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. i AUTHOR McLain, Douglas, Jr- TITLE United States Security and the Soviet Challenge. \ Report of a Wingspread Briefing. (Racine, Wisconsin, June 29, 1978). . INSTITUTION Department of State, Washington, D.C.; Johnson Foundation, Inc., Racine, Wis.; Wisconsin Univ., Milwaukee. Inst. of World Affairs. . PUB DATE. 79 , NOTE 25p. AVAILABLE FROM Johnson Foundation, 33 East Four Mile Road, Racine, WI 53401 (free).

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Civil Defense; Conflict; Cooperation; *Diplomatic : History; *Disarmament; Foreign Policy; *International' Relations; National Defense; *Nuclear Warfage; Treaties IDENTIFIERS *National Security; Strategic Arms LimitatiOn Talks;

*United States; *USSR . . ABSTRACT I. Six presentations, an introduction, and a summary discussion are included in this publication, which focuses on the variout complex factors inVolved in the negotiation of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Titles of the six'presentafions are: (1) Critical Issues in the United States-Soviet Relationship; (2) Basic Elements of Strategic Theory: Military Relations in a, Nuclear World;(3) United States Defense Capability; (4) A Closer Look at Soviet Capabilities; (5) Strengthening United States Security .. Through SALi; (6) How to Tell a Good SALT Treaty from a Bad One; and (7) Citizen Involvement in the SALT Debate. A congluding section contains questions and topics covered in panel discussions. Questions II and topics were related to a basic proposition that strategic arms

limitation agreements Could enhance world security by restraining ..I additional development of the mutually deterrent,nuclear weapons systems of the United States and the Soviet Union. (NE)

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6 *4**********************************************************N********** * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made * * .* from the original document. / . **************************4************************/*******************

- 1- i l S DEPARTMENT OF EDDC;TION 6 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION .t kLES NfuRMATI(A Ek,

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UNITED STATES SECURITY AND THE SOVIET CHALLENGE Repoit of "PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS A Wingspread Briefing MATERIAL HAS 86EN 9TtANTED BY convened by 1-/enrcy Instittite of World Affairs of The Universiey of Wisconsin-Milwaukee TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES and the INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)" United States Department of State in cooperation with The Johnson Foundation Racine, Wisconsin June 29, 1978

\,

Report preparecl 1)37 Douglas McLain, Jr.

A. Mr. McLain, a retired Foreign Service officer, 16. is Assistapt Professor, InternatiOnal Relations ,Major, anti Assistant Director of the Institute ot World Affairs of the University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee. .

4.

r% CdKJTENTS

FOREWORD

IN:TRODUCTION

CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHrP

BASIC ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC THEORY: MILITARY RELATIONS IN A NUCLEAR WORLD

UNITED STATES DEFENSE CAPABILITY

A CLOSER LOOK AT SOVIET CAPABILITIES

STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES S3CURITY THROUGH SALT

HOW TO TELL A GOODSALT TREATY' FROM A BAD ONE

DIS'CUSSION

CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SALT DEBATE.

-!: FOR EWORID

The johnson Foundation was priv- caust of a nuclear war. It is for this Director of Columbia University's ileged to, cooperate with the.Institute reason that the Board of Trustees of Russian Institute. of 'World AffairsUniversity orThe Johnson Foundation continues, ,Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the with other institutions which sliare Through Professor Shulman's corn- United States Department 'of State the same strong cOmmitment, to mitment and exceptional know- in the Wingspread Briefing convened support steadfastly study of the ledge of this subject, The Johnson in June, 1978 on the subject United complex factors which must be con- Foundation was able to remain States Security and the Soviet sidered in negotiating arms control active in this field, and we continue Challenge. The distinguished agreements with the Soviet Union. to be grateful for his valuable con- speakers whose presentations. are tribution to the work of this organ- reported in this publication ad-In the recent past The Johnson ization. dressed a Wingspread audience ofFoundation has initiated or'sup- ported many projects, each of which Under policy guidelines regularly Wisconstn leaders from, the fields of assessed by the Board of Trustees, business, labor, academic life, the relates/in its own way to the Un- provement of the human environ- The Johnson Foundation will con- media and the professions , ment. These have'included: tinue its educational role in advanc- ing public understanding of impor- The Johnson Foundation's commit- tant United States foreign policy ment to a better understanding of Coping with changes in Ameri- issues, including tha control of the arms control issue by, citizens can family life nuclear weaponry. Consistent with and government officials began as Improvement of basic education this commitment, The Johnson early as 1959 This initial project Human rights and United States Foundation will convene iri early was in the form of position papers foreign policy 1979 another Wingspread Briefing prepared by a number of the nation's - Prevention of youth delinquency on United States security, the Soviet outstanding experts in.the field, Racial justice in tthe United challenge, and SALT II. This brief- including the late Senator Hubert States ing will be convened by the Com- H Humphrey, Harrison Brown, Ldng term care and the aging of mittee on the Present Danger and Paul M. Doty, iflenry M. Kissinger, America the Institute of World Affairs of The Bernard T. Feld, Louis B. Sohn, and - Economic growth University of Wisconsip-Milwaukee, others. During a conference con- Wilderness preservation in cooperation with The Johnson vened by the American Academy of Reducing urbah youth unem- Foundation. Arts and-Sciences and The Johnson ployment Foundation, the papers served as Cooperation with the President's the basis .of discussion. The papers Commission, on Mental Health were subsequently published in an Health care in the United States issue of Daedalus, the scholarly journal of the American Academy It4 is right that the Foundation of Arts and Sciences,, made possible should convene specialists to deal through a Johnson Foundation with' these subjects, and we have Leslie Paffrath grant. The volume was distributed seen positive results grow \from President. widely in the United States apd-'these efforts. However, the Fpynda- The Johnson Foundition abroad and deemed to have a strong tion never allows itself to fbrget influence on public and official thnt proglams aimed at improving undetstanding of United States- the human condition will count for Soviet relations and arms controt at nothing if millions of lives are lost thaJ time. and the physical environment be. comesqinlivable through nuclear We recognize:that changes whibh destruction and contamination. take plact, in political, economi and éocial affairs require that for- For approximately a decadevrior to eign policy issues be reexamined his present aPpointment as Prin- regularly. Of all the foreign policy cipal Advisor on Soviet Affairs to tssues with which the nation must the Secretary of State, Professor deal, iti clear that none is more Marshall Shulman served as con- im portant to thee securitY of the sultant to TheJohnson Foundation ,United States and the entire globe in the field of United States-Soviet than working out agreements which Relations and Arms Control. At will prevent tlie unthinkable holo- that ,tinie Profegsor Shulman was -3 INVRODUCTION ..

ge cannot assure our seg. urity hy . controls on the Soviet Backfire controversial than that of the Stra- military strength alone Neu aeapons Sp, bornbr and restrictions on the tegic Arms Limitations Talks. She tem.> acquired h. one side stimulate the other deployment of new types of ICBMs. gide to detelop more counter measures The expressed satisfaction that the, net effect is the expansion ot ueapons sys United States flexibility on these United States Department of State terns on both sides utthoia a real increase in ,issues was increasingly limited by had become aware of the need to the sec uritv of either what could realistically be expected consult with the American public to gain Senate approval, on the vital questionofnational Secretary of State Cyrus Vance survival and had developed a pro- April 10, 1978 Prospects of trouble for SALT in the gram to inform the public about Senate may reflect confusion in the United States military strategy, to mind of the American public. The explain the purposes of SALT within The Strategic Arms Limitation ongoing growth of Soviet military Talks (SALT) between the United that strategy, and to solicit the might and adventurism in Africa public's views and concerns about States and the Soviet Union began have brought expressions of public in 1969. Stated United States aims concern for the nation's security SALT. include limitation and reduction of and have rhade further accornoda- Dr. Baumann noted that Marshall strategic weapons designed to in- tion on arms control increasingly Shulman, theSeatitifyof State's crease national securityand promote cóntroversial. At the same time, the advisor on Soviet affairs, has char- strategic stabilityIn 1972 SALT general climate for SALT has been acterized United States public ONE ended with two agreements, a soured by widely publicized accusa- opinion toward the U.S.S.R. as treaty limiting antiballistic missile-tions of Soviet violations of the vacillating widely between euphoria-i defense systems (ABM) and a five human rights provisions of the 1975 and despair depending on percep- year pact providing limitations on Helsinki accord. These have pro- tions of the current state of detente. strategic offensive weapons. Both duced official protest in the United She concurred with Dr. Shulman's were approved by Congress TheStates and corresponding resent- conclusion that no consistent or ABM agreement remains in effect. ment in the Soviet Union. successful policy could be based on The offensive weapons limitation such uncertainty and that public has expired, although both sides The outcome of 'the SALT process support and understanding of a have agreed not to take any actions win shape the natur.e of United "measured, balanced, and realistic" inconsistent with that agreement so.State§-U.S S R relations for gener- approach to relations with Che long as the present negotiations are ations These relations could affect Soviet Union was needed. continuing. the fate of the human race. Given the crucial importance of SALT and With such understanding a cor- A second round of talks, SALTindications of uncertainty and un- responding dampening of the swings TWO, began in 1972 and is still in ease regarding these talks, the Ad- of public opinion between too high pmcess These talks, thus far, have ministration has sought to clarify expectations and disillusioned hos- produced the 1974 Vladivostok the issues and seek responses from tility should occur. understanding which proposed that the ultimate arbiter of United States a' new agreement, to be reached in foreign policy the American 1975, would extend through 1985, public. limit the aggregate number of stra, tegic delivery vehicles of each nation to 2,400, and limit land and sub- Against this background, on a day ' marine missiles equipped with in June 1978, a group of Wisconsin MIRVs (murtiple independently civic leaders met for an educational targetable reentry vehicles) to 1,320. briefing on United States Security and the Soviet Challenge, including The United States and U.S.S.R. issues involved in the current SALT were unable to reach the anticipated TWO negotiations. In her remarks agreement by 1975. In the fall of opening the briefing, Carol Edler 1977, President Carter stated that a Baumann, Director of the Institute new SALT agreement was in sight. of World Affairs, stressed the critical However, by mid-1978 it was gen- importance of public understanding erally agreed that sevterfi1 difficult of the problerrk of United States issues 'had prOlonged the negotia- national security and the crucial tions, and that an uphill fight for role of our relatiomship with the ICongnessional consent was in pros- Soviet Union to that security. Within pectUnresolved disputes included that rdationship no issue is more ,. . O- ,, I

CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

William J. Dyess

; If public attitudes regarding the World War II made allies of the likely, We will continue to compete Soviet Union have been character- United States and the Soviet Union. for influence throughout the world ized by vacillation, this reflects to But, following the war, as the United for a long time to come. some extent the actual cOurse of the States partially dismanteled its mixed and ambiguous history of military machine, another swing in Given the adversary nature of our United States-Sovi.et relations. relationships took place. When" the relationship, the military area has William J. Dyess, Deputy Assistant United States initiated the Marshall the greatest potential for conflict ecretary for Public Affairs, de- Plan the Soviet Union blocked largely in the realm of strategic scribed the context within which Eastern European participation, nuclear weapons systems. With SALT TWO is being negotiated and and its ensuing policy made clear both sides recognizing that we are within which the United States that our wartime cooperation was the only two countries in the world Senate will consider a treaty. Trac- at an end. Although we were on with the capacity to do one another ing the path of United States- opposite sides during the Korean lethal harm, strategic arms limita- U.S.S.R. relations, Mr. Dyess noted war, Stalin's death in 1953 and the tion will constitute the most impor- that at their outset the United States advent of Khruschev brought re- tant aspect of United States-Soviet sought to intervene in 1917 and newed attempts to cooperate. Fol- relations in the foreseeable future. bnng about a change in the fledgling lowing the hiatus occasioned by the While there can be no guarantee government wrought by the suc- U-2 incident in 1960, a thaw initiated that a SALT treaty can be reached, cessful Red Revolution. While this under the Kennedy administration there is agreement that we have a abortive effort is perhaps best for- produced several pacts between the mutual interest in avoiding a nu,- gotten by the United States, each two countries, including the Limited clear holocaust. generation of Soviets is reminded Test Ban, an agreement on the use Concluding with a list of guidelines by its government Of early Western of outer space, and establishment of for a measured view of United States- hostility. It was not until 1933, after the hot line. The Vietnam conflict U.S.S.R. relationships, Mr. Dyess more than a decade of little contact, placed us on opposite sides again. counseled acceptance that the com- that formal diplomatic relations Notwithstanding, the United States petition/cooperation dichotomy will were established by the new Roose- and the U.S.S.R. reached the mile- continue, and that the United Statek velt Administration. This initiative stone SALT ONE agreements in would be unable to influence Soviet toward normality was soon blunted 1972 and other agreements in the domestic policies significantly in by the Soviet purges of the 1930's nuclear weapons field were con- the near future. Americans must which shunted United States-Soviet cluded in subsequent years. realize that in some cases United relations into diplomatic limbo. The The brief history of United States- States and Soviet interests will be Soviet's subsequent war against congruent and that in others they Finland produced near unanimous U.S.S.R. relations is one of inter- mittent confrontation interspersed will diverge. This attitude would hostility in the Ijnited States toward encourage a calm assessment of the the U.S.S.R. with attempts to control and replace 'rivalry, with negotiation. On occa- costs and benefits of United States ,sion our interests overlap and pro- policy options and the preservation WILLIAM .1 'DYESS, Deputy Assistant of a sense of priority among these Secretary, Bureau of Public Affair.s. Umted duce circumstances encouraging States Department of State,ill an 18 year cooperation. (President Carter's policies. veteran of !he f 'tilted States Foreign Seruwe,June 7, 1978 commencement address For most of his career he has dealt with the United States and the communist world at Annapolis in its entirety is a Before his present assignment, he was Chief description of the relationship be- of the United States Sot iet Mlateral Affairs tween the United States and the Staff in the tate DepartmentIn the late Soviet Union.) 1960's in Berlin he was Chief of Liaison with Sautet Authorities in East Berlin and before that was a hilitical Officer at the American Although the two superpowers dm- Embass in Moscaw He also served as front each other in a variety of Pal:Neal Officer at l'nited States Embassies ways, fundamental differences in Bi,lgrade and Copenhagen and sewed as between the Upited States and the Czechosloi ak Desk Officer in the Deparonent of State He serced seuen times as the State Soviet domestic systems are at the Department member of United States mart core of their rivalry. These funda- time delegations11 hi( 11negonated United mental differences are reflected in States Sin tet agreements On cargo sharing the means by which political power and port access A natne of Alabama. Mr Ihess ts a Phi Beta Kappa educated at the in each system is distributed, exer- Unit f,r%it zeN at Ala gam a S rar u se. and cised, and accounted for. Since in lhford neither country is systemic change

' BASIC ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC THEORY: MILITARY RELATIONS IN A NUCLEAR WORLD (David J. Fischer

Yuu arelgoing to be hearing a good have over nine thousand strategic We are a strong country. We have a dear today about nuclear war and meaning long-range nuclear stronger technological base than weapons systems. Because thebombs. The Soviet Union has the Soviet Union. Why not just go consequences of such a war employ- roughly half that. One Soviet missile all out, make the hard, 'tough deci- ing these systems would be so dev- can carry on its nose cone the equil, sions and beat themT The answers astating, so disastrous, prevention alent of twenty million tons of TNT. to that are complex. But technology of this requires considerable re-Twenty million tons is in itself is not something which is unique to sources on our part and considerable something we simply cannot con- this country. The Soviet Union is energy for those of us who deal with ceptualize. I was_lboking for an also an advanced society capable of nuclear weapons. analogy which all of us could under- developing the kinds of weapons in stand; if one were to load tWenty which we, perhaps, may have a It is difficult to conceptualize nu- million tons of TNT into railway small -lead. The history of United clegr weapons In the first instance boxcars, the train would stretch States-Soviet strategic relationships we have in some' ways erected a from New York to San Diego. That s shown that as one side moves bureaucratic screen that prevents is simply the potential of one missile. a ead with a weapons system the us from understanding the realities other side either creates defenses of the world. First and foremost are There are many paradoxes in the against it or adopts similar weapons the acronyms. You will be hearing nuclear age and the greatest ofsS,sterns. There really is no way today about ICBMs and CEPs and these is that the weapons have been today that you can put controls on SLBMs and MIRVs. It is an alpha- designed not to be used in time of tedfinology. It cannot be unique to bet soup. But I think it is important war but to prevent arwar from ever one side or the, other. that we begin to understand these occuring. This concept is the single concepts because what we are really most important factor governing all Fundamentally there is a more talking about is the national secu- aspects of our relationship with the important point. It is that politi- rity, the future of this nation, if notSoviet Union. The reality of the cally neither side is willing to risk the future of our civilization. We nuclear age is that each side today not only inferiority but even appear- need to understand some of the is capable of withstanding an attack ance of inferiority. The President, fundamental concepts which guide from the other side and retaining for example, has made perfectly the thinking in Washington, notsuch overwhelming force that it clear that if it is necessary wke are only as they relate to our diplomatic could retaliate and obliterate the going to make the defense decisions efforts with the Soviet Union but attacker nation as a viable society. required to assure that this country also in regard to our defense plan The analogy often used is that of and our forces will remain second to ning. In the light of the success of two scorpions in a bottle. One scor- none. Mr. Brezhnev, I am sure, in Proposition 13 in California, this pion strikes the other knowing full his response to his board of gover- should be of immediate interest well that in its victim's death throes nors, the Politburo, also feels it since twenty-five cents of your tax he, too, 'Zit be struck and killed. It necessary to guarantee that the dollar and my tax dollar go to is no accident that this concept has Soviet Union maintains strategic defense spending. come to be known as `mutuall parity with the United States.- assured destruction,' the initials for Both sides today, the Unites States which are MAD. It is a mad concept The concept of mutually assured and the Soviet! Union, have vast in many ways, but it is a fact of life destruction rests on a number of forces To give you some idea, we which I would argue has operated important premises and some im- successfully to limit the competition pprtant ideas with which I believe Da, id I Fos, her, Offs,* of Disarmament and so that it cannot grow into full scale you should be acquainted. Many Arms Contra!, Bureau of Politico Military Affairs, United States Department of State, nuclear war. We believe that this arcane theories are involved, but I is a career Foreign Service Officer with fundamental nuclear balance, this will touch on only one or two. In the otonmie bat kground in arms tontrol and deterrent, has worked in the pastfirst instance, one of the most im- bast Fan)p poloto al issues Ho has held ari'k it must be maintained in the portant premises of deterrence is asignment4 In Derma nv Poia nd, Bulgaria, future. And it is this concept which the concept of survivability that and Sepal (where he was a member of the American Bicentennial Mount Everest Ex I think guides all our thinking, not your weapons systems can survive perlitionoI,zimshington. Mr Fischer has only in terms of what we are,doing an attack of these 4,500 Soviet war- sort oit ith the Arm:, Control and Dos in the SALT talks, but in terms of heads and that you will have enough armour', .1g fit aridah t F MN' Iift 11# what we may have to du in order to left over to be able to threaten retali- routed States Delega tum to the first round of SALT at Helsinki A native of Connecticut. modernize our forces in the future. ation against the other side. he u'(IS educated at Brown University, the vers.tt V of Vienna, and Harvard tau Many Americans ask the question, Over tile years we have developed School 'Well, why not achieve superiority? the concept known as the "Triad."

' Basically, it means putting our able is viewed with great concern in fense of their country. They must . nuclear eggs intothree separate Washington. But fur a variety of therefore ma,ke extremely conserva- baskets. First, we hal,e bombers, reasons, although uf concern, it is tive estimates embodying what hass the B-52s, which will shortly be something we will be able to deal come to be-called 'worst case' analy- -armed with a fantastic new system, with over the next five to seven sis of what the other guy is up to. the cruise missile. Second, we have. years. There is always a possibility that our land-based missiles, ICBMs. Your opponent is going to do some- Finally, we have missiles in sub- When I say the Russians will have thing. As a defender, one must take marines. We have distnbuted our a theoretical capability for such an that possibility into account.-"In a forces in this way, because we want attack, I stress this because, first of way, both sides tend to look at each to insure that under any foreseeable all,it would require extreme pre- other through a telescope. We thus circumstance we still would have cision. It demands a high degree of tend to magify the other side's forces.after an attack which sould technical' sophistication to launch capabilities.(You are, I am sure, be able to obliterate the S such an attack and be assured that all cognizant of the missile gap Union. Each leg of this so-called all of those missiles can be de- which turned 'out not to have existsd Tnad bombers, submarines, and stroyed. It is not enough to destroy in the early 1960's.) I think one of missiles is capable of performing 50 percent of them. You really have 'the things we are trying to do that task on its own. to go in and wipe out 90 to 95 percent, through a variety of mechanisms is and that is extremely difficult. to decrease uncertainty and to have Now submarines are cle'arly the Above all, it is theoretical because, some understanding of what the most survivable weapons system although the Soviets could launch other side really does have. because they are virtually immune an attack against our ICBMs, there tu detection. They ride deep under is no way that they could do so A new SALT agreement would set a the waters of the Atlantic, indeed without full recognition that we tremendous precedent in this regard. under the Arctic ice cap, and there could retaliate with our bomber The Soviets are stripping away four is no technology we are aware of, or forcer and from our subdiarines with hundred years, uf secrecy -sand for antiupate in the foreseeable future, sufficient force to destroy the Soviet the first time are providing us with that would let the uther side knuw Union as a viable society. This explicit, precise numbers which where these submarines are and strategic deterrent, our ability to will confirm estimates arrived at permit an effective attack. Similarly prevent the Soviets from making through our intelligence mecha- with our bombers, because of the this irrational choice, will con-4-nue nisms of the vast range of their lead time required, we would have to exist in the fpreseeable future. strategic, weapuns systems. This sufficient warning to get airplanes would be published as part of a into the air and on their vl,ay to The previous question highlights SAT document. This kind of ex- their targets. another aspect of the concept of change of information will tend to deterrence, that is confidence in reduce the uncertainties in the alit we are now facing a problem for and understanding of each side's future. Hopefully, it also will allow the 1980's with an issue of increas- capabilities. Military men in us to formulate more rational de- ing concern to this country. Its tag Washington and military men in fense spending policies. We will be name in Washington is 'Minute Moscow are charged with the de- able to divide our defense pie in a Man Survivability.' What this really . means is that land-based ICBMs are increasingly vulnerable to at- tack. As the number of warheads grows on both sides, and as the 14°1-d44 accuracy of these weapons systems Is 1 1 M increases, the theoretical possibility exists that an enemy could launch

