Cyrus R. Vance and the Making of Foreign Policy in the Carter Administration
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THE WAGES OF PRINCIPLE AND POWER: CYRUS R. VANCE AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Of Georgetown University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In History By Mary DuBois Sexton, M.B.A. Washington, D.C. August 17, 2009 Copyright 2009 by Mary DuBois Sexton All Rights Reserved ii THE WAGES OF PRINCIPLE AND POWER: CYRUS R. VANCE AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION Mary DuBois Sexton, M.B.A. Thesis Advisor: David S. Painter, Ph.D. ABSTRACT On April 28, 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance joined William Jennings Bryan in the exclusive club of U.S. secretaries of state who resigned in the twentieth century as a matter of principle. Cyrus Vance fought and lost a number of significant policy battles during the Jimmy Carter administration, but none prompted him to resign until President Carter decided to undertake a military operation to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran. Vance’s forceful but lone opposition to the mission within the administration was based on three factors: he believed the military rescue mission violated U.S. foreign policies; he argued that the mission would endanger the lives of the U.S. hostages and believed that negotiation could eventually secure the safe release of the hostages; and he was convinced the mission would fail. As significant as Vance’s resignation was as a rare political act in U.S. history, it was his road to resignation, a road paved with numerous conflicts involving principle and power, which merits a detailed historical analysis, and provides valuable insights into the nature of leadership and the foreign policymaking process during the Carter administration. This study iii focuses on how the disparate values, leadership qualities, and strategic visions of Secretary Vance and President Carter helped to ensure that Vance would engage in substantive and bureaucratic battles from the first days of the administration until his resignation. Vance’s struggles to hold Carter to what Vance believed were mutually- accepted principles were an outgrowth of several factors. Although Vance held a well- defined, consistent world view, Carter’s statements and decisions over time revealed that he did not share some of Vance’s key strategic principles, particularly those regarding the nature of Soviet power, the critical importance of a strategic arms agreement, and the desirability of separating human rights and Third World issues from the East-West context. Carter implemented a foreign policymaking structure that tilted the power in the system to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, created opportunities for policy dissension, and ultimately undermined Vance’s authority and influence. Finally, Vance and Carter embraced different codes of professional behavior that affected the decisionmaking process and policy outcomes. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank my husband Kevin J. Sexton for being the inspiration for this topic. I thank him and my daughter Marybeth Sexton for their enthusiastic support for my research and writing. I am grateful to my Georgetown University dissertation committee, Advisor David S. Painter, Emmett Curran, and Michael Kazin. Working through several drafts, they provided extensive comments that strengthened the study’s focus and analysis, and confirmed my belief about the importance of the topic. I appreciate the organizational support provided by Kathleen Buc Gallagher, administrator of Georgetown’s Department of History. I am also grateful to former Georgetown University Provost and professor Dorothy Brown, who taught U.S. history in such a compelling way when I was a Georgetown undergraduate and graduate student that she created and sustained my interest in historical analysis. I was fortunate to be able to interview Grace Sloane Vance, Cyrus Vance’s wife, and many of Cyrus Vance’s colleagues who provided me with invaluable information about Vance’s leadership and the nature of the policymaking process of the Carter administration. Hodding Carter III, Lloyd Cutler, Bruce Laingen, Robert McNamara, David Newsom, Henry Precht, and Harold Saunders were generous with their time, and extraordinarily helpful in guiding my research. v I have been blessed by the following family members and friends who have cheered me on from the moment I entered the Ph.D. program until I completed my doctoral defense: Robert DuBois, Elaine DuBois, Kay Gallagher Sexton, Kathleen Sexton Mewhiney, Mary Beth Sexton Burke, Brian Burke, Megan Sexton Fretwell, Sammy Fretwell, Katie Stollman Sexton, Brian Sexton, Kim Irish, Craig Irish, Roseanne Pajka, Doug Fox, Alan Leis, Kathy Leis, Sue Forsgren, Brian Forsgren, Linda Rough, Rachel Callahan, C.S.C., Richard Boudreau, Bill Bridge, John Spiegel, Adi Rapport, Carolyn Ebeler, Jack Ebeler, Gerry Gerardi, Mary Magner Sine, Mary Mullarky Weir, John Gillespie, Sarah Gillespie, Marie Hogan, Angela Barnes, Janet Gimbel, Diane LaHaie, Debbie Humphreys, and Deb Frodigh. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 The Focus on Principle and Power in the Carter Administration ............................... 8 Organization of this Study ......................................................................................... 19 CHAPTER 1. THE FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP OF CYRUS R. VANCE ........ 24 Vance’s Professional Experience .............................................................................. 25 Vance’s Leadership Principles .................................................................................. 32 Vance’s Strategic World View .................................................................................. 36 CHAPTER 2. THE FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP OF JIMMY CARTER ........... 44 Carter’s Goal of Transformational Leadership ......................................................... 45 Carter’s Hands-on Foreign Policy Management ....................................................... 54 CHAPTER 3. THE FOREIGN POLICYMAKING APPARATUS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ................................................................................................... 65 Historical Roles of the Department of State and the National Security Council ...... 68 The Development of Carter’s National Security System .......................................... 78 The Nature and Location of Power in Carter’s Planning System ............................. 84 The Nature of Jimmy Carter’s Power in the Planning System ......................... 86 The Nature of Cyrus Vance’s Power in the Planning System .......................... 94 The Nature of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Power in the Planning System ............ 100 vii A Significant Departure from Carter’s Planning System ........................................ 128 Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 134 CHAPTER 4. SOVIET POLICY: THE ROOT OF ALL CONFLICTS ....................... 136 Disparate Views of Soviet Power ............................................................................ 137 Human Rights Intersects Soviet Policy ................................................................... 145 Carter’s Human Rights Inheritance ................................................................ 148 Disputes over Human Rights and Linkage ..................................................... 151 The March 1977 SALT Negotiations ...................................................................... 174 The Nature of Vance’s Battles ................................................................................ 188 CHAPTER 5. THE PROBLEM OF LINKAGE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA ............. 199 Historical Context of the Horn of Africa Conflict .................................................. 200 Different Views of the Strategic Importance of the Horn ....................................... 207 The Early Battles of the Horn Policy War .............................................................. 213 An All-Out, Internal Policy Battle .......................................................................... 221 Linkage and the Public Battle ................................................................................. 229 The Apex of the Conflict ......................................................................................... 242 Vance Soldiers On ................................................................................................... 255 CHAPTER 6. THE CHINA CARD ................................................................................. 258 The Historical Context ............................................................................................ 259 Initial Positions on the Strategic Meaning of China................................................ 265 Brzezinski Takes Charge ......................................................................................... 277 viii A Final Brzezinski Manipulation ............................................................................ 289 Impacts on Vance .................................................................................................... 296 CHAPTER 7. THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE ..............................................................