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BOOK REVIEW ROUNDTABLE: the Revolution That Failed BOOK REVIEW ROUNDTABLE: The Revolution that Failed June 14, 2021 Table of Contents 1. “Introduction: The Gap Between Theory and Practice,” Thomas G. Mahnken 2. “Who and What Made the Revolution that Failed?” Jayita Sarkar 3. “Nuclear Revelations About the Nuclear Revolution,” Scott D. Sagan 4. “Revolutionary Thinking: Questioning the Conventional Wisdom on Nuclear Deterrence,” Jasen J. Castillo 5. “Author Response: The Meaning of the Nuclear Counterrevolution,” Brendan Rittenhouse Green 2 Texas National Security Review 1. Introduction: The Gap Between Theory and Practice Thomas G. Mahnken Brendan Rittenhouse Green’s The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War makes an important contribution to our understanding of the history of the nuclear competition that took place between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.1 The book calls into question the extent to which Cold War-era theories, many of which argued that the existence of a mutually assured destruction (MAD) would stabilize the Soviet- American nuclear relationship, actually influenced American policymakers in practice. Indeed, Green documents in rich detail the disconnect between the theory of MAD and the way that U.S. policymakers actually behaved between 1969 and 1979. As Green shows, American policymakers did not share theorists’ belief that the advent of nuclear weapons had transformed international relations. Nor were they convinced that the United States and Soviet Union had, by the 1970s, reached a condition of nuclear stalemate, a claim that lay at the heart of the notion of MAD. It turns out that it was far from obvious to policymakers confronted with the task of deterring the Soviet Union that nuclear deterrence was robust.2 To the contrary, most U.S. decision-makers, as well as influential scholars like Albert Wohlstetter, believed that the balance of terror was “delicate.”3 They worried a great deal about the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, as well as the robustness and reliability of nuclear command, control, and communication systems, and they were less than sanguine about Soviet intentions and capabilities. With that in mind, they did not believe that nuclear stalemate was a given, and they took seriously Soviet views that a nuclear war could be fought and won. 1 Brendan Rittenhouse Green, The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). 2 Green, The Revolution that Failed, 29. 3 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959): 211–34, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1959-01-01/delicate-balance-terror. Book Review Roundtable: The Revolution that Failed https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-the-revolution-that-failed/ 3 Texas National Security Review As a result — contrary to the predictions and prescriptions of nuclear theorists, who held that the advent of nuclear weapons had transformed international politics — the United States found itself competing fiercely with the Soviet Union in the nuclear realm, as in many others. American policymakers clearly believed that nuclear weapons retained political and strategic utility, whether or not nuclear theory predicted or prescribed that they should. As a consequence, the significant qualitative and quantitative changes to the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals that occurred during the 1970s should be seen as a reflection of that competition, rather than as a deviation from the theory of MAD. The other reviewers in this roundtable — Jasen Castillo, Scott Sagan, and Jayita Sarkar — all find considerable merit in Green’s arguments. Each, in their own way, characterizes The Revolution that Failed as an important contribution to our understanding of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The fact that Green’s research caused Castillo to reevaluate his own beliefs about nuclear weapons and strategic stability theory speaks to the power of his arguments. All three reviewers also focus on the relationship between ideas and practice in U.S. Cold War nuclear strategy. Castillo specifically points to the career of Paul Nitze as an example of top policymakers’ skepticism of the theory of MAD. Sagan notes that some counterforce, or “nuclear war-fighting,” capabilities might indirectly enhance operational forms of nuclear stability, even in the absence of a conscious effort to achieve such a condition. Sarkar calls for giving greater attention to the role that “defense intellectuals” played in creating and disseminating theories about the effects of nuclear weapons. In this respect, Green’s book, and the responses to it, all focus on a defining feature of the field of strategic studies: Because war is the ultimate test of military effectiveness, and because wars are both occasional and unique, theory must play a central role in the study of military affairs.4 4 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Introduction,” in Learning the Lessons of Modern War, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020), 1. Book Review Roundtable: The Revolution that Failed https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-the-revolution-that-failed/ 4 Texas National Security Review Finally, the reviewers suggest ways to broaden and expand the framework presented in The Revolution that Failed. Castillo sees value in testing Green’s argument against events that took place during both the early and late Cold War periods. Sagan argues that greater weight should be given to organizational and bureaucratic forces. And Sarkar calls for greater consideration of the role of the defense industry in shaping the U.S. nuclear arsenal during the Cold War. Nuclear Competition in the 21st Century The nuclear landscape of the early 21st century is much different from the one that Soviet and American soldiers and statesmen faced during the Cold War.5 Whereas the nuclear balance throughout the Cold War was centered on the United States and the Soviet Union, today nuclear competition is increasingly multipolar. The total inventory of nuclear warheads has been decreasing for decades, but the number of nuclear powers is increasing. Some states, such as the United States and Great Britain, appear to see decreasing political utility in nuclear weapons, whereas others, notably Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea, appear to believe that the reverse is true. And whereas the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia have been constrained and shaped by bilateral nuclear arms control agreements, those of other nuclear powers, such as China, have not. Moreover, much of the Cold War arms control regime has gone away, raising questions as to what, if anything, should replace it. In the future, as in the past, the advent of new technologies, such as hypersonic delivery vehicles, will reshape nuclear arsenals and potentially nuclear employment. Perhaps most significantly, given the growing number of players and increasing dimensions of competition, future patterns of interaction among nuclear powers are likely to be even more complex than those Green describes in The Revolution that Failed. 5 Jacob Cohn, Adam Lemon, and Evan Braden Montgomery, Assessing the Arsenals: Past, Present, and Future Capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019); and Thomas G. Mahnken, et al., Understanding Strategic Interaction in the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019). Book Review Roundtable: The Revolution that Failed https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-the-revolution-that-failed/ 5 Texas National Security Review Given current circumstances, scholars and policymakers may be tempted to apply — consciously or unconsciously — concepts developed and used freely during the Cold War, such as “arms racing,” without fully understanding how they actually applied to the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition, let alone the extent to which they may apply under much different contemporary circumstances.6 The more we understand about the historical record of the Cold War, the more practice appears to diverge from theory. Green’s The Revolution that Failed thus contains an important note of caution that the gap between theory and practice may in fact be a yawning one. It is a book that should be read, discussed, and debated. Thomas G. Mahnken is a senior research professor at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). 2. Who and What Made the Revolution that Failed? Jayita Sarkar In The Revolution that Failed, Brendan Rittenhouse Green makes a persuasive case that the theory of the nuclear revolution, which rests on the core premise of “mutually 6 Thomas G. Mahnken, Joseph A. Maiolo, and David Stevenson, eds., Arms Races in International Politics from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Thomas G. Mahnken, “Arms Races and Long-Term Competition,” in Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 225–40. Book Review Roundtable: The Revolution that Failed https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-the-revolution-that-failed/ 6 Texas National Security Review assured destruction,” or MAD, merits a substantial update.7 MAD, Green writes, “drains all competition out of the
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