an attack which would destroy our VISAA r ICBM force despite the measures we have taken by building very hard concrete shelters for our mis- siles. If a nuclear weapon is suf- SA.11 ficiently accurate to land on top of c ' the concrete doors, it can destroy the missile system. The same is true ij of Soviet missiles. We have about 30 percent of our strategic forces in this one 'basket' of land-based mis- siles. The Soviets, for many reasons, have a far greater proportion of their weapons systems on land about 70 percent. The possibility of our Minute Men becoming vulner- way which makes Inure sense, be- survive a retaliatory attack. It is. our goal with arms control is to eause we will have increased con true that the Soviet civil defense limit the buildup in Soviet forces. In fidence in what the other side has. program is larger than ours. We fact, the SALT agreements that we made the decision in the mid-1960's are negotiating will for the first Another paradox in the nuclear) that civil defense in the nuclear age time require real reductions in Soviet world isAat -defense.may be bad." did not make sense, The Soviets weapons systems. The Soviets will Defense creates instability. Let us have not .come to that conclusion be required to destroy between two irrfagine that t-bmorrowAinThing and they continue to invest some hundred fifty and three hundred of solne mad scientist runs in to Mr. resources in this. But there is no these vast systems which are now Brezhnes, and says, I have devel- way the Soviets can avoid the im targeted against the United States. oped a magic banana. This isit. mediate effect of nine thousand It is fortuitous, hut I am pleased to This will allow us to destroy any weapons exploding over their ter- say that we will not be required`to American rockets or arm American ritory. And certainly there is no desfroy any. bombers when they pre a hundred way that that society could survive miles away frorq us. There is no the long-range effects of nuclear That is ls important, however, way that thsose warheads can ex- war about which we know very than the undamental goal which is plode.' Clearly, under this situation little. What kind of soFiety is it aft0 to stiivé to maintain the strategic Mr. Brezhnev or his successor could you have been in your shelter fOr balance. The issues re terribly be more inclined in a time of crisis three weeks and you open the door complex. They are difficult. You tv) launch an attack against the to get out? What is left? Nothing. We will hear many numbers and acro- °United States, knowing it would be cannot even send people to Bikini nyms about systems on both sides. unable to retaliate. Atoll twenty-five years after the But in this discussion and in this tests, much less three weeks after. public debate which is taking place, One of the major steps in arms Admittedly, the idea of civil defense do not lose sight of the forest for the control and the whole United States- plays a certain role in the strategic trees.'The idea is to maintain the Soviet relationship was the agree- concept. It is something we may balance, and therefore fo reduce the ment in 1972 for both sides to re- want to deal with in SALT THREE. theoreticalpossibility however nounce the concept of strategic We may-want to negotiate limits on small of a nuclear war. defense utilizing anti-ballistic mis- this with the Soviets. But 'for the sile systems. In any case, botli sides moment, it does not change the agreed to limit in essence, do fundamentO balance. away with anti-ballistic missiles. The concept of defense has come That nuclear balance today is stable. increasingly tO the public attention. Neither side has the incentive which You may have read articles on the might confer the capability to Soviet civil defense program. A*launch an attack against the other defense prograth need not be active, and survive. But we are concerned it need not be a missile system to about die buildup in Soviet strategic shoot down other missiles. You forces which has gone on for almost could have, in theoryfa civil defense a decade. Although they started in program by which all of your people. second place, they have parity in could he put underground. This this critipal year of 1978. The Presi- would be destabilizing because dent has said we will maintain the whichever side it was that had this strategic balance at any cost. We program would think, 'Well, in a will do so through a program of time of crisis we can go ahead and modernization of our own forces, launch, and although missiles are moving ahead if necessary with a going to go off in our territory, a mobile missile system, moving large percentage of our population ahead with a dtrast range of cruise itgoing to survive.' , missile programs, and developing new submarines. In theory, therefore, civil defense is an issue of some concern to the We are also trying to maintain a strategic balance. Now again I say strategic balance through arms 'in theory because we have looke'd control. I think there is a misper- carefully at the Soviet civil defense ception in this country today that program. Secretary of Defense arms control is somehow soft, that Harold Brown is a man who, believe it is 'liberal,' that you are playing me, is no softy on the Russians. The footsie with the Russians. Nothing Defense Department has done sev- could be farther from the truth. eral studies, and it is Secretary Arms control and a strong national Brown's conclusion that the civil defense policy are not contradictgry. defense program the Soviet Union They are complementary. They4are has today .would not allow it to two paths to the same goal, because UNITED STATES DEFENSE CAPABILITY

Henry H. Gaffney

Henry H. Gaffney, Deputy Director or deployed. ,However, the "hard- weapons distribution of the Unitea of Nuclear Policy in the Office of ened" sites of concrete silos and States is known as "the strategic Policy Planning and National their ICBMs within become increas- Triad," and serves to hedge against Security Affairs of the United States ingly vulnerable to attack as the lunching and other uncertainties. Department of Defense, described numbers, power, and accuracy of The Soviet Union has placed'great- the contents of the United States opposing ntissiles increase. Missile est emphasis on land based ICBMe nuclear arsenal and the ti,.S.S.R.'s hedring submarines can launch and the greatest part of itestrategic counterforce: His presentation their weapons fi:om beneath the force is deployed in this manner. included slides and an accompany- surface of the sea. Delivery time ing sound traok. would be generally lees than that At present the United States has required for land-based ICBMs, 350 B-52 bombers and, the U.S.S.R. After brief review of the.concept of since they fly shorter rdnges. Thus has 140 Bear an .Bison bombers. deterrence, Dr: Gaffney turned to a far the submarine forces are es- The, Soviet bmbeks are hot kept on di4cussion of the fundamentals sentially invulnerable, since neither alert as are a la ge portion of the involved in strategic nuclear...weap- side has developed a reliable method B-52s. There are' 41 United States onry. Since the first atomic blast, of locating and destroying sub- different types of nuclear weapons missile submarines with 656 tubes stantial numbers of the other's and 62 Soviet.submarines with 950 have -been developed and a variety underwater fleet at a given time. tubes. Thirty-one of the United of nucle r warheads have evolved.t . - Staies boats, carrY MIRVed Poseidon Howeve, basic to the concept ofIn his analysis of the delivery strateginuclear deterrence is 'the systems of the United States and missiles. Deploymenr of MIRVs in requireent that the weapons must the U.S,S.R., Dr. Gaffney rioted Soviet boats may have' begun re- be able'o survive a first strike and significant difference in emphasis. cently. The U.S.S.R. hap a 1,477 to be delivered ,to their targets. In The United States has opted for a 1,054 numerical advantage'in land- strategic terms, *delivery generally based ICBMs over the Unjted States. systems mix thatslivides our strate- Overall, the United States has 2,050 encompasses intersontinental dis- gic force about 4quall between the.delivery,systems and the Soviet tances, though systems based at three methods of delivery. This Union has 2,440. The United States sea may have shorter range. has superiority over the Soviet There are threepriLe4palstrategic Union in number of warheads by delivery systems in use by both more than a Iwo-tO-one margin, sides today Ithe bomber, the land- -while the Soviets enjoY a substantial based Intercontinental Ballistic superiority in throw-weight (deliver- Missile (ICBM) and the Submarine- able *useful weapon, weight). Launched Ballistic.Missile (SLBM). . Numerical comparisons, while per- They have differing haracteristics. tinent, are inSufficient when evalu- Bombers can carry both nuclear ating the, strategic torces of the two missiles and bombs. They take hours nations,since numbers do not reflect to reach theirtargets and they are technological differences or the vulnerable to enemy defensive circumstances of an exchange. It is measures. Land-based ICBMs more useful to consider the totality equipped 'With nuclear warheads of the two forces and whether, juxta- take about one-half hour for delivery. posed, they constituted strategic 'No adequate defense against a large- nuclear balance.. He emphasized the scale ICBM attack has been devised importance of maintaining deter- rence, stability, and equiValence in Henry Ii Gaffney. d'r lkputy Director of forces. Nuch,ar Policy, Planmng and National Security Affairs, United Staws Mwartment Several factors threaten stability of Defense A former United States Naval and these vary in potential. Both officer, he hag been,uith the Defense Depart sides are engaged in Modernization ment for'more than twenty years Dr Gaffney programs. The United States has has served on the United States Mission to NATO a4 Director of the; NATO Ammon in begun to build Trident submarines the Office of the Assistant Secretary of with more missiles, longer range, Defense, and as Deputy Assistant to the and better defenses against "killer'4 Secretary of Defense A native of Boston.' submarines to replace aging Polaris/ Massachusetts. he received lus degrees from Harvard Colkge and Columbia University Poseidon boats. The Soviets are

1 0 completing develoPment of oneThe advent of ballistic missiles generation of MIRVed ICBMs andwith ihtercontinental range has developing a-new generation ofwiped out previous restrictions of ICBMs. Since MIRVs will threatengeography and time in warfare', United States ICBM sites, theaccording'to Dr. Gaffney. With no United States is considering makingnation immune..from the threat of our ICBMs mobile. The Sovi.etsnuclear attack, the mission ot.the have also largely corhpleted theirUnited States fo'rces is to deter modern submarine buildup andattack by ensuring stability and have a newly operational MIRVedbalance of forces. Although this submarine missile. equivalence now exists, moderniza- tion continues, forced on by per- pr. Gaffney included a detailedceived advances and threats on description of the United States'either side. a- newest weappn the cruise missile. This is a small, unmanned, cheap aircraft about the s of a sub- marine torpeda. Itiizes. capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses at an extremely low altitude. Its devel- opment -was made possible by the miniaturization of warheads and tiropulsion and guidance systems. The cruise missile achieves great accuracy by virtue of its_ability to orient ithelf from landfall grids and correct:course. The development of the cruise missile was decisive 'in r the decision to abandan plans to build the B-1 bomber and has en- abled the United Skates to cpt for extending the life of the B-52 in spite .of improved Soviet air defenses by,equipping them with these devic s.

