Annual Meeting of the New Champions 2015 List of Participants
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China Data Supplement
China Data Supplement October 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 29 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 36 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 45 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 54 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 61 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 66 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 October 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
Appendix 1: Rank of China's 338 Prefecture-Level Cities
Appendix 1: Rank of China’s 338 Prefecture-Level Cities © The Author(s) 2018 149 Y. Zheng, K. Deng, State Failure and Distorted Urbanisation in Post-Mao’s China, 1993–2012, Palgrave Studies in Economic History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92168-6 150 First-tier cities (4) Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou Shenzhen First-tier cities-to-be (15) Chengdu Hangzhou Wuhan Nanjing Chongqing Tianjin Suzhou苏州 Appendix Rank 1: of China’s 338 Prefecture-Level Cities Xi’an Changsha Shenyang Qingdao Zhengzhou Dalian Dongguan Ningbo Second-tier cities (30) Xiamen Fuzhou福州 Wuxi Hefei Kunming Harbin Jinan Foshan Changchun Wenzhou Shijiazhuang Nanning Changzhou Quanzhou Nanchang Guiyang Taiyuan Jinhua Zhuhai Huizhou Xuzhou Yantai Jiaxing Nantong Urumqi Shaoxing Zhongshan Taizhou Lanzhou Haikou Third-tier cities (70) Weifang Baoding Zhenjiang Yangzhou Guilin Tangshan Sanya Huhehot Langfang Luoyang Weihai Yangcheng Linyi Jiangmen Taizhou Zhangzhou Handan Jining Wuhu Zibo Yinchuan Liuzhou Mianyang Zhanjiang Anshan Huzhou Shantou Nanping Ganzhou Daqing Yichang Baotou Xianyang Qinhuangdao Lianyungang Zhuzhou Putian Jilin Huai’an Zhaoqing Ningde Hengyang Dandong Lijiang Jieyang Sanming Zhoushan Xiaogan Qiqihar Jiujiang Longyan Cangzhou Fushun Xiangyang Shangrao Yingkou Bengbu Lishui Yueyang Qingyuan Jingzhou Taian Quzhou Panjin Dongying Nanyang Ma’anshan Nanchong Xining Yanbian prefecture Fourth-tier cities (90) Leshan Xiangtan Zunyi Suqian Xinxiang Xinyang Chuzhou Jinzhou Chaozhou Huanggang Kaifeng Deyang Dezhou Meizhou Ordos Xingtai Maoming Jingdezhen Shaoguan -
Gobi: from “Space of Flows” to a Space of People and Places
Gobi: From “Space of Flows” to a Space of People and Places Relational Analysis, Critique, and Proposal for an Alter-Urbanization Guan Min and Andrew Stokols I. Gobi: Space of Flows (Relational analysis) The Gobi Desert is being remade into a space of flows between China and Europe. This is the result of two primary forces: 1. The geopolitical strategy of China to more closely integrate European, Central Asian, and ultimately Middle Eastern economies into its own with the goal of creating an integrated economic zone. 2. The calculations of multinational electronics and automotive companies that are beginning to ship products between China and Europe using overland rail routes that are now faster than sea routes. China is investing billions in new roads, rail, inland ‘ports’, logistics centers, and other infrastructure designed to realize this political project. Logistics companies and electronic firms are also partnering with state-owned rail companies in China, Russia, and Kazakhstan to reduce tariffs, customs processing times, and other bureaucratic obstacles to free trade. These new infrastructures and associated urban nodes are facilitating increased trade flows in products between Europe and China, as well as the increased extraction of raw materials like oil and natural gas. Additionally, the growth of new connective infrastructures are facilitating plans for export zones at border ports and in certain Western Chinese cities like Xi’an, Urumqi, and Lanzhou. These new cities are predicated on attracting investment from high-tech companies and facilitating a transfer of manufacturing and industry from China’s East to China’s west. But until now, most of the growth of manufacturing in the West has been that related to extraction, including oil, coal, and mining. -
