignment) and this is II. Global Trends. The next step in the likely to continue to drive unstable governments and transnational analysis is to apply strategic foresight to identify separatist and criminal movements. key global or regional trends, drivers, and Decrease in military Governance: A “shift towards coups and a shift towards representative government is likely to endogenous variables which bear on the system representative continue, driven by improved education, and help to understand the problem. A trend is a governments14 higher income and better access, via technology, to information and different discernable pattern of change. A driver is a points of view.”15 “Flawed democracies factor that directly influences or causes change. are still likely to be prevalent in 2045, with some countries subject to An endogenous variable is an internal variable authoritarian governments. Demands embedded within the system.10 Using the UK for democratic elections could become violent, particularly in areas where Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Trends democracy is not entrenched.”16
Campaigning Fall 2015 53 Trends Drivers Trends Drivers Decline in corruption in “Poverty, weak political institutions and Increased population Drivers include increasing urbanization, some parts of the region, poorly developed institutional checks migrations violent conflict, and climate change that but enduring corruption and balances will probably continue to increases droughts, flooding, and other in other parts17 drive and allow corruption in some parts threats to agricultural and community of the region. However, this is likely to stability.29 “Average annual surface be mitigated to some extent by: deeper temperatures projected to increase involvement of civil groups; across strengthening the judiciary; more North Africa … by approximately 1.2 transparency (facilitated in large part by times more than the global average. increasing information and Global drying could lead to a general communication technology); and increase in the size of deserts, such as increasing education and corruption- the Sahara. Annual average rainfall will awareness programs.”18 probably reduce, with a shift to more Countervailing forces Drivers increasing violent extremism: intense drought events which could both increase and “dramatic population growth, negatively impact freshwater decrease potential future unfulfilled expectations, unemployment, availability. These climate and weather violent extremism19 radicalizing ideologies, widening factors, coupled with potentially inequalities and differences in access to changing pest and disease distribution, “[T]errorist groups…are resources” 21 “Satellite television could negatively impact crop yields, likely to continue to channels and social media are also particularly in the North African target…Western interests likely to play an increasing role in region.”30 in the region and secular spreading sectarian mistrust.”22 “Social, Increased connection to Communication technology, including governments, with many economic, religious and political diaspora populations, mobile phones and the Internet.32 acting in the name of justifications for terrorism are likely to increased accountability Islam and following continue to be used by many groups of government to the Islamic fundamentalist within the region.”23 people31 principles. Most Decrease in infant Sanitation programs, vaccines, and terrorists are highly Drivers decreasing violent extremism: mortality, decrease or nutritional supplements will drive a likely to remain focused stronger civil societies, economic shifts in infectious decrease in infant mortality. “Changes on attacks within the growth, greater access to education, the disease, and an increase in temperature and rainfall could impact region, although Al- growing in first-world health the geographic distribution of malaria, Qaeda and affiliated empowerment of women, and the problems causing areas of contraction as well as groups are likely to capacity of African governments and expansion.” “A rise in non- continue to target regional organizations, particularly the communicable diseases such as Western interests out to African Union, to deal with security hypertension, heart disease and cancer” 2045.”20 challenges 24 is likely due to changing lifestyles. 33 Improving economies25 Increased resource extraction, including hydrocarbons. “Oil and gas production is likely to grow faster in sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions, attracting Table 2. Key Endogenous Variables in the United significant foreign investment. China is States/France/Maghreb and Sahel Governments/VEO System highly likely to continue to be involved in the region.”26 Endogenous Variables Increased violent With increasing wealth comes an The U.S. and French vital interests to defeat threats to their competition for resources increase in the potential for violence. respective homelands before they arrive in the homeland and economic “Between 2010 and 2011, friction over The U.S. and French desires to reduce costs of defense and foreign inequality27 resources accounted for approximately aid 35% of all conflicts in sub-Saharan Increased French willingness, relative to the United States, to Africa – and this trend is likely to engage in counterterrorist or counterinsurgent activities in the continue. By 2045, dramatic population Maghreb growth and the increasing threat from Maghreb and Sahel governments which value regime stability and climate change are likely to increase legitimacy over security or well-being of their populations competition for food, water and energy VEOs who desire a fundamentalist Islamic Caliphate in the – these factors may also act as catalysts Maghreb and Sahel for further violence and instability, particularly in the most fragile countries. Water scarcity could [also] Trends in population growth, Internet be a key driver of conflict.”28 use, and mobile phone use in these countries are shown in Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4.