- A, CLOSER LOOK AT SOVIET CAPABILITIES 7. A> 1 Martha C. Mautner

I would like tu deal with the Soviet 'ICS not a threat to us. We can just her weaknesses. When dealing with Union itself, the target of all of ignore-the whole subject altogether. ,the U.S.S.R. we should not forget those weapons that we have been It will go away eventually. We are these aspects. It is because of this talking about and our main pro- powerful.' complex of strengths and weak- tagonist in the world. All of you nesses and because of its national have discovered that everyone has The interesting part about this fear of the outside world that the a different view of what the Soviet contrast in views is that both of country is so difficult to deal with. Union is and, what it mea.ns to us. these extreme assessments are cor- Because of this it also iS difficult for Every one of you also will have a rect in certain aspects. It is the us to cope with the Russians in different question on the subject, conclusions which are drawn from negotiations or to understand them. and so an important part of this them that are wrong. The point is It follows that it is equally hard for session is going to be your questions that the Soviet Union is an enor-the public to understand why the and, hopefully, some of.the answer's mously respectable adversary: There SALT process is so difficult. SALT that I can give to you. What I want is no question about it. It is a is difficult because it impinges so to do is to try to put something of a tary power of tremendous propor-intimately on both the,strengths perspective and a proportion into tions. It is the only other global and weaknesses of both sides. our assessment of the Soviet Union. power that interacts with us all over the world. It is athreat to our allies. There is a simple answer to the oft- You will have heard all kinds ofIt is the only other nation which heard question of why it is that a views uf the Soviet Umon. Some see has the capacity to destroy -us or to country to which military might is it, as an ominous menace pn the inflict intolerable damage on our so important would be willing to cut honzon, others accept every word of ountry. There is no getting around back on its ,military arsenal. The the peace rhetoric at face value a that fact. answer is that the alternative to assume it will be translated to such cutbacks is so undesirable. reality tomorrow. You Swill have On the other hand, by our Western This is really,the focus of our whole heard extreme assessments by those industrial standards, the Soviet discussion. ,We and the Soviets are who are obsessed with the military Union is a backward country. It is adversaries, and we are going to might of the Soviet Union, who see underdeveloped to a very great retnain adversaries. They know tank armies and gigantic missiles extent. It is a nation with -tremen- that. We know that. This means and naval, armadas everywhere, dous potentitriartrffMrces but unable that inevitably there is going tq be and who assume, that we must as yet to exploit ajose resources on tension in our relationshfp, that mobilize all our armed forces im- it's own. It has always had to import'tension is going to lead to friction, mediately to meet this threat. At the outside technology to plug the gaps. and both of us are going to find it other end of the spectrum there are It keeps falling behind the techno-necessary to keep our defense es- those individuals who are somehow logical level of the rest of the world. eabliShments in top priority order to o,bsessed with the lack of pl.uffibing It has to stop periodicallx to gird meet any threat from the other. that they may have run int4in the itself, or import outside technology This leads to an action/reaction Soviet Union, who see ortly the to catch up. It is a country in which cycle a constant competition in underdeveloped aspects of its econ- th4 tremendous investments that go the arms race. Down the-road, both omy, and who see a technology Alto the military establishment are of us the Soviets particulaily which looks backward by Western practically sterile as far as thecan see the looming danger that or Amencan standards. Focusing civilian economy is concerned. There sometime, someplace, something is on this, they assume that the Soviet is no spinoff. It consists of two going to happen perhaps via a. Union is nothing to worry about. separate worlds. What goes into the third party that can involve us in military is lost in the Military maw. a confrontation which could lead to It does not return to Soviet citizens' our mutual destruction. In essence benefit. this is ,the entire basis of why we really want arms control. It is not a Martha C Mautner is Chief of the Sot let All of those things make up thisquestion of statisticor balance Foreign Policy Division in the United States country with which we must deal. It Department of State's Buri.au for Intelligence sheets. and Research Iler area of specialization is is a country which has its weak- Soviet foreign policy with particular ern nesses as well as its strengths.This is the firscregime iiLhhistory phasis un Germany and Berlin, Europe and Above and beyond all security of the Soviet Unidn which has been the Middle East Mrs Mautner has serted in requirements, that tremendous willing to negotiate seriously on Moscow, Khartoum, and Berlin She attended issues so basic to, its security. We Seton Hill College and received her Master's military establishment that the degree from the Fletcher School for Inter. Soviet Union maintains is there to have had other agreements in the national Lau. and DiplomacY compensate for and to camouflage past but all have been peripheral. We are nowdown to gut,issues. This to Maintain status and prestige.We often forget that the United is the first regime that has been This has important psychological States,has strengths in the compe- do. this,_and itis also the ramifications and means that it is titionith the Soyiet Union beyond first ti in Russian history when easier to behave with.aestraint in the merely militarY dimension. We that land mass which constitutes the world. More'concretely, it nov; is have a tremendous economic base the Soviet Union has been as secure easier for the Soviet Union to begin and technological capacity, pnd as if ever could be in the contem- considering cutting back on the size perhaps even more important, we porary world. It is a type of security of its arsenal if it can get some have the ability to absorb change the Soviet state has never had before. assurance that arms competition andilse it profitably in our system And it'is the tylie of security that with the United.States can be con- without destabilizing our society. gives the Soviet Union the measure tained, perhaps reduced, or even We o.verlook these strengths when and the sense of-Confidence with reversed. we estimate the Soviet Union's which to go ahead and at least try perc,e,kaon of us. We forget that they to discuss security issues to see if The Soviets want this not just ke them into account. The point some common ground with us can because the cost of arms spirals is ,successful arms control would be found. so horrendous in social and eco- reduce the impact of the military nomic terms, but also because theelement in our relationship and The S viet Un n derives its sense constant competition in arms ag-_woirld bring all of the United States of securino erelY from its large gravates all of the yulnerabilities of advantages to the fore. Here there is military e lishment, but bectause their system. T,hey have their own no parity for the Soviet Union, and it feels it finally has achieved a action/ reaction cycle dsmestically. there will not be at least in our relative Rarity with its major ad- Their emphasis on the military and lifetirrie. But we tend to forget that versaryI rhay 'injure the sensibili- sterile investments in the military these are elements which the Soviets ties of all of the arms experts here means losses to the civilian econ- have to put' into their calculations. by the claim that parity really has omy. If threatened, #ie Soviet Union We are a far more formidable enemy very little to do with numbers or naturlly will do anything it must than we sometimes think. The weapons systems Rather, it has to to maintain its defense. It will spare Kremlin is willing to take a chance do with the sepse or the ability, nne nothing. But entering another round with that future risk of United States way or the dher, to inflkt intoler- in the arms race will mean that an advantage in return for being able able damage on the other side. And economy, that is already stretched to head off the more immediate risk whether ypu do it with one big:to take care of the present danger of another arms race or nuclear bang, 'or with a lot of little bangs, or4 and the looming threat of China is confrontation. whether you do it with slingshots,'going to be stretched even further. the effect is the,same. You have And th t stietching is going to The Soviets have reservations about equalized the ,balance. No matter mean irill be necessary to return the SALT talks just as many people what happens you have struck a to the, tigit domestic contfols of a in this country do. They have their situation where the intolerable previous era and. to Stalinist prac- own views of the way the world is aspect of that damage factpr gives tices to keep the situation under supposed to be and these are quite you the rough balance that exists in Control. Forcing production out of different from ours. But we and the world today. It is a weird sort of the population to get- the 'results they also have one very funda- balance but it's the only one, the that are necessary would mean a mental aim in common; both of us only type of security, we have in reversal of all the gradual easing of really approach the SALT process today's world. much the same as Maurice Chevalier life that has taken place in the approached old age. He said he was years since Stalin's death. Addi- not particularly enthusiastic about Now, for the Soviet Union, thee ac- liOnally, it would necessitate a more the prospect of getting old, bu he ceptance and the recognition of that militant international stance to preferred it to the alternative. That sense of equality is of prime impor- justify domestic controls. If there is is really the basis for SALT. tance and a major factor in the no arms control agreement, there is SALT process. Being acknowledged going to be more tension. as an equal justifies the Soviets' _wingness to negotiate in SALT to In dealing with a situation as coM- their allies, to themselves, and to plex as this, one must be able to their own domesticiwwks. Recog- cope with the strengths and, at the nition of that equalrty to a very same time, exploit the vulnerabili- great extent compensates for and ties ot the Soviet adversary. This makes less pertinent the vulner- must bee in ways which will abilities and the weaknesses in the enhanv not only our national inter- Soviet system. TheY no longer have ests, bcit also' theirs. This requires to feel humiliated by the fact that presenting the security equation in they are inferior in certain areas. such a way that it answers Soviet And being recognized as equal also security needs as well as ours. We reduces the importance of military cannot have it all our own way. It posturing toward the outside,world does require compromise. - STREATHENING UNITED STATES SECURITY THROUGH SALT