As of April 7, 2014 Select List of Delegates Boao Forum for Asia
As of April 7, 2014 Select List of Delegates Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2014 State/Government Leaders 1. H.E. LI Keqiang, Premier, State Council, the People’s Republic of China 2. The Hon. Tony Abbott, Prime Minister, the Common-wealth of Australia 3. H.E. Chung Hongwon, Prime Minister, Republic of Korea 4. H.E. Thongsing Thammavong, Prime Minister, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 5. Rt. Hon. Dr. Hage Geingob, Prime Minister, the Republic of Namibia 6. H.E. Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 7. H.E. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, Prime Minister, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 8. H.E. Arkady Vladimirovich Dvorkovich, Deputy Prime Minister, Russian Federation 9. H.E. Vu Duc Dam, Vice Prime Minister, Socialist Republic of Vietnam 10. H. E. YANG Jiechi, State Councilor, People’s Republic of China 11. FUKUDA Yasuo, Former Prime Minister, Japan 12. ZENG Peiyan, Former Vice Premier, China 13. Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad BADAWI, Former Prime Minister, Malaysia 14. GOH Chok Tong, Emeritus Senior Minister, Republic of Singapore 15. Jean-Pierre RAFFARIN, Former Prime Minister, France 16. Dominique de VILLEPIN, former Prime Minister, France 17. Fidel V. RAMOS, Former President, the Philippines 18. Bob HAWKE, Former Prime Minister of Australia 19. HAN Duck-Soo, Chairman, KITA; Former Prime Minister, Republic of Korea 20. ZHOU Xiaochuan, Governor, People’s Bank of China 21. Surakiart SATHIRATHAI, Chairman of the Asian Peace and Reconciliation Council (APRC), Former Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 22. Peter COSTELLO, Former Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia; Chairman, Australian Government Sovereign Wealth Fund, Future Fund; Managing Director, BKK Partners; Chairman, ECG Advisory Solutions 23. -
The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’S Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World
The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance By Sarah Cook October 22, 2013 The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), at the National Endowment for Democracy, works to strengthen the support, raise the visibility, and improve the effectiveness of independent media development throughout the world. The Center provides information, builds networks, conducts research, and highlights the indispensable role independent media play in the creation and development of sustainable democracies. An important aspect of CIMA’s work is to research ways to attract additional U.S. private sector interest in and support for international media development. CIMA convenes working groups, discussions, and panels on a variety of topics in the field of media development and assistance. The center also issues reports and recommendations based on working group discussions and other investigations. These reports aim to provide policymakers, as well as donors and practitioners, with ideas for bolstering the effectiveness of media assistance. Don Podesta Interim Senior Director Center for International Media Assistance National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F Street, N.W., 8th Floor Washington, DC 20004 Phone: (202) 378-9700 Fax: (202) 378-9407 Email: [email protected] URL: http://cima.ned.org Design and Layout by Valerie Popper About the Author Sarah Cook Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House. She manages the editorial team producing the China Media Bulletin, a biweekly news digest of media freedom developments related to the People’s Republic of China. -
Insights for Intra-Party Tensions?
