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RAND History Project Interview: Robert A. Davis 1/17/1991

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RAND History Project Interview: Robert A. Davis 1/17/1991 Davis '\.-'\-'- ~~~ / NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE !1USEUM RAND CORPORATION JOINT ORAL HISTORY PROJECT ON THE HISTORY OF THE RAND CORPORATION EDITORIAL USE FORM PREFACE This ~anuscript is based upon a tape-recorded interview conducted by Mart~n I Call j ns on January I 7. 1991 The ~ape ~nd the manuscript are the property of the undersigned: however, ~he originals and copies are indefinitely deposited, respec"::..·:ely, at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Ins~itu~~~n and at the RAND corporation. I have read the transcript · and have ~ade only minor corrections and emendations. The reader is therefore asked to bear in mind that this manuscript is a record of a spoken c=nversation rather than a literary product. Though the Smithsonian Institution and the RAND Corporation may use these materials for their own purposes as they deem appropriate, I wish t= place the condition as selected below upon the use of this interview material by others and I understand that the Smithsonian Institu~:..~n and the RAND Corporation will make reasonable efforts to enforce ~~e condition to the extent possible. CONDIT~:!~S (Check c::e) PUBLIC. THE MATERIAL MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE TO AND MAY BE USED BY ANY PERSON FOR ANY LAWFUL PURPOSE. OPEN. This manuscript may be read and the tape heard by persons approved by the Smithsonian Institution or by the RAND Corporation. The user must agree not to quote from, cite or reproduce by any mea~~ ~his material except with the written permiss ~ · ;_ ::.f the Smithsonian or RAND. MY PERMISSION REQUIR.:..:..o... ...';.) QUC'TE, CITE OR REPRODUCE. This manuscript and the tape are open to examination as above. The user must agree not to quote from, cite or reproduce by any means this material except with the written permission of the Smithsonian or RAND in which permission I must join. Upon my death this interview becomes open. ·--"!'~ EDITORIAL USE FORM (CONT.) MY PERMISSION REQUIRED FOR ACCESS. I must give writen permission before the manuscript or tape can be utilized other than by Smithsonian or RAND staff for official Smithsonian or RAND purposes. Also my permission is required to quote, cite or reproduce by any means. Upon my death the interview becomes open. &d.A~ (Signature) Mr. Robert A. Davis (Name, :::ed/) II L!_3. 91 (Dater' j Robert A. Davis January 17, 1991 TAPE 1, SIDE 1 1-2 Davis's family background, educational training, and early professional background 2-5 Davis recounts his hiring at RAND, and discusses his first responsibilities, early colleagues, and first project {the bomber defense missile for the B-52) 5-7 Davis discusses what he learned about RAND methods and approaches during his first project 7-8 Davis discusses the advisory role played by RAND in relation to the Air Force, and the effect RAND had on Air Force actions and relations 8-9 Davis describes the degree of involvement RAND's Economics and Cost Analysis Departments had in weapons development and procurement projects 10-11 Science Departments at RAND; Davis's work with the strategic analysts, especially Albert Wohlstetter; the SWEEP project; the bringing together of various professional skills at RAND TAPE 1, SIDE 2 11-12 How RAND engineers felt about the non-technical people, and the division between the two groups; the role of personalities in dominating "communities" within RAND; the Life Magazine article featuring Roger Johnson and the ring-shaped wing; the role played by "experts" at RAND 13-15 The manned bomber project; the technical versus strategic implications approach to the manned bomber project; the contributions of Social Scientists and Strategic Analysts to this and other projects 15-17 Davis summarizes his discussions about his interactions with other elements at RAND, with an example; how the interaction of the various RAND groups formed a RAND culture 17-18 Davis describes his analysis of bombardment satellites project; ADO #38 18-20 The nature of RAND's interactions with the Air Force during the bombardment satellite project; sponsorship of the pr0ject--BMD or SAC, brief discussion of SWEEP and DASH {Development of Advanced Strategic Hardware) 20-21 RAND's role in helping the Air Force evaluate and develop requirements; General Flickinger and the "Worth of Man" symposium 21-22 Davis's views on RAND's concern about its mission, Force; the question, "What is RAND?" TAPE 2, SIDE 1 23-25 The exodus of engineers from RAND to Lockheed in order to get more "hands on" experience; Davis's views of this phenomenon 25-26 