Paul C. Warnke

- Today I would like to address the accomodation when we can mutu- opinions vary as to how many, major concerns that are expressed ally benefit from that accomoda- maybe as few as 30 or 40 million, to me about SALT. I think that both tiori." Se-cretarY V'ance told the maybe hundreds of millions would the national polls and certainly my.',1-louseinternational ifelatiOns be killed in the initial nexchange. own experience speaking Through- Committee las,t week that our policy The survivors would face a devas- out the country wodld indicate that,toward the Soviet Union should be. tatedcolintrY stripped of industrial the American public has mixed based, first, on "maintaining our capacity, contaminated 'by fallout, feeling's about dealing with the military, economic and,political deprived of the means of food pro- Soviets on arms control matters. On Strengths" and, second, on pursuing duction and devoid of the health the one hand, there is a deep desire "areas of negotiation which a're facilities needed to deal with the for peace and an easing of inter- vital to geace and to our nationalunexampled casualties. It is the national tensions. On the other, security." very fact of sure retaliation that there is the continuing asuspiRion tOday provides the only sure deter- about Soviet policies and Soviet I think iis essential that we keep rent to nuclear aggression. ambitions. ow eye on one main fact, And that , - is that a sounch fair, verifiable The extent/ofour retaliatory cepa- These feelings coalesce into twobig ,agreement limiting strategic arms bility is illustrated'by a study that questions that I am frequently asked. is not a favor that we ar,e_doing for the Arms Control and Disarmament The first one is why the Strategic the Soviet Union. It is instead some- Agency; has recently completed. Arms Limitation agreemeht-now thing we do for our own national What the study did was to measure being negotiated will contribute to security. ' United States and Soviet strategic our security. The-second question - forces against a sample targeting if that's the case, why would it be Sound arms control measures, in- pattern of approximately 6,500 that the Soviet Union would have cluding a good SALT TWO 'agree- targets.,This was a mixture of hard any interest in entenng into thatment, serve our own interests. I targets, such as missile silos, and th ught I would list five reasons kind of agreement. 2 soft targets, such as cities. Against y a SALT agreement does serve this sample targeting'pattern, the Some even ask Why if the Soviets the.security interests of the United.study shows that the United States are acting as badly as they are in States. forces could absorb a Soviet strike, the Mrican Situation, if they con- First, there is now a continuing and in retaliation could destroy tinue to suppress independent voices more, of the Spviet Union than the within the Soviet Union itself we buildup of the strategic nuclear forces of both sides. We have to keep Soviet Union had destroyed of the should try to deal with thern'on United States by striking first. The matters of such importance to us. pace. We can't have the Soviets gain any sort Ofstrategic advan- study also shows that by the mid- tage. We have keTt pace. We have 1980s our ability to retaliate after a I beli0e--thatPretsiderii-Catter.,and today about 9,000 nuclear warheads Soviet nuclear strike will be greater Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on our strategic intercontinental than the entire destructive power of have put the question of United systems. These include the inter- our strategic forces if we were to use States-Soviet relations into its prop- continental ballistic missiles, our tliem first in a strike today. So What er perspective. President Carter-ballistic missile submarines and hat means is that we do possess in observed in his press conference our heavy bombers equipped with ample quantity 'the only security earlier this week that we will prob- bombs and short-range missiles. against a nuclear attack. And the ably stay in a "state of competition" The Soviet Union doesn't have as question is how this security can be with the Soviet Union for many many warheads. It has only some-best maintained... years, but that "we want to have thing in excess of 4,000. But be- tween us, we have almost 14,000 There are alternative ways avail- 4 Paul C Warnke was Director, United States strategic nuclear warheads more,table to us. We can continae in the Arms-Control and Dtsarmament Agency warheads than there are targets on un,restricted,competition in the and Chief United States Negotiator,Strategic either side. accumulation of more and more Arms Limitation Talksat the.time of the nuclear weapons. It's a competition' Wingspread briefing Formerly he was As- sistant Secretary of Defense (Internatwnal There is, today, a stable strategicin Which neither side would allow Security Affairs) and General Counsel for balance. By that I mean that neither the other to gain a strategic advan- the United States Department ktf Defense side could plan to initiate a nuclear tage. ,We could, and I am sure we Mr Warnke practiced !au from I94R to 1966 war without being faced with thewould, keep up in this competition. and from 1969 to 1977 He was Editor in Chief of the Columbia Law Review (1948) certainty of retaliation which would But the, fact is that after the expend- Mr Warnke recewed his degrees from Yale destroy the attacker as a moderniture of billions and billions of College and Columbia Lau, School. functioning society. Many millions additional dollars on both sides, the most we could hope is that we would and the Soviets witil Vladivostok With regard to the guestion of inter- .not be much worse off than-we are had insisted that these had to be continental ballistic missiles with today and that the strategic balance taken into account in any SALT MIRV8,. the Soviets have agreed to would not have been rendered more agreement; They have not been, set a ceiling which will mean 100 precarious. and from that staddpoint we retain less of these particular missiles the advantage of those systems. than they would otherwise have, If instead, we can reach an agree- not enough to eliminate all risk to ment that limits and then reverses . , . the survivability of our forces but a the buildup of nuclear weapons, a Strategic stabiKity, is furthei pro- very desirable first.step toward stable strategic balance can be moted in the SALT TWO ag eement bringing about a more durable situ- maintained. And if we -can main- by the fact thaf the Soy' have. ation of assured stability. tain that sort of a situation, then we agreed to reductions. Thehave can devote more o`f oar tir and agreed that they will cut back both And thenfinahy,as an attempt to wealth to the pursuit of the positive the aggregate number of 2,400 and strengthen strategic stability, we elements of our foreign policy and also the sub-ceiling of 1,320 on have been tryftig since March of to dealing with our many domestic MPRVed ballistic missifes. Qis a 1977 to negotiate a ban on new types problem%. practical matter, as f result of S'ALT of intercontinental ballistic mis- TWO, the Soviets will have cut out siles:The Soviets have agreed in My second reason for reaommending ef their forces approximately, 300 principle tohave that kind of a to you the emerging SALT TWO nuclear delivery systems. There will prohibitiorn It will for the first time agreement is that it will in fact_be 300 less of these systems targeted begin to resfrain the qualitative preserye and increase this strategic against the United States. In the aspect of the nuclear armi race stabil#y. I think we sometimes lose absence of SALT, it is estimated not just quantitative 4ductions Put sight cif the fact that the Vladivostok that the Soviets would increase by actual qualitative controls. The meeting between President Ford some 600. So SALT TWO means- a exact extent of this limitation is and General Secretary Brezhnev in swing of almost 1,000 strategic something which is still under 1974 gave rise to a breakthrough in nuclear delivery systems 1,000 negotiation. It is one of the more strategic arms control which is ofless targeted against the United difficult problems with which we immense importance. What hap- States. Because our present total is are presently struggling. pened at this point was that the two less than the new ceiling, we, on the heads of state agreed that theother 'hand, would not have to cut One factor that makes this a diffi- SALT TWO agreement would pro- back at all, and could, in fact, in- cult problem Jo soRie is that the vide for equal ceilings on the inter- crease by some 250. Soviet Union is dore dependent continental strategic nuclear deliv- .. uponICIrls than *e are. Whereas ery vehicles of both sides; that each we have split our resources about side would have an equal entitle- Also contributing to a stable, even equally clver the ballistic missile ment of 2,400 strategic nuclear strategic balance are certain sub-- submarines and the manned bomb- deliveiy vehicles; and that each ceilings to which the Soviets have ers as well as the ICBMs, the Soviet ide within that overall total would already agreed'. We felt that the Union still has tabout 70 percent of have a c.eiling of 1,320 for launchers most cliangerou's of the strategic its strategic forces in the land-based of MIRVed missiles. (The MIRVed nuclear weapons is the interconti- ballistic missiles. Thus, the kind of missiles, of course, are the missiles nental ballistic missile equipped restraint we are negotiating will that have multiple warheads that with multiple warheads. Itis the affect them more severely, more can be directed at widely separated most destabilizing because it has stringently than it will us. targets.) the accuracy and yield .that can challenge the viability and the sur- SALT 'will thus make us safer by The significance of this agreerhent vivability of the ICBMs on the providing for equality in ceilings, in equal aggregates is two fold. other sid9. What that means is that actual reductions in Soviet weapons Politically, it meets the require- as the technological competition and restrictions on new types of ments of the Jackson Amendment, continues the intercontinental bal- ICBMs. - which was passed in 1972 at the listic missiles of each side are be- time of SALT ONE. And that re- corning at the same time both more A third reason why a SALT TWO owired that all future SALT agree- dangerous and more vulnerable. agreement will protect and improve ments have equality in interconti What that does, of course, is to the security of the United States is nental range nuclear weapons. Then create the risk that at a time of that it doesn't rely on trust of the from the military standpoint, the extreme international tension, one Soviet Union. It relies instead on significance is that the Vladivostok'side will be tempted to use its inter limits and rules that we can verify understanding provides for equal continental ballistic missiles' first, ourselves by Our own national tech- aggregates without taking into con because it will be afraid it will never nical Without adequate .sideration the so called forward be able to use them second, because assura ce that arms control provi- baed systems that the United they would be gone. So it promotes sions were being complied with, States has in Europe. We have sys such concepts as "launch on-warn there really wouldn't be much point tems in Europe that can deliver ing" and therefore decreases stra- in having an arms control agree- nuclear weapons on Soviet territory, tegic stability. ment. It would be a source of suspi-