Hong Kong as a proxy battlefield Insights for Intra-Party tensions? Zhang Xiaoming 张晓明, the director of the State Council Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office 国务 院港澳办, was replaced a few days ago, as vice-director of the small leading group of the same name, by the current Minister of Public Security, Zhao Kezhi 赵克志. That said, it seems Hong Kong’s issues run deeper than just a few personnel appointments. Is the special administrative zone becoming a proxy battleground for opposing political forces inside the Party? The timeline and people involved suggest that parts of the ongoing crisis might have been made by design by outgoing political networks amid the anti-corruption campaign. From the selection of Carrie Lam 林郑月娥, the underpinnings of the Hong Kong and Macau affairs system, to the bid for the London Stock Exchange, there is more than meets the eye. The “Manchurian” Candidate and the Jiangpai From the beginning, the opinion was that Madame Lam would be a short-live replacement for Liang Zhenying 梁振英. Carrie Lam, who actually joined the protest – even for a brief moment – for universal suffrage back in 2014, stayed close to the negotiation with Beijing, unlike some of her counterparts who were refused entry in Shenzhen back in 2015. She then became one of the favorite faces of the administration, especially in late 2016, when Liang Zhenying1 announced he would not be running for re-election. Liang, a representative of the “old regime” – associated with both Zeng Qinghong 曾庆红2 and Zhang Dejiang 张德江, was creating issues leading to the deterioration of the situation in Hong Kong (i.e. -
Rule of Law and Its Effect on Chinese Economic Development
Al WASATH Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Volume 2 No. 1 April 2021: 41-57 RULE OF LAW AND ITS EFFECT ON CHINESE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Roziqin Guanghua Law School, Zhejiang University, China Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT China's economic growth during the Covid-19 pandemic was impressive because it did not fell into recession. China's government has become a role model for facing Covid-19 outbreaks. China is now the world's wealthiest country, if we see its Gross Domestic Product from Purchasing Power Parity (GDP-PPP). China's position as the number one globally is faster than Jacques's prediction in 2009 that it will happen in 2050. For China, which does not implement liberal democracy, the writer hypothesizes that the reasonable choice to develop the economy is state-driven development through the rule of law. At present, the rule of law has become a daily conversation of the Chinese people. However, there are still many outsiders who doubt China has and applies the rule of law. It happens because China implements the rule of law with Chinese characteristics. This research will study the rule of law with Chinese characteristics, China's effort to implement the rule of law, and the rule of law on China's economy. This study uses a qualitative descriptive approach to explain the rule of law with Chinese characteristics. It will analyze the rule of law concept and its effect on China's economy. China applies the rule of law with Chinese characteristics based on Chinese traditions, which are heavily influenced by Confucius's teachings and prioritize obligations rather than rights. -
Chapter 4 China's High-Tech Development
CHAPTER 4 CHINA’S HIGH-TECH DEVELOPMENT SECTION 1: CHINA’S PURSUIT OF DOMINANCE IN COMPUTING, ROBOTICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY Key Findings • China has laid out an ambitious whole-of-government plan to achieve dominance in advanced technology. This state-led ap- proach utilizes government financing and regulations, high market access and investment barriers for foreign firms, over- seas acquisitions and talent recruitment, and, in some cases, industrial espionage to create globally competitive firms. • China’s close integration of civilian and military technology de- velopment raises concerns that technology, expertise, and intel- lectual property shared by U.S. firms with Chinese commercial partners could be transferred to China’s military. • Artificialintelligence: China—led by Baidu—is now on par with the United States in artificial intelligence due in part to robust Chinese government support, establishment of research insti- tutes in the United States, recruitment of U.S.