Campaigning Fall 2015 54 Forecasting these variables into 2045, Mali, Chad, and Niger are likely to experience explosive population growth, while the growth is more modest in Libya. Internet use in Libya reached more than 16% of the population by 2013 and is growing rapidly, likely resulting in the majority of the population having access to the Internet by 2045. Internet use in Mali, Chad, Figure 3. Percentage of individuals using the Internet. Data from International Telecommunication Union. Last updated January 30, and Niger started later and is growing more 2015.35 slowly, but could reach perhaps a quarter of the population by 2045, with the heaviest concentration of Internet use in the cities. Mobile phone subscriptions in Libya and Mali have already reached more than one mobile phone per person, and mobile phones will remain ubiquitous in these countries. Mobile phone subscriptions in Niger and Chad were at about 40 per 100 inhabitants in 2013, and the trend has been rising rapidly since 2006, leading to predictions of near-ubiquitous use of mobile Figure 4. Mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. Data from International Telecommunication Union. Last Updated phones in these countries by 2045, as well, January 30, 2015.36 again with a higher prevalence in the cities.
Several of the key forces at play in the
Maghreb and Sahel environment are shown in the force field analysis in Figure 5. This analysis relates the forces acting against U.S. interests in the Maghreb and Sahel on the left hand side against forces acting in favor of U.S. interests on the right-hand side. The global trends discussed above are affecting the region and are included as part of the forces identified Figure 2. Population, total both sexes (thousands). Data from in Figure 5. Some of the forces are external to Human Development Report 2014. United Nations Development Programme. Last updated July 21, 2014.34 the region, some are generated wholly within the area, and some external influences have co-
opted or combined with internal forces. As the force field analysis graphically demonstrates, the overall balance of forces is working against U.S. interests, requiring action to either increase the effect positive forces or reduce the effect of negative forces.
Campaigning Fall 2015 55 border), negative (red border) or mixed (no border), while the colors within the ovals simply help identify the first-order (pink oval), second- order (tan oval), and third-order (green oval) impacts.
Figure 5. Force Field Analysis of the Maghreb and Sahel
In the absence of external intervention or assistance, the study team anticipates that these forces will continue in approximately the same ratios into the future. This means that the negative forces of Islamic extremism, poverty, corruption nation-state misalignment, and criminal gains will continue to overcome the positive countervailing forces in the region. External actors such as the United States and France can assist in increasing the power of the positive forces by countering Islamic extremism by providing alternate messages and by capturing or killing irreconcilable VEOs. Figure 6. Futures Wheel Examining the Impacts of Population External actors can assist with battling poverty, Growth in the Maghreb and Sahel corruption, nation-state misalignment, and criminal gains primarily through international development aid, as well as capacity-building programs for local governments and security forces. The trends and drivers can also be analyzed using a Futures Wheel, which is a method to explore possible futures by determining first, second, and third-order effects of trends and events.37 A Futures Wheel assessing the impacts of the projected rapid population growth in the Maghreb and Sahel is shown in Figure 6, while a Futures Wheel assessing the effects of increased access to mobile phones and the Internet is shown in Figure 7. In each figure, the outline colors indicate whether the impact is positive (green
Campaigning Fall 2015 56 in the future of that system, the study team examined possible alternative futures for the system, focusing on high-impact variables which are uncertain in their future outcome. The two variables which seem most uncertain in their outcome are those developed in the Futures Wheels—whether increased population growth leads to increased employment or to increased unemployment and scarcity and whether increased mobile phone and Internet availability leads to increased civil society and electronic banking or to increased VEO communication. These uncertain trends could lead to four potential futures in 2045, as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 7. Futures Wheel Examining the Impacts of Increased Mobile Phone and Internet Use in the Maghreb and Sahel