1 cion kither th.an comfort, and you step in our negotiations is based on cruise missiles. These will allow our would have the constant question a fully staffed-out and jully coordi- bombers to stay' outside of Soviet as to whether the other side was nated American position. The sul- territbry beyond the reachof Soviet taktng advantage. We can, however, stantive positions and, for that air defenses and still strike the key with our highly sophisticated na- mAter, much of the negotiating Soviet targets. Now for several tional technical means, determine tactics are decided upon in the first years, ever since Vladivostok, the that the quantitative controls and instance by the Special Coordi- Soviets had insisted that heavy the qualitative restraintsI.hat I nating Committee, whin is a sub- bombers with cruise missiles should have been discussing are in fact committee of the National Security be treated asif they were MIRVed, being met by the' Soviet Union. In Councilc-chaired by Dr. Brzezinski, bajlistic MisSiles. In other words, order to_improve verification, we as the President'sAssistant for each bomber of that sort would be have also obtained Soviet agree- National Security Affairs. And in counted agoainst that side's entitle- ment to an exchange of,dataun the SXLT, it includes the Secretary of ment of MIRVed ballistic missiles. strateg/' kirces of both sides. In State, the Secretary of Defense,, the It is now agreed, however, that both *earlier SALT discussions, they had Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of sides will have the same entitlement refused to do this, but they have Staff, the Directorof Central Intel for MIRVed ballistic missiles and now .agreed to supply their figures ltgenoe, and the Director of the that each side can have' in addition on_their forces so that we can dieck Arms Control and Disarmament over 100. heavy bombqrs with strate- them against'our own and have an Agency. If this Special Coordina gic cruise missiles, which is certainly agreed-upon base from which we ting Committee can't reach an adequate to encompass the program can start to bnng about reductions. agreement on a particular question, that the Air Force has in mind. then thgt is referred to the National They have also agreed on a total Security Council, which consists of In addition, the Soviets have ac- prohibition a 'any measures of con- the same people but, of course, in- cepted our proposal that the limits cealment that would lessen our cludes the President and the Vice on cruise missile range, tiie limits verification capability. And they President. on the deployment of cruise missiles have agreed on a ban on any inter- on ground launchers and sea launch- ference with national technicalThe negotiating delegation in ers, and on the prohibition on, the means of verification. We have Geneva has the same interagency deployment of, mobile launchers developed counting rules under compositipn. It includes representa- will all be,contained.in a protocol, which we can verity particular types tives of tike Joint Chiefs, the State. which has a three-year life, span, of launchers as a result of their Department, the Department of rather than through 1985. This will physically observable feature's, so Defense,.and the Arms Control' and 'permit us to deterniine, within this that our national technical means Disarmament Agency. And it oper- three year period, whethey to trade enable us to tell whaarticular ates on the basis of instructions off 'continuing restrictions on some launchers ought to be c as that are furnished by tiie President, or ail of these systems for certain launchers of MIRVed missile* In based on the National Security additional lirnitations on Soviet fact, in the months& that have passed Council decisions. The negbtiators forces, or whether irittead we should since the two delegations went.back in Geneva are nevier faced with the go ahead,and deplioy some.of these to Geneva in May of 1977, the Soviet possibility of an ill-considered or systems.It iyOuld be illogical and Union has accepted fully the Ameri- impetuous decision. They operate, illusbry to claim that in arms contpl can position on verification. Now instead, in complete consonance you can get Aomething for nothing. we have in addition on verification with Washington decisions. You can't. Obviously yie have had, the experience of SALT ONE in times that makes for a certdin to accept some restrictions on our which questions of complianpt have amount of frustration on the part of military options in order. to gain been considered and resolvaewithin the negotiators, but I would have to significant Soviet cbncessions with the Standing Consultative Commis- concede that it does i'mprove the regard to their own fOrces. But, as I sion com osed of United States and product and does contribute to have indicated, all of the options Soviet ex erts. This Commission protecting the sedirity of the United that we need are preservedin the will continu"e to function inverify- States. SALT 'TWO agreement. ing compliance with SALT TWO. - - Fifth, and finally, the SALT agree- There arek of course, somt that The fourth reason 'why you can ment will protect our security be- would argue that any restrictions at have confidence in the SALT Agree- cause it preserves the military all on our forces are unacceptable ment being negotiated is that the options that.we; have concluded are concesSions. But tho*who criticize process- isextraordinarily careful necessary in order to update and SALT pn that basis ar&eally saying and detailed in every respect and at modernize our strategic nuclear that what they want is unrestricted all stages. It's an interagency forces. I have mentioned the fact freedom tb continue the competition process. I sometimes read columns that, under the agreed upon provi in strategic nuclear. arms. For rea- by critics that say that Warnke is sions, heavy bombers are included sons that I regard as vital to nation- giving away the farm in Geneva. in the total, and we have the right al security the risk to strategic You can be sure I have no intention under the SALT agreement to stability, the adverse consequences of doing that. But even if I was modernize the heavy bomber forces for-non-proliferation policy, the inclined to do so, I couldn't. Each by equipping them with long range greater chance of nuclear war I can't agfee witiithose who take \stand that an unrestricted competi- States and, the Soviet Union in.' that position. I atn confident that tion would allow them no advan- Article VI undertook to take prompt the restrictions we have acCepted on tage. We haye the money, we have steps to bring nuclear armaments our 'military ptograms are more the technology, we have the will to under control. We haven't done it than offset by the liniitations and keep up with anything the Soviets yet And I think that the inducement reductions that SALT will require might dp in the .strategic nuclear which that constitutes for other of the Soviet Upion. field. Therefore, an unrestricted countries to give up the.prospect of This foenses inescapably on theoompetition holds no promise of acquiring nuclear weapons is begin- second- concern that I noted in my advantage for them. All it promises ning to look like a fake. I think it's opening remarks. If in fact the is that their inordinatelY high mili- unrealistic to assume that, if we SALT TWO agreement.is as good as tary expenditures would bt in- and the Soviet Union are unable to I think it is, if it makes this sort of a chased, but that no Soviet strategic'agree on nuclear parms control and contribution in American security, 'superiority could result. continue insteacKto clvelop more then wh'y would the Soviet Union Finally; despite our many differ- and more nuclear weaponp, other have any interest in completing it? ences in philosophy, our different countries are going to continue to Is it perhaps so they can neutralize stance on human rights, our 'dif- forego the acquisition of nuclear our strategic weapons,. put more ferent views on a 'desirable world weapons themselves. I think the money into their conventional forces order, we do share certain interests. Soviet Union recognizes that fact and thus gain a military advantage One is thk common interest in and that they also must 'regard a over the United States and its Allies? survival. I've heard it argued that world in which more countries and theSoviet Union, because it lost,20 even subnational terrorist groups It's clear, I think, that strategiac million people in World War II, is may acquire nuclear weapons as at ntclear weapons, with or without used to it and is prepared to accept least as dangerous for them as it is SALT, can't sUbstitute for conven- that or heavier losses and therefore for us. They know today that for the tional military power. We need and will plan to fight, survive and win a other nuclear powers China:' will continue to need strong conven- nuclear war. But.that to me is sort France, Britain they:re target tional forces to ensure that nuclear of tipsy-topsy reasoning. It doesn't number one, not the United States. weapons are a final option and not make any sense.' The-experience of And the other developed countries our only choice. We can't be indif- tragedy on that massive a scale can that could acquire promptly a nu- ferent to the amount of money and hardly be kgarded as habit- form- clear weapons capability would effort the Soviets put into theiring. It's like saying that the burnt represent again an increase in the European forces. But the facts rebut child doesn't dread the fire. No threat to the Soviet Union. any assertion that SALT may some- thinking Soviet leader, no matter So we have today a coincidence of how contribute td shifting the mili- how malevolent his motives, could interests that logically leads the tary balance in favor of the Sovietseriously con template advancing Soviets to view with favor a SALT Union The Soviet military buildup his interests by attacking the United Agrewnent, even though it protects in Europe predates SALT and must States and evoking a nuclear the tseOurity of the United States. be met apart from SALT prefer- exchange. And whatever our distaste for cer- . ably by mutual and balanced force tain Soviet behavior, our own self- reductions, and, if this is not pos- In addition to the common interest interest requires that we seize this sible,y the kind of actions agreed in survival, we have a common opportunity to advance our own upon at the recent NATO summit. interest in avoiding the prolifera- security and to make more remote So the goal of outpacing us on the tion of nuclear weapons. In- the the prospect of nuclear catastrophe conventional side is not an explana- Non-Proliferation Treaty, which forus and for Pie world as a whole. tion for Soviet interest in a SALT went into effect in 1970, the United agreement. Howeiier there are, I think, a number- of sound reasons' that do explain their interest. First, from the political standpoint, there is little doubt that President Brezhnev has a big pOlitical stake in completingthe SALT agreement. He went out 'tana limb at Vladi- vostok. A number of Soviet officials have mentioned that a great deal of political blood had to be spilled in order for Mr. Brezhnev to get his colleagues' acceptance of the prin- ciple of equal aggregates. Second, and I think more important, the Soviet leadership has to under- HOW TO TELL A GOOD SALT TREATY FROM A BAD ONE

, Alton Frye

Alton Frye, Washingta Director of Dr. Frye maintained that the three Dr. Frye's remarks were completely the Council on Foreign Relations,jests by which a SALT treaty should off-the-record and therefore not discussed the printipal elements of be measured are: reproduced here. a suc'cessful SALT treaty and stressed the need for establishing (1) Does it enhance the confidence pattefris of mutual restraint through of each party in its own secu- SALT. rity? + Alton Frye, Senior Fellow and Washington (2) Does it safisfy requirements Director,of the Council on Foreign Relations, already established by Con- is a former staff member of the Rand Corpor. gress? ation, Research Fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. and Fellow of the (3) Does it lay a sound basis for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He has lectured at the Universities f'uture efforts to strengthen of California and Southern California and security by negotiation? was Legislative and Administratwe Assist- 'ant to Senator Edward W. Brooke from 1968 Dr. Frye also discussed the prospects to 1971. A native of NashVille, Tennessee, Dr. for Senate consent. Frye received his degrees from St. Louis University and Yale University.