-based talent, investment in U.S. artificial intelligence-related startups and firms, and commercial and academic partnerships. • Quantum information science: China has closed the technolog- ical gap with the United States in quantum information sci- ence—a sector the United States has long dominated—due to a concerted strategy by the Chinese government and inconsistent and unstable levels of R&D funding and limited government coordination by the United States. • High performance computing: Through multilevel government support, China now has the world’s two fastest supercomputers and is on track to surpass the United States in the next gener- ation of supercomputers—exascale computers—with an expect- ed rollout by 2020 compared to the accelerated U.S. -
Atrocities in China
ATROCITIES IN CHINA: LIST OF VICTIMS IN THE PERSECUTION OF FALUN GONG IN CHINA Jointly Compiled By World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong PO Box 365506 Hyde Park, MA 02136 Contact: John Jaw - President Tel: 781-710-4515 Fax: 781-862-0833 Web Site: http://www.upholdjustice.org Email: [email protected] Fa Wang Hui Hui – Database system dedicated to collecting information on the persecution of Falun Gong Web Site: http://www.fawanghuihui.org Email: [email protected] April 2004 Preface We have compiled this list of victims who were persecuted for their belief to appeal to the people of the world. We particularly appeal to the international communities and request investigation of this systematic, ongoing, egregious violation of human rights committed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China against Falun Gong. Falun Gong, also called Falun Dafa, is a traditional Chinese spiritual practice that includes exercise and meditation. Its principles are based on the values of truthfulness, compassion, and tolerance. The practice began in China in 1992 and quickly spread throughout China and then beyond. By the end of 1998, by the Chinese government's own estimate, there were 70 - 100 million people in China who had taken up the practice, outnumbering Communist Party member. Despite the fact that it was good for the people and for the stability of the country, former President JIANG Zemin launched in July 1999 an unprecedented persecution of Faun Gong out of fears of losing control. Today the persecution of Falun Gong still continues in China. As of the end of March 2004, 918 Falun Gong practitioners have been confirmed to die from persecution. -
Défense Antimissile En Europe
o VEILIGHEID & STRATEGIE N XXX SÉCURITÉ & STRATÉGIE Mois 20XX o SÉCURITÉ & STRATÉGIE N 117 VEILIGHEID & STRATEGIE avril 2014 Les programmes spatiaux russes et chinois : ambitions politiques, contraintes institutionnelles et dimension technologique Alain De Neve Chercheur au Centre d’études de sécurité et défense Institut royal supérieur de défense supérieur royal Institut Une version électronique du présent document est disponible et peut être téléchargée gratuitement sur notre site internet : www.irsd.be Les vues exprimées dans ce document sont celles de son auteur et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles de l’Institut royal supérieur de défense, de la Défense ou du gouvernement belge. Vous pouvez adresser vos questions, commentaires ou remarques quant à ce document à l’adresse suivante : Directeur du Centre d’études de sécurité et défense Institut royal supérieur de défense Avenue de la Renaissance, 30 1000 Bruxelles Ou par courriel : [email protected] ISSN : 0770-9005 Les programmes spatiaux russes et chinois : ambitions politiques, contraintes institutionnelles et dimension technologique Alain De Neve Chercheur au Centre d’études de sécurité et défense Institut royal supérieur de défense Centre d’études de sécurité et défense Avenue de la Renaissance 30 1000 Bruxelles Images de couverture : À gauche : le lanceur Soyouz TMA-04M décollant depuis Baïkonour le 15 mai 2012. À droite : le lanceur Longue March 3-A avant son lancement en février 2007. Executive Summary According to public data for 2011, China exported $3 billion worth of high-tech goods, including aerospace. The corresponding Russian figure is $1.1 billion. Does this indicate that China is becoming a leader in the aerospace industry, rapidly catching up with Russia? In 2012, according to official world statistics, twenty-four Earth survey satellites, owned by 13 different countries and organisations, were launched into orbit around the Earth. -