The Futures Wheel analysis of population grown shows more negative than positive impacts, including some that threaten U.S. security or have a high likelihood of causing a U.S. economic, diplomatic, or military response. The primary branch between positive and negative impacts appears to be whether the larger population leads to a larger employed workforce or to higher unemployment. On the other hand, the Futures Wheel analysis of increased mobile phone and Internet use shows Figure 8. Alternative Futures more positive than negative impacts. In this case, the primary branch between positive and • Growth and Development: The upper negative impacts appears to be whether these right quadrant represents the desired communication technologies lead to increased future, in which the increasing use of civil society and electronic banking or to mobile phones and the Internet in the improved VEO communication. Sahel and Maghreb countries lead to increased civil society through better III. Alternative Futures. Armed with access to information and to increased a better understanding of the mechanics of the electronic banking, coupled with an United States/France/Maghreb and Sahel increasing population that is put into Governments/VEO system and the key variables productive work in the economy. These
Campaigning Fall 2015 57 outcomes would result in a growing increased effectiveness of VEO economy, a reduction in corruption, messaging and recruitment. Targeting better government accountability, and foreign aid on civil society reform and the growth of civic groups necessary for democracy promotion while not a stable democracy. All of this would sufficiently developing the economy reduce the influence of VEOs and could lead this undesirable outcome. increase security, leading to stability, • VEO Explosion: If the growing growth, and development. Triggers that population remains largely unemployed, could help generate this future include and if increased penetration of mobile foreign aid targeted toward electronic phones and the Internet fail to improve banking, microloans, and civil society finance and reduce corruption, the formation, a coordinated campaign to VEOs, benefiting from a more effective counter VEO messaging, more effective messaging infrastructure, could local governments to counter the potentially cause the collapse of one or attractiveness of the VEO alternative, more of the Maghreb or Sahel and measures to improve regional governments into a failed state. This agriculture. worst-case future could result from an • Simmering Instability: If the increasing absence of foreign aid or attention from population is put to productive work in the rest of the world while these the economy but mobile phones and the problems fester and grow. Internet do not generate benefits, the decreased unemployment and growing IV. Social Change. Armed with a range of economy will tend to lead to stability, potential futures and some understanding of the but continued corruption, weak civil drivers that could lead to each of these future society, and effective VEO messaging worlds, the study group next turned to social would permit the VEOs to continue to change theory to gain insight into how actors in present an attractive alternative to the the system perceive and react to social change, Maghreb and Sahel governments. aiding the team in developing recommendations Providing foreign aid that improves to achieve desired changes in the system. security and economic opportunities but People from different cultures view themselves which does not leverage the potential of and others differently. In the United mobile phones and the Internet could States/France/Maghreb and Sahel lead to this undesirable outcome. Governments/VEO system, there are three • Chaos: In the reverse of the Simmering unlike groups all interacting with one another in Instability future, focus on civil society the context of the global trends and regional development that does not also focus on forces detailed earlier. Social change theory providing employment opportunities for assists in the description of these groups, their the growing population will lead to a values and likely viewpoints on the situation dissatisfied, poor populace with time on and proposed changes. Of the ten social change their hands, the ability to use mobile theories described by Bishop and Hines,38 the phones and the Internet to organize, and study team selected a theory that best describes
Campaigning Fall 2015 58 the interests of each of the three sets of actors in as helpful to the interests of the group, while a the system. The United States and France are red box signifies a trend that is counter to the considered one actor in this analysis because desires of the actor. Although both the Western they share many common interests in the region governments and the VEOs realize an even and share considerable cultural aspects. In result (some number of aligned and misaligned investigating these shared views, the team used trends), the regional governments are not as Progress Theory to describe Western interests in fortunate. The analysis identifies the risk to the the Maghreb and Sahel. Progress Theory is the region that global trends pose and the result, dominant theory used to describe social change much like that of the regional force field in the West and generally assumes that, analysis, is that the regional governments are at “Today’s society is better than the societies of a significant disadvantage. the past” and that “future societies will be better than the present.”39 Table 3. Culture Theory: Global Trends Interaction The VEOs are best understood through the lens of Conflict Theory, which describes entities who view the world in zero-sum terms, where one group can only gain through seizing resources from another. These groups also see the world in constant conflict with progress of their faction coming only through struggle.40 Finally, in order to