Kyle Haddad-Fonda on Challenged Hegemony: the United
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Steve A. Yetiv, Katerina Oskarsson. Challenged Hegemony: The United States, China, and Russia in the Persian Gulf. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018. 256 pp. $90.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-5036-0287-8. Reviewed by Kyle Haddad-Fonda Published on H-Diplo (July, 2018) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) In Challenged Hegemony: The United States, of trying to keep track of twenty-four separate re‐ China, and Russia in the Persian Gulf, Katerina lationships—that is, three foreign powers times Oskarsson and the late Steve A. Yetiv have taken eight countries in the region. Accordingly, many on the monumental task of making sense of the chapters of Challenged Hegemony are divided relationships of three world powers with the into smaller sections, usually only a few pages countries of the Persian Gulf. In a moment of ap‐ long and sometimes as short as a single para‐ parent upheaval in that region, this topic makes graph, dealing with the various themes as they for timely reading. Listed in Stanford University apply to particular pairings of countries. In gener‐ Press’s catalog on security studies, this book is al, these sections are the most useful parts of this chiefly concerned with the idea of oil security. The book. A reader who takes an interest in, for exam‐ fundamental question underlying their book is ple, China’s investment in Iraq’s oil sector since which world power will be in the strongest posi‐ 2003 or Russian bilateral energy deals with Gulf tion to guarantee the smooth functioning of global countries will fnd impressive and exhaustive oil markets in the near future. summaries laid out under convenient topic head‐ Yetiv and Oskarsson define the Persian Gulf ings. Most sections contain a formidable barrage region as the entirety of the eight countries that of statistics, which makes for challenging prose. border that body of water. It is refreshing to see Nonetheless, it is apparent that Challenged Hege‐ Iran and Iraq recognized as crucial parts of the mony could serve as a helpful reference book for Persian Gulf region alongside the Arab monar‐ somebody looking for straightforward catalogs of chies of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Unfortu‐ economic arrangements between most of the nately, it must be pointed out here that, in a par‐ twenty-four country pairings. ticularly egregious example of the copyediting er‐ One difficulty with Yetiv and Oskarsson’s deci‐ rors that dog their book, the authors erroneously sion to focus on so many international relation‐ list the eight countries on which they focus as ships is that they are continually forced to inter‐ “Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Kuwait, rupt the fow of the book by jumping in with two- Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates” (p. 14). to-three-page sections of historical background. Since Yetiv and Oskarsson take a state-centric To do justice to these numerous historical sec‐ approach to international relations, that means tions, any author would have to have a strong they have set for themselves the unenviable task command of the secondary literature on a great H-Net Reviews many vital international relationships in the In their chapters about China, Yetiv and Os‐ twentieth century. For the most part, Yetiv and Os‐ karsson have missed the opportunity to build on karsson do an admirable job of condensing the the renaissance in scholarship about China’s rela‐ historical context into short sections. In some cas‐ tions with the Middle East that has taken place in es, however, the need to be brief has led them to the past several decades. A new generation of oversimplify. For example, their assertion that younger researchers has taken advantage of the Moscow was “Iraq’s Cold war patron” glosses over increased availability of sources in both China the complexities of a rocky relationship (p. 117); and the Middle East to transform the scholarly elsewhere in the book, they clarify that they are understanding of relations between these parts of referring mainly to a few years in the early 1970s the world. With respect to China and the Persian when Moscow and Baghdad were briefly on close Gulf region in particular, it is worthwhile to high‐ terms (p. 105). light here the work of anthropologist Jackie Armi‐ One particular oversimplification in a histori‐ jo on religious and educational ties between Chi‐ cal background section deserves special mention na and the Arab world, political scientist Makio because it reflects one of the larger problems with Yamada on the economic relations between East this book. Yetiv and Oskarsson dismiss entirely Asian countries and Saudi Arabia, political ana‐ the history of China’s relations with the Persian lyst and historian Mohammed Al-Sudairi on the Gulf countries prior to 1978, with the exception of religious and ideological dimensions of China’s a vague note that China pursued a project “to gen‐ outreach to Saudi Arabia, and historian Shuang erate anticolonial sentiment in the region” (p. 72). Wen on economic and cultural encounters in the In fact, China had many connections to the region early twentieth century.