6 --

DISCUSSION

Substantial time was devoted to a-such activity is costly, risky, and Factors Affecting SALT panel discussion by the speakerssterile. Experience suggests that Negotiations and to question and answer periods each weapons advance is promptly In an age of proliferating acronyms, following each presentation. Par- countered by a defense or counter- SALT has come to symbolize a ticipation was stimulated by Mr. weapon. This produces constant single finite treaty embracing some Dyess' comments on the State competition enormously costly in master arms control plan. In fact, Department's "credibility gap," terms of human effort and resources. SALT is precisely what its full name its diffioulty in convincing people The threat of a deStabilizing strate- suggests strategic arms limita- that it sincerely sought and actually gic weapons development with con- tion talks. These talks constitute a utilized the views of the public. sequent risk of a nuclear outbreak is process of ongoing attempts to Public input is sought, he said, for ever present. Ironically, if suchnegotiate separate treaties an the eminently practical reason that escalating arms expenditures are agreements whose totality is de- no long-term foreign policy can be successful in maintaining arms signed to enhance stratpgic stability, sustained without the support, parity and risk is averted, the in- halt and someaay- reverse nuclear understanding, or at least tolerance escapable net result can only be the arms competition. This process of the public. status quo antes, but at a higher began in 1969 insofar as SALT per level. se is concerned. Actually, it 'Origi- questions and topics were related to nated with Hiroshima. a. basic proposition that strategicIt was conceded that .the imprac- arms limitation agreements could ticability of preventing techno-Several questions centered on enhance world security by restrain- logical advances and the military factors, other than the preservation ing additional development of the characteristics of new devices in- of a strategic balance, which also mutually deterrent ntrclear weapons hibit attempts to control the devel proviae impetus for the conclusion systems of the United States and opment of additional weapons. This, of a strategic arms lifnitation pact. the Soviet Union. In these discus- of course, has the effect of encour- One such involves non-proliferation. sions, four principal categories aging additions to the overwhelming Attempts by the major powers to emerged. (1) Alternatives to Strate- overkill capacity already -possessed limit the spread of nuclear weapons gic Arms Limitation, (2) Factors by each side. The seeming illogicby convincing other nations to Affecting SALT Negotifktions, (3) and inherent danger of this spiral remain non-nuclear will gain in- Technological Considerations, and has stimulated interest in different legitimacy and moral force on.ly (4) Ratification Problems. or unilateral steps in pursuit ofwith progress in their own efforts international security. However, it toward disarmament. The ppectre was pointed out that previous con- of uncontrollable numbers of small- Alternatives To SALT cessions designed to elicit reciprocal er states or terrorist groups with Although not unchallened, the Soviet behavior have only resulted nuclear capabilities is a matter of maintenance of conventional and in Soviet pressures for additional, deep-concern to United States offi- strategic forces and the coricept of unrequited concessions, and dra- cials who indicated their belief that mutual deterrence have been ac- matic initiatives for a disarmament present controls \to prevent prolifer- cepttd by both the United States breakthrough have not been effec- ation are insufficient. Paralleling and the Soviet Union as funda-tive in the past. these considerations are efforts by mental to national security.` Pre- the third worrd for disermament dictably, questions regarding alter- The possibility of unilateral steps through United Nations mecha- natives to strategic arms limitation toward disarmament based upon nisms. Although lacking the com- revealed opposing views. There prior agreement was not entirely pulsion of self-preservation, South were suggestions that United States discounted. However, policy makers vs. North demands that wdrld re- security could and should be pur- regarded most presently proposed sued by continuing to develop new alternatives to the strategic arms,sources be diverted from an arms weapons systems and attempting to limitation route as ineffective or race to economic development place achieve equality or superiority vis- entailing unacceptable risks or appreciable psychological and a:vis the Soviets in all weaponsboth. The cdncensus among the moral pressures upon the United categories. Opposing proposals for panelist& was that there is a sound States and the Sariet Union. t6tal disarmament, new approaches basis for ultimate agreement based Fundamental to attempts,by the to arms control, or freezes on arms upon mutual restraints and that a United States to seek arms accom- developments also were advanced. step by step approach and cautious modation with the Soviet Union are search for balanced arms limitation assumptions that Soviet leaders Response to the "match the Soviets" is the course most likely to prosperconstrue their national interests as schbol of thought concluded that at this time. favoring such an agreement, and - 1,91P that they perceive and accept the The response b e pnited States Technological Considerations existence of a balance in strategic in the form of di ect and public The' complexities of strategic weap- deterrence. Some questioned this. criticism at the highest levels of ons systems and nuclear technology Obviously, misconceptions of Soviet government and United States are mind-boggling. Almost literally perceptions are possible and dan efforts to encourage a counterforce inconceivable, they are sometimes gerous. However, panelists pointed tu the Soviet presence in Africa have paradoxical. Earlier this year, Mr. out that even though United States created profound resentment within Warnke referred to the "crazy logic calculations of anticipated Soviet the U.S.S.R. While admitting that of the strategic nuclear age (in) that behavior may err, the United States there would be a betterclimate for one could think of defense as being can and has estaE;lished certain SALT in the absence lof these dif- bad, but anything that challenges military parameters for the U.S.S.R., ferences, United States government the retaliatory capability of the defining what can and cannot be officials maintained that these other side is necessarily destabi- tolerated. issues can be kept- separate from lizing and contributes to the arms SALT, 'Which is a matter of pre- race." The advancing age and declining eminent doncern and should stand health of Soviet leader Leonid or fall on its merits alone. The "crazy logic" Mr., Warnke de- Brezhnev has inspired speculation There are precedents which suggest scribed is exemplified by MAD, the that he seeks to achieve a meaning- acronym which stands for Mutual ful SALT agreement as his monu- that the Soviet leadership accepts the concept of such separation of Assured Destruction. This assumes ment. This consideration gave rise that both the United States and the to questions regarding the possible issues. This is clearly the position Soviet Union have the ability to effects of a change in Soviet leader- of the United States Executive absorb a first nuclear strike, ana ,ship occtrring in the midst of SALT Branch. As Mr. Warnke stated in January, 1978, "If the Soviet Union still retain the capacity to retaliate negotiations. The concensus was and destroy the attacker. The theory 'that the impact upon policy of both were to stand up tomorrow and say, !Okay, we're getting out of Ethiopia is that as long as both sides believe leadership and communist idealogy this MAD condition prevails, neither appear to have much in common: ahd by the way, Mr. Carter, we will invite certain obliteration by Both affect style. Both color views. agree with your position on human attacking the other. However, any Both have significant influence rights,' it wouldn't have the least development which could cause upon domestic affairs. But neither effect on our delegation in Geneva. It wouldn't lead them to be one either to believe that a successful seems likely to cause basic changes nuclear attaick,ispoSsible that is, in the pattern pf United States- degree softer in terms of their basic positions." However, while cooling an attack which would destroy the U.S.S.R. relations (ir;jri fundamen- enemy's lethalretaliatory ability tal beliefs of what constitutes na- relations may have no Wnkage with the,terms of any SALT agreement could destabilize the nuclear bal- tional interests. (Sinee Chinese ance. Of course, the idea that either hostility has fostered Soviet accoM- reached, they will constitute an side would actually avail itself of an modation elsewhere, different poli- obstacle to the United States opportunity to'destroy the bther, cies by the Chinese or a shift in the Senate's approval. even if it could, is open to question. U.S.S R.'s ideological differences Inevitably, a linkage exists between ,Nevertheless, in the MAD world it with the People'A Republic of China. SALT and that state of collective is when such "worst case assump- could conceivably influence the min'd known ambiguauSly as tions" are made by planners on course of SALT.) "detente." The panelists indicated bath sides thabrmutual deterrence _that, while. the Soviets generally becomes more t:redible., This is so If evidence of the transcendental resist and reject the concept of because if either side believes the importance of SALT were required, package deall, relationships do other will do less than its worst, one need look no further than the exist and arenon-controversial then the prospect of profiting by willingness of buth sides to cuntinue insofar as they do not become ex- nuclear attack, or nuclear blac,k- talks at a time when differences plicit. Perhaps the most tenuous but majl, could arise. An additional between, the United States and the vital linkage concept is that of a assumption by United States strate- U.S.S.R. have produced acrimonious possible tie-in between strategic gists is basic to the above. This rhetoric unmatched since the U-2 arms controls and conventional assumption, which was challenged incident. The possible "linkage" of arms limitation. Although the recent-by some participants, is that strate prhlems affecting United States SoViet agreement, in principle, to gic superiprity is impossible to national interests in the success or an equal ceiling for NATO and achieve over any king period of time failure of SALT was the subject ofWarsaw Pact ground forces was and that the Soviets, therefore, considerable discussion and conjec- reached in apparent independence accept long term strategic parity as ture. Soviet additions to conven- of SALT, it has been considered as inevitable, if not desirable. tional military capacity beyond all an encouraging sign'. A preponder- conceivable defense needs, adven- ance of arms expenditures are al- .turism in Africa', and domestic located to conventional forces and A possibly 'fatal flaw in the basic harshness un human rights have some participants envisioned the tenet of mutual deterrence emerged produced growing .concern and expansion of future SALTS to em in a question concerning the na- indignation in the United States. brace this area. tional will of the United States to So

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.actually employ nuclear weapons. is a proposal that the United States give the adversary the ability to This seemed particularly relevant accept a three year period"Of re- win a decisive military victory. The in view of the quantitative disparity straints on the deployment of the consensus was that no nation could in conventional fprces which exists cruise missile and mobile ICBM have absolute confidence in a new in Central Europe. One scenario systems. The _controversy over the weapons system until it had been suggested that, in the event of con- significance of a Soviet th row- flight-tested and deployed. Even ventional warfare there, the military weight advantage was compared though technological research anti disadvantage to NATO forces could with proposed limits on United development cannot be restricted, be redressed .only by the use uf States cruise missile numbers and both flight'and deployment are tactical nuclear weapons. This deployment. Both sides have the verifiable. As a xesult, chances of means that the effectiveness of ability to match ,the other in these sudden technological breakthroughs United States tactical and even areas but have opted for alterna- were discounted. More difficult for strategic nuclear weapons as a tives. Those minimizing the impact national security planners are deterrent to Soviet conventional of imbalances in thesereas argue problems presented by known sys- military adventurism in Europe is that, in the final analysis, develop- tems. A significant iriiprovement of conditioned by that nation's belief ment time and weaponry mix are at a system by one side demands an in United States readiness to resort issue here rather than comparative equivalent response. For example. to one or another level of nuclear strength in one field or another. The United States decision to response. . "MIRV" its installations threatened The trend of discussion clearlydestabilization until the Soviets Secretary of State Vance has said indicated that a major stumbling established countervailing MIRV that any SALT agreement must block to the quest for peace through deterrence. "maintain or improve our overall arms control is mutual distrust. J security as compared to the likely Panelists concede'd that the key-Crucial destabilization problems situation without an agreement." stone of any SALT agreement must center on the development of the However, such respected figures as be a reliable and independent meansUnited States cruise missile and the former Chief of Naval Operations, of verification of'complia,nce and a threat that the Soviets will deploy Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., and reasonable assurance that somemissiles in numbers and accuracy former Deputy Secretary of Defense event or development cannot sud- sufficient to destroy our ICBM force. Paul H. Nitze have warned that denly skew the balance of mutual The panelists contended that the SALT TWO agreements, as pres- strategic deterrence. Reliable verifi- cruise missile is "stable," in that it ently contemplated, wo'uld lead to a cation is essential to both sides and is too slow to be used as a first strike , strategic imbalance in favor of the the,present state of technology weapon. They admitted, however, Soviet Union. Mr. Warnke flatly appears to guarantee that violations that itis small enough to create of agreements contemplated by rejected this view although he ...0 verification problems for the Soviets admitted that there are "asym- SALT will be impractical. Unitedand that the types and numbers of metries" in the balance SALT TWO States State Department represent- the vehicles carrying cruise missiles would maintain. atives stated that reports of Soviet are at issue. Insofar as the United violations of previous arms agree- The intricacies of an attempt to States ICBMs are concerned, it was ments have involved ambiguities, conceded that theoretically there is match nuclear apples against differing interpretations, or mis- no way to assure their total safety. nuclear oranges are such that understandings. Although both However, a SALT agreement would honest men seem certain to dis- sides have raised questions regard- agree. What, for example, is the retard their increasing vulnerability ing compliance, neither has ever and the United States would retain advantage (if any) to the Soviets of formally accused the other of athe option of deploying a mobile their superiority in throw-weight violation. There are agreements not (maximum useful weight which can ICBM system (after the expiration t(interfere with means of verifi- of the proposed three-year protocol). be delivered)? What will the United cation, and the combination ofIn practical terms, any Soviet at- States give in return for Soviet technology and intelligence sources tempt to wipe out 'United States agreement to destroy 300 missile available to both sides enable each systems? Why should the United ICBMs would entail enormous risks to know exac,tly what the other has for questionable advantages. States consent to limits on the and is doing. This does not eliminate numbers and deployment of the the need for, gireat care to remove cruise missile? ambiguities from future agreements Future weapons development could or for improving existing mecha-affect strategic stability. On the Since SALT ONE permitted.the nisms for prompt investigation,United States side, most potentially Soviets to increase their missile when questions arise. /destabilizing developments are on arsenal, a Soviet reduction to pro- the back burner. Although research posed SALT TWO limits might be One nightmare of those in charge ofmoney remains, it seems certain viewed as only a limited concession, national security is destabilization. the United States decision to aban especially since the systems affected Participants raised the question ofdon development of the B 1 bomber are approaching obsolescence. Ad- possible developments of a weapons in favor of the cruise missile is ditionally, auxilliary to the basic or defense system or a sudden tech final. This option was dictated by package pu tmg a ceiling on missiles nulogical breakthrough which would strategic and financial considera i ) ) al 6 4, A g k t \ tions and Paul Warnke has said in Chances for ratification seem tin ment Agency and as chief SALT jest tha.t, "if I could persuade the breakably bound to Soviet behavior negotiator was controversial in the Soviets to build the B-1, I would and to public and CongressionalSenate. Finally, in spite of White regard it as a victory." Develop- views of the national security cre-House claims that the ratification ment of the controversial neutron dentials of the present Administra- of the Panama Canal treaties cre- bomb has been deferxed although tion. ated a momentum for SALT, events President Carter has stated that the could prove that the reverse is true ultimate decision will depend on It was conceded that while Ameri- that with gust so much Executive Soviet restraint on conventional cans favor arms limitation, they do credit in the Senate bank, Panama forces. not trust the Sciviet Union. Huge may have been a costly inversion of Soviet arms increases, meddling inpriorities. Expressions from the From the questions that arose, it Africa, and human rights harsh- audience indicated that a combina- was apparent that the decision on ness have generated widespread tion of eroding public confidence, the neutron bomb and its potential opprobrium. There is equally ex-Soviet behavior, and Senate un- as a weaPon were subjects of great tensive guspicion that anything the happiness with some features of interest and concern. The panelists Russians would sign would be either national security policy could result pointed out that, although contro- greatly to their advantage or notin the failure of a SALT treaty to versial, it is a weapon eritirely entered intO in good faith. If so, this overcome the first foreign relations separate from SALT. It is not con- would make SALT too risky. Apartisan split in Congress in many sidered a strategic weapon, but a substantial minority of the Ameri-years. , tactical defensive device designed can public believes that the U.S.S.R. to help'NATO forces counter the already has military superiorityThe prospect of Senate rejection of a three-to-one tank superiority enjoyed over the United States either inSALT agreement was seen to have by the Warsaw Pact nations. Al- conventional forces or in strategicgrave implications. Soviet reaction though the United States has put weaponry. Psychologically, wide- could fuel an accelerated arms race. off a decision on production of the spread publicity given to the SovietRejection also would cast doubt on 43ornb, it has ordered modernization arms buildup seems to have -cca5-the future ability of the United of the Lance missile nuclear war- tributed to a fear that momentum isStates Administration to 'negotiate head and the eight-inch (artillery) on their side. Misgivings aboutseriously. Alternate prospects for ' weaponssY§tem to accommodate it. dealing with the U.S.S.R, have notSenate agreement to ratification in , been allayed by confidence in United Thus far, the strategic arms race States strength. pn "the contrary,exchange for beefed-up United has not extended to outer space. recent rulings affecting our nationalState§ security measures could have BOth the Soviet Union and the security have been controversial.equally serious ramifictitions. A United States continue research The decision not to build the 13-1 possible Senate price tagdevelop. ahd development worlc on anti- bomber, to delaY development of the ment of the neutron bomb or de- satellite weapons, but the U,nited neutron bomb, to postpone actionployment of mobile ICBMs could States is preparing proposals for on mobile land-based ICBMs havedestabilize the the nuclear balance. anti-satellite arms control. inspired critical comment question-Administration spokesmen said Ratification Problems ing the Administration's commit-that the White House is acutely No formal agreements or treaties ment to national security. aware of the consequences of Senate have yet been reached by SALT In addition to problems with therejection of a SALT treaty and that TWO. Panelists emphasized that public, the Administration faces ait does not want to sign an agree:- the United States is operating under Senate which may have a predis-ment it cannot present to the Senate no time constraints and that negoti- position unfavorable to SALT thatwith some degree of assurance. One ations will.continue until the United was created by prior events. Thepanelist, admitting that the extent States gets the kind of agreement it Administration's earlier dramaticof opposition to the Panama Canal wants. However, the general shape attempt to shortcut the tedioustreaties had been badly under- and content of the eventual SALT SALT process 'with its comprehen-estimated, insisted that the Admin- agreement that would go to the sive proposal was rebuffed by aistration is unlikely to make the Senate for consideration is known. same mistake with SALT. Can Soviet government unprepared atSALT survive a restive Senak? The the time to deal with arms reduc-consensus of both panelists and Queries regarding chances of Senate'tions on so sweeping a scale. One approval of ratification seemed to result may be that a subsequentparticipants was that part of the reflect a general opinion that SALT more limited and achievable SALTanswer will depend on the extent to is in trouble. Although the Adminis- agreement will be in double jeop- which public support for SALT can tration panelistg held that SALT is ardy. It risks rejection not only bybe enlisted and brought to bear on too important to be linked to other those Senators who believe it goes its elected representatives. issues, it appeared that there was too far but by those who believe it widespread belief by participants does not go far enough. Also, the that a SALT agreement probably nomination of Mr. Warnke in a dual will not stand on its own merits in role as both director of the United spite of any logic that it should. States Arms Control and Disarma- -23 -2 i

CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT

IN THE SALT DEBATE .

Carol Edler Baumann .. ./

I mention this in no way to challenge cluded not only higlilevel policy- During the past six hours we have :. been privileged to hear the chiefor to denigrate the validity of the makers . ..but leading figures of United States negotiator for a SALT views expressed here today, but (the) opposition .. . notto air our TWO agreement as well as five of simply to illustrate the point that prejudices and convictions on the the most knowledgeable experts in there is in fact a foreign policy basis of our present knowledge and this country regarding the United debate going on in this country uurpresent ignorance, but where we States-Soviet relationship, strategic which is far more likely to wax than Would all listen... towhat could be theory, Soviet and United States to wane and which is certainly told to us by the most experienced military capabilities, and the pro- destined to become more heated and Isnowledgeable people who could posed elements of a strategic arms before it is eventually drowned be found in (their} respective limitation agreement. We havewhether in a sea. of rhetoric or in .fields. ...' heard about or heard allusions one of reason is yet to be seen. Our To the extent that this conference to strategic nuclear forces and purpose at this conference has been can lead to further exchanges of the theater nuclear forces, the Backfire to set forth the wider parameters of sort envisioned by George Kennan bomber, the B-1, and the cruise that debate and to present a frame- whether in ,other parts of the missile, arms limitations and verifi- work for understanding the nature country or here in Wisconsin we cation problems, the African-Cuban of the issues with which it will have will have succeeded. To the extent "linkage" question, MIRV, MARV, to deal the entire relationship that the. Institute can provide any and MAD (the delightful acronym betWeen the United States and the or all of you with information, for "mutual assured destruction"). Soviet Union as well as the relation speakers, or other resources on any If any of us remain confused ship between, United States national of the topics discussed today, we there can be no doubt that we are atsecurity and the Strategic Arms will be ready and eager to do-so. Our least confused at a much higher Limitation Talks. Our hope is that hope is that this meeting will serve level! regardless of your own particular as a launching pad for a whole point of view you have gained series of public education programs, What we have not heard, however insight into the complexities of not only on SALT, narrowly defined, at least in any comprehensive these interrelationships as well as a but on all aspects of United States framework is the other side of the more sobering realization of the relations with the Soviet Union. debate. We have not heard from a critical nature of the decisions which In conclusion, it is my own personal Mr. Paul Nitze, although we did lie ahead. provide you with a copy of the New belief based on several years of York Times Magazine article in George Kennan perhaps came work in the area' of public opinion which he argued that unless the closest to setting these issues in a and foreign policy, that the United United States takes urgent measures proper perspective when he de- States government at all levels . at once to reverse current trends,.scribed the need for developing now perhaps, more than at any 'the Russians in a few years' time what he called 'a more workable time in our history needs the will have.the capability to fight a consensus' behind United States advice and support of informed and nuclear war and to win such a policies toward the Soviet Union `to concerned citizens, is actively seek- war in the military sense of ending take the placer-of the resounding ing that advice and will listen. up in undisputed command of thedisagreements that affect, and This significant cadre of govern- battlefield and being in a Position thfeaten to paralyze, the formula- ment representatives who came to dictate the peace.' Neither have'tion and execution of policy in this from, Washington to meet with us we heard the hard-line views of the field today.' Kerman went on to set here in Wisconsin would seem to Committee on the Present Danger forth the requirements which he provide ample proof Of that. nor the pessimistic prognosticationsregards as necessary for developing Many of you are familiar with the from the research-scholars of the that consensus. First, to set aside Biblical quotation that 'For every- Hudson Institute and the National 'the whole question of the (purely) thing there is a season, and a time Strategy Information Center. military relationship and all the for every matter under heaven.' Let arguments about who could con- me simply remind you of four addi- tional lines which refer to 'A time to Carol Edler Baurvnn, Director, Institute of ceivably do what to whom if their World Affairs, ThOlUniversity of Wisconsin-.7'intentions' were of the nastiest; and keep silent, and a time to speak; Milwaukee. is Professor of Political Science that we elevate our vision ... to the . .. atime to war, and a time for and Chairman of the lnternatwnal Relations question of the real nature and peace.' I would like to conclude this Major at Unit ersity of Wisconsin Mil situation of the particular foreign meeting with the proposition that if ' waukee Dr Baumann received her degrees from The University of WisconsinMadison power we are dealing with.' Second, we indeed seek 'a time for peace,' and the London School of Economics and he sug ested 'a series of private then now is not the time 'to keep Pohtical Science, University of London gatherings in which would be in- silent.'

ca 2,1 WINGSPREAR' 3

ThebuildingFrankLloydWrightcalled interest.'It is the hope of the Foundation's Wingspread, situated on sfrolling prairie site just trustees that Wingspread willtalie its place . north of Racine, Wisconsin, was designed in increasingly as a national institution devoted to 1938 as a residence for the Johnson family. In the free exchange of ideas among people. 1960, through the gift of Mr. and Mrs. H. F. " Johnson, it became the headquarters of The The rolling expanse of the Mtdwestern prairies Johnson Foundation and began its career as was considered a natural setting for Wingspread. an educatiOnal conference center. In the limitless earth the,architect envisioned a freedom and movement. The name Wingspread In the years since, it has been the setting for was an;expression of the nature of the house, many conferences and meetings dealing with reflecting aspiration through spread wings a subjects of regional, national, and international symbol 'of- soaring inspiration.

THE JOHNSON FOUNDATION JohnSon Founder

BOARD OF TRUSTEES iSamuel C. Johnson Chairman Melvin BrorbY Vice-President James L. Alleni Catherine B. Cleary Jerome H. Holland Harold H. Lenti Daniel Parker George H. Wheary, Jr. Leslie Paffrath President The Johnson Foundation encourages the examination of avariety ofproblems, facing the Midwest, the Nation, and mankind.ln the belief that responsible anulyses and proposals should reach a substantial audience, The Johnson Foundation assists in the publicatiorttof uarious papers and reports. Publication,f course, does notimplyapproual. Becpuse the uiews expressed at the conference reported in this publication largely represent theposition of the United States Department of State, a second Wingspreadconferencehas been scheduled to present other positionson this important topic. Additional copies of this report may be ol?tained from TheJohnsonFoundation, Racine, Wisconsin 53401.

Illustrations by Robert Osbqrn from MISSILE MADNESS by Herbert Scoville Copynght 1970 by Herbert Scoville and Robert'Osborn Reprinted by Permission of Houghtoh Mifflin Company 41. Editor for t Report, Rita Goodman, Vice President-Area Programs, The Johnson Foundation, , Published, J ary, 1979 .0/