identify interests of the regional governments and the majority of the population of Mali, Chad, Libya, and Niger, the research team used Culture Theory. This region of Africa has a rich tribal history that existed long before today’s political lines were drawn and many inhabitants draw their sense of identity not from governmental associations, but from tribal affiliation. Culture Theory assumes Figure 9 shows what the three groups will that “society is based on culture more than on likely do in reaction to each other, considering material environment of technology (technology both the impact of global trends and of each being part of culture)” and that “ideas are the other’s actions in the region. Conflict arises at key components that give culture its ability to the interaction of the VEOs (Conflict Theory) drive change.”41 and both the regional and Western governments. Using the applicable social change theory This conflict likely will not be eliminated (some for each group, the research team determined irreconcilable VEOs will need to be captured or the effects of the identified global and regional killed because they will not shift their paradigm trends on each of the stakeholder groups in the away from their zero-sum viewpoint and goals), system. Table 3 provides a summary of these but considerations can be made to minimize effects. In this figure, the green boxes identify a conflict through astute understanding of global trend producing change that is perceived Conflict Theory and communicating to counter
Campaigning Fall 2015 59 its negative aspects. Although there is some magnitude of the signal—the indicator of an alignment of interests between the Western existing or future issue—increases over time. governments and the regional governments, the Significant issues often arise initially out of only way to ensure success is to understand social expectations, then become part of the what Culture Theory has to say about views on policy agenda as governments first debate and change. The United States and France should then formalize their policies on the issue, and use that knowledge to form plans that allow for finally culminate through execution and the culture to adopt need technologies, while monitoring of the policy, or social control of the framing other changes in terms of regional issue.42 cultures and countering VEO messaging in a To apply the anticipatory management way that resonates with the Culture Theory analysis to the issue under study, the study team point of view held by the local governments and assessed and categorized internal and external majority of the population. issues that require immediate action (Category I), future but not immediate action (Category II), and no action other than monitoring (Category III). The results, shown as votes by each of the three members of the study team, are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Anticipatory Management: Issue Categorization Category Category Category I III II (Immediate (No Issue (No Action) Action; Immediate Monitor) Action)
Increased IN III instability Radicalizing RI III ideologies VEO desire for IC Salafist Islamic III Caliphate World health WH II I Figure 9. Culture Theory: Interaction of Progress Theory, Culture problems Theory, and Conflict Theory in the United States/France/Maghreb- U.S. cost cuts to Sahel Governments/VEO System $D defense and II I foreign aid Increased French FCT II I CT activity V. Anticipatory Management. The Enduring EC I II final strategic forecasting tool the team used in corruption Maghreb and this analysis was Anticipatory Management, Sahel which is a method used by organizations to governments’ pursuit of regime identify and prioritize issues that could develop RSL stability and III into situations requiring timely policy decisions. legitimacy over security or well- According to Molitor model of change theory, being of their issues generally follow a life cycle wherein the population EMP Unemployment II I
Campaigning Fall 2015 60 Category Category population growth and increased migrations Category I III II (Immediate (No (POP), and increased tech connection to Issue (No Action) Action; Immediate diaspora populations (IT)—have weaker signals Monitor) Action) and do not yet appear to have entered the U.S. Increased violent policy cycle. Because it is often easier and less VC competition for II I resources expensive to solve a problem earlier in its life Dramatic cycle, the Anticipatory Management analysis population POP growth and III indicates that U.S. policymakers should place increased their attention on formalizing and implementing migrations Widening policies for the three issues identified in the WI III inequalities policy agenda portion of the life cycle curve, Increased tech connection to while monitoring the three issues in the societal IT III diaspora expectations part of the curve. populations