Davis's views on the surpassing of RAND in technical expertise by the aerospace contractors in the mid -fifties; the formation of the MITRE Corporation and this context 26-28 Davis's assessment of his most significant work at RAND-- The Dynasor project Interviewee: Dr. Robert A. Davis Interviewer: Mr. Martin Collins Date: January 17, 1991 Place: Dr. Davis home Woodland Hills, California TAPE 1, SIDE 1 Mr. Collins: Just to get started, could you quickly sketch for me your family background and your early professional background, including where and when you were born and your educational training? Dr. Davis: It's Rohert Arthur Davis, middle initial A, of course. I was born in Weehawken, New Jersey on June 15, 1926. I attended the Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades until 1942. I entered NYU (New York University) College of Engineering in 1943, and I accumulated bachelors, masters and doctors degrees in engineering science over the years. My doctoral thesis was on the downwash lag phenomenon connected with the Sparrow missile, which was a "cruciform" configuration and, I understand, was just successfully used i~ the Persian Gulf. So that makes me feel good. Collins: Let me quickly ask where was your graduate training? Was it also done at NYU? Davis: Yes. My graduate and undergraduate training was at NYU. When I graduated with my bachelors degree, World War II was just over, and there wer~ only two of us offered any jobs at the time. Both Grumman and NYU offered me a job. I accepted NYU's job. I was just as glad because it turned out that the Grumman job didn't last very lo;1g for the fellow who took it. There were only two of us in the class, as I say, who received offers I became a graduate assistant at NYU and went on from there to become an instructor in the College of Engineering, Department of Aeronautics. I began my masters studies at that time. My masters thesis was on supersonic duct analysis, flow through supersonic ducts and some theoretical methods that were being developed at the time. It was kind of fun, so that's what I did. But meanwhile, I got interested in going out in industry, and I sent out job applications. By 1950 had improved tremendously. I got a lot of acceptances and decided to accept DAVIS-2 the offer from Sperry Gyroscope. It happened to be at home, and I was there for only a few months when they decided to ship me out to California to work at Point Mugu on the Sparrow project. Douglas was a subcontractor to Sperry at the time. We had had a problem with this "cruciform" missile taking off and suddenly spinning up, and the boat tail would unscrew. It was very embarrassing. The whole thing would come apart. There were a couple of experts in the field arguing over the thing, and I took a look at the problem because we had to solve it. They only had to discuss it, but we had to solve it. I figured out what was wrong with the analysis and why the boat tail was coming off. It suddenly occurred to me that that demonstrated my understanding of the field, so I got that accepted as a doctoral thesis. I finished my postgraduate studies for the doctoral degree at NYU and had a year of residency to fulfill, so Sperry very kindly shipped me back to New York to complete my thesis. I turned it in and defended it successfully, and it was published in the Journal of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences. The IAS was the predecessor to the AIAA {American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics} at the time. It later became the AIAA in other words. While I was back east, the RAND Corporation did a very rare thing. They ran an ad in the New York Times for help. It looked like I could fulfill the responsibilities, so I responded to it. They called me up within a few days and said, "Please come on out for an interview." They paid my way out. I went out, and I was interviewed by Ed Williams and hired on the spot. I went back on the very same equipment that I had flown out on and told my wife, (I was married to my first wife at the time) that we were headed back to California, which was just as well. So I came back to RAND and started working for them on July 8, 1955. I worked for RAND through April 13, 1962, which was a Friday, and started at Aerospace on April 16, 1962, continuing essentially my work for RAND, a point I'll touch on later. Collins: Let me pi~k up a couple of points from your introductory remarks. Did the aeronautical faculty at NYU have reasonably close ties with what you might call the aerospace industry in that pa~t of the country? Davis: Not that I was aware of. There might have been some casual contacts occasionally with people, but by and large it was pretty much an ingrown sort of thing.
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