[1] Each of these scholars between 1949 and 1978, all of which continued to has conducted research in both Chinese and Ara‐ have important ramifications for Chinese ambi‐ bic. And while none of these scholars has explicit‐ tions in the Gulf in the period under study in this ly framed his or her work as a contribution to the book. Some of the specific linkages that Yetiv and field of “security studies,” each of them offers in‐ Oskarsson neglect to mention include Beijing’s en‐ sight into the thorniest dilemmas of international thusiasm for ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim following the politics and global security. Iraqi revolution of July 1958, to the point of overt‐ These individuals exemplify the current stan‐ ly supporting Qasim in his feud with Gamal Abdel dard scholarship in 2018 for academic work in all Nasser following the 1959 Mosul uprising; the disciplines about China and the Middle East. The deal negotiated with Saudi Prince Faisal in 1955 to best work poses difficult questions, pays attention permit Chinese pilgrims to make the hajj to Mec‐ to a wide variety of non-state actors (including ca; the residence in Saudi Arabia of a significant those from marginalized communities), engages population of overseas Chinese, including the with the diverse and growing recent literature high-ranking Nationalist general Ma Bufang; and about China and the Middle East, and is based on Beijing’s popularity among and material support substantial research in both Chinese and Arabic. for Marxist insurgents in Oman in the 1960s and Yetiv and Oskarsson’s Challenged Hegemony fails 1970s. Any of these topics could have provided a to meet this standard. While the chapters on Rus‐ starting point for the authors to delve into the sia contain a sprinkling of citations to sources in complicated question of how the perceptions of Russian, the book cites only one source in Chinese Chinese communist ideology in the region have (a government report; see chapter 5, endnote 14) changed over time. and none in Arabic or Farsi. The overwhelming majority of Yetiv and Oskarsson’s primary sources are news reports in English and published gov‐ 2 H-Net Reviews ernment statistics. They have not tapped into the and the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian Presi‐ kinds of source bases that might have made an dent Mahmoud Abbas responded to that decision original contribution to our understanding of in‐ by immediately dispatching envoys to Beijing and ternational relations: no close analysis of the Moscow, publicly declaring that he hoped one of rhetoric of the relevant governments, no inter‐ those countries could step in as the main guaran‐ views with policymakers in Russia or China, no at‐ tor of the two-state solution.[2] Even if China and tempt to trace how intellectuals in one country Russia had previously intended to tread cautious‐ learn about issues in another, and no feldwork ly in the Middle East, the potential for American among expatriate communities. disengagement from the international community Overall, Yetiv and Oskarsson are skeptical raises the possibility that they might become em‐ about the abilities of China and Russia to rival the boldened sooner than expected. United States for hegemony in the Persian Gulf re‐ I mention this possibility because, as I sit gion. They note that, despite the obvious increase down to write this review, it is less than one week in China’s military and economic influence, Bei‐ after Trump’s announcement that the United jing remains reluctant to challenge American pre‐ States will withdraw from the 2015 international eminence overtly, in part because the Chinese agreement over Iran’s nuclear program. Yetiv and economy relies on the global oil markets that the Oskarsson, to their credit, hedged their bets about United States keeps secure. Similarly, they assert the future of the Iran nuclear deal. They judged that Russia is so interdependent with other oil that it was “not likely to become a tectonic shift in producing countries that it has clear incentives to the region” (p. 27). They also held out the possibil‐ cooperate with the United States to keep fows of ity that the deal might falter in the event of “a oil stable and consistent. Consequently, Yetiv and change in administration in Washington or Iran” Oskarsson conclude that the United States will re‐ (p. 151). This caveat seems jarring to read today, tain its preeminent position in the Persian Gulf re‐ since we already know which of those two capi‐ gion despite apparent challenges from other na‐ tals has experienced regime change since this tions.