Figure 10 plots these issues along Molitor’s Life Cycle curve, which places each of the issues in terms of the magnitude of signals indicating the importance of the issue and the timing of the issue in the policy cycle. Several of the issues identified by this study are also covered in the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy—including increased instability (IN), radicalizing ideologies (RI), world health Figure 10. Anticipatory Management: Issue Life Cycle problems (WH), enduring corruption (EC), Maghreb and Sahel governments’ pursuit of regime stability and legitimacy over security or VI. Conclusions and well-being of their population (RSL), Recommendations. We can draw several unemployment (EMP), and widening conclusions from the strategic foresight and inequalities (WI)—indicating that these issues systems-thinking methods applied to the are well into the policy formalization portion of question of whether the United States should the U.S. policy cycle.43 Three other issues— continue to support French CT and COIN VEO desire for a Salafist Islamic Caliphate (IC), activities in the Maghreb and Sahel. The system U.S. cost cuts to defense and foreign aid ($D), model analysis identified shared U.S. interests and increased French CT activity (FCT)—have with France in security in the Maghreb-Sahel strong signals but are not mentioned in the 2015 region, global security, the NATO alliance, and National Security Strategy, indicating that they an open international economic system. The are important issues on the policy agenda but system model also identified the economy as a have not yet resulted in formalized policies. The key leverage variable in the system and noted a final three issues—increased violent causal loop in the Maghreb-Sahel system competition for resources (VC), dramatic relating the economy, security, and the local governments.
Campaigning Fall 2015 61 The global trends analysis identified they are often more economical to address than trends in the future environment which will when the issues have matured. This means drive the Maghreb-Sahel region into a future policymakers should focus now on VEO desire that fails to achieve U.S. interests without for a Salafist Islamic Caliphate in the Maghreb- external intervention to counter Islamic Sahel region and on balancing potential cuts to extremism and improve regional economic U.S. defense and foreign aid budgets with conditions. Achieving a future of improved increased French CT activity in the region. regional security, economic growth and Based on the conclusions from these development, and reduced corruption and strategic foresight and system-thinking analyses, violent extremism requires assisting the the study team recommends that the United governments and populations in leveraging States continue to support French CT and COIN growing populations and the increase in access activities in the Maghreb and Sahel, to mobile phones and the Internet to increase synchronizing these activities with direct U.S. civil society through better access to security, governance, and economic assistance information, increased electronic banking, and to the governments in this region. This policy increased employment opportunities. The approach considers the dynamics of the system, global trends analysis also indicates the the likely future environment, and the differing importance if improving the effectiveness and actors’ perceptions of change, while inclusiveness of the local governments to reduce recommending steps that can achieve U.S. the impact of the geographic misalignment of interests in the region at a lower overall cost and state boundaries and national or tribal effort by tackling them earlier in the issue life boundaries, and to counteract the attractiveness cycle, before these issues become crises. of the VEOs’ proposed alternative to the current Supporting French efforts in the region further local governments. contributes to reducing direct costs on the The social change theory analysis United States to achieve its interests in the indicates that the U.S. and French approach to region, while also reinforcing relations with change must positively resonate with the France, a U.S. ally which is important to the regional governments and populations through a strength of the NATO alliance and to other Culture Theory lens, which means that actions actions the Unites States desires to conduct and messages must value and align with local around the world with allies and partners to cultures and traditions. Social change theory improve global security and maintain an open also indicates that many of the VEOs, who view international economic system. change through a zero-sum Conflict Theory, The study team’s recommended U.S. will need to be captured or killed to improve policy for the Maghreb-Sahel region can be security and reduce VEO messaging, as many in depicted as five synchronized lines of effort these groups are irreconcilable and will not join (LOE), as shown in Figure 11. Each LOE in this a society whose goals are anything other than a figure depicts U.S., French, and local Salafist Islamic Caliphate. government actions and shows a shifting weight Finally, the anticipatory management of effort over time, with direct U.S. and French analysis recommends that U.S. policymakers actions in the near and mid-term shifting to address key issues early in their life cycle, when predominately local government actions in the