Asia Focus #3
PROGRAMME ASIE QUELLE COMPOSITION DU POLITBURO ET DU COMITÉ CENTRAL CHINOIS APRÈS 2017 ? Par Alex PAYETTE STAGIAIRE POSTDOCTORAL CRSH UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTREAL OCTOBRE 2016 Septembre 2016 ASIA FOCUS #3 l’IRIS ASIA FOCUS #3 - PROGRAMME ASIE / Octobre 2016 lors que 2016 se termine et que la campagne anticorruption agressivement menée par la tristement célèbre « jiwei » [纪委] a pris fin, il ne reste que A quelques mois pour finaliser la sélection interne des cadres qui seront appelés à être élus en novembre au Politburo ainsi qu’au Comité central. Cela dit, depuis la fin de 2015, nous avons pu remarquer un certain durcissement, voire même un « repli » de la part de Xi, tant dans son attitude face au pouvoir (p. ex. retour aux idiomes/symboles maoïstes, méfiance ouverte de l’Occident, attitude de plus en plus inflexible en matière de structures internationales, etc.), que dans son attitude envers certains patriarches du Parti, notamment Jiang Zemin (président de la République populaire entre 1993 et 2003) et Hu Jintao (président de 2003 à 2013), ainsi qu’envers les autres forces en présence sur la scène politique chinoise (par exemple la Ligue des jeunesses communistes [共青团]1, la « faction du pétrole » [石油帮]2, la bande Shanghai [ 上海帮], la bande du Jiangxi [江派], etc.). Ce dernier a également resserré son emprise non seulement sur Beijing – par le biais de son proche collaborateur Wang Xiaohong [王 小洪]3-, mais bien aussi sur le pays en entier. Tandis que le temps d’« abattre les tigres » [打虎] et que les déraillements de la jiwei sont encore perceptibles, en particulier dans la province du Hebei4, fort est de constater que l’impact n’est pas celui escompté, sauf dans les cas de Su Shulin [苏树林]5 et Jiang Jiemin [蒋洁敏]6, et qu’il ne sera pas vraiment possible d’évaluer les dégâts de cette campagne avant la formation du Comité central de 2022. -
Report Title Raabe, Wilhelm Karl = Corvinus, Jakob (Pseud.)
Report Title - p. 1 of 672 Report Title Raabe, Wilhelm Karl = Corvinus, Jakob (Pseud.) (Eschershausen 1831-1910 Braunschweig) : Schriftsteller Biographie 1870 Raabe, Wilhelm Karl. Der Schüdderump [ID D15996]. Ingrid Schuster : Raabe verwendet im Roman den chinesischen Gartenpavillon als bezugsreiches Symbol für die zwei Hauptpersonen, der Ritter von Glaubigernd und das Fräulein von St. Trouin, sowie Chinoiserien in Adelaide von St. Trouins Zimmer. [Schu4:S. 162-168] Bibliographie : Autor 1870 Raabe, Wilhelm Karl. Der Schüdderump. In : Westermann's Jahrbuch der Illustrirten deutschen Monatshefte ; Bd. 27, N.F. Bd. 11, Oct.1869-März 1870. [Schu4] 1985 [Raabe, Wilhelm]. Que xiang chun qiu. Wang Kecheng yi. (Shanghai : Yi wen chu ban she, 1985). Übersetzung von Raabe, Wilhelm. Die Chronik der Sperlingsgasse. Hrsg. von Jakob Corvinus. (Berlin : Stage, 1857). [ZhaYi2,WC] 1997 [Raabe, Wilhelm Karl]. Hun xi yue shan. Weilian Labei zhu ; Wang Kecheng yi. (Shanghai : Shanghai yi wen chu ban she, 1997). Übersetzung von Raabe, Wilhelm Karl. Abu Telfan : oder, Die Heimkehr vom Mondgebirge : Roman. (Köln : Atlas-Verlag, 1867). [WC] Raaschou, Peter Theodor (Dänemark 1862-1924 Shanghai) : Diplomat Biographie 1907-1908 Peter Theodor Raaschou ist Konsul des dänischen Konsulats in Shanghai. [Who2] 1909-1917 Peter Theodor Raaschou ist Generalkonsul des dänischen Konsulats in Shanghai. 1917 ist er Senior Konsul. [Who2] Raasloff, Waldemar Rudolf (1815-1883) : Dänischer Politiker, General Biographie 1863 Dritte dänische diplomatische Mission nach China durch Waldemar Rudolf Raasloff. [BroK1] Rabban Bar Sauma (ca. 1220-1294) : Türkisch-mongolischer Mönch, Nestorianer Bibliographie : erwähnt in 1992 Rossabi, Morris. Voyager from Xanadu : Rabban Sauma and the first journey from China to the West. (Tokyo ; New York, N.Y.