Campaigning Fall 2015 62 far term as the U.S. and France assist the local provide inter- and intratheater lift in support of governments in building indigenous capacity in French CT and COIN activities, while building each of these areas. The United States should both French and Maghreb-Sahel government ensure that actions in each LOE are properly capability to take on this role in the mid- to calibrated to achieve the desired results and are long-term. The White House should request synchronized and deconflicted with France’s renewal of the enabling legal authorities so the efforts in the region so both the United States Department of Defense can continue these and France can achieve their shared national programs. interests in the most economical manner. The third LOE is military training. In this LOE, the United States should use security cooperation authorities to improve French and Maghreb-Sahel government capability to capture and kill irreconcilable VEOs and counter VEO messaging and other capabilities. The Department of Defense already has several security cooperation legal authorities and funding streams to conduct such assistance, but these authorities and programs could be better synchronized with the other LOEs to improve the likelihood of achieving the desired U.S. outcome in the region. The fourth and fifth LOEs—governance and economic development—fall outside of the Department of Defense and are the respective Figure 11. Recommended Lines of Effort to Achieve U.S. Interests in the Maghreb-Sahel Region. “DIME” refers to the diplomatic, responsibilities of the State Department and the informational, military, and economic instruments of national U.S. Agency for International Development power, respectively, with the large letters indicating the predominant element(s) involved in each line of effort. (USAID). In the governance the United States should contribute to civil-society development and strengthening of local government The first two LOEs—intelligence and institutions. The pace of these governance airlift—represent the support the United States development activities must be synchronized currently provides to French CT and COIN with the pace of development in the local efforts in the region under legal authorities security sectors to reduce the likelihood that a which are currently set to expire in early 2015. well-developed military will conduct a coup In the intelligence LOE, the United States against a poorly-developed local government—a should continue to provide tactical intelligence very real concern in this region. Finally, in the support and regional intelligence coordination to economic development LOE, the study team’s France and should build counter-VEO analysis indicates that the United States should intelligence capacity within the Sahel-Maghreb focus on assistance programs that contribute to governments. In the airlift LOE, the United electronic banking, microloans, and increased States should, in the near-term, continue to employment opportunities.
Campaigning Fall 2015 63 Properly targeted and synchronized, the United States and France stand a very real Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey J. Fair, USA, is currently assigned to 525th Military Intelligence Brigade, Fort chance of achieving their national interests in Bragg, NC. He was commissioned through ROTC at this region without significant increase in Georgetown University in 1997. LTC Fair has a BA in funding, since nearly all of the actions in these International Relations from the George Washington five LOEs are currently underway. However, University, an MBA from Hawaii Pacific University in decoupling U.S. and French efforts, or 2001, a MPA from the University of Washington's Evans School in 2009, and a MS in Strategic Intelligence from permitting the Department of Defense, State the National Intelligence University in 2012. Prior to his Department, and USAID to conduct isolated current assignment, LTC Fair served as the Chief of efforts, or efforts focused on short-term goals Ground Analysis, J2, United States Forces Korea. rather than calibrated to the long-term global trends and system dynamics, will decrease the Major Dale R. Fenton, USMC, is currently serving as Branch Chief, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link School, at chances of achieving U.S. policy goals in the the Joint Staff, J7 Joint Interoperability Division. He was region. commissioned upon completing the Officer Candidates Course in 2001. Maj Fenton earned a Bachelor of Music degree from the University of Akron in 1997 and a Master of Business Administration from National University in Team Biographies 2014. Prior to his current assignment, Maj Fenton served as Unmanned Aircraft Commander and Assistant Colonel Robert S. Pope, USAF, is currently serving as Operations Officer at Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle the chief of the Program Integration Division in the Squadron 2 (VMU-2). Cooperative Threat Reduction Program at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He was commissioned through the Air Force ROTC at Michigan State University in 1991. Col Pope earned a BS in Physics from Michigan State University in 1991, an MS in Physics from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 1993, a PhD in Physics from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 1999, and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College in 2004. Col Pope was a National Defense Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he wrote the book U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement. Prior to his current assignment, Col Pope served as the deputy chief of the Security Cooperation Division at the United States Central Command.
1 White House, National Security Strategy (NSS) (Washington, D.C., May 2010). 2 Dan McCauley, The Practitioner’s Guide to Strategic Foresight, (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College, Jan 2015), 11. 3 Ibid. 4 Republique Francaise, French White Paper: Defence and National Security,(Ministère de la Défense / SGA / SPAC., 2013).
Campaigning Fall 2015 64 5 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Niger: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Economic and Social Development Plan 2012- 2015, (IMF Country Report No. 13/105, April 2013), http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Niger/Niger_PRSP_2012- 2015.pdf (accessed February 12, 2015). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Chad vows to eradicate hunger, boost community resilience, (Press release, September 16, 2013), http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressrelease s/2013/09/16/chad-vows-to-eradicate-hunger-boost-community- resilience-/ (accessed February 12, 2015). Rural Poverty Portal, Rural poverty approaches, policies and strategies in Chad, (no date), http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/approaches/tags/chad (accessed February 12, 2015). 6 United States Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Chad, (May 21, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/37992.htm (accessed February 12, 2015). United States Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Libya, (January 15, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm (accessed February 12, 2015). United States Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Mali, (April 30, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm (accessed February 12, 2015). United States Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Niger (June 12, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5474.htm (accessed February 12, 2015). 7 Peter Tinty, “Mali 2.0,” Foreign Policy, (September 23, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/23/mali-2-0/ (accessed February 12, 2015). Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Mali Country Profile (Washington, D.C., January 2005). Sebastian Elischer, “After Mali Comes Niger,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138931/sebastian- elischer/after-mali-comes-niger (accessed February 12, 2015). Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, (Yale University Press, 1990). Foreign Relations of Chad, (no date), https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/ docs/Foreign_relations_of_Chad.html (accessed February 12, 2015). 8 Jon Lee Anderson, “Libya on Edge,” The New Yorker, (January 30, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/libya-edge (accessed February 12, 2015). 9 Joint Publication 3-26, Counterterrorism (October 24, 2014). United States Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism., Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, (Washington, D.C., April 2014). 10 McCauley, The Practitioner’s Guide to Strategic Foresight, 15. 11 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045, 5th Edition, (DCDC, MOD, SWINDON, Wiltshire, UK, SN6 8RF, 2014), 133. 12 Ibid., 133. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 134. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.
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17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., 135. 20 Ibid., 131. 21 Ibid., 135. 22 Ibid., 130. 23 Ibid., 131. 24 Ibid., 135. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 135-136. 29 Ibid., 136. 30 Ibid., 129. 31 Ibid., 137. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., 137-138. 34 Google Public Data, http://www.google.com/publicdata/directory (accessed March 1, 2015). 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 McCauley, The Practitioner’s Guide to Strategic Foresight, 16. 38 Peter C. Bishop and Andy Hines, “Social Change,” in Teaching about the Future, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 119. 39 Ibid., 120. 40 Ibid., 133. 41 Ibid., 126. 42 Dan McCauley, “Joint Professional Military Education: Anticipating at the Speed of the Environment,” Small Wars Journal, (April 3, 2014), n.p. 43 White House, National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C., February 2015), 9, 10, 13, 18, and 24.
Campaigning Fall 2015 66 Campaigning is a Joint Forces Staff College journal designed as a forum for students, faculty, and senior fellows to provide the broader joint professional military education community insights into the application of joint warfighting principles through critical analysis and strategic thinking on current and future operations at the operational level of war.
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Campaigning Fall 2015 67 JFSC Vision
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